Mellitah Oil & Gas B.V. Libyan Branch - (Bouri Field Security Evacuation Plan)
Revision History
Rev
P2
P1
REASON FOR REVISION
Written By
and Date
Reviewed By Endorsed By
and Date
and Date
W.Fandi
Abdunasser
Attia
NA
NA
12/06/2021
15/06/2021
-
-
W.Fandi
NA
NA
NA
12/06/2021
-
-
-
Issued for departmental review
Draft
MOG-HSEQ-S-P-137 Rev A1
Approved By
and Date
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Mellitah Oil & Gas B.V. Libyan Branch - (Bouri Field Security Evacuation Plan)
TABLE OF CONTENT
1
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................................... 5
1.1
OVERVIEW ......................................................................................................................................... 5
1.2
AIM ...................................................................................................................................................... 5
1.3
SCOPE ................................................................................................................................................ 5
1.4
TERMS AND DEFINITIONS ........................................................................................................... 8
1.5
SECURITY ALERT STAGES ......................................................................................................... 9
1.6
TYPE OF EVACUATION ............................................................................................................... 10
2
EVACUATION PLANNING ........................................................................................................................ 11
2.1
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................... 11
2.2 EVACUATION COORDINATION ............................................................................................................ 11
2.3 ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE ERT ................................................................................... 11
2.4 MAINTENANCE OF THE PLAN .............................................................................................................. 13
2.5 EVACUATION TRIGGERS ...................................................................................................................... 13
2.6 EVACUATION DECISION ..................................................................................................................... 14
2.7 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT SCENARIO ......................................................................................... 14
2.7.1 Draw Down ........................................................................................................................................ 14
2.7.2
Evacuation ................................................................................................................................. 15
2.8 PLATFORMS EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE ................................................................ 15
2.9 RADAR SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM ........................................................................................................ 17
3 EVACUATION FROM BOURI FIELD PLATFORMS ................................................................................. 18
3.1
EVACUATION STAGES .................................................................................................................... 18
3.2
EVACUATION OPTIONS .................................................................................................................. 18
3.2.1
Primary Option: Air Evacuation ................................................................................................. 18
3.2.2
Secondary Option: Sea Evacuation........................................................................................... 18
4 COORDINATION MEASURES-COMMUNICATIONS ............................................................................... 19
4.1
INITIAL NOTIFICATION .................................................................................................................... 19
4.2
COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT .................................................................................................. 19
4.3
ERT ROSTER.................................................................................................................................... 19
4.4
LOST COMMUNICATION PROCEDURES ...................................................................................... 19
5 COORDINATION OF EXTERNAL SUPPORT ........................................................................................... 19
5.1 COMMERCIAL AVIATION ....................................................................................................................... 19
6 ADMINISTRATIONS .................................................................................................................................. 20
6.1 FINANCE - CONTINGENCY FUNDS ...................................................................................................... 20
6.2 PASSPORTS .......................................................................................................................................... 20
6.3 MANDATORY EVACUATION EQUIPMENT ........................................................................................... 20
7 USEFUL CONTACTS ................................................................................................................................ 21
7.5 EXPATRIATE PERSONNEL ................................................................................................................... 23
ANNEX .............................................................................................................................................................. 24
ANNEX 1: EVACUATION CONTACT LIST................................................................................................. 24
ANNEX 2: BOURI HELIDECKS LAYOUTS ............................................................................................... 25
MOG-HSEQ-S-P-137 Rev A1
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Mellitah Oil & Gas B.V. Libyan Branch - (Bouri Field Security Evacuation Plan)
Note: This Evacuation Plan is a living document that should be updated in order to reflect changes
in the operational environment and the physical / logical systems and procedural changes
undertaken by Mellitah Oil & Gas B.V. — Libyan Branch.
Distribution and security of this document
This evacuation plan is property of Mellitah Oil & Gas BV and must not be distributed, copied or
published without the permission of the Chairman or in his absence his delegated manager. Each
copy must be signed for individually and staffs are reminded that it is a confidential document and
should be treated accordingly.
