ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW
Paul F. Diehl
Political Science and Law
University of Illinois
Overview
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The Need for Compliance Mechanisms
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Basic Compliance Mechanisms
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International and Domestic Legal
Structures andProcesses
Compliance Mechanisms
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1. “Habit”
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Professional Militaries
Less Professional Militaries
Rebel Groups, Militias, Mobs
2. Reciprocity
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POW Treatment
Problems of Asymmetry
Compliance (con’t)
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3. Reputation (“diffuse reciprocity”)
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“shadow of the future”
4. Direct Enforcement
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Institutional capability
Institutional willingness
LEGAL STRUCTURES: INTERNATIONAL
COURT OF JUSTICE
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VIOLATIONS ADJUDICATED – PLANTIFF V.
DEFENDENT
LIMITATIONS
ONLY STATES CAN BE PARTIES
OPTIONAL CLAUSE EXCEPTIONS
PREFERENCE FOR LOW POLITICS
TIME CONSUMING
ENFORCEMENT DEPENDS ON UNSC
LEGAL STRUCTURES:
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT
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122 state parties
Notable Exceptions: US, Russia (signed not ratified), China, Israel,
All Arab states (except Jordan), Pakistan
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Case Referral
 By Member States or Security Council
Jurisdiction
 Prosecute Individuals, not States
 Genocide, War Crimes, Crimes against Humanity, Aggression
Crimes on Territory of Member or Person is a National of a State
Party (or Security Council refers the case)
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Current Cases
 Uganda, Congo, Darfur, Central African Republic, Mali, Kenya
ICC Limitations
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Small Set of Crimes
Cooperation of States
Apprehension of Suspects
Very Slow
Creates Perverse Incentives for Leaders
LEGAL STRUCTURES: DOMESTIC
COURTS
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Jurisdiction: Territorial, Nationality, or
Universal
Limitations
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Must have appropriate domestic laws
Must be willing and able to prosecute
POLITICAL STRUCTURES: UN
HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL
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47 member states
Investigates and reports on abuses
Normative power
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Limitations
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no reciprocity incentive (opposite is true)
source of UN information - government themselves
Politicized membership (major violators are members)