What’s Mine is His and What’s His is Mine
The Justice of Penal Substitution
Name: Cortney Alexander
Student ID: 01738108
Due Date: May 5, 2018
CSAP 694 The Atonement
Term Paper
Intended Audience: Christians desiring to understand how to respond to attacks on the justice of
penal substitution from inside and outside the church.
Introduction
The doctrine of penal substitution—the belief that Jesus, through his death on the cross,
took the punishment due those who believe in him—receives much criticism from both
professing Christians and non-Christians. Many objections relate to the justice of penal
substitution. These justice-based objections extend both to the sufficiency of the substitute and to
the principle of substitution itself. First, if God’s justice demands that sin be punished by death,
how does the one death of Jesus satisfy the punishment due many people? Second, how is it just
for Jesus, an innocent person, to take the punishment due guilty persons?
In this paper, I will argue that neither category of objections succeeds in impugning the
justice of penal substitution. The one death of Jesus is sufficient to satisfy the punishment due
many because he is not merely a human being, but an infinite being—the God-man. Thus, while
sinners deserve infinite punishment, the infinite God-man experienced infinite punishment.
Further, Jesus could justly die in place of believers because they are united with him—they are
one with Christ. Thus, Christ’s satisfaction of justice’s demands is rightly imputed to all who are
united with him. Penal substitution is therefore not only just, it provides the only explanation as
to how God can be both just and the justifier of those who trust in Jesus.
How Does One Death Satisfy the Penalty Due an Innumerable Multitude?
Eleonore Stump argues that if the wages of sin is death (i.e., “everlasting damnation”),
then Jesus’ death cannot fully satisfy the demands of God’s justice: “no matter what sort of
agony Christ experienced in his crucifixion, it certainly was not (and was not equivalent to)
everlasting punishment, if for no other reason than that Christ’s suffering came to an end.” 1
To understand how Jesus’ death on the cross satisfies God’s wrath against a multitude of
1
Eleonore Stump, Aquinas (London: Routledge, 2003), 429.
1
people, it helps to consider why the lost will suffer everlasting punishment. Sin is the
manifestation of rebellion against God, who is the eternal King over all creation (Js. 1:14-15; Isa.
47:7; Gen. 14:22). God’s eternal nature means that crime against him warrants endless
punishment. 2 The connection between the nature of a crime’s victim and the appropriate
punishment is illustrated by considering the consequences of harming a flower, a dog, and a
human being. We would expect no punishment for harming a flower, some punishment for
destroying a dog, and severe punishment for harming a person because humans are more
valuable than dogs. 3 This principle only becomes more magnified when applied to God, whose
value “infinitely surpasses the value of other kinds.” 4 Thus, while finite punishment suffices for
crime against a finite being, crime against an infinite being warrants infinite punishment. Since a
finite being has no capacity to satisfy an infinite debt, punishment will extend without end.
Jesus, however, is not merely a finite man. He is the uncreated Word become flesh, the
God-man. While the appropriate punishment for crime considers the nature of the victim, “so
also the severity of a punishment is determined in part by the dignity of the one punished.” 5 It is
customary in prisoner exchanges for one higher-ranking official to be swapped for many lowerranking soldiers. For example, during the American Civil War, “one colonel was worth fifteen
private soldiers.” 6 As Francis Turretin asked, “If this is admitted among creatures who are all
finite and mortal, how much more between creatures and the Creator, between whom there is an
infinite distance?” 7 Indeed, “Christ’s suffering, though it lasted only a finite time, was infinite in
William G.T. Shedd, Dogmatic Theology (Phillipsburg, N.J.: P&R Publishing, 2003), 925.
William Wainwright, “Original Sin,” in Philosophy and the Christian Faith, Thomas V. Morris, ed. (Notre Dame,
IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), 34.
4
Ibid., 34.
5
Steve Jeffery, Michael Ovey, and Andrew Sach, Pierced for Our Transgressions (Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2007),
267.
6
Charles Hubbard, ed., Lincoln Reshapes the Presidency (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 2003), 36.
