The graphic on pp. 104-105 illustrates the logic behind this proposition. Assume conflicting interests over the that two states—call them State A and State B—have y N division of a particular good, represented by the green bar in each dialg'l'aï"l on the' of territory, asin left-hand page. To make this concrete, think of this good as a piece the example on the right-hand page. Any line dividing the bar, such as the dotted ble division of the good, such line labeled Possible deal in panel 1, represents a possi receives the share of the good to the as a border drawn through the territory. State A good to the right. Since both left of that line, and State B receives the share of the a deal as far to the states prefer more of the good over less, State A wants to get as possible. Put right as possible, and State B wants to get a deal as far to the left is at the far right another way, State A's most preferred outcome, or ideal point, ideal of the bar, which would mean State A gets the entire good, and State B's e good. (Hence, point is on the far left, which would mean State B gets the entir ining in this horizontal bar is identical to the diagonal line used to illustrate barga Figure 2.3 on p. 57). Now consider what happens if the two states go to war. Moving to panel 2, the line labeled War outcome indicates the actual, or expected, outcome of a violent conflict. In the case of a conflict over territory, we can think of this line as indicating how much territory each state would control after a war. The farther that line is to the right, the better State A is expected to fare in the event of war; the farther it is to the left, the better State B is expected to fare. Crucially, fighting entails costs. These costs diminish the value ofthe expected war outcome to each state. As shown in panel 3, the value of war to each state is the share of the good it expects to win, minus the costs it expects to incur. Notice that the value of war to State A (which corresponds to the portion of the bar to the left of the dotted red line) is smaller than the share of the good that it expects to get from war (the portion of the bar to the left of the War outcome line). Indeed, as the figure is constructed, State A expects to win more of the good in a war than it would get from the possible deal in the first panel, but once the costs of war are taken into account, the possible deal is actually preferable to war. 'To understand how the costs affect the value of war for each state, we have to think about those costs as they relate to the value of the good. Looking at the corresponding example on the right-hand page of the graphic, imagine that State A expects to win 70 percent of the territory, at the cost of 5,000 lives. State A's war value hinges on how much State A values those lost lives relative to the value of the territory. If State A thinks that losing those soldiers is eguivalent to losing 30 percent of the entire territory, then its value for war is 70 — 30 - 40 percent of the value of the territory. State B would make a similar calculation. For both states, the costs of war would effectively increase if either the number of lives lost went up or the value attached to the territory went down. As panel 4 shows, State A prefers over war any deal that gives it more than its value for war (deals that fall to the right of the dotted red line). Deals in this range ! give State A more than it expects to get through war, once the costs aretakeninto 102 Chapter3 WhyAre There Wars? f ) account. Similarly, State B prefers over war any deal that gives it more than its value for war (deals that fall to the left of the dotted blue line). Notice that the set of deals that State A prefers to war overlaps with the set of deals that State B prefers to war, creating a region called the bargaining range. Any division of the good in this bargaining range gives both states more than they expect to get from fighting a war. As Ŵ 3 means that costs on both sides i demonstrates, the.fact that wa'r imposes this i exercise Z bargaining range The set of deals that na both bargaining in a i parties Pnedetioy such a range ofdeals always exists. Hence, in theory, there are bargains that both reversion outcome. When sides would prefer over war. Although the preceding exercise treated the reversion outcome is war, the bargaining range indi g 5 good in dispute as a piece of ter & and insight canthe Sframework ritory, this general be applied to any kind ofissue over is the set of deals that both sides prefer over war. which states have conflicting interests. For example, consider the conflict between North Korea and the United States over the former's nuclear arsenal. In this case, the United States' ideal outcome, which we could put at one end of the bar, is for North Korea to disarm completely and become a democratic state. North Korea's ideal outcome, which would be located at the opposite end of the bar, is for the United States to accept North Korea's status as a nuclear power and recognize its existing regime. In between are various compromise alternatives that neither considers ideal, including the current status guo, in which North Korea has a modest number of nuclear devices but the United States refuses