SEBA

advertisement
国际管理
International Management
刘松柏
北京师范大学
Email: [email protected]
电话:58808163
2
SEBA
第九章 国际企业的控制管理
北京师范大学
经管学院
本章要点:
国际控制的目的、任务与特点
 国际控制的类型
 国际企业控制的方法
 国际企业政治风险控制与管理

Prof. Dr. LIU Songbai, Email:[email protected]
BNU, SEBA
3
SEBA
北京师范大学
经管学院
第一节 国际控制概述
一、控制的含义


战略控制:基本任务是利用组织(企业)现
有和潜在的优势,保证组织(企业)得以长
期生存和发展。
经营控制:主要任务则主要与赢利和绩效有
关。经营控制主要针对企业的经营过程,分
析企业活动的经济性和赢利性,分析成本与
效益的关系,监控产品的数量和质量,参与
策略计划和运营计划以及预算的制定等。
Prof. Dr. LIU Songbai, Email:[email protected]
BNU, SEBA
4
二、国际控制的目的与任务
SEBA
北京师范大学
经管学院
1. 目的
 确保企业目标及其计划的实现
 确保企业战略计划的有效实施和企业长期的
生存与发展
 减少企业外部环境的不确定性,保证企业各
要素的协调发展和企业目标的实现
Prof. Dr. LIU Songbai, Email:[email protected]
BNU, SEBA
5
SEBA
北京师范大学
经管学院
2. 任务

