“BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION AND THE LAW” (MGMT 3100A&B) York University, Schulich School of Business – Fall 2025 Practice Textbook Questions with Answers Optional Preparation for Mid-term Exam Please note: Unless otherwise indicated, “Questions” below refer to the “Questions for Review” appearing at the end of each chapter of our Textbook, and “Cases” below refer to the “Cases and Problems” appearing at the end of each chapter of the Textbook. All answers pertain to previously assigned Textbook readings from the 15th Edition of our Textbook. These answers are being provided as an OPTOINAL WAY to review certain concepts covered during the first half of Mgmt 3100 in preparation for our Mid-term Exam. Please note that the Mid-term Exam will cover other material discussed in class that is beyond the scope of the following questions and that the questions below will generally not be the subject-matter of the Mid-term Exam. These answers are being provided as examples of the types of answers that will be expected for typical short answer and case problem questions that may appear on the Mid-term Exam. CHAPTER 1 Question 1 – Law: (a) sets rules of conduct that protect us from being harmed by, and from harming others and provides compensation when we suffer harm; (b) empowers government to provide services for the benefit of society; and (c) provides a broader framework for organizing our affairs, such as entering into binding business arrangements. Question 14 – A statute is presumed to be valid and initially it is not the task of the government to defend it; instead, the onus is on the citizen to show that one of his or her constitutionally guaranteed rights has been infringed by a provision in the statute. Only if the court agrees that there has been an infringement, must the government then defend it by showing that the infringement is “reasonable limit” which is “demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society” under section 1 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Question 15 - The Charter applies to governments and their activities, but not to private sector activities. CHAPTER 2 Question 6 – No witnesses are called, and no new evidence is submitted. The complete record of trial proceedings is available. Only “questions of law” or “mixed questions of law and fact” are argued at the Court of Appeal level. Three judges hear the appeal as a panel. Question 11 – A class action is one in which a “representative plaintiff” represents a group of plaintiffs having the same cause of action against a defendant (involving a “common issue”, suffered by a “definable class”, where it is preferable from a “judicial efficiency” perspective to proceed by way of class action). The judgment in a class action lawsuit determines the outcome of the case for all plaintiffs who have opted-in to the class action (based on the principle of res judicata). Question 13 - Each province has exclusive jurisdiction to pass legislation in certain fields and such legislation may, and quite often does, differ from province to province. In addition, the concept of stare decisis allows courts from different provinces to decide their cases differently (unless the case involves the same 2 fact scenario and legal principles as a case that has been decided by the Supreme Court of Canada). Question 16 – Contingency fees are paid to a lawyer for services rendered, only if the action is successful and the client receives a damage award. The fee is usually a percentage of the damages awarded. In Canada, for purposes of discouraging unnecessary litigation, contingency fees are subject to court supervision. CHAPTER 6 Question 4 – An offer may come to an end when it lapses (i.e., the offeree fails to accept within the specified time, within a reasonable time if no time period is specified or when either party dies or becomes insane prior to acceptance), by revocation (i.e., the offer is withdrawn before it has been accepted), by counteroffer or when it is rejected. Question 6 – An offeree cannot accept an offer unless he or she is aware of it. He or she is entitled to receive an offer to do the work, which he or she may then accept or reject. Question 11 – When instantaneous means of communication (such as telephone) are used, the offeror must actually receive the acceptance before he or she is bound by it. Question 13 – A unilateral contract is one in which the offer is accepted by performing an act or series of acts required by the terms of the offer. A bilateral contract is a contract where the offeror and offeree trade promises, and both are bound to perform as a result of those promises. Case 6 – It is possible that a court would consider Purcell’s statement, “I need substantially more cash by way of down payment – say $125,000. Tell me how high you are willing to go” as a rejection of Quentin’s offer to pay $75,000 down. If so, the court would conclude that Purcell said $75,000 was not enough. On the other hand, if the above statement is merely considered