Publishing in
Top-Tier Management Journals in top-tier
management journals
Professor Xiao-Ping Chen
Editor-in-Chief, Organizational Behavior and Human
Decision Processes
Foster School of Business
University of Washington
A list of top-tier management journals:
 Administrative Science Quarterly (ASQ)
 Academy of Management Review (AMR)
 Academy of Management Journal (AMJ)
 Journal of Applied Psychology (JAP)
 Strategic Management Journal (SMJ)
 Journal of International Business Studies (JIBS)
 Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes
(OBHDP)
 Organizational Science (OS)
 Personnel Psychology (PS)
Mission statement (OBHDP)
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision
Processes publishes fundamental research in
organizational behavior, organizational
psychology, and human cognition, judgment,
and decision-making. We are interested in
articles that investigate these topics as they
pertain to individuals, dyads, groups, and other
social collectives. For each topic, we place a
premium on articles that make fundamental and
substantial contributions to understanding
psychological processes relevant to human
attitudes, cognitions, and behavior in
organizations.
Criteria for evaluation (OBHDP):
1. Importance of Problem/Question
2. Incorporation of Relevant Theory
3. Mastery of Pertinent Research
4. Development of Hypotheses*
5. Methodological Rigor*
6. Statistical Analyses*
7. Legitimacy of Conclusions*
8. Writing Clarity and Organization
9. Relevance to Behavior in Organizations
10. Relevance to Judgment and Decision-Making
Mission Statement (AMJ)
Academy of Management Journal
To publish empirical research that tests, extends, or builds
management theory and contributes to management practice. All
empirical methods -- including, but not limited to, qualitative,
quantitative, field, laboratory, and combination methods -- are
welcome. To be published in AMJ, a manuscript must make strong
empirical and theoretical contributions and highlight the significance
of those contributions to the management field. Thus, preference is
given to submissions that test, extend, or build strong theoretical
frameworks while empirically examining issues with high
importance for management theory and practice.
Evaluation criteria (AMJ)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
Appropriateness for AMJ
Clarity of exposition
Technical adequacy
Theoretical contribution (i.e. testing, creating, or extending
theory)
Empirical contribution
Interestingness, innovativeness, and novelty
Potential implications for practice
Potential significance of contribution
Magnitude of contribution relative to length
To cooperate or not to cooperate?
Individual decision making in team contexts
---- My journey to find ways of inducing
cooperation in social dilemmas
What is a social dilemma
It is a situation in which members of a group face
conflict between maximizing individual interest and
maximizing group interest
Two typical situations:
4/8/2015
Public goods dilemma: small scale; large scale
Resource dilemma: small scale; large scale
A two-person dilemma
Your Partner’s Choice
C
D
$70
Your
Choice
C
$70
$100
$20
$20
D
$100
$40
$40
My approach to find ways to induce cooperation
Psychological approach Cross-cultural approach
• Use of pledge
– OBHDP 1994, 1996
• Individualism-collectivism
• Perceived criticality
– AMR 1998
– OBHDP 1996, 1998
• Social norm
– OBHDP 1999
• Use of sanctions
– GPIR 2009
• Tolerance
– OBHDP 2003, in progress
• Strategic alliance
– AMR 2003
– JIBS 2005
• Norm vs. attitude
– IJIR 2007
• Meaning of cooperation
vs. competition in China
– MOR 2011
4-person Social Dilemma Game
Each participant receives \1,000, and decides how much of it to
give to the group fund.
Group Fund
4-person Social Dilemma Game
The money given to the group fund is doubled.
Group Fund
4-person Social Dilemma Game
And allocated equally among the four members.
Group Fund
\1,700
\1,000
\1,300
\1,600
A 4-person public goods research paradigm
Your Contribution
0
1
2
3
…
10
Mean Contribution of Other Members
0
1
2
3
…
10
10
9.5
9.0
8.5
…
5.0
11.5
11.0
10.5
10.0
…
6.5
13.0
12.5
12.0
11.5
…
8.0
14.5 …
14.0 …
13.5 …
13.0 …
…
…
9.5 …
Your Payoff = (10 – C) + 2* [(n-1) MC + C] / n
25.0
24.5
24.0
23.5
…
20.0
Sequential Choice in a Step-Level
Public Goods Dilemma: The Effects
of Criticality and Uncertainty
Xiao-Ping Chen, Winton Au, & Samuel Komorita
(1996). OBHDP, 65(1), 37-47.
