6th Review Meeting of the
6th
Review Meeting of the
Convention on Nuclear Safety
Finland
l d
Country Group 3
March 27, 2014
Head of Delegation
Head of Delegation
Petteri Tiippana Director General STUK
Petteri Tiippana, Director General, STUK
Kirsi Alm‐Lytz, Director, STUK Hannu Koponen, Deputy Director General, STUK
Ri S i
Risto Sairanen, Section Head, STUK S i H d STUK
Kristian Maunula, Senior Inspector, STUK Mauri Riihonen, Councellor, Permanent Mission of FI
Pekka Viitanen, Head of Radiation Safety, TVO
SÄTEILYTURVAKESKUS • STRÅLSÄKERHETSCENTRALEN
RADIATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AUTHORITY
Presentation Outline
Presentation Outline
• Overview of national nuclear activities within the scope of CNS • Highlights of recent activities at NPPs
Highlights of recent activities at NPPs
–
–
–
–
Recent events at operating NPPs
Continued construction of new NPP unit
Preparations for new reactor licensing activities
f
l
Fukushima follow‐up and improvements
• Regulatory activities
g
y
– Strategy, organisation, resources
– IRRS mission in Finland 2012
• Regulations
R l i
– Finalisation of the renewal of legislation and regulatory guides
•
•
•
•
Follow‐up from 5th Review Meeting
p
g
Challenges / good practices
Questions raised from peer review of National Report
Conclusions
SÄTEILYTURVAKESKUS • STRÅLSÄKERHETSCENTRALEN
RADIATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AUTHORITY
Nuclear facilities in Finland
F
Fennovoima Ltd
i
Ltd
• New utility, no operating reactors
• Decision in Principle (DiP) for FH1 (Hanhikivi Site), SF storage
(Hanhikivi Site), SF storage Loviisa NPP (Fortum)
Olkiluoto NPP (TVO)
• 2 operating units ‐
2
ti
it ABB BWRs
ABB BWR
• OL3 (EPR) under construction
• DiP approved for OL4
• Interim Spent Fuel Storage
p
g
•L/ILLW repository
• Posiva SF repository site “Onkalo”
• 2 operating units – VVERs
• Interim Spent Fuel Storage
Interim Spent Fuel Storage
• L/ILLW repository
Photo: Fortum
Photo: TVO
FiR research reactor
SÄTEILYTURVAKESKUS • STRÅLSÄKERHETSCENTRALEN
RADIATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AUTHORITY
Three licensing steps of nuclear facilities
R
Renewal
l of operating
f
i license, PSR
li
PSR
Decomissioning
Operating license: Government Decision
• STUK’s safety assessment on the technical and organisational aspects of the as build plant Operating License
Operating License
Construction: Review and approval of the detailed design and oversight of construction to verify that approved principles and requirements are implemented
Construction
Construction License
Bidding & site preparation
Nuclear safety
Energy policy
Construction License: Government Decision
• STUK’s Safety assessment on the acceptability of Technical principles and requirements of the plant
• Issued in February 2005 for Olkiluoto 3
Decision in Principle
Feasibility studies
Feasibility studies
(by utility)
Environmental Impact Assessment
SÄTEILYTURVAKESKUS • STRÅLSÄKERHETSCENTRALEN
RADIATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AUTHORITY
Decision in Principle: Political debate on whether using nuclear energy is for the overall good of society ‐ Government decision and Parliament ratification/rejection ‐ STUK’s preliminary safety assessment
• Issued in February/May 2002 for Olkiluoto 3
• Issued in May/July 2010 for Olkiluoto 4 and Fennovoima 1
Main parties involved in licensing and regulation of nuclear facilities in Finland
f
l
f iliti i Fi l d
All licenses for nuclear facilities are issued by the Government
•
Ministry of Employment and the Economy (MEE) provides administrative support for processing license applications STUK is the nuclear safety regulatory body and has following duties:
•
•
•
•
•
•
preparation of national nuclear safety regulations
safety evaluation (necessary prerequisite for issuing a license)
inspections and oversight needed to verify the safety of the facility and the compliance with safety requirements over the plant lifetime
p
y q
p
review of plant modifications
inspections on nuclear waste management and nuclear material safeguards as well as physical protection of nuclear facilities
as well as physical protection of nuclear facilities
binding orders to the licensees as needed to ensure nuclear safety (based on expert judgment made at STUK).
SÄTEILYTURVAKESKUS • STRÅLSÄKERHETSCENTRALEN
RADIATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AUTHORITY
5
Licensing status of the existing Finnish NPPs
Relicensing of the operation of a NPP involves a comprehensive Relicensing
of the operation of a NPP involves a comprehensive
safety review, latest renewals were done taking into account the IAEA PSR guidelines (SSG‐25, NS‐G‐2.10, 50‐SG‐O12)
Loviisa NPP
Terms of licenses
Olkiluoto NPP
Terms of licenses
LO1
LO 2
OL1
OL2
1977 - 1983
1980 - 1983
1978 - 1983
1982 - 1983
1984 - 1989
1984 - 1988
1984 - 1988
1984 - 1988
1989 - 1998
1989 - 1998
1989 - 1998
1989 - 1998
1999 - 2007
1999 - 2007
1999 - 2018
1999 - 2018
00 - 2027
0
2007
2007
00 - 2030
030
PSR
S in 2008
008
PSR
S in 2008
008
PSR in 2015
and 2023
PSR in 2015
and 2023
SÄTEILYTURVAKESKUS • STRÅLSÄKERHETSCENTRALEN
RADIATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AUTHORITY
6
Large oversight projects at nuclear facilities in Finland
Regulations
Overall revision of YVL Guides
Implementation
I&C Modernisation
Modernisation and Fukushima related Improvements
LO1/2
LO 1/2 PSR
LO 1/2 PSR
Modernisation and Fukushima related Improvements
OL1/2
OL1/2 License reneval
Construction
OL3
Operation
Commissioning
OLA
Construction Licence
OL4/FH1
SF final
SF final repository
FiR
research reactor
Construction License
EIA
2012
2013
2014
Construction, commissioning, OLA
Construction, commissioning, OLA
Licensing
2015
SÄTEILYTURVAKESKUS • STRÅLSÄKERHETSCENTRALEN
RADIATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AUTHORITY
Operation
Decommissioning
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
2022
Number of events at INES Level 1 at the four Finnish plant units LO1/2, OL1/2
/ ,
/
6
5
5
4
4
3
3
3
2
1
1
0
2009
2010
2011
2012
No INES Level 2 events after 1992, never INES Level 3 or higher
SÄTEILYTURVAKESKUS • STRÅLSÄKERHETSCENTRALEN
RADIATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AUTHORITY
2013
INES 1 rated events from 2011 ‐ until today • year 2011
– OL: Defects in the internal parts of the valves of the system required for overpressure protection of and residual heat removal from the primary circuit at Olkiluoto 2 and Olkiluoto 1
• year 2012
–
–
–
–
–
LO: Deficiencies in the testing of radiation monitors at Loviisa 2
LO: Excess fire load in the containment at Loviisa 1
LO: Erroneous settings of protective relays of motors at Loviisa 2
OL: Deficiencies found in the operation of main steam isolation valves at Olkiluoto 1
OL D fi i i f
OL: Deficiencies found in the operation of main steam isolation valves at Olkiluoto 2
d i th
ti
f
i t
i l ti
l
t Olkil t 2
• year 2013
– LO
LO: The automatic start‐up of the Loviisa 1 boron supply system pumps were disabled during Th
i
f h L ii 1 b
l
di bl d d i
the outage and were left on after the outage.
