Information and documentation
Center on NATO in Moldova
Non-proliferation of MDA: threats,
mechanisms and solutions
Chisinau, Moldova, April 18
MOLDOVAN LEGAL, TECHNICAL AND HUMAN
RESOURCES CAPABILITIES TO COMBAT NUCLEAR
AND RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS PROLIFERATION
D r. h . A . B U Z D U G A N , d i r e c t o r
NATIONAL AGENCY FOR REGULATION OF NUCLEAR AND
RADIOLOGICAL ACTIVITY
2. State responsability
 Establishing
 Implementing
 Maintaining
 Sustaining
of nuclear security regime, aplicable to:
nuclear materials & other radioactive materials
whether it is under or out of regulatory control,
and
to associated facilities & associated activities
throughout their lifetime under a state’s jurisdiction
3. Repercussions of the nuclear and radioactive
terrorism on non-nuclear countries
 No State, regardless of the status of its nuclear/non-nuclear, cannot be
sure that the threats and risks of proliferation will not be applied in its
territory.
 The Republic of Moldova is not an except, confirmed, unfortumately, by
2 events of illicit trafficking of NM with LEU (2010) and HEU (2011)
(see next slide) - origin of NM were Transnistria region).
 These cases were mentioned in the Global Security Newswire
(September, 27, 2011) and in the speech of IAEA Director General, Dr.
Y.Amano, addressed at Seoul Security Summit of 21 March 2012.
 2 above mentioned illicit traffics with NM, Bulgaria NM illicit traffic
case (1999, origin of the NM being in the same Transnistria region),
concludes that the territory of Moldova were selected by the non-state
actors as a illicit transit corridor for NM.
4. Detection of nuclear security events
• 4
cases
of
radioactive
contamination at the Ribnitsa
Metallurgical
Plant
(noncontrolled Transnistria region)
results with 295 tonn of
contaminated metal by Co-60 and
500 tonn of dust contaminated by
Cs-137,
5.Tentative of illicit traffic of
Highly Enriched Uranium
Shielding container is made of lead with
about of 10 mm thickness, lined on the
inside with yellow paraffin or wax.
The wax coating forms a central
channel with about18 mm diameter.
Inside of the channel there is a
glass ampoule with thick walls about
63 mm long, about 13 mm diameter and
an internal volume about 5-7 ml.
Inside the glass ampoule contained a
powder of dark gray color, almost black –
is assumed to be uranium oxide powder. Estimated mass of
material is about 4-5 g.
6. HEU (Illicit trafic case from Moldova)
7. MAJOR RISKS ON NATIONAL SECURITY
Approved (Law 112/22 May 2008) National Security
Concept of Moldova among the major risks, reiterated:
•separatist regime – on the left bank of the
Nistru river,
•international terrorism,
•consequences derived from human activity ,
•organized crime and corruption.
All these risks may by liaisons with unauthorized
possess or use of NRM
8. Identification and definition of
nuclear security regime
State designate competent authorities responsible for nuclear security
regime:
 Regulatory body: NARNRA
 Border control (First Line Officers)
a) Border Police
b) Custom Service.
 Law enforcement:
a) Ministry of Interior
b) Intelligent Service
 Response measures:
a) State Service on Civil Protection and Emergency Situations
b) NARNRA (in case of incident).
9. Main legal regulatory nuclear framework
 Law no. 132/8 June 2012 On safe deployment of nuclear and
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radiological activity
Laws no. 985/18.04.02 (Penal Code), no. 154/28.03.03 (Labor Code),
no.115/22.05.05 art. II, no. 41/02.03.06, no. 335/16.11.06,
no.235/20.06.06, no. 85/24.04.08, no. 20/21.02.08, no.36/28.02.08,
no. 218/24.10.08 (Contravention Code), no. 10/03.02.09,
no.111/18.12.09, no.142/14.07.11, no.80/12.04.12
Parliament Decisions no. 1623/26.10.93, no. 1267/17.07.97,
no. 1450/28.01.98,
Government Decisions: no. 961/21.08.06, no. 328/23.03.07,
no. 1017/01.09.08, no. 1220/30.10.08,
no. 212/13.03.09, no.388/26.06.09
Departmental Decisions: MoH: Basic Radiation Protection Norms
(NFRP-2000), NARNRA: no. 37/18.06.12
10. Main legal regulatory nuclear framework
Law 132/08 June 2012 On safe deployment of
nuclear and radiological activity
Regulation functions of the NARNRA:
 Authorization (it’s mean licensing);
 Elaboration and approve of laws and norms in the
fields of nuclear security and physical protection…
 Evidence/accounting of NRM;
 State control and supervision of activity with NRM
 Constrains for infringements…
 Control of non-proliferation and of respects of
international obligations…
11. NPT role
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The Republic of Moldova fully recognizes the central role that the safeguards
international systems of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has played in
providing assurances for the peaceful nature of nuclear programs of States Parties. By
being part (signing on 26 October 1993)) to the NPT, concluding a comprehensive
Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA and ratifying the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban
Treaty (CTBT) our country has shown its permanent commitment to strengthening of the
international NPT framework.