Payoff Matrix for Step-Level
Public Goods Paradigm
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Number of others
choosing J
Your choice
0
1
2
3
-----------------------------------------------------------J
0
0
20
20
P
10
10
10
30
------------------------------------------------------------
Criticality is defined as the extent to
which a person’s contribution will have
an effect on providing the bonus (public
good). A member of a group is critical in
two types of situations:
(1)person p’s contribution is both
necessary and sufficient to provide the
public good, or
(2)person p’s contribution is necessary
but not sufficient for the provision of PG.
Chen, Au, and Komorita (1996)
Number of cooperators before you
Your position
0
1st
2nd
3rd
4th
(1,0)
(2,0)
1
(2,1)
(3,1)
2
3
(3,2)
(4,2)
(4,3)
Hypotheses:
H1: Members in an objectively critical
position will be more likely to contribute
than members in a less critical position, if
the level of uncertainty is low;
H2: When uncertainty is high, subjects (in
both objectively critical and noncritical
positions) will be less likely to contribute
than when uncertainty is low.
Chen, Au, and Komorita (1996)
Mean contribution rate
-------------------------------------------------------------------Number of cooperators before you
Your position
2nd
3rd
4th
0
.58
1
.69
.81
2
3
.44
.91
.24
Perceived Criticalness (Mean Ratings on 9Point Scale)
Criticality
Uncertainty
Low Medium
High
Mean
High
Low
8.09
3.46
6.97
5.22
Mean
5.93 6.59
6.91
6.26
5.90
5.94
5.78
Conclusions
Objective criticality seems to induce cooperation
through perceived criticalness: If criticality evokes
the perception of criticalness, cooperation will be
enhanced, but if criticality does not evoke perceived
criticalness (e.g., inhibited by high uncertainty), then
the effects of criticality on cooperation may be
attenuated.
Therefore, it is perceived criticality that exerts direct
effect on cooperation
Tolerance of free-riding: The effects
of defection size, defection pattern,
and social orientation in a repeated
public goods dilemma
Xiao-Ping Chen and Daniel G. Bachrach
(2003). OBHDP, 90, 139-147
Behavioral Tolerance of Free Riding
The extent to which a member of a group or organization
is willing to keep making contributions to establish or
maintain a public good when some other members are
not doing so. Three conditions to be satisfied:
1. Tolerance must occur in situations where there are
repeated interactions among members, because onetime interactions leave no room for showing tolerance.
2. It must occur in situations where at least one member
free rides.
3. Given that the first and second conditions were met,
the member still cooperates (contributes to the public
good).
Study variables and hypotheses
Defection size: 1 or 2 members
Defection pattern: fixed or diffused
Hypothesis 1: Group members would be more willing to
tolerate free riding when there are fewer than more other
members who defect.
Hypothesis 2: Defection pattern would influence group
members’ tolerance for free riding such that a fixed pattern
and a diffused pattern would have different impact on their
level of tolerance.
Mean cooperation rate (SD) in experimental conditions
Condition
Trial blocks
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Defection Defection Blk1
Blk2
Blk3
Mean
Size
Pattern
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------1
Fixed
.34 (.38)
.29 (.38) .27 (.35)
.30 (.35)
1
Diffused .51 (.33)
.38 (.36) .38 (.36)
.42 (.31)
2
Fixed
.24 (.33)
.24 (.38) .24 (.38)
.24 (.35)
2
Diffused .30 (.29)
.43 (.32) .43 (.32)
.39 (.29)
Mean
.35 (.33)
.34 (.36) .33 (.36)
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Conclusions
1. The effects of defection size were unexpected. In the early
stages (trial block 1) of member interaction, participants
were sensitive to the number of others who were free
riding, and they were more tolerant when only one rather
than two other members were defecting. But the effect of
defection size diminished quickly with increased member
interactions (trial blocks 2 and 3)
2. Members were more tolerant of free riding when other
members took turns to defect (the diffused pattern) than
when the same members continued to defect over several
trials (the fixed pattern), regardless of the defection size in
the group.
Unintended consequences of cooperation
inducing and maintaining mechanisms in
public goods dilemmas: Sanctions and
moral appeal
Xiao-Ping Chen, Madan Pillutla and Xin
Yao, Group Processes and Intergroup
Relations (2009), 12 (2), 241-255.