– LO: Wedges of the Loviisa 2 ice condenser system bottom doors were installed during the p
g
g
repair outage and were left on after the outage
– LO: Escalated malfunction risk in the safety classified relays at Loviisa 1 and Loviisa 2
SÄTEILYTURVAKESKUS • STRÅLSÄKERHETSCENTRALEN
RADIATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AUTHORITY
Increased number of incidents at Loviisa NPP in 2012
• 10
10 reported incidents in 2012 (3 INES Level 1, 7 INES Level 0), several t d i id t i 2012 (3 INES L l 1 7 INES L l 0)
l
occurred during plant outage and several incidents included deficiencies in the operations and procedures
• Licensee established an investigation group which reported to the top management (+ STUK) and issued recommendations (6 topical areas):
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
•
Configuration management of plant design data and drawings, updating and Configuration
management of plant design data and drawings, updating and
coherent use of design data
Plant procedures need to be clear and contradictions should be removed. Process oriented management system approach should be used.
Roles and responsibilities should be clarified in different work processes
Modification process should be comprehensive and complete. “Design Authority” approach should be established.
Operating experience feedback process should be improved.
Human Performance Tools should be established and used in normal work processes.
Recommendations are elaborated further by the plant management into detailed actions. STUK is following the implementation of corrective actions. SÄTEILYTURVAKESKUS • STRÅLSÄKERHETSCENTRALEN
RADIATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AUTHORITY
Collective occupational doses at Finnish NPPs Olkiluoto
Loviisa
3,00
2,50
manSv
2,00
1,50
1,00
0 50
0,50
0,00
Regulatory targets (two years’ average): Loviisa 1,24 manSv, Olkiluoto 2,20 manSv
Collective doses in LO and in OL in 2013 were lowest in history
Collective doses in LO and in OL in 2013 were lowest in history SÄTEILYTURVAKESKUS • STRÅLSÄKERHETSCENTRALEN
RADIATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AUTHORITY
OL3 Project
• Main civil construction activities finished at the site.
• Installation and co
commissioning activities ss o g act t es
ongoing.
• Key challenge ‐ design of instrumentation and control
instrumentation and control systems (independence, testing, failure behaviour and analyses).
)
• Schedules under elaboration
– remaining
remaining works inc. works inc.
licensing
– operating license application
– commissioning etc.
commissioning etc
SÄTEILYTURVAKESKUS • STRÅLSÄKERHETSCENTRALEN
RADIATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AUTHORITY
12
New Reactor Projects – The Government granted DiPs to TVO and Fennovoima in 2010. CLs have to be applied by mid 2015.
TVO’s site in Olkiluoto
– STUK has continued project and topical meetings with both applicants – new YVL‐guides, design issues, licensing planning, emergency planning, management systems…
– TVO is continuing negotiations with five potential vendors (
(ABWR, APWR, AP1400, EPR, ESBWR)
)
– Fennovoima has made a plant contract s with Rosatom
– the original DiP didn’t cover AES‐2006, Fennovoima
applied for complementary DiP
applied for complementary DiP
– the Ministry of Employment and the Economy started complementary DiP process:
– Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) p
( )
process for lower power output
– STUK’s new safety assessment, target to be finalised by end of May 2014
– the Ministry asks Pyhäjoki municipality on the acceptability + other statements needed
– will go to the Government and the Parliament during fall 2014
during fall 2014
SÄTEILYTURVAKESKUS • STRÅLSÄKERHETSCENTRALEN
RADIATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AUTHORITY
Fennovoima’s site in Pyhäjoki ‐
Hanhikivi 1, FH1
,
Safety Assessments conducted in Finland as a consequence of the Fukushima Dai‐ichi accident
Activity
National Safety Reviews in 2011
Status
Regulatory review of the results completed in mid 2012, meetings with public to inform and involve
Stress tests in 2011 and peer Completed and actions reviews in 2012
started, follow up according to the ENSREG action plan
to the ENSREG action plan
Extraordinary CNS meeting in National report submitted, August 2012
active participation in the meeting
• No hazards or deficiencies requiring immediate actions at the Finnish NPPs but there are areas for further safety improvements
• Lessons learnt taken also into account in the renewal of Finnish legislation and regulatory guides and in the nuclear safety research programme
and regulatory guides and in the nuclear safety research programme
• http://www.stuk.fi/ydinturvallisuus/fi_FI/fukushima‐selvitykset/
SÄTEILYTURVAKESKUS • STRÅLSÄKERHETSCENTRALEN
RADIATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AUTHORITY
Safety enhancements planned in Finland
• Robustness against external events
– Provisions for extremely high sea water level
– Studies and improvements needed for seismic safety
• Prevention of severe accidents
– Provisions for Loss of AC power and loss of cooling – robust, diversified loss of cooling robust, diversified
and independent systems to cool the reactor and fuel pools
• Emergency Preparedness
Emergency Preparedness
– Capabilities to manage multi‐unit and long lasting emergencies
– Improved communication systems
– Improvement of crisis communication
SÄTEILYTURVAKESKUS • STRÅLSÄKERHETSCENTRALEN
RADIATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AUTHORITY
Examples of provisions for loss of AC power and loss of ultimate heat sink
• LO1/2; Implementation of an alternative ultimate heat sink (2014)
– a new system that ensures decay heat removal in case of loss of seawater
– system consists of two cooling towers dimensioned for decay heat per system consists of two cooling towers dimensioned for decay heat per
unit: one for the reactor, one for spent fuel. Power for the system can be supplied by an independent air cooled DG.
