The Evolution of Deterrence
The McNamara Years
Robert S. McNamara

Secretary of Defense,
1961-1968
A new approach at DoD

McNamara applied techniques from the
private sector to manage, analyze, and
evaluate defense programs.
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planning-programming-budgeting system
(PPBS)
systems analysis
The “Whiz Kids”

McNamara brings in a new civilian team to
apply his more centralized, quantitative
approach.
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Cyrus Vance
William Bundy
Paul Nitze
John F. Kennedy

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
President, 1961-63.
Critical of Eisenhower
policies.
Under McNamara’s
guidance, his
administration
develops the policy of
“Flexible Response.”
Flexible Response

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The U.S. would develop the capacity to
meet Communist encroachments with an
appropriate level of force.
Included a more optimistic assessment of
the U.S. economy.

Greater defense spending could actually
stimulate the economy.
Appropriate levels of force?
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Nuclear
Conventional
Assistance to allies

Counter-insurgency
McNamara and Nuclear Weapons:
Two Issues

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Modernize U.S. strategic nuclear forces.
Limit damage to civilians (should war
occur).

Initial development of counterforce strategy
for U.S. nuclear forces.
McNamara rejects defense options

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Included civil defense and anti-ballistic
missiles (ABM’s)
Arguments against them:
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Soviets could overwhelm ABM systems by
building more missiles/warheads.
Such systems very expensive (about $40
billion each)
Soviets might interpret such programs as a
sign U.S. thought it could survive nuclear war.
The problems of counterforce
doctrine

If U.S. targeted Soviet military targets
after U.S.S.R. had launched a first strike,
the number of such targets was
exceedingly high.

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The about of damage would invariably kill
millions of Soviet civilians.
Developing such an ability would appear as if
the U.S. was building a first strike capability.
Assured Destruction

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McNamara seeks to avoid programs that
could be considered provocative.
Bolsters stability by emphasizing
survivability of U.S. nuclear arsenal and
capacity to retaliation.
Becomes known as assured destruction,
also mutually assured destruction, or MAD.
Such policy sought:
“…the ability to deter a deliberate nuclear
attack upon the United States or its allies by
maintaining at all times a clear and
unmistakable ability to inflict an unacceptable
degree of damage upon any aggressor…
even after absorbing a surprise first attack.”
Bolstering the U.S. nuclear arsenal

The strategic “triad”:
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ICBM’s
submarines with SLBM’s/FBM’s
manned bombers
Multiple, independently targetable re-entry
vehicles (MIRV’s)
Another means to address nuclear
weapons

Arms control:
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The U.S., U.S.S.R. and U.K. sign the
Limited Test Ban Treaty in October, 1963.
Agreed only conduct future nuclear tests
underground.
Currently 113 signatories.
The conventional side of
Flexible Response
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By developing conventional forces, U.S.
would be better able to deter or fight
conflicts without escalation to nuclear war.
McNamara proposes a “two-and-a-half
war” capability.
Of the increased funds devoted to
defense, 80% goes to developing
conventional forces.
Conventional force development

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Navy: maintains 24
carriers, updates
aviation.
Army: develops air
cavalry/air mobility
forces (helicopters),
reorganizes ground
divisions.
Counterinsurgency
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JFK gives attention to having the Army
develop its Special Forces.
Directs other agencies to enhance
counterinsurgency (CI) capabilities:
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CIA
U.S. Agency for International Development
U.S. Information Agency
Flexible Response and NATO

U.S. pushes to develop alliance’s
conventional capability
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DoD analyses determine actual Soviet threat
to Western Europe only 46 divisions, much
lower than “New Look” estimates.
NATO forces increase from 21 to 27 divisions,
up to 3,500 aircraft.
Fissures in the alliance
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Flexible response gave the impression that
the U.S. was backing away from a
commitment to use nuclear weapons in
Europe’s defense.
Said impression reinforced by other U.S
policies.
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Cancellation of a missile program to
modernize British bomber force.
Refusal to assist French development of
nucealr weapons.
France leaves NATO’s military
organization, 1966

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Pursues independent development of
atomic bomb.
Argues French nuclear forces enhance
credibility of deterrence (whereas Flexible
Response undermines it).
Tests of Flexible Response
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January 1961: Nikita
Khrushchev states
U.S.S.R. will support
“wars of national
liberation” and
support socialist
governments in the
Third World.
Bay of Pigs
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April 1961: CIA
arranges a landing of
anti-Castro exiles, in
anticipation of
provoking an uprising
against the Cuban
regime.
Invasion botched,
embarrasses Kennedy
Administration.
Berlin
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Communists build the
Berlin Wall.
South Vietnam

Special Forces
introduced in
November 1961
October 1962: The Cuban Missile Crisis