协调 子公司与母公司的目标与计划,保
证企业整体战略的一致性;
 监控 子公司的目标实现过程,及时发现
子公司的优势与劣势,发现子公司偏离母
公司目标和计划的问题,采取有效措施,
纠正偏差;
 减轻子公司管理人员的税务工作负担;
 为子公司提供信息和管理 咨询 ,以支持
子公司的经营管理工作。
Prof. Dr. LIU Songbai, Email:[email protected]
BNU, SEBA
6
SEBA
北京师范大学
经管学院
三、国际控制的特点
1.复杂性
• 面对不同国家通货膨胀率、利率、汇率
• 面对不同国家的财务报告体系
• 结算时复杂的分析和换算工作
Prof. Dr. LIU Songbai, Email:[email protected]
BNU, SEBA
7
安然公司与美国的财务报告体系
SEBA
北京师范大学
经管学院
美国的安然(Enron)公司是美国最大的天然气采
购商及出售商,全美第七大公司,位居世界500强
强20位。2001年12月2日申请法庭的破产保护。破
产前有312亿的沉重债务。
美国的和财务报告体系一直被公认为是全世界最健
全、最有效的。但安然公司的破产使美国的财务报
告体系受到怀疑,并导致了对美国财务报告制度的
讨论。
美国的会计准则对与合作伙伴通过战略联合、合资
经营、合作合伙制企业等进行经营活动或者不要求
企业在合并财务报表中报告,或者只做很松散的报
告要求,以至于给企业造假的机会。
Prof. Dr. LIU Songbai, Email:[email protected]
BNU, SEBA
8
SEBA
北京师范大学
经管学院
安然公司的大量能源交易活动也是通过与合伙
者建立特殊目的实体(special purpose
entities,SPEs)进行的,但它长期在它的合并
财务报表上隐瞒它在SPEs中的负债。
美国现行的财务报告体系只要求企业披露其资
产、负债、盈利和现金流的风险,而基本上忽
略了因使用金融工具而引起的风险。投资者也
就无法评估企业的整体风险。
Prof. Dr. LIU Songbai, Email:[email protected]
BNU, SEBA
9
SEBA
北京师范大学
经管学院
国际财务报告准则
2005年起国际财务报告准则将在欧盟正式实行
国际财务报告准则的付诸实施,必然会给那些
目前仍然采用本国会计准则的企业带来严峻的
挑战。
目前,所有的欧盟上市公司正在加快迈向国际
财务报告准则的步伐。在其他一些国家,比如
俄罗斯和澳大利亚,也已经展开相应的部署工
作。
Prof. Dr. LIU Songbai, Email:[email protected]
BNU, SEBA
10
SEBA
北京师范大学
经管学院
三、国际控制的特点(续)
2.困难性
• 母公司与子公司控制权限的配置与权衡问题
• 要面对因跨国界和跨文化的经营带来的地理
距离和文化距离问题
• 很难确定母公司与子公司或它在全球不同国
家的子公司的统一评价标准
Prof. Dr. LIU Songbai, Email:[email protected]
BNU, SEBA
11
SEBA
北京师范大学
经管学院
国际控制易发生的问题
足国
外
生
产
设
施
开
工
不
立在
过同
多一
的国
经家
营或
实地
体区
成
Prof. Dr. LIU Songbai, Email:[email protected]
盾用 子
与与 公
冲收 司
突益 和
分母
配公
上司
的在
矛费
市各
场子
和公
客司
户或
分
部
争
夺
BNU, SEBA
12
SEBA
第二节 国际控制的类型
北京师范大学
经管学院
一、内部控制与外部控制,直接控制
与间接控制
内部控制
外部控制
直接控制(会议,视察,外派,组织结构)
间接控制
Prof. Dr. LIU Songbai, Email:[email protected]
BNU, SEBA
The Impact of Internal and ExternalOriented Cultures on the Control Process
Key Differences between
Internal Control
External Control
Often dominating attitude
bordering on aggressiveness
towards the environment.
Conflict and resistance means
that a person has convictions.
The focus is on self, function,
one’s own group, and one’s
own organization.
Often flexible attitude, willing
to compromise and keep the
peace.
Harmony, responsiveness, and
sensibility are encouraged.
The focus is on others such as
customers, partners, and
colleagues.
Tips for Doing Business with
Internally Control (for
Externals)
Playing “hard ball” is
legitimate to test the
resilience of an opponent.
It is most important to “win
your objective.”
Win some, lose some.
Externally Control (for
Internals)
Softness, persistence,
politeness, and long, long
patience will get rewards.
It is most important to
maintain one’s relationships
with others.
Win together, lose apart.
Source: Riding the Waves of Culture: Understanding Diversity in
Global Business, 2nd ed. McGraw-Hill, 1988, pp. 160-161
15
SEBA
北京师范大学
经管学院
二、会计控制、活动控制和管理系
统控制
1.会计控制:历史导向型控制
2.活动控制:未来导向型控制
3.管理系统控制:系统导向型控制
Prof. Dr. LIU Songbai, Email:[email protected]
BNU, SEBA
表9-1亨茨勒(Henzler)的三种控制类型
控制类型
历史导向和会计
导向型控制
未来导向和活动
导向型控制
管理系统导向
型控制
特征
提供的信息
具有记录、面向
过去、按准则行
事和准确性的特
征
具有支持论证和
决策、面向未来,
速度先于准确性
的特征
除未来导向和
活动导向外,
强调管理知识
的重要性
系统导向和跨职
能性
不具备
部分具备
工作重点
与企业其它部门
的关系
无
作为发现重大职
能冲突的“侦探”
强调服务意识,
从事控制、批
评和制裁工作
与传统控制相对
应的岗位
财务部门主管
财务部门主管,
企业财务主管
针对日益复杂
和动态发展的
企业业务设立
的新岗位
资料来源:H. Henzler, Der Januskopf muß weg, in: Wirtschaftswoche, Heft 38/1974, p. 60-63.
17
SEBA
北京师范大学
经管学院
村德的三种控制类型
记录人-环境相对稳定的企业
领航人-环境变化较大的企业
创新者-环境变化特别大的企业
Prof. Dr. LIU Songbai, Email:[email protected]
BNU, SEBA
18
SEBA
北京师范大学
经管学院
三、标准化控制与差异化控制,集权式
控制与分权式控制
1.标准化控制与差异化控制
 标准化控制的特征 差异化控制的特征
 范围-统一控制
重点-区别控制
 机构-集权控制
工具-不同工具
 人员-母国中心
时空-时空不同
 绩效-基本相同
人员-东道国中心
Prof. Dr. LIU Songbai, Email:[email protected]
BNU, SEBA
19
SEBA
北京师范大学
经管学院
2.集权式控制与分权式控制
集权式控制
优点:利用专业知识;保证一致性与协调性
 缺点:足够的外派人员;缺少子公司的配合;
少考虑子公司的特殊性

