Regional Perspective on Global
Disarmament Treaties
By Dr. Sameh AboulEnein
Professor for Disarmament and Security Studies,
School of Global Affairs, AUC, Cairo
I. Arab Revolutions: Their Impact
• The “Arab Spring” will without a doubt change existing
fundamental dynamics.
• It will have significant implications on the political and
security settings in the Middle East.
• Public opinion will play a more significant and
prominent role in the formulation of disarmament and
security issues.
• The parliament with its foreign affairs, Arab affairs and
National Security committees will be at the forefront of
foreign policy issues in the Arab world.
• Disarmament is central to the security and stability of
the Middle East.
1. Important Issues for the Middle East
• Nuclear issues are expected to receive considerable
attention:
• Israel’s non adherence to the NPT, Dimona Nuclear
hazard.
• The establishment of a Zone Free of Nuclear Weapons in
the Middle East.
• Other WMD Treaties are also expected to surface within
the 20120 Middle East Conference.
• The unfolding of the Iran file and its complexities.
• Peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
II. WMD: Regional Perspective
Geneva
Protocol
BWC
CWC
NPT
Egypt
Party without
reservation
Signatory
Non Party
State Party
Israel
Party with
reservation
Non Party
Signatory
Non Party
Iran
Party without
reservation
State Party
State Party
State Party
Syria
Party with
reservation
Signatory
Non Party
State Party
1. NPT: Regional Perspective
• Israel remains the only State in the region as a Non-Member of the
NPT.
• Universality of the Treaty.
• Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons and assurance that they will
never be produced again is the only guarantee against the use or
threat of use of nuclear weapons.
• Nuclear Weapon States should undertake further efforts to reduce
and eliminate all types of nuclear weapons (commitments and
obligations under Article VI).
• Respecting the balance between all three pillars of the Treaty.
• Implementation of 1995 Resolution on the Middle East.
• Inalienable right for the peaceful use of nuclear energy and
opposition to additional restrictions on the peaceful uses of nuclear
energy.
2. BWC: Regional Perspective
• The BWC is the first multilateral disarmament treaty banning a
whole category of weapons of mass destruction.
• In the Middle East, all states are party to the 1925 Geneva Protocol
banning the use of such Weapons in war
• The 1972 BTWC does not prohibit use but possession of such
weapons.
• Egypt, Syria and Somalia are signatories of the BWC.
• Israel, Mauritania, Djibouti and Comoros remain the only States in
the Region as Non-Members of the BWC. Universality of the
Biological Weapons Convention.
• Promote international cooperation, assistance, and exchange in the
field of biological sciences and technology for peaceful purposes in
accordance with Article X of the Convention.
• Strengthen the effectiveness of the implementation of the
Convention.
• Implementation Support Unit (ISU) (launched August 2007) role
crucial for the Biological Weapons Convention and its
implementation.
3. CWC: Regional Perspective
• In the Middle East, all states are party to the 1925 Geneva Protocol
banning the use of such Weapons in war, except Oman and the UAE.
• In the Middle East, only Egypt and Syria did not sign the CWC and
Israel did not Ratify it.
• Iran declared and destroyed production facilities.
• Iraq’s stockpile and production facilities had been destroyed by the
United Nations before 2003.
• The CWC prohibits or regulates the transfer of the most toxic chemicals
to non-parties.
• Egypt, Syria and Somalia remain the only 3 Arab States Non-Members
of the CWC.
• Regional Perspective is that Israel should Join the NPT before other
countries in the region join other WMD treaties.
• The convention is administered by the Organization for the Prohibition
of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), which acts as the legal platform for
specification of the CWC provisions (the Conference of State Parties is
mandated to change the CWC, pass regulations on implementation of
CWC requirements etc.). The organizations furthermore conducts
inspections at military and industrial plants to ensure compliance of
member states.
III. The Specific Challenges Posed by Chemical and Biological
Weapons to the International Process aiming to achieve nonconventional weapon disarmament in the Middle East
• The Proliferation risks stemming from the trade in dual-use materials:
The dual-use nature of chemical warfare technology, and dual-Use
Production Capacity.