an inquiry, then the courts would maintain that Quentin’s offer was still viable and Purcell’s subsequent acceptance would be binding: a contract would therefore be formed. If Purcell’s statement is considered a rejection, then the next question is what does Quentin’s statement, “There is no way I can increase the cash payment” mean? One interpretation is that he is restating his original offer and is prepared to make a contract on that basis. Accordingly, Purcell’s acceptance the following day would be binding. Another interpretation would be that Quentin is rejecting the counter-offer made by Purcell, with no further counteroffer being made. Under these latter circumstances, Purcell would not be able to return to Quentin’s original offer as it would be “off the table”, and no contract would be formed. CHAPTER 7 Question 8 – “Injurious reliance” places the emphasis on the reasonableness of the promisee’s conduct; that is, if he or she relied reasonably on the promise and suffered a loss as a result, the court concentrates on the unfairness of denying him or her a remedy. In contrast, “equitable (or promissory) estoppel” appears more concerned with the conduct of the promisor – rather than the harm it caused to the other party (i.e., the promise). In addition, “equitable estoppel” requires the existence of a pre-existing legal relationship and can only be used as a defence against a claim made by the promisor. Lastly, “equitable estoppel” applies in 3 Canada and England, whereas “injurious reliance” only applies in the United States. Question 11 – When one person requests the services of another and the other performs those services, the law implies a promise to pay for those services at a rate that is warranted by relevant prevailing industry standards. Such a promise is implied between strangers or business acquaintances, if the services are rendered in a customary business transaction. Question 14 – There is a strong presumption that parties intend to create legal relations in business dealings between strangers and in commerce generally. In contrast, there is a presumption that dealings between friends and promises made in a social context are not intended to create legal relations. Case 2 - The main issue here is whether the parties intended to create a legal relationship, rather than Adams simply providing friendly advice to Burowski. Since a court cannot discover what was actually present in the minds of Burkowski and Adams, their intentions must be inferred from all the circumstances of the case, including the nature of their relationship. Having a late-night coffee together is rather different from Burkowski going to Adams’ office for a meeting. When Burkowski asked where she might get investment advice from, was she expecting to pay for it? Very likely, she would have expected to do so, if she had gone to see an independent investment broker about her portofolio. Did Adams’ suggestion that they have coffee together imply that he would offer his advice as a friend? If not, and we conclude that the parties intended to create legal relations in this case, then we must consider the doctrine of quantum meruit (which states that consideration need not be expressly agreed upon between the parties to be payable, where the services of one party have been requested by another). If Burkowski believes that Adam’s fee is excessive, she would still be compelled to pay a “reasonable fee” for his advice (in accordance with prevailing industry rates) and Adams’ claim for a fee would be payable on the basis of quantum meruit. CHAPTER 9 Question 7 - Innocent misrepresentation is not an action in tort, however, it does provide for the right of rescission in contract law. An innocent misrepresentation can become negligent or even fraudulent, if the party fails to correct it where in a position to do so. If the misrepresentation is made a term of the contract, then it will give rise to a breach of contract claim. Question 8 – Marital relationships give rise to a presumption of undue influence. The bank would be wise to have the wife seek independent legal advice prior to signing the contract; that is, the wife should be sent, along with all the relevant documents and information, to an independent lawyer to be advised of the risks of agreeing to the transaction. By failing to do this, the bank runs the risk of having the mortgage declared void due to undue influence. Case 4 – The facts of this case are an adaptation of those in Tilden Rent-A-Car Co. v. Clendenning (1978), 18 O.R. (2d) 601. Tilford would try to argue that the exemption clause in the contract should be enforceable as it was an accepted term of the contract and therefore Tilford should be allowed to recover the cost for repair from the defendant, Clemson. 