Inequality, Grievances
and Civil War
Lars-Erik Cederman,
ETH Zürich
Kristian Skrede Gleditsch,
University of Essex & PRIO
Halvard Buhaug,
PRIO & NTNU
Cambridge University Press, 2013
Main argument
• Grievance skepticism in civil-war literature
• Yet, we argue that grievances matter
• Approach:
– Intermediate disaggregation
– Motivational mechanisms, not just cognition
– Ethno-Nationalism, not just ethnicity
– Relevant data, rather than standard toolbox
From inequalities to civil war
Horizontal
Inequalities
Empirical link
Civil War
Group identification
Claims & Repression
Intergroup comparison
Evaluation of injustice
Framing and blaming
Mobilization
Grievances
Group level dyads
State
Polity
Government
Legend:
Group 1
Included group
Group 1
Group 3
Excluded group
Group 4
Group 6
Group 5
Political relationship
0.03
0.02
0.01
0.00
Predicted Probability of Conflict
0.04
Using Ethnic Power Relations (EPRETH) Data to Study the Effect of
Exclusion and Downgrading
Not Downgraded
Downgraded
Change of Political Status
Polygon overlay (Yugoslavia)
6
Effect for poor groups
low_ratio =
G/g if g<G,
1 otherwise
where G = GDP pc of country
g = GDP pc of group
Beyond dyadic group model
• Transnational ethnic-kin
• Grievances and conflict duration
• Scaling to country level
– Constructing better indicators with group-level
information
– Improving conventional risk forecasts
Conclusions for theory
• Core themes
– Grievances matter!
– Economic and political HIs increase risk of
civil war
– Theory-measure correspondence
– Disaggregation in study of conflict
• Scaling information at different levels of analysis
– Theory development in new research areas
Conclusions for policy
• Address grievances rather than merely
strengthening state
• Focus on demos/inclusion/inequality, not
just democracy as elections
• Relevance to Iraq and Syria
• Exclusion and discrimination declining
globally, but still significant conflict risks
Exclusion over time
Current research: Gleditsch
• Spatial evolution of conflict
– Spread vs. containment
– Implications for peacekeeping
• Conflict and tactics
– Non-violent direct action, terrorism and
indirect targeting; non-violent direct action
– Group perspective on strategy choice
Current research: Buhaug
• Security implications of climate change
– Food insecurity and urban protest
– Agricultural loss and rural unrest
• An urbanization bomb?
– All global population growth until 2050 will be
absorbed by cities in developing countries
– Increasing poverty, inequalities, unemployment to be
expected without successful adaptation
Current research: Cederman
•
•
•
•
Endogeneity of exclusion
Measuring economic horizontal inequality
Power sharing
Trends in inequality and civil war
• Ethnic Power Relations data: next release
in October, see http://www.icr.ethz.ch/data
Instrumenting for Exclusion
Colonial
Strategy
Initial
Exclusion
Conflict
7
Initial Inclusion
British vs. French Initial Inclusion
Model 4
6 1.0
French
British
Density
Predicted Probability
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
Difference in Predicted Probability
1.0
Model 3
5
4
3
0.5
0.0
2
−0.5
1
0
−1.0
0.0
−1.0
3
4
5
6
7
−0.5
3
4
5
0.0
6
7
Change in Predicted Probability of Conflict f or Inclu
log Distance to Coast
log Distance to Coast
Wucherpfennig, Hunziker, Cederman. 2012.
“Who Inherits the State? Colonial Rule
15
and Post-Colonial Conflict.” Working paper, UCL and ETH Zürich.
Using satellite and survey data to
improve measures of econ. HI
G-Econ Estimate
Nightlights Estimate
Myanmar (Nightlight−based Estimates)
Myanmar (GECON−based Estimates)
Kachins
Shan
Bamar
(Barman)
Bamar
(Barman)
Kayin (Karens)
Inequality
Cederman, Weidmann and Bormann. 2014.
Triangulating Horizontal Inequality: Toward
Improved Conflict Analysis. APSA, Washington DC.
under 0.4
0.4 − 0.6
0.6 − 0.8
0.8 − 1
1 − 1.2
over 1.2
Myanmar
Ethnic inclusion & power sharing
Prewar conflict
risk
Pre Conflict
Postwar conflict risk
Post Conflict
Access to Power
400
Autonomy
Included
Included + Autonomy
50
Access to Power
Autonomy
Included
Included + Autonomy
40
30
Density
Density
300
200
20
100
10
0
0
−0.010
−0.005
change in probability of conflict onset
0.000
−0.10
−0.05
0.00
change in probability of conflict onset
Cederman, Hug, Schädel & Wucherpfennig. 2013. “Territorial autonomy in the shadow
17
of future conflict: Too little too late?” APSA, Chicago.
0.05
Exclusion and the decline of violence
12
Kaplan
Number of Groups in Conflict (Onsets)
10
estimation
8
6
Gurr
4
2
0
1950
1960
1970
1980
1990
2000
2010
Cederman, Gleditsch & Wucherpfennig. 2014. Explaining the Decline of Ethnic Conflict:
Was Gurr Right and For the Right Reasons? APSA, Washington DC.