• The contradiction in national interest among states concerning the goals
from WMD regimes, norms, and treaties.
• Lack of Reliable “Data” information and trustable WMD information
that are received from countries as clandestine CW programs data is
hard to obtain, so open-source data should be viewed with skepticism.
• The difficulty to handle the Israeli nuclear question and its non
adherence status to the WMD treaties.
• Due to continued growth of industries such as the pharmaceutical
industry in developing countries, the number and geographic
distribution of industrial facilities that employ these technologies is
expanding, as well as, the increasingly intervention of Stakeholders and
Businesses such as individuals, E-commerce, industries in the field of
WMD, which means the easy access to sensitive information. This
expansion may lower the barriers that non-state actors face when
attempting to acquire CBW.
1. The Specific Challenges Posed by Chemical and Biological
Weapons to the International Process aiming to achieve nonconventional weapon disarmament in the Middle East
• The double standard conduct in the field of WMD that lead to a
serious breakdown to several WMD disarmament regimes.
• Globalization and industrial developments have resulted in a
significant increase in the global trade risk in chemicals, as chemicals
are shipped through various transportation means, both within and
between countries (further enhance transportation security in the
light of terrorist threats by adopting the regulations that apply
internationally to the transportation of dangerous goods).
• The emergence of the threat of “non-state actors” and the
ambiguousness of their intentions and capabilities regarding the
potential use of such chemical agents (how and when they will use it),
such as Aum Shinrikyo.
• The fast pace of developments in science and technology.
• How to address compliance and non-compliance status regardless
whether the state is NWS or NNWS.
2. The Specific Challenges Posed by Chemical and Biological
Weapons to the International Process aiming to achieve nonconventional weapon disarmament in the Middle East
• Problems with the verification protocols of the CWC and BWC, the
latter lacking a significant verification procedure altogether,
undermine the ability of the treaties to prevent users or terrorists from
acquiring and using CBW. Hence, if the international community
cannot verify that CBW do or do not exist in a given state, it is also
likely that cannot target assistance or other efforts aimed at preventing
proliferation
• Given that the 2012 Conference aims to establish a Nuclear Weapons
and all other WMD Free Zone in the Middle east, this means that it will
reinforce the Chemical Weapons Convention, as all States Parties to
the Zone will be prohibited and must abandon the use of such
weapons.
• The success of the 2012 Conference by taking practical steps to
establish the zone will help in making symbolic progress towards
universal adherence to the CWC which prohibits the Development,
Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons, as well as, will
contribute to regional and international peace and security.
4. Chemical and Biological Developments
in the Region (from open sources)
• Recent Developments in the region have increased the risk of proliferation of both
chemical and biological weapons, especially in both Syria and Libya in which the
situation remains unstable.
• A recent UN report from a mission that assessed the impact of the Libyan crisis
on the wider Sahel region in North-Africa shows there is reason for concern.
• large quantities of conventional weapons and ammunition from Libyan stockpiles
are smuggled across the border into the region, including advanced weaponry.
• Before the Libyan Revolution 54% of its declared amounts of mustard gas, about
40% of its precursor chemicals for making weapons, as well as its entire stockpile
of aerial bombs had been destroyed.
• The New Libyan government has committed to fulfill its obligations under the
CWC and the fact that the chemical weapon destruction process had begun before
the revolution inspires optimism.
• Given the lack of internal stability there is a risk of proliferation of such weapons.
Although chemical weapons storage facilities remained secure and were not
compromised during the war it is imperative that steps be taken to secure and
destroy remaining chemical stockpiles.
5. UN Resolution 1540
• UN Security Council Resolution 1540 was passed in 2004 in order to
reduce the threat that non-state actors will get their hands on CBRN
materials.
• It imposes binding obligations on all States to establish domestic controls
to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons,
and their means of delivery, including by establishing appropriate controls
over related materials.
• It also encourages enhanced international cooperation on such efforts, in
accord with and promoting universal adherence to existing international
non proliferation treaties.
