Depending on Character: ASCE Shapes Its First Code
of Ethics
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Sarah K. A. Pfatteicher1
Abstract: From the founding of the ASCE in 1852 through today, engineers have relied not only on their individual reputations, but also
on the character of the entire discipline. The value of ethical behavior to individual engineers and to the profession leads us to assume that
codes of ethics should exist, that they should shape engineers’ behavior, and that they should be enforced. Yet for the first 60 years of their
society’s existence, ASCE members repeatedly rejected proposals that the society adopt a formal code of ethics to define appropriate
behavior for ASCE members. Furthermore, the code the society eventually did adopt in 1914 was accepted reluctantly, amid strong
concern that it would unduly restrict an engineer’s behavior and practice. The first ASCE code was intended, in effect, not so much as a
collection of rules, but as a declaration of engineers’ independence from such rules. This paper explores the origins of the ASCE’s first
code of ethics to provide a historical backdrop for contemporary discussions about what it means to be an ethical engineer and what role
professional societies should play in establishing, encouraging, and enforcing ethical standards.
DOI: 10.1061/共ASCE兲1052-3928共2003兲129:1共21兲
CE Database keywords: ASCE Code of Ethics; Engineering profession.
Introduction
In a paper read before the ASCE in 1869, John B. Jervis explained that ‘‘the engineer eminently depends on character.... On
his capacity for his profession, and his integrity as a man, reliance
must be placed.’’ The 74-year-old Jervis held no degree and had
completed no apprenticeship. He had trained as an engineer by
working his way up from an axeman on the Erie Canal to become
chief engineer on a variety of projects. Yet despite this lack of
formal training, in 1869 Jervis had been named an honorary member of the American Society of Civil Engineers, the highest membership level offered by the society. Jervis understood that his
reputation had been essential to his success 共Jervis 1872, 1876 –
77; A biographical 1972; Morison 1974; Wisely 1974兲.
Experienced engineers who heard Jervis’ remarks hardly
needed to be reminded of the importance of establishing and
maintaining one’s reputation. In late nineteenth-century America,
most engineers had no official credentials with which to impress
prospective clients. An engineer’s reputation was indeed his most
important credential, and success in one job was necessary to
obtain the next position. Yet for the first 60 years of their society’s
existence, ASCE members repeatedly rejected proposals that the
society adopt a code of ethics. Given the value that nineteenthcentury engineers placed on ethical behavior, why did they prefer
to forego a formal code? And what happened in the early years of
1
Assistant Dean for Engineering Academic Affairs and Director of
Wisconsin Engineering Education Laboratory, College of Engineering,
Univ. of Wisconsin—Madison, 2630 Engineering Hall, 1415 Engineering
Dr., Madison, WI 53706. E-mail: spfatt@engr.wisc.edu
Note. Discussion open until June 1, 2003. Separate discussions must
be submitted for individual papers. To extend the closing date by one
month, a written request must be filed with the ASCE Managing Editor.
The manuscript for this paper was submitted for review and possible
publication on August 14, 2001; approved on March 21, 2002. This paper
is part of the Journal of Professional Issues in Engineering Education
and Practice, Vol. 129, No. 1, January 1, 2003. ©ASCE, ISSN 10523928/2003/1-21–31/$18.00.
the twentieth century to convince ASCE members to adopt their
first official code in 1914?
In their textbook on engineering ethics, Roland Schinzinger
and Mike Martin list the following seven roles of codes of ethics:
expression of shared standards, support for ethical behavior, guidance for ethical decisions, inspiration to behave ethically, education and mutual understanding among engineers of ethical standards, deterrence and discipline of unethical behavior, and
contributing to the profession’s image 共Unger 1994; Fleddermann
1999; Schinzinger and Martin 2000兲. Of these, only the last role
played a pivotal part in the adoption of the first engineering codes
of ethics.
In spite of our current understanding of a code as a ‘‘framework for ethical judgment for a professional’’ 共Harris et al. 1995;
Fleddermann 1999兲, the first code of ethics adopted by the ASCE
was intended to describe, rather than guide, the behavior of ASCE
members, who were assumed to be the most respectable members
of the profession. Early codes of ethics were intended to document and publicize existing standards of behavior 共largely for the
benefit of potential employers兲, not to establish ideals toward
which ASCE members might strive. Furthermore, neither the unsuccessful codes proposed in the nineteenth century nor the successful 1914 version were intended to address the most fundamental, technical aspects of engineering such as safety and
reliability, which were assumed to be obvious goals of the profession.
The engineers of the twenty-first century can gain valuable
insight from those of the nineteenth century by contrasting our
assumptions with their beliefs about what it means to be an ethical engineer and about what role professional societies should
play in establishing, encouraging, and enforcing ethical standards.
The argument here is a simple yet counterintuitive one: that much
of what we take to be central to engineering codes of ethics—that
they should shape engineers’ behavior, that they should be enforced, and even that they should exist—was the subject of heated
debate a century ago. To understand our modern codes fully and
apply them sensibly, we must understand and appreciate their
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origins. In the case of the ASCE’s code, those origins lie in the
very foundations of the society.
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Removing the Rubbish
The prominent engineers who founded the ASCE did so in an
attempt to limit the number and type of individuals upon whose
reputations they depended. John Jervis and a handful of his colleagues met in 1839 to discuss organizing a national engineering
society to raise the ‘‘character and standing of civil engineers in
the United States.’’ These men wanted both to distinguish themselves from poorly trained builders and to increase their status as
compared to military engineers, from whom they had split. In
1852, a slightly larger group made up of 12 men in the building
trade, including several of the 1839 cohort, met in New York.
They officially established the American Society of Civil Engineers and Architects that November, to seek ‘‘the professional
improvement of its members.’’ By 1855, financial troubles and
membership shortages led the society into hiatus. By the time the
engineers reconvened in 1867, the architects had established their
own society, leaving the engineers to comprise the ASCE 共Hunt
1897, 1902; Calhoun 1960; Merritt 1969; Watkins 1970; Wisely
1974兲.
In 1869, the fledgling group 共now numbering 160 engineers兲
held its first annual convention; 55 men attended. One of the
highlights of the program was the induction of John Jervis as an
honorary member. It was then that the 74-year-old, self-educated
engineer reminded his colleagues of the importance of reputation.
During this same speech, Jervis described the primary mission
facing the founding members:
All professions must have a beginning. There must be preparation; just as when a fabric 关factory兴 is to be reared, the rubbish
must first be removed and a proper foundation prepared on
which the structure is to rest 共Jervis 1872兲.
Removing the ‘‘rubbish’’ would be a continuing goal of the society, for it was a necessary step in establishing the group’s reputation as professionals. These men, who had no formal training or
diploma to certify their abilities, viewed membership in the society as a certification of their competence. The ASCE founders,
who were already successful members of their discipline, banded
together to certify one another and admit as new members only
those engineers of whom they approved 共Wisely 1974; Levy
1980兲.
