Mandatory and voluntary
measures taken to deter attack
of Somali Based Pirates in the
high risk area and their
effectiveness
Author: Paraskevi Papasimakopoulou
Maritime Economist – MBA TQM
DPA –CSO at Oceanfleet Shippinng ltd
Purpose of the research
To take into account all measures
currently in place for combating Somalia
based piracy in the high risk area and
evaluate their effectiveness in the long
run.
Piracy Activity in the high risk area
• The High Risk Area is an area bounded by Suez and
the Strait of Hormuz to the North, 10South and 78
East. Pirates’ attacks have taken place at most
extremities of the high risk area.
• The level of pirate activity varies within the High Risk
Area due to changing weather conditions and activity
by Naval / Military forces.
• Pirates’ activity generally reduces in areas affected by
the South West monsoon, and increases in the period
following the monsoon. When piracy activity is reduced
in one area of the High Risk Area it is likely to increase
in another area
• According to official statistics, since 2009 to date, 123
vessels have been seized by pirates in a total of 549
attacks.
Indian Ocean High risk area source www.mschoa.org
How did the Somali based piracy start?
• the root cause of the Somali based piracy was the
presence of illegally placed foreign fishermen in the
Somali coast since the early nineties.
• Increasing number of Somali fishermen started to sail
further offshore and begun to chase away illegal foreign
fishing vessels. After the year 2005, Somali attacks took
a different form and began to go after any vulnerable
vessel (fishing or not) that moved in Somali waters.
• The eagerness of the earliest victims to pay rising ‘fines’
helped encourage the rising trend of 'ransom piracy',
reaching record levels around 2008/2009.
Why piracy in the Somali region is
different?
• Pirates attack the ship, mainly to capture it and its crew
for ransom, but also for robbery of belongings and
equipment onboard. Thus any successful acts of piracy
will inevitably result in a protracted period of captivity for
the crew onboard.
• Somali pirates consider the act of piracy as a business,
and recognize that unnecessary harm or injury to the
crew is counter-productive and may harm their
negotiations or the amount of ransom received. To date,
the level of violence against ships crews is relatively low
when compared to other regions around Africa.
Company and Master planning
procedures according to the Best
Management Practices
• The latest version of “Best Management
Practices 4”, dated August 2011, contains all the
Suggested Planning and Operational Practices
for Ship Operators and Masters of Ships
Transiting the High Risk Area.
Prior to transit the High Risk Area, ship operators
and Masters should carry out a thorough Risk
Assessment to assess the likelihood and
consequences of piracy attacks to the vessel, by
considering mainly the following factors:
• crew safety
• Vessel’s freeboard
• speed
• Sea state
Company planning procedure
• Registration with the MSC HOA prior to
vessel’s transit
• Review of Ship security Assessment (SSA)
and SSP by the CSO
• provide guidance to Master with regards
to the recommended route, plan and
“Ship protection measures” to be taken.
Ship’s Master planning procedure
prior to entering the high risk area
• Crew briefing on security measures and their
•
duties,
conduct of security drill and ssas testing
• preparation of an emergency communication
•
plan
cross checking with the company that the
vessel movement registration form is submitted
to the MSC HOA.
Ship’s Master planning procedure
upon entering the high risk area
• it is mandatory to ensure that a UKMTO ‘Vessel
Position Reporting Form’ - Initial Report is sent
by Master.
• Vessels are strongly encouraged to report daily
to the UKMTO by email at 08:00 hours GMT
whilst operating within the High Risk Area
• maintenance and engineering works should be
reduced to minimum and any work outside of
accommodation should be strictly controlled
Gulf of Aden transit and the use of
International Recommended
Transit Corridor
• In case of transiting through the Gulf of Aden, It
is strongly recommended that ships navigate
within the IRTC, where Naval/Military forces are
concentrated. The IRTC consists of east bound
and west bound corridors. The East bound
corridor starts at 45° East between 11°53’ &
11°48’North and terminates at 53° East between
14°23’ & 14°18’ North. The West bound corridor
starts at 53° East between 14°30’ & 14°25’
North and terminates at 45° East between
12°00’ & 11°55’ North.
International recommended transit
corridor source www.shipping.nato.int
Gulf of Aden Group transits
• Group Transits have been developed after
analysis of GOA pirate activity and are
designed to exploit the additional
protection and assurance that can be
gained from grouping vessels together
Ship protection measures according to
the Best Management Practices
• Increased watch keeping and enhanced vigilance
• Enhanced bridge protection
• Control of access to bridge accommodation and
machinery spaces
The use of physical barriers such as razor wire
•
• The use of water spray and foam monitors
• In case of attack evasive maneuvering at
•
increased speed
The establishment of a safe Muster point- CITADEL
The use of Privately contracted
unarmed and armed security
Guards
• The use, or not, of Private Maritime Security Contractors
onboard merchant vessels is a matter for individual ship
operators to decide following their own voyage risk
assessment and approval of respective Flag States
• Since 2012, the use of Privately Contracted Security
Guards either armed or unarmed remains the most
popular additional measure to prevent vessels from being
hijacked. According to statistics, those measures taken by
ship operators together with the increasing presence of
EU NAV forces in the area were proven to be effective as
the number of vessels being pirated has been significantly
reduced in 2012 only to 5 vessels against 25 vessels in
the previous year
Table 3: Somali based Piracy statistics
source www.eunavfor.eu
Suggested selection criteria of
Security Company
• The vessel operator in order to select a reliable
company and thus mitigate the risk of
unnecessary escalation should take into
consideration first of all the profile of the
members of security team: they should
preferably have ex navy and Special Forces
military background and great experience. They
must be well trained with regards to the use of
weapons and to the implementation of the isps
code and duly certified with regards to STCW,
yellow fever and first aid.
Suggested selection criteria of
Security Company
• Most flag administrations also require that the selected
private security services provider operates according to
an operation manual approved by the flag state.
• The selected company should be also able to provide
evidence that the weapons used are legally bought and
used
• Flag administrations request that a Private Maritime
Security Company has a clear policy and set of rules on
the use of force consistent with an international model
set of standards and has issued specific operating
procedures, as agreed between the PMSC, ship-owner,
and Master, to PCASP operating for them on the use of
force.
Major Conclusions
• Nowadays the shipping industry is in recession and
under huge cost pressure. Ship operators pay high
insurance premiums every time a vessel is transiting the
high risk area.
• The most effective counter-measures against Somalia
based pirates have proven to be the use of physical
barriers (such as razor wire), evasive maneuvering,
speed, the use of Citadels and last but not least the
presence of armed security guards
• there have been many unreported incidents where armed
guards thought of local fishermen for pirates and
attacked them. Therefore, it is of utmost importance the
selection of a reliable security company to avoid
unnecessary use of force and attacks to innocents.
Major Conclusions
• The reduced number of seized vessels does not
guarantee future reducing trend either, as the pirates
keep evolving: they are changing their tactics, have
increased their fire power, they attack in larger groups
and in case targeted vessel’s anti piracy measures are
proved to be weak, they are more persistent in order to
capture the vessel
• Root cause must be understood and addressed in order
for the Somali based piracy to be successfully combated.
The use of all previously mentioned measures actually
faces the consequence but the previously referred root
cause still remains and should be eliminated in order to
resolve this problem.
Thank you for your attention!