TANADA VS TUVERA
G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985
Facts
Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in Section 6,
Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution, as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable
must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of
mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official
Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive
orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders.
Issue
Whether or not the Court's declaration of invalidity applies to P.D.s which had been enforced or
implemented prior to their publication.
Rulings
Yes. The Court declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been published,
shall have no force and effect.
In Pesigan vs. Angeles, the Court, through Justice Ramon Aquino, ruled that "publication is necessary to
apprise the public of the contents of penal regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons
affected thereby. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the
maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat."
Here in this case, the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that of the
presidential decrees sought by petitioners to be published in the Official Gazette, only Presidential Decrees
Nos. 1019 to 1030, inclusive, 1278, and 1937 to 1939, inclusive, have not been so published. Without such notice
and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat."
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished
presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding
force and effect.
DE ROY VS CA
G.R. No. 80718 January 29, 1988
Facts
The firewall of a burned-out building owned by petitioners collapsed and destroyed the tailoring shop
occupied by the family of private respondents, resulting in injuries to private respondents and the death of
Marissa Bernal, a daughter. Private respondents had been warned by petitioners to vacate their shop in
view of its proximity to the weakened wall but the former failed to do so
The RTC rendered judgment finding petitioners guilty of gross negligence and awarding damages to
private respondents.
On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals in a decision
promulgated on August 17, 1987, a copy of which was received by petitioners on August 25, 1987. On
September 9, 1987, the last day of the fifteen-day period to file an appeal, petitioners filed a motion for
extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration, which was eventually denied by the appellate court in
the Resolution of September 30, 1987. Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration on September 24,
1987 but this was denied in the Resolution of October 27, 1987.
This Court finds that the Court of Appeals did not commit a grave abuse of discretion when it denied
petitioners' motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration, directed entry of judgment and
denied their motion for reconsideration. It correctly applied the rule laid down in Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc.
v. Japzon, G.R. No. 70895, August 5, 1985,138 SCRA 461, that the fifteen-day period for appealing or for
filing a motion for reconsideration cannot be extended.
Issue
Whether or not the in Habaluyas case may be apply to the current case considering the non-publication of
this decision to the Official Gazette.
Rulings
No, there is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decisions in the Official Gazette before they
can be binding and as a condition to their becoming effective. It is the bounden duty of counsel as lawyer
in active law practice to keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court particularly where issues have
been clarified, consistently reiterated, and published in the advance reports of Supreme Court decisions
(G. R. s) and in such publications as the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and law journals.
Wherefore, the Court resolved to DENY the instant petition for lack of merit.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V QUE POLAY
G.R. NO. L-6791
Facts
Que Po Lay is appealing from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, finding him guilty of
violating Central Bank Circular No. 20 in connection with section 34 of Republic Act No. 265. The charge
was that the appellant who was in possession of foreign exchange consisting of U.S. dollars, U.S. checks and
U.S. money orders amounting to about USD7,000 failed to sell the same to the Central Bank through its
agents within one day following the receipt of such foreign exchange as required by Circular No. 20. the
appeal is based on the claim that said circular No. 20 was not published in the Official Gazette prior to
the act or omission imputed to the appellant, and that consequently, said circular had no force and
effect.
Issue
Whether or not the violation of Circular 20 is punishable without its publication
Rulings
No, on the general principle and theory that before the public is bound by its contents, especial y its penal
provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the people official y and specifically
informed of said contents and its penalties.
Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank is not a statute or law but being issued for the implementation of the
law authorizing its issuance, it has the force and effect of law according to settled jurisprudence
according to U.S. vs. Tupasi Molina.
In the present case, although circular No. 20 of the Central Bank was issued in the year 1949, it was not
published until November 1951, that is, about 3 months after appellant's conviction of its violation. It is clear
that said circular, particularly its penal provision, did not have any legal effect and bound no one until its
publication in the Official Gazzette or after November 1951. In other words, appellant could not be held liable
for its violation, for it was not binding at the time he was found to have failed to sell the foreign exchange
in his possession thereof.
Therefore, the appellant is not guilty of the violation.
National Power Corporation v Pinatubo Commercial
G.R. No. 176006
Facts
NPC Circular No. 99-755 dated October 8, 1999 set the guidelines in the "disposal of scrap aluminum
conductor steel-reinforced or ACSRs in order to decongest and maintain good housekeeping in NPC
installations and to generate additional income for NPC."
In April 2003, NPC published an invitation for the pre-qualification of bidders for the public sale of its scrap
ACSR7 cables. Respondent Pinatubo Commercial, submitted a pre-qualification form to NPC. Pinatubo,
however, was informed in a letter dated April 29, 2003 that its application for pre-qualification had been
denied.8 Petitioner asked for reconsideration but NPC denied it.
Pinatubo then filed a petition in the RTC for the annulment of NPC Circular No. 99-75, with a prayer for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. Pinatubo argued that
the circular was unconstitutional as it violated the due process and equal protection clauses of the
Constitution, and ran counter to the government policy of competitive public bidding.
Issue
Whether NPC Circular No. 99-75 must be published
Rulings
No, NPC Circular No. 99-75 did not have to be published since it was merely an internal rule or regulation.
In the case of Tanada, Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating
only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is
publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the
rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.
In this case NPC did not purport to enforce or implement an existing law but was merely a directive issued
by the NPC President to his subordinates to regulate the proper and efficient disposal of scrap ACSRs to
qualified bidders. All these guidelines were addressed to the NPC personnel involved in the bidding and
award of scrap ACSRs. It did not, in any way, affect the rights of the public in general or of any other
person not involved in the bidding process. Assuming it affected individual rights, it did so only remotely,
indirectly and incidentally.
NERI VS SENATE COMMITTEE
Facts
On September 26, 2007, petitioner appeared before respondent Committees and testified for about
eleven (11) hours on matters concerning the National Broadband Project (the "NBN Project"), a project
awarded by the Department of Transportation and Communications ("DOTC") to Zhong Xing
Telecommunications Equipment ("ZTE"). Petitioner disclosed that then Commission on Elections ("COMELEC")
Chairman Benjamin Abalos offered him P200 Mil ion in exchange for his approval of the NBN Project. He
further narrated that he informed President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo ("President Arroyo") of the bribery
attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when probed further on President
Arroyo and petitioner’s discussions relating to the NBN Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking
"executive privilege."
Respondent Committees found petitioner’s explanations unsatisfactory. Without responding to his request for
advance notice of the matters that he should stil clarify, they issued the Order dated January 30, 2008;
In Re: P.S. Res. Nos. 127,129,136 & 144; and privilege speeches of Senator Lacson and Santiago (all on the
ZTE-NBN Project), citing petitioner in contempt of respondent Committees and ordering his arrest and
detention at the Office of the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms until such time that he would appear and give
his testimony.
Issue
Whether or not the Petitioner has the right to invoke the Executive Privilege.
Rulings
Yes, petitioner is an executive official under the direct control and supervision of the Chief Executive. Why
punish petitioner for contempt when he was merely directed by his superior? The Purpose of Executive
Privilege, is to assure that the nation wil receive the benefit of candid, objective and untrammeled
communication and exchange of information between the President and his/her advisers in the process of
shaping or forming policies and arriving at decisions in the exercise of the functions of the Presidency
under the Constitution.
The Court is not unmindful of the fact that the Executive and the Legislature are political branches of
government. In a free and democratic society, the interests of these branches inevitably clash, but each
must treat the other with official courtesy and respect.
PIMENTEL V SENATE
FACTS
Petitioners assail the non-publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole. Respondent
counters that publication is not necessary because the Senate Committee of the Whole merely adopted
the Rules of the Ethics Committee which had been published in the Official Gazette on 23 March 2009.
Respondent alleges that there is only one set of Rules that governs both the Ethics Committee and the
Senate Committee of the Whole.
ISSUE
Whether publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole is required for their effectivity.
RULINGS
The duly published rules of procedure is categorical, in accordance with Section 21, Article VI of the
Constitution. It is incumbent upon the Senate to publish the rules of its legislative inquiries in each Congress
or otherwise make the published rules clearly state that the same shall be effective in the subsequent
Congresses or until they are amended or repealed to sufficiently put public on notice. The Constitution
does not require publication of the internal rules of the House or Senate, unless such rules expressly provide
for their publication before the rules can take effect.In this case, even if publication is not required under
the Constitution, publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole is required because the
Rules expressly mandate their publication.
Therefore, the Respondent cannot dispense with the publication requirement just because the Rules of
the Ethics Committee had already been published in the Official Gazette.
VALEROSO VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 164815
Facts
Valeroso was charged with violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866, committed as follows:
That on or about the 10th day of July, 1996, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused without any
authority of law, did then and there wil fully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his/her possession and under
his/her custody and control
One (1) cal. 38 "Charter Arms" revolver bearing serial no. 52315 with five (5) live ammo.
without first having secured the necessary license/permit issued by the proper authorities.
When arraigned, Valeroso pleaded "not guilty."
Issue
WON the Respondent violates the substantial rights of the Petitioner.
Rulings
Yes, Valeroso’s substantive right was violated. Under the Sec. 2, Art. 3 of the 1987 Constitution, the Police
officers violated the right of a person against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Because a warrantless search is in derogation of a constitutional right, peace officers who conduct it
cannot invoke regularity in the performance of official functions. the fundamental right of an individual
against unreasonable searches and seizures, the Constitution succinctly declares in Article III, Section
3(2), that "any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible in
evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.
The Court values liberty and wil always insist on the observance of basic constitutional rights as a
condition sine qua non against the awesome investigative and prosecutory powers of the government.
Therefore, Sr. Insp. Jerry Valeroso is hereby ACQUITTED of il egal possession of firearm and ammunition.
PNB v OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
FACTS
Private Respondent a buyer of a property at a foreclosure sale dispossess prior purchasers on installment
of individual lots therein, or compel them to pay again for the lots which they previously bought from the
defaulting mortgagor-subdivision developer, on the theory that P.D. 957, "The Subdivision and Condominium
Buyers' Protective Decree", is not applicable to the mortgage contract in question, the same having been
executed prior to the enactment of P.D. 957?
ISSUE
WON the retroactive application of the P.D. 957 would violate the impairment clause
RULINGS
No, while P.D. 957 did not expressly provide for retroactivity in its entirety, yet the same can be plainly
inferred from the unmistakable intent of the law to protect innocent lot buyers from scheming subdivision
developers. The real estate mortgage in the above cited case, although constituted in 1975 and outside
the beneficial aegis of P.D. 957, was struck down by the Court of Appeals which found in favor of subdivision
lot buyers when the rights of the latter clashed with the mortgagee bank's right to foreclose the
property. The Court of Appeals in that case upheld the decision of the trial court declaring the real
estate mortgage as null and void.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE V PHILIPPINE HEALTH CARE PROVIDER
FACTS
Before the effectivity of E.O. No. 273, the Philippine Health Care Providers, Inc., herein the respondent wrote
the CIR (Petitioner) inquiring whether the services it provides to the participants in its health care program
are exempt from the payment of the VAT. On June 8, 1988 the Petitioner answered that the respondent
is exempted from the VAT Coverage and was confirmed by Regional Director.
On January 1, 1996 Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7716 (Expanded VAT or E-VAT Law) took effect amending
further the National Internal Revenue of 1977. Then on January 1, 1998, R.A. No. 8424. This new Tax Code
substantial y adopted and reproduced the provisions of E.O. No. 273 on VAT and R.A. No. 7716 on E-VAT.
On October 1, 1999, the BIR sent respondent a Preliminary Assessment Notice for deficiency in its payment
of the VAT and documentary stamp taxes (DST) for taxable years 1996 and 1997.
The Respondent filed another protest questioning the assessment notices, however it was not answered.
Hence, on September 21, 2000, respondent filed with the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) a petition for
review.
ISSUE
Whether or not the VAT Ruling No. 231-88 exempting respondent from payment of VAT has retroactive
application.
RULING
The CTA found that there is no showing that respondent "deliberately committed mistakes or omitted
material facts" when it obtained VAT Ruling No. 231-88 from the BIR. In sustaining the CTA, the Court of
Appeals found that "the failure of respondent to refer to itself as a health maintenance organization is
not an indication of bad faith or a deliberate attempt to make false representations." As "the term
health maintenance organization did not as yet have any particular significance for tax purposes,"
respondent's failure "to include a term that has yet to acquire its present definition and significance
cannot be equated with bad faith."
The term "health maintenance organization" was first recorded in the Philippine statute books only upon
the passage of "The National Health Insurance Act of 1995" (Republic Act No. 7875). Section 4 (o) (3)
thereof defines a health maintenance organization as "an entity that provides, offers, or arranges for
coverage of designated health services needed by plan members for a fixed prepaid premium." Under this
law, a health maintenance organization is one of the classes of a "health care provider.
"D.M. Consunji V CA
FACTS
November 2, 1990, Jose Juego, a construction worker of D. M. Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from the Renaissance
Tower, Pasig City to his death. He was crushed to death when the platform he was then on board and
performing work, fell. And the falling of the platform was due to the removal or getting loose of the pin which
was merely inserted to the connecting points of the chain block and platform but without a safety lock.
On May 9, 1991, Jose Juego’s widow, Maria, filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig a complaint for
damages against the deceased’s employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc. The employer raised, among other defenses,
the widow’s prior availment of the benefits from the State Insurance Fund.
ISSUE
Whether or not Mrs. Juego has waived her right on filing a Civil Case after she had availed the benefits
of ECC.
RULING
No, Mrs. Juego did not knew of the remedies available to her when the claim before the ECC was filed. In
short, she did not lose her right to file civil action for the damages against the Petitioner.
In the Floresca ruling a claimant cannot simultaneously pursue recovery under the Labor Code and
prosecute an ordinary course of action under the Civil Code. The claimant, by his choice of one remedy, is
deemed to have waived the other.
However, herein this case, Mrs. Juego show lack of knowledge of a fact that nullifies the election of a
remedy is the basis for the exception in Floresca. Article 3 is not applicable since ignorance of the law is
applicable only to mandatory and prohibitory law, and choosing remedies is neither of the two.
Wherefore, her ignorance thereof cannot be held against her.
CUI V ARELLANO UNIVERSITY
FACTS
Plaintiff finished his law studies in the defendant university up to and including the first semester of the
fourth year. During all the time he was studying law in defendant university was awarded scholarship grants,
for scholastic merit, so that his semestral tuition fees were returned to him after the ends of semester
and when his scholarship grants were awarded to him. The sum of P1,033.87 amount of the plaintiff was
awarded to him by the defendant. After graduating to the defendant’s law school, he applied to take bar
examination. To secure permission to take the bar he needed the transcripts of his records in
defendant Arellano University. However, the plaintiff refused to give him the transcript until he paid back
the P 10,033.87 which defendant refunded to him as above stated. As he could not take the bar
examination without those transcripts, plaintiff paid to defendant the said sum under protest. This is the
sum which plaintiff seeks to recover from defendant in this case. Before defendant awarded to plaintiff
the scholarship grants as above stated, he was made to sign the following contract covenant and
agreement stating that he waive my right to transfer to another school without having refunded to the
University (defendant) the equivalent of the scholarship cash.
ISSUE
The validity of Mr. Cui’s contract with the Respondent waiving his right to transfer to another school
without refunding the latter the equivalent of his scholarship in cash.
RULINGS
The contract is null and void. The contract entered by the Petitioner and the Respondent does not
pass upon the validity of said Memorandum No. 38.
In accordance with, Sec. 5 Art. 14 of the Constitution on giving free scholarship to gifted children it does
not require scholars to reimburse the corresponding value of the scholarships if they transfer to other
schools. Scholarship are awarded in recognition of merit not to keep outstanding students in school to
bolster its prestige. In the understanding of that university scholarships award is a business
scheme designed to increase the business potential of an education institution.
The practice of awarding scholarships to attract students and keep them in school is not good customs
nor has it received some kind of social and practical confirmation except in some private institutions as in
Arellano University. In these institutions scholarships are granted not to attract and to keep bril iant
students in school for their propaganda mine but to reward merit or help gifted students in whom society
has an established interest or a first lien.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and another one shall be entered sentencing
the defendant to pay to the plaintiff
MECANO V COA
FACTS
Petitioner is a Director II of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). He was hospitalized for cholecystitis
from March 26, 1990 to April 7, 1990, on account of which he incurred medical and hospitalization expenses,
the total amount of which he is claiming from the COA.
On May 11, 1990, in a memorandum to the NBI Director, Alfredo S. Lim (Director Lim, for brevity), he requested
reimbursement for his expenses on the ground that he is entitled to the benefits under Section 6991 of the
RAC.
However the Respondent, the petitioner's claim on the ground that Section 699 of the RAC had been
repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987. The Respondent questions the applicability of the aforesaid
opinion of the Secretary of Justice in deciding the matter. Lastly, the COA contends that employmentrelated sickness, injury or death is adequately covered by the Employees' Compensation Program under P.D.
626, such that to allow simultaneous recovery of benefits under both laws on account of the same
contingency would be unfair and unjust to the Government.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Administrative Code of 1987 repealed or abrogated Section 699 of the RAC.
RULINGS
No, as explained by the Court, the provision on sickness benefits of the nature being claimed by petitioner
has not been restated in the Administrative Code of 1987.
The second sentence of Article 173, Chapter II, Title II (dealing on Employees' Compensation and State
Insurance Fund), Book IV of the Labor Code, as amended by P.D. 1921, expressly provides that "the payment
of compensation under this Title shall not bar the recovery of benefits as provided for in Section 699 of
the Revised Administrative Code . . . whose benefits are administered by the system (meaning SSS or
GSIS) or by other agencies of the government."
the new Code does not cover nor attempt to cover the entire subject matter of the old Code. There
are several matters treated in the old Code which are not found in the new Code, such as the provisions
on notaries public, the leave law, the public bonding law, military reservations, claims for sickness benefits
under Section 699, and stil others.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to GRANT the petition; respondent is hereby
ordered to give due course to petitioner's claim for benefits.
PEOPLE V LICERA
FACTS
On Dec. 3, 1965 the Municipal Court charged the Accused, Rafael Licera, for violation of il egal possession of
a Winchester rifle, Model 55, Caliber .30. sentencing him an indeterminate penalty ranging five years and
one day to six years and eight months of imprisonment.
Licera's appeal to the Court of Appeals was certified on October 16, 1974 to this Court as involving only one
question of law.
Licera invoke that he was appointed as a secret agent by Gov. Leviste of Batangas on December, 1961.
He claims that he is a preaces officer and was exempt from the requirements relating to the issuance
of license to possess firearms. He alleges that the court a quo erred in relying on the latter case
of People vs. Mapa2 which held that section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code provides no exemption
for persons appointed as secret agents by provincial governors from the requirements relating to firearm
licenses.
ISSUE
Whether the Macarandang or Mapa ruling shall be apply on this case.
RULING
Mapa revoked the Macarandang precedent only in 1967.At the time of Licera's designation as secret
agent in 1961 and at the time of his apprehension for possession of the Winchester rifle without the
requisite license or permit therefor in 1965.
"In accordance with the decision of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. L-12088 dated December 23, 1959, you
wil have the right to bear a firearm . . for use in connection with the performance of your duties." Under
the rule then prevailing, enunciated in Macarandang,3 the appointment of a civilian as a "secret agent to
assist in the maintenance of peace and order campaigns and detection of crimes sufficiently puts him
within the category of a "peace officer" equivalent even to a member of the municipal police" whom
section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code exempts from the requirements relating to firearm
licenses.
Where a new doctrine abrogates an old rule, the new doctrine should operate respectively only and should
not adversely affect those favored by the old rule, especial y those who relied thereon and acted on the
faith thereof.
Pursuant to the Macarandang rule obtaining not only at the time of Licera's appointment as secret agent,
which appointment included a grant of authority to possess the Winchester rifle, but as well at the time as
of his apprehension, Licera incurred no criminal liability for possession of the said rifle, notwithstanding his
non-compliance with the legal requirements relating to firearm licenses.