分权式控制
优点:子公司的支持;母子公司信息沟通
 缺点:实施统一的控制方案

Prof. Dr. LIU Songbai, Email:[email protected]
BNU, SEBA
20
SEBA
北京师范大学
经管学院
四、产出控制与行为控制,层级制控制
与文化控制
1.产出控制与行为控制
产出控制:包括对资产负债、销售数据、
生产数据、生产规模和人员的绩效等方
面的控制。
行为控制:是国际企业通过对国外子公
司组织成员行为事先或事后施加影响而
实施的控制。
Prof. Dr. LIU Songbai, Email:[email protected]
BNU, SEBA
21
SEBA
北京师范大学
经管学院
2.层级制控制与文化控制
层级制控制:是通过正式的组织结构和
一整套明确的规章制度以保证控制目标
实现的过程。
文化控制:是通过非正式组织和利用企
业成员中共享的行为准则和管理哲学来
实现的控制过程。
Prof. Dr. LIU Songbai, Email:[email protected]
BNU, SEBA
表9-2 层级制控制与文化控制机制比较
控制对象
控制类型
纯层级制控制
纯文化控制
产出
正式的各种运营绩效报告
共享的行为准则
行为
公司政策,公司守则与规
章
共享的管理哲学
资料来源:B. R. Baliga and A. M. Jaeger, “Multinational Corporations: Control Systems
and Delegation Issues”, Journal of International Business Studies 15 (Fall 1984), pp. 2540.
23
SEBA
北京师范大学
经管学院
控制工具——层级制控制
计划与预算体系
职能报告
政策与规章
Prof. Dr. LIU Songbai, Email:[email protected]
BNU, SEBA
表 9-3 跨国公司的职能报告类型
U.S. MNCs(33) German MNCs(44) Japanesse MNCs(40)
97
49
42
91
49
42
Type of Report
 Balance sheet
 Profit and loss
statements
 Production
94
50
47
output
 Market share
70
48
31
 Cash and
100
41
39
credit
statement
 Inventory
88
46
38
levels
 Sales per
88
37
44
product
 Perfermance
9
15
2
review of
personnel
 Report on local
33
32
12
economic and
political
conditions
资料来源:A. R. Negandhi and M. Welge, Beyond Theory Z, JAI, 1984/18.
25
SEBA
北京师范大学
经管学院
控制工具——文化控制
对员工的仔细甄别与培训
建立自我控制机制
Prof. Dr. LIU Songbai, Email:[email protected]
BNU, SEBA
26
SEBA
第三节 国际企业控制的方法
北京师范大学
经管学院
一、传统的控制方法
1.预算控制
2.非预算控制
二、现代控制方法
1.股东价值法(Shareholder value)
2.绩效衡量法-平衡计分卡(Balanced
Scorecard,BSC)
Prof. Dr. LIU Songbai, Email:[email protected]
BNU, SEBA
27
SEBA
北京师范大学
经管学院
股东价值法
以经济效用值为基础,根据股东未来可
能以红利、资本返还或股票价值提高等
形式得到的收益进行计算得。
优点:保证管理人员的稳定性
Prof. Dr. LIU Songbai, Email:[email protected]
BNU, SEBA
平衡计分卡法
资料来源:www.balancedscorecard.org,Balanced Scorecard Institute,Paul Arveson, 1998
29
SEBA
平衡计分卡
北京师范大学
经管学院
客 户
-价格指数
-客户群分类调
查
-客户满意度
-市场份额
财 务
-资本收益率
-现金流量
-项目回报率
-收益预测的可信度
-未完成的合同
学习与成长
(创新与知识)
-提供的新服务在所得
收益中所占比例
-改善程度
-员工行为调查
-员工提出的建议数量
-员工人均销售额
Prof. Dr. LIU Songbai, Email:[email protected]
企业内部
业务流程
-使客户接受新项目所需
要的时间
-供给效果
-后期加工范围
-安全度清单
-项目结果清单
-所提交项目的排序
BNU, SEBA
30
SEBA
北京师范大学
经管学院
BSC的优点
财务指标与非财务指标之间的平衡
长期目标与短期目标之间的平衡
内部衡量与外部衡量之间的平衡
成果与成果的执行动因之间的平衡
管理业绩与经营业绩之间的平衡
Prof. Dr. LIU Songbai, Email:[email protected]
BNU, SEBA
31
SEBA
北京师范大学
经管学院
Case 1
Spain
Spain, which covers 195,000 square miles, is
located on the Iberian peninsula at the
southwest corner of Europe; its southernmost
tip is directly across from Morocco. The
country has a population of approximately 40
million and a gross domestic product of about
$570 billion($14,250 per capita). Until the mid1990s, Spain, known for its sunny climate,
colorful bullfights, and storybook castles, was
Prof. Dr. LIU Songbai, Email:[email protected]
BNU, SEBA
32
SEBA
北京师范大学
经管学院
one of the most underdeveloped countries in
Western Europe. Now, it is an industrialized
country whose economy relies heavily on
trade, manufacturing, and agriculture. Many
of the old Spanish customs, such as taking a
siesta (nap or rest) after lunch, are less
common. The democratic government uses a
constitutional monarchy, which was
Prof. Dr. LIU Songbai, Email:[email protected]
BNU, SEBA
33
SEBA
北京师范大学
经管学院
Adopted in 1978, in which the king is head
of state and commander-in-chief of the
armed forces, but the legislative power
rests in a bicameral parliament consisting
of a Congress of Deputies and a Senate.
Investors Limited, a partnership based in
Hong Kong and headed by Stanley Wong,
owns 17 medium and large hotels