The ASCE’s early membership requirements ensured that only
the most established, successful engineering practitioners could
lead 共or even join兲 the society. The 12 founding members chose
whom to invite into membership, and these invitees accounted for
the entire early membership. Interested engineers who were not
on the invited list could apply to the society for membership. An
applicant was required to submit a statement of his qualifications
and the names of several ‘‘endorsers’’ who could ‘‘verify his good
character and reputation as well as his education, technical training, and professional experience.’’ The founding members accepted only applicants who were ‘‘the most respectable and respected members of their calling.’’ From the founding days of the
society, ASCE leaders had intended society membership to be
‘‘adequate proof that an individual is fully qualified to practice.’’
Anyone not fulfilling these select criteria was not a bad engineer;
he was, by the ASCE definition, not an engineer at all 共‘‘The
regulation’’ 1902兲.
‘‘Private Professional Matters’’
Historian Samuel Haber has described how a variety of occupations, from the traditional three—medicine, law, and the
ministry—to the ‘‘newer’’ professions—including engineering,
pharmacy, and the professoriate—in the 1800s sought authority as
a route to social status as professionals. As Haber explains it, by
the 1880s ‘‘social exclusiveness no longer seemed as unAmerican as it once had’’ in the mid-1800s. Old professional
societies like the American Medical Association 共AMA兲 ‘‘found
new vitality,’’ and they, along with newer societies like the ASCE,
sought ways to establish their ‘‘authority and honor,’’ often
through licensing laws, membership requirements, and codes of
ethics 共Haber 1991兲. In the words of historian Burton Bledstein,
American doctors, lawyers, ministers, and engineers, as well as
such diverse groups as athletes and librarians, all participated in
and helped establish a ‘‘culture of professionalism’’ in the postCivil War United States. Preserving 共or establishing兲 the exclusiveness of practitioners in their chosen field was a central aim of
each of these ‘‘professions’’ 共Bledstein 1976兲.
The American Institute for Architects 共AIA兲, which had split
off from the ASCE in 1857, was one such elite group trying to
establish ‘‘a recognizable professional role’’ and using society
membership ‘‘to indicate to prospective employers a minimum
level of competence.’’ Indeed, the AIA even sought to certify its
informally trained members by issuing them diplomas. Such goals
were common to many professionalizing groups in late
nineteenth-century America 共Levy 1980兲.
The ASCE’s early efforts to assert members’ authority came to
a head in 1877. On October 18, ASCE Secretary Gabriel Leverich
pointed out to society members the dilemma faced by an engineer
who has been ‘‘restrained or overruled by his employers’’ on an
engineering matter, and asked the society to rule that ‘‘it is unprofessional for a civil engineer to continue the discharge of his
duties when so restrained or overruled’’ 共‘‘Minutes’’ 1877b兲.
It was the first time a society member had proposed that the
ASCE codify proper conduct. Although Leverich’s fellow
members sympathized with the problem of nonengineers attempting to control engineering work, they ultimately rejected Leverich’s motion.
The policy Leverich suggested would not have established the
wrongness of such restraint, for ASCE members were already
agreed that they should not be expected to conform to an employer’s wishes when they conflicted with an engineer’s ‘‘best judgment.’’ Instead, the proposed resolution would have provided leverage and support for an engineer caught in an awkward position
by indicating that to go against an ASCE member’s judgment was
to take on the whole engineering society 共Jervis 1872兲.
The other society leaders, however, expressed apprehension
about exerting such control over an engineer’s practice. Founding
member and Past-president William J. McAlpine countered Leverich’s proposal with a resolution requiring each ‘‘overruled’’
member to request that a society committee be formed to decide
what action the engineer ought to take. By allowing the society to
respond to each case on an ad hoc basis, McAlpine’s suggestion
fit more neatly with the contemporary nature of engineering practice than did Leverich’s initial proposal. The membership passed
both proposals on to the society directors, who felt it was not their
place to tell engineers how to practice, even on a case-by-case
basis. The board members responded succinctly, and without
elaboration or explanation, that ‘‘it is inexpedient for this Society
to instruct its members as to their duties in private professional
matters’’ 共‘‘Minutes’’ 1877a; Watkins 1970兲. Society members
would neither propose nor consider a formal ethics policy again
for over 15 years.
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‘‘For the Guidance of the Members’’
In January 1893, a decade and a half after Leverich’s quickly
rejected motion, the ASCE began a more sustained debate over
the possibility of adopting a code of ethics. Though this second
attempt would also ultimately fail, members were more willing to
discuss the possibility of a code—in part because the language in
the proposals had begun to shift away from establishing ‘‘rules’’
and ‘‘control’’ and toward fostering ‘‘etiquette’’ and providing
‘‘guidance.’’ As with Leverich’s proposal, the 1893 attempt at a
code would also begin with a disgruntled engineer.
In 1890, J. P. Frizell, ‘‘an experienced and well-known engineer,’’ signed on as chief engineer for the design of a dam and
hydraulic works in Austin, Tex. 共‘‘Correspondence’’ 1892; ‘‘The
ethics’’ 1892a,b兲. He and the board of public works soon began to
disagree as to the design of the dam, and the board called in a
second engineer, John T. Fanning, as a consultant. At the board’s
request, Fanning submitted his report directly to the board without contacting Frizell. The board of public works then offered
consultant Fanning the job of designing the dam, and Frizell,
furious at having been overruled and replaced by a fellow engineer, soon resigned 共‘‘An engineering’’ 1892; ‘‘The ethics’’
1892b; ‘‘What is’’ 1893; A biographical 1972, 1991兲.
The controversy drew the attention of the engineering press
because the ASCE had recently nominated Fanning to be a director of the society. For a profession and a society so dependent
upon character and reputation, Fanning’s actions raised questions
about his suitability as an officer in the society. Despite opposition from at least a few members, the ASCE members elected
Fanning to the board of directors for a three-year term beginning
in 1893.
Two prominent engineering periodicals devoted substantial
space to the issue in late 1892 and early 1893. Engineering News
and Engineering Record began their coverage by declaring that a
consultant such as Fanning clearly had an ethical obligation to
contact the chief engineer, Frizell, and allow him to respond to
the consultant’s work, thus acknowledging the continuing authority of the chief engineer. According to both periodicals, by interfering in the project, Fanning had called into question both his
and Frizell’s reputations, and his poor judgment would reflect on
the character of the entire profession. Engineering News and Engineering Record argued that the Austin Dam episode epitomized
the reasons why professional societies should adopt codes of ethics. A set of guidelines would have spelled out Fanning’s duties to
Frizell and might also have saved Frizell’s job and avoided a
messy controversy 共Waddell 1893兲.
Engineering Record, led by editor and long-time activist
Henry C. Meyer, went further 共Pfatteicher 1999兲. In December
1892 and January 1893, the magazine ran a series of editorials on
‘‘Professional Ethics and Etiquette,’’ strongly encouraging national engineering and architectural societies to adopt codes of
ethics 共‘‘Professional’’ 1892a,b,c,d, 1893兲. According to Meyer,
the ‘‘selfish and unscrupulous greed’’ of undesirable practitioners
‘‘would bring discredit upon the profession’’ if honest men did
not take steps to stop it.
