Global Discourse • vol XX • no XX • 1–20 • © Authors 2024
Online ISSN 2043-7897 • https://doi.org/10.1332/20437897Y2024D000000043
Accepted for publication 31 October 2024 • First published online 29 November 2024
RESEARCH ARTICLE
The disruptive effect of Western supremacist
civilizationism: why Southern Cone reactionary
governments confront regionalism
Bernabé Malacalza, b.malacalza@conicet.gov.ar
National University of Quilmes and Consejo Nacional
de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas (CONICET), Argentina
Gisela Pereyra Doval, gpdoval@gmail.com
National University of Rosario and Consejo Nacional
de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas (CONICET), Argentina
This article argues that Southern Cone reactionary governments often tend to confront
international and regional institutions. Evidence of this approach is found in the administrations
of Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil (2019–22) and Javier Milei in Argentina (2023–), exhibiting various
forms of confrontation. The analysis highlights two primary explanations: first, the distinct
nature of reactionary governments based in a world view rooted in a Western supremacist
civilizationism (WSC) vision; and, second, the driving of their foreign policies by ‘culture
wars’ and a new kind of alignment with the US named ‘performative emulation’. By focusing
on how beliefs rooted in WSC influence foreign policy, the article illustrates how these
reactionary governments are altering the regional political landscape with ‘culture wars’
becoming civilizational regionalism (Geistregionalismus). Methodologically, this article examines
these two case studies to glean broader theoretical understandings from the experiences of
reactionary governments in the Southern Cone, their foreign policies and their relationship
with regionalism.
Keywords Western supremacist civilizationism • Southern Cone reactionary governments
• regionalism
Key messages
•
•
Reactionary governments defend Western Supremacist Civilizationism (WSC), defining
identity through historical civilizations and portraying threats to Christian Western
civilization as both internal (modern cosmopolitanism, the liberal international order)
and external (China’s rise and influence in multilateral institutions).
They act as zealous promoters of US values, adopting policies with exceptional enthusiasm,
often exceeding alliance requirements. This ‘performative emulation’ reflects not just
imitation but actively enacting dominant state ideals as their own.
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Bernabé Malacalza and Gisela Pereyra Doval
•
•
In the Southern Cone, reactionary governments align regionalism with WSC through
‘Geistregionalismus’, waging a culture war against internal opposition using obstructionist tactics
and religious rhetoric, while forming external alliances to challenge established platforms.
Geistregionalismus transfers cultural supremacy to regionalism, seeking to ‘purify’ the
region from perceived internal and external threats, reshaping cooperation to align with
WSC ideals over traditional political or economic priorities.
To cite this article: Malacalza, B. and Doval, G.P. (2024) The disruptive effect of Western
supremacist civilizationism: why Southern Cone reactionary governments confront
regionalism, Global Discourse, Early View, DOI: 10.1332/20437897Y2024D000000043
Introduction
From the mid-2010s onwards, traditional political parties worldwide began to
consider far-right formations as acceptable partners in coalitions (koalitionsfähig),
bringing them out of electoral marginalization and normalizing the discussion of
their ideas (Mudde, 2021). Within these ideas, foreign policy occupies increasing
centrality, as some scholars have begun to study the impact of right-wing
governments in international politics. From these studies, several assertions can
be drawn: (1) beliefs (and culture) play a crucial role in shaping foreign policy
(Shaffer, 2006); (2) they influence international politics and the configuration
of global order (Anievas and Saull, 2022); (3) different leaders may share similar
beliefs on the international stage yet pursue divergent foreign policies due to
varying geopolitical considerations (Pereyra Doval, 2023); and (4) regional and
national contexts are essential factors (Hudson, 1997). This understanding allows
us to identify key aspects of the world views of Latin American right-wing leaders,
particularly those in the Southern Cone.
Simultaneously, there is a growing debate in the international relations literature
on how beliefs, culture and ideologies influence regionalism (Baracaldo Orjuela and
Chenou, 2019). Recent studies by González et al (2021), Malacalza and Tokatlian
(2022) and Merke and Pereyra Doval (2022) have examined the structural and agentive
causes behind Mercosur’s regional disintegration and the increasing divergence
between Brazil and Argentina, focusing on the underlying dynamics propelling this
decoupling. This article argues that Southern Cone reactionary governments embrace
a civilizational conception of regionalism, which we refer to as ‘Geistregionalismus’.
In line with this vision, they pursue a strategy that balances the radicalism of ‘culture
wars’ with pragmatism yet primarily focuses on confronting existing regionalism
(Pacciardi et al, 2024). We observe that this approach, characterized by scepticism or
outright hostility towards regional institutions, is evident in the cases of reactionary
governments led by Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil (2019–22) and Javier Milei in Argentina
(2023–), manifesting in various forms of confrontation with regional dynamics.
The cases of Argentina and Brazil are analysed based on two key explanations: on
the one hand, the unique characteristics of reactionary movements as an international
project based on Western supremacist civilizationism (WSC), a world view embraced
by reactionary governments that frames cultural and religious identity through the
prism of Christian Western civilization, positioning itself against perceived threats
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The disruptive effect of Western supremacist civilizationism
from both internal forces, such as advocates of cosmopolitanism and liberalism,
and external ones, including the rise of China. This conception combines cultural
exceptionalism with a sense of civilizational superiority, transcending nationalism
by promoting a broad, transnational identity rooted in pre-modern values while
actively resisting modernity. It embodies a fundamentalist and exclusionary stance,
primarily opposing liberal Western values and progressive agendas focused on social
justice and the expansion of rights within the Southern Cone. On the other hand,
the specific characteristics of their foreign policies are driven by ‘culture wars’ and
a new form of acquiescence in their relations with the US, which can be described
as ‘performative emulation’. By highlighting the role of beliefs in shaping foreign
policy, this article illustrates how reactionary governments are reshaping the regional
political landscape, making ‘culture wars’ central to their confrontation with existing
regionalism. Methodologically, the article analyses case studies to provide broader
insights into the Southern Cone experiences of reactionary governments, their foreign
policies and their interactions with regionalism.
