Why citizens’ perceptions matter:
social safety nets and state-citizen
relations in the post-Arab spring
Dr. Nicola Jones,
Research Fellow,
n.jones@odi.org.uk
Bath, December 3, 2013
Overview
2
1.
Context: growing regional interest in social safety net reform
and implications for state-citizen relations
2.
Empirical findings: results from Transforming Cash Transfers
beneficiary perception study MENA cases
– Right to information
– Right to complain
– Right to a voice
– Importance of relationships of
trust
– Need for governance frameworks
and systems
3.
Conclusions and ways forward
1. The Arab Spring and a regional
rethink about a state-citizen contract
Rethinking the state-citizen contract
Historically…
• Regional norm relied on a redistribution system that protected against
destitution through universal food and fuel subsidies for all citizens
• Gov’ts responded to crises by scaling up subsidies or expanding public
employment but system was hard to sustain fiscally
• Moreover, regressive approach to social policy,
with minimal empowerment dividends
More recently….
• Reform is on the agenda but politically complex
• Optimistic view is that social safety nets could enhance
the state-citizen contract (Silva et al., 2013)
• Realists however caution that inducing civic participation
in programme governance is fraught with challenges and
trajectories are often non-linear (Mansuri and Rao, 2013)
4
Challenge of high vulnerability/
low levels of resilience
5
SSN spending with/out subsidies in
MENA cf. developing world
6
A renewed interest in the politics
of social safety nets
7
Towards a transformative social
protection agenda?
8
(Source: UNICEF, 2008)
Safety nets and citizenship in
conflict-affected contexts
•
Increasing interest in potential of social transfers, to
strengthen state legitimacy and citizenship in
conflict-affected contexts (Carpeneter et al., 2012)
•
However, the evidence base is quite limited. Osofian
(2011) finds positive evidence in Kenya’s HSNP but
troubling evidence in Sierra Leone’s Social Safety Net
programme of exacerbated state-citizen tensions
•
Consensus that it is not just what services are
provided, but whether they are provided in a way
that preserves/ builds individual and group dignity
(Ringold et al., 2012).
•
A new focus on the politics of implementation –
rather than more common politics of adoption that
has dominated political economy
2. Transforming cash transfers
beneficiary perceptions study
• DFID-funded cross regional study in
MENA and SSA looking at
beneficiary perceptions of
unconditional cash transfer
programmes in conflict- affected
contexts
• Qualitative research study looking
at programme participants’ views
on programme functioning ,
impacts and governance
Middle East case study findings
Palestinian National Cash
Transfer Programme in Gaza
and the West Bank
Yemen’s Social Welfare Fund
Programmes in a nutshell
Country
Occupied Palestinian Territories
(Gaza and West Bank)
West Bank
Name
Yemen
Gaza
Palestinian National Cash Transfer Programme
Social Welfare Fund
Start date
2010/2011 but based on amalgamation of
predecessor programmes
Transfer amount
From 750–1,800 NIS ($195-468)
Maximum benefit of YER 4,000 ($20) for
a family of 6 people, per month.
Quarterly
Quarterly
Social health insurance, food aid for the poorest,
education fee waivers
Fee exemptions for basic services (but
seldom implemented)
Target group
Extremely poor households;
with additional weighting for vulnerable groups,
Since 2008 includes all people living
below the poverty line.
Coverage
Approx. 99,000 families in West Bank;
48,000 families in Gaza
Approx. 1,500,000 beneficiaries.
Frequency of
transfer
Complementary
services
1996
Qualitative research methodology
Gaza
West Bank
Yemen
Beit Lahia,
Rafah
18
Hebron,
Jenin
32
Hodeiah,
Taiz
16
12
13
8
23
23
14
Life histories
4
4
9
Family case studies
4
4
2
Community mapping
4
4
4
Structured observations of programme
implementer-beneficiary interface
6
6
5
Research tools
Research sites
13
Key informant interviews (national,
governorate, municipality/ camp level)
Focus group discussions with
beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries
In-depth interviews
A right to information
•
Little investment in strategic communication of programme objectives,
targeting, provisions to beneficiaries/ public
– ‘It is a gift from God and we buy rice and sugar. When we receive the
amount it is a happy day for us [...] I know nothing about the
programme, sometimes they say it is support from abroad or from
the president, I don’t know.’ (beneficiary woman, Taiz, Yemen).
•
Lack of explicit budget and plans for communication as part of
programme design and implementation considerations
– e.g. in oPT low awareness that programme is 50% funded by
Palestinian Authority; assumption is donor funding.