throughout Asia and a total of 9 others
Prof. Dr. LIU Songbai, Email:[email protected]
BNU, SEBA
34
SEBA
北京师范大学
经管学院
throughout the United Kingdom, France, and
Germany. The group now plans on buying a large
hotel in Madrid. This hotel was built at the turn
of the century but was completely refurbished in
1990 at a cost of $20 million. The current owners
have since decided that the return on investment,
which has been averaging 5.2 percent annually, is
too small to justify continuing the operation.
They have offered the
Prof. Dr. LIU Songbai, Email:[email protected]
BNU, SEBA
35
SEBA
北京师范大学
经管学院
Hotel to the Wong group for $60 million.
One-half is payable immediately, and the
rest will be paid in equal annual installments
over 5 years.
Stanley Wong believes that this is a good
investment and has suggested to his partners
they accept the offer. “Europe is going to
boom during the new millennium,” he told
Prof. Dr. LIU Songbai, Email:[email protected]
BNU, SEBA
36
SEBA
北京师范大学
经管学院
them, “and Spain is going to be an excellent
investment. This hotel is one of the finest in
Madrid, and we are going to more than
triple our investment by the end of the
decade.”
In the past, the partnership has handled
all hotel investments in the same way. A
handful of company-appointed managers
Prof. Dr. LIU Songbai, Email:[email protected]
BNU, SEBA
37
SEBA
北京师范大学
经管学院
are sent in to oversee general operations
and monitor financial performance, and all
other matters continue to be handled by
those personnel who have been with the
hotel before acquisition. The investment
group intends to handle the Madrid
operation in the same way. “The most
important thing,” Stanley noted recently,
Prof. Dr. LIU Songbai, Email:[email protected]
BNU, SEBA
38
SEBA
北京师范大学
经管学院
“is costs and return on investment. If we do
that and continue to offer the best possible
service, we’ll come out just fine.”
www.docuweb.ca/sispain
Prof. Dr. LIU Songbai, Email:[email protected]
BNU, SEBA
39
SEBA
北京师范大学
经管学院
Questions
1. Do you think the Wong group, in running the
hotel, should use centralized or decentralized
decision making?
2.What types of control might the Wong group
use?
3.What are some likely differences between the
control measures that the Wong group would use
and those that typically are used in countries such
as Spain?
Prof. Dr. LIU Songbai, Email:[email protected]
BNU, SEBA
Case 2
Who Killed Barings Bank?
In February 1995, London-based Barings, an
international investment bank with a 200-year
tradition of providing financial services throughout
the world, died an untimely death following the
discovery of a $1.4 billion loss at one of its
subsidiaries, Baring Futures Singapore(BFS). Most
of that loss was attributed to the questionable
dealings of a Singapore-based derivates trader
named Nick Leeson. A month earlier, it had been
revealed that Leeson had imperiled Barings by
taking large trading positions in Japan’s Nikkel
Index futures. Examiners also uncovered fictitious
accounts Leeson had set up to cover his huge
trading losses. But Nick Leeson was not the only
Cause of the demise of prestigious Barings Bank.
Barings’ death is an excellent example the ultimate
cost of a lack of management controls.
In Singapore, government-hired auditors “found the
fall of Baring Futures Singapore was caused by
‘institutional incompetence,’ lack of understanding of
futures business among senior executives, and a ‘total
failure of internal controls.” The report also claimed
that Barings CEO Peter Norris and other top officers