• On 27 April 2006, the Security Council extended the mandate of the 1540
Committee for a further two years with the adoption of Resolution 1673
(2006), which reiterated the objectives of Resolution 1540 (2004),
expressed the interest of the Security Council in intensifying its efforts to
promote full implementation of the resolution, and obliged the 1540
Committee to report again by April 2008.
UN Resolution 1540
• The 1540 Committee released its first report to the United Nations
Security Council on implementation of the Resolution in April 2006.
The second one was presented in July 2008. A third report was
presented in April 2011, as requested in Resolution 1810 (2008).
• Only 161 states have submitted their reports to date, and as of May
2010 there were still 29 states yet to submit their reports on the
implementation of the resolution 1540.
IV. Egyptian Implementation of 1540
(Regional Workshop 7-10 December 2009)
• Egypt held a regional workshop in Cairo between 7-10 December 2009
on Egyptian efforts to implement UN Security Council Resolution 1540
with cooperation from the UNODA.
• Egypt established a National Committee to follow up on the
Implementation of Egypt’s obligations regarding 1540.
• In the context of Egypt's commitment to Security Council resolution
1540; the text of the law regulating the nuclear and radiological
activities states in one of its articles the following: "The development,
manufacturing, possession, transport, use or threat of use or
ownership of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices or any
means of radiological dispersal is strictly prohibited. It is also
prohibited to provide any assistance in performing the aforementioned
actions, as well as attempt to commit or initiate any such actions
"(consistent with operative paragraph (1) of the Security Council
resolution 1540).
1. Egyptian Implementation of 1540
(Regional Workshop 7-10 December 2009)
• Take effective measures to tighten controls on the movement and handling
of hazardous and chemicals materials that are classified under explosive
materials in accordance with the ministerial decision No. 2225 of 2007,
which includes specific detail of these materials and prohibits their
circulation.
• The Egyptian Atomic Energy Authority is carrying out a project for
integrated management of sealed radioactive sources. This project includes
the preparation of a database of all radioactive sources present in Egypt,
whether still in use or out of service. As well as review physical security
systems for radioactive sources and ensure that these systems conform to
international standards in coordination with the Ministry of Health and
other agencies using such sources.
• Ministerial Decrees 419, 420, 421 of 2006 take further steps to strengthen
the functions of the regulatory Body and tighten the control over nuclear
materials and any other related activities.
2. 2010 Achievements
• The Egyptian Nuclear and Radiation Law was issued (Law no. 7 for
the year 2010)
• Establishment of the independent Regulatory Body and its Egyptian
System of Nuclear Security.
• Hosted a Regional Training Course on Physical Protection of
Research Reactors (7th June- 17th June, 2010) for 25 candidates
from 11 AFRA Member States including Egypt (5 Egyptian
Candidates).
• Participated in different International/regional training courses,
workshops and technical meetings (7 candidates) in the field of
Nuclear Security Culture, SSAC, Physical Protection and Draft
Document on Nuclear Security Fundamentals (objective and
Essential Elements of Nuclear Security)
• Conducted Local training for Egyptian candidates from RB, NM
holders, Customs, Civil defense, Petroleum sector, Universities,
Research Institutes and Import and Export Companies (53
candidates).
3. Egyptian System of Nuclear Security
• The Egyptian Law established the Egyptian System of
Nuclear Security within the RB, The System deals with
all nuclear security related activities for:
• Physical Protection.
• Design Basis Threat (DBT).
• Import and Export Control.
• Illicit Trafficking of Nuclear & Radioactive Material.
• The Nuclear Materials were protected adequately when
the revolution took place on 25 January 2011 (No single
Case Recorded).
4. Egyptian System of Accounting for
and Control of Nuclear Materials
(ESAC)
• By the Presidential Decree (No. 152, 19-10-2006)
• Prime Minister Decree (No.242 and 243, 2012)
• The Egyptian Atomic Energy Authority shall supervise
the implementation of ESAC.
• Represents the point of contact between the Government
and local and international bodies.
• The RB is the responsible body for the implementation
of the ESAC.