Copy
No.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Name of holder
Format*
Date of
issue
Issued by (name)
HC/EC
MOG OMC CHAIRMAN
HC/EC
MOG OMC MEMBERS
HC/EC
HSEQ Div. MANAGER
HC/EC
HSEQ Dept. MANAGER
HC/EC
MOG SECURITY MANAGER
HC
BOURI FIELD MANAGER
HC/EC
NOC CHAIRMAN
* NOTE (1): HC - Hard Copy; EC - Electronic Copy; MAIL - email
MOG-HSEQ-S-P-137 Rev A1
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Mellitah Oil & Gas B.V. Libyan Branch - (Bouri Field Security Evacuation Plan)
1
INTRODUCTION
1.1
OVERVIEW
In fulfilling its duty to protect its resources, Mellitah Oil & Gas B.V (MOG) produced
documentation and guidelines necessary to address the personnel in the conduct of an
evacuation, considering all stakeholders involvement in the process.
This evacuation plan concerns the possible evacuation routes from Bouri Field Installations
(DP4, DP3, GAZA/SLOUG FSO) in the event of a Security emergency related to the BOURI
Field or to entire country. The evacuation from Bouri Field DP4, DP3 and GAZA/SLOUG FSO
is possible via Helicopters, Lifeboats and Standby Vessels to safe havens in Europe
(International), other North African Countries or in-country safe havens. The evacuation plan
shows the possible evacuation routes. The use of these options is normally driven by
situational factors, and one or more may be used in combination by evaluating all the options
available in the event of emergency.
1.2
AIM
The aims of the plan are:
• Provide a clear passage for evacuating staff from Bouri Platforms in times of
unacceptable risk posed by a deteriorating Security situation.
• To ensure that all employees in Bouri Field Installations have a comprehensive
understanding of the basic procedures and the actions that should be undertaken in
the event of emergency evacuation.
1.3
SCOPE
This plan is designed to describe the process of evacuation for:
• MOG employees residing in Bouri Field.
• Employees traveling to Bouri Field.
• Contractors’ staff under MOG responsibilities working in Bouri Field.
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BOURI FIELD FACILITIES LAYOUT
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BOURI FIELD NC47 LOCATION
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1.4 TERMS AND DEFINITIONS
Term
Definition:
Emergency
A sudden event that causes a deviation from normal operating conditions
and that, although it does not carry the potentiality of determining great
repercussions for the company's integrity, both at a national and
international level, it is capable of causing situations that carry a potential
damage for material and human resources, and that must be controlled
and solved as quickly as possible.
Crisis
An event whose resolution may take a long time and that possesses the
potentiality of determining serious repercussions for the company's
integrity, both at a national level and internationally, as well as
compromising company's image and reputation on the international
markets.
Corporate
liability and
sustainable
development of
the enterprise
Concept based on the creation of long-term value for our shareholders
and employees by contributing to the development of the local
communities with which company is involved. This development involves
ethical commerce, protection of the environment, economic growth and
social progress for our customers and those with whom we work.
Human Rights
Human Rights are the inalienable rights of all individuals, without
distinction, by virtue of their very belonging to the human race. They are
based on the recognition of the dignity, freedom and equality of all the
human beings, and are sanctioned in the United Nations' Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (10 December 1948) as "the foundation of
freedom, justice and peace in the world".
Threat
A wide range of events and conditions that might have negative effects or
any action by groups or individuals designed to cause intentional damage
or injury. Actions designed to harm interests and aux activities, for
example, criminality (computer piracy, petty crime and organized crime),
violence, national and international terrorism, kidnapping, fraud, internal
tension (dispute with an employee or a supplier, etc.), sabotage, social
tension (activism, lobbying, extremism, etc.).
Vulnerability
Risk - Security
Risk
The weak point that a system possesses in relation to a security event of
a certain intensity, location, duration and frequency in time.
Vulnerabilities may derive from, but are not limited to, weakness of
ordinary management activities, of physical security or of Security
operating procedures.
A security risk is the result of threat and vulnerability combined together,
and represents the possibility of hitting a specific objective with more or
less success, causing a security event.