• OL1/2; Conceptual design of independent way of pumping water /
ld
f d
d
f
into the RPV (2015‐2016)
– A diverse method to inject coolant into the reactor in case of loss of all j
AC. The system would inject coolant using the fire fighting system after reactor cooling system depressurization. Decay heat would be removed from the cooling circuit into depression pool and from the containment
from the cooling circuit into depression pool and from the containment via containment filtered venting system. Power supply will be ensured by an independent diesel generator. System design for the plant modification is under way.
modification is under way.
– In a case of a total SBO, the time available prior to fuel damage may not be long enough to take the system into use. The utility is investigating possibilities for a system with a turbine driven pump
possibilities for a system with a turbine driven pump. SÄTEILYTURVAKESKUS • STRÅLSÄKERHETSCENTRALEN
RADIATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AUTHORITY
Fukushima NPP accident; national level activities
• Public protection during emergencies;
Public protection during emergencies;
– Requirements exist, protective and planning zones around the sites
– Public protection activities performed in co‐operation between STUK, Rescue services and other governmental authorities (large co‐operation exercise every third year /site)
– Need to ensure accessibility to the site in case of extreme weather y
conditions, sufficient amount of needed equipment (2014)
– STUK has developed a measurement strategy for different types of radiological emergencies for early/intermediate/recovery phases
radiological emergencies for early/intermediate/recovery phases (prioritisation of sampling and measurements, needed resources, …)
SÄTEILYTURVAKESKUS • STRÅLSÄKERHETSCENTRALEN
RADIATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AUTHORITY
Fukushima NPP accident; international level activities
• New
New Nordic guidelines for nuclear and radiological emergencies have Nordic guidelines for nuclear and radiological emergencies have
been developed based on existing Finnish guidelines in co‐operation with five countries (February 2014)
– Denmark, Iceland, Norway, Finland and Sweden
– guidelines take into account both domestic and foreign emergencies and cover both accidents and intentional acts
cover both accidents and intentional acts
– joint criteria allow consistent protective measures and advice in early and intermediate phases
– http://www.stuk.fi/ajankohtaista/tiedotteet/fi_FI/news_890/_files/91363928
htt //
t k fi/ j k ht i t /ti d tt t/fi FI/
890/ fil /91363928
307537126/default/nordic_flagbook_february2014.pdf
SÄTEILYTURVAKESKUS • STRÅLSÄKERHETSCENTRALEN
RADIATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AUTHORITY
STUK’s Strategy 2013‐2017
• Mission, Values and Vision 2017
• 10 focal areas identified to meet the 10 focal areas identified to meet the
challenges
– Effective use of resources, organisation and management
g
– Expanding oversight activities in general
– Refocus of radiation safety research
– Budget stabilisation
Budget stabilisation
• Specific to nuclear reactor regulation
– Prioritisation of oversight activities, licensee’ss responsibility for safety
licensee
responsibility for safety
– Effective communication – Ensuring adequate resources and oversight activities for ageing NPPs as g
g g
well as for new NPPs
SÄTEILYTURVAKESKUS • STRÅLSÄKERHETSCENTRALEN
RADIATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AUTHORITY
Organisation of STUK and Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Reactor Regulation
Reorganised 1.4.2014
personnel ~115
Number of p
Reorganised
g
1.5.2013
Number of personnel ~350
SÄTEILYTURVAKESKUS • STRÅLSÄKERHETSCENTRALEN
RADIATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AUTHORITY
Number of Personnel at Nuclear Reactor R l ti D
Regulation Department
t
t
140
120
106
115
113
2011
2012
2013
99
100
88
86
2006
2007
83
Numbe
er
115
110
76
80
68
62
60
40
20
0
2002
2003
2004
2005
SÄTEILYTURVAKESKUS • STRÅLSÄKERHETSCENTRALEN
RADIATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AUTHORITY
2008
2009
2010
2013:
Reviews: 77 %
I
Inspections:
ti
23 %
STUK’s oversight (man‐years / NPP)
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
LO1/LO2
SÄTEILYTURVAKESKUS • STRÅLSÄKERHETSCENTRALEN
RADIATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AUTHORITY
2007
LO3
2008
OL1/OL2
2009
OL3
2010
OL4
2011
FV1
2012
2013
Continuous improvement at STUK
Internal assessment
–
–
–
–
–
–
systematic follow‐up of achievements against the agreed annual targets
cross‐audits conducted by staff members according to annual audit programme
self‐assessment carried out in internal workshops
annual upper management reviews
staff surveys every year (on staff engagement, motivation, satisfaction, etc.), and annual Report to the Ministry on work results and developments, including assessment against agreed targets and other performance indicators.