CHU JAN V BERNAS
FACTS
The defendant denied each and all of the allegations of the complaint and moved to dismiss with the
costs against the plaintiff. On September 11, 1913, the said Court of First Instance rendered judgment
dismissing the appeal without special finding as to costs. The grounds for the dismissal pronounced by the
lower court in the judgment appealed from ere that the court has always dismissed cases of this nature,
that he is not familiar with the rules governing cockfights and the duties of referees thereof; that he
does not know where to find the law on the subject and, finally, that he knows of no law whatever that
governs the rights to the plaintiff and the defendant in questions concerning cockfights.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Court may dismiss a case for lack of knowledge regarding the law applicable to a
case.
RULING
No, The ignorance of the court or his lack of knowledge regarding the law applicable to a case submitted
to him for decision, the fact that the court does not know the rules applicable to a certain matter that
is the subject of an appeal which must be decided by him and his not knowing where to find the la w
relative to the case, are not reasons that can serve to excuse the court for terminating the
proceedings by dismissing them without deciding the issues. Such an excuse is the less acceptable
because, foreseeing that a case might arise to which no law would be exactly applicable, the Civil Code, in
the second paragraph of article 6, provides that the customs of the place shall be observed, and, in the
absence thereof, the general principles of law.
Therefore the judgment and the order appealed from, hereinbefore mentioned, are reversed and to
record of the proceedings shall remanded to the court from whence they came for due trial and
judgment as provided by law. No special finding is made with regard to costs. So ordered.
PEOPLE V PURISIMA
FACTS
Twenty-six (26) Petitions for Review filed by the People of the Philippines represented, respectively, by the
Office of the City Fiscal of Manila, the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Samar, and joined by the Solicitor
General, are consolidated in this one Decision as they involve one basic question of law.
Hon. Purisima et. al., filed an Order quashing or dismissing the Informations, on a common ground, viz, that the
Information did not allege facts which constitute the offense penalized by Presidential Decree No. 9
because it failed to state one essential element of the crime. The Informations filed by the People
sufficient in form and substance to constitute the offense of "il egal possession of deadly weapon" penalized
under Presidential Decree (PD for short) No. 9
ISSUE
The validity of Presidential Decree 9 (3).
RULINGS
When P.D. 9 was promulgated by the President of the Republic there was no intent to work a hardship or
an oppressive result, a possible abuse of authority or act of oppression, arming one person with a weapon to
impose hardship on another, and so on.
while it is not within the power of courts of justice to inquire into the wisdom of a law, it is however a
judicial task and prerogative to determine if official action is within the spirit and letter of the law and if
basic fundamental rights of an individual guaranteed by the Constitution are not violated in the process of
its implementation. We have to face the fact that it is an unwise and unjust application of a law,
necessary and justified under prevailing circumstances, which renders the measure an instrument of
oppression and evil and leads the citizenry to lose their faith in their government.
Mere carrying of bladed weapon does not constitute that it is punishable under the P.D. 9 (3) as it wil be
unjust, unreasonable and wil violate the rights of the citizen that is never intended by the legislature.
WHEREFORE, The Court deny the 26 Petitions for Review and AFFIRM the Orders of respondent Judges
dismissing or quashing the Information concerned, subject however to Our observations made in the
preceding pages 23 to 25 of this Decision regarding the right of the State or Petitioner herein to file
either an amended Information under Presidential Decree No. 9, paragraph 3, or a new one under other
existing statute or city ordinance as the facts may warrant.
MARTINEZ V VAN BUSKRIK
FACTS
On the 11th day of September, 1908, the defendant cochero, who was driving his delivery wagon at the time
the accident occurred, was a good servant and was considered a safe and reliable cochero; that the
delivery wagon had sent to deliver some forage at Paco Livery Stable on Calle Herran, and that for the
purpose of delivery thereof the cochero driving the team as defendant's employee tied the driving lines of
the horses to the front end of the delivery wagon and then went back inside of the wagon for the
purpose of unloading the forage to be delivered; that while unloading the forage and in the act of carrying
some of it out, another vehicle drove by, the driver of which cracked a whip and made some other noises,
which frightened the horses attached to the delivery wagon and they ran away, and the driver was
thrown from the inside of the wagon out through the rear upon the ground and was unable to stop the
horses; that the horses then ran up and on which street they came into collision with the carromata in
which the plaintiff, Carmen Ong de Martinez, was riding. The plaintiff with her child and overturned it,
severely wounding said plaintiff by making a serious cut upon her head, and also injuring the carromata
itself and the harness upon the horse which was drawing it.
The lower court found the defendant guilty and filed an appeal.
ISSUE
Whether or not the conchero was negligent on leaving the horse unhitched and otherwise unattended on
the side of a public highways while the driver is upon the sidewalk loading goods on the wagon.
RULING
No, the act of defendant's driver in leaving the horses in the manner proved was not unreasonable or
imprudent. Acts the performance of which has not proved destructive or injurious and which have,
therefore, been acquiesced in by society for so long a time that they have ripened into custom, cannot
be held to be themselves unreasonable or imprudent.
Accidents sometimes happen and injuries result from the most ordinary acts of life. But such are not their
natural or customary results. To hold that, because such an act once resulted in accident or injury, the
actor is necessarily negligent, is to go far.
It is a matter of common knowledge as well as proof that it is the universal practice of merchants to
deliver merchandise of the kind of that being delivered at the time of the injury, in the manner in which
that was then being delivered; and that it is the universal practice to leave the horses in the manner in
which they were left at the time of the accident. This is the custom in all cities. It has not been
productive of accidents or injuries. The public, finding itself unprejudiced by such practice, has acquiesced
for years without objection. Ought the public now, through the courts, without prior objection or notice, to be
permitted to reverse the practice of decades and thereby make culpable and guilty one who had every
reason and assurance to believe that he was acting under the sanction of the strongest of all civil
forces, the custom of a people? We think not.
YAO KEE V SY-GONZALES
Facts:
Sy Kiat, a chines national died in Caloocan City, leaving behind his real and personal properties in the
Philippines worth P 300,000 more or less. Aida Sy-Gonzales, et. al. filed a petition for the grant of letters of
administration claiming among other things that they are children of the deceased with Asuncion Gil ego, a
Filipina. The petition was opposed by Yao kee who alleged that she is the lawful wife of the deceased
whom he married in China and that one of her children, Sze Sook Wah, should be the administrator of the
deceased. The CFI decided in favor of Yao Kee’s petition but was modified and set aside by the court
of appeals.
Issue:
Whether or not Sy Kiat’s marriage to Yao Kee in accordance with Chinese Law and Custom conclusive.
Held:
The Supreme Court ruled that evidence may prove the fact if marriage between Sy Kiat and Yao Kee
is valid, but it is not sufficient to establish the validity of said marriage in accordance with Chinese law
and custom. A custom must be proved as a fact according to the rules of evidence and that a local
custom as a source of right cannot be considered by a court of justice unless such custom is properly
established by competent evidence. In the case at bar, petitioners did not present any competent
evidence relative to the law of China on marriage. In the absence of proof of the Chinese law on
marriage, it should be presumed that it is the same as that of the Philippines.
The Supreme Court affirmed (all of them were acknowledged as natural children, hence given equal rights)
the decision of the Court of Appeals.
CIR V PRIMETOWN
FACTS:
Gilbert Yap, vice chair of respondent Primetown Property Group, Inc., applied for the refund or credit of
income tax respondent paid in 1997. According to Yap, because respondent suffered losses, it was not liable
for income taxes. Respondent complied, but the claim was not acted upon. Thus, on April 14, 2000, it filed a
Petition for Review with the CTA. CTA dismissed the petition having been filed beyond the two-year
prescriptive period for filing a judicial claim for tax refund or credit under Section 229 of the NIRC. The
CTA found that respondent filed its final adjusted return on April 14, 1998. Thus, its right to claim a refund
or credit commenced on that date.
Applying Article 13 of the Civil Code, the CTA ruled that the two-year prescriptive period under Section
229 of the NIRC for the filing of judicial claims was equivalent to 730 days. Because the year 2000 was
a leap year, respondent’s petition, which was filed 731 days after respondent filed its final adjusted
return, was filed beyond the reglementary period. The CA reversed the CTA decision ruling that Article
13 of the Civil Code does not distinguish between a regular year and a leap year.
ISSUE:
Whether the Court of Appeals is correct in referring to Article 13 of the NCC as the basis in the
correct computation of time.
HELD
NO. The Court of Appeals is correct in finding that the petition was filed within the prescriptive period but
its basis is should not be the NCC. Article 13 of the Civil Code provides that when the law speaks of a
year, it is understood to be equivalent to 365 days. However, in 1987, EO 292 or the Administrative Code
of 1987 was enacted. Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I thereof provide: Sec. 31. Legal Periods. — “Year“
shall be understood to be twelve calendar months; “month“ of thirty days, unless it refers to a specific
calendar month in which case it shall be computed according to the number of days the specific month
contains; “day“, to a day of twenty-four hours and; “night“ from sunrise to sunset.
Both Article 13 of the Civil Code and Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987
deal with the same subject matter — the computation of legal periods. Under the Civil Code, a year is
equivalent to 365 days whether it be a regular year or a leap year. Under the Administrative Code of
1987, however, a year is composed of 12 calendar months. Needless to state, under the Administrative
Code of 1987, the number of days is irrelevant. But being the more recent law, Section 31, Chapter VIII,
Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987, being the more recent law and having impliedly repealed in its
repealing clause all laws inconsistent therewith, governs the computation of legal periods. Lex posteriori
derogat priori.
VAN DORN V RONILLO
FACTS:
Petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent Richard Upton is a
citizen of the United States. They were married in Hongkong in 1972. In 1982 they were divorced in
Nevada, USA. Petitioner re-married in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.
In 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner in the RTC of Pasay City stating that petitioner
Alice’s business in Ermita, Manila, the Galleon Shop, is their conjugal property and that private respondent
be declared with right to manage the conjugal property.
Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous
judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged
that he and petitioner had “no community property“. The Court below denied the Motion to Dismiss on the
ground that the property involved is located in the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in
the case.
Petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from laying claim on the alleged conjugal property
because of the representation he made in the divorce proceedings. Respondent on the other hand
maintain that,the divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law
and public policy.
ISSUE:
What is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their alleged conjugal property in the
Philippines?
HELD:
The divorce decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private
respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine
nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our
concept of public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized
in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in
Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which
divorce dissolves the marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have
no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner’s husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal
assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country’s Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over
him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court
from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.
PILAPIL V IBAY-SOMERA
FACTS:
Petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, was married to private respondent Erich Geiling
(Geiling), a German national, in Germany. Geiling obtained a divorce in a German court on the ground of
failure of marriage.
More than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, Geiling filed two complaints for adultery
against petitioner alleging that, she had an affair with two different men while their marriage subsisted.
Petitioner filed a motion to quash on the main ground that the court is without jurisdiction to try and
decide the charge of adultery, which is a private offense that cannot be prosecuted de officio, since the
complainant, a foreigner, does not qualify as an offended spouse having obtained a final divorce decree
prior to the filing of the criminal complaint. However, the said motion was denied by the respondent judge.
Hence, petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a temporary
restraining order, seeking the annulment of the order of the lower court denying her motion to quash.
ISSUE:
Whether or not an alien spouse has legal standing to file a complaint for adultery after obtaining a divorce
decree
HELD:
No, an alien spouse has no legal standing to file a complaint for adultery after obtaining a divorce decree.
Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of adultery cannot be prosecuted except upon a
sworn written complaint filed by the offended spouse. Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the
offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status,
capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. Hence, after a
divorce has been decreed, the innocent spouse no longer has the right to institute proceedings against
the offenders. Where, however, proceedings have been properly commenced, a divorce subsequently
granted can have no legal effect on the prosecution of the criminal proceedings.
In the present case, the fact that Geiling obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of
Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as
private respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status
of persons.
Therefore, Geiling, being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the
adultery case.
SAN LUIS V SAN LUIS
FACTS
The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who was the
former governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His
first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six children, namely: Rodolfo,
Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo. Five years later,
on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias. However, on October 15,
1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce before the Family Court of the First
Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of America (U.S.A.), which issued a Decree Granting Absolute
Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on December 14, 1973. On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent
Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr. Wil iam Meyer, Minister of the United
Presbyterian at Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. He had no children with respondent but
lived with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992.
ISSUE
Whether a Filipino who is divorced by his alien spouse abroad may validly remarry under the Civil Code
RULINGS
In resolving this issue, the Court need not retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code, particularly
Art. 26, par. (2) considering that there is sufficient jurisprudential basis allowing them to rule in the
affirmative.
Art. 26 of Civil Code provides:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the country where
they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except those prohibited
under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romil o, Jr. The Van Dorn
case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a
divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino
spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law.
As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation where a divorce is validly obtained
abroad by the alien spouse.
UYPITCHING V QUIAMCO
FACTS:
Respondent Ernesto C. Quiamco was approached by Davalan, Gabutero and Generoso to amicably settle
the civil aspect of a criminal case for robbery filed by Quiamco against them. The motorcycle had been
sold on installment basis to Gabutero by petitioner Ramas Uypitching Sons, Inc., a family-owned corporation
managed by petitioner. To secure its payment, the motorcycle was mortgaged to petitioner
corporation.When Gabutero could no longer pay the installments, Davalan assumed the obligation and
continued the payments. However, Davalan stopped paying the remaining installments and told petitioner
corporation’s collector that the motorcycle had allegedly been “taken by respondent’s men.“
Thereafter, petitioner accompanied by policemen to recover the motorcycle. The leader of the police
team talked to the clerk in charge and asked for respondent. While the police team leader and the
clerk were talking, petitioner paced back and forth inside the establishment uttering “Quiamco is a thief
of a motorcycle.“
Petitioner filed a criminal complaint for qualified theft and/or violation of the Anti-Fencing Law against
respondent. Respondent moved for dismissal because the complaint did not charge an offense as he had
neither stolen nor bought the motorcycle. The Office of the City Prosecutor dismissed the complaint.
Respondent filed an action for damages against petitioners. He sought to hold the petitioners liable for
acts humiliated and embarrassed the respondent and injured his reputation and integrity.
The RTC ruled that petitioner was motivated with malice and il wil when he called respondent a thief,
took the motorcycle in an abusive manner and filed a baseless complaint for qualified theft and/or violation
of the Anti-Fencing Law. Petitioners appealed the RTC decision but the CA affirmed the RTC’s decision.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners’ acts violated the law as well as public morals, and transgressed the proper
norms of human relations
HELD:
Yes. Petitioners’ acts violated the law as well as public morals, and transgressed the proper norms of
human relations. No doubt, petitioner corporation, acting through its co-petitioner Uypitching, blatantly
disregarded the lawful procedure for the enforcement of its right, to the prejudice of respondent. The
basic principle of human relations, embodied in Article 19 of the Civil Code, provides: Art. 19. Every person
must in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give every one his
due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Article 19, also known as the “principle of abuse of right,“ prescribes that a person should not use his right
unjustly or contrary to honesty and good faith, otherwise he opens himself to liability. It seeks to preclude
the use of, or the tendency to use, a legal right (or duty) as a means to unjust ends. There is an abuse
of right when it is exercised solely to prejudice or injure another. The exercise of a right must be in
accordance with the purpose for which it was established and must not be excessive or unduly harsh;;
there must be no intention to harm another. Otherwise, liability for damages to the injured party wil
attach.
Petitioners themselves in fact described their action as a “precipitate act.“ Petitioners were bent on
portraying respondent as a thief. In this connection, we quote with approval the following findings of the
RTC, as adopted by the CA:
There was malice or il -wil in filing the complain because petitioner Atty. Uypitching knew or ought to have
known as he is a lawyer, that there was no probable cause at all for filing a criminal complaint for qualified
theft and fencing activity against respondent. Petitioner had no personal knowledge that respondent stole
the motorcycle in question. He was merely told by his bil collector that Dabalan wil no longer pay the
remaining installment(s) for the motorcycle because the motorcycle was taken by the men of respondent.
The absence of probable cause necessarily signifies the presence of malice
In this case, the manner by which the motorcycle was taken at petitioners’ instance was not only
attended by bad faith but also contrary to the procedure laid down by law. Considered in conjunction with
the defamatory statement, petitioners’ exercise of the right to recover the mortgaged vehicle was
utterly prejudicial and injurious to respondent. On the other hand, the precipitate act of filing an unfounded
complaint could not in any way be considered to be in accordance with the purpose for which the right to
prosecute a crime was established. Thus, the totality of petitioners’ actions showed a calculated design
to embarrass, humiliate and publicly ridicule respondent. Petitioners acted in an excessively harsh fashion to
the prejudice of respondent. Contrary to law, petitioners wil fully caused damage to respondent. Hence,
they should indemnify him.
WASSMER VS VELEZ
FACTS:
Beatriz Wassmer and Francisco Velez decided to get married and set the date on September 4, 1954.
Preparations were made including the following: obtaining a marriage license;; printing and distribution of
invitations to relatives, friends, and acquaintances;; purchasing the bride-to-be’s trousseau;; preparing the
dresses of those who are part of the entourage;; and buying a matrimonial bed and its accessories, among
others. Bridal showers were given and gifts were also received.
On September 2 or two days before the wedding, Velez went to his home city in Mindanao and left a note
for Wassmer postponing the wedding saying that his mother opposes it. The next day, September 3, he
sent her a telegram saying that nothing has changed and assuring her of his return soon. Thereafter,
Velez was never heard from again.
Wassmer sued Velez for damages and won the suit by default. Almost two months later, Velez filed a
petition for relief from orders, judgment, and proceedings and motion for new trial and reconsideration.
Velez lost in his petition so he elevated the same to the Supreme Court. He argues that there is no
provision in the Civil Code authorizing an action for breach of promise to marry.
ISSUE:
May a person be held liable even in the absence of a provision authorizing an action for breach of promise
to marry?
HELD:
Yes. Although mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong, it must not be overlooked, that
the extent to which acts not contrary to law may be perpetrated with impunity, is not limitless. Article 21
provides that “any person who wil fully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.“
In this case, to formally set a wedding and go through all the above-described preparation and publicity,
only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and
unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held answerable in damages in
accordance with Article 21. Therefore, Velez should be held liable.
NIKKO HOTEL VS. REYES
FACTS:
Roberto Reyes (AKA Amay Bisaya), filed an action for damages under Arts. 19 and 21 against petitioners.
He alleged that at around 6:00 in the evening of 13 October 1994, while he was having coffee at the lobby
of Hotel Nikko, he was spotted by his friend, Dr. Violeta Filart. Mrs. Filart invited him to join her in a
birthday party of the hotel’s manager, Mr. Masakazu Tsuruoka, and that she wil vouch for him. He then
carried Filart’s present (basket of fruits) to the party. However, while lining up at the buffet table, Reyes
was stopped by Ruby Lim (Executive Secretary for Hotel Nikko) and in a loud voice, was told to leave the
party. Filart was within hearing distance but completely ignored him when he said that he was invited by
Filart. Thereafter, he was escorted out by a Makati policeman.
Ms. Lim said that she approached the captain waiter, Dr. Filart’s sister (Ms. Fruto), and Capt. Batung
regarding his presence, and requested Fruto & Batung to tell Reyes to leave. Because he stil lingered,
she then approached Reyes when he went to a corner to eat and requested him to leave, but when she
turned around, Reyes began making a big scene. Filart, on the other hand, stated that she never invited
Mr. Reyes to the party and that it was Reyes who volunteered to carry the basket as he was also going
to take the elevator, but he was going to a different floor.
The RTC dismissed the complaint, but the CA reversed the same. Hence, this petition for review.
Petitioners contend that pursuant to the doctrine of volenti non fit injuria, they cannot be made liable for
damages as respondent Reyes assumed the risk of being asked to leave for being a gate-crasher.