Meyer’s editorials made it clear that a code should emphasize
‘‘professional honor, professional dignity, 关and兴 professional ethics,’’ rather than competency; little stress should be placed, he
wrote, on ‘‘what is known as crime and vice.’’ Meyer explained
that his proposed code
does not direct, in so many words, that 关the engineer兴 must not
lie, or steal, or run away with his neighbor’s wife—nor does it
advise him not to get drunk, or not to be profane, or vulgar, or
filthy in his habits. All these things are taken for granted. The
rules of professional ethics refer only to those relations of a
professional man to his clients, to his professional brethren, and
to the public, which are more or less different from those which
exist among laborers, mechanics, and tradesmen.
An ethics code, argued Meyer, should deal with the ambiguous
middle ground between what was clearly right and obviously
wrong. Competency and honesty had no role in such a code because they posed no moral dilemma. Meyer suggested that a useful code would establish a consensus on more debatable issues
such as how to advertise with dignity, and how to balance loyalty
to one’s employer with allegiance to one’s profession and engineering society. A code would lay out proper, uniform procedures
for requesting, accepting, and reporting consulting work 共one of
the most popular forms of employment for ASCE members in
these years兲. Furthermore, a helpful ethics code would explain
engineers’ more abstract obligations, from defending the profession from attack to sharing new knowledge for the good of the
profession and the public. In short, an ethics code would be a set
of guidelines to help engineers deal with questionable or unusual
circumstances, not a set of rules they would be obliged to follow
共‘‘Professional’’ 1892a兲.
In December 1892, stirred to action by the press coverage,
Samuel Whinery, retiring president of the Cincinnati Engineers
Club, addressed his local group on ‘‘Ethics for Civil Engineers’’
共‘‘Minutes’’ 1893兲. Three weeks after Whinery’s speech, the Cincinnati group met to discuss a possible code of ethics ‘‘for the
guidance of the members of the profession,’’ and on January 9,
1893, 14 members signed a letter to the ASCE board of direction
asking the directors to appoint a special committee to discuss two
proposals—one, that the society should ‘‘consider the propriety of
the adoption by the Society of a Code of Ethics for the profession,’’ and two, that if such a code were found ‘‘desirable and
advisable’’ the committee should design a code for consideration
by the members 共‘‘Minutes’’ 1893; Waddell 1893兲.
The discussion that followed indicated that the members were
aware that ‘‘this is the beginning...of an important step in the
history not only of this Society, but of the whole engineering
profession,’’ and ‘‘one of the most delicate things this Society has
ever attempted to do.’’ The debate that ensued would continue for
the next 14 years 共‘‘A code’’ 1893; ‘‘The ethics’’ 1893; ‘‘Minutes’’
1893; ‘‘The relation’’ 1893兲.
ASCE members continued to agree that the reputation of engineering was important. But could a code of ethics enhance that
reputation? The board members noted that a significant concern
among members was ‘‘the question as to whether civil engineering may properly be called a profession.’’ The directors pointed
out that other professions 共as well as some mere crafts兲 operated
under examination, licensure, or codes of ethics. Therefore, the
Austin Dam controversy aside, perhaps engineering should have a
code in order to be seen as a profession 共‘‘Proposed’’ 1893, ‘‘The
regulation’’ 1902兲. The directors conceded, however, that there
was no direct correlation between other professions’ codes and
their status as professionals. They noted that attorneys did not
have a code and yet were clearly professionals in the public’s
view. They also pointed to the case of the Medical Society of the
State of New York, which had recently decided to elide its code of
ethics 共‘‘Professional’’ 1892b; Warner 1991兲. The president of that
medical society had argued that the ‘‘dignity’’ and ‘‘respect’’ of
physicians would be ‘‘enhanced’’ if matters of ethical conduct
‘‘were hereafter left to the judgment of individual practitioners’’
共‘‘Proposed’’ 1893兲. The professionalization argument alone
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would not be sufficient to ensure a code’s adoption.
Whether or not engineering was a ‘‘profession,’’ members like
Clemens Herschel felt that the ASCE existed to ‘‘pass upon the
qualifications of a candidate and say whether or not he shall be
considered a civil engineer.’’ This group believed that ‘‘certification’’ by the society would hold more force if members were
required to adhere to a set of rules of behavior. Herschel had, in
this spirit, vehemently opposed John Fanning’s nomination as
ASCE director during the Austin dam affair 共‘‘What is’’ 1893; A
biographical 1972兲. One founding member of the society objected, declaring that certification of members via a code of ethics
did not properly concern the ASCE because ‘‘this Society...is organized for the promotion of engineering science. We have nothing to do with ethics nor with our members in relation to them... .
If this is not an engineering subject, we have nothing to do with
it’’ 共‘‘Minutes’’ 1893; Watkins 1970; A biographical 1972兲.
Though these comments reflected an extreme position taken by
few other members, they nonetheless highlight a central issue of
the debate—what should be the proper scope of the society? The
consensus on both sides of the debate about a code was that
ethical 共and unethical兲 behavior had to do with an engineer’s nonengineering duties; his business practices might be unethical, but
his design could not be. The question was whether the ASCE
ought to concern itself with nontechnical issues, and consensus
was difficult to achieve.
The deciding factor in the debate concerned the specific provisions of a code: If a code were adopted, what precisely would it
prohibit and would it be successful? The ASCE board members
suggested that the society should at least consider ‘‘whether the
dignity of civil engineering and the relations of members to themselves and to the public might not be improved by the application
of rules of ethics or of conduct to be adopted by this Society.’’
The board noted that civil engineers had on occasion acted ‘‘in
ways which in other professions or vocations would be generally
considered improper and unprofessional acts.’’ The directors did
not mention John Fanning by name, but his actions were to many
the epitome of the type of behavior being discussed as ‘‘contrary
to 关professional兴 rules of etiquette.’’ The discussion echoed Henry
Meyer’s editorials in that negligence was not a concern; propriety
was. The ASCE’s ‘‘lack of rules’’ provided ‘‘excuses for unprofessional conduct,’’ whereas a code ‘‘would restrain the unprincipled and guide the ignorant’’ 共‘‘Proposed’’ 1893兲.
In spite of misgivings about the etiquette of certain ASCE
members, the directors felt that no code could possibly address all
possible cases of such misconduct. This was especially true since
the code under discussion would address the vague issue of etiquette, not competence. Furthermore, ‘‘a strict code would restrain those who need no restraint, but it would not be regarded by
the unprincipled further than their own interests dictated.’’ Such a
code might even prevent an engineer from acting in the best interests of his client by making him too fearful of doing wrong.
Again the directors pointed out the advantages of allowing engineers to police their own individual conduct 共‘‘Proposed’’ 1893兲.
At the annual convention in August 1893, the directors put the
matter up for discussion with the recommendation that no committee be formed 共‘‘Proposed’’ 1893; ‘‘The regulation’’ 1902兲.