To achieve the central objective of illustrating that the reactionary governments
of the Southern Cone are attempting to change the landscape of the region by
confronting existing regionalism based on a civilizationalist vision of Western
supremacy, we will divide this article into three sections. The first explains the concept
of WSC and how it has become a framework for action for reactionary governments
in the Southern Cone through the ‘culture wars’ that filter into foreign policy. In
this sense, both anti-cosmopolitanism and anti-globalism become central to the
behaviour of these governments in the international and regional arenas. However,
the reactionaries of the Southern Cone of South America present particularities that
differentiate them from their counterparts in the North. These differences will also
be highlighted in this first section of the text. In the second section, we construct
the analytical category of ‘performative emulation’ to explain Bolsonaro’s and Milei’s
policy of acquiescence towards the US, considered by these reactionary governments
as the ‘beacon’ of Western civilization. The last section attempts to elucidate the
behaviour of the reactionary governments of the Southern Cone with respect to
regionalism from a conception aligned with a civilizational vision that is projected
in the region that also uses cultural wars as the main tool: Geistregionalismus.
Southern Cone reactionary governments and WSC: an
interpretative framework for action
If the international liberal order aims to universalize values and beliefs, reactionary
right-wing leaders do not seek to restore it; rather, they offer narratives and actions
that oppose the current order and propose embryonic frameworks for an alternative
one. Despite the differences and nuances among various reactionary doctrines,
certain commonalities allow scholars to group this broad and diverse phenomenon
under the term ‘reactionary internationalism’ (Tokatlian, 2018; 2023; Michelsen
and de Orellana, 2019; Sanahuja and López Burian, 2020; Michelsen et al, 2023;
Malacalza and Tokatlian, 2023b). However, while they share reactionary tendencies
and perspectives, the experience of reactionary governments in the Southern Cone
reveals certain distinctive features when compared to their Northern counterparts.
In this article, we define Southern Cone governments, such as Javier Milei’s
administration in Argentina and Jair Bolsonaro’s in Brazil, as reactionary. While
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Bernabé Malacalza and Gisela Pereyra Doval
acknowledging the many variables that shape a state’s foreign policy, we emphasize
the role of civilizational and culturally specific domestic factors in explaining the
external behaviour of these leaders. This focus highlights the values and beliefs
that shape a leader’s world view. Although beliefs may not always be considered
direct drivers of foreign policy, Goldstein and Keohane (1993) argue that they
can operate on three levels: first, by shaping the world views that frame how we
interpret our surroundings; second, by providing a roadmap for decision makers;
and, third, by offering justifications for specific actions. Consequently, civilization,
culture and beliefs are key variables in this analysis (Hudson, 1997; Shaffer, 2006;
Katzenstein, 2022).
The central international framework of reactionary governments is not nationalism
but rather WSC. By ‘civilizationism’, we refer to Brubaker’s (2017) concept of a
world view in which cultural and religious identity is defined in terms of a historical
civilization, positioning itself against cultures or civilizations seen as ‘foreign’ or
threatening. The perceived threat to Christian Western civilization, according to
Western reactionaries and their followers in the Southern Cone, stems from both
internal and external forces. Internal forces include those who advocate for modern
cosmopolitanism and the notion of a ‘liberal international order’ that, since the end
of the Cold War, has sought universal reach: politically through the expansion of
democracy and human rights; economically through the extension of the free market;
and internationally through liberal institutions and regimes. External forces, on the
other hand, are seen in the rise of China and its growing influence within the United
Nations (UN) and other multilateral forums, where it is viewed with suspicion as
part of a ‘globalist’ or cosmopolitan Marxist bureaucracy.
Civilizationism also merges ‘cultural exceptionalism’ with a sense of ‘civilizational
superiority’, grounding itself in pre-modern values, such as Christian heritage and
secularism, to construct a civilizational identity that excludes or limits the influence
of other cultures and modernist values. Unlike classic nationalism, which focuses
on cultural unity around a single ethnic group, civilizationism appeals to a broad,
transnational ‘us’ (for instance, ‘Christians’ versus ‘Muslims’) rather than a strictly
national identity (Bettiza et al, 2023). The term ‘supremacist’ is used here to
conceptualize this stance as a religiously Western, fundamentalist, uncompromising
and exclusionary world view, akin to the vision promoted by radical Islamism
regarding its own civilization. Both reactionaries and radical Islamists place significant
value on the communal dimension of human society, aim to privilege a specific set
of beliefs and symbols locally (beginning with the family), and seek to protect what
they perceive as the soul of their societies from internal and external threats (Hamid
and Dar, 2017). In the case of Argentina and Brazil, this opposition is not directed
against Islam but rather against liberal Western values and the left’s agenda focused
on social justice and the indefinite expansion of rights.
The defining tool of WSC is the ‘culture war’: a religious battle between
identities, driven not by political programmes but by dogmas and group loyalties.
This phenomenon explains the recent influence of civilizational and reactionary
movements in reshaping the social and cultural landscape of the West (Kurth, 2009).
Their cultural battle against what reactionaries call ‘globalism’ opposes modern, liberal
Western cosmopolitanism – the idea that there are ‘global citizens’ with a shared
responsibility for global issues – rooted in Enlightenment ideas and consolidated
by the French Revolution. These Enlightenment values promoted universal ideals
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The disruptive effect of Western supremacist civilizationism
of liberty, equality, fraternity and human rights and were later expanded to include
new rights in social justice, gender equality, Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender,
Queer or Questioning and more (LGBTQ+) rights and environmental justice, which
reactionaries label as a ‘socialist agenda’ or ‘cultural Marxism’.
To grasp this world view, it is essential to recognize that they perceive an
ongoing ‘clash of civilizations’, where the West is, in their view, on the losing side
(Araújo, 2017). This perspective does not simply critique the international liberal
order established after the Second World War; rather, it argues that ‘liberalism has
progressively undermined the very foundations of Western civilization’ (Pabst, 2019:
18). This view extends beyond Huntington’s (1993) concept of a clash between
distinct civilizations and suggests a deeper conflict within Western civilization
itself. Consequently, foreign policy is seen as having a role in this internal cultural
struggle, not to restore universal values or ideals but to shape a new community
with particularity as its hallmark. Importantly, this vision does not call for a return to
traditional society or conservatism in a conventional sense. Instead, it seeks to reclaim
an idealized lost order, which may harken back to the pre-modern medieval age or
even to the romantic reaction against Enlightenment ideas in the 19th century. In this
context, they reject the claim of a universal Western logos, attributing it to liberalism
and refusing to see this universality as inevitable. The alternative they propose is a form
of WSC, not as a universal ideal but as a civilizationism where each preserves its own
values, culture, religion and beliefs against modern cosmopolitanism (Araújo, 2017).
