Controlled and automatic mindreading
in children and adults
Ian Apperly
What is “Theory of Mind”?
•
•
“Folk psychology”, “Perspective-taking”, “Social cognition”
Essential for everyday social interaction and communication
•
•
False belief tasks as a paradigm case
(e.g., Wimmer & Perner, 1983)
–
These tasks ensure that participant must judge from other
person’s point of view
What is “Theory of Mind”?
•
•
“Folk psychology”, “Perspective-taking”, “Social cognition”
Essential for everyday social interaction and communication
•
•
False belief tasks as a paradigm case
(e.g., Wimmer & Perner, 1983)
–
These tasks ensure that participant must judge from other
person’s point of view
•
Significant developments from infancy to early childhood
•
Disproportionately impaired in autism and several other
genetic and psychiatric disorders
What is “Theory of Mind”?
•
•
“Folk psychology”, “Perspective-taking”, “Social cognition”
Essential for everyday social interaction and communication
•
•
False belief tasks as a paradigm case
(e.g., Wimmer & Perner, 1983)
–
These tasks ensure that participant must judge from other
person’s point of view
•
Significant developments from infancy to early childhood
•
Disproportionately impaired in autism and several other
genetic and psychiatric disorders
•
Identifiable neural network
Temporo-parietal junction / pSTS
Temporal pole
Medial prefrontal cortex
TPJ
TP
Lateral view
Medial view
What is “Theory of Mind”?
•
Adults?
Temporo-parietal junction / pSTS
Temporal pole
Medial prefrontal cortex
TPJ
TP
Lateral view
Medial view
Overview
• Part 1
– Evidence (from adults) that mindreading
• Often requires cognitive control
• May recruit specialised neural systems
• May sometimes operate efficiently and automatically
• Part 2
– How do these characteristics arise?
•
•
Evidence that mindreading is a flexible but demanding
ability
In Adults....
Impaired executive processes can lead to severe
egocentrism
–
•
Belief reasoning requires cognitive control
–
•
(Apperly, Back et al., 2008)
Recursion (e.g., beliefs about beliefs) remains challenging
–
•
•
(e.g., Keysar, Lin & Barr, 2003; Apperly et al., 2010)
Holding false beliefs briefly in mind has a measurable
processing cost
–
•
(Apperly, Samson, Riggs, Simpson & Chiavarino, 2006; Back & Apperly,
2010)
Belief inferences are not used automatically
–
•
(e.g., Bull, Philips & Conway, 2007)
Belief inferences are not made automatically
–
•
(e.g., Samson, Apperly, Kathirgamanathan & Humphreys, 2005)
E.g., Mckinnon & Moscovitch (2007)
And this converges with evidence from children…
.
A deductive Belief-Desire task
(Hartwright, Apperly & Hansen, 2012)
A deductive Belief-Desire task
(Hartwright, Apperly & Hansen, 2012)
NB only Belief factor involves a
perspective difference
A deductive Belief-Desire task
(Hartwright, Apperly & Hansen, 2012)
• B- is harder than B+
• D- is harder than D+
• (Replicates Apperly et al. 2011, Ch.
Dev. Who found same pattern for
adults and older children)
Orthogonal contrasts of varying beliefs and desires
(Hartwright, Apperly & Hansen, 2012)
Overlap
Belief (True vs. False)
Desire (Like vs. Hate)
IFG
recruit
EF, and attention/ToM
areas
Orthogonal contrasts of varying beliefs and desires
(Hartwright, Apperly & Hansen, 2012)
Overlap
Belief (True vs. False) TPJ, ACC,
Desire (Like vs. Hate) TPJ, ACC
Orthogonal contrasts of varying beliefs and desires
(Hartwright, Apperly & Hansen, 2012)
Overlap
Belief (True vs. False) TPJ, ACC, IFG
Desire (Like vs. Hate) TPJ, ACC
Notably no mPFC
Evidence that mindreading is a flexible but demanding
ability
•
•
In Adults....
Impaired executive processes can lead to severe egocentrism
–
•
Belief reasoning requires cognitive control
–
•
(e.g., Keysar, Lin & Barr, 2003; Apperly et al., 2010)
Holding false beliefs briefly in mind has a measurable processing cost
–
•
(Apperly, Samson, Riggs, Simpson & Chiavarino, 2006; Back & Apperly, 2010)
Belief inferences are not used automatically
–
•
(e.g., Bull, Philips & Conway, 2007)
Belief inferences are not made automatically
–
•
(e.g., Samson, Apperly, Kathirgamanathan & Humphreys, 2005)
(Apperly, Back et al., 2008)
Recursion (e.g., beliefs about beliefs) remains challenging
–
E.g., Mckinnon & Moscovitch (2007)
•
And this converges with evidence from children…
•
•
Mindreading seems to depend on processes for attention,
working memory and executive control
Recruitment reflects functional components of mindreading
•
.
Specialised neural systems for Mindreading?
(Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003......)
False belief (FB) sample story
John told Emily that he had a Porsche.
Actually, his car is a Ford. Emily
doesn’t know anything about cars
though, so she believed John.
—
When Emily sees John’s car she
thinks it is a
porsche ford
False photograph (FP) sample story
A photograph was taken of an apple hanging
on a tree branch. The film took half an hour to
develop. In the meantime, a strong
wind blew the apple to the ground.
—
The developed photograph shows the apple on the
ground branch
Specialised neural systems for Mindreading?
(Saxe & Kanwisher, 2003......)
False belief (FB) sample story
John told Emily that he had a Porsche.
Actually, his car is a Ford. Emily