•
V. Middle East Free Zone (2012
Conference)
Achieved:
▫ Selecting the facilitator
▫ Determining the host government
• Partially Achieved:
▫ Facilitator visited capitals
▫ Facilitator conducting regional visits
• Remaining Procedural Tasks:
▫ Determining date of Conference. (sometime in December 2012)
▫ Financing:
 From host government
 Other interested states (some Arab states have already pledged).
 Operationalizing the financial mechanism.
 United Nations Fund.
▫ Background Documentation:
 Starting background documentation taking into account work previously
undertaken and experience gained:
 By IAEA, OPCW.
 Need to identify and contact the other relevant international
organizations.
 Possible contribution
1. Middle East Free Zone (2012
Conference)
▫ Participants:
 Participating regional states as referred to in Para 7b of the Action Plan.
 Determining the geographic scope in accordance to the Middle East
definition used by the IAEA.
 Israel – Iran.
 Turkey?
▫ Other Participants:
Nuclear Weapon States.
Relevant international organizations.
European Union.
Representatives of other regional verification models (EURATOM &
ABACC).
 Representatives from other regional WMD free zone treaties (Tlatelolco,
Rarotonga, Pelindaba, and Bangkok, Central Asia).
 NGO’s:
 There is a possible role and contribution from research and academic
centers and think tanks such as BASIC (Malta) – Landau Network (Como,
Italy) – Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (Vienna)- Wilton Park
(London).




2. Regional Challenges and Obstacles
• A continuing perceived utility of nuclear, chemical, and
biological weapons.
• Deep enmity and distrust among states whose
participation in bringing a zone into force is essential.
• Uncertainty due to internal transitions in key Middle
Eastern states.
• Complex, de facto linkages between issues in need of
resolution to bring a zone into force.
• No existing regional institutions for verification and
WMD dismantlement Process.
VI. Other NWFZ/WMDZ
• There are five zones covering continental or sub continental
groups of countries (including their territorial waters and
airspace).
• Beneficial to reflect on these treaties such as the Antarctic,
Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Pelindaba, and Bangkok Treaties.
Treaty
Region
Land Covered
(km²)
States
Date in
Force
Antarctic
Antarctica
14,000,000
Tlatelolco
Latin America,
Caribbean
21,069,501
33
25-04-1969
Rarotonga
South Pacific
9,008,458
13
11-12-1986
Pelindaba
Africa
30,221,532
53
15-07-2009
Bangkok
ASEAN
4,465,501
10
28-03-1997
23-06-1963
1. Other NWFZ/WMDZ
• The establishment of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZ) is a regional
approach to strengthen global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament
norms and consolidate international efforts towards peace and security.
• Article VII of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) states: “Nothing in
this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in
order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective
territories”.
• Guidelines and Principles for the Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones:
 Nuclear-weapon-free zones should be established on the basis of arrangements freely
arrived at among the States of the region concerned.
 The initiative to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone should emanate exclusively from
States within the region concerned and be pursued by all States of that region.
 The nuclear-weapon States should be consulted during the negotiations of each treaty
and its relevant protocol(s) establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in order to facilitate
their signature to and ratification of the relevant protocol(s) to the treaty, through which
they undertake legally binding commitments to the status of the zone and not to use or
threaten to use nuclear weapons against States parties to the treaty.
 A nuclear-weapon-free zone should not prevent the use of nuclear science and technology
for peaceful purposes and could also promote, if provided for in the treaties establishing
such zones, bilateral, regional and international cooperation for the peaceful use of
nuclear energy in the zone, in support of socio-economic, scientific and technological
development of the States parties.
2. EURATOM (Example 1)
•
•
•
•
•
•
Established on 25 March 1957 (Euratom treaty)
Effective 1 January 1958
Administrative Center: Brussels, Belgium
Membership: 27 European Union Members
Acts in several areas connected with atomic energy, including
research, the drawing-up of safety standards, and the peaceful
uses of nuclear energy.
