Cian O’Donoghue & Tianyu Xia
#31
In Class Report
From an Armenian perspective, the Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh) conflict is not
simply about borders but also about cultural survival and physical protection. Despite
having a sizable Armenian population for many generations, Nagorno-Karabakh was
included in the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic throughout the Soviet era.
Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh attempted to merge with Armenia following the fall of
the USSR in the late 1980s, which resulted in violence, conflict, and widespread
displacement in the early 1990s. The majority of the international world continued to
treat Nagorno-Karabakh as a part of Azerbaijan even after Armenian forces took control
of the region and its environs.
Fear of what happens under Azerbaijani authority is the primary gripe of
Armenians. They recall anti-Armenian violence in pogroms during the Soviet era, the
Armenian Genocide in the Ottoman Empire, and more contemporary hate speech and
destruction of Armenian cemeteries and churches in areas under Azerbaijani rule.
Following the 2020 conflict and particularly the 2023 Azerbaijani attack, which caused
nearly all of Nagorno-Karabakh's Armenian population—more than 100,000 people—to
escape to Armenia in a matter of days, these concerns intensified. Many Armenians see
this as ethnic cleansing and believe that their community in the area cannot endure
without strong protection or some kind of self-rule.
According to this perspective, military confrontation is acceptable because they
have not been protected by discussions alone. Ceasefire violations and border incidents
persisted for years as negotiations under the OSCE Minsk Group failed to result in a
final deal. Human rights organizations reported grave violations, including indiscriminate
attacks on civilian areas, when Azerbaijan employed massive military force to alter the
situation on the ground in 2020 and 2023. Armenians contend that they are vulnerable
to future attacks, blockades like the Lachin corridor blockade, and forced relocation if
they simply rely on discussion and have no means of self-defense. Fighting, in their
opinion, should only be used as a last resort when all other options appear to be
expulsion or worse.
Particularly following the initial Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in the 1990s,
Armenians can also cite certain benefits of fighting. Armenians in Artsakh were able to
live under their own institutions, speak their language freely, and maintain their culture
for almost thirty years because the de facto authorities there controlled their own
government, army, and schools. Additionally, military resistance prevented other parties
from dismissing the conflict as a petty border dispute, keeping their case apparent on a
global scale. However, the setbacks in 2020 and 2023 demonstrate how brittle those
victories were and how expensive the human cost of war is.
Armenians now prioritize the safety and rights of those who have left while
deciding how to end the conflict. They argue that any fair settlement must allow
Armenians from Nagorno-Karabakh to return voluntarily and offer significant
international guarantees for their political rights, cultural legacy, and security. This might
include international troops or monitors, legal protection for Armenian churches and
cemeteries, and accountability for war crimes by all parties. Although most Armenians
agree that formal negotiations with Azerbaijan on borders, passageways, and mutual
recognition are necessary for any lasting peace, they maintain that peace cannot be
achieved by merely accepting the outcomes of military action without safeguarding
Armenian identity and life.
The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has always been about territorial integrity and
displaced people, according to Azerbaijan. Nagorno-Karabakh was acknowledged
internationally as a component of the newly independent Azerbaijan following the
dissolution of the Soviet Union. Azerbaijan claims that its sovereignty was infringed by
Armenian forces' separatist actions in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Many of the
hundreds of thousands of Azerbaijanis who were uprooted from Nagorno-Karabakh and
the neighboring areas during the first war have been internally displaced people (IDPs)
for decades. The main complaints of Baku are its long-term relocation and lack of
authority over its own area.
Azerbaijan raises security issues as well. It contends that Armenian forces
utilized Nagorno-Karabakh and seven other districts that had been cleared of
Azerbaijani residents as a buffer zone and negotiating chip. Baku asserts that despite
numerous attempts at mediation, Armenia and the de facto leadership in NagornoKarabakh refused to accept a peace agreement that would return these regions for
almost thirty years. This supports Azerbaijan's assertion that diplomacy was tried and
failed for a long time.
According to this perspective, the only remaining option for restoring territorial
integrity and enabling displaced Azerbaijanis to return home is armed combat. Leaders
in Azerbaijan contend that the 2020 conflict was a "counteroffensive" to reclaim territory
acknowledged as belonging to Azerbaijan by the UN and the majority of governments.
