Public Goods
 Goods that are normally provided by Governments
 Goods that are not provided by the private market or
are insufficiently provided by the private market
 Goods that are non-rivaled: consumption of good
does not reduce availability of good for consumption
by others
 Goods that are non-exclusive: no one can be easily or
effectively prohibited from using the good
Type of Goods
Excludable
Non-Excludable
Rivalrous
Private Goods: food,
Clothing, cars, homes,
furniture, toys
Common goods: water,
fish, hunting game
Non-rivalous
Collective good: Cable,
Phone, Access to Internet
Public Goods:
National defense,
national parks, clean air,
clean oceans
Collective versus Individual Interests
 Global Politics revolves around one key problem:
 How can a group – such as two or more states – serve its
collective interests when doing so requires its members
to forego their national interests?

Example: Problem of global warning. Solving it can only be
achieved by many countries acting together.
 Collective goods problem
 The problem of how to provide something that benefits all
members of a group regardless of what each member contributes
to it
Free Rider Problem
 Free riders are those who consume more than their fair
share of the public good yet do not contribute their fair
share in providing it
1. National Defense: no one individual can be
excluded from being defended by a state’s military
forces
2. Public Parks: no one individual can be
excluded from its use regardless of his/her
contribution to its up-keep
Small Groups Versus Large Groups
 In general, collective goods are easier to provide in
small groups than large ones.
 Small group: defection (free riding) is harder to conceal and
has a greater impact on the overall collective good, and is
easier to punish.
 Collective goods problem occurs in all groups and
societies
 Particularly acute in global politics
 No central authority such as a world government to enforce on
individual nations the necessary measures to provide for the
common good
 Also acute for domestic politics of a state when de facto
sovereignty is weak, the state is failed, or widespread
corruption at the level of government
How can we assure that a Collective
Good is Provided Internationally
 Three basic principles offer possible solutions for this
core problem of getting individuals or states to
cooperate for the common good without a central
authority to make them do so.
 Dominance
 Reciprocity
 Identity
Table 1.1
Dominance
 Solves the collective goods problem by establishing a power
hierarchy in which those at the top control those below
 Status hierarchy


Symbolic acts of submission and dominance reinforce the hierarchy.
Hegemon
 The advantage of the dominance solution
 Forces members of a group to contribute to the common good
 Minimizes open conflict within the group
 Disadvantage of the dominance solution
 Stability comes at a cost of constant oppression of, and resentment
by, the lower-ranking members of the status hierarchy.
 Conflicts over position can sometimes harm the group’s stability
and well-being.
Reciprocity
 Solves the collective goods problem by rewarding
behavior that contributes to the group and
punishing behavior that pursues self-interest at
the cost of the group
 Easy to understand and can be “enforced” without any
central authority
 Positive and negative reciprocity
 Disadvantage: It can lead to a downward spiral as each
side punishes what it believes to be the negative acts of
the other.

Generally people overestimate their own good intentions and
underestimate those of opponents or rivals.
Identity
 Identity principle does not rely on self-interest.
 Members of an identity community care about the
interests of others in the community enough to
sacrifice their own interests to benefit others.
 Family, extended family, kinship group roots,
citizenship, ethnic/national identity
 In domestic and international politics, identity
communities play important roles in overcoming
difficult collective goods problems.
 Non-state actors also rely on identity politics.
Mancur Olsen and the Problem of
Collective Action
 The Logic of Collective Action (1968):
Mancur Olson argued that people have no reason to
join groups when the fruits of the group’s efforts are
available to nonmembers as well as members.
 F.ex.: Why should a worker join a union when the wage
rise it negotiates goes to all employees? Why should a
company pay a fee to join an industry association when
the benefits the group obtains will help all the firms in
that sector?
 Smart move: to free-ride
Problem of Collective Action
 Olson suggests that free riders do hinder collective
organization. He argues that interest groups will only
emerge in specific conditions.
 Membership is compulsory: closed shop
 When groups offer selective benefits, marked
members only, rather than collective goods for the
constituency at large
 Olson’s analysis poses the problem of collective
action—the difficulty of organizing rational actors to
achieve what is in their collective interest.