ISSUE:
WON Ruby Lim acted abusively in asking Roberto Reyes to leave the party.
HELD:
NO. We find more credible the lower courts findings of fact. We are dealing with a formal party in a posh,
five-star hotel, for-invitation-only, thrown for the hotel’s former Manager. To unnecessarily call attention to
the presence of Mr. Reyes would certainly reflect badly on Ms. Lim’s ability to follow the instructions of the
celebrant to invite only his close friends and some of the hotel’s personnel. In the absence of any proof of
motive on the part of Ms. Lim to humiliate Mr. Reyes and expose him to ridicule and shame, it is highly unlikely
that she would shout at him from a very close distance. Moreover, another problem with Mr. Reyes’s version
of the story is that it is unsupported.A common theme runs through Articles 19 and 21, and that is, the act
complained of must be intentional. As applied to herein case and as earlier discussed, Mr. Reyes has not
shown that Ms. Lim was driven by animosity against him. These two people did not know each other
personally before the evening of 13 October 1994, thus, Mr. Reyes had nothing to offer for an explanation for
Ms. Lim’s alleged abusive conduct except the statement that Ms. Lim, being single at 44 years old, had a
very strong bias and prejudice against (Mr. Reyes) possibly influenced by her associates in her work at
the hotel with foreign businessmen. The lameness of this argument need not be belabored.Parenthetically,
the manner by which Ms. Lim asked Mr. Reyes to leave was likewise acceptable and humane under the
circumstances. Not being liable for both actual and moral damages, neither can petitioners Lim and Hotel
Nikko be made answerable for exemplary damages.
GASHEM SHOOKAT BASH V C.A.
FACTS:
Private respondent is a 22 year old Filipino citizen residing in Dagupan CIty. Petitioner is an Iranian
medical exchange student at the Lyceum Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City. Petitioner allegedly
courted and proposed to marry her. Thereafter, private respondent began living with him. She allegedly
was a virgin before such arrangement.
A week before the filing of private respondent’s complaint, petitioner’s attitute towards her started to
change;; he maltreated and threatened to kil her. As a result, she sustained injuries. Petitioner
repudiated their marriage agreement and asked not to live with her anymore.
Private respondent then prayed for judgment ordering the petitioner to pay her damages in the amount
of not less than P45,000.00, reimbursement for actual expenses amounting to P600.00, attorney’s fees and
costs, and granting her such other relief and remedies as may be just and equitable. Petitioner denied
the claims of private respondent. Accordingly, he never proposed marriage to or agreed to be married
with the private respondent nor he forced her to live with him.
The lower court, applying Article 21 of the Civil Code, rendered a decision favoring the private respondent.
The CA affirmed in toto the trial court’s decision.
ISSUE:
WON a breach of promise to marry is actionable under Article 21 of the Civil Code?
HELD:
Yes. The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. However,
where a man’s promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman
and his representation to fulfil that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of
herself unto him in a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that
the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to
obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not
because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit behind it and the wil ful injury to
her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that such injury should have
been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.
Petitoner’s profession of love and promise to marry were empty words directly intended to fool, dupe, entice,
beguile and deceive the poor woman into believing that indeed, he loved her and would want her to be his
life’s partner. His was nothing but pure lust which he wanted satisfied by a Filipina who honestly believed
that by accepting his proffer of love and proposal of marriage, she would be able to enjoy a life of ease
and security. Petitioner clearly violated the Filipino’s concept of morality and brazenly defied the traditional
respect Filipinos have for their women. It can even be said that the petitioner committed such deplorable
acts in blatant disregard of Article 19 of the Civil Code which directs every person to act with justice,
give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his obligations.
PE V PE
FACTS:
Alfonso Pe, the defendant, was a married man, agent of La Perla Cigar and Cigarette Factory in Gasan
Marinduque who was treated like a son by Cecilio Pe, one of the petitioners. Cecilio introduced Alfonso to
his children and was given access to visit their house. Alfonso got fond of Lolita, 24 year old single,
daughter of Cecilio. The defendant frequented the house of Lolita sometime in 1952 on the pretext that
he wanted her to teach him how to pray the rosary. Eventually they fell in love with each other.
Plaintiff brought action before lower court of Manila and failed to prove Alfonso deliberately and in bad
faith tried to win Lolita’s affection. The case on moral damages was dismissed.
ISSUE
Whether or not defendant is liable to Lolita’s family on the ground of moral, good custom and public policy
due to their il icit affair.
HELD:
Alfonso committed an injury to Lolita’s family in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy
contemplated in Article 20 of the civil code. The defendant took advantage of the trust of Cecilio and
even used the praying of rosary as a reason to get close with Lolita. The wrong caused by Alfonso is
immeasurable considering the fact that he is a married man.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed. Defendant is hereby sentenced to pay the plaintiffs
the sum of P5,000.00 as damages and P2,000.00 as attorney's fees and expenses of litigations. Costs
against appellee.
GLOBEMACKAY V CA
FACTS
In year 1972 GlobeMackay discovered fictitious purchases and other fraudulent transactions for which it
lost several thousands of pesos. Herbert C. Hendry who was the Executive President alleged Mr. Restituto
M. Torbias as a number one suspect of the said anomalies since, the latter actually made the report
regarding the hot issues in the company. And the petitioner filed 5cases against the respondent which 4
of those were estafa through falsification of commercial documents and 5th was for violation Art. 290 of
the Revised Penal Code(Discovering Secrets Through Seizure of Correspondence) but all these cases
were dismissed by the Judge of RTC for lack supporting evidence. The defendant file a civil case for
damages anchored on alleged unlawful, malicious, oppressive, and abusive act of the petitioner and
fortunately the judge decided in favour of the private respondents for payable charges. Petitioners
appealed the RTC decision to CA and on the other hand Torbias appeal as to the amount of damages.
However, in decision dated August 31, 1987 affirmed the RTC decision in toto. Petitioner questioned the
award of moral damages.
ISSUE
Whether or not the petitioner is subject to exemplary damages as subject to him by the private
respondents.
HELD
The court ruled in the negative. The civil liability for non-payment of the nutri-wafer biscuits delivered by
petitioner to the Edward Ty Brothers Corporation cannot be enforced against the private respondents
because the said civil liability was not the personal liability of Ty Teck Suan to Mansion Biscuit Corporation,
rather, it was the contractual liability of Edward Ty Brothers Corporation, of which Ty Teck Suan was
president, to Mansion Biscuit Corporation.
In the case at bench, the acquittal of Ty Teck Suan and Siy Gui extinguished both their criminal and
civil liability as it is clear from the order acquitting them that the issuance of the checks in question did
not constitute a violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Consequently, no civil liability arising from the alleged delict may be
awarded.
Wherefore, the petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of the CA in CA-GR CV No. 09055 is
AFFIRMED.
UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST vs. ROMEO A. JADER
Facts
Romeo Jader was a law student at the University of the East from 1984 to 1988. In his first semester of
his fourth year, he failed to take the regular examination in Practice Court I for which he was given an
incomplete grade. He enrolled for the second semester and on February 1, 1988, he filed an examination for
the removal of his incomplete grade, which was approved by the dean. He took the examination but was
given a grade of 5 (failing).
The dean and the faculty members of the university deliberated as to who among their graduating
students would be allowed to graduate. Jader’s name was in the tentative list of candidates for
graduation. The invitation for the commencement exercises also included his name, but at the foot of the
list, the following was written:
This is a tentative list Degrees wil be conferred upon these candidates who satisfactorily complete
requirements as stated in the University Bulletin and as approved of the Department of Education, Culture
and Sports
During the ceremony, Jader’s name was called, and he received a rolled white sheet of paper symbolical of
the law diploma. After graduation, he took a leave of absence without pay from his job to prepare for the
bar examination and enrolled in a pre-bar review class. When he learned the deficiency in his
requirements for graduation, he dropped his review class and was not able to take the bar exam.
Jader filed a case in the trial court, and the latter granted him the amount of Php35,470 as well as
Php5,000 for attorney’s fees. At the Court of Appeals, the decision of the trial court was upheld, but the
CA added the award for moral damages amounting to Php50,000.
Issues:
1. Can the University of the East be held liable for actual damages?
Ruling:
1. Yes. Educational institutions are duty-bound to inform the students of their academic status and not
wait for the latter to inquire from the former. The conscious indifference of a person to the rights or
welfare of the person/persons who may be affected by his act or omission can support a claim for
damages. The university could not just give the grades at any time because law students have a
deadline to meet in the submission of requirements for taking the bar. It was guilty of negligence and for
violating Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code, which provide
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify
the latter for the same.
TENCHAVEZ V ESCANO
FACTS:
Pastor and Vicenta entered into a secret marriage before a Catholic chaplain. Upon discovery of their
daughter’s marriage, spouses Mamerto and Mena sought priestly advice where it was suggested that the
marriage be recelebrated. However, the recelebration did not take place and the newlyweds eventually
became estranged. Later, unknown to Pastor, Vicenta left for the United States. There, she filed a
complaint for divorce on the ground of extreme mental cruelty, and an absolute divorce was granted by
the Court of Nevada. She later sought for the annulment of her marriage from the Archbishop of Cebu.
Vicenta eventually married an American in Nevada and acquired American citizenship.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the divorce obtained by Vicenta abroad was valid and binding in the Philippines;
RULING:
The Court held that under Philippine law, the valid marriage between Tenchavez and Escano remained
subsisting and undissolved notwithstanding the decree of absolute divorce that the wife sought and
obtained in Nevada. Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which was already in force at the time
expressly provided that “Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons are binding upon the citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.“ Here, at the
time the divorce decree was issued, Vicenta, like her husband, was stil a Filipino citizen. She was then stil
subject to Philippine law, which does not admit absolute divorce. Thus, under Philippine law, the divorce was
invalid.
ST. LOUIS REALTY VS. CA
FACTS:
Petitioner, St. Louis Realty caused to be published with the permission of Arcadio S. Arcadio but without
permission of private respondent Dr. Aramil, a neuropsychiatrist and faculty member of UERM Medical
Center, in the issue of the Sunday Times of December 15, 1968 an advertisement with the heading
“WHERE THE HEART IS“. The same advertisement was republished in the Sunday Times dated January
5, 1969.
Private respondent noticed the mistake and wrote a letter of protest. The letter was received by St.
Louis Realty’s officer in charge of advertising. He stopped publication of the advertisement. However, no
rectification or apology was made. Private respondent’s counsel demanded from St. Louis Realty actual,
moral and exemplary damages of P110,000. It published in the issue of the Manila Times of March 18, 1969 a
new advertisement with the Arcadio family and their real house but it did not publish any apology to Dr.
Aramil and an explanation of the error. Dr. Aramil filed a complaint for damages. St. Louis Realty published in
the issue of the Manila Times of April 15, 1969 a notice of rectification.
St. Louis Realty argued that the case was not covered by Article 26 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE:
Whether the case at bar is covered by Article 26 of the Civil Code.
HELD:
YES. St. Louis Realty’s employee was grossly negligent in mixing up the Aramil and Arcadio residences in a
widely circulated publication like the Sunday Times. To suit its purpose, it never made any written apology
and explanation of the mix-up. It just contented itself with a cavalier “rectification “.
Persons, who know the residence of Doctor Aramil, were confused by the distorted, lingering impression that
he was renting his residence from Arcadio or that Arcadio had leased it from him. Either way, his private
life was mistakenly and unnecessarily exposed. He suffered diminution of income and mental anguish.
GREGORIO V CA
FACTS:
A complaint for violation of B.P. Blg.22 was filed against petitioner Zenaida R. Gregorio as proprietor of Alvi
Marketing, allegedly for delivering insufficiently funded bank checks as payment for the numerous appliances
bought by Alvi Marketing from Sansio. As the address in the complaint was wrong, she was indicted for 3
counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 for failure to controvert the charges against her. Gregorio filed a Motion
for Deferment of Arraignment and Reinvestigation, alleging that she could not have issued the bounced
checks, since she did not even have a checking account with the bank on which the checks were drawn.
In the course of the reinvestigation, Datuin submitted an Affidavit of Desistance stating that Gregorio was
not one of the signatories of the bounced checks subject of prosecution. Subsequently, the court ordered
the B.P. Blg. 22 cases dismissed.
Gregorio filed a complaint for damages against Sansio Philippines, Inc. and Emma J. Datuin. Gregorio in her
complaint for damages stated that incalculable damage has been inflicted upon him due to the
defendants reckless disregard of the fundamental legal precept that every person shall respect the
dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons. Sansio and Datuin filed a
motion to dismiss alleging that the complaint, being one for damages arising from malicious prosecution, failed
to state a cause of action, as the ultimate facts constituting the elements thereof were not alleged in
the complaint. The RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss. The CA reversed the decision of the RTC and
ordered the dismissal of Gregorio’s complaint for damages.
ISSUE:
Whether the complaint for damages filed by Gregorio is based on quasi-delict or malicious prosecution.
HELD:
It is a complaint based on quasi-delict under Article 2176, in relation to Article 26 of the Civil Code,
rather than on malicious prosecution.
Quasi-delict exists under Article 2176 when the plaintiff suffers damage due to the fault or negligence of
the defendant or some other person to whose act he must respond provided that there must be no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties. On the other hand, Article 26 of the Civil Code grants
a cause of action for damages, prevention, and other relief in cases of breach, though not necessarily
constituting a criminal offense, of the following rights: (1) right to personal dignity; (2) right to personal
security; (3) right to family relations; (4) right to social intercourse; (5) right to privacy; and (6) right to
peace of mind. Gregorio’s rights to personal dignity, personal security, privacy, and peace of mind were
infringed by Sansio and Datuin when they failed to exercise the requisite diligence in determining the
identity of the person, they should rightfully accuse of tendering insufficiently funded checks. This fault was
compounded when they failed to ascertain the correct address of petitioner, thus depriving her of the
opportunity to controvert the charges, because she was not given proper notice. Therefore, Sansio and
Datuin are liable for damages.
CAPILI VS PEOPLE
FACTS
On June 28, 2004, petitioner was charged with the crime of bigamy before the RTC of Pasig City.
Petitioner thereafter filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings alleging that: (1) there is a pending civil case
for declaration of nullity of the second marriage before the RTC of Antipolo City filed by Karla Y. MedinaCapili; (2) in the event that the marriage is declared null and void, it would exculpate him from the charge
of bigamy; and (3) the pendency of the civil case for the declaration of nullity of the second marriage
serves as a prejudicial question in the instant criminal case.
ISSUE
Whether or not the subsequent declaration of nullity of the second marriage is a ground for dismissal of
the criminal case for bigamy.
RULING
It is undisputed that a second marriage between petitioner and private respondent was contracted on
December 8, 1999 during the subsistence of a valid first marriage between petitioner and Karla Y. MedinaCapili contracted on September 3, 1999. Notably, the RTC of Antipolo City itself declared the bigamous
nature of the second marriage between petitioner and private respondent. Thus, the subsequent judicial
declaration of the second marriage for being bigamous in nature does not bar the prosecution of petitioner
for the crime of bigamy.
TENEBRO V CA
FACTS
Veronico Tenebro contracted marriage with private complainant Leticia Ancajas on April 10, 1990.
Tenebro and Ancajas lived together continuously and without interruption until the latter part of 1991, when
Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been previously married to a certain Hilda Vil areyes on
November 10, 1986. Tenebro showed Ancajas a photocopy of a marriage contract between him and
Vil areyes. Invoking this previous marriage, petitioner thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which he shared
with Ancajas, stating that he was going to cohabit with Vil areyes. On January 25, 1993, petitioner
contracted yet another marriage, this one with a certain Nilda Vil egas. When Ancajas learned of this
third marriage, she verified from Vil areyes whether the latter was indeed married to petitioner. In a
handwritten letter, Vil areyes confirmed that petitioner, Veronico Tenebro, was indeed her husband.
Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner. Vil egas countered that his marriage
with Vil areyes cannot be proven as a fact there being no record of such. He further argued that his
second marriage, with Ancajas, has been declared void ab initio due to psychological incapacity. Hence he
cannot be charged for bigamy.
ISSUE
Whether or not Tenebro is guilty of bigamy.
HELD
Individual who contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage is
criminally liable for bigamy notwithstanding the declaration of the second marriage as void ab initio on the
ground of psychological incapacity.
MONTANEZ V CIPRIANO
FACTS
Respondent Lourdes Cipriano married Socrates Flores on April 8, 1976. On January 24, 1983, during the
subsistence of the said marriage, respondent married Silverio V. Cipriano.
In 2001, respondent filed a Petition for the Annulment of her marriage with Socrates on the ground of the
latter’s psychological incapacity. On July 18, 2003, the marriage of respondent with Socrates was declared
null and void. Said decision became final and executory on October 13, 2003.
On May 14, 2004, petitioner Merlinda Montanez, Silverio’s daughter from the first marriage, filed a Complaint
for Bigamy against respondent. The respondent filed a Motion to Quash Information alleging that her
marriage with Socrates had already been declared void ab initio in 2003, thus, there was no more
marriage to speak of prior to her marriage to Silverio on January 24, 1983. Hence, the basic element of
the crime of bigamy, i.e., two valid marriages, is wanting.
The RTC dismissed the case ruling that since the second marriage was contracted before the
enactment of the Family Code, the judicial declaration of absolute nullity is not required as a condition
precedent to contracting a subsequent marriage thereby rendering the second marriage valid.
ISSUE
Is the declaration of the judicial nullity of the first marriage a valid defense for a charge of bigamy?
HELD
NO. The subsequent nullification of the first marriage is immaterial to the commission of the crime of
bigamy.
The elements of the crime of bigamy are: (a) the offender has been legally married;; (b) the marriage
has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be
presumed dead according to the Civil Code;; (c) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage;;
and (d) the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. The felony is
consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or subsequent marriage. It is essential in the
prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all the essential requirements, would be
valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage.
At the time respondent contracted the second marriage, the first marriage was stil subsisting as it had
not yet been legally dissolved. The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage would not
change the fact that she contracted the second marriage during the subsistence of the first marriage.
Thus, respondent was properly charged of the crime of bigamy, since the essential elements of the
offense charged were sufficiently alleged.
Therefore, the dismissal of the charge of bigamy against respondent is improper.
QUIMGUING V ICAO
FACTS
This is an appeal from an order of the CFI of Zamboanga del Norte, dismissing a complaint for support and
damages, and another order denying amendment of the same pleading.
Plaintiff and defendant were neighbors in Dapitan City, they had close and confidential relations; although
defendant was married, the latter succeeded in having carnal intercourse with plaintiff several times by
force and intimidation, and without her consent; as a result she became pregnant, despite efforts and
drugs supplied by defendant, and plaintiff had to stop studying. Hence, she claimed support at P120. 00 per
month, damages and attorney’s fees.
Defendant moved to dismiss for lack of cause of action since the complaint did not allege that the child
had been born, the trial judge sustained defendant’s motion and dismissed the complaint.
Plaintiff moved to amend the complaint to allege that as a result of the intercourse, plaintiff had later
given birth to a baby girl; but the court, sustaining defendant’s objection, ruled that no amendment was
allowable, since the original complaint averred no cause of action. Wherefore, the plaintiff appealed directly
to this Court.
ISSUE
Whether the plaintiff is entitled to claim support and damages
HELD
The plaintiff is entitled to claim support and damages.
According to ART. 21 of the Civil Code. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner
that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
In the case at bar defendant, a married man, to force a plaintiff not his wife to yield to his lust
constitutes a clear violation of the rights of his victim therefore entitles her to claim compensation for the
damage caused. Supporting ART. 21, ART 2219 of the same Code provides “Moral damages may be
recovered in the following and analogous cases:(3) Seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts: (10)
Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28 …. Therefore, plaintiff herself had a cause of
action for damages under the terms of the complaint. The orders under appeal are reversed and set
aside. The case is remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings conformable to this decision.
Costs against appellee Felix Icao.
