Summer 2011
Tuesday, 8/9
Clark and Chalmers on
the Extended Mind
“Where does the mind stop
and the rest of the world
begin?”
• What are C & C asking here? On
one way of looking at things,
the answer seems “nowhere”
(our minds can reach anywhere
we like in the world!). On
another, the question seems
very hard to make sense of (the
mind and the rest of the world
may not be in any sort of
competition with one trying to
overtake the other!)
Clark and Chalmers on
the Extended Mind
“I bought an iPhone. The
iPhone has already taken over
some of the central functions
of my brain . . . The iPhone is
part of my mind already…In
at least some cases the world
is not serving as a mere
instrument for the mind.
Rather, the relevant parts of
the world have become parts
of my mind. My iPhone is not
my tool, or at least it is not
wholly my tool. Parts of it
have become parts of me . . .”
(Chalmers)
Clark and Chalmers on the Extended Mind
“When parts of the environment are coupled to
the brain in the right way, they become parts of
the mind.” (Chalmers)
• So maybe the question is: Is there a categorical
difference between parts of the mind and parts of
the environment or can some parts of the
environment be parts of the mind?
• But then, what does it even mean to say that the
mind has parts and that certain parts of the mind
are located someplace (e.g. inside or outside the
brain)?
Extended Mental Processes
C & C invite us to consider:
1. Performing a task – figuring out whether a
certain shape fits in a slot – using mental
rotation.
2. Performing the same task using physical
rotation (by pressing a button).
3. Performing the same task using physical
rotation (controlled by a neural implant).
Extended Mental Processes
Extended Mental Processes
• Parity Principle: “If, as we confront some task,
a part of the world functions as a process
which, were it done in the head, we would
have no hesitation in recognizing as part of
the cognitive process, then that part of the
world is part of the cognitive process.”
• PP gives a sufficient condition for being an
extended mental process.
Extended Mental Processes
• C & C claim that given PP, mental rotation and
physical (button/neural-device controlled)
rotation both count as parts of a
mental/cognitive process.
• Q1: Is this claim obviously true? What are
some cases where the sufficient condition is
not met?
Extended Mental Processes
• Other examples:
Rearranging tiles in scrabble
Using pen and paper to do long
multiplications
Using a compass or a nautical slide rule to
navigate
Typing up ones thoughts while composing
an essay
• Epistemic vs. Pragmatic Actions
Extended Mental States
• Information vs. Information carrying item
(analogous to: Monetary value and monetaryvalue carrying item, e.g. a coin or a bill)
• Content-Externalism (very roughly): The thesis
that what information a mental state carries is
determined by relational (or extrinsic) features of
the information carrying item.
• Active-Externalism: The thesis that the
information carrying item may be constituted by
elements that extend beyond the body/brain.
(notice that such a thesis would be implausible in
the money case!)
Extended Mental States
Otto and Inga both want to go to the Museum:
• Inga recalls that the Museum is on 53rd street,
walks to 53rd street and goes into the
Museum.
• Otto has Alzheimer’s. He carries a notebook
where he writes down important information.
He consults the notebook, which says that the
Museum is on 53rd street, so he walks to 53rd
street and goes into the museum.
Extended Mental States
“Clearly, Otto walked to 53rd Street because he
wanted to go to the museum and he believed the
museum was on 53rd Street. And just as Inga had
her belief even before she consulted her memory,
it seems reasonable to say that Otto believed the
museum was on 53rd Street even before
consulting his notebook. For in relevant respects
the cases are entirely analogous: the notebook
plays for Otto the same role that memory plays
for Inga. The information in the notebook
functions just like the information constituting an
ordinary non-occurrent belief; it just happens
that this information lies beyond the skin.”
Extended Mental States
“Some will resist this conclusion. An opponent might
put her foot down and insist that as she uses the term
"belief", or perhaps even according to standard usage,
Otto simply does not qualify as believing that the
museum is on 53rd Street. We do not intend to debate
what is standard usage; our broader point is that the
notion of belief ought to be used so that Otto qualifies
as having the belief in question. In all important
respects, Otto's case is similar to a standard case of
(non-occurrent) belief. The differences between Otto's
case and Inga's are striking, but they are superficial. By
using the "belief" notion in a wider way, it picks out
something more akin to a natural kind. The notion
becomes deeper and more unified, and is more useful
in explanation.”
Extended Mental States
• To resist C & C’s conclusion, their opponent
must show that Otto’s and Inga’s cases differ
in some deep and relevant respect.
• Q: Is there any principled reason for
distinguishing what Otto keeps in his
notebook from what Inga keeps in her head.
Quiz
• What is C & C’s extended mind thesis?
• Give an example of one process and one state
that C & C would claim extends beyond the
boundaries of the skin & skull.