de Beauvo l r. From The Second Sex
,...d. "Don't panic, We're going to
But they were
a terrifying sensation, an endless
b\ the tangle of ropes and balloon
arms and legs like a starfish, and felt
L The sea rush ed up at her with
n falling forever. It was over in an
•
179
"Destroving ourselves'" For a second, Lizzie co uldn't breathe, It had
taken hou rs for the city/entity to cOllle to terms with the alien concepts
she'd dumped upon it. I luman beings thought and lived at a mueh slower
rate th an it did, How long would those hours be, translated into human
time) 1\lonths) learS' Centuries' It had spo ken of scars and rebuilding.
That didn't sound good at all,
Then the robofish accelerated. so quickly th at Lizzie almost lost her
grip. The dark waters were whirling around her, and unsee n Reeks of frozen
material were bouncing from her helmet. She laughed w ildly, Suddenly, she
felt gre(lt~
"Bring it on," she said, '']'11 take everyt hing you've go t."
It was going to be one hell of a ride,
of balloon a nd harness, elrew her
_loaned herself perpendicular to
the surface of the sea, sending enorIt knocked th e breath out of he r.
Critical Contexts for Alien Encounters
rna\be she'd broken a fell' ribs,
Qentle ,'oice sa id. "YOll gave us so
tnmnd her. The light was fading,
ed us a universe infinitely larger
Simone de Beauvoir
From The Second Sex
(1949)
"'mi:ll~gto\\ard her in a burst of s il ver
robot fish swam into them, I Ier nnConsuela had used to wrestle the
bani that she th ought for an instant
ir sockets, T hen the robonsh was
aD sbe cou ld do to keep her grip,
larik
. It \\ill no t be easy."
,he wasn't at all sure she could, But
,he \las almost astride the speede returned, She cou ld do this, It
the Au and aced her gYJl1nast ics
on: It was just a matter of grit and
its about he r, "Listen," she said.
. There must be thi ngs you know
knew how m uch thought. "Some
French philosopher and social critic Simone de Beauvoir (1908-1996) wrote on
many issues, but she is best known for her influence on the development of
modern feminist theory. In The Second Sex, de Bea uvoir builds on ideas suggested by Carl Jung, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, and Jean-Paul Sartre that
the self defines itself through contrast with an Other, and examines history,
mythology, li terature, and biology to show the ways in which Woman has been
cast in this role.
For de Beauvoir, gender is largely a social construction. Like Jung, she sees
t he definition of the Other as a process of projedion whereby the dominant
part creates a mirror image of itself, investing the Other (in this case, the
female) with all the rejected or despised qualities it wishes to deny in itself.
This process is reflected not only in gender but in all relations between a powerful, socially normative identity and a marginalized party, incl ud ing racism.
De Beauvoir is opposed to "essentialism," the belief that women (or any
group) have innate charaderistics defined by nature, Rejecting th e idea of biological destiny, she argues that femininity is not a biological given but a social
construdion. As an existentialist, she believes in the malleability of human
nature and the freedom of the individual to create his or her own identity. As a
corollary, she believes that women hold some responsibility for reshaping their
In.- A pause. "But in the long run,
fill heal, You will rebuild, 11,e chances
thin the lim its of acceptability."
Translatcd
b~
II.
~
I.
Parshlt'~.
180
•
Alien Encounters: Critical Contexts
role. While groups may be oppressed, she believes, individuals always have
choices.
De Beauvoir's ideas about the psychodynamics underlying interactions
between the sexes form a useful analytical tool for examining the role of the
alien as Other in sf.
AUTHOR'S INTRODUCTION
For a long time I have hesitated to write a book on woman . The subject is
irritating, especially to v/omen; and it is not new. Enough ink has been
spilled in the quarrelling over feminism, now practically over, and perhaps
we should say no more about it. It is still talked about, however, fo r the
vo luminous nonsense uttered during the last century seems to have done
little to il luminate the problem. After all, is there a problem? And if so,
wha t is it? Are the re wome n, really) Most assuredly the theory of the eternal feminine still has its adherents who will whisper in your ear: "Even in
Russia wo men still are women"; and other erudite persons - sometimes
the very same - say with a Sigh: "\r\foman is losing her way, woman is lost."
