Jim Schwartz, Chief Arlington County Fire Department Located directly across from Washington D.C. Highly urbanized community of 26 square miles; population if 212,900 • Columbine High School Shooting –April 20, 1999 • Eric Harris & Dylan Klebold • Both had self-inflicted fatal wounds • Occurred within 45 minutes from start of incident • No significant law enforcement entry for 1 hour • No medical operations inside for 4 hours • 12 students & 1 teacher killed • 24 wounded • Coach Dave Sanders • Bled for > 2hrs before dying IAFC, IACP, FBI and DHS Host meeting to discuss medical response to active shooter IAFF, Metro Chiefs and USFA also in attendance Discussion also covered use of ICS during incidents Conclusion -“integrated and coordinated planning, policies, training and team building prior to any incident will ensure effective and successful response” Initial EMS/Fire medical responders should work with Law Enforcement assets to rapidly deploy into areas that have been cleared but not secured to initiate treatment and effect rescue of injured victims ▪ ▪ ▪ ▪ NOT tactical medics but first arriving EMS assets Security and/or escort provided by LE teams Requires appropriate equipment and PPE Should utilize TECC medical principles One answer to the issue of rapidly providing stabilizing medical care in areas that are clear but not secure NIMS compliant name Task Force: Any combination of single resources, but typically two to five, assembled to meet a specific tactical need First arriving EMS providers (NOT tactical medics) team up with 3 patrol officers to move quickly into “warm” zone areas along cleared corridors to initiate treatment and evacuation of victims 3 patrol officers for front and rear security Readily available resource Do NOT assist medics in care Responsible for security and movement only 2 street medics in ballistic gear with supplies to treat up to 14 patients Readily available resource Able to initiate TECC care and rapidly evacuate Comprehensive document summarizing commonalities, trends, and events Total qualifying cases from 1966-2012: 230 Some common characteristics found but also a large degree of variation across broad categories Age, Sex, Planning, Location, Relationship to victim, weapons used Duration of event Average <10 minute duration ▪ Most as short as 3-4 minutes Average 12-15 min response by Police 93% of incidents in academic institutions were over prior to the first responding asset, police or fire/EMS, arriving on scene After review of combat and post-incident data: The immediate threat is rapidly mitigated in almost all incidents well prior to Fire/EMS response The sooner the first responders start medical treatment, the greater the chance that victims will survive The risk from active shooter incidents is very low in areas that are clear but not secure Mumbai Attack November 26-28, 2008 • 10 terrorists –6 killed / 4 arrested • 171 killed • Multiple attack sites • • • • TajMahalPalace andTower –50 killed OberoiHotel –30 killed NaramanHouse –8 killed Other incidents • Overcoming the ‘us vs. them’ mentality • Who ‘s in charge of the scene • Cost sharing concerns • Emphasize the force multiplying benefit during ASEs • Emphasize improved operational relationships • During both ASEs and normal day to day operations • Public image of collaboration between police & fire • Teach TECC –Tactical Emergency Casualty Care Evidenced-based best practices medical guidelines for care at or near the point of wounding in high risk operations NOT Law Enforcement tactical medic specific For use by any first responder who is providing medical care whenever and wherever there is increased risk to provider and patient Goals: Provide principles for point of wounding management of trauma for response to ALL atypical and high risk civilian emergencies To balance appropriate medical care with the threat, the required tactics, and the civilian scope of practice, equipment, and population Initial responding patrol officers form 2-3 contact teams that all enter building along same corridor and move quickly to engage shooter Contact teams essentially are clearing the primary corridor as they move to sound of shooting Identify and notifty command of threats (IEDs, etc) Do not open locked doors unless sound from behind would indicate threat Do not aide or assist injured As victims encountered, notify Command of location Need for RTF identified by 2nd contact team Initial RTF team formed and quickly moves into area down the corridor cleared by the contact teams Will not move into un-cleared areas or get in front of contact teams RTF Goal of initial RTF team is to stabilize as many victims as possible using TECC principles Will penetrate into building as far as possible until they run out of accessible victims or out of supplies “Stabilize, position, and move on” Once RTF operational, Fire and Police Unified Command will establish: RTF re-supply near point of entry External casualty collection point for transfer of patients Warm Corridor for evacuation away from area Dedicate non-RTF assets to assist in transfer of patients from RTF assets for external evacuation C C P Resupply boxes Questions?