Emergency
Response
Team (ERT)
A group of Company managers nominated to manage a major incident at
country level. In the event of an evacuation, the ERT coordinates the
logistical and administrative requirements to support the Chairman, in the
movement of all evacuees efficiently and safely as possible.
Site Emergency
Control Manager
The Site Emergency Control Manager is the most representative
employee operating in a defined area. Usually the company will appoint
different sector leader country-wide who in case of event are the person
who has to implement the instruction issued by ERT.
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Business
Continuity Plan
(BCP)
A plan designed to allow essential business function to continue in the
event of a crisis or disaster where business is interrupted. The BCP will
outline alternate facilities to be used, measures to back up information
and identify the essential business functions that must be maintained.
An in-country location of relative safety that will allow staff to remain in
Local Safe haven comfort during a crisis. The safe haven should have power, water,
sanitation and communications. Limited medical supplies and food
should also be available at minimum.
Regional
Safe haven
A secure location within the region where evacuees can relocate to in the
event of an evacuation. Non-essential staff may pass through the
regional safe haven before returning home and Company management
may choose to remain in the regional safe haven to establish an
alternative office. The regional safe haven must be suitable for mid to
long-term occupation (as dictated by the BCP).
GSF
Government Security Forces i.e. Police, Army, Navy, Air Force
Persons On
Board (POB)
Used in reference to the number of people located at the Company facility
at any time.
Access point
The point at which personnel transit to and from a controlled area.
GM
General Manager
It includes MOG's Top Management; in particular, the Chairman
Top Management of Management Committee, and the top executives/OMC
members under the said Chairman.
MOG
Mellitah Oil & Gas BV.
FSO
Floating storage and offloading unit/tanker.
OMC
Operating Management Committee
BOURI
Installations
Are Bouri Field platforms and FSOs namely : DP4,DP3 &
GAZA/SLOUG FSOs.
1.5 SECURITY ALERT STAGES
Four Alert stages are used to grade the security threat in the MOG area of operation : The stages
are divided into to two parts, Alert stage 1 to 3 representing emergency planning and Alert stage 4
being the evacuation planning.
Table 2: Security Incident Scenarios and Evacuation Relation
Alert Stage
Level
Color
Description
No or low risk of criminal activities (Robbery, Burglary, Car
Low and Medium
1
Jacking)
Risk (Code Alpha)
Increased Risk
Increased criminal activities, industry specific targeting,
(Code Bravo)
political activities with potential for violence.(Robbery,
2
Burglary, Car Jacking, Kidnapping & Industry specific
targeting)
High Risk (Code
MOG-HSEQ-S-P-137 Rev A1
3
Credible MOG targeted asset or operational specific and/or
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Mellitah Oil & Gas B.V. Libyan Branch - (Bouri Field Security Evacuation Plan)
Charlie)
Extreme Risk (Code
Delta)
4
industry specific criminal activity , militant activity, community
activity, industrial protests, etc.
Actual activity impacting MOG operations and safety of
employees. Evacuate.
Form
Form
IMT
ERT
Improvised Explosive Device ( IED) detected in MOG
(Package, vehicle bomb, suitcase)
INFO
y
Y
A person enters the site with a Suicide Vest Attack (SVA),
detected/detonated
Y
Y
Y
During searching of personnel/passengers’ bags, explosive
trace in cargo container/chopper is found
INFO
Y
N
INFO/Y
Y
Yes, if high intensity
and escalates
Indirect Fire directed at Bouri Field Installations
by intruders or illegal immigrants.
Y
Y
Y
Any type of bomb/device explosion at a checkpoint or
within the Bouri Installations.
Y
Y
Y
Bouri Field Installations’ Attack.
Y
Y
Y
Security Scenario
Small Arms Fire (SAF) directed against MOG
Evacuate
1.6 TYPE OF EVACUATION
Evacuation from Bouri Field Installations in the event of crisis, involves considerable planning, logistic and
security resources. The evacuation option by helicopter for ENI NA personnel and Contractor expatriates
will be utilized when applicable and manageable, such as in cases of a planned and controlled
evacuation . Evacuation by Supply Vessel and or Lifeboats/rescue craft to the nearest supply vessel
available as refugee location, and final evacuation will be the most probable and fastest option,
especially in an immediate and unplanned evacuation scenario.