One \vonders if women stlll exist, if they will always exist, whether or not
it is desirable that they should. wha t place they occupy in this world, what
their place should be. "\oVhat has become of women?" was asked recentl y
in an ephemeral magazine . 1
But firs t we must ask: what is a woman? ;'Tot{l 1//ulier in lItero," says one,
\voman is a \".Iomb." But in speaking of certain women, connoisseurs declare
that they are not \-\'omen, although they are equipped with a uterus like the
rest. All agree in recognizing the fact that females exist in the human species;
today as always they make up about one half of humanity, And yet we are told
that femininity is in danger; we are exhorted to be women, remain women,
become women. It would appear, then, that everv female human being is not
necessarily a woman; to be so considered she must share in that mysterious
and threatened reality known as femininity. Is this attribute something
secreted by the ovaries? Or is it a Platonic essence, a product of the philosophic imagination e Is a rustling petticoat enough to bring it down to earth)
Although some women try zealously to incarnate this essence, it is hardly
patentable. It is frequently described in vague and dazzling terms that seem
to have been borrowed from the vocabulary of the seers, and indeed in the
times of St. Thomas il was considered an essence as certainly den ned as the
somniferous virtue of the poppy,
But conceptualism has lost ground. The biological and social sciences
no longer adm it the existence of unchangeably fixed entities that determine
given characteristics, such as those ascribed to woman, the Jew, or the Negro.
Science regards any characteristic as a reaction dependent in part upon a
situation. If today fe m ininity no longer exists, then it never existed. But does
the word 1II01lla1t, then, have no specific content' This is stoutly affirmed bv
those who hold to the philosophy of the enlightenment, of rationalism, of
I. Fmllc1lise, dead today.
de Beau
nominaJism; women, to them, are
ignated by the word 1II011711" , Many
to think that there is no longer any
individual still takes herself for a\\'
choanalyzed and th us get rid of thi
WOIIIG/>: TI,e Lost Sex, which in '
Dorothy Parker has written: "I can
as woman. ' ' . My idea is that all
regarded as human beings." But nand the antifemin ists have had no
are not men. Surely woman is, lik~
ration is abstract. The fact is that
singular, separate individual. To d
nal feminine, the black soul, the J
Negroes , women exist today - I
for those concerned, but rather a
knov-m \-Voman \",'riter refused to
photographs especially devoted to
among the men. But in order to
band's influence! Women who
less to masculine consideration
standing on a platform at a boist
fists , in spite of her evident fra -,
ness; but it \vas [or love of a mili
attitude of defiance of many Am
by a sense of their femin inity. In
is enough to demonstrate that h
viduals whose clothes, faces, b .are manifestly different. Perhaps
they are destined to disappear. \\
obviously exist.
If her functioning as a fe
decline also to explain her thw
less \\·e admit, provisiOnally, t
question: what is a woman?
To state the question is, to
The fact that I ask it is in it
notion of writing a book on the
if I wish to define myself, I m
truth must be based all further
ing himself as an individual of
is a man. The terms ma5Ctd-ine
a matter of form, as on legal
2. The Kinsey Report [Alfred C. Kin:
Saunders Co .. 19-18)} is no exception.
Am£:rican men , which is quile a diffetn!
.... texts
hc,.....arr.Ks underlying interactions
;;001 for examini ng the role of the
a book on wo man . T he subject is
is 001 new. Enough ink has been
""" practically over, and perhaps
talked abo ut, however, for the
last century seems to have done
aIL is there a proble m? And if so,
assuredly the theory of the eter"ill whisper in yo ur ear: "Even in
erudite persons - sometimes
is losing her way) woman is lost."
....iU always exist , whether or not
they occupy in thi s world, what
of \~-omen?" was as ked recently
lota nmlier 1.n utero )" says one)
I rf"rt.ain women, connojsseurs declare
are equipped with a uterus like the
females exist in the human species;
half of humanity. And yet we are told
"0l1:ed to be women, remain women)
female human being is not
she m-ust share in that mysterious
Is this attribu te something
essence, a product of the philoenough to bring it down to ea rth?
incarnate this essence, il is hardly
'-ague and dazzling te rms that seem
"',b,,,- of the seers, and indeed in the
essence as certainly defined as the
"'''IV
The biological and social sciences
t;.<Jg'eat,1y fixed entities that determine
to woman, the Jew, or the Negro .
