IMMIGRATION INTEGRATION
AND SOCIAL COHESION IN EUROPE
Conference on trends in immigration and approaches to the integration of
immigrants in Europe.
Prague, Thursday, 16 February 2012.
Demographic Challenges for the 21st Century –
Europe in global context.
D.A. Coleman
Oxford Centre for Population Research
Challenges for Europe in the era of
‘demographic maturity’
Population ageing
Population decline
Marginalisation on the world stage
Fragmentation of family
Immigration and ethnic diversity
The future of population-what we think we
know
All population projections are always wrong.
What matters is how wrong.
Some good bets for the future:
World population will increase by about 3 billion.
Almost all that will be in the urban third world.
Almost all birth rates will stay low or decline.
Almost all populations are getting older.
Europe will decline demographically
Europe will become less ‘European’.
The 21st century has two problems at once: rapid
increase in poorest countries; rapid ageing and (?)
decline in Europe and other rich countries.
The longer-term future of population: what we
know we don’t know.
Effects of global warming on population.
Why does anyone ever have any children?
What are the limits to lifespan, if any?
World population projections 2010 - 2100 and estimates 1950-2010 (thousands).
Source: UN variant projections 2010-based.
30000
25000
Medium variant
High variant
20000
Low variant
Constant rates
15000
10000
5000
2100
2094
2088
2082
2076
2070
2064
2058
2052
2046
2040
2034
2028
2022
2016
2010
2004
1998
1992
1986
1980
1974
1968
1962
1956
0
1950
population (millions)
Variant world population projections, 2010based (millions). Source: United Nations 2011.
Forecast distribution of world population (a
‘probabilistic’ projection)
Source: Lutz, 2009
Who inherits the Earth?
Population projections 2010-2100 and estimates 1950-2010, selected major regions and countries (millions).
Source: UN 2010-based projections.
3500
3000
Sub-Saharan Africa
India
China
Europe
Pakistan
Brazil
Japan
USA
2000
1500
1000
500
2100
2094
2088
2082
2076
2070
2064
2058
2052
2046
2040
2034
2028
2022
2016
2010
2004
1998
1992
1986
1980
1974
1968
1962
1956
0
1950
Population (millions)
2500
No such thing as ‘Europe’? Population estimates
and projections, European regions and USA 1950 – 2010.
Source UN 2010-based projections.
500
Population estimates and projections, European regions and USA 1950 - 2100 (millions). Source: United Nations
2010-based projections
450
USA
Eastern Europe
Western Europe
Southern Europe
Northern Europe
400
350
OXPOP
300
250
200
150
100
50
Estimates
Projections
2097
2090
2083
2076
2069
2062
2055
2048
2041
2034
2027
2020
2013
2006
1999
1992
1985
1978
1971
1964
1957
1950
0
A closer view – selected Southern and
Western European populations 1950-2050
Projection, total population, major European countries 1950 - 2050 (thousands),
Source: UN 2008 World Population Prospects (pre-publication data)
90,000
80,000
Estimate
70,000
Projection
60,000
50,000
40,000
30,000
Germany
Italy
France
United Kingdom
Spain
2050
2045
2040
2035
2030
2025
2020
2015
2010
2005
2000
1995
1990
1985
1980
1975
1970
1965
1960
1955
1950
20,000
Population estimates and projections, Central and
Eastern Europe 1950 – 2100.
Source: United Nations 2010.
45
Population estimates and projections, Central and Eastern Europe 1950 - 2100 (millions).
40
OXPOP
35
Poland
Czech Republic
Belarus
Bulgaria
30
Romania
Hungary
Slovakia
25
20
15
10
5
Estimates
Projections
2097
2090
2083
2076
2069
2062
2055
2048
2041
2034
2027
2020
2013
2006
1999
1992
1985
1978
1971
1964
1957
1950
0
Fertility rates – the basic driver of population
ageing and its international divergence.