•
Availability of the resource.
•
Reaction time from charter/commission to on station at nearest evacuation point.
•
Carrying capacity of the resource.
•
Duration of evacuation when using the resource.
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•
The effect of weather conditions on the resource.
•
The security threat (does it necessitate immediate and speedy evacuation).
2 EVACUATION PLANNING
2.1 INTRODUCTION
In the event of emergency, it is essential to use a checklist listing a clear, concise, and
chronological way of actions to undertake during evacuation.
2.2 EVACUATION COORDINATION
The evacuation from Bouri Field will be coordinated with the Chairman after contacting NOC
by the Emergency Response Team (ERT) created in Tripoli and composed by key managers
of MOG and in a case representative from ENI North Africa. In Bouri Field the person in
charge to organize the evacuation is the Field Manager.
2.3 ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE ERT
In general the role of the ERT is to deal with the immediate issues faced by the Field
operations and MOG / Contractors staff, in order to contain the situation and prevent the
incident or emergency from getting any worse.
The primary objectives of the ERT include:
•
To provide support for all staff in Libya, including Bouri field (DP4, DP3 and
GAZA/SLOUG FSOs).
•
To provide a structured command and control system that interfaces with the
recognized emergency management structure abroad and locally.
•
To provide for the orderly evacuation of all staff for security reasons where required.
•
To provide reporting and recording systems for any emergency.
•
To participate in the education and on-going training of personnel in emergency
response to support emergency incidents.
•
To periodically assess the threat situation and apply appropriate alert levels in
conjunction with Company stakeholders.
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•
To provide a managed emergency response in accordance with agreed plans and
procedures in consultation with all stakeholders and external support agencies; and
to budget for and allocate emergency and recovery resources/ finances.
•
Maintain situational awareness and monitor the local situation, evacuation triggers
and alert levels.
ERT composition:
•
•
•
•
•
•
MOG Chairman (Leader)
MOG Members
MOG Operation Manager
MOG HSEQ Manager
HR&O Manager
Scribe / Secretary / Log keeper
The ERT can involve any other figures necessary to support any emergency situations:
ERT leader
Site Emergency Control Manager
(General Manager or Deputy GM)
(Field Manager)
Activate the evacuation plan.
Maintain communication with the ERT.
Ensure that continual contingency planning
takes place during the evacuation.
Coordinate all local internal and external
transport resources necessary for the conduct
of the evacuation.
Make sure that all possible measures are
taken to ensure the safety of evacuees.
Account for all staff in particular expatriate
staff/ evacuees in their area of responsibility.
Identify and authorize the commencement
of evacuation to Safe Haven.
Ensure that the Evacuation Coordinator is
continually updated on the progress of the
evacuation.
Monitoring the group of evacuees to the
Safe Haven.
Provide orientation briefings to evacuees on
the evacuation plan.
Coordinate the handover of business
operations to senior employees (Continuity
Team).
Move with the last group of evacuees to the
Safe Haven.
Ensure that sufficient contingency funds
are available through the proper
department.
Ensure that all staff on arrival in Bouri
Platforms are aware of this plan and familiar
with their responsibilities in its execution.
Maintain continual communications with
Personnel are to be briefed at least on an
annual basis as part of normal compliance
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Company stakeholders.
training.
Inform Company stakeholders in the area if
necessary (embassies, NGOs, companies
etc)
Ensure a constant and updated information
flux to NOC.
2.4 MAINTENANCE OF THE PLAN
It is the responsibility of HSEQ manager and Field Manager to ensure this plan is kept up to
date, with particular focus on staff contact information. It is recommended this be done once a
year and additionally every time there is a change to the Alert State.
2.5 EVACUATION TRIGGERS
MOG through the competent departments is continuing monitoring the situation evaluating
what have the potential to impact the overall security situation in the country.
As generic indications possible triggers for evacuation may include the following:
•
Improvised and violent protests and demonstrations also with armed personnel.