Recently, our country passed necessary step for entry in force of the Additional Protocol
to Safeguard Agreement in connection with the NPT, as
On December 2011 it was signed in Vienna, by the Director of the National Agency for
Regulation of Nuclear and Radiological Activities and IAEA Director General;
On 12 April 2012, it was ratified by the Parliament;
On 10 May, 2012 our President promulgate Law about it ratification.
For more information we presents the general picture about memberships of the Republic of
Moldova in more important international instruments liaisons, directly or indirectly, with
non-proliferation
12. NPT role
 The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons (NPT) is the most important multilateral
instrument for the promotion of nuclear
disarmament
and
prevention
of
nuclear
proliferation, whereas sustaining the peaceful use of
nuclear energy.
 For that reason, the Republic of Moldova perceives
the NPT as a key universal instrument for the
maintenance of international peace and security that
requires a comprehensive implementation.
13. NPT role
 We means, that the NPT may be resume to the
following 3 milestones
 Nonproliferation of nuclear weapons
 Nuclear Disarmament
 Inalienable right of any country to develop and use
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes
14. NPT role
Is refer de facto to:
 Primo: to 5 states with has nuclear weapons and technology before
signing of the NPT (France, China, Russian Federation (as successor of
died URSS, United Kingdom and USA).
 Secundo: to other country memberships of the NPT, which accept
conditions about interdiction for procurements or proper development
nuclear weapons.
 Terto: to states, which confectioned and has, contrary any agreements,
nuclear weapons (India, Israel, Pakistan, DPR of Korea), or, which has
technology which permit to produce nuclear weapons in any time
(Taiwan, Egypt, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Alger, Brasilia, Argentina,
South Africa, Japan)
From the last we would like to mentioned, as conclusion, that NPT is not
an universal treaty, and there are not a efficient mechanism do regulate
these
15. International obligations...
International instruments
Signature /
Instrument
Deposit/In
force
General
IAEA Statute
Revised Supplementary Agreement Concerning the Provision
of Technical Assistance by the IAEA
Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the IAEA
Accession
24.09.1997
Signed
24.09.1998
Acceptance,28.0
2.2008
22.12.2008
S a f e g u a r d s a n d n o n–p r o l i f e r a t i o n
11.10.1994 (a)
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
Safeguards Agreements between the Agency and the Republic
of Moldova in connection with the NPT
SQP to the Safeguard Agreement between the Republic of
Moldova and the IAEA
Model Protocol Additional to the Safeguard Agreement
between the Republic of Moldova and the IAEA
Ratified,
02.03.2006
17.05.2006
Ratified, 06.2011
01.09.2011,
yearly reports
Signed,
First report
14.12.2011,
in
force 01.06.2012
16...
International instruments
Nuclear safety
Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident
Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear
Accident or Radiological Emergency
Convention on Nuclear Safety
Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel
Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste
Management
Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of
Radioactive Sources
IBSS for Protection Against Ionizing Radiation and for
Safety of Radiation Sources.
Signature /
Instrument
Deposit/In
force
Accession 07.06.1998
Accession 07.06.1998
Accession 05.08.1998
Accession 24.05.2010
,
Applied
reports
Applied
2000
17...
International instruments
Signature /
Instrument
Deposit/In
force
Nuclear security
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material &
Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of
Nuclear Material
Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of
Nuclear Material
International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of
Nuclear Terrorism
CTBTO Treaty
Accession
06.06.1998
Ratified,
24.04.2008
22.12.2008
16.09.2005
18.04.2008
24.09.1997
16.01.2007
UN Security Council Resolution 1540;
Sustained
reports
IAEA IDTB
accession
contributes
Accession
07.05.1998
Liability
Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage
18. Lacks on domestic legal instruments with impact on
nuclear and radiation activity
There are no:
•domestic strategy on nuclear security
•regulation about physical protection
•graded approach of physical protection levels,
•domestic regulation about transportation of NRM;
Are planned for 2013elaboration and approving of:
Regulation for Physical protection, including cyber security requirements;
National Strategy for Nuclear Security;
National Strategy for management of nuclear and raioactive waste
Review of regulations on authorisation, inspection, management of
radioactive waste
19. Sustaining a nuclear security regime
 Take part on multilateral treaties and their verification mechanisms;
 Effective export control at national level, in good correlation to the
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international requirements;
Cooperation in frameworks of regional Programe
or Global Threat Reduction Initiatives;
Prohibition of any illegal acquisition activity;
Use of economic and political levers;
Export-import control (Law & Regulation);
Autorization issuance (Law & Regulation);
Yearly inventory by stakeholders;
Categorization of radioactive sources
Inspection;
Safeguards and materials control & accountancy ;
20. Sustaining a nuclear security regime
• Action Plan between the Moldovan Government and the USA (signed, 2011) on
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combating illicit traffics of NRM;
TACIS project with EC on combatting of illicit traficking of NRM.
