CH-53K Heavy Lift Helicopter A Survivability Focused Design Kathy Russell Martin Krammer Richard Gardner Nicholas Gerstner kathy.russell@navy.mil martin.krammer@navy.mil richard.gardner@navy.mil nick.gerstner@survice.com Vulnerability Analyst Vulnerability Test Engineer Survivability Lead Survivability Analyst NAVAIR NAVAIR NAVAIR SURVICE Engineering China Lake, California China Lake, California Patuxent River, Maryland Dayton, Ohio Presented at the American Helicopter Society 67th Annual Forum Virginia Beach, VA May 3-5, 2011 This is a work of the U.S. Government and is not subject to copyright protection in the U.S. Introduction Next Generation Heavy Lift Helicopter for the US Marine Corps • Operational Requirements • Survivability Key Performance Parameters • Air Vehicle Specification More Survivable Design CH-53E CH-53K Background Balanced Survivability Approach • Susceptibility - the inability of an aircraft to avoid being hit Susceptibility Reduction - missile warning and missile jamming or decoying further enhance the survivability capabilities of the platform • Vulnerability - the inability of an aircraft to sustain damage once hit Vulnerability Reduction – threat tolerant design Susceptibility and Vulnerability Reduction Verification • Analysis • Flight Test • Live Fire Test Susceptibility Reduction Threat Avoidance Susceptibility reduction for the CH-53K consists of an integrated Aircraft Survivability Equipment (ASE) suite Radar Warning Receiver AN/APR-39B(V)2 (RWR)/Electronic Warfare Management System Missile Warning System (MWS) *update – Laser Detection incorporated with MWS Directional Infrared Countermeasures System (DIRCM) AN/AAQ-24(V) Countermeasure Dispenser System (CMDS) AN/ALE-47 Susceptibility Verification Susceptibility Analysis • Incorporates threat systems • Aircraft performance data • Various models and simulations – Moderate Transmittance (MODTRAN) – Modeling System for Advanced Investigation of Countermeasures (MOSAIC) – Future Operational Combat Unified Simulation (FOCUS) – Multi-Service Electro-Optics Signature (MuSES) Analysis and Flight Test will assess the ASE system effectiveness against AVS threats Survivability Requirements CH-53K Key Performance Parameters Two of the seven system KPP’s are Survivability Requirements • Fly Away Capability – Ballistic Tolerant Design • Force Protection – Cockpit and Cabin Armor Meeting the KPP requirements • • • • Challenging yet achievable Air Vehicle Specification (AVS) Continuous Survivability Analyses Early Ballistic Tests Early involvement and a coordinated survivability team Vulnerability Reduction Vulnerability Verification Analysis and Test MODEL TEST Vulnerability Verification Vulnerability Analysis – Critical Data Sets Geometry Conversion Techniques • SAC CATIA to BRL-CAD format • Streamlines the modeling effort • Ensures precise and accurate component representation Traditional Data Sets • DMEA • Pd/h and Pk/d • FALT Vulnerability Verification Vulnerability Analysis – Critical Data Sets Traditional Flight Regimes Discrete Mission Points • Define specific flight conditions • Correlate to susceptibility analyses Mission Points Vulnerability Verification Design Impact Initial Assessment – Not compliant Assessment Updates • • Updated preliminary designs Integrated CH-53E JLF results Design Enhancements • • • • MGB redundant lube system Supplemental fuel feed system Main rotor actuator redesign Tail rotor drive shaft growth Risk Reduction Testing • • • Identified components for testing to refine design and analysis Tail rotor drive shaft and Flexbeam successfully tested Additional items identified for testing Vulnerability Verification Assessment Progression Milestone Assessments – Compliant 4.5 Initial assessment 4.0 Status Spec Normalized Value (1=Spec) 3.5 3.0 2.5 2.0 Risks From CDR Design Challenges 1.5 RR testing PDR 1.0 CDR 0.5 0.0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 Analysis Update Reference No. Force Protection Verification Design Impact Initial and Milestone Assessments – Compliant Assessment Progression • • • KPP requirements addressed cockpit and cabin occupant protection Weight optimization studies conducted to minimize ineffective armor and maximize protection Design changes assessed for impact on protection levels CDR Cabin Armor Current CDR Design CDR Cockpit Armor CH-53K Survivability • Risk Reduction Tests ─ Tail Rotor Flex Beam ─ Tail Rotor Drive Shaft ─ Sponson Material - Fuel Cell Interaction ─ Fuel Line Leak Containment • Live Fire Tests Risk Reduction Test Tail Rotor Flex Beam Test Ballistic Impact Test Conclusion Test articles were able to maintain the loads after damage Test Damage Risk Reduction Test Tail Rotor Drive Shaft Test Ballistic Impact Test Conclusion Tail Rotor Drive Shaft is tolerant to the AVS ballistic threat Test Damage Test Set-up Risk Reduction Test Sponson Material – Fuel Cell Interaction Fuel Line Leak Containment Demonstrates structural capability to respond to hydrodynamic ram • Sponson composite wall construction • Self sealing performance of candidate fuel bladder Proposed solutions tested for leak mitigation / fire suppression initiated by ballistic impacts on fuel feed lines LFT&E • CH-53K is designated as a covered LFT&E system – U.S. Code Title 10, Section 2366 (10USC2366) • Alternative LFT&E (ALFT&E) strategy uses analysis to aid in identification of critical components and viable test shots • Key Focus Areas – – – – – Collateral and cascading effects Assess potential crew and passenger casualty Assess CH-53K Battle Damage Assessment and Repair procedures Provide survivability comparison of CH-53K with legacy CH-53E What modifications can be made to reduce the vulnerability of the CH-53K? Component Level Ballistic Tests Stationary and Rotating Scissors TR Pitch Beam Pitch Control Link Main and Tail Rotor Servos • • • • • MRGB IGB & TGB TR Drive Shaft TR Flex Couplings TR Disconnect Couplings • TR Hangar Bearings & Mounts • Stationary Scissors • Swash Plate • MR & TR Servos • Sponson structure & cell • • • • • • • TR Blade, Flex Beam TR Pitch Link TR Pitch Change Shaft TR Shaft TR Pitch Beam Armor – Crew, Cabin Propulsion – GE 38 GTV System Level Tests • Drive System Tests – – – – – – – MRGB Rear Module TR Gearbox Intermediate Gearbox TR Drive Shaft TR Flex Coupling TR Disconnect Coupling TR Hanger Bearing and Bracket – NGB-MRGB Shaft, Coupling Hanger Bearing – Rotor Brake – NGB & Mounts • Fire Tests – Engine Nacelle • Fire detection / ext. system – Fuel System • • • • Sponson / SEFS Feed (Engine) Dump & Refuel Fuel line Sleeves – Hydraulic System • Flight Control Tests – – – – – – – – – Control boxes & wiring MR Servo Actuator TR Servo Actuator TR Blade TR Hub TR Pitch Beam TR Control Link TR Pitch Change Shaft Swashplate • Armor Tests – Cabin floor / wall – Cockpit seat & wing • Structure Tests – Transition and Tail CH-53E (mounted on a hover stand at WSL during JLF Tests) Model - Test - Model Trade Studies MODEL TEST ENSURES SURVIVABLE DESIGN Questions ?