•
A complete breakdown in law and order caused by military coup, violent civil unrest,
or insurgency.
•
An attack on commercial air operations causing a significant decrease or cessation
of air operations.
•
Lack of all essential services.
•
Significant risks during transfers or impossibility to travel.
•
Hostile diplomatic relations.
•
Seizure or appropriation of property.
•
Major conflicts involving the country; threat of regional war.
•
Lack of essential goods and raw materials.
•
Terrorist actions mainly against foreign interests; kidnappings and murders targeting
personnel.
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2.6 EVACUATION DECISION
The evacuation from Bouri Field is decided by the Chairman supported in his decisions by
Emergency Response Team (ERT) created locally and composed with key managers of MOG
and in case ENI North Africa. In Bouri Platforms, the person in charge to organize the
evacuation is the Field Manager.
In case of emergency and/or total communication breakdown the Field Manager will take the
responsibility of the evacuation according to the last instruction received or at his sole
discretion.
Timing of the decision
Evacuation should be considered in situations where:
• There are clear indicators that expatriates may be at serious risk in the short-term.
• There are clear indicators that security is unlikely to improve in the short-term, and;
• An evacuation would not expose personnel to greater risk than remaining in location.
Situation awareness
MOG through the competent departments will monitor all threats in order to manage risk
exposure and increase preparedness as the risk increases. Having a good understanding
of the current and developing situations across the country will ideally allow the
management team to pre-empt escalating crises and manage the situation accordingly by
reacting in an informed and timely manner.
2.7 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT SCENARIO
The decision to adopt the following actions will be driven by an accurate analysis of the security
scenario and taken by the ERT:
2.7.1 Draw Down
As the security situation deteriorates, it may become more difficult to conduct routine
operations. The objective of the Draw Down phase is to limit personnel exposure to
unnecessary danger.
At this point, preparations for a full evacuation will be made including the confirmation of
logistical and administrative arrangements. Essential staff will be briefed on the next
possible steps, with evacuation and continuity plans reviewed and rehearsed.
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2.7.2
Evacuation
In Bouri Field the most-preferred option for an evacuation to a safe haven (local or
international) is by air (Helicopters). As back up evacuation routes it is possible to use
other options such as Lifeboats or Standby Vessels through Crane and /or the boatlandings. Every effort should be made to place evacuees on regularly scheduled
commercial aircraft to their home of residence. For instance, where commercial aircraft
become unavailable, charter aviation options may be required.
The designation of primary and secondary assembly locations provides flexibility in
dealing with unforeseen contingencies. The primary location and mode is the default
solution, unless access is blocked or its security is compromised or instruction is given to
proceed to alternative locations. If communications are lost, staff will attempt to make their
way to the Meeting Points (MP). In case of emergency and total communication
breakdown the Site Emergency Control Manager will take the responsibility of the
evacuation according to the last instruction received.
2.8 PLATFORMS EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE
Overall responsibility for actions on the installations lies with the OFM on Bouri Platforms. This
responsibility will transfer to the Production Superintendent if the OFM is rendered incapable of
responding.
The OFM will be the Emergency Control Manager (ECM) directing the response to the
emergency and providing direct support to the On Scene Commander (OSC). Designated
personnel must be aware of their specific duties, and it is their responsibility to check these
duty lists daily.
In the event of an emergency requiring notification of the onshore Emergency Response
Manager and his Emergency Support Team in MOG Headquarters, the Emergency Control
Manager will initiate immediate contact with the ERT in Tripoli, passing on Information as
appropriate.