External assessments conducted by international peers, including the following:
– regulatory activities were evaluated by an IAEA’s IRRT mission in year 2000 and a follow‐
up in 2003
– IPPAS mission in Finland in summer 2009, follow‐up 2012
– IRRS mission in Finland in October 2012, follow‐up in June 2015
SÄTEILYTURVAKESKUS • STRÅLSÄKERHETSCENTRALEN
RADIATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AUTHORITY
23
Scope of IRRS mission • Full‐scope mission in 2012 (research reactor FiR 1 was excluded due to the decision to shut down the reactor)
• As regards modules 5‐9, the following facilities/activities
As regards modules 5 9 the following facilities/activities were included
were included
•
•
•
•
•
Nuclear power plants
Radioactive sources
Fuel cycle facilities
Waste management facilities Decommissioning Decommissioning
• Following thematic areas were included
–
–
–
–
Transport
Control of medical exposure
Occupational radiation protection
Control of radioactive discharges and materials for clearance
Control of radioactive discharges and materials for clearance
• Fukushima Session was included
Self‐assessment was carried out
SÄTEILYTURVAKESKUS • STRÅLSÄKERHETSCENTRALEN
RADIATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AUTHORITY
24
• IRRS mission resulted in 8 recommendations (+ 21 suggestions and 10 good practices):
IRRS mission 2012 results
http://www.stuk.fi/stuk/en_GB/irrs-2012/
SÄTEILYTURVAKESKUS • STRÅLSÄKERHETSCENTRALEN
RADIATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AUTHORITY
– Ensuring STUK’s independence (i.e. location within the Government)
– STUK’s legal authorities in the licensing process and in setting binding regulations
– Comprehensive policy and strategy for all radioactive waste in Finland
– Ensuring adequate resources for STUK to provide all technical services
all technical services
– Expansion of legislation to encompass authorizations for decommissioning
– Graded approach for planning and conducting Graded approach for planning and conducting
inspections
– Modification of emergency classification scheme to include “facility emergency”
y
g y
– Rearrangement of environmental monitoring programmes in the vicinity on NPPs
• Most of them were based on STUK’s own self‐
assessment findings
• An Action Plan from the beginning of 2013 taking into account all suggestions & g
gg
recommendations
• Follow‐up in 2015
Example of recommendation in Module 1
p
• Ensuring STUK’s independence (i.e. location within the Government) and STUK’s legal authorities in the licensing process and in setting binding regulations
‐> An amendment to the Nuclear Energy Act which would give STUK the legal authority to specify any licence conditions necessary for nuclear safety, y
p y y
y
y,
STUK having a veto right in CL and OL phases concerning safety issues and STUK having a right to give binding regulations, is under consideration. SÄTEILYTURVAKESKUS • STRÅLSÄKERHETSCENTRALEN
RADIATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AUTHORITY
26
STUK and relevant Ministries
MINISTRY OF SOCIAL
AFFAIRS AND HEALTH
‐ administrative authority
for the use of radiation
MINISTRY OF EMPLOYMENT AND THE ECONOMY ‐ administrative authority for the use of nuclear energy
Budget and supervision
Expert advice
Expert
advice
and service
STUK – RADIATION AND NUCLEAR
SAFETY AUTHORITY
SAFETY AUTHORITY
‐ independent regulatory organisation
MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR
‐ rescue and protection duties in
emergency conditions
‐ security and physical protection
MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS
‐ nuclear safety in neighbour countries
‐ non‐proliferation of nuclear weapons
27
SÄTEILYTURVAKESKUS • STRÅLSÄKERHETSCENTRALEN
RADIATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AUTHORITY
Publication of new YVL Guides 1/2
• New Government Decrees and revision of Nuclear Energy Decree effective October 2013
• New YVL Guides issued December 1, 2013 New YVL Guides issued December 1 2013
– Lessons learned from recent plant and modification projects
– Lessons learned from recent events and Fukushima accident
– IAEA Safety Standards as references (Safety Requirements, S f t G id )
Safety Guides)
– WENRA Safety Reference Levels included (2007/8) as well as WENRA safety objectives for new reactors (2010, report 2013) )
– New structure for the guidance and standard format for single guides, compact presentation of requirements ‐
numbered requirements, descriptive text only as needed
– additional clarifications in a justification memorandum (separately for each guide)
– consistent terminology, glossary
SÄTEILYTURVAKESKUS • STRÅLSÄKERHETSCENTRALEN
RADIATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AUTHORITY
P bli i
Publication of new YVL Guides 2/2
f
YVL G id 2/2
• YVL Guides are to be applied as such to new NPPs – application to operating plants and plants under construction is considered case by case
y
– After issuing a new or revised YVL Guide STUK asks the licensees to assess whether the facility and the licensee operations are in compliance with its requirements
– in case of non‐compliances the licensee is expected to propose plans and schedules for achieving compliance
– exemptions from new requirements can be accepted if it is not technically or economically reasonable to implement respective modifications and if safety justification is considered adequate.
yj
q
SÄTEILYTURVAKESKUS • STRÅLSÄKERHETSCENTRALEN
RADIATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AUTHORITY
Structure of the new YVL guides http://www.stuk.fi/julkaisut_maaraykset/viranomaisohjeet/en_GB/yvl/
htt
//
t k fi/j lk i t
k t/ i
i hj t/
GB/ l/
(currently only in Finnish, will be translated also in English)
SÄTEILYTURVAKESKUS • STRÅLSÄKERHETSCENTRALEN
RADIATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AUTHORITY
Examples of changes in YVL Guides; Plant and system design
• Management of design process, configuration management
• DiD levels and their strength and independence (levels 1‐5)
– Level 3 is divided into sub‐levels 3a and 3b
– Level 3b is divided into DEC A (CCFs), DEC B (probable failure combinations) and DEC C (rare external threats)
• Events that may lead to early or large radioactive release must be y
y
g
practically eliminated (similar to WENRA safety objective for new reactors)
• Residual heat removal in DEC C‐situations (Fukushima‐requirement)
R id l h t
l i DEC C it ti
(F k hi
i
t)
– autonomy criterion
• fixed systems, no material supplements (water, fuel, recharging batteries) for at least 8 h
• there has to be resources at the site for at least 72 h
• Requirements
Requirements concerning provisions for severe accidents already existed in concerning provisions for severe accidents already existed in
the regulations, therefore no major changes concerning requirements for containment were introduced
• Requirements concerning spent fuel storages updated to take into account R
i
t
i
tf l t
d t dt t k i t
t
lessons from the TEPCO Fukushima Dai‐ichi accident
SÄTEILYTURVAKESKUS • STRÅLSÄKERHETSCENTRALEN
RADIATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AUTHORITY
New requirements in Government Decree on on‐site EP
• In the design of on‐site emergency preparedness a simultaneous accident of all nuclear facilities on the same site and its possible
accident of all nuclear facilities on the same site and its possible consequences has to be considered
• A long duration of an emergency situation shall be considered in planning of emergency preparedness
l
f
• Emergency centre shall be provided where adequate working conditions can be maintained in all emergency situations and which
conditions can be maintained in all emergency situations and which is available also in the case of long term loss of electricity supply
• Other changes concerning protection arrangements of workers, radiation measuring devices and communication systems (based on Fukushima accident) SÄTEILYTURVAKESKUS • STRÅLSÄKERHETSCENTRALEN
RADIATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AUTHORITY
Changes in Finnish Nuclear Liability Act
• Nuclear liability act amended on national basis (into force 1.1.2012)
– the Paris/Brussels convention changes not foreseen to be ratified in near future
– licensee’s liability amount covered by insurance 700 M€
li
’ li bilit
t
db i
700 M€
– in case of exceeding this limit, licensee’s unlimited liability
SÄTEILYTURVAKESKUS • STRÅLSÄKERHETSCENTRALEN
RADIATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AUTHORITY
Finnish Safety Research Programme ‐
y
g
SAFIR2014
•
•
•
•
•
Finnish national safety research programmes since 1990
i
1990
Goal to ensure availability of knowledge and adequate
knowledge and adequate expertise in Finland
All Finnish stakeholders are participating in the programme
Programme has received also international interest and
international interest and financing
Information on Research
Information on Research activities is published annually
SÄTEILYTURVAKESKUS • STRÅLSÄKERHETSCENTRALEN
RADIATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AUTHORITY
Finnish Safety Research Programme ‐
y
g
SAFIR2014
•
Research areas in the programme
1.