In the reactionary vision, anti-cosmopolitanism or anti-globalism refers to
the rejection of the principles, values, norms and institutions that constitute the
liberal international order’s institutional architecture. For this group, globalism is
perceived almost as a conspiracy against their interests and those of the nation. This
perspective stems from a distrust of globalism’s claim to universality. Thus, their
‘reaction’ to the international liberal order manifests as a rejection of multilateralism,
which reactionary leaders view as globalism’s primary tool. Consequently, these
governments favour unilateral or bilateral mechanisms for international engagement
over multilateral avenues. As such, Southern Cone reactionary governments are not
Table 1: Liberal-conservative and reactionary views of the liberal international order
View of the liberal
international order
Liberal-conservative
Reactionary
General approach
Seeks stability and gradual evolution Seeks a return to a perceived golden
within the liberal international order age, often through radical or regresand its institutions
sive changes opposing the
liberal order
View of
current order
Views the liberal international order Sees the liberal international order
as imperfect but generally legitimate as fundamentally flawed or corrupt,
and worth preserving
requiring the restoration of traditional hierarchies
Attitude
towards change
Advocates for cautious, incremental
changes that maintain continuity
within liberal norms and institutions
Supports dramatic or abrupt change
to reverse perceived decline and
dismantle liberal norms
Foreign policy
Prioritizes diplomacy, balance of
power and maintaining the liberal
status quo in global affairs
Favours cultural battles and aggressive, assertive foreign policies that
challenge the liberal order and assert
national or civilizational dominance
Source: Own elaboration from Pabst (2019) and Michelsen, de Orellana and Buranelli (2023).
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Bernabé Malacalza and Gisela Pereyra Doval
anti-internationalists; rather, they are anti-globalists proposing an alternative model
for international order. This vision advocates for a particularist, pre-modern and
anti-modern international order that rejects universality and aligns with a differential
logic of state power (see Table 1).
Most studies focus on the perspectives of Northern leaders or, alternatively, on
how Southern leaders adapt those ideas locally (Rodrigues, 2019; Wehner, 2023).
Therefore, it is crucial to recognize distinctions not only between reactionary
and liberal-conservative governments but also between Northern and Southern
reactionary governments. While Northern reactionaries often express strong
nationalist sentiments, Southern Cone reactionary governments, while employing
WSC rhetoric, tend to align so closely with the US that they prioritize North
American interests over their own (as will be discussed further in the second part of this
article). In this respect, they feel culturally ‘closer’ to North America or Europe than
to South America, leading them to downplay regional alliances like the Community
of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) or Mercosur.
Additionally, Southern Cone reactionary governments often advocate for neoliberal
economic programmes, whereas Northern reactionary governments lean towards
protectionism or welfare chauvinism. As Sanahuja and López Burian (2022: 8)
describe, globalism is commonly defined ‘in terms of the ideological dimension of
globalization, which aims to separate politics from economics, assigning the latter
to the supposedly superior rationality of the market’. Consequently, Southern
Cone reactionary governments, in their neoliberal opposition to globalism, find
no inconsistency in promoting economic and trade globalization while distancing
themselves from regulatory institutions. While Southern Cone reactionary leaders
share this anti-globalist stance rhetorically, they have simultaneously sought to join the
‘big boys’ club’. In other words, they resist the universalization of norms yet aspire to
join institutions like the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD), described by Merke (2024) as ‘an organization that specializes in producing
regulatory and governance standards for its members’.
Another characteristic of Southern Cone reactionary governments is the
phenomenon of fusionism,1 understood as a merging of interests and ideas. This
fusionism is the union of interests or ideas in a single coalition. Thus, Milei and
Bolsonaro represent a fusion between the mainstream liberal-conservative right, a
right that has remained present in the histories of both countries, and the reactionary
right that with the end of the military dictatorships, has had residual expressions.
Specifically, anti-communism, which takes on particular characteristics in the cases
of Bolsonaro and Milei, is typical of the reactionary right (McGee Deutsch, 1999;
Goebel, 2011). As a counterpoint to this element, the idea of the important role
of the Church in maintaining social order is reinforced and acts as a binder of the
different traditional conservative values. This convergence of different right-wing
strands made possible the emergence of a network in which dissimilar sectors of the
right participate and merge.
Both Bolsonaro’s Liberal Party and Milei’s La Libertad Avanza operated as a
surface for the convergence of reactionary, authoritarian, conservative, Christian,
neoliberal and mainstream liberal-conservative traditions, which were reflected in
the ministerial cabinet of each of the leaders (but are not watertight compartments).
Far from generating stability or the necessary consensus for governance, this fusion
of ideological traditions negatively impacts Argentina’s foreign policy, and despite
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The disruptive effect of Western supremacist civilizationism
the traditional coalition presidentialism, the same happens in Brazil. However, it is
through WSC that the world view is amalgamated. This amalgamation centres on
the defence of a declining or lost West, where the cleavages assume and recognize a
common foreign policy vision based on acquiescence to and the representation of
the interests of a great power in the hemisphere: the US.
What do we mean by acquiescence? Performative emulation in
Milei’s and Bolsonaro’s foreign policies
The field of international relations has produced a substantial body of work addressing
asymmetric relationships and the actions of weaker countries, emphasizing the role of
hierarchy and political-military inequalities in global politics (Tickner and Morales,
2015). Hierarchy, as a structural feature of the international system, plays a central
role in discussions about the various types of relationships between dominant and
subordinate states (Triska, 1986). These dynamics are often analysed through such
frameworks as dependency theory and peripheral autonomy (Cardoso and Faletto,
1969; Jaguaribe, 1972; Puig, 1980).