not only tried to conceal Leeson’s unauthorized
dealings but also played down their significance.
In early 1993, Leeson had become BFS’s general
manager. Sometime later, he opened a special account,
to conceal unauthorized trading. Leeson is said to
have hidden the activity of his special account from
his London superiors by creating fictitious accounts
to cover huge losses until the market improved. Then,
panicked by a continuing plunge in the Tokyo futures
market, Leeson according to one source, began
“doubling his bets in desperation.”
In July and August 1994, an internal audit by
Barings officials identified possible control problems
at BFS. This report noted that Leeson supervised
both the front and back offices at BFS, which allowed
him both to make trades and to settle them. At first,
Barings management in London did little,
if anything, to rectify the situation. It seems that
London feared that attempting to control BFS’s
operations might slow Barings’ aggressive global
expansion.Moreover, some London executives were
too involved with a planned restructuring of BFS
and/or intoxicated by their own prospective
handsome annual bonuses to question Leeson’s
methods. Much of the money for those bonuses
was generated by the Singapore subsidiary, which
had provided almost two-thirds of Barings’ total
profit for the year. Indeed, Leeson could claim to
have made nearly $30 million of the subsidiary’s
$157 million profit.
Because BFS was expected by London to produce
disproportionately large profits from a relatively
small capital base, Leeson strove not only to please
his bosses but also to boost his own economic and
social standing. A report issued later by the Bank of
England’s Board of Banking Supervisions
speculated that had Leeson been successful, “he and
his team would have received $24 million in
bonuses.”
Officials in Singapore claimed that Leeson
“dominated the the staff at BFS, who did his
bidding, sometimes falsifying reports and
transferring trades between Barings accounts.”
Barings management, however, consistently
contended that they had no knowledge of false
accounts. This discrepancy, continues the Singapore
report, raises the question of how Mr. Leeson had
obtained over $1.2 billion from the Barings Group
without accounting for it.”
It was not until someone noticed BFS’s large
exposure in future trading positions on the Nikkel
Index that alarms began to go off. Fearing that one of
BFS’s customers might not be able to meet a margin
call, London officials in January 1995 instructed BFS
to reduce its exposure. Apparently that order was
never carried out. The Singapore report later claimed
That the large-exposures report submitted by
Barings to the Bank of England(BOE), although
inaccurate because of Leeson’s false reporting,
showed that the bank’s maximum exposure had
already exceeded the BOE’s 25 percent largeexposure limit.
In late January 1995, Barings’ auditors informed
London of an apparent outstanding debt of $86
million due from a New York securities trader. In
early February, two London Barings officials were
sent to Singapore to look at the purported account
receivable. They were unable to meet with Leeson
until some 16 days later. After about a half-hour talk
on February 23, Leeson left the BFS office and never
returned. From his hotel in Kuala Lumpur,
Malaysia, the next day, officials in Singapore
discovered information that the $86 million account
receivable was a fake.
Two days later, after the discovery of additional
