Draft CMP ROADMAP
S-GRI
Madrid
27th February 2013
CMP Context
•
o
o
•
Commission decision of 24 August 2012 on amending Annex I to
Regulation (EC) No 715/2009
“Therefore it is necessary to amend the guidelines on the application of congestionmanagement procedures in the event of contractual congestion”
“The congestion-management procedures should apply in the event of contractual
congestion and are aimed at resolving those events by bringing unused capacity back
to the market to be reallocated in the course of the regular allocation processes.
Where an interconnection point is frequently subject to the occurrence of physical
congestion, congestion management procedures may often be of no avail. In those
cases a solution should be examined from a network planning and investment point of
view.”
Key milestones:
o
UIOLI LT, Capacity surrender operational at concerned IPs, Oversubscription
and Buy-back operational at concerned IPs :
1st October 2013
o
UIOLI FIRM ST operational:
1st July 2016
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CMP implementation
•
TSOs are currently working on a common proposal for the
implementation of UIOLI LT, Surrender and Oversubscription
and Buy-back mechanisms
•
Work on UIOLI DA will be launched by 2014
•
The different mechanisms need a detailed analysis by TSOs
and further coordinated definitions from NRAs
•
Oversubscription and buy-back mechanisms request a
particular evaluation of the congestion situation due to the
risks/rewards associated for TSOs
•
The following Draft CMP Roadmap is a proposal and must not
be seen as a formal engagement from TSOs until further
precisions are given to the different mechanisms
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UIOLI LT (under discussion between Enagás, REN and TIGF)
• UIOLI LT is already under application in France since 2007 and
since 2003 in Spain.
• TSOs are working in a proposal to adapt the existing rules under
application to the new rules and to CAM auctions
• For the interim period (before the start of CAM auctions) continue
with current arrangements
• Once CAM auctions are in place: application of UIOLI LT
mechanism if demand exceeded offer at the Yearly capacity
auctions by IP
4
UIOLI LT (under discussion between Enagás, REN and TIGF)
• Evaluation of the underutilisation of capacity and application of UIOLI LT
to be done every year after the Yearly Capacity auctions
• Two semesters will be analysed independently (1 April – 30 September
and 1 October – 31 March)
• Only yearly capacity products will be analysed and only capacity related
to yearly capacity products will be released
• Withdrawal if capacity use is <80% on both semesters analysed
• Withdrawn capacity to be offered through Quarterly capacity auctions
• Capacity to be withdrawn up to demand exceeding offer at P0 (Reserve
price)
• If the clearing price of the reallocated capacity is lower than the clearing
price of the capacity initially allocated, the initial holder of the capacity
will retain its payment obligations for the difference of clearing prices
5
Capacity Surrender (under discussion between GRTgaz and TIGF)
• TSO shall accept any surrender of firm capacity (except products
with a daily duration, DA et WD)
• Surrendered capacity shall be considered to be reallocated only
after all the available capacity has been allocated
• Product subdivision: CAM calendar implies to surrender capacity
only via a shorter term product
Initial Product
Shipper
surrender
TSO allocation
Quarterly Product
One or several
months
Month
Yearly Product (Y+1)
One or several
quarters/months
Quarter/Month
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Capacity Surrender (under discussion between GRTgaz and TIGF)
• In case, several product are surrendered, a first-come-first-served
(time stamp) mechanism shall be used to decide on the order of
allocation
• Each surrendered capacity shall be definitively surrendered until
the rolling monthly allocation (unsold capacity is given back to the
shipper after the rolling monthly auction)
• A fee is to be introduced to reflect the cost of service and to avoid
a loss of revenue for the TSO
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Oversubscription and buy-back
(under discussion between GRTgaz and TIGF)
• Statistic studies shall be used to define the amount of additional
capacities (if no physical congestion is observed at the concerned IP)
• Taking into account the limitation of a statistic study, additional
capacities should be limited to annual Y+1, Quarter, Month and
Day-ahead product
• Buy-back scheme: when and if necessary, TSO shall
o 1st : Verify whether alternative technical and commercial measures can
maintain system integrity in a more cost-efficient manner
o 2nd : Apply a market-based buy-back procedure
• This mechanism necessitates a strong coordination amongst
adjacent TSOs and NRAs to propose additional capacities and to
define a rule on the buy-back procedure
o An oversubscribed capacity at one side of the IP has to “find” the equivalent
on the other side to be bundled
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Oversubscription and buy-back
(under discussion between GRTgaz and TIGF)
•
Several market-based buy-back procedure could be used
o Option mechanism
o Market intervention
•
The adequate mechanism has to further detailed, discussed at
EU level and with the market
o In particular: no interest to develop a specific IT tool at one TSO level
•
All potentially envisaged mechanisms will imply to define a
default rule
o To guarantee the effectiveness of the oversubscription
o To mitigate the risks for the TSO
•
When buy-back mechanism is activated, shippers don’t have
anymore the right to revise upwards their (re)nomination
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Oversubscription and buy-back
(under discussion between GRTgaz and TIGF)
•
This implementation will incur costs and risks for TSOs which have
to be covered and incentivised
•
Proposition of a gradual implementation:
o October 2013: implementation at some IPs using only the default rule
o 2014-2015: implementation using a market based mechanism in coordination
with other TSOs
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Thank you for your attention!