Russell and Tokatlian (2024) bring this debate into contemporary contexts, arguing
that Latin America’s foreign policy approaches to asymmetry, especially in relation to
the US, can be understood through two ‘grand strategies’: autonomy and acquiescence.
Autonomy is often idealized as the pursuit of complete freedom, while acquiescence
is seen as total submission. However, these extremes rarely capture the complex
realities of political practice. Russell and Tokatlian (2013) propose that acquiescence
does not necessarily imply full subordination to the dominant power’s interests.
Instead, it can represent a form of rationalization, akin to Puig’s (1980) concept of
‘national dependency’. In this interpretation, peripheral elites instrumentalize their
subordination to achieve their own objectives, seeking to maximize the benefits of
asymmetry while aiming for greater autonomy in the future. At its most undesirable
extreme, what Puig (1980) termed ‘paracolonial dependency’, the peripheral state
maintains formal sovereignty and independence but remains practically dependent
on external structures and actors.
Historically, in Latin America, acquiescence has involved a pragmatic approach
to power asymmetries, setting objectives to maximize benefits within a dependent
situation while striving for greater autonomy in the long term. An acquiescent state
does not simply follow the dominant power’s lead or act as its puppet. During the Cold
War, efforts towards autonomy involved reducing dependence on the US by fostering
relationships with other significant actors, such as Europe, the Global South and
the Soviet Union. Today, the global redistribution of power, wealth and influence –
particularly with China’s rise as a new ‘Other’ – presents new opportunities, challenges
and dilemmas. The increasing marginalization of Latin America in global politics
and the consequent loss of relative autonomy raise the risk that many countries in
the region may find themselves in an unprecedented situation of dual dependency
on both China and the US.
With the rise of Donald Trump, a new dimension emerged that framed foreign
policies within a civilizational battle. The Trump administration mainstreamed this
approach in its foreign policy, particularly concerning China, the World Health
Organization (WHO) and its handling of the COVID-19 pandemic. Simultaneously,
Trump intensified Sino-US rivalries and escalated rhetoric towards a ‘New Cold
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Table 2: Types of acquiescence strategies
Acquiescence
strategies
Coupling
Description
Key differences
Accepting the international status
quo and aligning with major
powers’ strategic interests
Emphasizes maintaining the current international order and aligning with dominant
powers without challenging them
Accommodation Making concessions to meet the
preferences or demands of dominant powers to avoid conflict
or punishment
Involves tactical adjustments and concessions to address specific demands or pressures, aiming to prevent escalation
or conflict
Engagement
Acting as a proxy for dominant
powers in conflicts or policies
towards third countries
Focuses on participating in actions or policies directed by dominant powers, often in
a supportive or secondary role
Performative
emulation
Using WSC (often cultural wars) to More extreme than the others, involving
align with dominant powers
the use of narrative and symbolic rhetoric
to align public perceptions and actions
with dominant powers’ interests and values
War’. His administration adopted coercive strategies towards China, combining
discourses on industrial consolidation, free trade, globalism, the ‘clash of civilizations’,
immigration and terrorism (Parmar and Furse, 2023). In the contemporary regional
landscape, the primary debate over the foreign policies of Southern Cone reactionary
governments often centres on the concept of acquiescence, highlighting how these
policies navigate the balance between assertive autonomy or equidistance and
submission to the US. These governments frequently prioritize a defensive and cultural
protective sovereignty over multilateral rule making (anti-multilateralist sovereigntism),
while selectively aligning with the US to secure material or symbolic dividends and
obtain US collaboration or protection to support domestic political or social forces.
According to Russell and Tokatlian (2024), acquiescence strategies can be
categorized into three main types: coupling, accommodation and engagement.
Coupling involves accepting the international status quo and aligning with US strategic
interests while avoiding deep regional integration that could jeopardize close ties
with Washington. Accommodation entails yielding to US preferences or demands
to avoid displeasure or punitive actions, particularly in areas like trade, migration,
tariffs or drug policies. Engagement refers to acting as a US ‘proxy’ in interactions
with other countries, whether through low-intensity conflicts, voluntary coalitions
or regime changes (see Table 2). Building on these classifications, we add a fourth
type: performative emulation. In this approach, reactionary governments often
view themselves as protectors or standard-bearers of the WSC they have adopted,
taking on a role in defending or promoting US values and interests in their region.
The aligned state goes beyond the minimum requirements of the alliance, adopting
and promoting the dominant state’s policies, values and goals with exceptional zeal,
sometimes even more vigorously than the dominant state itself.
‘Performative emulation’ is a concept that combines the idea of striving to imitate or
match a model with an element of visible, deliberate enactment. It suggests not merely
copying but actively ‘performing’ behaviours, values or stances to reflect another’s
ideals or achievements as if they were one’s own. This approach blends the notion
of ‘emulate’, derived from the Latin aemulārī, implying a competitive drive to equal
or exceed another, with ‘perform’, which involves carrying out actions in a visible,
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demonstrative manner. In this context, performative emulation implies an outward,
almost theatrical display of adopting another’s actions, values or policies. Unlike
simple imitation, it involves a conscious, visible enactment intended to showcase
alignment or shared identity, often at the expense of unique local or national values.
In foreign policy, for example, it is seen when leaders adopt the strategies or
stances of a larger ally, not only as policy decisions but also as public gestures
signalling solidarity or shared purpose, sometimes to an exaggerated degree. Hirst
and Maciel (2022) use the concept of ‘mimetism’ instead of alignment to describe the
relationship between Brazil and the US during Bolsonaro’s government. However,
the term ‘performative’ specifically underscores the transformation and evolution
of civilizational beliefs and values into observable behaviours. ‘Emulation’ more
accurately captures the essence of this dynamic, as it involves actively enacting, making
present and visibly embodying the influence of the US in the Western Hemisphere
rather than merely aligning, adapting or participating.
Historically, ‘performative emulation’ was evident in the Southern Cone during
the Cold War, when military dictatorships adopted US-backed anti-communist
policies, positioning themselves as supremacist and defenders of Western values against
leftist insurgencies. This was more than just alignment; it was an active promotion
of US ideological frameworks within their own regions. A notable example outside
Latin America is Japan’s alignment with the US during the same period. Japan not
only adopted US policies, values and strategic stances but also acted as a proactive
representative of US interests in East Asia, further illustrating the concept of
performative emulation in international relations.