to recognize its right to them. This point is close to North Korea's ideal point. Another point on the bar, closer to the United States' ideal point than to the status guo, would be for North Korea to dismantle some of its nuclear weapons and admit international inspectors. Though the substantive meaning of any location on the bar depends on the exact issue in dispute, the basic argument for the existence of a bargain- ing range holds across issues. Clearly, this simple model does not accurately describe the complexity of realworld bargaining interactions. Nevertheless, it is useful because it forces us to think about all the ways in which bargaining could go wrong. Understanding why wars happen even though a peaceful bargain theoretically exists for virtually any conflict is the main purpose of this chapter. Compellence and Deterrence: Varieties of Coercive Bargaining The model is also useful for thinking about the conditions under which states might have an interest in initiating a crisis in the first place. The pre-crisis distribution, or status quo, can be represented as a line dividing the bar (see Figure 3.2). Where the status quo is located relative to the states' values for war determines which state, if any, might have an interest in changing the status guo througha threat of force. If a state is already getting from the status guo at least as much as it expects to get through war, then it generally cannot gain by threatening war to change the status guo. However, if a state expects to get more through war than it has in the status guo, then it has an interest in making a challenge. 'What Is the Purpose of War? 103 The Model: Bargaining and War 1.A possible deal: Two states, A and B, have conflicting interests N GIH TITFE THW 3 over a good [represented by the Jr < green bar). Both states want as much of the good as possible. A 's SHARE F—LYEESKLî — B The dotted line represents the “ distribution of the good based on X one possible deal. Any deal determines A's and B's shares. v J T STATE A's SHARE POSSIBLE DEAL STATE A's IDEAL OUTCOME 2. The expected outcome of war: WE AFTER WAR , As they bargain, each state evaluates how much it can expect to get as a result of war. The dotted line shows the expected outcome of war. Here, A would get more by going to war than by accepting the above deal. —V A's SHARE AFTER WAR U WAR OUTCOME i 3. Costs of war: However, war also involves costs, and these costs must be subtracted from what each state hopes to gain. So, although war would give A more of the good than it would COSTS : VALUEOF TOB : WARTOB B A 3 jé\ N v get under the deal in panel 1, the : of war to A. v” TOA 4, The bargaining range: Each DEALS BIgHEERSTOMAR state pregrs ane dealgthat gives it more than its expected value of J H COSTS — WAR VALUE OF WAR TO A costs incurred reduce the value OUTCOME ; uu AA l]UTIê(IME ARD : war, once costs are subtracted. Because war inflicts costs on both A B sides, there is a range of possible deals that both sides would prefer over war. %__J: VALUE OF WARTO A 104 Chapter3 Why Are There Wars? 5 H . : DEALS A PREFERS TO WAR > An Example: Bargaining over Territory POSSIBLE DEAL 1. A conflict over territory: Imagine two states have a conflict of interest over a piece of territory. State A would like to have the whole territory, as would State B. A deal is proposed to divide the territory at the dotted line. WAR OUTCOME 2. The expected outcome of war: Based on the strength of their respective armies and other resources, a war over the territory is expected to result in State A winning the portion of the territory to the left of the dotted line. WAR OUTCOME 3. Costs of war: Each side also considers the costs of war. Imagine that State A values the .0OSTS OF WAR territory it would win as a result of war at $100 million but value the costs of war (both financial and human) at $30 million. These costs would reduce the value of war to A by 30 percent. WAR OUTCOME 4. The bargaining range: Each side should prefer any deal thaî gives it more territory than wha it expects from war, once the costs of war are subtracted fror the territory it wins. Any border drawn through the shaded rang divides the territory into shares that both sides prefer over war. What Is the Purpose of War? 105 The top panel of Figure 3.2 depicts sucha situation: in the status guo, State A's share of the good is less than what A would expect to gain from war, even when the costs of war are taken into account. This does not mean that there will be a war, since, after all, a bargaining range still exists. But in this situation, the dissatisfied state can profit by threatening war in order to get a better deal. As the lower panel in Figure 3.2 shows, this logic divides the bar into three segments. If the status guo is to the left of the red dotted line indicating State A's value for war, then State A has an interest in threatening war to try to get a better outcome. Similarly, if the status guo is to the right of the blue dotted line indicating State B's value for war, then State B prefers war over the status quo and thus has an interest in sparking a crisis. Finally, if the status guo is in the bargaining range, then both prefer the current situation over war, and