THE INTERNATONAL POLICY RESPONSE TO THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: THE ROLE OF THE IMF AND EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS Pilar L’Hotellerie-Fallois DGA de Asuntos Internacionales Jean Monet Conference Universidad Carlos III Madrid, 8 de marzo de 2011 INDEX 1. The financial crisis and the emergence of BRICs: a new international economic environment 2. The international policy response: The role of the G-20. I. Policy coordination II. Reform of the International Financial Architecture 3. The IMF response to the crisis: governance, lending and surveillance 4. The EU response to the crisis: economic governance and crisis resolution 5. Scope for IMF/EU coordination 6. Concluding comments INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 2 THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT: WHAT CRISIS? A multifaceted crisis in a highly interconnected world: At global level, the international financial crisis. In Aug 2007, financial turbulence in the US (subprime) quickly spreads to other advanced economies. It turns into global systemic liquidity shortage and sudden stop of capital flows in Sept 2008 (Lehman Bros.), affecting also EME At domestic level, country-specific vulnerabilities led to specific adjustment processes. Financial sector, housing bubbles At regional level, European sovereign debt crisis. The fiscal consequences of the recession and the initial strong policy support spark a sovereign debt crisis in Europe (in 2010) This means that common shocks have resulted in different time profiles and characteristics of the crisis across countries and regions, leading to different policy responses INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 3 THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT: THE EMERGENCE OF BRIC The global financial crisis hit especially advanced economies. The persistent and strong growth differential between emerging countries –BRIC in particular, Brazil, Russia, India, China- and advanced economies has widened with the crisis. INVESTMENT GDP Share GDP Annual Growth rate BRIC INDUSTRIALIZED ECONOMIES (a) BRIC (b) REST EMEs ADVANCED ECONOMIES WORLD 12 28 10 27 8 26 6 25 4 24 2 23 0 22 21 -2 20 -4 1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 2012 19 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 4 THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT: THE EMERGENCE OF BRIC This has resulted in a growing weight of EME/ BRIC in the world economy and a substantial contribution to global growth. Thereby the need for their greater implication of EME in global governance SHARE OF WORLD GDP CONTRIBUTIONS TO GROWTH Percentage Points ADVANCED ECONOMIES OTHER EMERGING BRIC 100% 90% 80% OTHER EMERGING BRIC WORLD GROWTH 5 12.7 22.1 14.5 20.3 70% 16.4 24.5 29.1 4 20.7 22.7 60% 2.2 23.1 3 50% 40% 30% ADVANCED ECONOMIES 2 69.4 69.4 63.0 52.9 20% 0.6 1.6 0.6 1.0 47.9 1 1.9 10% 0% 1.1 1.1 1.2 2000 -2010 2011- 2015 0 1980 1990 2000 2010 2015 1980- 1999 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 5 THE INTERNATIONAL POLICY RESPONSE: LINES OF ACTION OF THE G20 The 2008 crisis accelerates the changes in global governance and the G20 takes the lead along three basic lines Strengthening global policy coordination Short term: conutercyclical policies and exit strategies Medium/long term: Framework for stable, balanced and sustainable growth Enhancing International Financial institutions (legitimacy and effectiveness) Changes in governance (quota and representation) to fully reflect changing economic weigths in the world economy-in line with G-20 membership Ensure sufficient resources for IFIs (capital increases; options to mobilize resources and liquidity); enhancement of their lending instruments Financial regulation and surveillance to promote financial stability: FSB mandate: elaboration of international financial and supervisory regulatory practices, peer review, standard-setting bodies coordination Strengthening of capital and liquidity requirements (BCBS). Stronger regulation and supervision for SIFIs/ G-SIFIs. Identification of macro-prudential risks across the financial system and development of macro-prudential tools. Strengthening of financial markets INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 6 THE INTERNATIONAL POLICY RESPONSE: THE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF G-20 G-20 MEMBERS Europe European Union France Germany Italy Russia Turkey United Kingdom America Argentina Brazil Canada Mexico U.S.America Asia China India Indonesia Japan Rep.of Korea G-20 (replaces G-7) Informal structure: Meetings: Summits, M inisters and Governors, Sherpas, Deputies Ad hoc Working Groups Others Australia Saudi Arabia South Africa Financial regulation and supervision Financial Stability Board, FSB (BCBS/BIS) (New IEO pillar) Economic stability Growth and development [Seoul Consensus] Commercial policy International Monetary Fund World Bank World Trade Organization (Reform of the three multilateral pillars from Bretton Woods) INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS THE INTERNATIONAL POLICY RESPONSE: STEPS IN THE POLICY COORDINATION PROCESS STEPS TAKEN IN THE LEADER’S SUMMITS Washington and London Summits (Nov 2008/ April 2009) Consensus on the need for strongly countercyclical policies Pittsburg Summit (September 2009) Importance of designing exit strategies Activation of the Framework for Strong, Balanced and Suatainable Growth and the Mutual Assessment Process (MAP) to address Global Imbalances Toronto Summit (June 2010) Commitment to fiscal adjustment (halve deficit by 2013 and reduction in debt/GDP ratios by 2016 Seoul Summit (Nov 2011) Seoul Action Plan A reinforced MAP (indicative guidelines) INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 8 IMF REFORM IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE CRISIS: GOVERNANCE AND FINANCIAL RESSOURCES The IMF has been crucial in implementing G20 mandates and providing analytical support across different areas. To fulfill that role it has: Improved its governance, by upgrading representation of emerging and developing countries