The members apparently agreed. Society member Robert Moore,
who vehemently opposed adopting any policy, believed that ‘‘the
conduct of members of the Society can fairly be left to their
intelligence and their intention to do right’’ 共‘‘Proposed’’ 1893; A
biographical 1991兲. Past-president Mendes Cohen conceded that
occasionally an engineer might lack ‘‘good sense, good breeding,
and general comity of man to man,’’ but that such an ‘‘exception’’
would best be handled quietly without establishing a code to draw
attention to a few bad seeds. Cohen thought it best not to ‘‘stir
up’’ the membership over the issue. Another prominent member
and past officer of the society, Alphonse Fteley, argued that even
to put the question to a vote would ‘‘likely disturb the even tenor
of our ways’’ 共‘‘Proposed’’ 1893; ‘‘The regulation’’ 1902; A biographical 1972兲. The members voted 54 to 11 not to formulate a
code of ethics.
The key issues of concern in the 1893 discussions revolved
around business etiquette rather than technical competence.
Though the public might be better served by a profession dedicated to a set of ethical standards, individual engineers 共particularly those elite engineers who made up the majority of the
ASCE兲 tended to object to being told what to do, even by a code
of their own devising 共‘‘Professional’’ 1892b兲. It would take a
substantial threat to engineering practice and a new notion of a
code’s purpose to make a code viable in the ASCE.
‘‘Judicious Legal Restrictions’’ or ‘‘Unwritten Law’’
The landmark legal decision in Dent v. West Virginia in 1888
contributed to interest in self-regulation in many American professions. That year the U.S. Supreme Court considered a case that
had originated when Frank Dent, a sectarian physician in West
Virginia, challenged the state’s requirement that a physician be
licensed by the state board of health in order to practice. The state
board had rejected Dent’s diploma from the American Medical
Eclectic College of Cincinnati, arguing that Dent did not hold a
degree from a ‘‘reputable medical college.’’ The justices decided
unanimously that a state did have a right to protect the public by
restricting practice 共so long as the requirements were applied to
all applicants equally兲 and that physicians should be the ones to
determine the fitness of other physicians. That decision opened
the way for all professions to pursue licensing statutes as a way of
excluding undesirable practitioners 共Starr 1982兲. American architects would soon join the trend toward licensing and thus draw the
attention of the ASCE.
By the nature of their work, engineers and architects had always had close, if not comfortable, professional ties. Their mutual
interest in building had led the two groups to attempt to establish
a joint society in the 1850s, but rivalries between the two encouraged the split that established the AIA and ASCE as two distinct
groups. At the end of the century, the architects again sought to
distinguish themselves and their work from that of engineers, this
time through legal restrictions on the practice of architecture. In
1897, Illinois became the first state to adopt a licensing law for
architects. The ASCE leadership felt concern over the architects’
new statute in Illinois; the overlap in architects’ and engineers’
duties meant that architects could and did use licensing laws to
define certain areas as their own, shutting out competition by
engineers.
As Andrew Abbott astutely noted in his study of the professions, ‘‘It is the history of 关such兴 jurisdictional disputes that is the
real, the determining history of the professions.’’ Abbott further
explained that jurisdictional boundaries can be defined via laws,
via practice, and/or via public opinion; the architects had focused
their fight in the legal ‘‘arena’’ 共Abbott 1988兲. Though ASCE
members were hesitant to support licensing, they recognized the
drawbacks to allowing architects to define engineers out of work,
and began to debate which arena to choose for their counterattack.
At the annual ASCE meetings in 1897, 1898, and 1899, society member S. C. Thompson repeatedly proposed that the ASCE
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officially endorse ‘‘judicious legal restrictions against the unauthorized and improper use of the title of Civil Engineer’’ to prevent the practice of ‘‘incompetent and unscrupulous’’ would-be
engineers from ‘‘reflecting upon and injuring the entire profession.’’ The society directors repeatedly and summarily dismissed
Thompson’s suggestions 共Wisely 1974兲.
In June 1901, with a New Jersey architects’ law imminent,
Samuel Whinery renewed his ‘‘determined and devoted stand’’ in
support of ethics for engineers and again attempted to convince
the members of the ASCE of the value of some form of selfregulation 共Molitor 1926兲. This time, however, he proposed licensing legislation rather than a code of ethics. Unlike Thompson,
Whinery proposed not only that the ASCE support restrictions,
but, more important, that the ASCE define and enforce the restrictions. Whinery argued before the annual convention of the ASCE
that ‘‘legal restrictions’’ on engineering practice would prevent
trained, competent engineers from being forced to compete with
those ‘‘who were almost totally lacking in education and natural
capacity for conducting engineering work’’ and would allow engineers to remain on a par with architects 共‘‘Annual’’ 1901兲.
The society members agreed with Whinery that the profession
and the public would both clearly be better off if only competent
men were allowed to call themselves civil engineers. As Whinery
had put it, excluding incompetent engineers was not only desirable, it was ‘‘the duty of every worthy and loyal member of the
profession to protect its good name from this source of danger
and dishonor.’’ He also reminded his colleagues that they had
‘‘invested’’ their money, time, and reputations in their practices,
and if only out of ‘‘self-interest’’ they should demand ‘‘protection
from the unfair competition of the quack’’ 共‘‘Civil’’ 1901兲. Whinery and his fellow engineers agreed that the public, too, would be
best served by competent engineers, and asserted that only an
engineer could determine another engineer’s competency. Engineers alone should therefore be allowed to testify to one another’s
abilities. Doctors, lawyers, and now architects were using such
logic to argue for self-regulation, and engineers had begun to
wonder if their profession could survive without joining the trend.
What the members could not agree on, however, was what to
do about their desire to ensure the competence of their colleagues.
It seemed clear that if any legislation were to be adopted, the
profession 共meaning ASCE兲 should control its form. But would it
be possible to draft legislation that would solve more problems
than it would create? Whinery’s proposed state-level system of
licensing boards to certify engineers in various levels of expertise
met with a variety of objections.
Several commentators argued that national legislation would
be preferable to state-level control. The nature of their work required that civil engineers practice over large geographical areas.
The size and scope of projects like bridge and dam construction
meant an engineer would have to work in a variety of states over
the course of a career, unlike doctors and lawyers, who could
more profitably set up practice in a single city. Would it be reasonable, ASCE members asked, to require engineers to obtain
licenses in several states at once, particularly if standards varied
from one state to another? Whinery quickly pointed out that federal control would be unconstitutional, raising the question of
whether problematic state boards would be better than none at all.
Others questioned whether the imposition legislation would
place on qualified engineers would be worth excluding incompetent practitioners. Engineering was so much more specialized than
medicine or law that it would be impossible to examine a single
engineer in all subfields of engineering, and it would be unwieldy
to set up separate examinations for each specialty 共‘‘Civil’’ 1901兲.
One member went so far as to contend that regulation by licensure would be un-American. He described favorably the current system of determining an engineer’s competence:
In our country, when a keen business man is in need of an
engineer for any particular service, he sends for one, looks him
in the eye, weighs him up, and in less than seven minutes
knows whether he wants that man or not. He does not care
whether that man has a license to practice in the profession of
civil engineering; but he judges of him by looking into his eye,
by talking with him and finding out what his experience has
been, and with that he is satisfied, and it is pretty sure that he is
not going to make a mistake.
