A Novel Approach for Avoiding Wormhole Attacks in VANET

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A Novel Approach for Avoiding

Wormhole Attacks in VANET

Seyed Mohammad Safi, Ali Movaghar and

Misagh Mohammadizadeh @ Computer

Science and Engineering, 2009 page: 160 – 165, 28-30 Oct. 2009

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Outline

• Wormhole attack

• Defense

– Packet leash – notice

– Geographical leashes

– Temporal leashes

– Geographical leashes V.S. Temporal leashes

– Packet leash authentication

– HEAP authentication

• Heap

• Summary

• Reference

2

Wormhole attack

• What is it?

– An attacker receives packets at one point in the network,

“tunnels” them to a different point in the network and then replays them from this point.

– Note: the attacker can create a wormhole for packets not addressed to itself so long as it is within hearing range

• Why is this bad?

– A node is misled to believe it is within transmission range of the sending node

3

Wormhole attack(contd.)

• Example(S: source, D: destination, A: attacker)

Private tunnel 4

Packet Leash

• Author defined general mechanism for detecting and defending against wormhole attacks.

• A Leash is any information that is added to a packet for the purpose of restricting the packet’s maximum allowed transmission distance. Two types:

– Geographical Leashes

– Temporal Leashes

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• Require:

Geographical leashes

– Each node must know its own location.

– all nodes must have loosely synchronized clocks.

• The sender includes in the packet, its own location, p s

, and the time it sent the packet, t s,

The receiver compares these values to its location p r, and the time it receives the packet t r,

If the clocks of both sender and receiver are synchronized within



,and v is an upper bound on the velocity of any node, the receiver can compute an upper bound on the distance between itself and the sender, d sr is the upper bound on the distance between the sender and receiver.

d sr

 p s

 p r

2

 

( t r

 t s

 

)

 

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Geographical leashes(contd.)

• A digital signature could be used to authenticate the the location and timestamp in the received packet

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Temporal leashes

• Definition: a temporal leash establishes an upper bound on a packet’s lifetime, which restricts the maximum travel distance

• All nodes must have tightly sync clocks

– Maximum clock error

() must be known by all nodes

– Maximum error must be on the order of microseconds or hundreds of nanoseconds

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Temporal leashes(contd.)

• t s

: sender’s timestamp t r

: sreceiver’s timestamp

: clock error c: propagation speed of wireless signal d sr

 c

( t r

 t s

 

)

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Geographical leashes

V.S. Temporal leashes

Geographical Leash

• Can be used with radio propagation model

• Do not require tight time sync

• Location info increase overhead

• Can be used until max range is

2

Temporal Leash

• Highly efficient

• Require tight time sync

• Cannot be used if max range is less than c

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Heap authentication

• Hop-by-hop Efficient Authentication Protocol

• Role

– Outsider: a node that is not an authorized member of the MANET.

– Insider: an authorized member.

• Goal

– Packets sent by outsiders should not be allowed to propagate through the MANET.

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Heap authentication (contd.)

• Ikey(private key): a single group key.

• Okey(public key): one pairwise key share with each 1-hop neighbors.

• Key exchange

1. When a node moves to a new neighborhood it exchanges keys with its neighbors.

2. When an existing node in the neighborhood has remained idle for too long.

3. The keys should expire after a certain amount of time.

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Heap authentication (contd.)

Picture from reference [2]

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Summary

• Using geographical leashes and HEAP for safety of control packets and traffic packets.

• This method created low overhead for network while it secured it against wormhole and can detect malicious nodes as far as possible.

14

Summary

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Reference

• [1]http://www.csie.mcu.edu.tw/stuproj/97/04

/attack.htm

• [2] R. Akbani, T. Korkmaz, G.v.S Raju," HEAP: A packet authentication scheme for mobile ad hoc networks", ad hoc network, v.6 n.7, p.1134-1150, 2008.

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