2.
3.
4.
5
5.
6.
7.
8
8.
9.
•
Man, Organization and Society
Automation and Control Room
Fuel Research and Reactor l
h d
Analysis
Thermo Hydraulics
S
Severe Accidents
A id t
Structural Safety of Reactor Circuit
Construction Safety
P b bili i Ri k A
Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA)
Infrastructure
Research areas were re‐
R
h
evaluated after the Fukushima Dai‐ichi accident SÄTEILYTURVAKESKUS • STRÅLSÄKERHETSCENTRALEN
RADIATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AUTHORITY
Updates to National Report to 6th Review Meeting
• Changes since issuance of the 6th report are
– STUK finalised the revision of regulatory guides (YVL Guides) in f l d h
f
l
d (
d )
November 2013
– Fennovoima made plant contract with Rosatom (AES‐2006) ‐> application for complementary Decision in Principle (DiP), STUK is preparing an updated preliminary safety assessment, participation
preparing an updated preliminary safety assessment, participation to the updated Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) SÄTEILYTURVAKESKUS • STRÅLSÄKERHETSCENTRALEN
RADIATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AUTHORITY
Follow‐up from 5th Review Meeting – issues addressed to Finland
• Revising the existing regulatory guide system
– was finalised in 2013 (see Article 7 and previous slides)
(
p
)
• Response to the Fukushima accident; improvements on national and plant level
– National Action Plan exists and is under implementation (see Articles 5, 7, 14, 17, 17, 18, and 19 and previous slides)
• Ageing management of reactors in operation
– ageing management programmes exists (see Article 14)
– addressed especially in license renewals and PSRs
dd
d
ll
l
l
d
– Upgrades being done at both operating plants, renewal of I&C systems at Loviisa NPP progressing (see Article 18) y
p g
g(
)
SÄTEILYTURVAKESKUS • STRÅLSÄKERHETSCENTRALEN
RADIATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AUTHORITY
Follow‐up from 5th Review Meeting – issues addressed to Finland (Cont)
(
)
• Challenges in new NPP construction project (OL3)
– Olkiluoto unit 3 project progressing (see Annex 4 and previous slides)
– competence, training and oversight of subcontractors, compliance with QA programme, adequacy of oversight resources at site (vendor, licensee), and safety culture of organisations and personnel have been subjects in construction inspection programme (see Articles 10, 11, and 13)
• Preparations for the new build
– Discussions
Discussions continued with licence applicants concerning different technical continued with licence applicants concerning different technical
topics and YVL Guide requirements (see Annex 5 and previous slides)
– STUK is preparing an updated preliminary safety assessment of Fennovoima’s Decision in Principle
Decision in Principle
• Maintaining competence and responding to the growing needs for professional staff
– addressed, however a constant issue on nuclear Sector (see Articles 8 and 11 and also Q&A)
SÄTEILYTURVAKESKUS • STRÅLSÄKERHETSCENTRALEN
RADIATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AUTHORITY
Follow‐up from 5th Review Meeting – issues addressed to Finland (Cont)
(
)
• Ensuring reliability of digital I&C, verification & validation
– concerns taken into account in I&C renewal projects and in OL3 project (see A ti l 18)
Article 18)
• Responding to increased demand for timely and effectively communication to public
– especially important in new plant projects (see Articles 8, 16 and 17)
• Integration of safety and security arrangements
– the
the need for strengthened security has been addressed in the amended need for strengthened security has been addressed in the amended
legislation and regulatory guidance, IPPAS mission in Finland in 2009 + follow‐up 2012 (see Articles 7 and 8)
– This is a generic worldwide issue, not specific only to Finland
Thi i
i
ld id i
t
ifi
l t Fi l d
• IRRS mission in 2012
– Results will be used to further improve regulatory practices, follow‐up in June 2015 (see Articles 7, 8, 10, 13, 15, 16 and previous slides)
For details please see the Finnish national report as referenced above
For details, please see the Finnish national report as referenced above.
SÄTEILYTURVAKESKUS • STRÅLSÄKERHETSCENTRALEN
RADIATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AUTHORITY
Finnish good practices (1)
Finnish good practices (1)
• Modern nuclear safety legislation and regulations – covers all safety related issues, is regularly updated to follow development of science and technology and responds to operational experience. – recent revision of YVL Guides took into account lessons learnt from oversight projects, recent events and Fukushima accident, IAEA Requirements and WENRA Safety Reference levels and Safety Objectives
WENRA Safety Reference levels and Safety Objectives for New Reactors.