7
James Willson, trans., Turrettin on the Atonement of Christ (New York: Board of Publication of the Reformed
Protestant Dutch Church in North America, 1859), 62.
2
3
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value because he is infinitely worthy.” 8 And because Jesus’ suffering was infinite, it satisfied the
infinite debt of a multitude since “2 x infinity” is still infinity. The sum of each person’s infinite
debt is still infinite. In this way, “[t]he dignity of an infinite person swallows up all the infinities
of punishment due to us: they sink into it and are lost.” 9 Thus, Jesus’ suffering—though lasting
only a finite time—satisfied the infinite debt of a multitude.
Faustus Socinus, a 16th-century Unitarian theologian who articulated many objections to
penal substitution that remain popular today, attempted to use this theory about the value of
Christ’s suffering to attack the justice of penal substitution. If it were true, Socinus argued, that
Christ’s suffering was of infinite value, then his death was unnecessary. God “might well have
been contented with one drop (as they say) of the blood of Christ,” and it would therefore be
unjust for God to require his death. 10 If God is just, then it must follow that Christ’s suffering is
not of infinite value. But this argument overlooks that the wages of sin is death (Rom. 6:23).
That sin is a capital crime should not be surprising given that sin inherently involves treason
against the sovereign King. As Eve succumbed to the temptation to be like the God who says, “I
am the LORD, and there is no other” (Isa. 45:5), so too all sin involves the sinner crying out to his
Maker, “No, I am and there is no one besides me!” (cf. Isa. 47:8). A slap on the wrist does not
suffice for this crime; it is a capital offense. The necessity of Jesus’ death is also implicit in his
prayer in the hours before his crucifixion: “My Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass from me;
nevertheless, not as I will, but as you will” (Matt. 26:39). Since a mere drop of blood would not
satisfy the demands of the law, Socinus’s attack on the sufficiency of Christ’s sacrifice fails.
Stump seeks to support her objections by arguing that if Jesus’ death did pay for sin, it
Jeffery, Ovey, and Sach, 267.
Willson, 61.
10
Faustus Socinus, Rac. Cat., v. 8, cited in Laurence W. Grensted, A Short History of the Doctrine of the Atonement
(London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1920), 285-86.
8
9
3
would raise other justice issues. For example, she states, “it as a fundamental Christian doctrine
that God justly condemns some people to everlasting punishment in hell. If Christ has paid the
penalty for sin completely, how is God just in demanding that some people pay the penalty
again?” 11 But this objection assumes that the benefit of Christ’s death is imputed to unbelievers,
a view that orthodox Christianity rejects. For example, Calvinism and Arminianism share the
belief that the atonement “is adapted to provide the cure for human sin and will save any and all
who should believe in it”—but only those who believe. 12 As John puts it, “whoever does not
obey the Son shall not see life, but the wrath of God remains on him” (Jn. 3:36). Thus, Stump’s
objection is invalid because it forces onto penal substitution a belief its defenders do not hold. 13
Stump next asserts that “[o]n Christian doctrine, the punishment for sin is not just death
but hell.” 14 Based on this understanding, she argues that penal substitution “has the infelicitous
result that what Christ undergoes in his substitutionary suffering is not the traditionally assigned
penalty for sin.” 15 While it is certainly true that Scripture speaks of the lost experiencing
everlasting punishment (e.g., Matt. 25:46; 2 Thess. 1:9; Jude 1:7), Scripture plainly states that
“the wages of sin is death” (Rom. 6:23). The term “hell” (Greek, γέεννα) refers to “the place of
torment reserved for the punishment of the wicked in a future state.” 16 The ultimate punishment
that the lost suffer in this “second death” (Rev. 20:14) is referred to in various Scriptural
passages as drinking from the cup of the wrath of God (e.g., Rev. 14:10-11; Ps. 75:8).
Jesus drank from this cup of God’s wrath in connection with his crucifixion. When
praying in the Garden of Gethsemane before his arrest, Jesus said, “Father, if you are willing,
Stump, 429.
Alan Gomes, “Editor’s Introduction,” in Dogmatic Theology, 34.
13
John S. Feinberg, The Many Faces of Evil (Wheaton, IL: Crossway Books, 2004), 27.