a reaction depe ndent in part upon a
aislS. then it never existed. But does
content? This is stou tly affi rmed by
.p-nJbohtP- nment _of r:H i on~ Ii ~rT). of
de Beau v oir : From The Second Sex
•
181
nominalism; women, to them, are merely the human beings arbitrarily designated by the word lFoman . i\ Iany American \",'omen particularly are prepared
to th ink that there is no longer any place for woman as such; if a backward
individual still takes herself for a woman, her friends advise her to be psychoanalvzed and thus ge t rid of this obsess ion. In regard to a work, Modem
\ \vlIlan: TIle Lost Se...x, which in other respects has its irritating features,
Dorothy Parker has written: "1 cannot be just to books which treat of woman
as 'mman .... i\ Iv idea is that all of us, men as well as wo me n, should be
regarded as human beings ." But nominalism is a rather inadequate doctrine,
and the antifeminis ts h3\'e had no trouble in showing that women simply
are not men. Surely woman is, like man, a human being; but such a declaration is abstract. The fact is that every concrete human being is always a
singular. separate individual. To decline to accep t such notions as the eternal fem inine, the black soul, the Jewish character, is not to deny tha t Jews,
Negroes, \,·omen exist today - this denial does not represen t a liberation
for those concerned, but rather a Right from reality. Some years ago a wellknown \\-oman wri ler refused to permit her portrait to appear in a series of
photographs especially devoted to women write rs; she wished to be counted
among the men. But in order to gain this privilege she made use of her husband's influence! Women who assert that they are men lay claim none the
less to masculine consideration and respect. I recall also a you ng Trotskyrite
standing on a platform at a boisterous meeting and getting ready to use her
fists, in spite of her eviden t fragility. She was denying her femin ine wcakness; but it was for love of a militant male whose equal she wished to be. The
attitude of defiance of many American women proves that they are haunted
by a sense of their femininity. In truth , to go for a walk wit h one's eyes open
is eno ugh to demonstrate that humanity is divided into two classes of individuals whose clothes, faces, bodies, smiles, gaits, interests, and occupations
are manifestly different. Perhaps these differences are superfic ial , perhaps
they are destined to disappear. What is certain is that right now they do most
Obviously exist.
If her functioning as a female is not enough to define woman, if we
decline also to explain her through "the eternal feminine,.' and if neverth eless we admit, provisionally, that \,,-'omen do exist, then \\le must face the
question: \vhat is a woman?
To state the question is, to me, to suggest, at once a preliminary ans\ver.
T he fact that I ask it is in itself significant. A man wo uld never get the
notion of writing a book on the peculiar situatio n of the human male. 2 But
if I wish to define myself, I must first of a ll say: "I am a woma n"; on this
truth must be based all further discussion. A man never begins by presenting himself as an individual of a certain sex; it goes without saying that he
is a man. The terms ·masc1Jli.ne and jelll.i.n.i.1'le are used symmetrica lly only as
a matter of form, as on legal papers. In act uality the rclation of the two
2. The Kinsey Report [Alrred C. Kinsey and others, Se.>:1W1 Belwl·ior ill Ille HUll/till Mille (\V. B.
Saunders Co., 19-18)J is no exception. for it is limited to describing the se.:,,:u31 characteristics of
American men. which is quite a different mailer.
1 82
Al ie n Encounters: Critical Contexts
sexes is not guite li ke that of t\.vo electrical poles, for man rep resents both
the positive and the neutral, as is indicated by the comrnon use of mall to
desi gnate human beings in general; whereas woman re prese nts only the
negative, defined by limiting criteria, without reciprocity, In the mi dst of
an abstract discussion it is vexing to hear a man say: "You think thus and
so because you are a wom'ln"; but I knmv that n1)' only de fense is to repl y:
"I think thus a nd so beca use it is true," thereby removing my subjective self
from the argument. It wou Id be out of the qu estion to reply: "A nd yo u
think the contrary beca use yo u are a man ," for it is und erstood that the fact
of being a man is no pecu liarity. A man is in the ri ght in being a man ; it is
the v\lom3n who is in th e wrong. It amounts to this: just as for th e anc ie nts
there was an absolute ve rtical wi th reference to which the oblique was
defined , so there is an abso lute human t)1Je, th e mascu lin e. Woman has
ovaries, a uteru s; these peculiarities imprison her in her subjectivity, circumscribe her within the limits of her own nature, It is often sa id that she
thinks with her gland s, 1\lla n superbly ignores th e fact tha t hi s anatomy also
includes glands, such as the testicles , and that they sec rete hormones. He
thinks of hi s body as a direct an d normal connection with th e world, which
he believes he apprehends objectively, whereas he regards the body of woman
as a hindrance, a prison , weighed down by everything peculiar to it, "The
female is a femal e by virtu e of a certain lack of qualities"· sai d Aris totle;
"we shou ld regard the female nature as afA icted with a natural defectiveness." And Sl. Tho ma s for his part pronounced woman to be an "imperfect
man ," an "inc idental" be ing, This is symbolized in Genesis where Eve is
depicted as made from what Bossuet called "a supernumerary bone" of Adam .
