LAW OF CONTEMPT AND MEDIA
THE CONTEMPT OF COURTS ACT 1971
CONTEMPT
OBJECTIVE
• To examine the basic purpose of contempt law in India.
• Ninty nine percent of the failures come from people who
have the habit of making excuses.
George Washington
DEFINITION
Contempt of court is defined as an act or omission
calculated to interfere with the due administration of
justice.
V.C. Mishra’s case; (1995) 2 SCC 584
MEANING OF CONTEMPT
1. Wilful disobedience to, or open disrespect of a court or
judge.
2. Contempt means lack of respect or reverence for
something.
Contempt of court is disobedience of the court by acting
in opposition to the authority, justice and dignity thereof.
It signifies a wilful disregard or disobedience of the court
order, it also signifies such conduct as tends to bring the
authority of the court and the administration of justice
into dispute.
Baradakanta Mishra V Bhimsen Dixit ; 1973 (1) SCC 446
CONTEMPT LAW
PURPOSE
To keep the administration of justice pure and
undefiled.
CONCEPT
Contempt jurisdiction is inherent in a court of record from
the very nature of court itself.
NEED
To deal sternly with any action which has the
tendency to
• interfere with, or
• obstruct
the due course of justice.
CONTEMPT JURISDICTION TOUCHES
UPON TWO FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
• The right to personal liberty
• The right to freedom of expression
CONTEMPT LAW
A CONFLICT
between
Freedom of speech in the Constitution
versus
Need to safeguard the status and dignity of courts
and
interests of administration of justice.
WHILE INVOKING CONTEMPT LAW
CARE IS TO BE TAKEN
THAT
• The dignity of the court is to be maintained at all
costs.
• Contempt jurisdiction, which is of a special nature,
should be sparingly used.
EXCEPTIONS TO CONTEMPT
1. Innocent publications
2. Fair comments/criticism
SECTION 3
Innocent publication and distribution of matter if
the person had no reasonable grounds for
believing that the proceeding was pending in a
court.
REACH OF SECTION 3
•
Publication Sec 3(1) and (2)
(a) Pending
(b) Not pending
•
Distribution Sec 3 (3)
PUBLICATION
may be by
• words
– spoken, or
– written
• signs
• visible representation
• or otherwise
SECTION 4
Fair and accurate report of judicial proceeding
SECTION 5
Fair criticism of judicial act on the merits of any
case heard and finally decided.
SECTION 7
Publication of information relating to proceedings
in chambers or in camera.
Fair comments, even if outspoken, but made
without any malice or attempting to impair the
administration of justice and made in good
faith and in proper language do not attract any
punishment for contempt.
Jaswant Singh V Virender Singh
1995 Supp (1) SCC 384
Judgments are open to criticism that must be
done without casting aspersions on the judge
and the courts, and without adverse
comments amounting to scandalising the
courts.
EXAMPLES OF WHAT CONSTITUTES
CONTEMPT
1. Not caring of the warrant issued by the criminal
Court.
2. Any wilful disobedience of the order of the court to do or
abstain from doing any act or breach of any undertaking
given to the court.
3. Attributing improper motive to a judge or scurrilous
abuse of a judge will amount to scandalising the court.
Rajesh Kumar Singh V High Court of Judicature of
MP; AIR 2007 SC 2725.
It is to be noted that the criticism of judiciary should be
constructive and not destructive. One may weigh a
Judge critically - academically but never inveigh him
personally.
DEFENCES TO CONTEMPT
1. Truth
2. Privileges
Section 13
WHEN IS CONTEMPT
NOT PUNISHABLE?
Section 13
• If it does not substantially interferes with the due
course of justice.
• Justification by truth is a valid defence, if it is in public
interest and the request for invoking the said defence
is bonafide.
R.K. ANAND V REGISTRAR
DELHI HIGH COURT ;
(2009) 8 SCC 106
Justices BN Agrawal, GS Singhvi
and Aftab Alam
Judgment by Justice Aftab Alam
Facts of the case
1. The criminal trial in a case of reckless driving by
Sanjeev Nanda, a young person of a very wealthy
business family which crashed to death six people in
Delhi meandered endlessly for eight years.
2. NDTV, a news channel telecast a programme on 30
May 2007 in which the Special Public Prosecutor and
R.K. Anand, the Senior Defence Counsel, were seen
negotiating sell out of a prosecution witness for a very
high price.
According to NDTV, the programme was based on a
clandestine sting operation.
3. Delhi High Court suo motu initiated a proceeding for
criminal contempt and issued notice to R.K. Anand and
IU Khan under Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts
Act, 1971
4. During the pendency of the matter in the High Court,
R.K. Anand filed a petition requesting Justice Manmohan
Sarin, the Presiding Judge to recuse himself from the
proceeding.
He stated in the petition that he had a feeling that he was
not likely to get justice at the hands of Manmohan Sarin.