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Figure 1. MOG EMERGENCY RESPONSE ORGANISATION
NOC Libya
Eni North Africa BV
In case of Level 3
Mellitah Oil&Gas BV HSEQ Division Manager
(Duty Company Emergency Response Coordinator)
Mellitah Oil&Gas
ERT
DP4 Offshore Field Manager (or his designate)
Emergency Control Manager (ECM)
(Duty Site Emergency Response Coordinator)
Contractors
available on site
In case of Level 2
CALL OUT OF ERT
Emergency Control Centre (ECC)
HSEQ
Section Supervisor
Administration
Supervisor
Maintenance
Superintendent
OFM Technical
Support
Maintenance
Technical Support
Marine and Aviation
Supervisor
DP4 Production Superintendent (or his designate)
Incident Commander (IC)
(Company Representative at Site)
DP3 Superintendent / Terminal Superintendent /
HSEQ Coordinator
On Scene Commanders (OSC)
Combat
Team
MOG-HSEQ-S-P-137 Rev A1
Rescue
Team(s) + First Aid
HAZMAT
Team(s)
Production/ Technical
Team(s)
Marine and Aviation
Team(s)
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2.9 RADAR SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM
This system is an electro-optic servo-controlled system, able to aim with camera sensors any
target of interest around the ship, during day and night time. The equipment is able to move
freely in the azimuth axis with continuous rotation, due to internal slip-rings, and in the vertical
axis with a wide elevation range. The payload is internally gyro-stabilized to reduce user
workload in order to compensate roll and pitch movements of the ship. The equipment carries
2 sensors: one daylight colour camera with low-light enhancement functionality, and one
infrared night camera with uncooled 8-14Km detector. Finally, the equipment is completed with
a high-performance automatic video tracker.
The mission of the system is to detect as soon as possible small vessels entering the covered
area. For this reason, they have been elaborated the range estimations, based on
the
selected locations for radar and EOD equipment’s and on the following assumptions for radar.
The system, based on radars and cameras installed on proper locations, is able to
automatically detect and locate surface objects, on a wide area, by means of automatic sensor
data processing. Basically n.2 independent subsystems installed on 2 locations (platforms
and/or ship), each one able autonomously to collect object data (position, cinematic and video
image) and to permit detection, recognition and identification of friend and hostile vessels. The
first system will be installed on an offshore platform, and the second one is installed on the
floating/storage vessel in another area. Additionally, both systems can be connected to remote
centres, by means of a satellite connection (not supplied), where it will be possible remotely
control or monitor only the surveillance subsystems.
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3 EVACUATION FROM BOURI FIELD PLATFORMS
3.1
EVACUATION STAGES
The process of evacuation is standardized for simplicity and is broken into two stages. Once
the decision to evacuate has been made, these stages will be used. The key events that take
place within each stage are summarized below:
Phase 1: Movement to and actions at the Meeting Points (MP):
• Coordination of evacuation Helicopters, Standby Vessels, logistics and medical
support.
• Notification of staff through Public Address system (PA).
• Staff to proceed to their Meeting Points.
• Briefings and administrative procedures at the Meeting Points done by Emergency
Control Manager / Meeting Point Checking Officers.
Phase 2: Movement from Meeting Point (MT) to the Heli-Reception or and Lifeboats’ Muster
Stations (MS) and actions to be taken:
• Coordinating safe movement to the (Heli-reception) or and (Lifeboats Muster
Station).
• Briefings and administrative procedures at the (Heli-reception) or and Lifeboats’
Muster Stations done by Helideck Team or and the (HSE) Rescue Inspector on duty.
• Transfer of Evacuees to nearest Platform or Shore (Tripoli, Malta, or Tunisia).
3.2
3.2.1
EVACUATION OPTIONS
Primary Option: Air Evacuation
• Air Evacuation (By Helicopters) from Bouri Helidecks to safe haven.
• Primary DP4, DP3 Gaza FSO Helideck.
3.2.2
Secondary Option: Sea Evacuation
• Primary Bouri Installations by Standby Vessels then to nearest Platform or Shore
(Tripoli, Malta or Tunisia).
• Reserve DP4, DP3 and GAZA FSO Lifeboats then to nearest Platform or Standby
Vessel.
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4 COORDINATION MEASURES-COMMUNICATIONS
4.1
INITIAL NOTIFICATION
The Initial notification of staff is to occur using the emergency Public Address system (PA)
while normal landline phone systems remain operable. The notification could be initiated by
ERT but the Field Manager is the key figure in the field to manage an evacuation in agreement
with the ERT in Tripoli. The alternate systems of communications notification may involve
usage of satellite system (Thuraya) and radio system.