Thus hum anity is male and mall defines woman not in herse lf but as
relative to him ; she is not regarded as an autonomous being. j\ lichelet writes
·'Woman, the re lative bei ng ..... And Benda is most positive in hi s Roppolt
d' Uriel: "The body of man makes sense in itself quite apart from that of
woman, whereas the latter seems wanting in significance by itself, , . t'vlan
can think of himself without woman. She cannot think of he rse lf without
man.'· And she is simply what man decrees: thus she is ca lled ··the sex,'· by
which is meant th at she appears essentially to th e male as a sexual being,
For him she is sex - absolute sex, no less. She is denned and differentiated
with reference to man and not he with reference to her; she is the incidental, the inessential as opposed to the essential. H e is the Subject, he is the
Absolute - she is th e Other3
3. C, Levinas expresses this idea most explici tly in his essay "li!"IPS et fAurre, "Is there not a case in
\\hil:h otherness, altcrity [(lIterite]. unguestionabl~ marks the nature of a being, as its essence, an
instance of Olherne!>s not consisting purdy and simply in rhc opposition of 1\\0 species of the same
gen us? I think that the feminine represents the cont rary in its absolute sense, this wntr.lriness being
in no Ili!>e affected by an} relation between it and its correlati\(- and thus remaining absoilltel~ other.
Sc..x is not a certain specific difference ... no more is the scxual difference a mere contradiction.
Nor does this difference lie in the duality of two complementary terms, for \110 complementary
terms imply 11 pre-e.xisting \I hole .... Otherness reaches its fuil no\\erinK in the femininc, a term of
the same rank as conscious ness hut of opposite meaning:'
I suppose that Levinas docs not forget that woman . too, is aware of her o\\'n consciousness, or ego.
But it is striking Iha\ he deliber:Hd~ takes a man's point or viC\I, disreg<lrding the reciprocity of sub-
The category of th e Other·
the most primitive societies, in
ex pression of a dua li ty - that
not originally attached to the
upo n any empirica l facts . It is
C hinese thou ght and those of
fe minine e lement was at first
~ Iitra , Uranus-Zeus, Sun-l\loo1
tras ts between Good and Evil. •
God anel Luc ifer. Otherness is
Thus it is that no group e\
settin g up the Other over agai
the same compartment, that is
of all the rest of the passengers
nO l belonging to the vi llage are
country all \,vho inhabit other c'
fo r the anti-Semite, Negroes
are "natives" for colon ists, prof.
Levi ~S trauss) at the end oi
primiti ve soc iet ies, reaches
state of Nature to the state of
b iological relations as a series
and symmetry, whether under
much phenomena to be expl data of social reali ty.'" These
fact human soc iety were simp
and frie ndliness . Things beco
we nnd in consciOllsness itself,
consciou sness; the s ubject can,
himself up as the essential. as'
object.
But the other consciousn
T he native traveling abroad is
a "stranger" by the natives of
wars, festiva ls, trading, treao,
classes tend to deprive th e co
manifest its relativity; willy-nize the reciprocity of their re
has nol been recogn ized be
terms is set up as the sole es·
corre lative a nd defining the Ia
do not dispute male sovereign_
jccI and object. When he writes that"
his dcsniption, wh ich is intended to ~
4. Sec C, Lel'i-Strauss; Les StrilClufi!'S
Strauss for bis kindness in furni shing
used li berally in Part II.