One of the fundamental objectives of the Euratom Treaty is to
ensure that all users in the EU enjoy a regular and equitable
supply of ores and nuclear fuels (source materials and special
fissile materials).
3. South African Dismantlement
Experience as a Model (Example 2)
 The example of South Africa, the first country to voluntarily
abandon a fully developed nuclear weapons program should
serve as a model. It took 5 years to build the country’s first
nuclear device and a total of 16 years to construct its 6 weapon
arsenal.
 Ending and fully dismantling the program and all the facilities,
however, took less than 24 months. South Africa’s decision to
become a non nuclear weapon state shows that it is possible in
principle to roll back a nuclear capability. Subsequently, South
Africa implemented integrated IAEA safeguards and joined the
Nuclear Suppliers Group and is implementing its guidelines.
South African Dismantlement
Experience as a Model (2)
Technical Steps
• Dismantled the six completed gun type devices at Armaments
•
•
•
•
•
•
Corporation of South Africa Ltd (ARMSCOR) under controlled and
safe conditions;
Melted and recast the Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) from
these six devices as well as the partially completed seventh device
and return it to the Atomic Energy Corporation (AEC) for safe
keeping;
Decontamination of the ARMSCOR facilities fully and to
return severely contaminated equipment to the AEC (such as a
melting furnace);
Conversion of the ARMSCOR facilities to conventional weapon
and non-weapon commercial activities;
Destroyed all hardware components of the devices as well
as technical design and manufacturing information;
The Government joined the NPT, signed the Comprehensive
Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA and submitted of a full and
complete national initial inventory of nuclear material and facilities,
as required by the Safeguards Agreement; and the first IAEA team
came in Nov. 1991
Completing the termination of the Pelindaba Y Plant at the
earliest moment.
VII. Important Global Disarmament
Treaties
Countries
NPT
BWC
CWC
CTBT
Egypt
Ratification
Signatory
Non-Member
Signatory
Sudan
Ratification
Accession
Accession
Ratification
Algeria
Accession
Accession
Ratification
Ratification
Iraq
Ratification
Ratification
Accession
Signatory
Morocco
Ratification
Ratification
Ratification
Ratification
Saudi Arabia
Accession
Ratification
Ratification
Non-Member
Yemen
Ratification
Ratification
Ratification
Signatory
Syria
Ratification
Signatory
Non-Member
Non-Member
Tunisia
Ratification
Ratification
Ratification
Ratification
Israel
Non-Member
Non-Member
Signatory
Signatory
Iran
Ratification
Ratification
Ratification
Signatory
Somalia
Ratification
Signatory
Non-Member
Non-Member
UAE
Accession
Ratification
Ratification
Ratification
Important Global Disarmament
Treaties
Countries
NPT
BWC
CWC
CTBT
Libya
Ratification
Accession
Accession
Ratification
Jordan
Ratification
Ratification
Accession
Ratification
Lebanon
Ratification
Ratification
Accession
Ratification
Mauritania
Accession
Non-Member
Ratification
Ratification
Oman
Accession
Accession
Ratification
Ratification
Kuwait
Ratification
Ratification
Ratification
Ratification
Qatar
Accession
Ratification
Ratification
Ratification
Bahrain
Accession
Accession
Ratification
Ratification
Djibouti
Accession
Non-Member
Ratification
Ratification
Comoros
Accession
Non-Member
Ratification
Signatory
Palestine
Thank You
Middle East Free Zone
•
The free zone in the Middle East could contain the following
technical provisions:
 Dismantling and destroying existing or remaining nuclear
weapons capabilities, facilities, and devices under
international verification mechanisms.
 Renouncing nuclear weapons through refraining from
conducting indigenous development and activities related to
nuclear weapons.
 Prohibiting stationing of any nuclear explosive devices on the
zone.
 Prohibiting nuclear explosive testing in the zone.
 Using nuclear materials and facilities for peaceful purposes
only.
 Placing all nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA
safeguards.
 Establishing the necessary relevant institutions and
mechanisms/entities to uphold such a zone free of nuclear
weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and address
the issue of verification to identify the role of the IAEA and
other relevant organizations within such a zone.