This phenomenon is particularly pronounced in contemporary Southern Cone
reactionary governments, such as those led by Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil and Javier
Milei in Argentina. These governments have often replicated the WSC and the
cultural symbols, language and political rhetoric of Trumpism, including antiglobalism, and integrated them into their domestic agendas. Moreover, these
governments engage in what can be described as ‘bandwagoning with zeal’. They
adopt and promote US policies with exceptional enthusiasm, sometimes even
advocating for more aggressive stances than the US itself. They do not merely
follow the lead of the US; they actively propagate these ideas within their regions,
positioning themselves as vocal defenders and promoters of US policies and
creating regional alliances that reinforce these values. By doing so, they amplify
US influence within Latin America, presenting themselves as regional protectors
of US values and interests.
In Brazil, Bolsonaro’s government demonstrated a WSC stance and a strong
inclination towards the US, aligning closely with Donald Trump’s agenda and
adopting an anti-China stance. This alignment was evident in multiple ways, such
as Bolsonaro’s support for Brazil’s entry into the OECD at the cost of renouncing
special treatment within the World Trade Organization (WTO). The relationship
also led to significant military cooperation with the US, with Brazil becoming a
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) extra ally, granting the US access to
its Alcantara space base, engaging in joint operations on the Venezuelan border
and purchasing US military equipment. Bolsonaro’s government strongly rejected
China’s influence, particularly during the COVID-19 pandemic, criticizing China’s
role and creating tensions over the CoronaVac vaccine. This anti-China stance was
further reinforced by a broader anti-communist narrative that linked communism
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Bernabé Malacalza and Gisela Pereyra Doval
with cultural Marxism and distorted values, consistent with Bolsonaro’s attacks on
China as a promoter of this ideology (Pereyra Doval and Ordoñez, 2020; Guimarães
and Silva, 2021; Hirst and Valls Pereira, 2022).
Moreover, Bolsonaro’s administration was marked by an anti-globalist approach
that challenged Brazil’s historical commitments to multilateralism. Influenced by
thinkers like Olavo de Carvalho and inspired by Trump’s ideas, Bolsonaro criticized
international bureaucracies and their control over globalization. Climate denialism
became another pillar of his policy, leading to the weakening of environmental
protection laws, criticisms of global environmental norms and conflicts with countries
like Germany and Norway over the Amazon Fund. On human rights, Bolsonaro’s
government adopted a reactionary approach, rejecting progressive international
agendas, such as the 2030 Agenda, opposing terms like ‘gender’ and ‘social justice’.
This stance was evident in Brazil’s positions at the UN, where it opposed reproductive
rights and supported a reactionary agenda focused on anti-gender ideology (Casarões
and Barros, 2022).
Under Javier Milei, Argentina’s administration marked a significant shift towards
a WSC stance, showing a strong inclination towards alignment with the US and
its defence and security policies. In 2024, Argentina joined the Contact Group
on Ukraine, underscoring its support for Ukraine and opposition to Russian
aggression. Additionally, Milei’s administration announced a foreign policy
doctrine prioritizing Western values and interests, with frequent diplomatic
engagements with US entities like the Southern Command and the Central
Intelligence Agency. This Western-centric stance extended to the Israel–Palestine
conflict, where Argentina abstained from a UN resolution calling for a ceasefire
in Gaza and opposed another resolution granting Palestine full UN membership.
A defining move in this alignment was the decision to relocate the Argentine
embassy to Jerusalem, further signalling its shift in international alliances.
Argentina’s aspirations to become a NATO Global Partner have further solidified
its position within Western military alliances (Malacalza, 2024; Pereyra Doval,
2024; Tokatlian, 2024).
Milei’s government also embraced a strong anti-China stance, rejecting Chinese
influence and technology in favour of Western alternatives. The decision to
purchase US F-16s instead of Chinese JF-17s and the broader criticism of China’s
role and influence exemplify this shift. Argentina’s rejection of Brazil, Russia, India,
China, South Africa (BRICS) membership further indicated a clear preference for
Western-oriented alliances (Malacalza and Tokatlian, 2023a). Additionally, Milei’s
administration opposed modern global agendas, particularly the 2030 Agenda, taking
critical stances on gender, climate and health issues. This rejection of global norms
positioned Argentina in the reactionary camp on the international stage (Malacalza
and Tokatlian, 2023b).
Performative emulation as a form of acquiescence does not exclude other
approaches. Instead, it reflects a sort of collective memory within liberalconservative circles on how to engage with the liberal order – a memory that
Southern Cone reactionary governments do not fully embrace (and may even
openly disagree with) but still use, at least symbolically, to keep their base or
coalition unified. For instance, while these governments may aim to become
NATO Global Partners, secure OECD membership or reach a European Union–
Mercosur agreement, they do not see these aspirations as contradicting their
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The disruptive effect of Western supremacist civilizationism
Table 3: Performative emulation in Bolsonaro and Milei’s foreign policies
Axis
WSC
Description
Civilization struggle: They frame international relations as a clash between
Christian civilization and secular/globalist forces. International relations are
depicted in black-and-white terms, with stark divisions between allies and
enemies. Bolsonaro and Milei present global politics as a battle between good
and evil forces, particularly against globalism, communism and China, which
they see as existential threats to their nations.
Culture wars: Both governments not only defend against perceived threats but
also actively promote their internal conflicts on the international stage. Their
foreign policies are used as tools to reinforce domestic narratives (communism
or cultural Marxism), casting their nations as part of a global struggle against
forces that threaten their ideological and cultural values.
Supremacism: South America is positioned not as part of the classical West but
as its successor, defending Western civilization in a time of perceived threat.
Figures like Trump are seen as icons resisting global decline. Bolsonaro and
Milei emphasize strong ties with the US while portraying their nations as saviours of traditional Western identity.
Anti-multilateralism: Sovereignty is prioritized over participation in multilateral
organizations. Both Bolsonaro and Milei resist international agreements that
they see as compromising national autonomy. Milei’s opposition to WHO regulations reflects their broader resistance to multilateral frameworks that challenge
their sovereignty.