de Beauvo i r : From The Second Sex
poles, fo r man represents both
bv the com mon use of ll1(fll to
~en,as' woma n represents only the
t-llth,)ut rec iprocity. In the midst of
a man say: "You think thus and
that my onl y defense is to reply:
hlne,ret,y removing my subjective self
the question to reply: "And you
- for it is u nde rstood that the fact
is in the ri ght in being a man; it is
to thi s: just as for the ancients
lrefeJ·ence to wh ich the ob lique was
t\lJe, the mascul ine. \!\loman has
"nor·i·lson her in her subjectivity, cirown natu re. It is often said that she
li!!no res the fact that his anatomy also
tha t they secrete hormones. He
connection with the world, which
I,d..,,,,eas he regards the body of woman
bv everythi ng peculiar to it. "The
inck of qualities"· sa id Aristotle:
as affl icted with a natural defective."nounceu v·.'oman to be an "imperfect
in Genesis where Eve is
"a supcrn ume rmy bone·· of Adam.
defines woman not in herself but as
au tonomous being. iVlichelet \vrites
Benda is most positive in h is Rapport
in itself qu ite apart from that of
in signi ficance by itself ... 1\ Ian
She cannot thi nk of herself without
....rrees: thus she is called ··the sex," by
to the ma le as a sexual being.
"'I''''es·''s''. 'SYhe is defined and differentiated
refere nce to her; she is the inc idenessential. He is the Subject. he is the
in his eSS:ly TeUips Cl r ;\r/lrc. "Is there not a casc in
marks the nlture of a being. as its esscnce. an
in t he opposition of 1\\0 species of the Sllme
1.0,"""" in its absolute ~cnsc. this contr<lriness bemg
correlative and thus remaining absolutely other.
is the sexual difFerence a mere contradiction ....
complementary terms. for t\~O ~o.mplementllry
reaches its full flowering in the \cllllnllle. a term of
meaning."
\00, is aware of her own c:onscioLlsncss. o~ ego
point of vic\\. disregarding. the reciprocity 01 sub·
183
The category of the Other is as primordial as consciousness itse lf. In
the most primith'e societies, in the most ancient myt hologies, one fi nds the
expression of a dualitv - tha t of the Self and the Orher. This duality was
not originally attached to the di\·ision of the sexes: it was no t depende nt
upon any empirical facts. It is revealed in such works as that of Grane t on
Chinese thought and those of Dumezil on the East Indies an d Rome. The
feminine element was at first no more involved in such pairs as Varu na1\ litra. Uranus-Zeus, Sun- I\ loon, and Day-Night than it was in the contrasts between Good and Evil, luck-y and unlucky auspices, righ t and left,
God and Lucifer. Otherness is a fundamental category of human thought.
T hus it is that no group ever sets itself up as the One without at once
setting Lip the Other over against itself. If three travelers chance to occupy
the same compartment, that is enough to make vaguely hos tile "others" ou t
of all the rest of the passengers on the train . In small-to\Vn eyes a ll persons
not belonging to the \1l1age are "strangers" and suspect; to the native of a
country all \\·ho inhabit other countries are "foreigners"; Jews are "differen t"
for the anti-Semite, Negroes are "inferior" for American rac ists. aborigines
are "natives" for colonists, proletarians are the "Iower class" fo r the privileged.
Levi-Strauss, at the end of a profound work on the various forms of
primitive societies, rcaches the following conclusion: "Passage from the
state of Nature to the state of Culture is marked by man's ability to view
biological relations as a series of contrasts; duality, alternation, opposi tion,
and symmetry, whether under definite or vague forms, constitute not so
much phenomena to be explained as fundamental and im mediate ly given
data of socia l reality. ··4 T hesc phenomena would be incomprehensible if in
fac t human society were simply a M itseill or fellows hip based on solidarity
and friendliness. Things become clear, on the contrary) if, following H egel,
we find in consciousness itself a fundamental hos til ity toward every other
consciousness; the subject can be posed only in being opposed - he sets
himself up as the essential, as opposed to the other, the inessential, the
object.
But the other consciousness, the other ego, sets up a reCiprocal claim .