‐>> The new Finnish nuclear safety regulations ensure The new Finnish nuclear safety regulations ensure
a high level of safety, are advanced and up‐to‐date and demanding in international comparison
SÄTEILYTURVAKESKUS • STRÅLSÄKERHETSCENTRALEN
RADIATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AUTHORITY
Finnish good practices (2)
• Practice for continuous improvement
– Updated regulatory guides are applied as such to new reactors, a separate decision will be made concerning the implementation at the operating NPPs or NPPs under construction (all reasonably practicable
under construction (all reasonably practicable measures shall be made)
– Important
Important safety issues can be discussed also during safety issues can be discussed also during
PSRs and in large plant modifications
– New
New urgent safety information might also lead to urgent safety information might also lead to
direct improvement measures (e.g. Fukushima issues)
– Several plant modifications done based on PRA results
Several plant modifications done based on PRA results
SÄTEILYTURVAKESKUS • STRÅLSÄKERHETSCENTRALEN
RADIATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AUTHORITY
Finnish good practices (3)
• Severe accident management systems
– Existing requirements on Severe Accident Management systems (shall be safety classified, independent, and single failure tolerant)
– Implemented in 1980’s and 1990’s at the operating Loviisa and Olkiluoto NPPs
SÄTEILYTURVAKESKUS • STRÅLSÄKERHETSCENTRALEN
RADIATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AUTHORITY
Finnish good practices (4)
• Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA)
b bili i i k A l i ( A)
– Existing requirements for full‐scope (including internal events, fi
fires, floods, seismic events, harsh weather and other external fl d
i i
t h h
th
d th
t
l
events) PRA at Levels 1 and 2 for power operation and low‐
power and shut‐down
power and shut
down states states
– Preliminary PRA required in CL phase, final PRA required in OL p ase, du g ope at o
phase, during operation PRA has to be updated reflecting the as to be updated e ect g t e
actual plant configuration
– Several risk‐informed PRA applications required and in use (plant pp
q
p
modifications, in‐service inspection program, in‐service testing, Tech Specs, preventive maintenance during power operation, event analysis risk follow‐up, safety classification, staff training, l i i k f ll
f
l ifi i
ff i i
development of EOPs and other procedures)
– Several risk informed plant modifications have been Several risk informed plant modifications have been
implemented in both Loviisa and Olkiluoto NPPs
SÄTEILYTURVAKESKUS • STRÅLSÄKERHETSCENTRALEN
RADIATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AUTHORITY
Okiluoto 1 and 2 core damage frequency
4,0E‐5
3,5E‐5
3,0E‐5
2,5E‐5
Internal
2,0E‐5
Flood
Fire
1,5E‐5
ShutDown
Weather
Seismic
1 0E 5
1,0E‐5
5,0E‐6
0,0E0
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Internal
6,9E‐06 5,3E‐06 6,6E‐06 1,1E‐05 1,2E‐05 1,0E‐05 9,7E‐06 9,7E‐06 8,9E‐06 8,4E‐06 8,4E‐06 8,2E‐06 1,1E‐05 8,1E‐06 7,3E‐06 7,3E‐06
Flood
1,4E‐06 1,2E‐06 1,2E‐06 1,5E‐06 2,1E‐06 2,1E‐06 1,6E‐07 1,6E‐07 1,6E‐07 1,6E‐07 1,3E‐07 5,9E‐08 1,3E‐07 1,1E‐07 1,2E‐07 1,1E‐07
Fire
3,5E‐07 2,6E‐07 2,8E‐07 3,8E‐07 5,1E‐07 5,0E‐07 4,6E‐07 4,6E‐07 4,7E‐07 4,7E‐07 3,8E‐07 3,9E‐07 6,1E‐07 5,4E‐07 2,4E‐06 2,6E‐06
ShutDown 3,6E‐07 2,6E‐07 3,1E‐07 3,8E‐07 4,4E‐07 4,1E‐07 4,1E‐07 4,1E‐07 4,4E‐07 1,6E‐07 1,7E‐07 1,4E‐07 6,2E‐07 5,4E‐07 5,6E‐07 5,6E‐07
Weather
1,9E‐06 9,1E‐07 9,0E‐07 9,5E‐07 9,5E‐07 9,3E‐07 9,4E‐07 9,4E‐07 1,2E‐06 1,2E‐06 1,2E‐06 1,2E‐06 1,2E‐06 1,2E‐06 2,7E‐06 2,7E‐06
SÄTEILYTURVAKESKUS • STRÅLSÄKERHETSCENTRALEN
Seismic
2,5E‐05 5,1E‐06 5,0E‐06 4,9E‐06 5,2E‐06 4,9E‐06 4,9E‐06 4,9E‐06 5,0E‐06 5,1E‐06 5,0E‐06 1,7E‐07 1,7E‐07 1,1E‐07 1,7E‐07 1,7E‐07
RADIATION
AND NUCLEAR
SAFETY AUTHORITY
Loviisa core damage frequency
4,0E‐4
3,5E‐4
3 0E 4
3,0E‐4
2,5E‐4
Intern PO
2,0E‐4
Intern SD
Flood PO
1,5E‐4
,
Flood SD
Flood SD
Seismic
Fire PO
1,0E‐4
Fire SD
W th PO
Weather PO
5,0E‐5
0,0E0
Weather SD
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Intern PO
1,1E‐04 1,1E‐04 1,1E‐04 1,0E‐04 9,5E‐05 3,6E‐05 3,4E‐05 1,3E‐05 1,3E‐05 9,8E‐06 9,1E‐06 6,4E‐06 5,9E‐06 5,9E‐06 3,5E‐06 3,0E‐06
Intern SD
8,1E‐05 8,1E‐05 4,0E‐05 4,0E‐05 4,0E‐05 5,8E‐05 5,8E‐05 3,9E‐05 3,9E‐05 3,6E‐05 3,6E‐05 2,4E‐05 2,3E‐05 2,3E‐05 2,0E‐05 1,1E‐05
Flood PO
9,0E‐06 9,0E‐06 9,0E‐06 9,0E‐06 6,9E‐06 6,4E‐06 6,2E‐06 4,7E‐06 4,7E‐06 4,3E‐06 4,2E‐06 4,1E‐06 3,0E‐06 3,0E‐06 2,8E‐06 7,5E‐07
Flood SD
0,0E+00 0,0E+00 0,0E+00 0,0E+00 0,0E+00 3,6E‐07 3,5E‐07 7,0E‐07 7,0E‐07 8,0E‐07 4,8E‐07 4,7E‐07 6,4E‐07 6,4E‐07 1,7E‐07 4,0E‐08
Seismic
3,6E‐06 3,6E‐06 3,6E‐06 3,6E‐06 3,6E‐06 3,6E‐06 3,6E‐06 3,6E‐06 3,6E‐06 3,6E‐06 3,6E‐06 3,6E‐06 3,6E‐06 3,6E‐06 1,3E‐07 1,3E‐07
Fire PO
4,1E‐05 3,6E‐05 3,6E‐05 3,6E‐05 3,5E‐05 3,4E‐05 3,4E‐05 2,8E‐05 2,8E‐05 1,6E‐05 9,6E‐06 8,4E‐06 7,4E‐06 7,4E‐06 7,7E‐06 7,5E‐06
Fire SD
0,0E+00 0,0E+00 0,0E+00 0,0E+00 0,0E+00 0,0E+00 0,0E+00 0,0E+00 0,0E+00 0,0E+00 0,0E+00 0,0E+00 0,0E+00 0,0E+00 9,9E‐07 8,6E‐07
Weather PO 1,3E‐04 4,3E‐05 2,0E‐05 1,9E‐05 1,7E‐05 1,7E‐05 1,6E‐05 1,3E‐05 1,3E‐05 1,8E‐05 7,3E‐06 7,8E‐06 3,6E‐06 3,6E‐06 3,1E‐06 3,0E‐06
SÄTEILYTURVAKESKUS • STRÅLSÄKERHETSCENTRALEN
Weather SD 0,0E+00 0,0E+00 0,0E+00 0,0E+00 0,0E+00 0,0E+00 3,6E‐05 1,1E‐05 1,1E‐05 1,1E‐05 4,7E‐06 4,9E‐06 4,8E‐06 4,8E‐06 4,7E‐06 4,3E‐06
RADIATION
AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AUTHORITY
Nordic and Finnish good practices (5)
• New Nordic guidelines for nuclear and radiological emergencies published in 2014 based on existing Finnish g
p
g
guidelines
‐> joint criteria allow consistent protective measures and advice in early and intermediate phases in Nordic
