Privatisation or loose coupling?
Governance with empty pockets
in the education sector, DRC
Tom De Herdt & Kristof Titeca
International Seminar
Education and International Development
Amsterdam 29-30 September 2011
Contrasting data
• State budget to education: $150 (“82) => $10 (“08)
- Number of teachers declined with 25%
- Teachers’ salary declined with 50%
• Number of pupils increased (4%/year)
- Literacy higher than average SSA
- Pupil-teacher ratio of 39 ( < 44 SSA)
 What kind of state is this (if not a failed state) ?
1
structure
• A loosely coupled state?
• Loose coupling upgraded in DRC
• Loose coupling, not privatisation
• Conclusions
2
“Inhabited institutions”
 Hallet/ventresca, Burawoy, inspired by Gouldner
 Tension between formal and enacted bureaucracy
 The idea of “practical norms” as reproduced in the
interactions around actual practices.
 Loose coupling: Selective filtering of influence from
one part to the next (horizontally & vertically)
3
 How did the schools react to the
cuts in functioning costs, teachers
and salaries?
• System of “frais de motivation”
- To pay for salary top-ups
- And engage “non-mécanisés”
4
Number of teachers in public schools, their source of finance and monthly remuneration per
province in DRC (2009)
Personnel budget
frais de
motivation
Kinshasa
Bas-Congo
Bandundu
Equateur
Orientale
Nord-Kivu
Sud-Kivu
Maniema
Kasaï-Oriental
Kasaï-Occid
Katanga
RDC
5
000 USD
11.590
4.150
5.021
4.839
8.053
10.069
7.301
2.159
3.583
3.896
16.522
85.261
state
budget
000
USD
11.079
6.851
14.454
8.937
8.792
5.294
8.214
2.821
6.195
3.558
8.839
87.778
Number of Teachers
on public % on
Total
payroll
public
(MEPSP) (SECOPE) payroll
Units
15.806
16.149
47.739
37.218
36.354
24.733
21.059
9.132
24.428
23.780
32.936
290.734
Units
14.013
12.945
29.409
17.405
16.472
10.140
9.147
6.069
11.390
14.434
16.624
158.048
%
88,7%
80,2%
61,6%
46,8%
45,3%
41,0%
43,4%
66,5%
46,6%
60,7%
50,5%
54,4%
Average monthly
remuneration
USD
156
63
38
35
43
59
69
50
37
30
72
56
Poverty Line
Units
0,89 - 0,89
0,62 - 1,20
0,43 - 1,01
0,55 - 1,05
0,53 - 0,99
0,63 - 1,23
0,65 - 0,92
0,61 - 0,78
0,43 - 0,50
0,37 - 0,36
0,98 - 1,74
0,53 - 1,11
 How did schools react to the cuts
in functioning costs, teachers and
salaries?
• System of “frais de motivation”
- To pay for salary top-ups
- And engage “non-mécanisés”
• “face-to-face administration” to ‘follow-up’
registration files and solve salary conflicts
 “coupling” of practices and regulatory framework,
but coupling in a “loose” way
6
Loose Coupling
upgraded in DRC
• “loosely coupled” regulatory framework to legalize
school fees:
- Constitution 2005: primary education is free
- Ministerial Decree 2007: max school cost at 1020 FC
- Ministerial Letter 2008: allowing provinces to define some
other cost categories (referring to Framework Law of 1986)
- Provinces themselves yet define still other categories
- Special arrangement with DfID: no SONAS payments
- Churches refer to Convention of 1977 to ask for extra fees
- Teachers refer to Mbudi agreement 2004 to raise salaries
7
Patterns of loose and tight
coupling in the education
system as a whole
• “loosely coupled” regulatory framework
• “système de ventilation” feeds a complex system of
parallel budgets
- 70 different fees to be paid per child
- All fees have a destination somewhere in the education
system
8
. Redistribution of functioning costs paid by parents for conventionized schools
(Province Equateur 2008-9, in FC)
Level
State Actors
Non-state Actors
District-level administration
4,5 District Coordination
110
Antenna of SECOPE (salary
administration)
4,5
District Antenna of SERNIE (pupil
administration)
4,5
Antenna of PRS (pension administration)
4,5
Antenna of inspection service
4,5
Provincial
Provincial level administration
9,0 Coordination
40,5
Provincial level of SECOPE
7,0
4,5
Province Provincial level of SERNIE
Provincial level of PRS
4,5
Provincial level of inspection service
9,0
Governor
4,5
“Fund for the promotion of national
National
education”
4,5 Coordination
4,5
Nation
Parents' association
4,5
Totals
65,5
159,5
(29%)
(71%)
9
Total
132,5
(59%)
79,0
(35%)
13,5
(6%)
225,0
(100%)
Patterns of loose and tight
coupling in the education
system as a whole
• “loosely coupled” regulatory framework
• “système de ventilation” feeds a complex system of
parallel budgets
- 70 different fees to be paid per child
- All fees have a destination somewhere in the education
system
Recoupling of education budget to users of the
system




10
eases tax collection
solves problems of security
eliminates leakage of money
minimizes problems associated with monetary instability
Loose coupling
or privatisation?
• Privatisation-1: private schools
=> legal reform to make schools public?
 (1) really private schools = 10%, major cities
(2) most public schools = religious networks
• Privatisation-2: privatisation of the state
=> increasing salaries?
 (1) salary top-ups as a (local) collective strategy
(2) also engagement of non-registered teachers
• Privatisation 3: private financing by parents
=> abolish school costs?

11
(1) has added to legal confusion
(2) has not been effective
Conclusion
• The privatisation perspective is too easily
supposing the “private” is replacing the
“public”, in response to the state fading away
- In fact, the “public” has rather been transformed
- “loose coupling” has enabled the schools to keep
functioning without public finance
• Generating means from parents
• Engaging ‘own’ personnel, paying salary complements
• Reproduing the state administration itself
• Warning of confusing two objectives of “state
reconstruction” and “poverty reduction”:
aren’t we trying to rebuild the ship at sea?
12
Thank you
13