GELUZ VS CA
FACTS:
In 1950, before Nita Vil anueva and Oscar Lazo were married, Vil anueva became pregnant. To conceal
her pregnancy from her parents and upon her aunt’s advice, she had an abortion by Antonio Geluz, a
physician. After Vil anueva and Lazo got married, she became pregnant for the second time. As she was
an employee of the Commission on Elections and found it inconvenient, she had her second abortion by Geluz
in October 1953. In less than two years, she again became pregnant. On 21 February 1955, Vil anueva went
to the clinic of Geluz in Manila accompanied by her sister and her niece. Unknown to Lazo and without his
consent, his wife had an abortion for the third time, an abortion of a two-month old fetus. Vil anueva paid
Geluz fifty pesos. At that time, Lazo was in Cagayan campaigning for his election to the provincial board.
On the basis of the last abortion, Lazo instituted an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila against
Geluz. The trial court ordered Geluz to pay Lazo damages, attorney’s fees and costs of the suit. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals sustained the decision of the trial court. Hence, Geluz filed a petition for
certiorari to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Did the unborn child acquire civil personality?
HELD:
No, the unborn child did not acquire civil personality. Article 40 of the Civil Code expressly limits the
provisional personality by imposing the condition that the child should be subsequently born alive: “provided it
be born later with the condition specified in the following article.“ In this case, there is no dispute that the
child was dead when separated from its mother’s womb.
Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury of death pertains primarily to the
one injured, it is easy to see that if no action for such damages could be instituted on behalf of the
unborn child on account of the injuries it received, no such right of action could derivatively accrue to its
parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same
was extinguished by its pre-natal death since no transmission to anyone can take place from on that
lacked juridical personality (or juridical capacity as distinguished from capacity to act).
In this case, however, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals have not found any basis for an
award of moral damages, evidently because the appellee’s indifference to the previous abortions of his
wife, also caused by the appellant herein, clearly indicates that he was unconcerned with the frustration
of his parental hopes and affections. Even after learning of the third abortion, the appellee does not
seem to have taken interest in the administrative and criminal cases against the appellant. His only
concern appears to have been directed at obtaining from the doctor a large money payment.
Hence, the decision appealed from is reversed, and the complaint ordered dismissed.
LIMJOCO VS ESTATE OF FRAGANTE
FACTS:
Pedro O. Fragante applied for a certificate of public convenience to install, maintain and operate an ice
plant in San Juan, Rizal. The Public Service Commission approved the application and held that evidence
showed that the public interest and convenience wil be promoted in a proper and suitable manner by the
authorization of the operation of another ice-plant, that Pedro Fragante was a Filipino Citizen at the time
of his death and that his intestate estate is financial y capable of maintaining the proposed service. The
commission ordered that a certificate of public convenience be issued to the Intestate Estate of the
deceased Pedro Fragante.
Petitioner contends that the commission erred in allowing the substitution of the legal representative of
the estate of Pedro O. Fragante for the latter as party applicant, and in subsequently granting to said
estate the certificate applied for, which is said to be in contravention of law.
ISSUE:
Whether the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante is a “person“.
HELD:
Yes. The SC cited the SC of Indiana which held that “The estate of the decedent is a person in legal
contemplation. The word “person“ in its legal signification, is a generic term, and includes artificial as well
as natural persons.“ It said in another work that ’persons are of two kinds: natural and artificial. A natural
person is a human being. Artificial persons include (1) a collection or succession of natural persons forming a
corporation; (2) a collection of property to which the law attributes the capacity of having rights and
duties. The latter class of artificial persons is recognized only to a limited extent in our law.“
Under the present legal system, such rights and obligations as survive after death have to be exercised
and fulfil ed only by the estate of the deceased. And if the same legal fiction were not indulged, there
would be no juridical basis for the estate, represented by the executor or administrator, to exercise
those rights and to fulfil those obligations of the deceased.
The underlying reason for the legal fiction by which, for certain purposes, the estate of the deceased
person is considered a “person“ is the avoidance of injustice or prejudice resulting from the impossibility of
exercising such legal rights and fulfil ing such legal obligations of the decedent as survived after his death
unless the fiction is indulged.
Moreover, the citizenship of Fragrante is also extended. The fiction of such extension of his citizenship is
grounded upon the same principle, and motivated by the same reason, as the fiction of the extension of
personality. The fiction is made necessary to avoid the injustice of subjecting his estate, creditors and
heirs, solely by reason of his death to the loss of the investment amounting to P35,000, which he has
already made in the ice plant, not counting the other expenses occasioned by the instant proceeding,
from the Public Service Commission of this Court.
MOY YA LIM YAO V CID
FACTS:
Petitioners seek the issuance of a writ of injunction against the Commissioner of Immigration, “restraining
the latter and/or his authorized representative from ordering plaintiff Lau Yuen Yeung to leave the
Philippines and causing her arrest and deportation and the confiscation of her bond, upon her failure to do
so.“
On February 8, 1961, Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippines as a non-immigrant.
In the interrogation made in connection with her application for a temporary visitor’s visa to enter the
Philippines, she stated that she was a Chinese residing at Kowloon, Hongkong, and that she desired to take
a pleasure trip to the Philippines to visit her great (grand) uncle Lau Ching Ping for a period of one month.
She was permitted to come into the Philippines on March 13, 1961, and was permitted to stay for a period
of one month which would expire on April 13, 1961.
On the date of her arrival, Asher Y. Cheng filed a bond in the amount of P1,000.00 to undertake, among
others that said Lau Yuen Yeung would actually depart from the Philippines on or before the expiration of
her authorized period of stay in this country or within the period as in his discretion the Commissioner of
Immigration or his authorized representative might properly allow. After repeated extensions, petitioner Lau
Yuen Yeung was allowed to stay in the Philippines up to February 13, 1962.
On January 25, 1962, she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged
Filipino citizen. Because of the contemplated action of respondent to confiscate her bond and order her
arrest and immediate deportation, after the expiration of her authorized stay, she brought this action for
injunction with preliminary injunction. At the hearing which took place one and a half years after her
arrival, it was admitted that petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung could not write either English or Tagalog. Except
for a few words, she could not speak either English or Tagalog. She could not name any Filipino neighbor,
with a Filipino name except one, Rosa. She did not know the names of her brothers-in-law, or sisters-in-law.
ISSUE:
Should Lau Yuen Yeung become ipso facto a Filipino citizen, upon her marriage to a Filipino citizen?
HELD:
YES. The Court persuaded that it is in the best interest of all concerned that under Section 15 of
Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a
Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law.
Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine
citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not
suffer from any of the disqualifications under said Section 4.
As under any other law rich in benefits for those coming under it, doubtless there wil be instances where
unscrupulous persons wil attempt to take advantage of this provision of law by entering into fake and
fictitious marriages or mala fide matrimonies. We cannot as a matter of law hold that just because of
these possibilities, the construction of the provision should be otherwise than as dictated inexorably by more
ponderous relevant considerations, legal, juridical and practical. There can always be means of discovering
such undesirable practice and every case can be dealt with accordingly as it arises.
Section 16, as may be seen, is a parallel provision to Section 15. If the widow of an applicant for
naturalization as Filipino, who dies during the proceedings, is not required to go through a naturalization
preceeding, in order to be considered as a Filipino citizen hereof, it should follow that the wife of a living
Filipino cannot be denied the same privilege. This is plain common sense and there is absolutely no
evidence that the Legislature intended to treat them differently.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment of the Court a quo dismissing appellants’ petition for
injunction is hereby reversed and the Commissioner of Immigration and/or his authorized representative is
permanently enjoined from causing the arrest and deportation and the confiscation of the bond of
appellant Lau Yuen Yeung, who is hereby declared to have become a Filipino citizen from and by virtue of
her marriage to her co-appellant Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino citizen on January
25, 1962.
FACTS:
This Petition for Review assails the Decision of the CA, which affirmed the Decision of the RTC that
granted the Petition for Naturalization of respondent Azucena Saavedra Batuigas (Azucena).
On December 2, 2002, Azucena filed a Petition for Naturalization before the RTC of Zamboanga del Sur.
She stated that she intends in good faith to become a citizen of the Philippines and to renounce
absolutely and forever all allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty,
and particularly to China; and that she wil reside continuously in the Philippines from the time of the filing of
her Petition up to the time of her naturalization.
After all the jurisdictional requirements had been complied with, the Office of the Solicitor General filed its
Motion to Dismiss on the ground that Azucena failed to allege that she is engaged in a lawful occupation or
in some known lucrative trade. The OSG maintained that Azucena is not allowed under the Retail Trade
to engage directly or indirectly in the retail trade. The OSG likewise disputed Azucena’s claim that she
owns real property because aliens are precluded from owning lands in the country. Finding the grounds
relied upon by the OSG to be evidentiary in nature, the RTC denied said Motion.
Born in Malangas, Zamboanga del Sur on September 28, 1941 to Chinese parents, Azucena has never
departed the Philippines since birth. Azucena can speak English, Tagalog, Visayan, and Chavacano. Her
primary, secondary, and tertiary education were taken in Philippine schools. After earning a degree in
education, she then practiced her teaching profession in several different schools in Mindanao.
In 1968, at the age of 26, Azucena married Santiago Batuigas (Santiago), a natural-born Filipino citizen.
They have five children, all of whom studied in Philippine public and private schools and are all professionals.
After her stint as a teacher, Azucena and her husband, as conjugal partners, engaged in the retail
business of and later on in mil ing/distributing rice, corn, and copra. As proof of their income, Azucena
submitted their joint annual tax returns and balance sheets from 2000- 2002 and from 2004-2005. During
their marital union, the Batuigas spouses bought parcels of land in Barrio Lombog, Margosatubig.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner has validly complied the citizenship requirement as required by law to become a
naturalized citizen of the Philippines.
RULING:
Under existing laws, an alien may acquire Philippine citizenship through either judicial naturalization under CA
473 or administrative naturalization under Republic Act No. 9139 (the “Administrative Naturalization Law of
2000“). A third option, called derivative naturalization, which is available to alien women married to Filipino
husbands is found under Section 15 of CA 473, which provides that: “Any woman who is now or may
hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines and who might herself be lawfully naturalized shall be
deemed a citizen of the Philippines.“ Under this provision, foreign women who are married to Philippine citizens
may be deemed ipso facto Philippine citizens and it is neither necessary for them to prove that they
possess other qualifications for naturalization at the time of their marriage nor do they have to submit
themselves to judicial naturalization.
FRIVALDO VS COMELEC
FACTS:
Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor of the province of Sorsogon and assumed office in due time. The
League of Municipalities filed with the COMELEC a petition for the annulment of Frivaldo on the ground that
he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in the United States.
Frivaldo admitted the allegations but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that he was
naturalized as American citizen only to protect himself against President Marcos during the Martial Law
era.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Frivaldo is a Filipino citizen.
RULING:
No. Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter must be, among other
qualifications, a citizen of the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage under Article
V, Section 1, of the Constitution.
He claims that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by virtue of valid repatriation. He claims that by
actively participating in the local elections, he automatically forfeited American citizenship under the laws
of the United States of America. The Court stated that that the alleged forfeiture was between him
and the US. If he really wanted to drop his American citizenship, he could do so in accordance with CA No.
63 as amended by CA No. 473 and PD 725. Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of
Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation.
ROMUALDEZ V. COMELEC
Facts
Garay and Apostol filed a complaint against Sps. Romualdez for violation of the OEC and RA 8189 or Voter’s
Registration Act of 1996 for making false information as to their residence in their applications as new
voters in Burauen, Leyte.
The Complaint-Affidavit contained a prayer that a preliminary investigation be conducted by the
COMELEC, and if the evidence so warrants, the corresponding Information against petitioners be filed
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for the prosecution of the same.
Sps. Romualdez contend that they intend to reside in Burauen, Leyte since 1989. On May 2000, they took
actual residence in Burauen by leasing for 5 years the house of Renomeron.
The Complaint-Affidavit contained a prayer that a preliminary investigation be conducted by the
COMELEC, and if the evidence so warrants, the corresponding Information against petitioners be filed
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for the prosecution of the same.
Issue
WON due process was violated.
Held
No. First, the Complaint-Affidavit filed by private respondent with the COMELEC is couched in a language
which embraces the allegations necessary to support the charge for violation of Section 10(g) and (j), in
relation to Section 45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189.
Petitioners cannot be said to have been denied due process on the claim that the election offenses
charged against them by private respondent are entirely different from those for which they stand to be
accused of before the RTC, as charged by the COMELEC. In the first place, there appears to be no
incongruity between the charges as contained in the Complaint-Affidavit and the Informations filed before
the RTC, notwithstanding the denomination by private respondent of the alleged violations to be covered
by Section 261(y)(2) and Section 261(y)(5) of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 12 of Republic Act No.
8189. Evidently, the Informations directed to be filed by the COMELEC against petitioners, and which were,
in fact, filed with the RTC, were based on the same set of facts as originally alleged in the private
respondent’s Complaint-Affidavit.
In Lacson, we underscored the elementary rule that the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the
allegations in the Complaint or Information, and not by the evidence presented by the parties at the trial.
Indeed, in Lacson, we articulated that the real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the
caption or preamble of the Information nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have
been violated, they being conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of facts in the Complaint or
Information.
NAVARRO V DOMAGTOY
FACTS:
On October 27, 1994, the Judge Dumagtoy allegedly performed a marriage ceremony between Floriano Dador
Sumaylo and Gemma G. Del Rosario outside of the respondent’s court’s jurisdiction. Such wedding was
solemnized at the respondent’s residence in municipality of Dapa, which does not fall within the respondent’s
jurisdictional area of Sta. Monica Burgos.
For his defense, Dumagtoy maintained that in solemnizing the marriage between Sumaylo and
Del Rosario, he did not violate Article 7, paragraph one (1) of the Family Code, which states that “Marriage
may be solemnized by: (1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court’s jurisdiction.“; and that
Article 8 thereof applies to the case in question.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the solemnization of the marriage of Sumaylo and Del Rosario was within the respondent’s
court’s jurisdiction.
HELD:
NO. Under Article 3, one of the formal requisites of marriage is the “authority of the solemnizing officer.“
Under Article 7, marriage may be solemnized by, among others, “any incumbent member of the judiciary
within the court’s jurisdiction.“ Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court’s jurisdiction, there is
a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the
validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability. Article 8, which is a
directory provision, refers only to the venue of the marriage ceremony and does not alter or qualify the
authority of the solemnizing officer as provided in the preceding provision. Non-compliance herewith wil not
invalidate the marriage.
Respondent judge points to Article 8 and its exceptions as the justifications for his having solemnized the
marriage between Floriano Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario outside of his court’s jurisdiction. As the
aforequoted provision states, a marriage can be held outside of the judge’s chambers or courtroom only in
the following instances: (1) at the point of death, (2) in remote places in accordance with Article 29 or
(3) upon request of both parties in writing in a sworn statement to this effect. There is no pretense that
either Sumaylo or del Rosario was at the point of death or in a remote place. Moreover, the written
request presented addressed to the respondent judge was made by only one party, Gemma del Rosario.
RAQUEL KHO V REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 187462, 01 June 2016
FACTS
Petitioner Raquel Kho (Raquel) filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a petition for the declaration
of nullity of marriage to Respondent Veronica Kho (Veronica) on the ground that their marriage was
solemnized without the requisite marriage license. According to Raquel, his parents summoned one Eusebio
Colongon to arrange and prepare whatever necessary papers required for the marriage of Raquel and
Veronica. The couple thereafter exchanged vows. Nevertheless, Raquel alleges that he never went to
the Local Civil Registrar (MCR) to apply for a marriage license and had not seen any documents in
connection thereto. Thus, their marriage is void ab initio. Raquel presented as evidence a Certification
from the LCR that there is neither record nor copy of the marriage license issued to Raquel and
Veronica. Veronica opposed Raquel’s allegations by claiming that their marriage was celebrated with a
marriage license, though she cannot present any evidence to support her claim.
The RTC rendered its decision granting the petition, finding Raquel to have sufficiently established the
absence of the requisite marriage license when his marriage to Veronica took place. On appeal, the Court
of Appeals (CA) reversed the RTC’s decision, holding that there is a presumption a marriage license was
issued in the absence of any indication in the marriage certificate on the contrary.
ISSUE
Whether or not the petition for nullity of marriage must be granted.
RULING
The Supreme Court ruled in the affirmative. Under the Civil Code, which is the applicable law in the
present case, provides that a marriage license is one of the requisites to be complied with in order for a
marriage to be validly solemnized, except for some instances of marriages of exceptional character. Now,
for a marriage to be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage license, the law requires
that its absence must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at least, supported by a certification
from the local civil registrar that no such marriage was issued to the parties.
In the present case, aside from the fact that Veronica failed to adduce any evidence to show that
there was a valid marriage license at the time of the celebration of the marriage, Raquel was able to
present a Certification issued by the LCR attesting that neither a record nor a copy of any marriage
license was ever issued in favor of Raquel and Veronica. Thus, on the basis of such certification, the
presumed validity of the marriage of Raquel and Veronica has been overcome and it becomes the burden
of Veronica to prove that their marriage is valid as it is she who alleges such validity.
NINAL V BAYADOG
G.R. No. 133778
FACTS
Pepito Ninal was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting
in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and
respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. They executed an affidavit dated
December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, thus,
they are exempted from securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito died in a car accident.
After their father’s death, petitioners, children of Pepito in the first marriage, filed a petition for
declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack
of a marriage license. The case was filed under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the
second marriage would affect petitioner’s successional rights. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground
that petitioners have no cause of action since they are not among the persons who could file an action
for "annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the Family Code.
ISSUE
W/N the marriage was valid
HELD
The 5-year common law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of
marriage should be a period of legal union. Pepito and Teodulfa’s marriage was stil subsisting 5 years prior
to Pepito and Norma’s marriage. 2nd marriage is void ab initio. Note: However, other than for purposes of
remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes,
such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or il egitimacy of a child, settlement of
estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the
validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to
the determination of the case.
DIAZ-SALGADO V ANSON
FACTS:
Luis Anson filed a Complaint against Jo-Ann Diaz-Salgado and Gerard Salgado (Spouses Salgado) seeking
the annulment of the three Unilateral Deeds of Sale and the Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of
Estate of the Deceased Severina De Asis.
Luis alleged in his complaint that he is the surviving spouse of the late Severina de Asis-Anson. They were
married in a civil ceremony on December 28, 1966. Prior to the celebration of their marriage, Severina
gave birth to their daughter, Maria Luisa on December 30, 1965 while Jo-Ann is Severina’s daughter from a
previous relationship.
During his marital union with Severina, they acquired several real properties, because there was no
marriage settlement between him and Severina, the above-listed properties pertain to their conjugal
partnership. But without his knowledge and consent, Severina executed three separate Unilateral Deeds
of Sale transferring the properties in favor of Jo-Ann, who secured new certificates of title over the said
properties.10 When Severina died Maria Luisa executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate of
Deceased Severina de Asis adjudicating herself as Severina’s sole heir. She secured new TCTs over
the properties.
Luis claimed that because of the preceding acts, he was divested of his lawful share in the conjugal
properties and of his inheritance as a compulsory heir of Severina. The Spouses in defense raised the
nullity of the marriage which took effect prior the effectively of the family code for lack of marriage
license.
RTC and CA rendered its Decision in favor of Luis.
ISSUE:
Is the marriage celebrated prior the effectivity of the FC valid in the absence of marriage license?
HELD:
No. A cursory examination of the marriage contract of Luis and Severina reveals that no marriage license
number was indicated therein. It also appears therein that no marriage license was exhibited to the
solemnizing officer with Article 77 of Republic Act No. 386 (Civil Code) being cited as the reason
therefor. The reference to Article 77 of the Civil Code in the marriage contract is not dismissible. Being
a public document, the marriage contract is not only a prima facie proof of marriage, but is also a prima
facie evidence of the facts stated therein.
