by
Allan, Miguel Serrano, Sean Ellis and Jonathan Noble
General Alexander Samsonov
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Occurred from August 26 –
30, 1914 in East Prussia
It was between General
Alexander Samsonov and
General Paul Rennenkampf’s
Russian First and Second
Armies and General Paul Von
Hindenburg and General Erich
Ludendorff’s German Eighth
Army.
The Russians intended to
surround and capture the
German army or at least
drive them from East Prussia.
General Paul von Rennenkampf
General Paul von Hindenburg
General Erich Ludendorff
A map showing where each side was situated and movements as of August 17.
From the start the Russian armies involved had numerous problems, including:
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Commanders clashed over how to fight the war and many officers
were lazy, having gotten their positions through wealth and social
status.
Difficult terrain. Dense forests, lakes and marshlands had to be
crossed. There were also few roads and railroads from the south.
Their supply service couldn’t provide for all and was confused,
losing rations or sending them to the wrong unit.
Communication and intelligence was limited and not ciphered.
This resulted in the Russians not knowing anything of the plans
and movements of the enemy, although the enemy knew
everything about them by intercepting their messages.
The leaders of the Tannenburg Russian offensive – General
Samsonov and General Rennenkampf – had problems with
eccentricity, with Rennenkampf holding a vendetta against
Samsonov for complaining of Rennenkampf’s conduct at the
Battle of Mukden in 1905.
An aerial photo showing some of Tannenburg’s dense forestry and hilly terrain.
Where in Tannenburg this photo was taken is unknown.
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General Maximilian Prittwitz
The original commander of the
German troops in Tannenberg
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When faced with the Russian
Second Army, the General of
the German Eighth Army
(General Prittwitz) ordered a
retreat for fear of being
surrounded.
General Erich Ludendorff
This order for a retreat had him
dismissed, bringing in General Paul von
Hindenburg and General Erich Ludendorff
to replace him.
Upon Hindenburg‘s arrival on August
23rd, he reversed Prittwitz‘s order of
retreat and moved forward to meet
samsonov‘s troops.
General Paul von Hindenburg
A map showing the situation on August 23 and each side’s movements since August 20.
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Hoffman knew of Rennenkampf’s vendetta against
Samsonov, which would keep Rennenkampf from
coming to Samsanov’s aid if he had a justifiable cause
not to. He used this to his advantage, proposing a ploy
where calvary troops would be employed to
Samsonov’s position (Vistula) to confuse him.
German troops were then set into position:
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General Hermann von Francois’ troops were sent to the far
southwest by rail to meet the left wing of Samsonov’s army
Two of Hindenburg’s corps were to await orders to move south
by foot to engage Samsonov’s right wing.
A fourth corps was to remain at Vistula to meet Samsonov’s
army as it moved north.
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General Hermann von Francois was
General Hermann von Francois
given a direct order by
Hindenburg’s Chief of Staff Erich
Ludendorff to initiate his attack on
Samsonov’s left wing. He refused
this order, choosing instead to wait
until his artillery was ready.
 Ludendorff and Colonel Hoffman
(Prittwitz’s deputy chief of
operations) then travelled to see
Francois and repeated the order.
Francois reluctantly agreed to begin
the attack, although complaining of
Colonel Maximilian Hoffman
a lack of shells.
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Whilst returning from the meeting with Francois,
Hoffman was given two intelligence intercepts that had
been transmitted between Rennenkampf and
Samsonov out in the clear, not ciphered.
The first message revealed the distance between the
two Russian armies and further detailed the Russian
First Army’s marching plans.
The second message provided detailed plans for
Samsonov’s intended pursuit of the German forces.
These intercepted messages were significant, allowing
the German forces to be one step ahead of Samsonov’s
and Rennenkampf’s armies and thus eliminate them.
A map showing the situation on the evening of August 26
and each side’s movements since August 23.
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Ignoring warnings of a massed German advance
moving south, overall commander Yakov Zhilinksi
directed – via an unciphered communication Rennenkampf’s First Army to the west of Konigsberg
on 26 August, increasing the distance between
Rennenkampf and the struggling Samsonov.
Hoffman and Ludendorff intercepted this unciphered
communication and seen that Samsonov would have
no support from Rennenkampf, so they took advantage
of the opportunity.
Given the grudges held by Rennenkampf against
Samsonov – they had phyisically fought before – he
did not feel inclined to come to Samsonov’s assistance.
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On August 28, Samsonov finally
became aware of his fate.
Critically short on supplies and
with a ruined communication
system, his forces dispersed and
he ordered a general
withdrawal that evening.
Some Russian soldiers threw down
their weapons and surrendered
This retreat was too late, as many of Samsonov’s forces threw down their
weapons and ran right into the encircling German forces. Counterattacks
from the Russian border were weak and insufficient.
Of Samsonov’s original 150,00 troops, 95,000 were captured, 30,000 were
killed or wounded and only 10,000 escaped. The German forces suffered
less than 20,000 casualties.
Samsonov went into the surrounding forests with his aides and shot
himself to avoid having to report the disaster to the Tsar, Nicholas II.
A map showing the situation on August 29 and each side’s operations since August 27.
This map is evidence of the fact that German forces were actually able to surround and
eliminate Samsonov’s army.
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The lustre of the German victory had Ludendorff and
Hoffman feted as heroes in Germany.
The scale of the Russian defeat (the Russians lost a total
of 250,000 men) in Tannenburg shocked Russia’s allies,
making them wonder if it signalled the defeat of the
Russian army.
Such was not the case, as shown by lesser scale German
victories and the fact that Russia’s sheer weight of its
army guaranteed its survival.
A picture of what was the Tannenberg Monument celebrating the German success in
Tannenberg. All that is left of it today is whatever was buried.
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Tannenburg was a significant battle as it was
one of the greatest German victories and
served as a great propaganda piece to
encourage the German people and do the
opposite for the Allies.
With poor communication, personal vendettas,
disorganization and difficult terrain, the cause
for Russia’s failure in Tannenburg is pretty
clear. The effect of this failure, as mentioned
above, was the encouragement of the German
people and discouragement of the Allies.
Information
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1914 – 1917: The Eastern Front [Book 6]
FirstWorldWar.com “Battles – The Battle of Tannenberg”
http://www.firstworldwar.com/battles/tannenberg.htm
Spartacus Educational “Battle of Tannenberg”
http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/FWWtannenberg.htm
History Learning Site “The Battle of Tannenberg”
http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk/battle_of_tannenberg.htm
BBC “Battle of Tannenberg: 26-30 August 1914”
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwone/battle_tannenberg.shtml
Images
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/2/2b/AV_Samsonov.jpg
http://www.firstworldwar.com/photos/graphics/gw_rennenkampf_01.jpg
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/34/Bundesarchiv_Bild_183-2005-0828525,_Erich_Ludendorff.jpg
http://www.reedline.com/Workout/images/Von_Prittwitz.jpg
http://www.firstworldwar.com/battles/tannenberg.htm
http://www.lsg.musin.de/geschichte/geschichte/lkg/hindenburg.jpg