losses totaling an estimated $1.4 billion, the London
High Court named a panel to manage Barings.
Leeson and his wife, on their way to London, were
arrested in Frankfurt on March 1. Three days later,
a Dutch banking and insurance company, ING,
bought Barings, thus ending the bank’s 200-year-old
tradition as a leading British international
Investment bank.
Leeson’s rogue trading practices precipitated the
bank’s fall. Lack of control at all levels – by Barings
top executives, the Bank of England, and the
Singapore government – laid the groundwork for its
demise.
50
SEBA
北京师范大学
经管学院
1.
2.
Questions
List actions that Nick leeson took that led to the
demise of Barings. When should alarms have
triggered control activity at Barings’ London
headquarters? What may have interfered with
the process?
How were symptoms of problems at BFS hidden?
Were some symptoms readily apparent? Explain.
How might Barings’ organizational goals have
conflicted with control activities and corrective
action at BFS?
Prof. Dr. LIU Songbai, Email:[email protected]
BNU, SEBA
51
SEBA
北京师范大学
经管学院
3.
4.
In which areas of control – precontrol,
concurrent control, and/or feedback control –
was Barings remiss? Explain.
Describe Leeson’s power at BFS. How did the
power he accumulated play a role in
circumventing control?
Prof. Dr. LIU Songbai, Email:[email protected]
BNU, SEBA
52
SEBA
第四节 国际政治风险控制与管理
北京师范大学
经管学院
一、政治风险的含义
二、政治风险的类型
三、政治风险的评估与管理
Prof. Dr. LIU Songbai, Email:[email protected]
BNU, SEBA
53
SEBA
北京师范大学
经管学院
一、政治风险的含义
政治风险是指对海外投资的所有权和经营活动,
潜在的多种政治及类似于政治(如经济的与社
会的)的威胁。
政治风险是指为政府有偿或无偿没收或征用、
或破坏经营、造成财产、人员损失的动乱,以
及阻碍公司进行某种活动的限制。
政治风险对子公司、母公司和第三国的影响。
Prof. Dr. LIU Songbai, Email:[email protected]
BNU, SEBA
54
SEBA
北京师范大学
经管学院
二、政治风险的类型
1. 宏观政治风险
征收资产
非自由兑换货币
战争、贸易禁运与国内动乱
2. 微观政治风险
拒绝履行合同
有政治动机的刺杀
出于政治原因的绑架及赎金要求
从有潜在敌意地区的撤离
Prof. Dr. LIU Songbai, Email:[email protected]
BNU, SEBA
55
SEBA
北京师范大学
经管学院
三、影响政治风险的因素
 经营类型
 雇员构成
 合作伙伴
 贷款国别
 引进海外生产投入的程度
 对海外市场的依赖性
Prof. Dr. LIU Songbai, Email:[email protected]
BNU, SEBA
56
SEBA
北京师范大学
经管学院
四、政治风险的评估与管理
1. 政治风险的评估
2. 政治风险的控制与管理
Prof. Dr. LIU Songbai, Email:[email protected]
BNU, SEBA
57
SEBA
北京师范大学
经管学院
1. 政治风险的评估
(1)商业环境风险指数(BERI指数)
PRI —— 政治风险指数
 政治体制的划分
 语言、种族和宗教的划分
 为维持权利实施的强制措施
 意识形态:腐败、民族主义、妥协性和裙带关系
 人口密集程度和财富分配
 极左政府上台的能力
 对主要敌对力量依赖的程度
 地区政治的负面影响
 以罢工和非暴力反抗形式表现的社会冲突
 不稳定性,如战争和暗杀
Prof. Dr. LIU Songbai, Email:[email protected]
BNU, SEBA
58
SEBA
北京师范大学
经管学院
1. 政治风险的评估
ORI —— 经营风险指数
对国民比对外来者的优待程度
商业环境的总体质量
R系数
用于评价一国允许跨国企业把利润和资本调回国的意
愿和能力
(2)风险控制信息服务(CRIS)
主要涉及对一国人身安全,如雇员及家属是否会被绑
架和受到损害等问题的预测
Prof. Dr. LIU Songbai, Email:[email protected]
BNU, SEBA
59
SEBA
北京师范大学
经管学院
1. 政治风险的评估
(3)普林斯模型
• 原动质 —— 专家定义的评估一国的国家
性质
• 政权稳定性风险
• 发生动乱得可能性
• 投资限制
• 未来对贸易的限制
Prof. Dr. LIU Songbai, Email:[email protected]
BNU, SEBA
60
SEBA
北京师范大学
经管学院
1. 政治风险的评估
(4)国际国家风险指南(ICRG)
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
社会经济情况
经济规划
政府的稳定性
外来冲突的风险
腐败
军队在政治中的影响
宗教在政治中的影响
法制和秩序的程度
民族问题的紧张程度
政治暴力
内战的威胁
政党的发展
• 官僚统治的质量
Prof. Dr. LIU Songbai, Email:[email protected]
BNU, SEBA
61
SEBA
北京师范大学
经管学院
2. 政治风险的控制与管理
改变期望风险与期望收益
在国家内选择位置
分散资源
利用合作协议
建立联盟
使子公司议价能力最大化
Prof. Dr. LIU Songbai, Email:[email protected]
BNU, SEBA
62
SEBA
北京师范大学
经管学院
2. 政治风险的控制与管理
A. 议价能力:是指跨国企业母公司对成功地运作
子公司所需资源的控制力
B. 提高议价能力的方法
保持东道国技术合管理能力的领先优势
大量出口
控制东道国替代跨国公司原料采购的能力
Prof. Dr. LIU Songbai, Email:[email protected]
BNU, SEBA
高
子公司议价能力
议
价
能
力
D
发生干预
C
东道国议
价能力
A
B
低
时间
图9-4 不同时期的相对议价能力
Download
Related flashcards

E-commerce

29 cards

Containers

29 cards

Obsolete occupations

28 cards

Retailing

38 cards

Create Flashcards