Action Plan with IAEA Nuclear Security Office (INSSP)
Road Map with IAEA about implementation of the Additional Protocol
requirements;
National and regional TC projects with IAEA;
By Nuclear Security Office of the IAEA were implemented the project on upgrade
of nuclear security of our waste radioactive repository;
Technical assistance for domestic operators/authorities from the USA DoE and US
NRC for upgrade Moldovan capacities – part of nuclear and radiological
infrastructure;
Projects with UNICRI in the framework of the initiative of CoE.
Establish of Nuclear Security Support Center in Chisinau;
21. Detection equipment from mobile
laboratory (EC donation)
22. Detection equipment from Sweden
SSM donation
23. Bilateral agreement
• NARNRA and Romanian National Commission for
Control of Nuclear Activities;
• NARNRA and ITU from Karlsruhe (Germany)
• NARNRA and Sweden Radiation Safety Authority
• Is ready to be signed Memorandum with the
Radiation Protection Center from Lithuania
24.Domestic resources
Memorandum of Cooperation between NARNRA and:
 National Center of Public Health;
 State Service on Civil Protection and Emergency Situations;
 Custom Service;
 Technical University from Moldova;
 State Medicine and Pharmacy University “N.Testimitanu”;
 NGO INOTEH.
25. US donation for border securing...
Leuseni - EU border crossing
Radiation Portal Monitoring
Pedestrian RPM for Chisinau airport
Associated hand held detection equipment and PRDs.
26. Planning for preparedness for, and
response to a nuclear security event
 According to elaborated and implemented Concept of
Operation (ConOps),
 NARNRA,
 Custom Service (CSRM)
 Civil Protection and Emergencies Situations
Service (CPESS)
joints their efforts to response in case of
Nuclear/radiological Events
27. Framework for National Response Plan for
Nuclear Security Events
28. NARNRA MEST
NARNRA Mobile Expert Support Team
consists of technical experts (from NARNRA
jointly with NCPH MoH, CAP MAFI) with
experience in radiation detection and
response measures.
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29. NARNRA MEST: functions
 MEST is responsible for the following:
 Coordinating response when assistance is requested
 Acting as a Focal Point for all notifications relating to nuclear
security events
 Provide technical assistance (both remote and in-situ) for
identification and/or categorization of NRM detected by
CSRM , if the results of secondary inspection are inconclusive,
or otherwise assistance is requested related to assessment of
an alarm.
 Providing assistance in the implementation of the national
response plan, in relation to nuclear security events generated
by equipment alarm or information alert.
 Obtaining detailed information regarding all nuclear security
events, whereby assistance was requested.
30. OTHER CONTRIBUTED PROGRAMMES
 Periodic courses/workshop organised by NARNRA
 Participation on 8 Centers of Excellence projects launched
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by UNICRI and EC;
Participation on 2 STCU projects;
Participation on IAEA TC regional projects;
No CV on nuclear security teaching process: to be
establishe;
No participation on other education networks liaisons with
nuclear security – to be establishe
31. Events contributed to nuclear security
establishes in Moldova in 2012
 IAEA TC for FLO (Custom Service), May, September, 2012;
 NARNRA field exercises with new received equipment for detection of NRM,
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June, 2012;
IAEA workshop on implementation of Additional Protocol to Safeguard
Agreement, July, 2012;
Domestic Training Course for stakeholders organized by NARNRA – June,
2012.
IAEA field exercises on response on radioactive incident (with joint efforts of
NARNRA, Custom Service, Civil Protection and Emergency Situations),
October, 2012;
ARW NATO on 1540 UN CS Resolution, October, 2012;
IAEA TC on Introduction on Nuclear Forensics, October, 2012;
SSM & NARNRA Workshop on Nuclear Security Issues for GUAM countries,
November, 2012;
PSI WSH, November, 2012;
International nuclear security exercises At@mic 2012, Hagues, November,
2012;
Summer School “Global nuclear zero: political issues and related technical
aspects” June, 11-16, Odessa, Ukraine
32. INSTEAD OF CONCLUSIONS...
State nuclear security policy must contribute on
establish efficient domestic structures and measures
for prevention of, detection of, response to criminal
or intentional unauthorized acts with NRM/facility.
Horizontal interaction of involved state authorities
and TSO is crucially for achieving high standards.
But, indispensable elements of all indicate tasks
(prevention, detection and response) are continuous
education, maintenances and sustainability of
human resources in the field.
Recently established in TUM the National Nuclear
Security Support Center may play an essential role in
establish and maintenance of adequate nuclear
security in Moldova.