He made the prayer that the main matter be transferred
to be heard by some other bench of which Justice Sarin
was not a member.
5. The High Court held that the evidence and
circumstances fully established that both IU Khan and
R.K. Anand were guilty of the charges framed against
them.
It accordingly convicted them for criminal contempt of
court and sentenced them by prohibiting them from
appearing in the Delhi High Court and the Courts
subordinate to it for a period of four months from the
date of the judgment. The court also recommended to
the full court to divest them of the honour of being
designated as Senior Advocates and also sentenced
them to a fine of Rs. 2000/- each.
Law Laid Down
1. Suo motu cognizance taken by High Court on basis of
telecast alone. The court examined the audio and
video recordings of sting operation. The findings of
High Court were sustained. It had rightly punished
them by prohibiting them from appearing for a period of
four months and holding that they had forfeited their
right to be designated as Senior Advocates and
imposing fine.
2. A motivated application for recusal needs to be dealt
with sternly and viewed as interference in due course of
justice leading to penal consequences.
3. Directions given to High Courts not having framed rules
under Section 34 of Advocates Act to frame rules within
four months. The Rules should indicate need for specific
notice to be issued when punishment of debarring an
Advocate from practice be imposed.
4. Telecast of sting operation exposing collusion between
defence counsel and prosecutor did not amount to
contempt of court.
The programme was intended to prevent an attempt to
interfere with or obstruct the due course of a pending
matter. It was in larger public interest and served an
important public cause.
5. Grave concerns and dismay expressed on decline of
ethical and professional standards amongst lawyers.
Bar Council of India and the Bar Councils of different
States cannot escape their responsibility.
6. High Court’s powers of superintendence over
subordinate judiciary. Power of control should also be
exercised to protect them from external interference that
may some times appear overpowering to them and to
support them to discharge their duties fearlessly.
Criminal justice system should be insulated from external
influences aimed to subvert trials.
IN RE : VINAY CHANDRA MISHRA
(1995) 2 SCC 584
Facts of the case
Allegations of contempt committed in the face of a High
Court were made against a Senior Counsel. He was asked
by the Bench regarding the provision under which the
impugned order had been passed. He started shouting at
the bench. He said would get the Judge transferred or
impeached and threatened by saying that he had “turned
up many judges”. He created a scene in the Court. He lost
his temper and, according to the Judge, “except to abuse
him of mother and sister” the contemnor had insulted him
like anything. The contemnor was also President of the
Bar and Chairman of the Bar Council of India. The matter
was referred by the Acting Chief Justice to the Supreme
Court.
The Supreme Court took suo motu cognizance and issued
a show cause notice to the contemnor. In his counter and
additional counter, a different version of the incident was
put up by the contemnor. He alleged that in fact it was the
judge who hadcommitted contempt of his own court.
He filed application for initiating proceedings against the
Judge.
At a subsequent stage written unconditional apology was
also filed by the contemnor by seeking therein to withdraw
his application, petitions, counters, allegations and
submissions.
The Court sentenced the contemnor VC Mishra to undergo
simple imprisonment for six weeks. Also he was
suspended from practicing as an advocate for a period of
three years.
Issues Raised
1. Whether Supreme Court can take cognizance of
contempt of a High Court and initiate suo motu
proceedings against a contemnor?
2. Whether a contemnor has a right to examine the Judge
or Judges before whom contempt was committed?
3. Whether it is necessary to summon the Judge for
examination to verify the allegations against the
contemnor when the version of the contemnor is
different?
4. Whether a junior member of the Bench is barred in any
way by any convention or otherwise, from putting
questions to the Bar?
Law Laid Down
1. Supreme Court can take cognizance of a contempt of a
High Court and suo motu initiate contempt proceedings
against the contemnor.
2. When a High Court is dealing with a case of criminal
contempt and there is justification for adopting
summary procedure and punishing the offender on the
spot, the contemnor has no right to examine the Judge
or Judges before whom contempt is alleged to have
been committed.
3. Jurisdiction and power of Supreme Court to take
cognizance of any contempt of court and to award
punishment for it are not circumscribed by any statute.
4. Judiciary in a democratic written Constitution has been
assigned a special role and hence the need to protect its
dignity and authority. There is a need and justification
for vesting the extraordinary power in a court to punish
for the contempt of the Court.
5. Every member of the Bench is on a par with the other
member or members of the Bench. The lawyer or the
litigant concerned has to answer the questions put to him
by any member of the Bench.
ARUNDHATI ROY, In Re
(2002) 3 SCC 343
Facts of the case
Arundhati Roy, a writer, was interested in the result of a
litigation pending before the Supreme Court. It was alleged
that at a dharna organised in front of Supreme Court she
had raised improper slogans against the Court. When
issued a show cause notice, she denied having raised such
slogans. She further stated that the Supreme Court could
not spare a sitting Judge to hold inquiry into Tehelka
Scandal. However, when it came to an absurd, despicable
and entirely unsubstantiated petition, it displayed a
disturbing willingness to issue notice. She added that the
same indicated a disquieting inclination to silence criticism
and muzzle dissent, to harass and intimidate those who
disagreed with the Supreme Court.