advice in early and intermediate phases in Nordic countries
• STUK has developed a measurement strategy for different types of radiological emergencies for early/intermediate/recovery phases (prioritisation of sampling and measurements resources needed )
sampling and measurements, resources needed, …)
SÄTEILYTURVAKESKUS • STRÅLSÄKERHETSCENTRALEN
RADIATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AUTHORITY
Current and future challenges • Many ongoing activities in different life‐cycle phases of nuclear facilities
– Provision for plant ageing; the licensee ageing management programmes carefully reviewed, I&C and other systems modernisation f ll
i
d I&C d h
d i i
carried out at the existing NPPs (incl. Fukushima related modifications)
– Regulatory
Regulatory oversight of the construction and commissioning of OL3 unit; oversight of the construction and commissioning of OL3 unit;
design of I&C systems, installation of equipment, review of the OL application, commissioning tests, start of operation
– Preparations for the new build (OL4 and FH1); updated EIA, preliminary (
)
safety assessment for updated DiP, review of the possible CL applications
• Implementation of revised regulatory requirements at the operating NPPs
– licensees will send their requirement‐by‐requirement fulfilment assessment in end of 2014 and possible action plan to improve safety at the facility/ in d f 2014 d
ibl
ti
l t i
f t t th f ilit / i
operations
–
implementation decisions will be made in 2015
SÄTEILYTURVAKESKUS • STRÅLSÄKERHETSCENTRALEN
RADIATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AUTHORITY
Current and future challenges • Maintaining and improving competence / ensuring resources
M i t i i
di
i
t
/
i
– Retirement of large age groups in Finland, the plans for new NPP construction projects ‐> growing needs for professional staff at the RB, licensees and TSOs
– broad cooperation (industry, universities, authorities, licensees) for national training courses
– national funding for competence building safety research ensured through nuclear legislation, SAFIR research programme
– During 2010‐2012 the Ministry of Employment and the Economy set up a g
y
p y
y
p
committee giving recommendations to be taken until 2020’s for ensuring competence and resources needed for the nuclear sector
– In addition, MEE set up in January 2013 a working group to prepare a In addition, M set up in January 0 3 a working group to prepare a
research and development strategy
• Communication and information sharing on nuclear and radiation safety
– regulatory
regulatory processes and decisions have to be clear and understandable to processes and decisions have to be clear and understandable to
general public
– more timely information on STUK’s website (STUK’s decisions, event d
descriptions etc.)
i ti
t )
– interactions with media is important.
SÄTEILYTURVAKESKUS • STRÅLSÄKERHETSCENTRALEN
RADIATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AUTHORITY
Questions raised from Peer Review of 6th Finnish Report
The answers are available also at STUK’s website (www.stuk.fi)
• number of questions decreased for 6th review meeting: 1999 (63 f
from 9 countries), 2002 (78 from 14 countries ), 2005 (100 from 20 )
( f
)
(
f
countries), 2008 (132 from 25 countries), 2010 (162 from 21 )
(
)
countries), 2013 (109 from 18 countries)
• distribution according to articles – mostly generic questions + Articles 6, 7 and 14
• more frequently asked: status of measures after Fukushima accident, status of IRRS action plan, reason for increased number of events in Loviisa NPP (see updates and more detailed information in (
p
the previous slides)
• also topics of ageing management, licence renewals and resources of STUK (see next slides) f STUK (
t lid )
SÄTEILYTURVAKESKUS • STRÅLSÄKERHETSCENTRALEN
RADIATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AUTHORITY
Questions raised ‐ some selected answers
Q
In 2007 the Finnish government approved the lifetime extension for two units of Loviisa NPP, and during 2010 till 2012, lifetime extension of RPVs were given. What is the logistic g
,
g
g
relationship between the two approvals? • Loviisa 1 and 2 RPVs have separate operation permits (given by STUK) in addition to the operating license of the NPP itself (granted by Government). This arose originally from the need to control radiation embrittlement rate of the reactors that was found to be unexpectly fast during first years of operation. • The permits for RPV operation have been very useful to control the safety of the RPVs and to get confidence against brittle fracture risk Last RPV operation permits (Loviisa 2 in 2010
to get confidence against brittle fracture risk. Last RPV operation permits (Loviisa 2 in 2010 and Loviisa 1 in 2012) could be given until the end of the 50 year lifetime of the whole plants (until 2027 for Loviisa 1 and 2030 for Loviisa 2) because the comprehensive analysis of the licensee showed that the brittle fracture risk can be managed until the end of licensed plant operation. In the next PSRs (2015 and 2023) the safety of the reactors is, however, assessed again including re‐assessment of deterministic and probabilistic analysis results.
SÄTEILYTURVAKESKUS • STRÅLSÄKERHETSCENTRALEN
RADIATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AUTHORITY
Questions raised ‐ some selected answers
Q
Finnish report says that Loviisa NPP SGs are practically impossible to be replaced by new ones. How will the aging management of the SGs of Loviisa 1&2 be performed?
g g
g
p
• The situation is similar at all VVER 440 plants due to design and layout issues that do not allow replacing to be done with reasonable economical investments.