through quota increases of underrepresented and low income countries. The 2010 governance reform: 100% increase in total liquidity, 6% transfer of quota to emerging and developing countries; next quota review in 2014 Increase EME/ LIC representation by 2 seats/ 24 in the Board of Directors; Europeans reduce their presence by 2 Contributions to extended NAB Financial resources: Unión Europea (167 mil millones USD) Tripling of resources (London 2009 Summit) Increase the NAB from 55 bn USD to 588 bn USD 100% Increase in quotas 2010 USA (100 mil millones) Japon (100 mil millones) BRIC (92 mil millones) Otros (74 mil millones) INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 9 RESPONSE OF THE IMF TO THE CRISIS: LENDING Lending policy: IMF lending ($bn) Higher access limits, more flexible conditionality Accesibility: from 300% to 600% of quota for SBAs 2008-2010: $ 300 bn in new loans 200 180 160 140 New instruments for the insurance function (preacutionary): FCL (created March 2009; reformed Aug 2010). Ex-ante conditionality. The Fund gives its approval to a country’s economic policies and makes a credit line available to the country throughout the duration of the arrangement. 120 100 80 60 40 20 0 FCL Loans PCL (created Augoust 2010). For countries with sound economic fundamentals and policies (but less so than FCL). INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 10 RESPONSE OF THE IMF TO THE CRISIS: UPGRADED SURVEILLANCE Pressure on the IMF to improve its surveillance and eliminate its shortfalls (IEO report on IMF surveillance in the run-up to the crisis highlighted several failures) New approach to multilateral surveillance: interconnectedness and crosscountry spillovers Strengthening the Financial Sector Assessment Program; mandatory FSAP for Countries with systemically important financial sectors. New reports on international economic and financial issues: financial linkages, cross-border banks resolution, fiscal monitor. Spillover reports IMF becomes a member of the FSB, fostering coorditation between both institutions, which is all the more relevant given the potential for overlapping functions between both institutions INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 11 THE EU POLICY RESPONSE TO THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: COORDINATION WITH G20 The financial systems of some euro area (EA) / EU countries were touched the turbulences following the subprime crisis in 2007 European governments reacted with strong countercyclical policies and financial rescue plans INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 12 THE EU POLICY RESPONSE TO THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: LENDING AND FINANCIAL REFORM After the Lehman collapse, CEE countries were affected by the sudden stop of international capital flows. Some of them required combined external external programmes EU/ IMF BoP facility provides mutual assisstance. The EU and country authorities negotiate an agreement and its conditionality: usually involving governance measures, fiscal consolidation and financial stabilisation On-going BoP programs: Hungary, Latvia and Romania PSI: Viena initiative Financial reform (Larrosière) Macroprudential surveillance: European Systemic Risk Council Microprudential surveillance • Three European Surveillance Authorities (banking, insurance and financial markets) • Committee of the European Surveillance Authorities • Surveillance authorities of Member StateS INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 13 THE IMPACT OF THE SOVEREIGN DEBT CRISIS ON EA COUNTRIES The sovereign crisis erupted in 2010 and brought forward very deep problems related to the governance and surveillance structures of the EMU, and the lack of lending instruments directed to EA countries It was centered in EA countries Surveillance mechanisms proved inadequate and failed to effectively complement single monetary policy Additionally, there was no mechanism for supporting EA countries with liquidity/ solvency problems ; The response by the EU/ EMU has been the proposal of a widespread reform encompassing governance, fiscal and economic surveillance and a crisis resolution mechanism INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 14 THE EU RESPONSE TO THE CRISIS: NEW GOVERNANCE AND SURVEILLANCE INITIATIVES European Commission legislative proposal for reinforcing the EU economic governance and surveillance structures, along two dimensions: Strengthening the Stability and Growth Pact: Reinforcement of both the preventive and corrective parts of the SGP The debt criterion will be considered on the same footing with the deficit criterion, in initiating an Excessive Deficit Procedure. Financial sanctions will be imposed gradually, starting at an earlier (preventive) stage and with more automaticity. Minimum requirements for the budgetary framework of the member states, to promote higher quality of national fiscal policy frameworks Preventing and correcting macroeconomic imbalances within the EU and the euro area, including deteriorating competitive trends: An alert mechanism and preventive surveillance based on countryspecific in-depth reviews and discussions with member states considered “at risk” The Excessive Imbalance Procedure, for Member States with severe imbalances or imbalances that put at risk the functioning of EMU. INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 15 THE EU RESPONSE TO THE CRISIS: OTHER SURVEILLANCE INITIATIVES The European semester - a new EU policy coordination mechanism Starting from 2011, each January the European Commission issues an “Annual Growth Survey” which recommends priorities to Member States in the areas of economic and budgetary policy. Based on these recommendations, the members states will coordinate ex ante their medium-term budgetary strategies and national reform programs. An EMU Competitiveness Pact The idea is to balance the need for bigger rescue package (ESM) with greater fiscal, macroeocnomic and structural discipline on the part of EMU member states: a comprehensive package on economic governance for Europe There is a Commission’s