14
Stump, 429.
15
Ibid.
16
Richard Watson, A Biblical and Theological Dictionary (New York: Carlton & Porter, 1856), 446 (emphasis
added).
11
12
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remove this cup from me” (Lk. 22:42). The repeated references to the cup of God’s wrath in the
Old Testament leave little doubt about which cup Jesus had in mind. 17 This is supported by
Luke’s statement that Jesus experienced such “agony” that “his sweat became like great drops of
blood falling down to the ground” (Lk. 22:44). This agony was not merely in anticipation of the
physical pain Jesus would suffer at the hands of men. In his crucifixion, “the incarnate second
person of the Trinity received upon himself a stroke inflicted by the positive act of another divine
person,” as spoken of in Isaiah: “He was pierced for our transgressions . . . it was the will of the
LORD to crush him” (Isa. 53:6, 10). 18 This involved more than physical suffering; Jesus’ “human
nature was forsaken” (e.g., Matt. 27:46). 19 This forsaking was an aspect of Jesus drinking the cup
of wrath by God’s will (Matt. 26:42), the result of “becom[ing] sin,” of “becoming a curse,” for
believers (2 Cor. 5:21; Gal. 3:13). While “[t]he nature of this suffering is inexplicable, because it
has no parallel in human consciousness,” 20 Stump’s suggestion that Jesus did not suffer the
penalty for sin neglects to account for Jesus’ words indicating he did just that.
While Stump objects that “Christ’s sufferings would not remove the penalty from human
beings since they all suffer death anyway,” 21 she overlooks the fullness of the wages of sin by
focusing only on physical death. While it is appointed to all men to die once (Heb. 9:27), those to
whom Christ’s death is not imputed will also suffer the second death. Their “portion will be in
the lake that burns with fire and sulfur, which is the second death” (Rev. 21:8). In contrast, those
in Christ “will not be hurt by the second death” (Rev. 2:11). For them, to die is gain because to
depart from this life is to “be with Christ” (Phil. 1:21-23). The New Testament reflects this
Philip Graham Ryken, Jeremiah and Lamentations: From Sorrow to Hope, in Preaching the Word, ed. R. Kent
Hughes (Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2001), 372.
18
Shedd, Dogmatic Theology, 718.
19
Ibid., 717-18.
20
Ibid., 718.
21
Stump, 429.
17
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distinction by referring to the death of believers as “falling asleep” (1 Thess. 4:13). Thus,
Stump’s argument that the physical death of believers shows that Christ’s death did not remove
the penalty for sin does not hold up when comparing the eternal destiny of the saved and the lost.
Finally, Stump claims that human experience disproves the sufficiency of Christ’s death
to atone for sin, arguing that penal substitution does not provide atonement because it “leaves
human beings with just the same tendencies to will what is contrary to God’s will, so that their
wills are no more conformable with God’s will . . . than they were before the atonement.” 22 But
while Jesus’ death on the cross, in isolation, may not conform a person to God’s will, his blood
ransoms believers from futility (1 Pet. 1:18-19; Eph. 2:1-7), and those who are justified through
faith will be conformed to his image (Rom. 8:29). While this will reach its fullness in the
resurrection (1 Jn. 3:2), even in this life believers are “set free from sin,” enabling them to “walk
in newness of life” (Rom. 6:7, 4). The experience of millions bears witness to Scripture’s claim.
When a prominent atheist challenged 19th-century evangelist Hugh Price Hughes to debate
Christianity’s claims, Hughes accepted—if the atheist produced 100 people whose lives had been
positively changed by atheism to match the 100 Hughes would produce who had been delivered
from sinful lifestyles by faith in Jesus. The atheist withdrew his challenge when he could not
produce one person. 23 One could similarly render a debate over Stump’s assertion effectively
moot by filling the audience with the human evidence of the gospel’s power.
How is Justice Served by the Innocent Jesus Taking the Place of a Guilty Sinner?