Anti-China
stance
Anti-globalism or anti-cosmopolitanism: ‘Globalism’ is depicted as a conspiracy
by international agencies and China to impose ‘cultural Marxism’. This globalist
agenda is seen as a threat to national sovereignty, targeting inherently nationalist, Christian and anti-communist values. International law is viewed as a tool
of globalism, used against the ‘true people’.
Anti-communism: Communism is framed as a major threat, often linked to
globalism and socialist conspiracies. Bolsonaro and Milei see themselves as
defenders against communist ideologies, portraying communism as antithetical
to national and cultural identity.
Cold War mentality: China is viewed as a primary antagonist, associated with
globalism and communism. Both Bolsonaro and Milei adopt a binary world
view, where China represents a major threat alongside other enemies like
globalists and socialists.
stance on WSC. Rather, they recognize that these partnerships are essential for
a broader agenda, not merely a realignment of foreign policy but a reordering
of the country’s foundational relationship between the state, market and society.
In other words, they concede on less central issues in exchange for support on
those that truly matter to them.
In summary, performative emulation in the foreign policy visions, narratives
and actions of the Bolsonaro and Milei administrations can be distilled into two
main axes: WSC and anti-China stance (see Table 3). The first axis follows a logic
of civilizational crusade, positioning the world as a battle between good and evil,
with China, globalism, cultural Marxism or communism embodying the forces of
darkness. This axis perceives the West, primarily represented by the US, as having
lost its primacy, which must be restored. Bolsonaro and Milei see themselves as
saviours and defenders of a Western civilization that must resist decline and the
threat posed by autocratic powers and globalist elites. Finally, the second axis
centres on an anti-China stance. This involves antagonizing China, driven by a
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Bernabé Malacalza and Gisela Pereyra Doval
conspiratorial mindset and a Cold War mentality that exaggerates the threat China
poses to the international order.
An imagined internal–external enemy is constructed, often symbolized by the
spread of communism or cultural Marxism. Even with long-term economic,
financial and trade interests tied to China, this perspective treats Beijing merely as a
transactional tool within the relationship with the US. This view downplays China’s
role as a global power and overlooks the asymmetrical dynamic it presents for South
American countries. These perceptions, in turn, shape the reactionary governments’
approach to regionalism.
Regionalism as a ringside: the contested arena
Regionalism refers to the political and cognitive ideas and processes of defining and
forming regions, often associated with a formal programme that reflects certain ideas,
values and objectives aimed at creating, maintaining or modifying a particular region
within the global order. It is generally tied to formal policies or projects that can lead
to the establishment of institutions and is not limited by time but by spatial or social
dimensions (Söderbaum, 2011). Regional integration, on the other hand, is a more
specific process where states within a defined region work together to harmonize
policies, remove barriers to cooperation and enhance economic, political and social
integration. It involves not just cooperation but also often supranationality, meaning
that states cede some degree of sovereignty to regional institutions (Deutsch, 1968).
Reactionary governments often confront existing regional institutions through a
strategy that balances cultural wars and pragmatism. According to Pacciardi, Spandler,
and Söderbaum (2024), this approach is characterized by scepticism or hostility towards
such institutions and unfolds across four components: criticism, extortion, obstruction
and exit. These range from rhetorical actions like public criticism to tangible moves
like withdrawal. Confronting is rarely aimed at fully dismantling institutions and
is often limited by material factors, such as resource dependence and the costs of
leaving. Symbolically, refraining from full exit allows reactionary governments to
leverage international platforms for status seeking and performative strongmanship.
Practices like extortion or obstruction allow reactionary governments to voice
opposition to certain aspects of regionalism while still leaving room to negotiate
economic concessions aimed at market access or reducing common external tariffs.
Additionally, more extreme actions like ‘exit’ – typically signalling a fundamental
shift, such as withdrawing from a regional organization – can also serve as a strategic
tool, though one that is sometimes reversible.
Although they may not openly admit it, the Southern Cone reactionary governments
are based on a conception of regionalism that aligns with the WSC. We call this
conception ‘Geistregionalismus’, which represents the supremacist project transferred to
the region. This term combines ‘Geist’ (spirit or culture) with regionalism, maintaining
the sense of a policy or approach that emphasizes the spiritual or cultural dimension
of regions. As Samuel Huntington (1996: 230) pointed out, ‘military alliances and
economic associations require cooperation among their members; cooperation
depends on trust, and trust easily springs from common values and culture’. From
this perspective, regionalism is understood as both a cognitive and a civilizational
process. However, this is rare in practice. Regions are not inherently political or
cultural entities but rather geographical realities. According to Huntington (1996),
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The disruptive effect of Western supremacist civilizationism
regionalism can be fractured by conflicts between civilizations, as well as by internal
tensions within a single civilization. Regions only serve as a basis for cooperation when
geography coincides with culture. Otherwise, what emerges is dispute and conflict.
Under this logic, the success of regionalism depends on the supremacy of the
Western civilization. To achieve this, a shared Western civilizational vision with
common values and interests must prevail. However, from the Southern Cone
reactionary perspective, leftist culture is seen as a disruptive force that undermines
these traditional values and corrupts regionalism. Leftist culture, or what is referred
to as ‘cultural Marxism’, is perceived as a threat that appropriates regionalism and
has direct ties to communism, China and other foreign ideologies. For reactionary
government elites, there are two possible interpretations of Western civilization. In
the first one, this civilization is pre-existing and is being threatened by such actors
as the left, socialism or Castro-Chavista (Bolivarianist) ideologies. In the second, a
civilizational struggle with autocratic regimes like Venezuela is ongoing, where the
winner will impose its vision. If the first perspective is adopted, the response is to
preserve civilization, combat the infiltrated threat and close ranks externally. If the
second view is embraced, regionalism becomes a battleground.
The challenge posed by the reactionary vision is that Latin America as an extended
region has historically been and continues to be multi-civilizational. Thus, the idea
of a civilizational regionalism, or Geistregionalismus, that reactionary governments
aspire to is largely utopian. This article opens a dialogue with the body of scholarly
work that approaches Latin America through a civilizational lens. Scholars fall into
two primary camps: those who view Latin America as part of Western civilization
(Toynbee, 1949); and those who see it as a distinct sub-civilization (Braudel, 1963;
Huntington, 1993). In both interpretations, Latin America is perceived as a cultural
whole, unified by language, shared colonial history and certain cultural foundations.