This member argued that if a young would-be engineer could get
a job in the field and work his way up the ladder of responsibility
as he and so many other ASCE members had done, he should
have that right. Indeed, it would be detrimental to the profession
to deny ‘‘that element of Americanism’’ which allowed any citizen to improve himself and his craft. Even Whinery conceded that
‘‘it would be better to err in the direction of liberality than in that
of unnecessary restriction’’ 共‘‘Civil’’ 1901; A biographical 1991兲.
The subject was referred to committee, to be discussed at the
1902 Annual Meeting 共‘‘Committee’’ 1901; ‘‘Minutes’’ 1901兲. By
the time of the convention, the committee and the president had
decided regulation was both troublesome and unnecessary. The
committee duly presented its report, and concluded that ‘‘to secure the enactment of any laws of the character contemplated it
would undoubtedly be essential that the profession shall be united
in its demand for them. It is evident that at present such unanimity
does not exist.’’ President Robert Moore, noting the ‘‘moral
stimulus’’ provided by the society to its members, declared that,
‘‘for the kindling of professional enthusiasm,’’ the society would
‘‘continue to rely’’ on members’ individual ‘‘vital and moral
forces’’ rather than on a code or law. According to Moore, engineers worthy of the title were above needing to be regulated
共‘‘Minutes’’ 1902; Moore 1902; ‘‘Report’’ 1902兲.
This same May 1902 annual meeting also included a session
on ‘‘The Regulation of Engineering Practice by a Code of Ethics’’
as an alternative to registration. The arguments for and against a
code so closely resembled those used in the 1893 debate that
member George Soper reiterated them word for word as part of
the discussion. Aside from the adoption of the single law regulating the practice of architecture, the issues facing American engineers had not changed significantly and neither had the decision.
Again reputation, certification, and the content of a code were the
key concerns, and again society members determined that a code,
like licensing, would be more restrictive than it would be worth
共Moore 1902; ‘‘The regulation’’ 1902; ‘‘Report’’ 1902兲.
A prominent member from New York noted that ASCE members
are chosen from among the most respectable and respected
members of their calling, and the machinery of election is designed to exclude from membership all who have exhibited, or
seem likely to exhibit, anything less than perfect moral fitness.
Receiving their franchise from fellow engineers of high standing, the very badge of the Society worn by members is a mark
of probity and honor. And, let is be said, few who wear that
badge fall from grace 共‘‘The regulation’’ 1902兲.
A code of ethics for such select members of the profession would
be redundant.
For the third time since the founding of the society, ASCE
members at once acknowledged the desirability of ethical, ‘‘professional’’ behavior and chose not to define or regulate it. ASCE
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leaders continued to believe that a code would do nothing to
reduce unethical acts, nor would it help the directors deal with
those that did occur. When one member grumbled that certain of
his colleagues ‘‘filched work from their fellow-members, 关spoke兴
in disparaging terms both of their business and scientific attainments, and 关did兴 all that they possibly could to degrade the profession into a trade,’’ a past-president of the society responded
confidently that in such cases ‘‘an unwritten law will prevail, with
all the authority, and more completeness and flexibility than can
be given to a written code’’ 共‘‘The regulation’’ 1902兲.
‘‘Age of Specialties’’
By the second decade of the twentieth century, the ASCE bore
little resemblance to the exclusive club a dozen New York engineers had founded 50 years earlier. The membership of the society had grown exponentially and was drawn from a broad spectrum of the profession. The ASCE’s leaders had completed far
more formal education than had the society’s founders. These
changes required that the new members rethink their society’s
purpose and priorities.
In 1905, for the first time, over half of all American engineers
held bachelor’s degrees. ASCE membership, always disproportionately weighted toward college-trained engineers, now became
overwhelmingly so. The ASCE, 50 years old in 1902, of necessity
was led by a new generation of engineers as the founding members retired or died. In addition, ASCE membership doubled between 1902 共the last aborted attempt at a code兲 and 1909 共Bensel
1910兲. The biggest change had come among associate members—
those between junior 共entrance grade, nonvoting兲 status and full
membership. The number of engineers in this middling group
共most of whom were middle aged as well as midcareer兲 had increased by nearly 400% in just 10 years 共Wisely 1974兲. The imbalance was so striking that associate members even outnumbered
full and junior members combined; the implications of this shift
for voting tallies would soon become apparent.
It was these middle-aged members who were most troubled by
the dramatic changes in the profession and who led what would
become a successful push for self-regulation. Opposition to codes
often came from younger members of the profession, who found
their experiences and dilemmas missing from the codes drafted by
older, more traditional engineers, and from the oldest engineers,
who were established enough in their careers to have no incentive
to want to be told how to conduct themselves 共‘‘Negative’’ 1911兲.
In addition to these demographic changes, the proliferation of
specialization and the splinter groups that resulted reshaped the
ASCE. The founders of the ASCE had broadly defined civil engineering as all nonmilitary 共and nonrailroad兲 engineering
共Hughes 1960兲. Architects split from the civil engineers in 1857,
before the ASCE had been firmly established. In the late 1800s,
four more major groups had defined themselves apart from civil
engineering. Mining engineers were the first to go, founding their
own society in 1871; mechanical engineers formed their own association in 1880; electrical engineers followed suit in 1884. The
American Institute of Mining Engineers, the American Society of
Mechanical Engineers 共ASME兲, and the American Institute of
Electrical Engineers 关共AIEE兲, now the Institute of Electrical and
Electronics Engineers兴 joined with the ASCE to become the four
founder societies, purportedly working in parallel, each in its own
specialty. But the ASCE leaders continued to view themselves as
the umbrella group for what they considered the subspecialties of
mining, mechanical, and electrical engineering. Tensions rose in
the upper ranks of the ASCE every time one of the other founder
societies exerted its independence, and the ASCE continually felt
the blows of lessening control over the discipline of engineering.
In 1909, President Onward Bates conducted a survey of the
occupations of the 2,380 full members of the society 共out of a
total membership of over 5,000兲. Bate’s survey described a varied
membership—‘‘20% of the Members are in the service of the
Government, either national or local; 15% are employed on railways; 18% are engaged in manufacturing or contracting operations; 20% are consulting engineers; 5% consist of architects,
professors, etc.; and 21% are unclassified.’’ In all, members had
listed over 30 different job categories. The younger associate and
junior members would have added even more variety to Bates’ list
of occupations. Adding to the problems of heterogeneity was the
ASCE’s continued representation of itself as the national society
for all engineers, regardless of specialty. 共Bates’ list even included military engineers, who had by definition been excluded
from the original membership of the ASCE.兲 Many ASCE members, however, felt their primary professional loyalty to one of the
other, more specialized societies. Bates pointed out that if engineers were limited to joining one national society, many of these
members ‘‘might not elect to be classed among the Civil Engineers’’ 共Bates 1909兲.