TFR trends Major Regions 1950 - 2009
3.5
unweighted means. Source: Council of Europe, Eurostat, national statistical offices
CEE unweighted mean
Southern unweighted mean
FSU unweighted mean (excluding Moldova)
Northern Europe
Western Europe
USA
3.0
2.5
2.0
2008
2006
2004
2002
2000
1998
1996
1994
1992
1990
1988
1986
1984
1982
1980
1978
1976
1974
1972
1970
1968
1966
1964
1962
1960
1958
1956
1954
1952
1.0
1950
1.5
Birth rates can go up as well as down
Total Fertility trends, industrial higher-fertility countries 1945-2010
4.5
Source: Council of Europe, Eurostat and national statistical yearbooks
4.0
Denmark
France
3.5
NZ
USA
3.0
Norway
United Kingdom
2.5
2.0
1.5
2008
2005
2002
1999
1996
1993
1990
1987
1984
1981
1978
1975
1972
1969
1966
1963
1960
1957
1954
1951
1948
1945
1.0
Total fertility, Central and Eastern Europe 1945 – 2010.
Source; Council of Europe, Eurostat, national statistical offices.
4.0
Total fertility, Central and Eastern Europe, 1945 - 2010. Source: Ceouncil of Europe, Eurostat, national statistical
offices.
3.5
Belarus
Bulgaria
Czech Republic
East Germany
Hungary
Poland
Romania
Russia
Slovak Republic
Ukraine
3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
OXPOP
2008
2005
2002
1999
1996
1993
1990
1987
1984
1981
1978
1975
1972
1969
1966
1963
1960
1957
1954
1951
1948
1945
0.5
Things aren’t as bad as they seem…
Comparison of actual (2008) and adjusted (2005-7) TFR, selected countries. Arranged by order of adjusted TFR.
Adjustment by Bongaarts-Feeney method
2.5
Actual total fertility
Adjusted total fertility
OXPOP
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
Japan
Italy
Greece
Germany
Hungary
Slovakia
Austria
Bulgaria
Czech Republic
Finland
Denmark
UK
France
0.0
Longer lives and good health – for some
Current Western demographic trends mostly very
favourable, including ‘oldest-old’ (e.g France
2009 e0m = 78; e0f = 85).
Divergent trends in CEE, former Soviet Union.
Education important for healthy old age.
No upper limit evident in life expectancy.
Biological views less optimistic, and new threats
(e.g. obesity).
Male expectation of life at birth, trends 1945-2010, selected
European countries.
80
Switzerland
Source: Eurostat and national statistical offices.
Expectation of life at birth, males, selected European countries 1945 - 2010
United Kingdom
France
Poland
75
Hungary
Czech Republic
Belarus
70
Russia
Ukraine
65
60
OXPOP
2009
2007
2005
2003
2001
1999
1997
1995
1993
1991
1989
1987
1985
1983
1981
1979
1977
1975
1973
1971
1969
1967
1965
1963
1961
1959
1957
1955
1953
1951
1949
1947
1945
55
Expectation of life at birth , males, Europe 2008.
Quintiles. Source: WHO
Life expectancy at birth, in years, male
Upper
4-th
3-rd
2-nd
European Region
72.07
2008
Lower
No data
Min = 61.91
Evolution of age-structure through the demographic transition: an
example. Austria – from 19th c. Christmas tree to 21st c. coffin.
1: 1869, 1910, 1934.
Source: Demografische Informationen 1995/6 page 109.
Evolution of age-structure in Austria 2: effects of the
catastrophic early 20th century and the post-war ‘baby boom’
1951, 1971, 1995.
Evolution of age-structure in Austria - the projected effects of
continued sub-replacement fertility. Further ageing, decline,
and the extinction of the ‘boom’ generations.
2015, 2030, 2050.
Population change in selected European countries 2008 - 2055, percent,
with and without migration. Source: Eurostat 2007
30
Percent projected population change
with migration
Percent projected population change
without migration
20
10
-20
-30
Germany
Italy
Netherlands
Finland
Denmark
France
Spain
UK
Sweden
-10
Norway
0
Problematic aspects of population ageing
Lower birth and death rates increase the aged
dependency ratio, only partly relieved by lighter
youth dependency ratio.