neither can expect to gain by waging war. We often classify threats according to whether they are intended to preserve or îgg:iî“îlïînge Wa status guo through the change the existing relationship between states. An effort to change the. st_ams quo through the threat of force is called compellence. A compellent threat is intended threat of force to coerce the target state into making a concession or changing a current policy. Compellent threats take the form of “Give me y, or else” (where y is something deterrence that the threatener values) or “Stop doing x, or else” (where xis an objectionable An effort to preserve the policy). The United States' demand that Afghanistan hand over Osama bin Laden hroughthe quoforce. stetus of threat and stop harboring the Al Qaeda terrorist network after the 9/11 attacks is an example of compellence. A strategy of deterrence, by contrast, seeks to preserve the status guo by threatening the other side with unacceptable costs if it engages in some undesirable behavior. A deterrent threat takes the form of “Don't do x, or else” (where x is some possible future action that the threatener finds objectionable). The most common deterrent threat is one that all states make implicitly all the time: “Don't attack me, or Pll fight back.” This effort to deter attacks on one's own country is referred to as general deterrence. Another form of deterrence occurs whena state seeks to protect a friend. In this case, the deterrent message takes the form of “Don't attack my ally x, or else.” This kind of threat is generally referred In a 2012 speech to the United Nations, Israeli to as extended deterrence because in this case the threat- prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared ener attempts to extend protection to another state. that Israel would not permit Iran to reach Extended deterrence is crucial in the context of alli- the final stage of acguiring a nuclear weapon. He argued that a credible threat of military action was needed to deter Iran from crossing that “red line.” In 2020, the killing of top Iranian ances, a subject that we will consider in Chapter 5. In general, crises may involve a combination of deterrent and compellent threats. When one side tries nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh was to compel another, the target may issue deterrent attributed to Israel as evidence of its continued threats, or some third state may issue a deterrent threat determination to prevent Iran from developing nuclear warheads. on the target’s behalf. Crises often involve such threats and counterthreats, as each side tries to improve its bargaining position by bringing to bear its capability to 106 Chapter3 Why Are There Wars? FISURE3.2. Bargaining and the Status Quo Here, the status guo clearly gives State A less than war would (the value of war equals the war outcome minus costs). STATUS QUO ASSHARE Î B's SHARE A - nARsA|u|i|G'nAu递;— B VALUEOFWARTOA COSTSTOA COSTSTOB VALUE OF WARTO B WAR OUTCOME State A has an incentive to challenge any status quo that gives it less than war would, because it cnu!d.do better by going to war. The same holds for State B. If the status guo is within the bargaining range, however, neither State A nor State B could improve its outcome by going to war, so neither state will challenge the status quo. STATUS QUOS THAT A WILL CHALLENGE 05 Al STATUS QUOS NEITHER WILL CHALLENGE STATUS QUOS THAT B WILL CHALLENGE A Fu WR Ŵa N ) WAR OUTCOME harm the other. In many cases, threats alone will succeed in bringing about an outcome that both sides find acceptable. Indeed, the most effective threats never need to be carried out, since they coerce the target into making desired concessions or refraining from objectionable actions. If this contest of threats fails to generate an outcome that both sides prefer over fighting, we then observe the descent into war. This brings us back to the core puzzle: Given the costs associated with war, why does crisis bargaining sometimes fail to achieve a peaceful solution? The following sections elaborate several possible answers. Do Wars Happen by Mistake? War from Incomplete Information In July 1990, Irag was engaged in coercive diplomacy with its small neighbor to the south, Kuwait. Two years earlier, Irag had emerged from a disastrous eight-year war with Iran, and Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein desperately needed to rebuild his Do Wars Happen by Mistake? War from Incomplete Information 107 MAP32 Oil Fields in Iran, Irag, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia \‘ sAumAnA'BIA k’ N N country's shattered economy. Given that Irag was sitting on oil deposits containing an estimated 112 billion barrels of oil, it was not hard to imagine where money for Source: A.S. Alsharhan, “Petroleum Systems in the Middle East,” Geological Society, London, Special reconstruction would come from. But Hussein was not content simply to pump and sell Irag's own oil, and he guickly turned his gun sights on Kuwait. Kuwait's 95 billion barrels of recoverable oil reserves made a tempting target, and moreover, Hussein felt that his neighbor was standing in the way of his plans Publications, 392, 361-408, 1 January 2014, https://doi .org/10.1144/SP392.19. for