new proposal, after the initial German-French version has met with resistance Procedure to involve monitoring byHeads of State; to be approved by European Council end March 2011 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 16 CRISIS RESOLUTION: TEMPORARY FACILITY (EFSF) Need for funds to manage the size of the challenges faced: EFSF and EFSM Instrument / Institution EFSF (European Financial Stability Facility) EFSM (European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism) IMF TOTAL Amount (€ bn) 440 Amount ($ bn) 570.9 60 77.58 250 324.375 750 973.125 The European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) was created by the euro area member states following the May 9, 2010 Ecofin. It is an example of inter-institutional coordination: the European Commission sets conditionality in liaison with the European Central Bank and International Monetary Fund and must be approved by the Eurogroup. EFSF has been assigned the best possible credit rating: countries guarantee 120% of their share in the facility, to be used to cover amounts drawn for lending. This has reduced its effective lending capacity under the €440bn The European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM) raises funds (up to 60 billion euros) backed by EU budget (serves all EU members); has already placed a €5 billion issue to finance Ireland program INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 17 CRISIS RESOLUTION: A PERMANENT ESM Permanent crisis mechanism to be set up as of mid 2013: European Stability Mechanism (ESM) Assistance will be conditional on the implementation of a strict economic and fiscal adjustment programme, in line with existing arrangements Private sector involvement will be decided on a case-by-case basis, ‘in line with IMF usual practices’ Distinction will be made between liquidity and solvency crises. This will be based on a debt sustainability analysis (DSA) conducted by the European Commission and the IMF, in liaison with the ECB. Private creditors will be encouraged to maintain their exposure (liquidity). Need for a reestructuring plan with private creditors, in line with IMF practices, in case of insolvency Collective Action Clauses (CACs) will be included in the terms and conditions of all new euro area sovereign bonds starting in June 2013 INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 18 CRISIS RESOLUTION: PENDING ISSUES The European Council of March 2011 should come to a final agreement on the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and the EFSF Further issues under discussion around the ESM: Interest rate to be applied Effective size of the facility Possibility to include precautionary financing Possibility to buy bonds Changes to the present EFSF will probably follow those agreed for the ESM One particular issue concerns the term extension of present loan for GR And the easing of terms of the loan for IE INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 19 EU/ IMF COOPERATION IN PRACTICE IM F/EU lending in practice Country UE Arrangements Total assistance * of which (in € bn) EU IM F Ireland ESFS 85 62.5 22.5 Greece bilateral loans 110 80 30 7.5 3.1 1.7 20 5 12.95 21.9 - 21.9 Latvia UE: BoP Facility Romania Poland - * in some cases, other IFIs/countries contribute to the package INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 20 SCOPE FOR IMF/EU COOPERATION The case for cooperation: Regional and global institutions both have specific know-how Pooling resources may be necessary to temper large financing needs Given the overlapping roles, lack of cooperation can lead to inefficiencies and confusion at times of crisis The EU leaves that door open: conditionality from IMF explicit in BoP assistance New instruments IMF serves as liaison to negotiate MoU of the loan It is envisaged that financial support to euro-area Member States shall be provided by EFSF in conjunction with the IMF Further thoughts on IMF/ EU cooperation: Cooperation should cover both lending and surveillance, while some believe regional arrangements could complement PCL and FCL Rules and processes for cooperation with the Fund are better established ex ante, so as to guarantee a solid, predictable framework INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 21 CONCLUDING COMMENTS The governance of the world economy has experienced radical changes in the aftermath of the international financial crisis Relevant elements are the renewed emphasis on financial stability, specially linked to interconnectedness and macroprudential aspects The return keynesian policies and the turn to less orthodox and more practical ways to design policies (capital flows) is also important to note But the most important aspect is the need of Policy coordination in the face of increasing global interconnectedness The crisis has speeded up changes in the way policy coordination is achieved at the global level: across the world and across policies: financial stability macro policies structural policies In Europe, and specifically inside the EMU, the need for policy coordination is much more pressing and the only way forward INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 22 THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION Pilar L´Hotelerie-Fallois Associate Director General DGA INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS THE EU RESPONSE TO THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: IMPROVING REGULATION AND SURVEILLANCE MACROPRUDENTIAL SURVEILLANCE • European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) Information exchange/Treatment of systemic risks MICROPRUDENTIAL SURVEILLANCE • Three European Surveillance Authorities (ESA) (banks, insurance and markets (the decision-making body is the ESRB composed of the chiefs of the national supervisors) • Mixed Committee of the European Surveillance Authorities (forum formed by institutional representatives of the new authorities in which the three authorities cooperate regularly to guarantee intersectoral consistency) • Surveillance Authorities of Member States INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 24