The Fairness of Retributive Justice. A preliminary objection to the fairness of Jesus
taking the penalty due sinners is the fairness of retributive justice itself. For example,
philosopher Jonathan Kvanvig objects that a retributive system of justice (i.e., sinners receiving
22
23
Ibid.
D. James Kennedy and Jerry Newcombe, What If Jesus Had Never Been Born? (Nashville: Nelson, 2001), 189.
6
the punishment they deserve) is itself unjust—even for God. 24 First, this is directly contradicted
by Biblical teaching that (1) God is just; and (2) God executes retributive justice by punishing
sinners according to their works (e.g., Prov. 24:12; Rom. 2:6). While God’s justice may
sometimes accomplish other ends, such as deterring sin and rehabilitating the sinner, those
ancillary purposes do not negate the repeated teaching of retributive justice throughout the Old
and New Testaments. 25 Indeed, by its nature, the endless punishment of the lost can have no
rehabilitative effect. 26 As J.I. Packer wrote, Scripture “shows us also that the heart of the justice
which expresses God’s nature is retribution, the rendering to men what they have deserved; for
this is the essence of the judge’s task.” 27
Second, the justness of retributive justice is demonstrated by the fact that it safeguards
three important factors: (1) punishing only the guilty; (2) handing out punishment proportional to
the crime; and (3) ensuring that offenders receive equivalent punishments for equivalent
crimes. 28 The primary alternative penal theories (deterrence and rehabilitation) cannot say the
same. For example, a deterrence-centered system has little incentive to ensure that the person
punished is guilty or that the punishment is proportional to the crime, so long as the public is
deterred from crime. Likewise, in a rehabilitation-driven justice system, a disproportionately
harsh penalty might be inflicted if deemed necessary to bring about the desired change in the
offender. Indeed, a minor offender might never be released if deemed unrepentant. 29
Alternative Atonement Theories Actually Create a Justice Problem. In rejecting
penal substitution, P.T. Forsyth wrote that “it cannot be true in the sense that God punished
Jonathan L. Kvanvig, The Problem of Hell (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 53.
Graham Cole, God the Peacemaker: How Atonement Brings Shalom (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press,
2009), 77.
26
Jeffery, Ovey, and Sach, 258.
27
J.I. Packer, Knowing God (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1973), 142.
28
Jeffery, Ovey, and Sach, 254.
29
Ibid., 256-58.
24
25
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Christ. . . . How could God punish Him in whom He was always well pleased?” 30 While
Forsyth’s objection to penal substitution will be dealt with below, it is not merely the defender of
penal substitution who must answer this question. Anyone who believes that Jesus died on the
cross according to God’s plan, as Acts 4:24-31 makes abundantly clear, must explain how that
event comported with justice.
In attempting to provide an answer that does not include penal substitution, Paul Fiddes
asserts that “the judgment of God [should be] understood as his personal consent to the natural
outworking of people’s estrangement from God and each other,” and that Christ “participat[ed]
in our experience of being ‘accursed’ without any suggestion that the Father is punishing the Son
on our behalf.” 31 First, Fiddes’ argument does not square with Isaiah 53 (which Peter, among
other New Testament writers, applies to Jesus). This passage leaves no doubt that Jesus’ death
involved punishment: “he was pierced for our transgressions . . . upon him was the chastisement
that brought us peace” (Isa. 53:5). This accords with Scripture’s teaching that the wages of sin
(i.e., that which is due) is death (Rom. 6:23). Second, Fiddes’ argument does not actually answer
the justice question. Even under his view, Jesus experiences God’s judgment (by suffering the
natural outworking of sin) with God’s consent despite having done nothing deserving of that
judgment. It is unclear how this—in and of itself—would be any more just than if, as under the
penal-substitution view, the judgment involved God inflicting the punishment due sin.
Mischaracterizing God’s Wrath as a “Personal Act of Violence.” A common
objection to penal substitution is that God would be violating his own standards by trying to
resolve a problem through violence—or, as Steve Chalke puts it, through “cosmic child abuse”:
Jesus’ message was unambiguous. Reciprocal violence is a vicious circle – a
downward spiral. Vengeance always leads to reprisal. . . . Penal substitutionary
30
31
P.T. Forsyth, The Work of Christ (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 1996), 146.