• The Steam Generators (6 per unit) belong to the highest inspection and monitoring scope (class A) among the SSC’s of Loviisa 1&2 plant units. This means that the licensee performs regular in‐service inspection programme that follows the principle of ASME Code, Section XI. Consequently, all the SG’s become fully inspected during 10 year inspection period applying qualified NDT methods and personnel
qualified NDT‐methods and personnel. • Licensee inspects also the SG tubes correspondingly by a qualified eddy current (ET) method. Tubes showing indication are plugged according to normal practice. The licensee follows the p gg g q
plugging frequency which has remained relatively low compared to some other VVER 440 y
y
p
plants. This is due to well controlled water chemistry at Loviisa 1&2 as well as to regular secondary side blow down to remove concentrated impurities.
• Major repair and modification works to ensure long term operation of SGs have been made including replacements of feed water headers and primary collector heads.
• Experiences from other VVER‐plants are also followed to be aware about potential failure phenomena and their trends.
SÄTEILYTURVAKESKUS • STRÅLSÄKERHETSCENTRALEN
RADIATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AUTHORITY
Questions raised ‐ some selected answers
Q
Olkiluoto 1 and 2 operating licenses expire in 2018. License renewal was not sought during the PSR in 2007‐2009, but Olkiluoto appears to be making significant upgrades to plant ,
pp
g g
pg
p
equipment. Please clarify if there are plans for Olkiluoto to seek license renewal? If yes, when will the renewal of PSR take place?
• The licensee of Olkiluoto units 1 and 2 has plans to apply for the new operating licence by the end of 2017. This licence renewal includes also a periodic safety review. • In Finland, the operating licence is granted for a fixed term but the length of the licence is not determined in the legislation (licensee presents the justifications). Operating licence renewal includes always a periodic safety review If the operating licence period is longer
renewal includes always a periodic safety review. If the operating licence period is longer than ten years, the licensee has to carry out periodic safety review at least every ten years and send the results for STUK’s approval. Improvement of safety is a continuous process at the Finnish NPPs and significant upgrades have been made during the whole operating lifetime based on e.g. updated regulatory requirements in the regulations. SÄTEILYTURVAKESKUS • STRÅLSÄKERHETSCENTRALEN
RADIATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AUTHORITY
Questions raised ‐ some selected answers
Q
There has been a steady climb in the number of staff in the Nuclear Reactor Regulation Department over the last decade –
p
credited mostly to construction at OL3, but also to y
,
enhance security. Is this trend expected to continue as a result of the Decision‐in‐Principles granted for Fennovoima and Olkiluoto (OL4), and the Posiva’s geologic repository? • The increasing of regulatory staff has been remarkable during OL3 construction. The Posiva’s geologic repository has also increased the need for recruiting experts on that competence area. If both new projects will start at the same time STUK needs to increase its staff number but not nescessarily to such degree than in the past.
• The renewed regulatory guides (YVL Guides) gives STUK the possibility to forward more The renewed regulatory guides (YVL Guides) gives STUK the possibility to forward more
work to inspection organisations in future, also increased use of TSOs in the review work is under discussion
• In addition to STUK, new employees are needed also at the licensees and TSOs if new ,
p y
projects start. Also the retirement of large age groups is a challenge for human resources in Finland. During 2010‐2012 a committee set up by the Ministry of Employment and the Economy (MEE) worked on a report aiming at giving recommendations and steps to be taken until the 2020’s for ensuring competence and resources needed for the nuclear sector. In til th 2020’ f
i
t
d
d d f th
l
t I
addition, MEE set up in January 2013 a working group to prepare a research and development strategy for nuclear sector in Finland. SÄTEILYTURVAKESKUS • STRÅLSÄKERHETSCENTRALEN
RADIATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AUTHORITY
Positive comments received
Positive comments received
Acknowledgement of •
–
progress in the legal and regulatory framework (e.g. update of progress in the legal and regulatory framework (
e g update of
regulatory guides, amendments to the Nuclear Liability Act, actions planned/taken based on IRRS recommendations)
–
–
actions taken based on lessons learnt from Fukushima Dai‐ichi ti
t k b d l
l
tf
F k hi D i i hi
accident (mentioned e.g. the new autonomy criterion, already existing independent systems for SAM, description to i l
implement the IAEA Action Plan)
h IAEA A i Pl )
requiring a full‐scope (including internal events, fires, floods, seismic events, harsh weather and other external events) PRA Levels 1 and 2 for power operation and low‐power and shut‐
down states and that the PRAs are performed mainly by the utility personnel and external consultants are used only for special topics
SÄTEILYTURVAKESKUS • STRÅLSÄKERHETSCENTRALEN
RADIATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AUTHORITY
Conclusions 2014
• Finnish approach to safety is a proper approach to us – and it will be f h
further strengthened
h
d
– safety is based on trustworthy, safety‐minded licensees
• demonstrated alertness in nuclear and radiation safety issues
de o st ated a e t ess
uc ea a d ad at o sa ety ssues
• determined implementation of ageing management programmes
• pro‐active continuous investments for plant safety improvements – iindependent
d
d
safety
f verification is based on effective regulatory processes ifi i i b d
ff i
l
and periodical re‐licensing including periodic safety reviews
– the principle of continuous improvement of safety is followed in Finland
– professional, safety oriented and motivated staff (RB and licensees) with knowledge on all fields of nuclear safety
– danger of complacency needs to be recognised
d
f
l
d t b
i d
– Further improvement of facilities: lessons learnt from Fukushima, revised YVL Guides, other improvement measures (e.g. based on PRA results)
– Further improvement of regulatory functions: IRRS recommendations, revised YVL Guides, lessons learnt from oversight projects, ...
• Finland
Finland is in compliance with the articles of the Convention on Nuclear is in compliance with the articles of the Convention on Nuclear
Safety
SÄTEILYTURVAKESKUS • STRÅLSÄKERHETSCENTRALEN
RADIATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AUTHORITY
Thank you!
www stuk fi
www.stuk.fi
http://www.stuk.fi/ydinturvallisuus/en
p
y
_GB/convention/
SÄTEILYTURVAKESKUS • STRÅLSÄKERHETSCENTRALEN
RADIATION AND NUCLEAR SAFETY AUTHORITY
56