Chen, Pillutla, and Yao (2009)
Experiment 1
Condition
Control
Reward-No reward
Punish-No punish
Stage 1
4.46
5.55
5.56
Stage 2
5.34
3.44
4.28
Experiment 2: Mean Cooperation (SD) in Stages
1, 2, 3, and Mean (SD) Trust in Others in Stage 2
of the Three Experimental Conditions
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Contribution
Trust
Conditions (Stage 1) (Stage 2)
(Stage 3)
(Stage 2)
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Punish
3.89
5.96
2.63
2.88
Reward
5.00
6.12
3.50
3.09
Sanction
4.45
6.04
3.07
2.98
Appeal
5.34
6.28
5.01
3.72
Control
4.89
4.58
3.03
3.34
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Conclusions:
1. Sanctions resulted in higher rates of
cooperation than when they were not
applied in the short term. When sanctions
were removed, cooperation rates fell to a
level lower than that achieved when they
were not applied.
2. Trust in others was undermined by the
introduction of sanctions.
3. Moral appeals increase cooperation and
they do so in a sustainable fashion.
Chen & Li (2005), JIBS
Research question:
What is the cross-national differences in
cooperative decision-making in mixed-motive
business contexts (territorial behavior)?
1. Who will be more cooperative: Chinese or Australians?
2. Who cares more about whether the business partner is
of the same or different cultural heritage: Chinese or
Australians?
3. How does culture exert influence on individual decision
making?
Theoretical frameworks
Individualism–Collectivism (Triandis, 1995)
• Collectivism can be defined as a social pattern that consists
of closely linked individuals who see themselves as parts of
one or more collectives,
• Individualism can be defined as a social pattern that
consists of loosely linked individuals who view themselves
as independent of collectives.
• Horizontal-vertical Individualism-collectivism
– HI, VI, HC, VC
Theory
• A critical defining attribute of the “cultural syndromes”
(Triandis, 1995) is the degree to which individualists and
collectivists distinguish between in-group and out-group
members in social interactions.
• What are the boundaries between in-group and out-group ?
• Experimental Manipulation:
– ‘in‐groupness’ VS ‘out‐groupness’
– ‘compatriot’ business partners VS ‘non‐compatriot’ business partners
in a foreign territory
Theory
Institutional vs. Individualistic view of culture
(Yamagishi, 2003)
• Assumes an external incentive for collectivists’ cooperation
within groups. The long-term conditioning of the externally
driven cooperative behavior therefore becomes more
vulnerable to, or less likely to endure in, situations where
such external incentives are removed than in situations
where such incentive is absent in the first place (Chen,
Pillutla, and Yao, 2009).
Hypotheses
• Hypothesis 1: When complete strangers are involved in a
mixed-motive game, Chinese will be less cooperative than
their Australian counterparts.
• Hypothesis 2: Chinese will be more cooperative with
stranger compatriots in a foreign territory than with stranger
compatriots in their home country, or with non-compatriots
regardless of the geographic location, whereas Australians
will not differ across conditions.
Hypotheses
• Hypothesis 3: Chinese and Australians will differ on cultural
values such that Chinese will score higher on the vertical
dimension of individualism– collectivism whereas
Australians will score higher on the horizontal dimension of
individualism–collectivism.
• Hypothesis 4: The country-level effects on Chinese and
Australian cooperative decision-making in mixed-motive
contexts will be mediated by individual cultural value
orientation.
Study 1
• Culture: Country as the proxy; Territory: foreign
• Partner: either compatriots or non-compatriots
• Decision-making context: two person prisoner’s dilemma
(Bolle, 1990)
• Sample
– Australian (n=86)
– Chinese (n=98)
Results
Mean Competitiveness
Australian
Chinese
Mean
Compatriot
6.05
6.63
6.34
Non-compatriot
5.93
7.51
6.72
Mean
5.99
7.07
Study 2
• Sample: Australian (n=122), Chinese (n=151)
• Cultural Value Orientation
32-item scale of Singelis et al. (1995)
– Horizontal Individualism (HI), Vertical Individualism (VI),
– Horizontal Collectivism (HC), and Vertical Collectivism (VC).
Task: 5-person public good dilemma game
Results
Mean Competitiveness
Territory
Business
Partner
Australian
Chinese
Home
Non-compatriot
3.85
5.90
Home
Compatriot
4.68
5.78
Foreign
Non-compatriot
5.11
6.08
Foreign
compatriot
4.18
5.03
4.46
5.70
Mean
Conclusions
1. Chinese seemed to treat stranger compatriots more
cooperatively in a foreign territory than they treated noncompatriots or stranger compatriots at home.
2. Chinese scored higher on VI than Australians, who scored
higher on HI.
3. Observed national differences in decision-making were
fully mediated by individual cultural values: people who were
more vertically individualistic were less cooperative ;
whereas people who were more horizontally individualistic
were more cooperative
Questions?
Thank you!