4.2
COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT
Radio system and satellite telephones will be the primary method of communication amongst
staff during the evacuation.
4.3
ERT ROSTER
ERT Roster with key emergency contact numbers is available with ERT members in Bouri
Field. The ERT Roster is the primary reference for emergency communications and is
periodically updated.
4.4
LOST COMMUNICATION PROCEDURES
The Emergency Control Manager in agreement with ERT is to brief evacuees on the
procedures to take if communication is lost during the various phases of the evacuation. In the
event communications are lost prior to the decision to evacuate, staff should make their way to
their designated Meeting Points and wait for further instruction.
If staff is unable to reach the Meeting Points or it is deemed unsafe to do so, then they should
proceed to their designated Muster Stations. In case of extreme danger and total loss of
communications the Emergency Control Manager will take the responsibility to manage the
evacuation.
5 COORDINATION OF EXTERNAL SUPPORT
5.1 COMMERCIAL AVIATION
Scheduled Air Services
Scheduled commercial aviation services are the primary means of withdrawal during the
Warning and Stand-by levels. It should be noted that during a crisis, it is likely to be
extremely difficult to purchase seats on commercial scheduled air services.
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Chartered Air Services
First and second party can provide chartered aviation options upon request and monitor
availability of these aircrafts and provide daily updates on changes to availability for the
duration of the evacuation operation.
Ticketing
Ticketing for scheduled commercial air flights will be coordinated through MOG
administration department.
Manifesting
An evacuation manifest containing the information detailed is to be finalized and
maintained by the Emergency Control Manager in conjunction with ERT.
6 ADMINISTRATIONS
6.1 FINANCE - CONTINGENCY FUNDS
Arrangements are to be made to have access to appropriate funds. These contingency funds
are only to be drawn on the authority of the ERT and the supervision of the Emergency
Control Manager. All funds are to be accounted for after the evacuation.
6.2 PASSPORTS
All evacuees will require passports. Passports should have at least six m onths validity before
their expiry date.
6.3 MANDATORY EVACUATION EQUIPMENT
Evacuees are to pack their personal belongings once they have received the notification.
Baggage must be kept to essential items only during an evacuation. Under most evacuat ion
circumstances, evacuee personal belongings will be limited to the following:
-
One carry-on luggage weighing no more than 15 kg.
It is recommended that personal belongings be packed in small bags such as backpacks.
No dangerous goods (e.g. firearms, ammunition, lighters, etc) will be permitted aboard the
evacuation Helicopters.
MOG-HSEQ-S-P-137 Rev A1
Page 20 of 26
Mellitah Oil & Gas B.V. Libyan Branch - (Bouri Field Security Evacuation Plan)
7 USEFUL CONTACTS
7.1 BOURI
No.
Name
Telephone Number
1
Radio Room
Ext. 64600 /64455
2
Field Manager
Ext. 64401
3
HSE Coordinator
Ext. 64440
4
Clinic
5
Control Room
Ext. 64445- Radio 64642
Ext.64493 /64495
7.2 TRIPOLI OFFICE
No.
1
Name
OPERATION MANAGER
Abu baker Hussein Albarhsi
2
HSEQ-S Div. Mgr
Emad Elaaib
3
HSEQ Dept. Mgr.
Khalid Swiessi
4
Security Dept. Mgr.
Abdulnasser Attia
5
Employee Relations. Dept. Mgr.
Alhadar mohamed Wali
6
Logistics & Material Move. Dept. Mgr.
Mounir Ayad Abushawashi
MOG-HSEQ-S-P-137 Rev A1
Telephone Number
00218-213335135/ 48
Ext
21031
Mobile 091-6596653
Thuraya Phone
No. 00 88 216 3000 0577
00218213335135/48
Ext 21316
Gas division Ext 26885
Mobile 0912207497 /
0913390134.