economic recovery. For one thing, Kuwait was pumping more oil than it had previously agreed to. This extra supply meant that the price of oil was lower than it would otherwise be, depriving Irag of needed revenue. Iraq also charged that Kuwait was stealing oil from oil fields that straddled the countries’ shared border, as shown in Map 3.2. Finally, Kuwait had lent Irag substantial sums of money during the war, and Saddam Hussein hoped to get this debt forgiven. When Kuwait refused demands to reduce its oil production, reimburse Irag for the “stolen” oil, and forin mid-July, Irag started give the debts, Irag flexed its military muscle. Beginning 108 Chapter3 Why Are There Wars? moving its forces closer to the border with Kuwait, at one point moving an entire division per day. By the end of the month, 100,000 Iragi troops, supported by thousands oftanks, were in position near the border. With the help of spy satellites, American officials watched the buildup, and they passed on their intelligence to the Kuwaitis. Despite their concern, most officials in the U.S. government did not anticipate that Irag would invade, nor did the Kuwaitis bow to Hussein's demands. To many observers, the Iragi moves looked like an effort to intimidate, not a prelude to invasion. According to reporter Bob Woodward’s account, “Everything Saddam had to do to prepare for an invasion was exactly what he also had to do if his intention was simply to scare the Kuwaitis. There was no way to distinguish the two.”"” On August 2, with Kuwait still holding out, Hussein revealed that he had not simply been bluffing: Iragi forces swept into Kuwait and fully occupied the country in a matter of hours. In retrospect, it is clear that Irag was willing and able to wage war against Kuwait ifits demands were not met. At the time, however, key decision makers in Kuwait and Washington were not sure of Hussein's intentions. Would he really risk the wrath of the world by gobbling up his small neighbor? Would he be willing to put his military and his country through another war so soon after the previous one? The invasion of Kuwait happened in part because, unsure of the answers to these guestions, the Kuwaitis decided that calling Hussein's bluff was preferable to giving in to his demands. When it became apparent that the threat was not, in fact, a bluff, war was already upon them. This episode illustrates one reason that bargaining can fail to resolve disputes and avert war. When states have poor and incomplete information about each other's willingness and ability to wage war, two mistakes are possible, both of which can lead to armed conflict. First, a state confronted by demands may mistakenly yield too little or not at all—just as Kuwait failed to budge in the face of Hussein's threats. In these cases, bargaining can break down because at least one state feels that it can achieve more through fighting (in this case, Irag) than the other is willing to offer in the negotiations (Kuwait). The second, related danger is that a state may demand too much (Irag in this example) under the mistaken belief that the other side will cave in (Kuwait, and its protector, the United States). In this event, the state may not realize its mistake until war is already upon it. In either case, even though there might be a way to settle the issue that both sides would prefer to war, uncertainty about each other's willingness to wage war can prevent such a settlement from being reached. Where does this uncertainty come from? Recall that the main issue in crisis bargaining is how each state evaluates its prospects in a war. How likely is it that the state will be able to win the war? What will the human, financial, and political costs be? These assessments are important because each state's value for war determines what bargains it prefers over fighting. If one state is uncertain of how much its adversary values war, then it is also uncertain of how much it must concede in order to prevent a war. This uncertainty will arise whenevera state lacks information about any of the myriad factors that determine its adversary's evaluation of war. 17. Bob Woodward, The Commanders (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991), 200. Do Wars Happen by Mistake? War from Incomplete Information 109 In September 2016, Russia initiated massive military drills off the coast of Crimea, showcasing the country's ships, cruise missiles, and antiaircraft system. The degree to which a country will mobilize its capabilities for war can be a source of uncertainty in bargaining. are A poker analogy is useful here. In poker, the fact that at least some cards hidden from view means that players know more about the strength of their own hand than do their opponents. The hidden cards are what might be called private information: important facts that are known only to the player who observes those cards. Because no player sees all the cards, the game is played under a condition incomplete information known as incomplete information. All players lack information about their A situation in which actors in a strategic interaction opponents' hands and have private access to information about their own hands. Incomplete information arises in