Nuclear Security Beyond 2012
R. Rajaraman
Emeritus Professor, J.N.U . New Delhi
Co-Chair, International Panel on Fissile Materials
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Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Drs. Ken Luongo and Alex
Toma, as well our Korean Hosts Drs. Jun BongGeun and Yoon Wan Ki for giving me this
opportunity to participate in this important
conference.
I recall with pleasure the last such conference
that Ken and Alex had invited me to, at
Washington, which was specially enlivened by
the fact that the big Summit also took place
around the same time, just a mile or so away in
another building !
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Some of my remarks will be of global relevance,
but others will be specially related to S. Asia.
This is in part because I seem to be the only
speaker from that region and should bring to
this group the perspective from there.
It is also because even from the global
perspective, S Asia poses special dangers and
problems regarding Fissile Materials (FM)
security.
Let me start by showing you how much FM
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India and Pakistan possess
HEU Stocks (1475 ±125 tons)
IPFM Annual Report 2010
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Global Separated Pu Stocks (485±15 tons)
IPFM Annual Report 2010
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Realism in nuclear security conclaves
 India, Pakistan and Israel have much less FM than
the P5 countries but beyond a certain point, “size does
not matter”.
 India-Pak each have about 100 weapons worth of
either HEU or Pu--- more than enough for someone to
pilfer one weapon’s worth
 Therefore to not include them in discussions of non
proliferation or FM security , just because they are not
NPT members, amounts to ignoring the new realities
of the nuclear world.
 It would surely not be the way to encourage their
cooperation.
 This where these Nuclear Security Summits take on6
special significance
Need for similar Summits in the Future
 The first Nuclear Security Summit hosted by President Obama
in 2010 at Washington was free of this drawback
 One of the laudable features of the Obama summit was its
inclusiveness and acceptance of de facto realism. Both India
and Pakistan were invited and were represented by their top
most leaders. ( Israel was invited too, but at the last minute Mr.
Netanyahu cancelled his participation)
 Therefore one must continue this series of summits---- both
because security of FM is so important and also for continuing
to provide such an inclusive forum
 Participation by the highest level leadership of each nation is
also a must, to maintain the importance of nuclear safety and
security as a major concern for mankind.
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FM security and Nuclear strategy
 An important ingredient for re-assuring the world that all FM are
secure, is transparency over the steps being taken.
 Although some countries (like the US) declare their stock of FM
without fearing that such revelation would significantly erode
their national security, others do not yet feel free to publicly
declare any information about their FM.
 This is true of India and Pakistan, which are continuing to
produce FM and assemble warheads, and also Israel, which is
decidedly opaque.
 There, and perhaps in China too, opacity on nuclear materials
is just part of the overall secrecy surrounding nuclear arsenals .
It is felt that public disclosure of FM stocks or even measures
to keep them secure would compromise their nuclear strategies
 Similar considerations also apply to potential nuclear powers
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nurturing such ambitions, even if not publicly.
 Some nations may be willing to make voluntary declarations
that they are taking full care of their FM, but if others seek
verifiability, these countries may not accede to that.
 Note however that despite their reluctance to declare the
amount of FM, or even the security measures they employ, my
guess is that all these nations hold their FM very securely. Their
FM are among their crown jewels and given the highest levels
of protection. This is true of India and, as of now, also of
Pakistan
 Therefore we must distinguish between the actual level of FM
security in some given country and transparency or verifiability
of their security measures.
 The latter may happen only when they feel that they have a big
enough arsenal and stock of FM for the security needs,
 And are more or less ready to go into a “disarmament mode”.
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NM security and Disarmament
Hence not only possession of FM, but even its
security is coupled to overall nuclear weapon
ambitions.
Simultaneous with exhorting nations to safely
keep their FM, the old campaign against
nuclear weapons must be revitalized.
This is happening a little, thanks to various new
initiatives towards a “World without Nukes” –
but only at the level of elite think tanks, and not
at the grass root level.
That is grossly in sufficient
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Public education, outreach, Anti nuclear NGOs
Nuclear weapons must be de-legitimized in the
eyes of the general public, especially in the new
and emerging nuclear nations.
That will be massive task among peoples that
have been accustomed to viewing these
weapons as symbols of status and security.
Co-opt and encourage anti nuclear activists and
NGO s-- at least those who are willing to go
beyond merely denouncing nuclear weapons
from the sidelines, and make a constructive
contribution to reducing nuclear dangers. 11
THANK YOU
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