Consequently, the entries made in Luis and Severina’s marriage contract are prima facie proof that at
the time of their marriage, no marriage license was exhibited to the solemnizing officer for the reason
that their marriage is of an exceptional character under Article 77 of the Civil Code.Article 77 of the
Civil Code provides,
In the eyes of the law, the marriage already exists; the subsequent ceremony is undertaken merely to
conform to religious practices. Thus, the parties are exempted from complying with the required issuance
of marriage license insofar as the subsequent religious ceremony is concerned. For this exemption to be
applicable, it is sine qua non that: (1) the parties to the religious ceremony must already be married to
each other in accordance with law (civil marriage); and (2) the ratifying ceremony is purely religious in
nature.
REPUBLIC V DAYOT
FACTS:
Jose and Felisa Dayot were married at the Pasay City Hall on November 24, 1986. In lieu of a marriage
license, they executed a sworn affidavit that they had lived together for at least 5years. On August
1990, Jose contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual. They were both employees of the National
Statistics and Coordinating Board. Felisa then filed on June 1993 an action for bigamy against Jose and
an administrative complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman. On the other hand, Jose filed a complaint on
July 1993 for annulment and/or declaration of nullity of marriage where he contended that his marriage
with Felisa was a sham and his consent was secured through fraud.
ISSUE: Whether or not Jose’s marriage with Felisa is valid considering that they executed a sworn
affidavit in lieu of the marriage license requirement.
HELD
CA indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at the time they
executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. Jose and Felisa started living together only in
June 1986, or barely five months before the celebration of their marriage on November 1986. Findings of
facts of the Court of Appeals are binding in the Supreme Court.
The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law and invalidates a
marriage. Furthermore, “the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose
and Felisa’s cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as an exception to the requirement for
a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that the law
precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties under oath“. Hence, Jose and Felisa’s
marriage is void ab initio. The court also ruled that an action for nullity of marriage is
imprescriptible. The right to impugn marriage does not prescribe and may be raised any time.
GARCIA V. RECIO
G.R. No. 138322
Facts
Rederick Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, on March 1, 1987. On May 18,
1989, a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian family court. On
June 26, 1992, Rederick became an Australian citizen. He then married Grace Garcia, a Filipina, on
January 12, 1994. In their application for a marriage license, Rederick was declared single and Filipino. On
October 22, 1995, Grace and Rederick lived separately even without prior judicial dissolution of their
marriage.
Grace filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage on March 2, 1998, on the grounds of bigamy.
She contended that Rederick’s previous marriage was stil subsisting at the time she contracted a
marriage with him. She claimed that she learned of Rederick’s marriage to Editha Samson only in
November 1997. However, Rederick said that he had told Grace about his previous marriage and the
dissolution thereof. On July 7, 1998, Rederick was able to secure a divorce decree from a family court in
Australia. In this case, the Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads
A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute (unless the other party
has died) bigamy commits the offence of bigamy.
Issue
Did Rederick Garcia commit bigamy?
Ruling
The Court is not sure. The case has been remanded to the Court a quo for the following reasons. Article
26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines says that the Filipino spouse can be allowed to
remarry only when the alien spouse who initiated the divorce would be capacitated to remarry because of
the divorce. Like any other facts, foreign laws must be alleged and proved.
There are two basic types of divorce: (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii and (2) limited divorce or
a mensa et thoro. The Court could not determine which type of divorce Rederick had acquired in
Australia because of insufficient evidence.
The Australian law provision stated in the facts led the Court to believe that Rederick’s divorce might
have been restricted. Hence, his capacity to remarry has not been proven. Thus, the Court had to
remand the case to find conclusive evidence. However, the Court also ordered that if there is no proof
shown that Rederick had the capacity to remarry, then the court a quo may declare the nullity of the
marriage on the ground of bigamy since there are already two marriages contracted.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ORBECIDO III
G.R. No.154380
FACTS:
Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Vil anueva at the United Church of Christ in the Philippines.
Their marriage was blessed with a son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady
Kimberly V. Orbecido. In 1986, Cipriano’s wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A
few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen. Sometime
in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then married a
certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him. Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a
petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code in which the court
granted. The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), alleged that it is not applicable to
the instant case because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated
between a Filipino citizen and an alien.The proper remedy, according to the OSG, is to file a petition for
annulment or for legal separation.
ISSUE:
Whether Cipriano can remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code.
RULING:
NO. Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of
the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a
foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if
the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage.
The twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage,
but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the
latter to remarry.
In this case, when Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was stil a valid marriage
that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife
subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the
application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the “divorced“
Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.
VAN DORN VS. ROMILLO, JR.
FACTS:
Petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent Richard Upton is a
citizen of the United States. They were married in Hongkong in 1972. In 1982 they were divorced in
Nevada, USA. Petitioner re-married in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.
In 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner in the RTC of Pasay City stating that petitioner
Alice’s business in Ermita, Manila, the Galleon Shop, is their conjugal property and that private respondent
be declared with right to manage the conjugal property.
Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous
judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged
that he and petitioner had “no community property“. The Court below denied the Motion to Dismiss on the
ground that the property involved is located in the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in
the case.
Petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from laying claim on the alleged conjugal property
because of the representation he made in the divorce proceedings. Respondent on the other hand
maintain that, the divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law
and public policy.
ISSUE:
What is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their alleged conjugal property in the
Philippines?
HELD:
The divorce decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private
respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine
nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our
concept of public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized
in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in
Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which
divorce dissolves the marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have
no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner’s husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal
assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country’s Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over
him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court
from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.
REPUBLIC V IYOY
FACTS:
Crasus Iyoy married Fely on December 16, 1961 in Cebu City. They begot five children. After
the celebration of their marriage, respondent Crasus discovered that Fely was “hot-tempered, a nagger
and extravagant.“ In 1984, Fely left the Philippines for the United States of America (U.S.A.), leaving all of
their five children to the care of respondent Crasus. Sometime in 1985, respondent Crasus learned, through
the letters sent by Fely to their children, that Fely got married to an American, with whom she eventually
had a child. Fely had five visits in Cebu City but never met Crasus. Also, she had been openly using the
surname of her American husband in the Philippines and in the USA. Crasus filed a declaration of nullity of
marriage on March 25, 1997.
On her Answer, Fely alleged that while she did file for divorce from respondent Crasus, she denied having
herself sent a letter to respondent Crasus requesting him to sign the enclosed divorce papers. After
securing a divorce from respondent Crasus, Fely married her American husband and acquired American
citizenship. She argued that her marriage to her American husband was legal because now being an
American citizen, her status shall be governed by the law of her present nationality. Fely also prayed
that the RTC declare her marriage to respondent Crasus null and void; and that respondent Crasus be
ordered to pay to Fely the P90,000.00 she advanced to him, with interest, plus, moral and exemplary
damages, attorney’s fees, and litigation expenses.
The Regional Trial Court declared the marriage of Crasus and Fely null and void ab ignition on the ground
of psychological incapacity. One factor considered by the RTC is that Fely obtained a divorce decree in
the United States of America and married another man and has established another family of her own.
Plaintiff is in an anomalous situation, wherein he is married to a wife who is already married to another man
in another country. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision.
ISSUE
1. Whether or not abandonment and sexual infidelity constitute psychological incapacity.
2. Whether or not the divorce instituted by Fely abroad was valid.
RULING
1st issue: The totality of evidence presented during the trial is insufficient to support the finding of
psychological incapacity of Fely. Using the guidelines established by the cases of Santos, Molina and Marcos,
this Court found that the totality of evidence presented by respondent Crasus failed miserably to
establish the alleged psychological incapacity of his wife Fely; therefore, there is no basis for declaring
their marriage null and void under Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines. Irreconcilable
differences, conflicting personalities, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual
alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment, by themselves, also do not warrant a finding of
psychological incapacity under the said Article.
2nd issue: As it is worded, Article 26, paragraph 2, refers to a special situation wherein one of the couple
getting married is a Filipino citizen and the other a foreigner at the time the marriage was celebrated.
By its plain and literal interpretation, the said provision cannot be applied to the case of respondent
Crasus and his wife Fely because at the time Fely obtained her divorce, she was stil a Filipino citizen.
Although the exact date was not established, Fely herself admitted in her Answer filed before the RTC
that she obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus sometime after she left for the United States in
1984, after which she married her American husband in 1985. In the same Answer, she alleged that she
had been an American citizen since 1988. At the time she filed for divorce, Fely was stil a Filipino citizen,
and pursuant to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, she was
stil bound by Philippine laws on family rights and duties, status, condition, and legal capacity, even when she
was already living abroad. Philippine laws, then and even until now, do not allow and recognize divorce
between Filipino spouses. Thus, Fely could not have validly obtained a divorce from respondent Crasus.
The Supreme Court held that the marriage of respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy remains
valid and subsisting.
FUJIKI C MARINAY
FACTS
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay
(Marinay) in the Philippines on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with petitioner’s parents.
Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each
other. In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first marriage
being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara
brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She left
Maekara and started to contact Fujiki. Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to
reestablish their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan
which declared the marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy. On 14 January
2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: “Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of
Absolute Nullity of Marriage).“ The RTC immediately issued an Order dismissing the petition. The RTC
ruled that the petition was in “gross violation“ of the provisions of A.M. 02-10-11 pertaining to venue and the
party who may file the petition. The RTC took the view that only “the husband or the wife,“ in this case
either Maekara or Marinay, can file the petition to declare their marriage void, and not Fujiki. The RTC
resolved to deny petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE
Whether the husband of the first marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying
the second marriage between his wife and her second husband – YES
RULING AND DOCTRINE
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a
marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country.
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of
the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a
fact under the Rules of Court. To be more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in
evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48 (b)
of the Rules of Court.
To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of foreign judgment would mean that
the trial court and the parties should follow its provisions, including the form and contents of the petition,
the service of summons, the investigation of the public prosecutor, the setting of pre-trial, the trial and
the judgment of the trial court. This is absurd because it wil litigate the case anew. It wil defeat the
purpose of recognizing foreign judgments, which is “to limit repetitive litigation on claims and issues.
There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the Japanese Family Court
judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While the
Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is fully consistent with Philippine public
policy, as bigamous marriages are declared void from the beginning under Article 35 (4) of the Family
Code.
CORPUZ VS. STO. TOMAS
Facts:
Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship through
naturalization in 2000. In 2005, he married respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City. He
went to Canada soon after the wedding. When he returned to the Philippines four months later, he
discovered that his wife was having an affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned
to Canada and filed a petition for divorce which was granted.
Two years after the divorce, Gerbert found another Filipina to love. Desirous of marrying his new Filipina
fiance in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian
divorce decree on his and Daisylyn's marriage certificate. Despite the registration, an official of the NSO
informed Gerbert that the marriage between him and Daisylyn stil subsists under Philippine law; to be
enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be judicial y recognized by a competent Philippine court.
Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of
marriage as dissolved with the RTC. Daisylyn offered no opposition to Gerbert's petition.
The RTC denied the petition, ruling that Gerbert was not the proper party to institute the action for
judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that
only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code, in order for him or her to be able to remarry under Philippine law
ISSUE
WHETHER OR NOT the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code extends to aliens the right to
petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree?
RULING
NO. The provision was included in the law to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains
married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The
legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status, settling the
doubts created by the divorce decree. Essential y, the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse
considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to remarry. Without the second paragraph of Article 26
of the Family Code, the judicial recognition of the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding
instituted precisely for that purpose or as a related issue in another proceeding, would be of no
significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of severing the
marital bond; Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy against absolute divorces cannot be
subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of the second paragraph in Article
26 of the Family Code provides the direct exception to this rule and serves as basis for recognizing the
dissolution of the marriage between the Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse. Only the Filipino spouse
can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code; the alien spouse can claim no right
under this provision.
REPUBLIC V MANALO
Facts:
Marelyn Tanedo Manalo was married to a Japanese national, Yoshino Minoro. Manalo filed a case for divorce
in Japan and after due proceedings, a divorce decree dated December 6, 2011, was granted. Manalo now
wants to cancel the entry of marriage between her and Minoro from the Civil Registry and to be allowed
to reuse her maiden surname, Manalo.
According to Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code, Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen
and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse incapacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry
under Philippine law.
ISSUE
Was the divorce obtained by Marelyn Manalo from Japan valid here in the Philippines?
RULING
The Court cannot determine due to insufficient evidence.
It has been ruled that foreign laws must be proven. There are two basic types of divorces: (1) absolute
divorce or a vinculo matrimonii, which terminates the marriage, and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro,
which suspends it and leaves the bond in full force.
The presentation solely of the divorce decree wil not suffice to lead the Court to believe that the
decree is valid or constitutes absolute divorce. The fact of divorce must stil be proven. Therefore, the
Japanese law on divorce must stil be proved.
In this case, the Court remanded the case to the court of origin for further proceedings and reception of
evidence as to the relevant Japanese law on divorce.
Leonila Santiago v. People of the PH
GR 200233, July 15, 2015
Facts:
4 months after solemnization of marriage, Leonila (petitioner) and Nicanor Santiago were served an
information for Bigamy for the prosecution adduced that Nicaonor was stil married to Estela when he
entered into the 2nd marriage; he was able to escape while petitioner pleaded ’not guilty’ relying on the
fact that when she married him, she thought he was single. She soon averred that their marriage was void
due to lack of marriage license, wherein she should not then be charged with bigamy. 11 years after
inception if criminal case, Estela Galang, the first wife, testified for the prosecution. She alleged that she
had met petitioner and introduced herself as the legal wife. Petitioner denied allegation and stated that
she met Estela only after she had already married Nicanor.
Issue
W/N petitioner is co-accused in the instant case of Bigamy.
W/N marriage between Leonila and Nicanor is valid.
Held:
Lower courts consistently found that petitioner indeed knew of the first marriage as shown by the totality
of the following circumstances: (1) when Nicanor was courting and visiting petitioner in the house of her inlaws, they openly showed their disapproval of him (2) it was incredible for a learned person like petitioner to
not know of his true civil status (3) Estela, who was the more credible witness, compared to petitioner who
had various inconsistent testimonies, straightforwardly testified that she had already told petitioner on two
occasions that the former was the legal wife of Nicanor. In People v. Archil a, knowledge of the second wife
of the fact of her spouse’s existing prior marriage, constitutes an indispensable cooperation in the
commission of Bigamy, which makes her responsible as an accomplice. She is not co-accused. She is guilty of
Bigamy as an accomplice thereby sentenced to 6m arresto mayor to 4y prision correccional.
TENEBORO V COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 150758
FACTS:
Tenebro married Ancajas (complainant) on April 10, 1990. On 1991, Tenebro informed Ancajas that he was
previously married to a certain Vil areyes on November 10, 1986. Invoking this previous marriage, Tenebro
left Ancajas stating that he wanted to cohabit with Vil areyes.
Subsequently, on January 25,1993, Tenebro again contracted another marriage with Vil egas. When
Ancajas learned of this third marriage, she then filed a criminal complaint for bigamy against Tenebro.
During trial, Tenebro denied that he and Vil areyes were validly married to each other claiming that no
marriage ceremony took place to solemnize their union. He alleged that he only signed a marriage
contract merely to enable her to get the allotment from his office in connection with his work as a
seaman. He further avers that there was no record of his marriage with Vil areyes.
On November 10, 1997, the RTC found Tenebro guilty for the crime of bigamy. On appeal, the CA affirmed
the decision of the RTC. In his petition for review to the SC, Tenebro presents a two-tiered defense, in
which he (1) denies the existence of his first marriage to Vil areyes, and (2) argues that the declaration
of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity, which is an alleged indicator
that his marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validity, retroacts to the date on which
the second marriage was celebrated. Hence, petitioner argues that all four of the elements of the crime
of bigamy are absent, and prays for his acquittal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Tenebro may stil be convicted for the crime of bigamy despite the subsequent judicial
declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity?
HELD:
No, the subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity does
not retroact to the date of the celebration of the marriage insofar as the Philippines’ penal laws are
concerned. As such, an individual who contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of
a valid marriage is criminally liable for bigamy, notwithstanding the subsequent declaration that the second
marriage is void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity.
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code criminalizes “any person who shall contract a second or subsequent
marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been
declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings“. A plain
reading of the law, therefore, would indicate that the provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a
second or a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage.
Thus, as soon as the second marriage to Ancajas was celebrated on April 10, 1990, during the subsistence
of the valid first marriage, the crime of bigamy had already been consummated. To our mind, there is no
cogent reason for distinguishing between a subsequent marriage that is null and void purely because it is a
second or subsequent marriage, and a subsequent marriage that is null and void on the ground of
psychological incapacity, at least insofar as criminal liability for bigamy is concerned. The State’s penal
laws protecting the institution of marriage are in recognition of the sacrosanct character of this special
contract between spouses, and punish an individual’s deliberate disregard of the permanent character of
the special bond between spouses, which petitioner has undoubtedly done.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V TAMPUS
Facts
Nilda B. Tampus and Dante L. Del Mundo were married on November 29, 1975. Three days later, Dante, a
member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), was sent to Jolo, Sulu for an assignment and Nilda
had not heard from him since. Despite her efforts to locate Dante, she was unsuccessful. On April 14, 2009,
Nilda filed a petition to declare Dante as presumptively dead for the purpose of remarriage.
Issue
Should Dante be declared presumptively dead?
Ruling
The court ruled that Dante should not be declared presumptively dead. According to Article 41 of the
Family Code of the Philippines, there are four essential requirements for a judicial declaration of
presumptive death. Firstly, the absent spouse must have been missing for four consecutive years or two
consecutive years if the disappearance occurred in a situation of danger of death. Secondly, the present
spouse must wish to remarry. Thirdly, the present spouse must have a well-founded belief that the
absentee is dead. Lastly, the present spouse must file a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee.
The court found that Nilda did not meet the requirement of having a well-founded belief of Dante’s death.
Nilda testified that she only made inquiries with Dante’s parents, relatives, and neighbors but made no
further efforts to find him. She did not even seek the help of the authorities or the AFP in finding him.
The court noted that Nilda could have made additional efforts, such as calling the AFP headquarters or
inquiring about the status of Dante’s mission, to create a well-founded belief of his death. Therefore, Nilda
failed to meet the strict standard and degree of diligence required for a declaration of presumptive
death.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V JOSE B. SARANOGON
FACTS:
Sarenogon filed a petition before the RTC to declare the presumptive death of his wife Netchie. He
testified that they got married and lived together as husband and wife for a month only because he left
to work as a seaman while Netchie went to Hongkong as a domestic helper. For 3 months, he did not
receive any communication from Netchie and had no idea about her whereabouts. He returned home after
his contract expired, he inquired from Netchie’s relatives and they also did not know where she was.
Because of these, he had to presume that his wife Netchie was already dead. He filed the Petition
before the RTC so he could contract another marriage pursuant to Article 41 of the Family Code.
ISSUES:
1. Whether Rule 65 is the proper recourse to question the RTC ruling
2. Whether the “well-founded belief“ requisite under Article 41 (FC) was complied with?
HELD:
1. YES. Under Article 247 of the Family Code, the RTC’s decision on a petition pursuant to Article41 of
the Family Code is immediately final and executory. Thus, the CA has no jurisdiction to entertain a notice
of appeal pertaining to such judgment.
2. NO. To comply with this requirement, the present spouse must prove that his/her belief wasthe result of
diligent and reasonable efforts and inquiries to locate the absent spouse and thatbased on these efforts
and inquiries, he/she believes that under the circumstances, the absentspouse is already dead. The
"well-founded belief" requisite under Article 41 of the Family Codeis complied with only upon a showing that
sincere honest-to-goodness efforts had indeed beenmade to ascertain whether the absent spouse is stil
alive or is already dead. It requires exertionof active effort. In this case, Sarenogon failed to satisfy
required “well-founded belief“ standard.Jose did not call to the witness stand specific individuals or persons
whom he allegedly saw ormet in the course of his search or quest for the allegedly missing Netchie. Neither
did he provethat he sought the assistance of the pertinent government agencies as well as the media,
nordetermined and unflagging search for Netchie, say for at least two years (and what those yearswere),
and naming the particular places, provinces, cities, barangays or municipalities that he visited, or went to,
and identifying the specific persons he interviewed or talked to in the courseof his search.
