Chapter 6: Interpreting
the criminal
environment
Target selection

‘I’ve been set a performance management plan. It is
updated yearly.’ (intelligence manager)

‘I make my own decisions. I target the worst
offenders.’ (analyst)

Two New Zealand intelligence professionals, quoted from
Ratcliffe, J.H. (2005) 'The effectiveness of police intelligence
management: A New Zealand case study', Police Practice and
Research, 6:5, pp. 435-451.
Cope’s seven key variables
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
Nature of offence (the legal category of the crime)
Location (space and place of crime)
Time of offence
Method of offence (modus operandi)
Target details
Victim characteristics
Physical and social circumstances of the offence
ViCAP



Violent Criminal Apprehension Program
After ten years, it was found that less than 10 per
cent of homicides were reported to ViCAP
Original form had 189 questions
Threat assessments


National agencies such as SOCA, CISC and Europol
use unclassified annual threat assessments to raise
public awareness
Law-enforcement-sensitive versions used to inform
law enforcement priorities and other relevant
initiatives (legislation, regulation or policy)
Harm as a component of threat assessments


Harm – the adverse consequences of criminal activity
Metropolitan Police have four types:

Social
• Negative physical, psychological or emotional consequences that
cannot readily be expressed in cash terms (as in homicide and assault)

Economic
• Negative effects on an individual, community, business, institution,
government or country (in as theft, counterfeiting and fraud)

Political
• Negative effects on the political stability of a community or institution
(such as in corruption, loss of confidence in government or law
enforcement)

Indirect
• Secondary adverse consequences of criminal activities (such as
environmental damage from clandestine drug labs)
Offender self-selection



Offender self-selection may be a more ethical
approach to offender targeting
Existing criminal triggers are used to identify more
serious offenders
Offenders bring police attention on themselves
Self-selection example

Traffic wardens in Huddersfield, Yorkshire compared
cars illegally parked in disabled bays with nearby
legally parked cars. Illegal cars were:




nearly 10 times more likely to be of immediate police
interest
at least 10 times more likely to be owned by someone with
a criminal record, and
more likely to be driven by someone with a history of
traffic violations
See Chenery et al. 1999
Playing well with others

Problems:



Information sharing is a US priority after 9/11 but the
organization of police departments militates against it
Small agencies rarely have the resources to address wider
concerns
Memorandums of understanding are often convoluted and
take time to organize and approve
Playing well with others

Potential solutions:




Informal networks spring up to work around bureaucratic
hurdles
Joint task forces allow access to data from various agencies
Wide dissemination of products that are not case-sensitive
can improve information sharing
Liaison officers can overcome some problems
Intelligence requirements

Structured mechanisms that can aid information
collation, especially when analysts collaborate


Strategic Intelligence Requirements
Tactical Intelligence Requirements
Sheptycki’s organizational pathologies











Digital divide - caused by incompatible information systems between
agencies
Linkage blindness - where crime series cross agency boundaries
Noise - low-quality information volume exacerbated by increased sharing
Intelligence overload - lack of analytical capacity in the crime intelligence
system
Intelligence gaps - caused by criminals operating in the spaces between
police agencies either hierarchically or geographically
Duplication - caused by separate agencies keeping the same information on
isolated systems
Institutional friction - between agencies with different missions, structures
and methodologies
Intelligence hoarding and information silos - caused by retention of
information until it is most beneficial to the information-holder
Defensive data concentration - concentration of resources in one area to
address a short-term problem creates other organizational pathologies
Occupational subcultures - both intra-agency as well as interagency
Sharing information – 2005 forum ideas












Become intelligence-led
Police chiefs should work closely with analysts
Co-locate analysis and intelligence functions close to decisionmakers
Articulate the analytical vision within the police department
Make the case for integrated analysis
Create integrated reporting mechanisms
Develop informal information exchange mechanisms
Consciously collect feedback and respond to criticisms
Create an analysis users group
Get over the whole security issue
Develop technology solutions but do not fixate on them
Be realistic about what can be achieved in your department
Nine analytical techniques in the NIM
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
Crime pattern analysis
Network analysis
Market profiles
Demographic/social trend analysis
Criminal business profiles
Target profile analysis
Operational intelligence assessment
Risk analysis
Results analysis
Strategic thinking


Aims for a more ‘holistic’ view of the criminal
environment
Uses techniques rarely taught in analysis classes









Futures wheels
Competing hypothesis
Force-field analysis
Morphological analysis
Ishikawa diagrams
PESTEL(O)
SWOT analysis
Delphi analysis
Scenario generation
(for descriptions and examples of these techniques, see Heldon
2004 and Quarmby 2004)
Futures work in crime analysis

For future work within a strategic intelligence
environment to succeed, there must be:




An identifiable decision-making system to support;
A will to think ahead in both the intelligence system and
the decision system to be supported;
A will to apply the results in both the intelligence system
and the decision system to be supported
Neil Quarmby (2004: 128-129)