crisis bargaining when states cannot readily observe or measure the key political and military factors that determine their lack information about other actors' interests and/or adversaries’ expected value for war. The hidden cards in this context can be many and varied, and we typically differentiate between two broad classes of unknowns: capabilities and resolve. Capabilities are factors that determine the state's physi- capabilities. cal ability to prevail in war: the number of troops it can mobilize, the number and guality of its armaments, the economic resources it has to sustain the war effort. We might also include in this list the guality of the country's military leadership and military strategies. In addition, since third parties sometimes join wars on one or both sides, any uncertainty about what those third parties will do can lead to uncertainty about the capabilities that each side will bring to bear in the event of war (see Chapter 5). resolve Resolve, a more abstract concept, refers to a state's willingness to bear the The willingness of an actor to endure costs in order to acquire a particular good. costs of fighting and how much the state values the object of dispute relative to those costs." How many people is the country willing to lose in order to obtain, say, a given piece of territory? How much is it willing to pay in blood and money in order to win policy concessions or change another country's regime? Resolve 18. Resolve is a widely used concept in international relatio ns, but scholars often differ in their views of wh?t'n means and how it ils determined. See, for exampl e, Joshua D. Kertzer, Resolve in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016). 110 Chapter3 Why Are There Wars? determines not only whether a state is willing to fight but its potential capabilities would actually be mobilized also the degree to which in the event of war. We fre- mobilize their guently make the distinction between total wars (in which states (in which states fight with entire military and econo mic resources) and limited wars limited or of s something less than their full potential, often because their aim are relatively low value). iHowa state evaluates the stakes of conflict determines where on this cont as a war nuum its effort will fall. The combatants in World War II saw the conflict of national survival, and during the height of the war (1943-45) the United States spent about 37 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP) on defense. Other belligerents spent half of their GDP or more. By contrast, total U.S. defense spending in 2008, in the midst of wars in Irag and Afghanistan, amounted to about 4 percent of GDP, and only a portion ofthat paid for those wars. Resolve is obviously a difficult guality to measure, as it hinges on a variety of political, ideological, and psychological factors. Indeed, it may be difficult for a leader to accurately assess his or her own country's resolve, much less the resolve of its adversary. How could such uncertainty lead to war? When states have incomplete information about the capabilities and/or resolve of their opponents, bargaining over goods that they both desire may fail to achieve peaceful settlements. A central dynamic of bargaining under this kind of uncertainty is a phenomenon known as a risk-return trade-off: essentially, there is a trade-off between trying to get a good deal and trying to minimize the possibility that war will break out. At one extreme, - a state can ggenerall; ly ensure peace by capitulating i i to all of its i adversary’s demands. “Peace at any price” might not be a very attractive outcome, however. Kuwait, for example, could have given in to all of Irag's demands and would likely have avoided war. At the other extreme, a state can hold firm and yield risk-return trade-off In crisis bargaining, the Madesol BEOY I LIDO AD b i to avoid a war. nothing to its adversary. This strategy promises a good deal if it works, but doing so runs a risk that the adversary will decide to fight rather than settle for nothing—as Irag did when Kuwait refused to give in. Between these extremes, a state will generally find that it can reduce the risk of war only by making more generous offers, moving away from its ideal outcome. Put another way, a state can improve the bargaining outcome for itself only by embracing a higher risk of war. Although war is costly and regrettable in retrospect, bargaining strategies that entail a risk of war can be perfectly rational, given the uncertainty that states face. Incentives to Misrepresent and the Problem of Credibility Given that incomplete information can lead to war, why can't states simply tell each other how capable and resolved they are and thereby avoid conflict? Actually, a large part of what goes on in a crisis consists precisely of such efforts at communication. Crises are generally characterized by diplomatic exchanges, threats and counterthreats, mobilization of forces, movement of troops, and positioning of weaponry. These actions, in part, have a military purpose: one cannot wage war, after all, without first mobilizing the necessary forces and putting them in place. Do Wars Happen by Mistake? War from Incomplete Information 111