Paul Fiddes, Past Event and Present Salvation (Louisville: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1989), 104.
8
theory betrays Jesus’ attempt to root out the tendency of religion to lead to violence
by inventing a theology of his death that is in direct opposition to his teaching.” 32
Greg Boyd similarly claims that the concept that God must punish sin contradicts Jesus’
teaching: “How are we to reconcile the idea that the Father needs to exact payment from or on
behalf of his enemies with Jesus’ teaching (and example) that we are to love unconditionally and
forgive without demanding payment?” 33 These arguments, however, misunderstand the
relationship between mercy and justice.
First, if Chalke and Boyd were correct that Jesus’ teaching prohibited retributive justice,
earthly governments could not justly punish lawbreakers when the victim forgave the
perpetrator. Scripture says the opposite—that God provides civil governments with the authority
to punish crime—and expects that power to be exercised (e.g., Rom. 13:1-4). Moreover, the
realities of life show the absurdity of Chalke’s and Boyd’s characterization of Jesus’ teachings.
We find a recent example in the former doctor to the USA Gymnastics team, Larry Nassar.
Nassar received forgiveness from Rachael Denhollander, the accuser who initiated the avalanche
of accusations against him. Yet Denhollander also called on the judge to impose a sentence in
keeping with his crimes. 34 The person who says that Nassar’s jail sentence is somehow
inconsistent with Denhollander’s forgiveness has an unworkable sense of justice.
Second, God’s retributive justice (and therefore the need for atonement) does not
contradict Jesus’ teaching against personal vengeance. Actually, the New Testament’s
prohibition against personal vengeance is directly tied to God’s coming judgment of
lawbreakers: “Beloved, never avenge yourselves, but leave it to the wrath of God, for it is
Steve Chalke, “The Redemption of the Cross,” in Atonement Debate, eds. Derek Tidball, David Hilborn, and
Justin Thacker (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2008), 41.
33
Gregory Boyd, “Christus Victor Response to Penal Substitution View,” in The Nature of the Atonement, ed. James
Beilby and Paul Eddy (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2006), 104.
34
“Read Rachael Denhollander’s Full Victim Impact Statement About Larry Nassar,” CNN, January 30, 2018,
accessed April 27, 2018, https://www.cnn.com/2018/01/24/us/rachael-denhollander-full-statement/index.html.
32
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written, ‘Vengeance is mine, I will repay, says the Lord’” (Rom. 12:19). Chalke is likewise
wrong in arguing that God’s vengeance would only lead to more reprisals. Scripture teaches the
opposite—God’s eschatological wrath ushers in the reign of Christ (e.g., 2 Thess. 1:9-10; 1 Cor.
15:23-26; Jer. 23:5). When justice is finally executed, righteousness will reign on the earth. 35
Finally, arguments like Chalke’s and Boyd’s do not merely attack penal substitution, but
the very idea that God can justly punish sinners. This is evident, for example, in Chalke’s
allegation that if God were to punish sinners, he would be committing “a personal act of violence
toward humankind”: “If the cross is a personal act of violence perpetrated by God towards
humankind, but borne by his Son, then it makes a mockery of Jesus’ own teaching to love your
enemies and to refuse to repay evil with evil.” 36 For the sake of space, let it be said only that
Scripture repeatedly affirms both God’s justice (e.g., Deut. 32:4; Rom. 3:26) and the outpouring
of his wrath against sinners (e.g., Rom. 2:8). But so long as someone holds to the mistaken view
that God’s judgment of sinners is not righteous, but instead a “personal act of violence” violating
the teachings of Jesus, it is hardly surprising that he would reject the idea that God would pour
out his wrath on the innocent Jesus in substitution for those rebellious sinners. Thus, someone
entertaining Chalke’s views of the atonement should understand the even more foundational
disagreements with historic orthodox Christianity that underlie his atonement theories. 37
Union with Christ Establishes the Justice of Penal Substitution. Those who reject
penal substitution often argue that justice will not permit an innocent person to take the
punishment for a guilty person. For example, Thomas Smail writes that “it is hard not to assent
to the argumentation that guilt and punishment are not transferable, like money and fines, but
Charles Swindoll, Insights on Revelation (Carol Stream, IL: Tyndale House, 2014), 118.