The increasingly varied makeup of the ASCE could not be
changed, for, as President Bates noted, his was ‘‘an age of specialties’’ 共Bates 1909兲. Finding consensus among such a varied
group would prove difficult, but the society’s diversity made it all
the more important that the members find a way to express what
they all held in common. The conflicting interests of these different types of engineers at once encouraged the adoption of codes
and laws as guidelines for how to interact with one another and
instigated arguments over the content of those policies 共Bates
1909兲.
Enactment of a Special Statute
It was in the context of these new surroundings that engineers
again faced the question of self-regulation. The arguments remained as heated as those in earlier years, but this time had quite
different results. Local engineering societies, splinter groups of
civil engineers, and nonengineers began to propose engineering
licensing laws in a variety of states. The ASCE members quickly
realized they would have to act or be subjected to control by
non-ASCE members. The decision facing American civil engineers was no longer between whether to regulate or not; instead,
it became a question of whether regulation ought to come from
within the society or from without.
In March 1907, Wyoming State Engineer Clarence T. Johnston
announced that his state legislature had passed an engineering
registration law, intended to ensure that ‘‘all the surveying and
engineering pertaining to irrigation works should be properly
done.’’ The law established a board of examining engineers, consisting of the state engineer and two other engineers appointed by
the governor. The board was free to use whatever methods it saw
fit to certify an applicant’s abilities, but was required to ‘‘make
inquiry relative to the moral character of every applicant for a
license’’ and was instructed that ‘‘no license shall be issued to any
applicant who is incompetent, dishonest, intemperate or addicted
to any habit which would, in the judgment of the Board, render
him an unsafe employee of any citizen, corporation or association
of the State.’’ Johnston reassured prospective applicants that the
examination questions were ‘‘very simple,’’ though he warned
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that they would become more difficult over the years, in effect
creating a grandfather clause, but noted that ‘‘our law does not
provide any way by which incompetents could continue to practice’’ 共Examination 1907; ‘‘Licensing’’ 1907; Johnston 1908兲.
This first statute regulating engineering practice affected only
engineers applying for water rights. The ASCE members seemed
comfortable with it because its main aim was to eliminate undesirable practitioners; water speculation, they maintained, was
being undertaken in Wyoming by anyone choosing to call himself
an engineer, thereby threatening the reputation of the entire profession. Trained engineers wanted to distinguish themselves from
this haphazard group by obtaining licenses. In the frontier state of
Wyoming, society membership and college education meant little.
A license would be more tangible evidence of competence.
In contrast to the Wyoming law, which was generally well
received in the civil-engineering community, a Louisiana statute
the following year stirred more heated debate. In July 1908, the
Louisiana legislature established a state board of engineering examiners, intended ‘‘to prevent the practice of 关engineering兴 by
unauthorized persons.’’ All civil engineers and surveyors in the
state were required to register, though the law exempted federally
employed engineers, engineers from outside the state consulting
with registered engineers, and, significantly, any Louisiana engineer practicing prior to the passage of the act.
The Louisiana Engineering Society had endorsed and lobbied
for the bill, and arranged for the governor to select all five board
appointees from a list provided by the state society. But other
engineers vigorously opposed the law. Clarence Johnston, the
Wyoming state engineer, for instance, argued that the grandfather
clause weakened the law. The editor of Engineering News, who
agreed with Johnston, also objected to the statute because it made
so little distinction between engineers and surveyors. Engineering
News conceded that the purpose of the law was ‘‘to protect the
public against the results of incompetent engineering work,’’ but
took issue with the ability of the law to accomplish this goal.
It is said that the charlatan is abroad in the South and that
Southern towns and cities are being mulcted of vast amounts of
money through badly planned water-works, sewers, lighting
plants, streets, etc. Admitting this to be true, we do not see how
the Louisiana law—or any other law of this sort which we have
ever seen—is going to protect the public by preventing the
employment of incompetent engineers 共‘‘Editorial’’ 1908兲.
The editor argued that even if such ‘‘mulcting’’ were taking place,
no law could prevent it. The editor also noted that charlatans ‘‘of
the sort that get cities into trouble’’ could pass any state examination ‘‘with flying colors.’’ Furthermore, the grandfather clause
prevented the examination from having any impact whatsoever on
currently practicing engineers or charlatans.
Anybody practicing before the law was passed can go on the
registry list regardless of his qualifications or lack of qualifications. Hence until in the course of nature the incompetents and
dishonest hangers on of the profession have the goodness to die
or remove from the state, the public will still have to be on its
guard in employing engineering talent.
The editor of Engineering News suggested that examining the
work rather than the engineers would better prevent unsafe engineering, because, while ‘‘charlatans’’ might misrepresent themselves and their qualifications, engineering projects could not lie
共‘‘More’’ 1911兲.
Johnston and the Engineering News editors objected to the
Louisiana law primarily because of its breadth. Whereas the Wyoming law had been intended to confront a documented problem in
a specific area of engineering, the Louisiana statute sought to
restrict the practice of all engineers, even those who did not live
in the state, in order to prevent troubles that Johnston and the
News editors were not inclined to believe existed 共‘‘Editorial’’
1908; Johnston 1908兲.
A number of other states—including Idaho 共1909兲, Ohio
共1910兲, Pennsylvania 共1910兲, and Alabama 共1911兲—took up the
issue of licensing during these years, but, with the opposition of
Engineering News, Engineering Record, and the ASCE, all failed
to pass registration laws. Some engineers supported such statutes,
but the profession as a whole fought them down. Much more
troubling to ASCE members than any of these proposals, however, was the movement afoot in New York, long the ASCE’s
home state. Early in 1910, New York State assemblyman Edward
J. Lyons Raldiris proposed a law requiring engineers practicing in
that state to be licensed.
Initially, engineers like the editors at Engineering News ‘‘did
not attach much importance to the matter’’ 共‘‘A bill’’ 1910兲. In
March, New York engineer Walter G. Eliot wrote to the editors at
Engineering News to ask why their support 共or at least comment兲
had not been forthcoming for such a significant issue. The editors
responded that if ‘‘there is any prospect whatever of the bill’s
enactment,’’ it certainly warranted the attention of all engineers,
whether they lived in New York or not. The editors declared that
to allow engineers to be ‘‘under the control’’ of the New York
State Regents would be wholly unacceptable and encouraged all
engineers to indicate as much to the New York assembly 共‘‘A
bill’’ 1910兲.
Engineers from across New York State took up the suggestion
of the News and descended on Albany, N.Y. During the March
24th public hearing on the bill, at least 20 engineers, including
ASCE President Bensel and Walter Eliot, presented their objections or support. As a result, Raldiris agreed to wait for a revised
bill to be drafted by the engineers present before taking the matter
further 共‘‘The Raldiris’’ 1910; Raldiris 1910兲.