Additionally, they claim that Azerbaijan has no diplomatic way to alter the current
situation because Armenia first employed armed action in the 1990s and subsequently
rejected compromise. Although Azerbaijan was accused of carrying out illegal strikes on
civilian areas between 2020 and 2023, it also notes that Armenian forces killed citizens
in Azerbaijani cities by using prohibited weapons including cluster munitions. Both
parties suffered, according to the Azerbaijani perspective; the important thing is that the
prior occupation and displacement could not last indefinitely.
Fighting has clearly benefited Azerbaijan as well. By 2023, it had militarily
reclaimed all of Nagorno-Karabakh and its neighboring districts. In terms of politics,
Baku feels that what it refers to as a "frozen conflict" has finally come to an end,
allowing it to concentrate on infrastructural development, especially energy projects,
rebuilding the region, and resettling Azerbaijani IDPs. The government claims to
integrate the remaining Armenians as equal citizens, however many Armenians and
international observers strongly disagree with this assertion given the large-scale
migration of Armenians in 2023.
Azerbaijan's starting point for settling the conflict is that the territorial question is
"closed," meaning that Nagorno-Karabakh will not have any special status and is
completely under Azerbaijani sovereignty. Baku believes that a peace deal with
Armenia, boundary demarcation, and the opening of transportation links are the next
steps, all of which will have a positive economic impact on the entire region.
Additionally, it maintains that Azerbaijani institutions, not foreign peacekeepers, are
capable of providing security for Armenians in the area. A more forward-thinking
Azerbaijani stance would oppose any agreement that appears to be renewed special
autonomy or external control over its territory while accepting some short-term
international presence to foster confidence.
In the end, all parties perceive themselves primarily as victims and believe that
using force is both essential and defensive. Azerbaijanis concentrate on sovereignty,
displaced people, and the prolonged occupation of their acknowledged territory;
Armenians concentrate on safety, memories of the genocide, and the loss of a longstanding community.
Both Azerbaijan and Armenia claim to have long-standing historical sovereignty over
the region. From Azerbaijan’s perspective, their grievance is national sovereignty and
territorial integrity. The international community generally recognizes Nagorno Karabakh
as a part of Azerbaijan's territory, and the long-term occupation of its territory and the
resulting of hundreds of thousands of refugees cannot return home.
During this conflict, Azerbaijan gained the collapse of Nagorno-Karabakh regime with
the military support of other countries such as Turkey. However, This victory also
created hundred thousand of refugees toward Armenia and the influx of displaced
people will pose serious challenges for Armenia for years to come. (International Crisis
Group, 2023)
At the same time, in my perspective, Azerbaijan took the leadership of resolving this
conflict, it also reduced the influence of Armenia in the region of Nagorno Karabakh.
The reason of go into armed conflict is that after long and useless dialogues for almost
30 years, there are still accomplished enough progress
The solutions to resolve the conflict could be signing a new contract to provide enough
trust between two countries and enhance the trade and culture connections. Azerbaijan
should also help deal with the refugee problem.
Sources:
Council on Foreign Relations. (2023). Tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
Retrieved from https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/nagorno-karabakhconflict Council on Foreign Relations
Ertl, M. (2023, September 28). Nagorno-Karabakh: Conflict between Azerbaijan and
Armenians explained. BBC News. Retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/news/worldeurope-66852070 Political Pandora
Human Rights Watch. (2020, October 30). Armenia: Cluster munitions kill civilians in
Azerbaijan. Retrieved from https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/10/30/armenia-clustermunitions-kill-civilians-azerbaijan Human Rights Watch
Human Rights Watch. (2020, December 11). Azerbaijan: Unlawful strikes in NagornoKarabakh. Retrieved from https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/12/11/azerbaijan-unlawfulstrikes-nagorno-karabakh Human Rights Watch
Human Rights Watch. (2021, July 15). Technical briefing note: Cluster munition use in
the Karabakh conflict. Retrieved from https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/07/15/technicalbriefing-note-cluster-munition-use-karabakh-conflict Human Rights Watch
International Crisis Group. (2023, September 16). The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict: A
visual explainer. Retrieved from https://www.crisisgroup.org/visual-explainers/nagornokarabakh-conflict-visual-explainer Crisis Group