Generally adverse effects on economic production /
consumption balance; lower economic growth
than previously.
Specific problems: labour shortage, possible
inflation, care arrangements for elderly, adequacy
of pension provisions, possibly a less creative
older workforce.
Population growth does not stop population ageing.
Projections of changing balance between
(notionally) productive and non-productive
age-groups of the population
Aged potential support ratios 2010, 2060 assuming constant nominal working age 20-64. Source: calculated from UN
2010.
9.0
8.0
7.0
Aged potential support ratio
Potential Support Ratio 2010
6.0
Potential Support Ratio 2060
5.0
4.0
3.0
2.0
1.0
0.0
Japan
Italy
Germany
France
UK
Norway
Poland
Russia
South
Korea
China
Lower birth rates bring more severe ageing.
Total fertility rate in 2010 and projected aged potential support ratio in
2060, selected developed countries. Source; data from UN 2010.
Total fertility rate 2010 and potential support ratio 2060.
4
USA
3.5
R2 = 0.6403
Belgium
Netherlands
support ratio 2060
3
Czech Republic
Russia
2.5
UK
Norway
France
Switzerland
China
Germany
2
Poland
Italy
South Korea
Japan
1.5
1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
1.7
1.8
Total fertility rate 2010
1.9
2
2.1
2.2
A worst case scenario : from ‘bonus’ to
‘onus’. Taiwan 2010, 2060.
Source: Basten 2011 and Taiwan national statistical office.
100
95
90
85
80
75
70
65
60
55
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
2060
2060
2010
2010
females
males
250
200
150
100
50
0
50
population, '000s
100
150
200
250
Can higher fertility ‘solve’ population ageing?
Replacement TFR (2.05) without migration
would eventually maintain population size
and keep PSR to about 2.0. If no net
migration, no long-term population growth.
But TFR would need to rise to about 3.5 to
restore PSR to about 4 even by 2071, and to
5.5 to restore PSR by mid-century.
That would generate unsustainable population
growth.
UK 2001-2100. Can immigration protect us from
ageing? Population size consequent upon
‘replacement migration’ to preserve UK current
support ratio of 4.1. Source: GAD.
UK population size (millions) implied by levels of migration required to maintain given levels of
potential aged support ratio (PSR), 1998 - 2100. Source: unpublished projections by GAD - see Coleman (2002b)
350
PSR = 3.0
PSR = 3.5
PSR = 4.2
250
200
150
100
2100
2090
2080
2070
2060
2050
2040
2030
2025
2020
2015
2010
2005
0
2000
50
1998
population (millions)
300
Demography isn’t everything
Ageing Vulnerability Index 2003
Overall Index
Rank
Australia
UK
US
Canada
Sweden
Japan
Germany
Netherlands
Belgium
France
Italy
Spain
Score
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
Public
Fiscal
Benefit
Elder
Burden
Room
Dependence
Affluence
Rank
Rank
Rank
Rank
-1
7
18
42
48
50
52
62
63
81
84
93
weight
Source: Jackson and Howe 2003, Figure 18
2
1
3
6
4
9
7
8
5
10
11
12
1/3
2
1
4
6
3
9
5
7
8
10
11
12
1/3
4
6
3
5
8
1
11
9
10
12
2
7
1/6
6
11
1
2
10
3
5
4
9
8
12
7
1/6
Migration flows to European Union and USA
Net immigation to EU-15, EU27 and gross inflow to the USA, 1960 - 2008
(thousands)
2500
Net immigration to EU-15
Persons accepted for permanent residence, USA (gross inflow)
2000
Net immigration to EU27
1500
1000
500
0
2006
2004
2002
2000
1998
1996
1994
1992
1990
1988
1986
1984
1982
1980
1978
1976
1974
1972
1970
1968
1966
1964
1962
1960
-500
Gross migration flow to France 2005, by reason for
admission (%).
France 2005. Immigration (gross inflow)
according to reason for admission (percent).