doesn’t know anything about cars
though, so she believed John.
—
When Emily sees John’s car she
thinks it is a
porsche ford
False photograph (FP) sample story
A photograph was taken of an apple hanging
on a tree branch. The film took half an hour to
develop. In the meantime, a strong
wind blew the apple to the ground.
—
The developed photograph shows the apple on the
ground branch
R-TPJ shows greatest specificity for
reasoning about mental states.
Contrast with mPFC, which also
shows activity for thinking about
body states, internal sensations and
personal characteristics.
Evidence that mindreading is a flexible but demanding
ability
•
•
In Adults....
Impaired executive processes can lead to severe egocentrism
–
•
Belief reasoning requires cognitive control
–
•
(e.g., Keysar, Lin & Barr, 2003; Apperly et al., 2010)
Holding false beliefs briefly in mind has a measurable processing cost
–
•
(Apperly, Samson, Riggs, Simpson & Chiavarino, 2006; Back & Apperly, 2010)
Belief inferences are not used automatically
–
•
(e.g., Bull, Philips & Conway, 2007)
Belief inferences are not made automatically
–
•
(e.g., Samson, Apperly, Kathirgamanathan & Humphreys, 2005)
(Apperly, Back et al., 2008)
Recursion (e.g., beliefs about beliefs) remains challenging
–
E.g., Mckinnon & Moscovitch (2007)
•
And this converges with evidence from children…
•
•
•
Mindreading seems to depend on processes for attention,
working memory and executive control
Recruitment reflects functional components of mindreading
Quite strong evidence for some neural specialisation
•
.
Evidence that mindreading is an efficient
but inflexible processes?
•
•
Can all mindreading really be so demanding?
Two systems for mindreading? (e.g., Apperly &
Butterfill, 2009, Psych. Rev.)
Evidence that mindreading is an efficient
but inflexible processes?
•
•
Can all mindreading really be so demanding?
Two systems for mindreading? (e.g., Apperly &
Butterfill, 2009, Psych. Rev.)
•
Evidence of involuntary inference of:
•
•
•
•
Sometimes without explicit awareness
•
•
Simple visual perspective (Samson et al., 2010)
Agent’s spatial frame of reference (Zwickell, 2011)
Agent’s “false belief” (Kovacs et al., 2010)
Schneider et al. (2011)
Without need for “executive control”
•
Qureshi et al. (2010)
• This pattern converges with evidence of
mindreading in infants….
Automatic perspective-taking?
(Samson, Apperly, Braithwaite et al., 2010, JEP:HPP)
Only ever judge “self” – how many dots
you can see
Automatic perspective-taking?
(Samson, Apperly, Braithwaite et al., 2010, JEP:HPP)
800
Reaction time (ms)
750
700
650
Consistent
*
ns
600
550
500
Self - avatar distractor
Self - rectangle distractor
Experiment 3
Only ever judge “self” – how many dots you can see
Inconsistent
Automatic perspective-taking?
(Samson, Apperly, Braithwaite et al., 2010, JEP:HPP)
800
Reaction time (ms)
750
700
650
Consistent
*
ns
600
550
500
Self - avatar distractor
Self - rectangle distractor
Experiment 3
Only ever judge “self” – how many dots you can see
Such effects are exaggerated under cognitive load
(Qureshi et al., 2010)
Inconsistent
Overview
• Part 1
– Evidence that mindreading
• Often requires cognitive control
• May sometimes operate efficiently and automatically
• May recruit specialised neural systems
• Part 2
– How do these characteristics arise?
– We must look at developmental change
Effortful &
Flexible
Efficient &
limited
Temporo-parietal junction / pSTS
Temporal pole
Medial prefrontal cortex
TPJ
TP
Lateral view
Medial view
Effortful &
Flexible
?
Efficient &
limited
Temporo-parietal junction / pSTS
Temporal pole
Medial prefrontal cortex
TPJ
TP
Lateral view
Medial view
How do we end up with automatic processes?
(+ Language, Executive function,
Knowledge)
Effortful &
Flexible
Efficient &
limited
Automatisation
a. Infant
system
grows up
How do we end up with automatic processes?
(+ Language, Executive function,
Knowledge)
Effortful &
Flexible
Efficient &
limited
b. Infant
system
remains
intact
Efficient &
limited
(+ Language, Executive function,
Knowledge)
Effortful &
Flexible
Automatisation
a. Infant
system
grows up
How do we end up with automatic processes?
(+ Language, Executive function,
Knowledge)
Effortful &
Flexible
Efficient &
limited
b. Infant
system
remains
intact
Efficient &
limited
(+ Language, Executive function,
Knowledge)
Effortful &
Flexible
Both exist in development
Automatisation
a. Infant
system
grows up
What is the origin of automatic perspective-taking?
900
Altercentric interference = indication of
automatic perspective calculation
850
800
RT (ms)
750
700
Consistent
Inconsistent
650
600
550
500
450
400
Self
Other
Self
Other
Main effect of consistency
Discs vary
Figure varies
Significant interaction
Self
Other
Blocked
Evidence for automatisation?
Surtees & Apperly (2012) Child Development
120 children aged 6-10
and adults
Automatisation: Predict
younger children to suffer
less interference for self
judgements.
Original automaticity:
Predict equivalent
interference at all ages.
“You see 2”
Or
“He sees 2”
Evidence for automatisation?
Surtees & Apperly (2012) Child Development
120 children aged
6-10 and adults
“You see 2”
Or
“He sees 2”
OTHER
SELF
Consistency