DOMINGO V CA
FACTS:
Roberto Domingo married Delia Soledad in 1976 while being married with Emerlina dela Paz.
He has been unemployed and completely dependent upon Delia, who has been working in Saudi Arabia, for
support and subsistence.
Delia only found out about the prior marriage when Emerlina sued them for bigamy in 1983.
In 1989, she found out that Roberto was cohabiting with another woman and he was disposing of some of her
properties without her knowledge and consent.
In May 1991, Delia filed a petition for judicial declaration of nullity of her marriage to Roberto and separation
of property.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage is necessary. If in affirmative,
whether the same should be filed only for purpose of remarriage.
RULING:
Yes. A declaration of the absolute nullity of marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action
or a ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for
purpose of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for the said projected
marriage be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void.
The requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the protection of the
spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is il egal and void, marries again. With the judicial declaration
of the nullity of his or her first marriage, the person who marries again cannot be charged with bigamy.
Article 40 as finally formulated included the significant clause denotes that final judgment declaring the
previous marriage void need not be obtained only for purposes of remarriage. A person can conceive of
other instances other than remarriage, such as in case of an action for liquidation, partition, distribution
and separation of property between the spouses, as well as an action for the custody and support of
their common children and the delivery of the latters' presumptive legitimes. In such cases, however, one is
required by law to show proof that the previous one was an absolute nullity.
Marriage is an “inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family;“ as such, it “shall be protected by
the State. As a matter of policy, there should be a final judgment declaring the marriage void and a
party should not declare for himself or herself whether or not the marriage is void.
CASTILLO V DE LEON CASTILLO
Facts:
On 25 May 1972, respondent Lea P. De Leon Castil o (Lea) married Benjamin Bautista (Bautista). On 6
January 1979, respondent married herein petitioner Renato A. Castil o (Renato).
On 28 May 2001, Renato filed before the RTC a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, praying
that his marriage to Lea be declared void due to her subsisting marriage to Bautista. Respondent
opposed the Petition, and contended that her marriage to Bautista was null and void as they had not
secured any license therefor, and neither of them was a member of the denomination to which the
solemnizing officer belonged.
RTC declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void ab initio on the ground that
it was a bigamous marriage under Article 41 of the Family Code. The RTC said that the fact that Lea's
marriage to Bautista was subsisting when she married Renato on 6 January 1979, makes her marriage to
Renato bigamous, thus rendering it void ab initio. The lower court dismissed Lea's argument that she need
not obtain a judicial decree of nullity and could presume the nullity of a prior subsisting marriage. The
RTC stressed that so long as no judicial declaration exists, the prior marriage is valid and existing. Lastly,
RTC also said that even if respondent eventually had her first marriage judicial y declared void, the fact
remains that the first and second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled, since
Lea failed to obtain a judicial decree of nullity for her first marriage to Bautista before contracting her
second marriage with Renato.
CA reversed and set aside the RTC's Decision and Order and upheld the validity of the parties'
marriage. In reversing the RTC, the CA said that since Lea's marriages were solemnized in 1972 and in
1979, or prior to the effectivity of the Family Code on 3 August 1988, the Civil Code is the applicable law
since it is the law in effect at the time the marriages were celebrated, and not the Family Code.
Furthermore, the CA ruled that the Civil Code does not state that a judicial decree is necessary in
order to establish the nullity of a marriage.
Issue
W/N judicial declaration is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a marriage.
Ruling
NO, under the Civil Code. Petition is DENIED. The Court held that the subsequent marriage of Lea to
Renato is valid in view of the invalidity of her first marriage to Bautista because of the absence of a
marriage license. That there was no judicial declaration that the first marriage was void ab initio before
the second marriage was contracted is immaterial as this is not a requirement under the Civil Code.
Nonetheless, the subsequent Decision of the RTC declaring the nullity of Lea's first marriage only serves
to strengthen the conclusion that her subsequent marriage to Renato is valid.
MONTANEZ V CIPRIANO
FACTS
Respondent Lourdes Cipriano married Socrates Flores on April 8, 1976. On January 24, 1983, during the
subsistence of the said marriage, respondent married Silverio V. Cipriano.
In 2001, respondent filed a Petition for the Annulment of her marriage with Socrates on the ground of the
latter’s psychological incapacity. On July 18, 2003, the marriage of respondent with Socrates was declared
null and void. Said decision became final and executory on October 13, 2003.
On May 14, 2004, petitioner Merlinda Montanez, Silverio’s daughter from the first marriage, filed a Complaint
for Bigamy against respondent. The respondent filed a Motion to Quash Information alleging that her
marriage with Socrates had already been declared void ab initio in 2003, thus, there was no more
marriage to speak of prior to her marriage to Silverio on January 24, 1983. Hence, the basic element of
the crime of bigamy, i.e., two valid marriages, is wanting.
The RTC dismissed the case ruling that since the second marriage was contracted before the
enactment of the Family Code, the judicial declaration of absolute nullity is not required as a condition
precedent to contracting a subsequent marriage thereby rendering the second marriage valid.
ISSUE
Is the declaration of the judicial nullity of the first marriage a valid defense for a charge of bigamy?
HELD
NO. The subsequent nullification of the first marriage is immaterial to the commission of the crime of
bigamy.
The elements of the crime of bigamy are: (a) the offender has been legally married;; (b) the marriage
has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be
presumed dead according to the Civil Code;; (c) that he contracts a second or subsequent marriage;;
and (d) the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity. The felony is
consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or subsequent marriage. It is essential in the
prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all the essential requirements, would be
valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage.
At the time respondent contracted the second marriage, the first marriage was stil subsisting as it had
not yet been legally dissolved. The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage would not
change the fact that she contracted the second marriage during the subsistence of the first marriage.
Thus, respondent was properly charged of the crime of bigamy, since the essential elements of the
offense charged were sufficiently alleged.
Therefore, the dismissal of the charge of bigamy against respondent is improper.
NORBERTO VITANGCOL VS. PEOPLE
FACTS
On December 4, 1994, Norberto married Alice G. Eduardo (Alice) at the Manila Cathedral in Intramuros. She
eventually discovered that Norberto was previously married to a certain Gina M. Gaerlan (Gina) on July 17,
1987, as evidenced by a marriage contract registered with the National Statistics Office. Alice
subsequently filed a criminal Complaint for bigamy against Norberto.
Petitioner’s first marriage was solemnized on July 17, 1987. This was before the Family Code of the
Philippines became effective on August 3,1988. He presents as evidence a Certification which states that
the Office of Civil Registrar has no record of the marriage license allegedly issued in his favor and his first
wife, Gina. He argues that the first marriage was void because there is no proof of existence of its
marriage license. Hence, he is not guilty of bigamy.
ISSUES
Is Norberto guilty of bigamy because his first marriage has a certificate that “the marriage license
cannot be found“?
RULING
No. The Supreme Court ruled that “Cannot be found“ does not mean “does not exist.“ The document with
greater credence is the signed Marriage Contract bearing the marriage license number. The latter
have greater weight. Hence, the certification of “cannot be found“ wil not exculpate him from bigamy.
SUSAN NICDAO CARINO VS SUSAN YEE CARINO
G. R. No. 132529 – 351 SCRA 127
FACTS
In 1969 SPO4 Santiago Carino married Susan Nicdao Carino He had 2 children with her. In 1992, SPO4
contracted a second marriage, this time with Susan Yee Carino. In 1988, prior to his second marriage, SPO4
Carino was already bedridden and he was under the care of Yee. In 1992, he died 13 days after his
marriage with Yee. Thereafter, the both Susan Nocdao and Susan Yee went to claim the benefits of
SPO4 Carino. Nicdao was able to claim a total of P140,000.00 while Yee was able to collect a total of
P21,000.00. In 1993, Yee filed an action for collection of sum of money against Nicdao. She wanted to have
half of the P140k. Yee admitted that her marriage with SPO4 was solemnized during the subsistence of
the marriage between SPO4 Carino and Nicdao but the said marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 Carino is
null and void due to the absence of a valid marriage license as certified by the local civil registrar. Yee
also claimed that she only found out about the previous marriage on SPO4 Carino’s funeral.
ISSUE
Whether or not the court may pass upon the validity of the marriages herein to resolve the claim of
presumptive legitime.
HELD
Yes. The marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 Carino is void due the absence of a valid marriage license.
The marriage between Yee and SPO4 Carino is likewise void for the same has been solemnized without
the judicial declaration of the nullity of the marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 Carino. Under Article 40
of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage
on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute
nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the
sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final
judgment declaring the previous marriage void. However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial
action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity.
For other purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or il egitimacy of a
child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court
may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit
not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case. In such instances, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to
prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not
be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void.
The SC ruled that Yee has no right to the benefits earned by SPO4 Carino as a policeman for their
marriage is void due to bigamy; she is only entitled to properties, money etc owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions. Wages and salaries earned by each party shall belong to him
or her exclusively (Art. 148 of FC). Nicdao is entitled to the full benefits earned by SPO4 Carino as a cop
even if their marriage is likewise void. This is because the two were capacitated to marry each other
for there were no impediments but their marriage was void due to the lack of a marriage license; in their
situation, their property relations is governed by Art 147 of the FC which provides that everything they
earned during their cohabitation is presumed to have been equally contributed by each party – this
includes salaries and wages earned by each party notwithstanding the fact that the other may not have
contributed at all.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V RORIDEL MOLINA
G.R. NO. 108763
FACTS
Roridel Molina and Reynaldo Molina were married on April 14, 1985. A son, Andre Molina was born out of their
marriage in 1986. However, a year after their marriage, Roridel alleged that her husband Reynaldo showed
signs of immaturity and irresponsibility as a husband and a father. Reynaldo, as claimed was spending more
time with his friends, depending on his parents for aid and assistance, and was dishonest with his wife
regarding their finances. He even lost his job and abandon his family. Thus, due to his immaturity and
actions that lead to their frequent quarrels, their relationship was estranged and resulted to the filing of
this case to declare the marriage null and void on ground of psychological incapacity.
ISSUE
Whether the marriage of Reynaldo and Roridel shall be declared null and void on ground of psychological
incapacity.
RULING
No. The court ruled that psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental nor physical
incapacity. The law intended to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases
of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. The condition must exist at the time of the celebration of the marriage
and must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability.
In this case, there is no clear showing that the defect spoken of is an incapacity, but instead is likely to
appear as 'difficulty', if not outright 'refusal' or 'neglect' in the performance of some marital obligations.
Mere showing of "irreconcilable differences" and "conflicting personalities" in no wise constitutes psychological
incapacity. Their problem shows no gravity, neither juridical antecedence nor its incurability.
BRENDA MARCOS V WILSON MARCOS
G.R. NO. 136490
Facts
Plaintiff Brenda B. Marcos married Wilson Marcos in 1982 and they had five children. Alleging that the
husband failed to provide material support to the family and have resorted to physical abuse and
abandonment, Brenda filed a case for the nullity of the marriage for psychological incapacity. The RTC
declared the marriage null and void under Art. 36 which was however reversed by CA.
Issues
Whether personal medical or psychological examination of the respondent by a physician is a requirement
for a declaration of psychological incapacity.
Whether the totality of evidence presented in this case show psychological incapacity.
Held
Psychological incapacity as a ground for declaring the nullity of a marriage, may be established by the
totality of evidence presented. There is no requirement, however that the respondent be examined by a
physician or a psychologist as a condition sine qua non for such declaration. Although this Court is sufficiently
convinced that respondent failed to provide material support to the family and may have resorted to
physical abuse and abandonment, the totality of his acts does not lead to a conclusion of psychological
incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his “defects“ were already present at the
inception of the marriage or that they are incurable. Verily, the behavior of respondent can be
attributed to the fact that he had lost his job and was not gainfully employed for a period of more than
six years. It was during this period that he became intermittently drunk, failed to give material and moral
support, and even left the family home. Thus, his alleged psychological il ness was traced only to said period
and not to the inception of the marriage. Equally important, there is no evidence showing that his condition
is incurable, especial y now that he is gainfully employed as a taxi driver. In sum, this Court cannot declare
the dissolution of the marriage for failure of the petitioner to show that the alleged psychological
incapacity is characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence and incurabilty and for her failure to
observe the guidelines as outline in Republic v. CA and Molina.
CASTILLO V. REPUBLIC
G.R. NO. 214064
FACTS:
Mirasol and Felipe started as friends then, eventually, became sweethearts. During their courtship, Mirasol
discovered that Felipe sustained his affair with his former girlfriend. The couple’s relationship turned
tumultuous after the revelation. With the intervention of their parents, they reconciled. They got married
and were blessed with two childåren.
However, after thirteen years of marriage, Felipe resumed philandering.
Tired of her husband’s infidelity, she left the conjugal dwelling and stopped any communication with
him. Felipe’s irresponsible acts like cohabiting with another woman, not communicating with her, and not
supporting their children for a period of not less than ten years without any reason, constitute a severe
psychological disorder.
Mirasol filed a Complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage which was granted by the trial court.
On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the totality of evidence presented warrants, as the RTC determined, the declaration of
nullity of the marriage of Mirasol and Felipe on the ground of the latter’s psychological incapacity under
Article 36 of the Family Code.
RULING:
Irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility and the like,
do not by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only
be due to a person’s refusal or unwil ingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage.
In order for sexual infidelity to constitute as psychological incapacity, the respondent’s unfaithfulness must
be established as a manifestation of a disordered personality, completely preventing the respondent from
discharging the essential obligations of the marital state; there must be proof of a natal or supervening
disabling factor that effectively incapacitated him from complying with the obligation to be faithful to his
spouse.
It is indispensable that the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that
manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.
As discussed, the findings on Felipe’s personality profile did not emanate from a personal interview with the
subject himself. Apart from the psychologist’s opinion and petitioner’s allegations, no other reliable evidence
was cited to prove that Felipe’s sexual infidelity was a manifestation of his alleged personality disorder,
which is grave, deeply rooted, and incurable.
CHI MING TSOI V CA
G.R. NO. 127358
Facts
Chi Ming Tsoi and Gina Lao-Tsoi married on May 22, 1988 at the Manila Cathedral Intramuros
Manila. After the celebration thereof and wedding reception, the newlyweds proceeded to the house of
husband-defendant’s mother. Contrary to her expectations, instead of consummating their marriage,
husband-defendant just went to bed, slept on one side, then turned his back and went to sleep. The
newlyweds failed to consummate their marriage even on the succeeding nights. The couple slept together
in the same room and on the same bed for almost ten (10) months but there was no attempt of sexual
intercourse between them. She claims that she did not even see her husband’s private parts nor did he
see hers.
On January 20, 1989, they submitted themselves for medical examinations to Dr. Eufamio
Macalalag, urologist at the Chinese General Hospital. The results of said physical examination showed that
she is healthy, normal and stil a virgin, while that of her husband’s examination was kept confidential.
Medications were only prescribed for her husband but the same was also kept confidential. No treatment
was given to her, but for her husband, he was asked by the doctor to return but he failed to do so.
Frustrated, the wife filed a case in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in order to annul
their marriage.
Husband-defendant does not want his marriage annulled since he loves her wife very much,
he has no defect on his part, and there is stil chance of reconciliation. However, husband-defendant claims
that if their marriage shall be annulled by reason of psychological incapacity, the fault lies with his wife.
The husband-defendant admitted that since their marriage on May 22, 1988, until their separation on
March 15, 1989, there was no sexual contact between them. But, the reason for this, according to the
defendant, was that every time he wants to have sexual intercourse with his wife, she always avoided him
and whenever he caresses her private parts, she always removed his hands. The defendant claims, that
he forced his wife to have sex with him only once but he did not continue because she was shaking and
she did not like it. So he stopped. In another physical examination by Dr. Sergio Alteza, Jr., which was
submitted in a Medical Report, results showed that there is no evidence of impotency of husbanddefendant
The trial court rendered judgment declaring the marriage void. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
affirmed such decision and denied the subsequent motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition.
Issues
Whether or not the refusal of a couple to have sexual intercourse with each other constitutes
psychological incapacity.
RULING
Yes, the refusal of a couple to have sexual intercourse with each other constitutes psychological
incapacity. The Court provides that one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is “To
procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation
is the basic end of marriage.“ Constant non- fulfil ment of this obligation wil finally destroy the integrity or
wholeness of the marriage. In this case, the Court ruled that the senseless and protracted refusal of one
of the parties to fulfil the above marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
The Court further quoted, “If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to
perform his or her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic
marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and
protracted refusal is equivalent to psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to
have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity.“
While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe
mutual love, respect and fidelity (Art. 68, Family Code), the sanction therefor is actually the “spontaneous,
mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order“ (Cuaderno vs.
Cuaderno 120 Phil. 1298). Love is useless unless it is shared with another. Indeed, no man is an island, the
cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to say “I could not have cared less.“
Noel Buenaventura vs. CA
FACTS
A case was instituted by Petitioner where he stated that he and his wife, Isabel Lucia was both
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage. The lower court found
that petitioner was merely under heavy parental pressure to marry, and deceived Private Respondent
Isabel Singh to marry. Buenaventura was unable to relate to his wife, as a husband, and their son, Javy, as
a father. More so, he had no inclination to make the marriage work such that in times of trouble, he’d
rather choose to leave his family than reconcile with his wife.
The RTC declared the marriage between the parties null and void and ordered the liquidation of the
assets of the conjugal partnership property and ordered petitioner for regular support in favor of his son in
the amount of Php 15, 000 per month. Petitioner appealed before the CA with regard to the moral
damages awarded to the wife. While the appeal was pending, CA, upon respondent’s motion issued a
resolution increasing the support of his son to Php 20, 000. The CA dismissed the appeal of petitioner for
lack of merit and affirmed the RTC decision. MR was likewise denied.
ISSUE
Whether or not the award of moral damages to the aggrieved spouse is proper in such cases.
RULING
NO. Article 20 of the Civil Code provides that: Every person who, contrary to law, wil fully or negligently
causes damage to another shall indemnify the latter for the same.
In this case, by declaring the petitioner as psychologically incapacitated, the possibility of awarding moral
damages on the same set of facts was negated. The award of moral damages should be predicated, not
on the mere act of entering into the marriage, but on specific evidence that it was done deliberately
and with malice by a party who had knowledge of his or her disability and yet wil fully concealed the same.
CARATING-SIAYNGCO vs. SIAYNGCO
G.R. NO. 158896. October 27, 2004
FACTS: Petitioner Juanita and respondent Manuel were married at civil rites on 27 June 1973and before
the Catholic Church on August 11 1973. After discovering that they could nothave a child of their own, the
couple decided to adopt a baby boy in 1977, who they namedJeremy.On 25 September 1997, or after
twenty-four (24) years of married life together,respondent Manuel filed for the declaration of its nullity on
the ground of psychologicalincapacity of petitioner Juanita. He alleged that all throughout their marriage, his
wifeexhibited an over domineering and selfish attitude towards him.
In her Answer, petitioner Juanita alleged that respondent Manuel is stil living with herat their conjugal
home in Malolos, Bulacan; that he invented malicious stories against her sothat he could be free to marry
his paramour. The trial court denied respondentManuels petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage to
petitioner Juanita.
The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC decision, relying mainly on thepsychiatric evaluation of Dr. Garcia
finding both Manuel and Juanitapsychologically incapacitated. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari of
thedecision of the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE: Whether or not the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding ofpsychological
incapacity against petitioner Juanita and/or respondent Manuel.