Thuraya Phone
No. 00 88 216 300 30 507
00218213335135/ 4 8
Ext. 21146
Mobile 091-220 77 84
Thuraya Phone
No: 008821655540932
00218213335135/ 4 8
Ext. 21107
Phone No 091-3818551
00218213335135/
Ext. 23 801
091 8109396
Mobile: 092- 6696419 or
091 87 43875
00218213335135
Ext. 21 148
Mobile: 092- 7167847 or
091 2207322
Page 21 of 26
Mellitah Oil & Gas B.V. Libyan Branch - (Bouri Field Security Evacuation Plan)
7.3 DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES/EMBASSIES IN LIBYA
No.
Embassy
Address
Telephone
Emergency 091 3221686
1
Italian
Consulate
Shar Uahran Street, 1
Dahra Tripoli
+218(0)213603032 Ext.3111
+218213403644/45
OR 02070080000
Ukinlibya.fco.gov.uk/en
2
British
Embassy
24th Floor, Burj Tripoli,
Tripoli
3
German
Embassy
Sharia Hassan El Mashai
Tripoli
+218214448552/+218213330554
4
Dutch
Embassy
20 Gala Bayar Street
Dahra-Tripoli
+218214441549/1550
TRI@minbuza.nl
+218214774891,4770039,4772315
5
French
Embassy
Beni El Amar Street, Hay
Al-Andalus 21, Tripoli
6
Philippine
Embassy
KM 7 Gargaresh Road
Hail Andalous
P.O. Box 12508
Tripoli Libya
7
Indian
Embassy
Shar Uahran Street, 1
Dahra Tripoli
www.ambafrancely.org/france_libye
(+218) 21 483 3966
(+218) 21 483 6158
+218 213409288
+218912203239,+218913794560
8
USA
MOG-HSEQ-S-P-137 Rev A1
Sidi Slim Area/ Walie Al Ahed Road, Tripoli
Libya.usembassy.gov
Page 22 of 26
Mellitah Oil & Gas B.V. Libyan Branch - (Bouri Field Security Evacuation Plan)
7.4 COMMERCIAL AIRLINES
Transportation Providers ...
Organization
>
Contact
Name
Phone
Communications Means
Mobile
Email
Airlines
Libyan Airlines
TBD
+218 913702273
http://www.afriqiyah.aero
(Private
Medavia
Charter Company)
TBD
+356 21331010
http://www.medavia.com
4 Seasons Travel
TBD
+35621312134
http://www.4seasontrvl.com
Ghadames Airways
TBD
+90 5312771426
http://www.ghadamesair.ly
Afriqiyah Airways
TBD
+218 214449734
http://www.afriqiyah.aereo
TBD
TBD
TBD
TBD
Helicopter
Operators
Gulf Air
Helli-Union
TBD
TBD
Marine
Superintendent
7.5 EXPATRIATE PERSONNEL
A list of all expatriate personnel (POB) with all the relevant information is prepared on daily basis
by the field HSE section indicating all the foreign personnel (MOG & Contractors).
MOG-HSEQ-S-P-137 Rev A1
Page 23 of 26
Mellitah Oil & Gas B.V. Libyan Branch - (Bouri Field Security Evacuation Plan)
ANNEX
ANNEX 1: EVACUATION CONTACT LIST
This list provides the IMT/LMT with the contact details of key individuals and organizations for use
during an evacuation.
It is important that the ENI IMT ensures that this list is always kept up to date.
Alarm Centers
Communication Means
Phone
Fax
Email
Medical Facilities
Facility
Malta Hospital
Tripoli Hospital
MOG Medical SPT
MOG-HSEQ-S-P-137 Rev A1
Phone
TBD
TBD
Ext 21335
Location
Malta, TBD
Tripoli, TBD
Tripoli Office (Dahra)
Page 24 of 26
Mellitah Oil & Gas B.V. Libyan Branch - (Bouri Field Security Evacuation Plan)
ANNEX 2: BOURI HELIDECKS LAYOUTS
Bouri DP4 & DP3 Helideck Layout
MOG-HSEQ-S-P-137 Rev A1
Page 25 of 26
Mellitah Oil & Gas B.V. Libyan Branch - (Bouri Field Security Evacuation Plan)
GAZA FSO Helideck Layout
MOG-HSEQ-S-P-137 Rev A1
Page 26 of 26