The ASCE directors, who took the developments in New York
to be part of an ‘‘unmistakable tendency toward legislation regulating the practice of civil engineering,’’ decided that if states
were going to insist on continuing to propose licensing laws, the
society had better direct the content of those laws 共‘‘A report’’
1910; ‘‘Report’’ 1911兲. As President John Bensel expressed it,
‘‘For myself, having been confronted with legislation recently
attempted in New York, I am convinced that we shall have legislation affecting our members, and this legislation should properly
be molded by some responsible body like our own Society.’’ The
alternative, according to Bensel, would be disastrous: ‘‘If we do
not take the matter up ourselves it is likely to be taken up by other
associations, and from past experience, it would seem as though it
might be carried along lines that would tend to ridicule our desire
for professional standing’’ 共Bensel 1910兲. In spite of the society’s
heterogeneity, President Bensel argued, all members must come
together and present a united front or risk control from outside the
profession. In short, Bensel told his fellow engineers, ‘‘To be
effective... we must be cohesive.’’
On April 6, 1910, barely two weeks after the public hearing on
the Raldiris Bill in New York, the ASCE directors resolved that
‘‘it is the duty of the American Society of Civil Engineers to use
its influence in the proper formulation of all legislation by the
general Government, or by any of the states of the Union, which
affects the practice of engineers’’ 共‘‘A report’’ 1910兲. The directors believed that it was ‘‘not necessary or desirable that civil
engineers should be licensed in any State,’’ but if a state persisted
in seeking licensing legislation, they preferred their own model
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law. After a confused and hostile discussion, the president declared that the results of an oral vote supported adopting the
Model Law and its preface, and preempted several members who
objected to his opinion of the outcome of the vote by quickly
moving on to another order of business 共‘‘The licensing’’
1911a,b; ‘‘Minutes’’ 1911; ‘‘Report’’ 1911兲.
The Model Law of 1910 clearly reflected the ASCE’s interests.
It defined civil engineering as encompassing all nonmilitary
branches of the discipline. It required that the governor appoint to
a licensing board engineers who met qualifications laid out by the
ASCE. The law’s drafters recognized the informal nature of older
engineers’ training and so required that all applicants have either
six years’ experience or, as an acceptable substitute, a degree
from a recognized school, and that arrangements be made for
experienced engineers to forego the formal examination 共‘‘An
act’’ 1911; ‘‘The licensing’’ 1911b兲.
But the cohesion sought by Bensel and the drafters of the
Model Law would not be easy to achieve. Shortly after the Model
Law had been approved, Engineering News, for instance, rebuked
the president for himself undermining the very unity he sought.
The editor at the News noted that when Bensel had been on the
ASCE committee that had drafted the Model Law, he had not
considered the wishes or interests of the other national engineering societies, ‘‘although proposing to license as civil engineers all
engineers other than military or exclude them from state regulation as engineers.’’ The News concluded that ‘‘such an attitude
does not conform very well to the idea of cohesiveness, or the
solidarity of the engineering profession’’ 共‘‘Editorial’’ 1910兲. In
January 1911, the News again chastised the ASCE for presuming
to represent all nonmilitary engineers and argued that the Model
Law would benefit neither the public, in the form of increased
safety, nor engineers, in the form of increased wages or respect
共‘‘A law’’ 1911兲.
Particularly troubling to ASCE members was the rumor that
the Raldiris Bill had been initiated and supported by the ‘‘Technical League,’’ a secret society of New York City engineers. The
very existence of this group, which engineering historian Edwin
Layton has described as a ‘‘protest organization,’’ indicated the
drawbacks to the increasing heterogeneity of the field. The group,
led by Walter Eliot, consisted of young municipal engineers displeased with their lack of power in the ASCE and afraid of ‘‘retaliation on the part of employers’’ for their complaints. The
members of the Technical League felt that the ASCE leaders had
not paid sufficient attention to ‘‘cohesion.’’ Far from being the
umbrella organization for civil engineering, the ASCE was, in the
eyes of the league members, ‘‘a mere private corporation ruled by
a handful, mostly New Yorkers.’’ League president Eliot also
noted that the ASCE membership was ‘‘widely at odds on the
subject’’ of licensing, since the vote on the Model Law had been
so close. Eliot also suggested that the very wording of the Model
Law resolution—which at once opposed licensing and proposed
legislation—indicated that members could not decide whether to
support registration for engineers or not 共‘‘Making’’ 1911; Sprague 1911; Layton 1986兲.
In early 1911, the licensing debate continued in New York
when two more licensing laws came before the state legislature.
One, the Hoff Bill, was based on the ASCE Model Law. The
other, the McGrath Bill, was proposed on behalf of the Technical
League, whose members, apart from Eliot, refused to identify
themselves 共‘‘A license’’ 1911兲. Neither bill passed, and New
York would not license engineers until 1920. With the threat of
the New York licensing bills thwarted, at least temporarily, the
ASCE members turned to preventing future registration propos-
als. They began to consider a method recently adopted by other
engineering societies, one that would be more directly controlled
by the society than even engineer-directed licensing boards—a
code of ethics.
At the ASCE annual meeting in January 1913, society member
Percival Churchill proposed that the ASCE follow the lead of the
ASME and several other national engineering societies and adopt
a code of ethics 共‘‘Minutes’’ 1913; ‘‘Report’’ 1913; Wisely 1974兲.
In 1911 and 1912, at least three other national societies approved
codes of ethics for their memberships. In May 1911, the American
Institute of Consulting Engineers had become the first national
engineering society in America to adopt a code. The AIEE and the
American Institute of Chemical Engineers soon followed, in
March and December 1912, respectively. The ASME adopted its
own code in June 1914. The Engineering Institute of Canada had
been the leader in the area of self-regulation, adopting its code in
1887 共Molitor 1926; Hughes 1960; Van Antwerpen 1960; Wisely
1977; Reynolds 1983; McMahon 1984; Layton 1986兲.
Other professions were also adopting codes in the early years
of this century. The American Bar Association’s code dates to
1908, the American Institute of Architects’ code dates to 1909,
and the American Medical Association had revised its nineteenthcentury code in 1912. In a renewed burst of interest in the 1920s,
according to code historian Hunter Hughes, ‘‘every profession,
semiprofession, and business that had not adopted a code of ethics
before the War got one soon after.’’ Indeed, at least 130 such
groups, from clothing manufacturers to optometrists to stockbreeders, had adopted or revised their codes in the 1910s or 1920s
共Heermance 1924; Hughes 1960; Wisely 1977; Levy 1980兲.
In February 1913, the ASCE directors appointed a committee
‘‘to report on the whole question as to whether it is desirable for
the Society to adopt a Code of Ethics, and if they think favorably
of it, to present to the Board a short Code of Ethics’’ 共‘‘Minutes’’
1913; ‘‘Report’’ 1913; Wisely 1974兲. The committee members
drafted a code and presented it to the membership at the December 1913 meeting. After several revisions, the code was presented
to the general membership at the convention in June 1914 with
the board’s recommendation for approval; the members approved
sending the draft out for a vote 共Wisely 1974兲.
The subject remained a provocative one. Twelve letters were
read into the minutes and perhaps twice that many members commented in person—substantial numbers compared to other topics
on the day’s agenda. The arguments for and against a code closely
echoed those of 1893 and 1902. Supporters argued, as before, that
a code would help ‘‘elevate the engineering profession.’’ Again
they pointed out that other professions had codes, adding other
engineering specialties to the list of competitors with whom to
keep up. In addition, proponents reminded members, a code
would help to eliminate undesirable practitioners and thus might
help forestall licensing laws 共‘‘Minutes’’ 1914兲.