HELD: The petition for review is hereby granted.The presumption is always in favor of the validity of
marriage. Semper praesumiturpro matrimonio. In the case at bar, respondent Manuel failed to prove that
his wifes lack ofrespect for him, her jealousies and obsession with cleanliness, her outbursts and
hercontrolling nature, and her inability to endear herself to his parents are grave psychologicalmaladies
that paralyze her from complying with the essential obligations of marriage.Neither is there any showing
that these defects were already present at the inception ofthe marriage or that they are incurable. In
fact, the psychiatrist reported that petitioner waspsychologically capacitated to comply with the basic
and essential obligations of marriage.
The Court of Appeals committed reversible error in holding that respondent Manuel ispsychologically
incapacitated. The psychological report of Dr. Garcia, which is respondentManuels own evidence, contains
candid admissions of petitioner Juanita, the person in thebest position to gauge whether or not her husband
fulfil ed the essential marital obligationsof marriage.Sexual infidelity, per se, however, does not constitute
psychological incapacity withinthe contemplation of the Family Code. It must be shown that respondent
Manuelsunfaithfulness is a manifestation of a disordered personality, which makes him completelyunable to
discharge the essential obligations of the marital state and not merely due to hisardent wish to have a
child of his own flesh and blood. In herein case, respondent Manuelhas admitted that: "I had extra-marital
affairs because I wanted to have a child at thatparticular pointThe psychological report of respondent
Manuels witness, Dr. Garcia, showed that theroot cause of petitioner Juanitas behavior is traceable not
from the inception of their marriage as required by law but from her experiences during the marriage, e.g.,
her in laws disapproval of her as they wanted their son to enter the priesthood, her husbands phil andering,
admitted no less by him, and her inability to conceive. Thus, from the totality of the evidence adduced by
both parties, we have been allowed a window into the Siayngcoss life and have perceived therefrom a
simple case of a married couple drifting apart, becoming strangers to each other, with the husband
consequently falling out of love and wanting a way out. An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null and
void marriage. Mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities in no wise constitutes
psychological incapacity.
Te v. Te , GR 161793
FACTS:
On January 1996 Edward Kenneth Ngo Te a sophomore met Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te a freshman in a
gathering organized by the Filipino-Chinese association in their college. They developed a certain degree
of closeness towards each other. On March 1996, Rowena asked Edward that they elope. At first, he
refused but Rowena’s persistence made him relent. They left Manila and went to Cebu that month.
Edwards money lasted for only a month and they could not find a job. On April 1996, they returned to Manila.
Rowena proceeded to her uncles house and Edward to his parents home. As his family was away, Rowena
threathened him that she would commit suicide, Edward go to Rowena’s house. On April 23, 1996, Rowena’s
uncle brought the two to a court to get married. The couple continued to stay at Rowena’s uncles place
where Edward was treated like a prisoner and was not allowed to go out unaccompanied. After a month,
Edward escaped from the house and stayed with his parents. His family then hid him from Rowena. On June
1996, Edward was able to talk to Rowena and told her that they should live with his parents but she said
that it was better for them to live separate lives. On January 18, 2000, Edward filed a petition before
the RTC of Quezon City, for the annulment of his marriage to Rowena on the basis of the latters
psychological incapacity. On July 30, 2001, the trial court rendered the marriage of the parties null and void
on the ground that both parties were psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital
obligations. On review, the appellate court reversed and set aside the trial’s court ruling. It ruled that
petitioner failed to prove the psychological incapacity of respondent, for the clinical psychologist did not
personally examine respondent, and relied only on the information provided by petitioner. In sum, the
evidence adduced fell short of the requirements stated in the Molina case needed for the declaration of
nullity of the marriage under Art. 36 of the Family Code. Because of dissatisfaction, petitioner filed before
the SC the instant petition for review on certiorari. He posited that the trial court declared the
marriage void, not only because of respondent’s psychological incapacity, but rather due to both parties’
psychological incapacity. He also pointed out that there is no requirement for the psychologist to personally
examine respondent.
ISSUE:
Whether the marriage contracted is void on the ground of psychological incapacity.
HELD:
Yes. The psychologist who provided expert testimony found both parties psychologically incapacitated.
Edward’s behavioral pattern falls under the classification of dependent personality disorder, and Rowena’s,
that of the narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder.
There is no requirement that the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be personally
examined by a physician, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity. Verily, the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that
manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.
Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological incapacity, the precipitous
marriage that they contracted on April 23, 1996 is thus, declared null and void.
Nicolas Matudan vs Republic of the Philippines
FACTS
Nicolas Matudan and Marilyn Matudan married in 1976. After four children and ten years of marriage (1986),
Marilyn sought permission from Nicolas for her to work abroad. Nicolas gave his permission to Marilyn but
after she went abroad, Marilyn was never seen or heard of again.
In June 2008, Nicolas filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground that he and
Marilyn were psychologically incapacitated. To prove this, he submitted the findings of Dr. Nedy Tayag who
found Nicolas to be suffering from Passive-Aggressive Personality Disorder and Marilyn was suffering from
Narcissistic Personality Disorder with Antisocial Traits.
Dr. Tayag based her findings from her interviews with Nicolas and Maricel, one of the children of Nicolas
and Marilyn.
Dr. Tayag’s conclusion on the psychological incapacity of Nicolas can be attributed to his being an
abandoned child. At a young age, his parents separated and he was left in the custody of his paternal
grandmother. He lacked a support system and felt rejected. He developed a strong need for nurturance,
love and attention and that he would do anything to attain such. Meanwhile, Dr. Tayag’s findings on the
psychological incapacity of Marilyn were her preoccupation with pursuing matters that would make her
happy; has a high sense of self-importance; wants to have her way and disregards her husband’s opinions;
lacks empathy; wants to have a good life. Her personality condition is rooted on her unhealthy familial
environment. She came from an impoverished family. Her parents were more pre-occupied with finding ways
to make ends meet to such extent that they failed to give adequate attention and emotional support to
their children.
Dr. Tayag further testified that the psychological condition of Nicolas and Marilyn are grave and
characterized by juridical antecedence as the same already existed before they got married, their
disorders having been in existence since their childhood years are permanent and severe.
The trial proceeded without the participation of Marilyn. After the presentation of Nicolas’ evidence, the
trial court dismissed his petition. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.
The ground for the dismissal of the petition was that Nicolas failed to prove his psychological incapacity as
well as that of Marilyn.
ISSUE: Whether or not a finding of psychological incapacity by a psychologist may be based solely on the
information from the person seeking annulment.
HELD: YES but the Supreme Court ruled that in cases where the only basis of a psychologist’s findings is
that coming from the petitioner (person seeking the marriage to be annulled), the psychologist’s findings
deserve the application of a more rigid and stringent set of standards. In this case, although the
psychological incapacity of Nicolas was established, it was not proven that such was characterized by
gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability. This is compounded by the fact that Nicolas contradicted
his own claims by testifying that he and Marilyn were happily married and never had a fight, which is why
they begot four children; and the only reason for his filing the annulment was Marilyn’s complete
abandonment of the marriage and family when she left to work abroad.
OSCAR MALLION vs.EDITHA ALCANTARA
G.R. NO. 141528
FACTS: On October 24, 1995, petitioner Oscar Mallion filed a petition with the RTC seeking a declaration
of nullityof marriage to respondent Editha Alcantara under Article 36 of Executive Order No. 209, citing
respondent’salleged psychological incapacity.
The RTC denied the petition finding that he failed to adduce preponderant evidence to warrant the
grantof the relief he is seeking.“ The appeal filed with the CA was likewise dismissed for the failure of
petitioner to paythe docket and other lawful fees within the required period.
After the decision attained its finality, petitioner filed another petition for the declaration of nullity
ofmarriage with the regional trial court alleging that his marriage with respondent was null and void due to
the factthat it was celebrated without a valid marriage license. Respondent filed an answer with motion
to dismiss onthe ground of res judicata and forum shopping. Her petition was granted.
ISSUE
Does a previous final judgment denying a petition for declaration of nullity on the ground of
psychologicalincapacity bar a subsequent petition for declaration of nullity on the ground of lack of marriage
license?
RULING
Section 47 (b) pertains to in its concept as “bar by prior judgment“ or “estoppel by verdict,“ which is
theeffect of a judgment as a bar to the prosecution of a second action upon the same claim, demand or
cause ofaction. On the other hand, Section 47 (c) pertains to res judicata in its concept as
“conclusiveness of judgment“or otherwise known as the rule of auter action pendant which ordains that
issues actually and directly resolvedin a former suit cannot again be raised in any future case between
the same parties involving a different causeof action. Res judicata in its concept as a bar by prior
judgment obtains in this present case.
Petitioner forgets that he is simply invoking grounds for the same cause of action. By definition, a causeof
action is the act or omission by which a party violates the right of another. In both petitions, petitioner has
thesame cause – the declaration of nullity of marriage. What differs is the ground upon which the cause
of action ispredicated. These grounds cited by petitioner essential y split the various aspects of the
pivotal issue that holdsthe key to the resolution of this controversy.
Therefore, having expressly and impliedly conceded the validity of their marriage celebration, petitioneris
now deemed to have waived any defects therein. For this reason, the Court finds that the present
action fordeclaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of lack of marriage license is barred.
The petition is denied for lack of merit.
GARCIA-QUIAZON V BELEN
FACTS:
Merlinda Olaybar requested from the National Statistics Office a Certificate of No Marriage (CENOMAR)
as one of the requirements for her marriage with her boyfriend. Upon its receipt, she discovered she was
already married to a certain Ye Son Sune in 2002. However, she denied havi ng contracted marriage and
claimed that she did not know the alleged husband. Her signature was also allegedly forged. Thus, she filed
a Petition for Cancellation of Entries in the Marriage Contract, especial y the wife portion thereof.
The Office of the Solicitor General argued that in directing the cancellation of the entries in the wife
portion of the certificate of marriage, the RTC, in effect, declared the marriage void ab initio. Thus, the
petition instituted by Merlinda was actually a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage in the guise of a
Rule 108 proceeding which provides the procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil
registry.
ISSUE
Whether or not the cancellation of “ALL THE ENTRIES IN THE WIFE PORTION OF THE ALLEGED
MARRIAGE CONTRACT“ is in effect declaring the marriage void ab initio.
RULING
No. In Fujiki v. Marinay, the Court held that a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil
registry cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to
prevent circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code,
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws.
In this case, with the testimonies and other evidence presented, the RTC held that Merlinda’s signature
in the marriage certificate was not hers and was forged. Therefore, it was established that no marriage
was celebrated. On the contrary, aside from the certificate of marriage, no such evidence was
presented to show the existence of marriage. In allowing the correction of the subject certificate of
marriage by cancelling the wife portion thereof, the trial court did not, in any way, declare the marriage
void as there was no marriage to speak of.
FACTS:
Fernando Aquino filed a complaint in September 1955 on the ground of fraud against Conchita Delizo that
at the date of her marriage with the former on December 1954, concealed the fact that she was
pregnant by another man and sometime in April 1955 or about 4 months after their marriage, gave birth
to a child. During the trial, Provincial Fiscal Jose Goco represent the state in the proceedings to prevent
collusion. Only Aquino testified and the only documentary evidence presented was the marriage contract
between the parties. Delizo did not appear nor presented any evidence.
CFI-Rizal dismissed petitioner’s complaint for annulment of marriage, which was affirmed by CA thus a
petition for certiorari to review the decisions.
ISSUE
Whether or not concealment of pregnancy as alleged by Aquino does not constitute such fraud as would
annul a marriage.
HELD
The concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man
other than her husband constitutes fraud and is a ground for annulment of marriage. Delizo was allegedly
to be only more than four months pregnant at the time of her marriage. At this stage, it is hard to say
that her pregnancy was readily apparent especial y since she was “naturally plump“ or fat. It is only on
the 6th month of pregnancy that the enlargement of the woman’s abdomen reaches a height above the
umbilicus, making the roundness of the abdomen more general and apparent.
In the following circumstances, the court remanded the case for new trial and decision complained is set
aside.
ANAYA V PALAROAN
G.R. NO. L-27930
Facts
After one month of marriage, Fernando Palaroan filed a complaint for annulment of marriage
against Aurora Anaya on the ground that his consent was obtained through force and intimidation. The
court dismissed the complaint and granted Aurora's counterclaim. While the amount of the counterclaim
was being negotiated, Fernando allegedly divulged that several months prior to the marriage, he had premarital relationships with a close relative of his.
Anaya filed suit to annul the marriage and to recover moral damages, alleging that the non-divulgement to
her of such pre-marital secret constituted fraud in obtaining her consent. Fernando denied the allegation.
The trial court dismissed the complaint, holding that Aurora's allegation of the fraud was legally insufficient
to invalidate her marriage. Aurora appealed.
Issue
Is non-disclosure to a wife by her husband of his pre-marital relationship with another woman a ground for
annulment of marriage?
Held
No. Non-disclosure of a husband's pre-marital relationship with another woman is not one of the enumerated
circumstances that would constitute a ground for annulment; and it is further excluded by the last
paragraph of the article, providing that "no other misrepresentation or deceit as to . . chastity" shall give
ground for an action to annul a marriage. While a woman may detest such non-disclosure of premarital
lewdness or feel having been thereby cheated into giving her consent to the marriage, nevertheless the
law does not assuage her grief after her consent was solemnly given, for upon marriage she entered into
an institution in which society, and not herself alone, is interested. The lawmaker's intent being plain, the
Court's duty is to give effect to the same, whether it agrees with the rule or not.
SARAO VS GUEVARRA 40 OG 15 SUPPL 263
FACTS
Plaintiff and defendant were married and on the same day, plaintiff tried to have carnalknowledge of
defendant. The later showed reluctance and begged him to wait until evening. Althoughhe found the orifice
of her vagina sufficiently large for his organ, she complained of pains in her privatepart later that night.
Plaintiff also noticed oozing of some purulent matter offensive to the smell coming from defendants vagina.
Every attempt to have carnal access to his wife proved to be futile because she always complained of
pains in her genital organs. Upon the advice of the physician, defendants uterus and ovaries were, with
consent of the plaintiff removed due to the presence of a tumor. The removal of said organs rendered
defendant incapable of procreation. Plaintiff declared that from the time he witnessed the operation, he
lost all desire to have access with his wife and thus filed this complaint for annulment of marriage on the
ground of impotency.
ISSUE
WON their marriage can be annulled on the ground of physical impotency.
HELD
No. Judgment of the Court of First Instance affirmed.
RD: Plaintiff wants to construe the phrase physically incapable of entering into the married state as with
the capacity to procreate. Impotency is not the ability to procreate but the ability to copulate .Defect
must be one of copulation and not of reproduction. Bareness wil not invalidate the marriage. The removal
of the organs rendered her sterile but it by no means made her unfit for sexual intercourse. It would
appear that it was the memory of this first unpleasant experience with her that made him gave up the
idea of having carnal knowledge of her.
Defendant was not impotent at the time she married the plaintiff for the existence of tumor did not
necessarily render her incapable of copulation. Plaintiff also contends that his consent of the marriage was
procured through fraud in that the defendant did not reveal to him that she was afflicted with a disease
in her sex organs. According to the Court, this contention in untenable since fraud is not alleged in the
complaint and has not been proved at the trial.
Emilio Tuason and Victoria Tuason v CA
G.R. No. 116607 10 April 1996
Facts
On June 1972, respondent Victoria Lopez Tuazon married petitioner Emilio Tuason. Due to the series of
physical abuse against the respondent, the petitioners use of prohibited drugs, cohabitating with three
women, leaving the conjugal home and giving minimal child support, abuse of conjugal property use and
incurring of bank debts without the respondents consent, respondent filed a petition for annulment or
declaration of nullity of their marriage in 1989 before RTC Makati on the ground of psychological incapacity
and prayed for powers of administration to save the conjugal properties from further dissipation.
Petitioner filed his Opposition in April 1990 and was thereafter scheduled to present his evidence on 11May
1990. Counsel for petitioner moved for a postponement to 8 June, however, petitioner failed to appear. On 29
June 1990, the trial court rendered judgment declaring the nullity of marriage and awarding the custody of
common children to respondent. No appeal was taken.
Thereafter, on 24 September 1990, respondent filed Motion for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership of Gains
and Adjudication to Plaintiff of the Conjugal Properties which was opposed by petitioner on 17October. On
the same day, petitioner filed a petitioner from relief of judgment of the 19 June 1990decision. The trial
court denied the petition on 8 August 1991 which was affirmed by the CA on July1994. Hence, this petition for
review on certiorari.
Issues
1. Whether a petitioner for relief from judgment is warranted because the decision of the Court is null and
void for violation of petitioners right to due process.
2. Whether in the absence of the petitioner in the hearing, the court should have ordered a prosecuting
officer to intervene under Art. 48 of the Family Code.
Ruling
Section 2 of Rule 38 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: a final and executory judgment of the RTC
may be set aside on the ground of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence with petitioner
showing meritorious cause of action. In the case at bar, the decision of nullity had already become final
when petitioner through his counsel failed to appeal during the reglementary period despite petitioner
eventually justifying his absence due to medical reasons. Further, the failure of the counsel to inform
petitioner of adverse judgment to enable him to appeal is an inexcusable negligence and not aground for
setting aside a judgment valid and regular on its face. Similarly inexcusable is the counsels failure to notify
the court of petitioners confinement. Petitioner cannot claim he was deprived of due process by the Court.
Petitioner likewise insists he has a meritorious defense by citing the Family Code which provides that
inactions for annulment of marriage or legal separation, the prosecuting officer shall intervene for the
state. He contends that when he failed to appear at the hearing, the trial court should have ordered
the prosecuting officer to intervene for the state and inquire as to the reason for his nonappearance.
Because the Constitution is committed to the preservation and strengthening of the family as a basic
social institution, Art. 48 and 60 provides that a prosecuting officer shall intervene if a defendant spouse
fails to answer the complaint to prevent collision. It cannot be applied to the case at bar because the
petitioner actively participated in the proceedings by filing several pleadings and cross-examination of the
witnesses.
O Y. LUA, G.R. Nos. 175279-80, June 5, 2013 – Support pendente lite CASE DIGEST - Remedial Law
Review 2 - Provisional Remedies
SUSAN LIM-LUA vs. DANILO Y. LUA, G.R. Nos. 175279-80, June 5, 2013 – Support pendente lite CASE
DIGEST - Remedial Law Review 2 - Provisional Remedies
Lim-Lua filed an action for the declaration of nullity of her marriage with Lua, in her prayer for support
pendente lite for herself and her two children, she sought the amount of ₱500k as monthly support, citing
Lua’s huge earnings from salaries and dividends in several companies and businesses here and abroad.
RTC: ₱250k would be sufficient to take care of the needs Lim-Lua and their 2 children, being a
commendable act of defendant, should be continued by him considering the vast financial resources at his
disposal.
CA: CA reduced the monthly support pendente lite of ₱115k. Lua paid ₱162k and advances given by him
to his children and Lim-Lua in the sum of ₱2.4M. The expenses incurred by Lua consisting of the purchase
and maintenance of the two cars, payment of tuition fees, travel expenses, and the credit card
purchases involving groceries, dry goods and books, certainly inured to the benefit not only of the two
children, but their mother as well.
ISSUE: Whether or not certain expenses already incurred by Lim may be deducted from the total support
in arrears
Conflicting positions:
Lim-Lua: it was erroneous to have allowed the deduction of the value of the two cars and their
maintenance costs from the support in arrears, as these items are not indispensable to the sustenance
of the family or in keeping them alive.
Lua: disallowing the subject deductions would result in unjust enrichment, thus making him pay for the same
obligation twice. Since Lim-Lua and the children resided in one residence, the groceries and dry goods
purchased by the children using his credit were not consumed by the children alone but shared with their
mother. As to the cars, these, too, are to be considered advances for support, in keeping with the
financial capacity of the family as the children had never in their entire life commuted from one place to
another, nor do they eat their meals at "carinderias".