•
Results in widespread suspicion and frustration –between beneficiaries
and service providers; and national & subnational programme staff
– ‘The formula is like the coca-cola secret formula – we know nothing…’
(male FGD, Jenin, West Bank)
14
“I feel guilty and powerless – I cannot explain why
some people are excluded or included. So I can
listen to people’s problems but I can’t really do
much. I just gather information but don’t have a
role in decision-making. It is a very frustrating
working environment.’
Social worker, Jenin, West Bank
“Even if we were hanging by a rope
they would not help us! They don’t tell
us anything [about other services and
entitlements] – only from each other
and our neighbours do we learn about
our rights.’
Bedouin woman, West Bank.
A right to complain
“The CT is a compensation for the Palestinian people,
because they have been uprooted and displaced’
(male refugee, beneficiary, Gaza).
‘This is better than a hand-out. It is my right’
(Older female beneficiary, Hebron, West Bank).
Beneficiaries are less aware of their rights. Post office
and SWF workers treat beneficiaries with no respect’
(community leader, male, Zabid, Yemen).
•
A grievance system exists in oPT but citizen confidence
is limited; increasing use of media exposés to call
implementers to account.
•
In Yemen officials are ostensibly open to receiving
complaints but there is no official grievance system;
although matters are sometimes addressed informally
16
A right to a voice
•
Beyond information provision, institutionalised feedback channels and
spaces for interaction can be key to strengthening the relationship
between service providers and beneficiaries
•
More challenging in UCT programmes as less regular contact between
implementers and beneficiaries
• No direct contact on payment days
• Short annual visits by social workers in OPT and Yemen
• Only informal information-sharing between beneficiaries
•
When we meet we talk about our concerns, but there are no places
where we can raise our voices and speak up. It would be great if these
places existed...But the people we speak to should be in a position to
help …people who can decide, and can provide us with the things we
really need’ (Female beneficiary, Rafah, Gaza).
Similarly, strong demand to be involved in tracking and measuring
impact, but dearth of participatory M&E mechanisms (e.g. social audits,
community monitoring groups, score cards)
17
The importance of relationships
of trust
Merely receiving services from the state doesn’t mean people feel as if they
are citizens of the state; how they are treated by the state is a critical
factor in shaping sentiments of citizenship (Eyben and Ladbury, 2006;
Corbridge, 2005)
‘Being poor means desperation, humility and disrespect’
(FGD, males, Taiz, Yemen).
‘Key blockages include:
– excessive social worker caseloads;
– social workers’ data collection &
policing mandate not advice, referrals
– the corrosive nature of ‘wasta’;
“There is political Involvement and biases …
The main challenge is that community
leaders are given the main role in selection
(Youth leader, Taiz, Yemen).
18
The need for governance
frameworks and systems
•
Tembo (2013) cautions when multiple players are engaged in
programme delivery, without clear guidance /oversight, confusion
can prevail.
– CTs in oPT and Yemen involve a complex web of actors with
significant coordination and capacity challenges, and thus
promoting active citizenship will require a clear governance
framework and system.
•
Single registry systems are a useful tool:
– OPT provides example of promising practice for coordination,
information sharing
•
A strong M&E culture is also key to good governance (Joshi and
Houtzager, 2012) but not well embedded in our cases, but some
improvements:
– Palestine’s MOSA is facilitating coordination of a cluster of
donor-funded impact assessments
– Yemen, with support from donors, is also improving M&E
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3. Conclusions and ways forward
Capacity
strengthening
& clearer
mandates for
implementers
Processes and
mechanisms
to involve
beneficiaries
System
strengthening;
Strategic
communication;
Streamlined
coordination
20
Further reading
21
•
Hickey, S. and Bracking, S. (2005) ‘Exploring the politics of chronic
poverty: from representation to a politics of justice?’ World Development
33(6): 851–65.
•
Jones, N. and Samuels, F. with Malachowska, A. (2013) Holding Cash
Transfers to Account: Beneficiary and community perspectives.
Synthesis Report. London: ODI
•
Jones, N. and Shaheen, M. (2012) Transforming Cash Transfers:
Beneficiary and community perspectives on the Palestinian National Cash
Transfer Programme. Part 2: The case of the West Bank. London: ODI.
•
Silva, J., Levin, V. and Morgandi, M. (2013) Inclusion and resilience: the
way forward for social safety nets in the Middle East and North Africa.
Washington DC: International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development/The World Bank.
•
Tembo, F. (2013) Rethinking Social Accountability in Africa: Lessons from
the Mwananchi Programme. London: ODI.
•
Also see: Transformingcashtransfers.org