Opponents repeated their objection that a formal code would
‘‘tie the hands of the scrupulous and untie the hands of the unscrupulous.’’ They again asserted that sufficient mechanisms already existed for disciplining unworthy members, and asked,
‘‘Why advertise to the world that our membership needs training
in elementary business-moral principles?’’ The arguments may
not have changed, but the reaction could not have been more
different. Only one society officer opposed the code; and, as one
member commented during the discussion, there seemed to be
‘‘no question’’ but that the society both needed and would adopt a
code. The code was sent to the general membership on letterballot, and on September 2, 1914, the code was officially voted in
by 1,997 of 2,162 members. The recent massive influx of associ-
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ate members helped sway the vote strongly in favor of the code
共‘‘Minutes’’ 1913, 1914; ‘‘Report’’ 1913; Wisely 1974兲. The text
of the 1914 ASCE code appears in the appendix.
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Declaring Independence
The arguments for and against adopting a code had not changed.
Members still debated whether a code could enhance their reputations; certify their professionalism, and protect them from unfair
competition, all without unduly detracting from their autonomy.
But the atmosphere in which ASCE members made their decision
was substantially different from that faced by nineteenth-century
society members who had opposed self-regulation. Licensing was
no longer a mere suggestion, or even a looming possibility, but a
reality in two states. Nineteen more states would follow in the
next 10 years. ASCE members felt increasingly constrained and
wanted to assert their continuing self-control 共‘‘The licensing’’
1911b; ‘‘The McGrath’’ 1911兲.
The ASCE’s adoption of an ethics code did not prevent the
spread of registration laws, however. By 1950, every state had
adopted an engineering licensing statute. All of the state laws
followed the basic pattern of the ASCE’s Model Law. ‘‘All’’ engineers were required to register, but many were exempted, especially government and corporate engineers, whom the Model Law
presumed were already being monitored and were not directly in
contact with the public. State examining boards were, in general,
made up of engineers approved by the state society. Most states
required some sort of examination in general engineering knowledge. And all states provided a mechanism for revoking a license
once issued 共Constance 1989兲.
In its effort to at once thwart such expanding regulation and
protect members’ liberties, ASCE’s 1914 code struck an awkward
balance between control and freedom by describing proper behavior and yet not providing means to enforce such behavior. The
code began with a preface indicating that the society officially
considered the conduct described in the code’s six canons to be
‘‘unprofessional and inconsistent with honorable and dignified
bearing’’ 共see the appendix for the text of the 1914 code兲. The
entire code dealt with the business rather than the science of
engineering. Civil engineers were admonished to be loyal to their
clients, their fellow engineers, and their profession by avoiding
共1兲 bribes or gifts; 共2兲 disparaging statements regarding other engineers; 共3兲 theft of another engineer’s job; 共4兲 unfair bidding; 共5兲
reviewing another engineer’s work without that engineer’s knowledge or consent; and 共6兲 ‘‘self-laudatory’’ or undignified advertising.
The proscriptive language of the 1914 code was directed at
protecting the ability of engineers to practice without undue
interference—from one another or from nonengineers. Rephrased,
the 1914 code might well have said that an upstanding engineer
should not be threatened by 共1兲 cheating; 共2兲 lying; 共3兲 stealing;
共4兲 greed; 共5兲 deceit; and 共6兲 pride. The unspoken implication was
that such threats should not be tolerated, whether they came from
within the profession 共as in the Fanning-Frizell case兲 or from
without 共as in the trouble with the architects兲; to the greatest
extent possible, engineers should remain autonomous. Understood in this light, the 1914 code is not so much a collection of
rules as it is a declaration of engineers’ independence, meant to
ensure their continued freedom to practice according to their own
consciences.
Conclusion
Jervis and his mid-nineteenth-century colleagues in the ASCE had
argued that the ‘‘character’’ of an engineer, though crucial, could
best be ensured through judicious membership requirements.
Their successors a half century later still held ‘‘character’’ paramount, but through increasing diversification and competition felt
compelled to state publicly what that character entailed. The 1914
code of ethics, when it did emerge, had come about as a reluctantly supported preemptive mechanism.
For 60 years after the code’s initial adoption, ASCE members
periodically voted to add or delete a canon or, more commonly, a
word or phrase here and there. But the basic theme of the code
remained unchanged: Do not do anything to harm the profession,
its reputation, or your fellow engineers. The code did not directly
address competency and made no reference to the public 共who
would use or rely on the vast majority of civil-engineering
works兲, but ASCE members and directors did not intend for the
code to deal with these issues, which they felt ought to be assumed of any engineer worthy of the name. Ironically, then, the
ASCE code of ethics, which we now construe as a ‘‘framework
for ethical judgment,’’ meant to guide engineers in their practice,
was originally intended to protect engineers from just such constraints.
The ASCE’s legacy of autonomy would come under renewed
fire during the second half of the twentieth century as civil engineers and others strove to make public safety the ‘‘paramount’’
duty of engineers. The ASCE code would undergo a major shift in
language and focus in the mid-1970s, and the 1981 Kansas City
Hyatt Regency walkways collapse would bring the tensions between freedom and control to a new and even more urgent crisis
共Pfatteicher 2000兲. But throughout the changes that the ASCE
code has undergone, John Jervis’ 1869 dictum that ‘‘the engineer
eminently depends on character’’ still holds true. The essential
message from these nineteenth-century engineers is that whatever
the content of a profession’s code, the content of its character
matters more.
Acknowledgment
The writer gratefully acknowledges the assistance of the Linda
Hall Library in Kansas City, Mo., which provided crucial financial and research support in the middle stages of this project.
Appendix. 1914 ASCE Code of Ethics
It shall be considered unprofessional and inconsistent with honorable and dignified bearing for any member of the American
Society of Civil Engineers
1. To act for his clients in professional matters otherwise than
as a faithful agent or trustee, or to accept remuneration other
than his stated charges for services rendered his clients.
2. To attempt to injure falsely or maliciously, directly or indirectly, the professional reputation, prospects, or business of
another Engineer.
3. To attempt to supplant another Engineer after definite steps
have been taken toward his employment.
4. To compete with another Engineer for employment on the
basis of professional charges, by reducing his usual charges
and in this manner attempting to underbid after being informed of the charges named by another.
5. To review the work of another Engineer for the same client,
except with the knowledge or consent of such Engineer, or
unless the connection of such Engineer with the work has
been terminated.
JOURNAL OF PROFESSIONAL ISSUES IN ENGINEERING EDUCATION AND PRACTICE / JANUARY 2003 / 29
J. Prof. Issues Eng. Educ. Pract., 2003, 129(1): 21-31
6.
To advertise in self-laudatory language, or in any other manner derogatory to the dignity of the Profession.
As a note to the reader, the 1914 code appeared, among other
places, in ‘‘Minutes’’ 共1914兲.
Downloaded from ascelibrary.org by CASA Institution Identity on 06/05/24. Copyright ASCE. For personal use only; all rights reserved.
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