Steve Chalke, “The Redemption of the Cross,” 40.
37
Steve Chalke, “95 Burning Questions for the 21st Century Church,” Open Church Network, accessed April 27,
2018, http://www.openchurch.network/chalketalk.
35
36
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intrinsically by their own nature and morally by every rule of justice are inseparably attached to
the person whose sinful acts have incurred them.” 38 Forsyth says this is particularly true when
that innocent person is the beloved Son in whom God is well pleased. 39
The answer to this objection is found in the relationship between Jesus and the redeemed,
who are collectively referred to in Scripture as the body and bride of Christ. Scripture affirms
that believers are “in Christ” and that Christ is in them. 40 Paul writes of this union with Christ,
saying that “he who is joined to the Lord becomes one spirit with him” (1 Cor. 6:19). Because of
this relationship, penal substitution does not involve a “transfer” of guilt and punishment from
sinners to an unrelated party. Rather, “by virtue of [believers’] union with him, [their sins]
become his.” 41 Since Christ voluntarily chose to unite with believers and take their punishment
as his own (Jn. 10:17-18), it is not unjust for him to take on the penalty owed by believers. 42
While Christ’s crucifixion took place after the lifetime of some of those who receive its benefits
and before the life of others, this poses no difficulty for the God who is outside of time. 43 As
Scripture says, God “chose [believers] in him before the foundation of the world” (Eph. 1:4), so
their union with Christ was fait accompli regardless of the point in time it ultimately occurred.
While the believer’s union with Christ explains the justice of penal substitution, many
may nonetheless struggle to reconcile penal substitution with the idea of a loving God. This is
particularly true for those harboring the suspicion that God is like an angry old man looking over
the balcony of heaven, just waiting to smite someone for the smallest misdeed. Steve Chalke
invokes an encounter with just such a person in advocating the benefits of rejecting penal
Thomas Smail, Once and For All: A Confession of the Cross (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2005), 98.
Forsyth, 146.
40
James White, The God Who Justifies (Bloomington, MN: Bethany House, 2001), 365.
41
Jeffery, Ovey, and Sach, 244.
42
Ibid.
43
Ibid., 243 n.8.
38
39
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substitution. He describes visiting a prominent scholar who explained his belief that Chalke
mischaracterizes penal substitution. But when the scholar left the office for a few minutes, his
secretary rushed in to express her gratitude to Chalke for “releas[ing] her from the fear of an
angry God that had been crushing her for years.” 44 While some believers may misunderstand the
nature of redemption and therefore unnecessarily fear God’s condemnation, Chalke’s “remedy”
risks creating a false sense of security in people who would be well-advised to fear God’s wrath.
In any case, we need not abandon penal substitution to preserve Scripture’s teaching that
God is love. By exploring the nature of believers’ union with Christ, we discover not only the
justice of penal substitution, but also the love inherent in it. Specifically, the love displayed in
penal substitution becomes more apparent when considering Scripture’s description of those
redeemed by Christ’s sacrifice as (collectively) the bride of Christ. Paul wrote to the Corinthians
that he “betrothed you to one husband, to present you as a pure virgin to Christ” (2 Cor. 11:2).
To the Ephesians, he wrote that Christ sanctified the church “so that he might present the church
to himself in splendor . . . holy and without blemish” (Eph. 5:27). Paul then applies Genesis 2’s
definition of marriage to the relationship between Jesus and the church: “‘Therefore a man shall
leave his father and mother and hold fast to his wife, and the two shall become one flesh.’ This
mystery is profound, and I am saying that it refers to Christ and the church” (Eph. 5:31-32).
While Paul may provide Scripture’s most express articulation of this bridal paradigm, he is not
alone. Isaiah prophesied the following about eschatological Israel: “For your Maker is your
husband . . . the Holy One of Israel is your Redeemer” (Isa. 54:5). John even describes the
wedding feast of the Lamb in Revelation (Rev. 19:6-8). Jesus, in alluding to this coming day,
emphasized that it reflects not only his desire (Jn. 17:24), but the Father’s will: “The kingdom of
44
Chalke, “The Redemption of the Cross,” 42-43.