Student Worker Family Other
EEA
3
37
10
50
Non-Europe
26
5
50
19
All
21
11
42
25
All
100
100
100
Source: INED
Note: 'Other' includes inactive, retired, refugee. Percent by purpose excludes minors (about 8% of total).
Switzerland and Turkey omitted. 12% of total; mostly Turkey, 39% for family reasons.
Percent
by area
21
79
100
Net migration per thousand population, Czech
Republic and selected European countries.
Source: Eurostat
Net immigration per thousand population, selected European countries 1990 - 2009. Source: Eurostat.
20
Switzerland
United Kingdom
Netherlands
Germany
Czech Republic
10
5
-10
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
1993
1992
-5
1991
0
1990
Net immigration per thousand population
15
Comparison of live births, natural increase and net
immigration, selected Western countries 2008.
sources: Eurostat, national statistical offices.
Population
Live
Natural
Net
1st Jan 08
births
increase
immigration
Immigrants
as percent
of births
data in thousands
44475
488
107
702
7509
74
13
69
59131
563
-7
494
Norway
4681
58
17
40
Belgium
10585
121
20
62
Austria
8299
76
2
31
Greece
11172
110
2
41
5447
64
8
20
UK
60817
771
195
175
France mét
61538
784
268
70
Germany
82315
683
-141
48
144
93
88
69
51
41
37
31
23
9
7
Euro total
355968
3792
483
1752
46
Australia
21015
285
145
213
Canada
33311
357
127
204
New Zealand
4263
64
35
4
United States
298363
4217
1840
844
75
57
6
20
Spain
Switzerland
Italy
Denmark
Ethnic change – the USA in the lead
projected 2010-2050
Population projections of the United States by race and Hispanic origin,
2010 - 50 (percent).
Source: US Census Bureau 2008. Note - persons with more than one origin not included (3% in 2050).
70
non-Hispanic White
All minority groups
primarily immigrant-origin minorities
Black
Indigenous
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
2010
2015
2020
2025
2030
2035
2040
2045
2050
Comparison of projections of foreign-origin
populations in Europe
(percent of total population 2000 – 2050).
Projected growth of population of immigrant or foreign origin 2000-2050,
selected countries, as percent of total population.
35
30
Germany medium variant
USA medium variant (excludes black population)
Netherlands base scenario
Denmark 2002- based medium variant
Sweden foreign background 2004 based
Austria 'Compensating' scenario, no naturalisation.
percent
25
20
15
10
5
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
2025
2030
2035
2040
2045
2050
Current unions outside own group, Great Britain 199196, 1997-02 (percent).
40
35
30
percent
25
20
15
10
5
0
BlackCaribbean
Black-African
Women 1991-1996
Indian
Women 1997-2002
Pakistani
Bangladeshi
Men 1991-1996
Chinese
Men 1997-2002
The faces of the future?
An end to ‘ethnic’ categories? The rise of mixed populations.
Probabilistic projections of the UK 2001- 2100, average outcome for major groups
(percent).
UK Version 2 probabilistic projection: mean of percent of each major ethnic
group in the total population, 2001 - 2100.
100
90
80
70
60
White
50
Black
Asian
40
Mixed
30
20
10
2100
2095
2090
2085
2080
2075
2070
2065
2060
2055
2050
2045
2040
2035
2030
2025
2020
2015
2010
2005
2001
0
Concluding points
Population ageing inevitable, and relative decline of ‘1st
world’:
Major demographic losers (Germany, Russia, Ukraine,
Japan), and winners (Asia, Africa, USA).
In long run economic, military and strategic rank should
follow population size (cf. India and China), as in the past.
Fastest growth in the poorest countries risks serious security
and environmental problems, which may affect Europe.
Population of UK and NW Europe growing substantially.
Population ageing manageable, but much more difficult when
birth rates are low, as in Central / Eastern Europe.
Migration pressure on Western countries will persist for
decades, may lead to ethnic transformation.
Climate change on a collision course with population growth.
In the long run, equilibrium position of birth and death rates
(if any) is unknown.
World population may decline after about 2070.