Response Time (ms)

Consistent

2000


Inconsistent







1500



1000




500
0
Age
6
Experiment
8
10
1A
Adult*
8
1B
6
8
10
1A
Adult*
8
1B
Consistency
0.20
Consistent
Inconsistent
Automatic perspective-taking?
– In adults, Level-1 visual perspectives may be calculated even when
unnecessary and unhelpful
– Automatic?
– What is the developmental origin of automaticity?
– Original automaticity?
– Automatisation?
No evidence of
automatization
Neural specialisation through development
• E.g., Reading development
• correlation with children’s reading skill
– Yellow = +ve
– Blue = -ve
• Neural specialisation emerges
• Unlikely to be determined by an
evolved programme
Turkeltaub et al. 2003
Developmental specialisation of a rTPJ
(Gweon et al. 2012, Ch. Dev.)
• 5-11Y children, and adults
• 3 story conditions in fMRI
– Physical
– Social
– Mental (+Social)
• Battery of mindreading tasks outside of
scanner
Developmental specialisation of a rTPJ
(Gweon et al. 2012, Ch. Dev.)
Developmental specialisation of a rTPJ
(Gweon et al. 2012, Ch. Dev.)
Developmental specialisation of a rTPJ
(Gweon et al. 2012, Ch. Dev.)
Differentiation of social and mental in rTPJ was correlated with
mindreading success outside of the scanner
Summary
• Part 1
– Evidence that mindreading
• Often requires cognitive control
• May sometimes operate efficiently and
automatically
• May recruit specialised neural systems
• Part 2
Temporo-parietal junction / pSTS
Temporal pole
Medial prefrontal cortex
TPJ
TP
Lateral view
– Development must be explained
– Development constrains theories of the
mature system
Medial view
Social abduction
(Hartwright, Apperly & Hansen, in prep)
Social abduction
(Hartwright, Apperly & Hansen, subm.)
TB vs. FB
Green = D? vs. D-&D+
Green = D? vs. D-&D+&FB&TB
Selective for D?