The court sentenced her to simple imprisonment for one
day and to pay a fine of Rs. 2000/-. In case of default of
payment of fine, she was to undergo simple
imprisonment for three months.
Issues Raised
1. Whether it would be permissible to initiate contempt
proceedings for scandalising the court where the
contents of an affidavit cause no contempt to any
Judge personally but the action tried to cast an injury to
the public by creating a wrong impression in the mind of
the people regarding integrity, ability and fairness of the
judiciary?
2. Extent to which and circumstances in which fair criticism
of Judge, court or its functioning would be permissible
under Article 19(1) (a) and (2)?
3. Whether freedom of press is guaranteed separately from
and is the same as freedom of expression under Article
19(1)?
4. How should the court deal with a case when a
contemnor does not show any repentance or remorse
but persistently and consistently tried to justify the
prima facie contemptuous action and to frustrate the
contempt proceedings?
Law Laid Down
1. Proceedings under Section 14 of the Contempt of
Courts Act are distinguishable from Section 15 of the
said Act. When action is at the instance of the Court
there is no question of any motion of and prejudice from
any Judge. Accepting the plea raised by the
respondent would amount to depriving all the Judges of
the Court to hear the matter and thus frustrate the
contempt proceedings which cannot be the mandate of
law.
2. The judiciary is not immune from criticism but when that
criticism is based on obvious distortion or gross
misstatement and made in a manner which is designed
to lower the respect of the judiciary and destroy public.
3. Under the Constitution, there is no separate guarantee
of the freedom of the press and it is the same freedom of
expression, which is conferred on all citizens under
Article 19(1). Any expression of opinion would therefore,
be not immune from the liability for exceeding the limits
either under the law of defamation or contempt of court
or the other constitutional limitations under Article 19(2).
4. When a respondent has not shown any repentance or
regret or remorse, no lenient view should be taken in the
matter. It is difficult for the court either to shrug off or to
hold the accusations made as comments of an
outspoken ordinary man and permit the wrong headed to
err therein.
SAHARA INDIA REAL ESTATE CORP LTD.
V
SEBI
Five Judges Bench Justice S.H. Kapadia, D.K. Jain S.S.
Nijjar, Ranjana Desai and J.S. Khehar.
Judgment by
Justice S.H. Kapadia, CJI
Importance
Doctrine of Postponement
Facts of the Case
1. In a matter pending before it, the Supreme Court asked
the SAHARA and SEBI to attempt to reach a
consensus.
2. A day prior to the next date of hearing, one of the news
channels flashed the details of the proposal made by
SAHARA to SEBI
3. On a request made by SAHARA, the Supreme Court
decided to take up the matter with regard to the
reporting of subjudice matters.
It related to reporting of matters by electronic and
print media.
Issues Raised
1. Whether the courts can lay down guidelines for the
media?
2. Whether the media should self regulate itself.
3. The balancing of rights under Articles 19(1)(a) vis a vis
21
There is a difference between law making and framing of
guidelines. Hence, can the Supreme Court entertain
such a matter.
Law Laid Down
Open justice permits fair and accurate reports of court
proceedings to be published.
1. Free speech, in appropriate cases, has got to co-relate
with right to a fair trial.
2. Trial by newspapers comes in the category of acts
which interferes with the course of justice or due
administration of justice.
3. Prior restraint has not been rejected as constitutionally
impermissible.
Postponement of publicity is a judicial mechanism to
balance presumption of innocence.
The applicant who seeks order of postponement of
publicity must displace the presumption of open justice.
Postponement order not only safeguards fairness of the
later or connected trials, it prevents possible contempt by
the media.
Balancing of rights under Article 19(1) or equal public
interest by order of postponement of publication or publicity
would apply in cases in which there is real and substantial
risk of prejudice to the proper administration of justice or to
the fairness of trial and within the parameters of necessity
and proportionality which would satisfy the test of
reasonableness in Articles 14 and 19(2).
The postponement orders is a neutralizing device evolved
by the Courts to balance interests of equal weightage, viz.
freedom of expression vis a vis freedom of trial, in the
context of the law of contempt.
Order of postponement should be passed only when
reasonable alternative methods or measures such as
change of venue or postponement of trial will not prevent
the risk to the fairness of the trial and when the salutary
effects of such orders outweigh the deleterious effects to
the free expression of those effected by the prior restraint.
The postponement order is not a punitive measure, but a
preventive measures.
The text of Article 141 means law made while interpreting
the statutes or the Constitution. Such judicial law making
is a part of judicial process.