T he native trave ling abroad is shocked to nnd himself in turn regarded as
a "stranger" by the na tives of neighboring coumries. As a matte r of fact,
wars, festivals, trading, trea ties. and contests among tribes, nations, and
classes tend to deprive the concept Other of its absolute sense and to make
manifest its relativity; willy-nilly, individuals and groups arc forced to realize the reciprocity of the ir relations . How is it, then, that this rec iprocity
has not been recogn ized between the sexes, that one of the contrasting
terms is set up as the sale essential, denying any relativity in rega rd to its
correlative and defini ng the la tter as pu re otherness? "Vhy is it that women
do not disp ute male sovereignty? N o subject wi ll readi ly vol untee r to become
ject :.Ind object. When he writes that woman is mystery. he implies Ihat she is mystel)' for man . T hus
his description. \Ihich is intended to be objecti\'e. is in fact an assertion of masl:uiine privilege.
4. Sec C. Levi-Strauss ; Le$ Structurcs {fielacnlC/ires de 1(1 pHrenti. j\ ly thanks are due to C. Levi·
Strauss for his kindncss in furnishing me \Iith the proofs of his work, which, among others. I have
used liber<lll~ in Pari [I.
184
•
A l ien Encounters: Crit i cal Contexts
the object, the inessential; it is not the Other who, in defining himself as
the Other, establ ishes the One. The O ther is posed as such by the One in
defin ing himself as the One. But if the O ther is no t to rega in the status of
bei ng the O ne, he must be subm issive enough to accept this alien point of
view. \i\1hence come th is sub mission in the case of won1an? .
The reason for this is that women lack concrete means for organizi ng
themselves into a unit which can stand face to face with the correlative
uni t. They have no past, no history, no religion of their own; and they have
no such sol idarity of work and interest as that of the proletariat. They are
not even promiscuously herded together jn the way that creates community
feeling among the Ame rican Negroes, the ghetto Jews, the workers of SaintDenis, or the ractory hands of Renau lt. They live dispersed among the males,
attached through res idence, housework, economic condition, and social
sta nding to certain men - fa thers or husbands - more firmly than they are
to other women. If they belong to the bourgeoisie, they feel solidarity wi th men
of that class, not \vith proletarian women: jf they are white, their allegiance is
to \\-, hite men, not to Negro women. The proletariat can propose to massacre
the ruling class, and a sufficiently fanatical Jew or Negro might dream of getti ng sole possession of the atomic bomb and making humani ty wholly Jewis h
or black; but woman cannot evcn dream of exterminating the males. The bond
that un ites her to her oppressors is not comparable to any other. The division
of the sexes is a biological fact, not an event in human history Male and
fe male stand opposed "othin a primordial Milsein , and woman has not broke n it. T he couple is a fundamental unity \\oth its two halves riveted together,
and the cleavage or society along the line of sex is impossible. Here is to be
found the basic trait of woman; she is the Other in a totality of which the two
components are necessal)' to onc another..
But it is doubtless impossible to approach any human problem with a
mind free from bias. The way in which questions are put, the points of
view assumed, presuppose a relativity of interest; all characteristics imp ly
values, and every objective description. so called, implies an ethical backgro und. Rather than attempt to conceal principles more or less definitely
impli ed, it is better to state them openly at the beginning. This will make
it unnecessary to specify o n every page in just wha t sense one uses such
words as sUFerior, illferior, better, worse, progress, reaction, and the li ke. If
we su rvey some or the works on woman, we note that one of the po ints of
view most Frequently adopted is that of the public good, the general interest; an d one always means by th is the benefit of society as one wishes it to
be maintained or established. For our part. we hold that the only public
good is that which assures the private good of the citizens ; we shall pass
judgment on institut ions according to their effectiveness in giving concrete
opportunities to individuals. But we do not confuse the idea of private
interest with that of happiness, although that is another common point of
view. Are not women of the harem more happy than women vmers? Is not
the housekeeper happier than the working-woman) It is not too clear just
what the word happy really means and still less what true values it may
mas k. There is no possibility of measuring the happiness of others, and it
is always easy to desc ri be as ha
place them.
J n particu lar those who are
nou nced happy on the pretext th
notion we reject, fo r our pers
subjec t plays his part as such s
serve as a mode of tra nscenden
tinual reaching ou t to\·vard other
ent existence other than its expa
time transcende nce fa lls back imo
dation of existence into the "en-sol
conditions - and of liberty into 0
represents a moral fa ult if the s
him, it spel ls frust ration and opp'
Every ind ividua l concerned to j
involves an undefined need to
projects.