However, this characterization is problematic. While there are shared elements
and some points of convergence, Latin America does not constitute a culturally
homogeneous group of states. Instead, regionalization efforts have facilitated
convergences among diverse states rather than creating a single cultural entity. In sum,
since Latin America is inherently multi-civilizational, the vision of a civilizational
regionalism, or Geistregionalismus, is ultimately a chimaera.
The primary tool of Geistregionalismus is a culture war waged against the internal and
external forces that are seen as corrupting it and obstructing its success. Proponents
of this ‘culture war’ within regionalism seek to ‘purify’ it, aiming to expel what they
view as the ‘communist devil’ from both within and outside. Internally, they use
obstructionist tactics and religious discourse to challenge opponents; externally, they
create counterforces by forming alternative alliances or ad hoc discussion forums
to rival established platforms (see Table 4). A clear example of this dynamic is the
move towards unilateralism and the weakening of Mercosur. In more extreme cases,
the option is to exit, as in Brazil’s decision to leave CELAC. Meanwhile, initiatives
like the Forum for the Progress of South America (PROSUR) are created from the
outside, with the goal of establishing anti-left alliances in various sectors.
From Jair Bolsonaro’s perspective, regionalism is possible only if it involves
‘Latin American brothers free from dictatorships’ (Bolsonaro, 2018). This notion
reflects a selective approach, favouring alignment with ideologically similar nations,
with Argentina under Mauricio Macri and Chile under Sebastián Piñera being
his main allies at the time. Additionally, this idea of selective alliances, based on
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Bernabé Malacalza and Gisela Pereyra Doval
Table 4: Geistregionalismus: reactionary governments confronting regionalism
Form of
confrontation
Disruptive
factors
Axes of dispute
Visions of regionalism
Criticism
Venezuela as a
scapegoat for
the cultural
battle.
Venezuela is framed as a
tool to divide the region
into ‘good’ (democracies)
and ‘bad’ (Castro-Chavista
regimes) actors.
Regionalism is seen as promoting leftist ideologies and as a
threat to reactionary values.
Obstruction
Combating
regionalism as
a propagator of
socialist ideas.
Existing regional organizations
are viewed as tools for promoting socialist or communist
agendas. In response, reactionary governments actively
obstruct any initiatives they
perceive as advancing these
leftist ideologies.
Viewed as undermining
national sovereignty and
reactionary frameworks through
institutionalizing socialism.
Extortion
Enabling or
Regionalism is portrayed as
practising
bureaucratic and parasitic,
aggressive, uni- wasting resources.
lateral actions
against regional
agreements as a
form of extortion.
Unilateralism is favoured to
preserve state sovereignty
and maintain control without
the limitations imposed by
regional agreements. It is also
used as a strategy to negotiate the reduction of regional
constraints, such as common
external tariffs.
Exit
Abandoning
institutions and
the performative
emulation of
US influence.
Regionalism is viewed as
unnecessary or obstructive in
pursuing direct bilateral relations with global powers like
the US.
Regionalism is seen as an
obstacle to alignment with the
US, which is favoured as the
primary geopolitical partner.
cultural-ideological homogeneity, is coupled with a cultural battle against perceived
enemies: countries like Honduras, Cuba, Mexico, El Salvador and Nicaragua are
deemed responsible for exporting social ills. The São Paulo Forum, labelled a ‘leftist
laboratory’ with a ‘totalitarian bias’, is also targeted, with Venezuela identified as the
primary adversary. In January 2019, Brazil recognized Juan Guaidó as Venezuela’s
legitimate president. During a March visit to the US and a meeting with Trump,
Bolsonaro declared that ‘Brazil is in a position’ to bring democracy to Venezuela. By
April, at the Lima Group meeting in Colombia, Brazil’s government even suggested
that external intervention in Venezuela might be considered. On 22 March 2019,
Brazil joined the creation of the PROSUR and, in April, withdrew from the Union
of South American Nations (UNASUR). In January 2020, Brazil also formally
exited CELAC. These so-called ‘Castro-Chavista’ enemies are seen as the same forces
Bolsonaro perceives as undermining Brazil domestically, implying coordination with
the Workers’ Party (Frenkel, 2018; Bandeira de Mello and Gomes Saraiva, 2024).
During Bolsonaro’s presidency, Mercosur was relegated to a secondary position,
and any attempt at subregional integration – typically fostered through presidential
summits – was undermined by Bolsonaro’s undiplomatic approach towards Argentina.
His view was that Mercosur had not only failed to achieve its goals of becoming a
free trade area and customs union but was also an inefficient tool for connecting with
global markets. Under Bolsonaro, Brazil frequently expressed its intention to pursue
trade agreements outside of the bloc. Although Bolsonaro made occasional threats
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The disruptive effect of Western supremacist civilizationism
to leave Mercosur, his administration ultimately leaned more towards the flexibility
and unilateralism of the bloc rather than a complete withdrawal (Frenkel, 2018).
For his part, although he campaigned on the idea of eliminating Mercosur, Milei
also relegated it to the level of diplomatic bureaucracy. For an anarcho-capitalist,
the idea of a bloc where states regulate relations is simply an abomination. The
Argentine president has not even mentioned the integration process in any of his
official appearances, leaving it in the hands of his foreign minister, Diana Mondino,
acting with a form of concessive unilateralism that functions as an extortion
mechanism under Pacciardi, Spandler, and Söderbaum (2024) terms. In this sense,
the treatment of Mercosur’s future reflects the contradictions of the aforementioned
Argentine fusionism. While Milei represents its anarcho-capitalist vein, Mondino
comes from a liberal-conservative tradition. Since part of this tradition is to liberalize
the economy, the minister does not propose leaving Mercosur but rather to make
it more flexible in its commercial, financial and bureaucratic axes. The first axis
is crucial for the Argentine government, as it exemplifies a form of concessive
unilateralism, where Argentina remains within Mercosur but seeks to reserve the
option of negotiating bilateral trade agreements with third countries. As Mondino
articulated, ‘MERCOSUR has ceased to be an escape valve and has become a corset
that immobilizes us’ (Gosman, 2024). In this approach, Argentina aligns itself with
Uruguay’s president, Luis Lacalle Pou, and aims to persuade Paraguay’s Santiago Peña
to support this proposal, advocating for greater flexibility within the regional bloc.