12
heaven may be compared to a king who gave a wedding feast for his son” (Matt. 22:2).
As Jeffery et al. note, Martin Luther pointed to the New Testament’s depiction of
believers as the bride of Christ in explaining how Christ could take the penalty for their sin: 45
“[W]hatever Christ has, these are the believing soul’s own; whatever the soul has, becomes
Christ’s own.” 46 This is because, in the words of Genesis 2, “the two shall become one flesh.”
Thus, when Jesus “entered once for all into the holy place . . . by means of his own blood” (Heb.
9:12), that blood belonged not just to him, but to those chosen “in him before the foundation of
the world” (Eph. 1:4). We are joined to him in Spirit and, while it is indeed a great mystery, we
shall also become one flesh. This explains how Paul can write in Romans that believers “have
been united with [Christ] in a death like his” (Rom. 6:3-5). His death is our death. His
righteousness is our righteousness (Rom. 4:22-24). As Luther wrote, “Now is this not a happy
wedding celebration, when the rich, noble, pious bridegroom Christ takes the poor, despised, evil
whore in marriage, absolves her of all wickedness, and adorns her with all goodness?” 47 Indeed!
This deeper explanation of believers’ union with Christ answers the concern that penal
substitution plays into a wrong view of God as an angry old man. For while Christ voluntarily
laid down his life, it was not his plan alone but the Father’s will—it was the Father who gave his
only Son for believers (Eph. 3:7-12; Jn. 3:16) and the Father who gave believers as a bride to his
Son. It is the Father who plans the wedding. Thus, penal substitution proves not just that Christ
loves believers, but also that the Father loves believers, reinforcing that believers can trust
wholeheartedly in the Father’s love. As Paul asks, “He who did not spare his own Son but gave
him up for us all, how will he not also with him graciously give us all things?” (Rom. 8:32).
Martin Luther, On the Freedom of a Christian, ed. and trans. Tryntje Helfferich (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing,
2013), 26.
46
Ibid.
47
Ibid.
45
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Conclusion
Were Jesus merely a man, many of the objections to penal substitution would carry great
weight. How could a mere man pay the sin debt of a multitude of people? Even if he could, how
would justice be served by substituting an innocent man to die in place of a guilty multitude? But
Jesus is not merely a man; he is the God-man—an infinite being whose death is of infinite value,
a worthy offering for the infinite debt of a multitude. Moreover, he is not an unrelated party to
the transaction; he is united with all those who believe. As a result of that union, his sacrifice
inures to their benefit. While this is indeed a great mystery, it is no less a reality.
The concept that God’s wrath must be propitiated may be at odds with—even repugnant
to—the currently popular concept of God as an affirming, nonjudgmental figure. While this
attitude may seem relatively new, it is actually ancient. Six hundred years before Christ, God
warned his people not to listen to prophets who say to the person “who stubbornly follows his
own heart . . . ‘No disaster shall come upon you’” (Jer. 23:17). Such words of peace when there
is no peace provides the hearer no true security; it brings only superficial healing (Jer. 6:14).
Penal substitution, in contrast, offers true security because the believer knows the penalty
due his sin has been satisfied by the only one able to do so. This is why Jonathan Edwards could
boldly state that, for the believer, justice no longer demands his punishment, but his salvation:
“the believer may demand eternal life, because it has been merited by Christ, by a merit of
condignity. So is it contrived that that justice that seemed to require man’s destruction, now
requires his salvation.” 48 This, of course, has nothing to do with the merit of the believer, but
with the merit of Christ, who secured a bride by satisfying justice’s demands against her. Her
salvation, then, “is now absolutely due to him [i.e., Christ] as the reward of his suffering.” 49
48
49
Jonathan Edwards, The Works of Jonathan Edwards Vol. II-I (Woodstock, ON: Devoted Publishing, 2017), 235.
Shedd, 725.
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