Now, what pec uliarly sign
a free and au tonomo us being
finds herself li ving in a \,vorId \\
of the Othe r. T hey pro pose to s:
immanence since her transce
aa nscencled by another ego (
The drama of woman lies in this
tions of every subject (ego) - "
and the compu lsions of a situati
can a human being in woman"s s:open to her? Wh ic h are block,
a state or dependency? What c·
can they be overcome? These
;ould fain throw some light.
ru nes or the individ ual as deli
of liberty.
:;; De Seauvoir is borrowing this tenn
~ '-in-itself") and pour-wi ("for-itsdl
be applied 10 objects as well as h ~
msciousncss. [Ed.]
i Cont exts
the Other who, in defining himself as
Other is posed as such by the One in
the Other is not to regain the status of
enough to accept this alien point of
in the case of woman? .
lack concrete means for organizing
stand face to face with the correlative
no reUgion of their O\,v n; and they have
as that of the proletariat. They are
in the way that creates community
the ghetto Jews, the workers of SaintThey live dispersed among the males,
""."""k, economic condition, and social
husbands - more firmly than they are
bourgeoisie, they feel solidarity with men
tv,neln; if they are white, their allegiance is
pnoletar·iat can propose to massacre
In,atlical Jew or Negro might dream of getand making humanity wholly Jewish
of exterminating the males. The bond
not comparable to any other. The division
an event in human history Nlale and
pIlOf<lIa l Mitsein, and woman has not brounity with its two halves riveted together,
line of sex is impossible. Here is to be
is the Other in a totality of which the two
to approach any human problem with a
which queslions are put, the poin ts of
of interest; all characteristics imply
so called, implies an ethical backprinciples more or less defll1itely
openly at the beginning. This will make
page in just what sense one uses such
1I'0rse, progress, reaction, and the like. If
we note that one of the points of
of the public good, the general interthe benefit of society as one wishes it to
our part, we hold that the only public
good of the citizens; we shall pass
to their effectiveness in giving concrete
do not confuse the idea of private
.nno,ug:ll that is another common point of
more happy than women voters? Is not
wo rking-woman? It is not 100 clear just
and still less v,ihat true values it may
1Jl"asunng th e happiness of others, and it
de Beauvolr: From The Second Sex
1 85
is alv\lays easy to describe as happy the situation in v,lhich one wishes to
p lace them.
In particular those who are condemned to stagnation are often pronounced happy on the pretext that happiness consists in being at rest. This
notion v,'e reject, for our perspective is that of existentialist ethics. Every
subjec t plays his part as such specifically through exploi ts or projects that
serve as a mode of transcendence; he ach ieves liberty only through a conti nual reaching out toward other liberties. There is no justification for present existence other than its expansion into an indefinitely open future. Every
time transcendence falls back into immanence, stagnation, there is a degradation of existence into the "en-sotS - the brutish life of subjection to given
conditions - and of liberty into constraint and contingence. This downfall
represents a moral fault iF the subject consents to it; if it is inflicted upon
him , it spells frustration and oppression. In both cases it is an absolute evi l.
Every individual concerned to justify his existence feels that his existence
involves an undefined need to transcend himself, to engage in freely chosen
projects.
Now, what peculiarly signalizes the situation of \'voman is that she a free and autonomous being like all human creatures - nevertheless
fin ds herself living in a world where men compel her to assume the status
of the Other. They propose to stabilize her as object and to doom her to
immanence since her transcendence is to be overshadowed and forever
transcended by anothe r ego (conscience ) which is essential and sovereign .
The drama of woman lies in this conflict between the fu ndamental aspirations of every subject (ego) - who always regards the self as the essentialand the compulsions of a situation in \vhich she is the inessential. HO\v
can a h uman being in woman's situation attain fulfillment? \A/hat roads are
open to her? \iVhich are blocked? How can independence be recovered in
a state of dependency? \Nhat circumstances limit woman's liberty an d how
can they be overcome? These are the fundamental questions on which I
would fain thrm'\' some light. This means that I am interested in the fortunes of the individual as defined not in terms of happiness but in terms
of liberty.
5. Dc BC<1uvoir is borrmving this term from Sartre. Sanre distinguishes between two types of being,
en-soi (" in -itself ") and pour-soi (" for-ilself") Being in-itself refers to the state of simply exist ing and
can be applied to objects as well as human beings, while being for-itself is distinguished by human
consciousness. [Ed.]