However, Milei’s position of not attending the summit of presidents to meet at a
party rally with Bolsonaro, as well as other acts of disrespect or omission, show that to
the Argentine president, South America seems secondary in his government’s agenda.
As Bolsonaro did, he transfers the postulates of the cultural battle to the regional sphere,
linking it to anti-globalism. In line with this idea and the performative emulation
he exercises with the US, in the Argentine president’s view, regional processes like
Mercosur or CELAC have been co-opted by socialism and are an obstacle. For this
reason, he ratified Argentina’s exit from UNASUR or set himself up as one of the
leaders of the Lima Group 2.0 to deal with the Venezuela question. In this sense,
like Bolsonaro, he also picks out Castro-Chavism as disrupting, labelling it as 21stcentury socialism and extending it to countries like Venezuela, Cuba and Nicaragua,
though even going a little further and including ‘the para-dictatorial governments of
Fernández/Kirchner of Argentina, Andrés López Obrador of Mexico, Gabriel Boric
of Chile, Gustavo Petro of Colombia and Lula da Silva of Brazil’.
Finally, in the Bolsonaro and Milei governments, the possible Mercosur–EU
Association Agreement serves as a symbol of cultural homogeneity and an approach
towards regional alignment within the Western sphere, which, to some extent, aligns
with the aspiration for a civilizational regionalism, or Geistregionalismus. During the
Extraordinary Meeting of Foreign Ministers at the Ibero-American Conference
on 30 November 2020, Minister Ernesto Araújo emphasized: ‘The economic
integration that we are experiencing today in MERCOSUR, one of the pillars of
Latin American integration, was founded mainly on democracy, as it coincided with
the beginning of the redemocratization process in Brazil and Argentina’ (Araújo,
2020). He further noted that the agreement ‘is not only based on trade, but also on
democracy and respect for fundamental values’ (Araújo, 2020). For Milei, maintaining
relations with Europe is a priority, regardless of the associated costs. In his view, the
last parliamentary elections in Europe endorsed the alignment to the West that he so
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Bernabé Malacalza and Gisela Pereyra Doval
admires: ‘People of Europe have spoken and have revalidated our vision with their
vote, despite the cries of local and international progressives, journalists and politicians
who questioned Argentina’s new positioning to disguise their globalist intentions’,
he declared (Milei, 2024). Thus, the agreement could act as an external federator,
starting with a supposed cultural alignment in pursuit of consolidating their own
view of Western civilization.
Conclusions
This article has explored how reactionary governments in the Southern Cone
are transforming the regional political landscape by embedding civilizational and
cultural beliefs at the heart of their foreign policy stance towards regionalism, a
strategy described in this article as ‘Geistregionalismus’. By positioning concepts like
‘civilizational struggle’ and ‘cultural wars’ as central to their WSC approach, these
administrations not only import global cultural conflicts into the domestic sphere but
also export internal antagonisms to the regional level, contributing to different forms
of confronting the existing regionalism. Their narratives are driven by a civilizational
crusade against perceived threats, particularly from leftist ideologies and cultural
movements, which they associate with globalism and cultural Marxism. Unlike
their Northern counterparts, which often adopt protectionist or welfare chauvinist
policies, Southern Cone reactionary governments favour aggressive unilateralism.
This approach enables them to promote neoliberal economic agendas while
maintaining control of their reactionary projects without the constraints imposed by
regional agreements. Additionally, they employ unilateralism as a form of extortion
to negotiate the reduction of regional limitations, such as common external tariffs,
thereby asserting greater control in their economic decision making. In this sense,
it is important to emphasize that their aim is not merely a reorientation of foreign
policy but a comprehensive restructuring of the national project, encompassing the
relationship between the state, market and society.
The exploration of case studies has provided a broader theoretical understanding
of how reactionary governments engage with regional dynamics, underscoring
their distinct responses to the liberal international order. In the specific instances of
Bolsonaro’s and Milei’s reactionary world views, regionalism is framed as a civilizational
process that manifests in foreign policy through acquiescence to and ‘performative
emulation’ of US values and interests, often at the expense of existing regionalism
and regional integration. This antagonism fosters selective alliances that prioritize
cultural and ideological homogeneity, perceiving neighbouring countries and regional
bureaucracies as potential sources of social disruption. Consequently, their political
discourse and actions go beyond simple anti-globalism or anti-cosmopolitanism;
instead, they aim to redefine international engagement through a particularist lens
that emphasizes their own vision of Western cultural unity and ideological affinity,
prioritizing this over a broader regional collaboration that respects political and
cultural diversity among countries.
To mitigate the negative impacts of these anti-regionalism stances, several
mechanisms are critical. Strengthening regional institutions through technical
cooperation can help insulate regionalism from ‘culture wars’. Prioritizing economic
interdependence and pragmatic diplomacy over performative emulation can build
resilience against reactionary disruptions. Additionally, fostering inclusive dialogues
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The disruptive effect of Western supremacist civilizationism
that integrate diverse political perspectives while reinforcing shared economic interests
can be achieved by embracing flexible, issue-based cooperation that transcends cultural
divides. These mechanisms, coupled with efforts to rebuild trust in multilateral
institutions, offer pathways to addressing the destabilizing effects of Geistregionalismus
in South America.
Note
1 The analytical category of fusionism was born in the early 1960s and coined by
Brent Bozell as a critique of Meyer. In American politics, fusionism refers to the
philosophical and political amalgamation of traditionalist and social conservatism
with right-libertarianism in both political and economic aspects (for a debate, see
Carey, 2004).
Funding
This publication is possible thanks to the Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas
y Técnicas (CONICET) / National Scientifc and Technical Research Council,Argentina.
Acknowledgments
The authors are grateful to the Global Discourse Special Issue editors and the anonymous
reviewers for their thorough and constructive feedback.
Conflict of interest
The authors declare that there is no conflict of interest.
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