Inter-linkages between Process Safety and APELL for Accident Prevention and Preparedness Promoting Safer Operations and Emergency Preparedness Chemical Sector 26-27 April-2010 Zhangjiagang- CHINA ING. NESTOR SPOSITO DOW ARGENTINA Argentina NFPA Chapter President BAHIA BLANCA APELL PROCESS Coordinator UNEP/Bs.As. Province. Notwithstanding… They Keep On Happening Notwithstanding the enormous ongoing efforts and the significant progress so far attained in the last few years to increase our knowledge about the root causes of fires and explosions in process plants and even in spite of the remarkable technological progress accomplished in the field of materials and the development of safe design methodologies, such disastrous occurrences keep on happening Inter-linkages Process Safety and APELL Topics •BASIC CONCEPT • FIRE AND EXPLOSIONS • Fires. Classification. Effects. • Explosions. Classification. Effects. •Learning experiences about accidents. •PREVENTION AND MITIGATION METHODS. •IMPORTANCE OF A SAFE DESIGN AND THE USE OF PROPER STANDARDS. • Conclusions Inter-linkages Process Safety and APELL Basic Concepts Rich mixture (Upper Flammability Level ) Explossive Range (Lower Flammability Level) Lean mixture DOW RESTRICTED - For internal use only Inter-linkages Process Safety and APELL Basic Concepts Flammability - Variation of Temperature Limits 0.75 t 25 L.I .I .t L.I .I .25 ºC 1 comb 0.75 t 25 L.S .I .t L.S .I .25 ºC 1 comb Temperature ºC 400 DOW RESTRICTED - For internal use only L.L.I 0 L.S.I Concentration % vol. Inter-linkages Process Safety and APELL Basic Concepts Variation of Flammability-Pressure Limits L.S.I. (p) = L.S.I. (1 atm) + 20.6(log P + 1) @ atm press. @ P press. Slight impact Big increase L.I.I L.S.I DOW RESTRICTED - For internal use only Inter-linkages Process Safety and APELL Basic Concepts Variation of Flammability - O2 Concentration Limits 55.0% (oxygen) Propane R.I.(Oxygen) 9.5% (air) 2.3% (oxygen) R.I.(air) 2.1% (air) L.I.I. L.S.I. DOW RESTRICTED - For internal use only Inter-linkages Process Safety and APELL Basic Concepts Minimun Ignition Energy (MIE) MINIMUM IGNITION ENERGY (MIE) IGNITION - Characteristic for every material. -Varies with environmental conditions, pressure and composition. - For HC is of about 0.25 mj DOW RESTRICTED - For internal use only Inter-linkages Process Safety and APELL Basic Concepts Minimun Ignition Energy (MIE) Ignition Energy (mj) 0.5 CH4 MIE 0.2 H2 MIE 0.02 10 20 30 DOW RESTRICTED - For internal only 40 Flammable Gas Concentration (% use v/v) Inter-linkages Process Safety and APELL Fire and Explosion Pool Fire Begins with the release of flammable material from process equipment. Thermal effects depends on: Type of fuel Geometry of the pool Duration of the fire Location of the radiation receiver . Localized in their effects Main concern domino effect/ setup employee safety zones. Inter-linkages Process Safety and APELL Fire and Explosion Jet Fire Combustion of a material released from a pressurized process unit. Localized in their effects Main concern domino effect. Inter-linkages Process Safety and APELL Fire and Explosion Vapor Cloud Explosion (VCE). “A release of energy that causes a blast” AICheE/CCPS (1994) . “Blast is a transient change in the gas density, pressure and velocity of the air surrounding an explosion point” NFPA 69. “A rapid expansion of gases resulting in a rapidly moving pressure or shock wave”. Crowl and Louvar (1990) Inter-linkages Process Safety and APELL Fire and Explosion Vapor Cloud Explosion (VCE). Material flammable. Suitable conditions P y T. Cloud sufficient size prior to ignition ( Dispersion phase). Ignition delays 1 to 5 minutes ( more probable) . Sufficient amount of the cloud must be within the flammable range Inter-linkages Process Safety and APELL Fire and Explosion Vapor Cloud Explosion (VCE). Sufficient confinement or turbulent mixing of a portion of the vapor cloud must be present. Minimum mass of flammable material required: 1 ton (Wiekema, 1979) to 15 tons (Health &Safety Executive, 1979). More reactive species such as hydrogen and acetylene Gugan(1988) with quantities as low as 100 kg. A Long and Sad History of Fire and Explosion in Process Industry Inter-linkages Process Safety and APELL Lesson Learned 28 death Total destruction ( 70 MMU$S) 104injuries 1800 damages home Inter-linkages Process Safety and APELL Fire and Explosion Inter-linkages Process Safety and APELL Lesson Learned •Importance of Management of Change (MOC). •The need to eliminate expansion joints in dangerous services. •Control Room design concept in High Hazards Plants. Structural design to withstand major hazardous events •Plant Layout. Positioning of occupied buildings Inter-linkages Process Safety and APELL Lesson Learned Inter-linkages Process Safety and APELL Lesson Learned BHOPAL MOC (Management of Change) •The change was about the inadequate state of the facilities supporting the safe operation of the MIC storage. •Layers of Protection Identified and installed in the design/construction but out of operation. There were 5 levels of protection available to minimize the Release to atmosphere, all of which failed. Inter-linkages Process Safety and APELL Lesson Learned BHOPAL •American Institute of Chemical & Process Safety organization & programs (AIChE –CCPS). •UNEP Awareness Preparedness Emergency Local level Process ( APELL Process). •Chemical Manufacturer’s Association Community Awareness and Emergency Response (CAER). •Local Emergency Planning /Risk communication. •Community Engagement. Inter-linkages Process Safety and APELL Lesson Learned Inter-linkages Process Safety and APELL Lesson Learned BP Effective safety culture leadership and oversight to prevent catastrophic accident. •Focus on process safety besides personal safety. • Personal safety metrics are important to track low-consequence, high-probability incidents, but are not a good indicator of process safety performance . •Create an effective reporting and learning culture. Inter-linkages Process Safety and APELL Lesson Learned •Provide adequate resources to prevent major accidents; budget cuts impaired