4 Clemson, on the other hand, would argue that the failure to point out the clause on the back of the pre-printed form was a misrepresentation by omission. As per the Clendenning case: “In modern commercial practice, many standard form printed documents are signed without being read or understood. In many cases, the parties seeking to rely upon the terms of the contract know or ought to know that the signature of a party to the contract does not represent the true intention of the signer, and that the party signing is unaware of stringent and onerous provisions which a standard form contract often contains. Under such circumstances, I am of the opinion that the party seeking to rely on such terms should not be able to do so in the absence of first having taken reasonable measures to draw such terms to the attention of the other party, and, in the absence of such reasonable measures, it is not necessary for the party denying knowledge of such terms to prove either fraud or misrepresentation.” Where the maker of a standard form contract fails to point out the unusual, unexpected or onerous terms in the contract, at the time of formation, then such terms can be struck down by the court on the grounds of misrepresentation by omission. CHAPTER 13 Question 7 – Exemption clauses are strictly construed by the courts, and the court must be satisfied that such clauses were adequately brought to the attention of the other party, for such clauses to be enforceable. Question 12 – Expectation damages are an amount awarded for breach of contract based on expected profits. Where a vendor agrees to sell certain goods and the purchases refuses, the expectation damages are the lost profits on the sale. In this case, however, there is also a consideration for supply and demand that must be taken into account in calculating those damages. Consequential damages are damages that the seller knew or ought to have known would flow “naturally” from the breach, that is, were reasonably foreseeable by the seller at the time the contract was formed. Where a manufacturer orders parts for a product it is constructing for a purchaser, a breach of contract by the parts supplier causing the manufacturer to breach its contract with the purchaser would result in consequential damages; that is, any loss arising from the second breach would be payable by the parts supplier as arising from its initial breach. Specific performance is an equitable remedy where the court may require a defendant to do a specified act, usually to complete a transaction by performing specified terms of a contract. An example would include a court order compelling a seller to complete the sale of a house to a developer, where the land is of unique value (and cannot be readily replaced) or the damages that would be suffered by the developer (as a result of the seller’s breach) would be far greater than the value of the house. Case 3 – Carvel is requesting the remedy of specific performance. Specific performance is often granted in situations involving real estate (because the real estate in question is of unique value and cannot be readily replaced, and/or the quantum of damages necessary to put the purchaser in the position it would have been in, if the contract had been properly performed, is far greater than the purchase price for the land in question). 5 In this case, there are several factors that strengthen Carvel’s argument for specific performance: the facts suggest that an architect had designed each house differently, because they were to be “up-market” homes on each lot; Carvel had already invested substantial sums in their design by the architect, which presumably would be wasted even if a different set of lots could be purchased by Carvel (reliance damages). In any event the purchase of other lots in the area from the neighbouring landowner (to replace the land that was the subject matter of the contract with Dalquith Enterprises) remained speculative. Accordingly, the sum already invested, and likely to be wasted if the repudiation stands, is substantial. Carvel would also claim a very large sum for the lost profits (expectation damages) on the future sale of 24 large homes. If Carvel had entered into contracts with individual residents to purchase homes once they were developed (in reliance on the purchase agreement with Dalquith), losses emanating from any breach of those subsequent individual contracts could also be claimed by Carvel as consequential damages. Lastly, Carvel could claim general damages for injury to its business reputation resulting from its inability to honour its commitments with prospective homeowners (due to Dalquith’s breach). The aggregate damage amount claimed by Carvel in this case could be millions of dollars. Nevertheless, from Dalquith’s point of view, it may be difficult to claim that the land is unique; Dalquith might argue that the land represents only a business investment for which damages can provide full compensation, and that the land in question can be readily replace by purchasing lots from the neighbouring landowner. The real problem for the court here is that the damage award required to adequately compensate Carvel for it losses would involve a very large sum of money. Given Carvel’s substantial investment in the project to date, it is likely that