process safety performance at the Texas City refinery. •Effective vehicle traffic policy to control vehicle traffic into hazardous process areas. •Nonessential personnel must be removed from areas in and around process units during the hazardous unit startup Inter-linkages Process Safety and APELL Lesson Learned •Effective mechanical integrity program to maintain instruments and process equipment . •MOC guidelines that address the safe control of the following: •Major organizational changes including mergers, acquisitions, reorganizations. •Changes in policies and budgets. •Personal changes. Staffing during process Inter-linkages Process Safety and APELL Prevention and Mitigation Avoid or minimize releases. The occurrence of releases shall be minimized by measures which include: Proper operating and design conditions Material selection Preventive maintenance, procedures, alarm systems No flanges shall be installed inside the skirt of a vessel containing flammable materials. Welded connections instead of flanged connection. Inter-linkages Process Safety and APELL Prevention and Mitigation The amount of released material within flammability limits shall be minimized by: Proper atmosphere control Accelerated dispersion through water spray Proper storage and installation of check valves, remotely operated isolation valves and excess flow valves other systems where appropriate. Avoid the use of trhreaded connections in critical hazardous material services. DOW RESTRICTED - For internal use only Inter-linkages Process Safety and APELL Prevention and Mitigation Ignition Sources Potential ignition sources should be eliminated. Where they cannot be eliminated protection should be provided by: Proper spacing. Installing equipment which meet the area classification standard (NFPA 70). Installing water curtains to prevent flammable gas mixtures from reaching ignition sources. Inter-linkages Process Safety and APELL Prevention and Mitigation Ignition Sources Static electricity is a potential ignition source. It is crucial to prevent the simultaneous occurrence of a flammable mixture and static spark. Safe Design of Storage Tanks Sprinkler System Grade: 1-2 % Containment dike Fire protection DOWcontrolled RESTRICTED - For internal Remote use only diked area Avoid small connections at the bottom and liquid areas. EBV DOW RESTRICTED - For internal use only Inter-linkages Process Safety and APELL Prevention and Mitigation Buildings Critical buildings (Control Room) shall be designed to withstand the consequences of explosions. CR cannot meet this requirement shall be Relocation. Strengthening for pressure effects. Shielding the critical equipment with a blast wall. Shielding the area where a release can occur from possible ignition sources by providing properly grounded water or steam spray. Adequate Buildings Explosion proof control room Explosion resistant door Demand closing and opening DOW RESTRICTED - For internal use only Inter-linkages Process Safety and APELL Enhancement PS Knowledge Risk analysis, Consequence calculations, inherently safe design more reliable engineering practices and standards Awareness raising and dissemination Process Safety knowledge Inter-linkages Process Safety and APELL Enhancement PS Knowledge How to explain fire and explosion incidents in High-tech plants : Violations to or non compliance with safety regulations Not using supposedly very well known safe procedures. Layers of Protection disable. Lacks of compromise with PS. Lack of knowledge or commitment with Safe Design. Other, other,…… Process Safety knowledge should be open. Throughout all organizations Control Agencies. Technical schools and universities. Contractors/EPCM Inter-linkages Process Safety and APELL Enhancement PS Knowledge We must break the paradigm Good personal safety record is enough to ensure that we are sufficiently safe to prevent all types of major accidents. “The lost time rate is not a measure of process safety” (Kletz, 2003). “An emphasis on personal safety statistics can lead companies to lose sight of deteriorating process safety performance (Hopkins, 2000)” Inter-linkages Process Safety and APELL Enhancement PS Knowledge We must break the paradigm “Nothing bad will ever happen to us” or that any action made with impunity for some time against Safety Process rules could be repeated forever with the same lack of adverse results Inter-linkages Process Safety and APELL Enhancement PS Knowledge Another great challenge is to find a way to expand the knowledge in a worldwide context characterized by Global economical crisis. A progressive expansion of plant capacities and inventories. A progressive increase of investments in places where there is not enough background and experience about the operation, maintenance, Process safety and loss prevention (Middle East). High labor turnover. More reduced budgets. Inter-linkages Process Safety and APELL Enhancement PS Knowledge Our Proposal Raising awareness. Commitment. Companies, local community, local authorities (APELL) Promoted throughout the whole organization, all project stages and the whole project life span. Creativity. To improve and expand even more the existing PS knowledge and its dissemination, encouraging the universal creation, expansion and application of a Process Safety Culture in a world of continuous change. Inter-linkages Process Safety and APELL Enhancement PS Knowledge Our Proposal The study highlights the need for accident forecasting, enhancement PS knowledge consequence assessment, and development of upto-date emergency preparedness and disaster management plans in the chemical process industries and raising community awareness trough plan like APELL Process from UNEP APELL Process must include Process Safety as a key deliverable. Inter-linkages Process Safety and APELL Enhancement PS Knowledge PROCESS SAFETY IS NOT A MERE INTELLECTUAL EXCERCISE BUT THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN LIFE AND DEATH QUESTIONS? ING. NESTOR SPOSITO DOW ARGENTINA Argentina NFPA Chapter President BAHIA BLANCA APELL PROCESS Coordinator UNEP/Bs.As. Province. nspósito@dow.com