specific performance would be granted in this case. CHAPTER 4 Question 5 - There are two main justifications for the principle of vicarious liability: (i) employees may have limited assets available to pay compensation for the potential harm they can cause; and (ii), it is fair that the employer, who makes the profit, should also be liable for the loss. Question 16 - Libel is defamation in writing: slander is spoken defamation. There are two types of privilege. “Absolute privilege” provides complete immunity from liability for defamation (for example, words spoken in a parliamentary debate); “qualified privilege” provides immunity from liability for defamation where a person has been asked to provide information (such as a job reference), provided the statement was made in good faith with an honest belief as to its accuracy. Question 19 - The purpose of damages is to compensate the plaintiff for actual loss; that is, to restore the injured party, so far as is possible, to the position he/she would have been in if the tort had not been committed. Punitive (or exemplary) damages may be awarded in rare cases as a punishment to the defendant (for example, for a deliberate libel, or malicious false imprisonment). Case 2 - An innkeeper owes a duty of care to his customers; for example, in Menow v Honsberger and Jordan House Ltd., [1974] S.C.R. 239, the Supreme Court of Canada held that an innkeeper who ejected an intoxicated customer, who was later hit by a motorist, owed a duty of care to that customer. 6 The present case is based on the decision in Murphy v Little Memphis Cabaret Inc., (1998) 167 D.L.R. (4th) 190, in which the Ontario Court of Appeal upheld the finding of the trial judge that the tavern was liable. The tavern owner had a duty of care towards its customers and it was clearly foreseeable that, by ejecting the plaintiff from the tavern while the other four men were likely to still be outside, the tavern owner tavern owner had not met the “standard of care” expected of a reasonably prudent tavern owner in these circumstances and was therefore liable for negligence. If we conclude that the plaintiff had not exacerbated circumstances in the tavern which ultimately caused the fight to occur outside the back door (since the plaintiff had first been attacked by the intoxicated patron inside the tavern, as opposed to starting that altercation himself), there would be no evidence to support a finding of contributory negligence on the part of Sullivan. CHAPTER 5 Question 5 - The reluctance of the courts to find persons liable for negligent misstatements in the absence of direct contractual or fiduciary relationship was based on a fear that the scope of potential liability might be virtually unlimited. Question 10 - The duty to take reasonable care includes the duty to not omit essential steps in providing professional services. It embraces sins of omission as well as sins of commission where a duty to disclose is required. Question 12 - The essence of causation, in professional-client relationships, is reliance. Did the client rely and act upon the advice of the professional? Would the client not have acted in that way if he had not received that advice? Case 4 - The Canadian case law since Hedley Byrne v. Heller and Partners clearly establishes that a professional can be held liable for negligent misstatement to third party, non-clients of the professional, where such third parties rely upon the professional misstatement (or misrepresentation) for the specific purpose that it was intended to be used (i.e., in a reasonably foreseeable manner). In the present case, the financial statements in question were audited for the accounting firm’s client, Hopkins Steel Ltd., and contained a negligent misrepresentation that the statements had been prepared in accordance with GAAP (when in fact they had not been). The issue here is whether or not the accounting firm prepared these statements for prospective review by a bank (i.e., Canadian Business Bank) to assist the bank in deciding whether to advance credit to Hopkins Steel as a new client of that bank. The fact that the accounting firm had previously provided Hopkins’ audited financial statements to Hopkins’ creditors and bonding insurer from time to time may suggest that the accounting firm was aware that the present statements would be used for a similar purpose and that the accounting firm did in fact prepare the statements for that purpose. If so, Canadian Business Bank could sue the accounting firm for negligent misstatement pursuant to the Hedley Byrne principle discussed in class. Such a finding would be consistent with the outcome in Haig v. Bamford (1976), 72 D.L.R. (3d) 68 (Supreme Court of Canada), where the accountants knew that the accounts in question were being specifically prepared for review by a potential purchaser of the audited corporation (please see footnote 36 at page 111 of the Textbook for further details). Professor Peter Macdonald October 1 and 7, 2025
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