Held: No. The deductions should be limited to basic needs and expenses (food, household expenses such as
salaries of drivers and house helpers, and also Lim-Lua’s scoliosis therapy sessions
REYNALDO ESPIRITU V COURT OF APPEAL
GR 115640, March 15, 1995
FACTS
Reynaldo Espiritu and Teresita Masanding began to maintain a common law relationship of husband while in
US. Teresita works as a nurse while Reynaldo was sent by his empolyer, National Steel Corporation, to
Pittsburgh for a temporary post. They begot a child in 1986 named Rosalind. After a year, they went
back to the Philippines for a brief vacation when they also got married. Subsequently, they had a second
child named Reginald. In 1990, they decided to separate. Reynaldo pleaded for second chance but
instead of Teresita granting it, she left Reynaldo and the children and went back to California. Reynaldo
brought the children in the Philippines and left them with his sister. When Teresita returned in the
Philippines sometime in 1992, he filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus against Reynaldo and his sister
to gain custody of the children.
ISSUE
WON the custody of the 2 children should be awarded to the mother.
HELD
In cases of care, custody, education and property of children, the latter’s welfare shall be the paramount
concern and that even a child under 7 years of age may be ordered to be separated from the mother
for compelling reasons. The presumption that the mother is the best custodian for a child under seven
years of age is strong but not conclusive. At the time the judgment was rendered, the 2 children were
both over 7 years of age. The choice of the child to whom she preferred to stay must be
considered. It is evident in the records submitted that Rosalind chose to stay with his father/aunt. She
was found of suffering from emotional shock caused by her mother’s infidelity. Furthermore, there was
nothing in the records to show that Reynaldo is unfit well in fact he has been trying his best to give the
children the kind of attention and care which their mother is not in the position to extend. On the other
hand, the mother’s conviction for the crime of bigamy and her il icit relationship had already caused
emotional disturbances and personality conflicts at least with the daughter.
Hence, petition was granted. Custody of the minors was reinstated to their father.
MANGONON V. CA
G.R. No. 125041, June 30, 2006
FACTS:
1) On 16 February 1975, petitioner and respondent Federico Delgado were civil y married by then City Court
Judge Eleuterio Agudo in Legaspi City, Albay. At that time, petitioner was only 21 years old while
respondent Federico was only 19 years old. As the marriage was solemnized without the required consent
per Article 85 of the New Civil Code, it was annulled on 11 August 1975 by the Quezon City Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court. 25 March 1976, or within seven months after the annulment of their marriage,
petitioner gave birth to twins Rica and Rina. According to petitioner, she, with the assistance of her
second husband Danny Mangonon, raised her twin daughters as private respondents had totally abandoned
them. Rica and Rina were about to enter college in the United States of America (USA) where
petitioner, together with her daughters and second husband, had moved to and finally settled in. Rica was
admitted to the University of Massachusetts (Amherst) while Rina was accepted by the Long Island
University and Western New England College. Despite their admissions to said universities, Rica and Rina
were, however, financial y incapable of pursuing collegiate education because of the following: a) The
average annual cost for college education in the US is about USD 22,000/year or a total of USD44,000.00,
more or less, for both Rica and Rina b) Rica and Rina need general maintenance support each in the
amount of USD3,000.00 per year or a total of USD6,000 per year. c) Unfortunately, petitioners monthly
income from her 2 jobs is merely USD1,200 after taxes which she can hardly give general support to Rica
and Rina, much less their required college educational support. d) Neither can petitioners present husband
be compelled to share in the general support and college education of Rica and Rina since he has his own
son with petitioner and own daughter (also in college) to attend to. e) Worse, Rica and Rinas petitions for
Federal Student Aid have been rejected by the U.S. Department of Education. 4) On 17 March 1994,
petitioner Ma. Belen B. Mangonon filed, in behalf of her then minor children Rica and Rina, a Petition for
Declaration of Legitimacy and Support, with application for support pendente lite with the RTC Makati 5)
Petitioner averred that demands were made upon Federico and the latters father, Francisco, for
general support and for the payment of the required college education of Rica and Rina. The twin sisters
even exerted efforts to work out a settlement concerning these matters with respondent Federico and
respondent Francisco, the latter being generally known to be financial y well-off.
ISSUE: Whether or not, respondent Francisco Delgado be held liable for her grand-daughters educational
support
HELD: ART. 199. Whenever two or more persons are obliged to give support, the liability shall devolve upon
the following persons in the order herein provided: (1) The spouse; (2) The descendants in the nearest
degree; (3) The ascendants in the nearest degree; and (4) The brothers and sisters. There being
prima facie evidence showing that petitioner and respondent Federico are the parents of Rica and Rina,
petitioner and respondent Federico are primarily charged to support their childrens college education but
being restricted by their financial income- respondent Francisco, as the next immediate relative of Rica
and Rina, is tasked to give support to his granddaughters in default of their parents, it having been
established that respondent Francisco has the financial means to support his granddaughters education.
Art. 204. The person obliged to give support shall have the option to fulfil the obligation either by paying
the allowance fixed, or by receiving and maintaining in the family dwelling the person who has a right to
receive support. The latter alternative cannot be availed of in case there is a moral or legal obstacle
thereto. The obligor is given the choice as to how he could dispense his obligation to give support.
Respondent Francisco and Federicos claim that they have the option under the law as to how they could
perform their obligation to support Rica and Rina, respondent Francisco insists that Rica and Rina should
move here to the Philippines to study in any of the local universities. Thus, he may give the determined
amount of support to the claimant or he may allow the
latter to stay in the family dwelling. This option cannot be availed of in this case since there are
circumstances, legal or moral, between respondent and petitioner which should be considered. Respondent
Francisco is held liable for half of the amount of school expenses incurred by Rica and Rina as support
pendente lite. As established by petitioner, respondent Francisco has the financial resources to pay this
amount given his various business endeavors, thus the amount of support should be proportionate to the
resources or means of the giver and to the necessities of the recipient. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals fixing the amount of support pendente lite to P5,000.00 for Rebecca Angela and Regina Isabel,
are hereby MODIFIED in that respondent Francisco Delgado is hereby held liable for support pendente lite
in the amount to be determined by the trial court pursuant to this Decision. Considering, however, that the
twin sisters may have already been done with their education by the time of the promulgation of this
decision, we deem it proper to award support pendente lite in arrears to be computed from the time they
entered college until they had finished their respective studies.
DOMINGO V CA
FACTS:
Roberto Domingo married Delia Soledad in 1976 while being married with Emerlina dela Paz.
He has been unemployed and completely dependent upon Delia, who has been working in Saudi Arabia, for
support and subsistence.
Delia only found out about the prior marriage when Emerlina sued them for bigamy in 1983.
In 1989, she found out that Roberto was cohabiting with another woman and he was disposing of some of her
properties without her knowledge and consent.
In May 1991, Delia filed a petition for judicial declaration of nullity of her marriage to Roberto and separation
of property.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage is necessary. If in affirmative,
whether the same should be filed only for purpose of remarriage.
RULING:
Yes. A declaration of the absolute nullity of marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action
or a ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for
purpose of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for the said projected
marriage be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void.
The requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the protection of the
spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is il egal and void, marries again. With the judicial declaration
of the nullity of his or her first marriage, the person who marries again cannot be charged with bigamy.
Article 40 as finally formulated included the significant clause denotes that final judgment declaring the
previous marriage void need not be obtained only for purposes of remarriage. A person can conceive of
other instances other than remarriage, such as in case of an action for liquidation, partition, distribution
and separation of property between the spouses, as well as an action for the custody and support of
their common children and the delivery of the latters' presumptive legitimes. In such cases, however, one is
required by law to show proof that the previous one was an absolute nullity.
Marriage is an “inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family;“ as such, it “shall be protected by
the State. As a matter of policy, there should be a final judgment declaring the marriage void and a
party should not declare for himself or herself whether or not the marriage is void.
GANDIONCO V CA
G.R. NO. 79284
FACTS:
Teresita Gandionco, filed a complaint against herein petitioner, Froilan Gandionco for legal separation on
the ground of concubinage as a civil case. Teresita also filed a criminal complaint of concubinage against
her husband. She likewise filed an application for the provisional remedy of support pendent elite which was
approved and ordered by the respondent judge. Petitioner moved to suspend the action for legal
separation and the incidents consequent thereto such as the support for pendent elite, in view of the
criminal case for concubinage filed against him. He contends that the civil action for legal separation is
inextricably tied with the criminal action thus, all proceedings related to legal separation wil have to be
suspended and await the conviction or acquittal of the criminal case.
ISSUE
Whether or not a civil case for legal separation can proceed pending the resolution of the criminal case
for concubinage.
HELD
Supreme Court ruled that the contentions of the petitioner were incorrect. A civil action for legal
separation on the ground of concubinage may proceed ahead of, or simultaneously with, a criminal action for
concubinage, because said civil action is not one to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense, even
if both the civil and criminal actions arise from or are related to the same offense. Such civil action is
one intended to obtain the right to live separately, with the legal consequences thereof including the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains, custody of the children, support and disqualifications from
inheriting from the innocent spouse. Decree of legal separation may be issued upon proof by
preponderance of evidence, where no criminal proceeding or conviction is necessary.
Furthermore, the support pendente lite, as a remedy, can be availed of in an action for legal separation,
and granted at the discretion of the judge. If in case, the petitioner finds the amount of
support pendente lite ordered as too onerous, he can always file a motion to modify or reduce the same.
SABALONES V CA
G.R. NO. 106169
Facts:
Samson Sabalones was married to Remedios Gaviola-Sabalones, who managed the couple’s properties while
the former was away at work. In 1981, Samson contracted a bigamous marriage with Thelma Cumareng. In
1985, upon his retirement, Samson came back to the Philippines and stayed with Cumareng. Four years
later, he filed an action for judicial authorization to sell a building and lot belonging to the conjugal
partnership with Remedios. He claimed that he was 68 years old and sick and needed the proceeds of
the sale for his hospitalization and medical treatment.
Remedios opposed the authorization and filed a counterclaim for legal separation. She alleged that the
property her husband was trying to sell was being occupied by her and their six children and that they
were depending for support on the rentals from another conjugal property. The court decreed the legal
separation and declared the forfeiture of Samson’s share in the conjugal properties. The court further
ordered that he was not entitled to support by his wife.
While the decision was on appeal, Remedios filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
to enjoin Samson from interfering with the administration of their properties. She further stated that her
husband threatened their tenant that the contract would not be renewed. The writ was granted by the
Court of Appeals.
Issue:
Was the Court of Appeals correct in granting the writ of preliminary injunction?
Ruling:
Yes. Article 61 of the Family Code states that after a petition for legal separation, the trial court shall
appoint either one of the spouses or a third person to be the administrator of the conjugal properties if
there was no written agreement between the spouses. Although there was no formal declaration by the
trial court, it was implicitly provided in the decision that the administration would go to the wife since the
court denied the husband any share in the conjugal properties.
The primary purpose of the injunction is to preserve the status quo of the things subject of the action or
relations between the parties. The requirements for injunction are the existence of a right and its
actual or threatened violation, which was both present in the case.
Somosa-Ramos vs. Hon. Vamenta
G.R. NO. L-34132
Facts:
Lucy filed a case for legal separation against Clemente on the ground of concubinage and an attempt by
him against her life. She likewise sought the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction for the
return to her of what she claimed to be her paraphernal and exclusive property, then under the
administration and management of Clemente. Clemente opposed the motion based on Article 103 of the
Civil Code which provides: "An action for legal separation shall in no case be tried before six months shall
have elapsed since the filing of the petition“ (now Art 58, Family Code). He manifested that if the motion
were heard, the prospect of the reconciliation of the spouses would become even more dim. Judge
Vamenta granted the motion of Clemente and suspended the hearing of the petition for a writ of
mandatory preliminary injunction. Thus, Lucy filed a petition for certiorari.
Issue
Does the rule prohibiting the hearing of an action for legal separation before the lapse of six months from
the filing of the petition preclude the court from acting on a motion for preliminary mandatory injunction
applied for as an ancil ary remedy to such a suit?
Held:
No. Article 103 the Civil Code is not an absolute bar to the hearing motion for preliminary injunction prior to
the expiration of the six-month period.
The court where the action is pending according to Article 103 is to remain passive. It must let the
parties alone in the meanwhile. It is precluded from hearing the suit. That the law, however, remains
cognizant of the need in certain cases for judicial power to assert itself is discernible from what is set
forth in the following article. It reads thus: "After the filing of the petition for legal separation, the spouse
shall be entitled to live separately from each other and manage their respective property. The husband
shall continue to manage the conjugal partnership property but if the court deems it proper, it may
appoint another to manage said property, in which case the administrator shall have the same rights and
duties as a guardian and shall not be allowed to dispose of the income or of the capital except in
accordance with the orders of the court." (now Art. 61, Family Code)
ONG ENG KIAM V ONG
Facts:
On February 25, 1976 Imelda Ong, for and in consideration of One (P1.00) Peso and other valuable
considerations, executed in favor of private respondent Sandra Maruzzo, then a minor, a Quitclaim Deed
whereby she transferred, released, assigned and forever quit-claimed to Sandra Maruzzo, her heirs and
assigns, all her rights, title, interest and participation in the ONE-HALF (½) undivided portion of the
parcel of land.
On November 19, 1980, Imelda Ong revoked the aforesaid Deed of Quitclaim and, thereafter, on January 20,
1982 donated the whole property described above to her son, Rex Ong-Jimenez.
Sandra Maruzzo, through her guardian (ad litem) Alfredo Ong, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati,
Metro Manila an action against petitioners, for the recovery of ownership/possession and nullification of the
Deed of Donation over the portion belonging to her and for Accounting.
Petitioners claimed that the Quitclaim Deed is null and void inasmuch as it is equivalent to a Deed of
Donation, acceptance of which by the donee is necessary to give it validity. Further, it is averred that
the donee, Sandra Maruzzo, being a minor, had no legal personality and therefore incapable of accepting
the donation.
The trial court rendered judgment in favor of respondent Maruzzo and held that the Quitclaim Deed is
equivalent to a Deed of Sale and, hence, there was a valid conveyance in favor of the latter.
Petitioners appealed to the respondent Intermediate Appellate Court. They reiterated their argument
below and, in addition, contended that the One (P1.00) Peso consideration is not a consideration at all to
sustain the ruling that the Deed of Quitclaim is equivalent to a sale.
Issue:
Whether a Quitclaim Deed is equivalent to a Deed of Sale
Held:
A careful perusal of the subject deed reveals that the conveyance of the one- half (½) undivided
portion of the above-described property was for and in consideration of the One (P 1.00) Peso and the
other valuable considerations (emphasis supplied) paid by private respondent Sandra Maruzzo through her
representative, Alfredo Ong, to petitioner Imelda Ong. Stated differently, the cause or consideration is not
the One (P1.00) Peso alone but also the other valuable considerations.
The execution of a deed purporting to convey ownership of a realty is in itself prima facie evidence of
the existence of a valuable consideration, the party alleging lack of consideration has the burden of
proving such allegation.
Even granting that the Quitclaim deed in question is a donation, Article 741 of the Civil Code provides that
the requirement of the acceptance of the donation in favor of minor by parents of legal representatives
applies only to onerous and conditional donations where the donation may have to assume certain charges
or burdens (Article 726, Civil Code).
WHEREFORE. the appealed decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court should be, as it is hereby
AFFIRMED, with costs against herein petitioners.
BUGAYONG V GINEZ
G.R. NO. L-10033
Facts
Benjamin Bugayong, a serviceman in the United States Navy, was married to Leonila Ginez in 1949 at
Asingan, Pangasinan. In July 1951, Benjamin began receiving letters informing him of alleged acts of infidelity
of his wife. In August 1952, Benjamin went to Pangasinan and looked for his wife whom he met in the house
of one Mrs. Malalang, Leonila's godmother. She came along with him and both proceeded to the house of
Pedro, Benjamin's cousin, where they stayed and lived for 1 night and 1 day as husband and wife. The next
day they passed the night in their house as husband and wife. On the second day, Benjamin tried to verify
from his wife the truth of the information he received that she had committed adultery but Leonila,
instead of answering his query, merely packed up and left, which he took as a confirmation of the acts of
infidelity imputed on her.
Benjamin then filed a case for legal separation. Leonila filed an answer vehemently denying the averments
of the complaint and setting up affirmative defenses. After Benjamin testified, Leonila's counsel moved for
the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of condonation.
Issue
Does Benjamin's attitude of sleeping with his wife for 2 nights despite his alleged belief that she was
unfaithful to him, amount to a condonation of her previous and supposed adulterous acts?
Held
Condonation is the forgiveness of a marital offense constituting a ground for legal separation. A detailed
examination of the testimony of the plaintiff-husband, clearly shows that there was a condonation on the
part of the husband for the supposed "acts of infidelity amounting to adultery" committed by defendantwife. Admitting for the sake of argument that the infidelities amounting to adultery were committed by the
defendant, a reconciliation was effected between her and the plaintiff. The act of the latter in
persuading her to come along with him, and the fact that she went with him and consented to be brought
to the house of his cousin Pedro Bugayong and together they slept there as husband and wife for one day
and one night, and the further fact that in the second night they again slept together in their house
likewise as husband and wife — all these facts have no other meaning in the opinion of this court than
that a reconciliation between them was effected and that there was a condonation of the wife by the
husband. The reconciliation occurred almost ten months after he came to know of the acts of infidelity
amounting to adultery. It has been held in a long line of decisions of the various supreme courts of the
different states of the U. S. that 'a single voluntary act of sexual intercourse by the innocent spouse
after discovery of the offense is ordinarily sufficient to constitute condonation, especial y as against the
husband'. In the lights of the facts testified to by the plaintiff-husband, of the legal provisions above quoted,
and of the various decisions above-cited, the inevitable conclusion is that there is condonation. (Bugayong
vs. Ginez, G.R. No. L-10033, December 28, 1956)
BUSUEGO VS. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN
G.R. NO. 196842OCTOBER 9, 2013
Facts
Private respondent Rosa S. Busuego (Rosa) filed a complaint for: (1) Concubinage under Article 334 of the
Revised Penal Code; (2) violation of Republic Act No. 9262 (Anti-Violence Against Women and Their
Children); and (3) Grave Threats under Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code, before the Office of the
Ombudsman against her husband, Alfredo, with designation Chief of Hospital, Davao Regional Hospital, Apokon,
Tagum City. In their subsequent exchange of responsive pleadings, Rosa maintained Alfredo’s culpability, and
naturally, Alfredo claimed innocence. Alfredo filed a Motion referral of the complaint to the Office of the
City Prosecutor as provided in OMB-DOJ Circular No. 95-001. The Ombudsman then issued the assailed
Resolution stating, among others, that the motion of Busuego to refer this case to the Office of the City
Prosecutor was belatedly filed. Record would show that the motion praying for the referral of this case to
the Office of the City Prosecutor was filed on 17 July 2008, after the parties have already filed all their
pleadings and the case is now ripe for resolution. Further, referral to the said office is not mandatory as
cited in the said Joint Circular. Alfredo then filed a Partial Motion for Reconsideration which was
subsequently denied. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not Rosa Busuego’s complaint should be referred to the Department of Justice (DOJ), since the
crime of Concubinage is not committed in relation to Alfredo Busuego being a public officer.
Held:
No, Rosa Busuego’s complaint is not necessary to be referred to the Department of Justice (DOJ).
The Ombudsman’s primary jurisdiction, albeit concurrent with the DOJ, to conduct preliminary investigation of
crimes involving public officers, without regard to its commission in relation to office, had long been settled in
Sen. Honasan II v. The Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of DOJ,17 and affirmed in subsequent cases:
The Constitution, Section 15 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 and Section 4 of the Sandiganbayan Law, as
amended, do not give to the Ombudsman exclusive jurisdiction to investigate offenses committed by public
officers or employees. The authority of the Ombudsman to investigate offenses involving public officers or
employees is concurrent withother government investigating agencies such as provincial, city and state
prosecutors. However, the Ombudsman, in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan, may take over, at any stage, from any investigating agency of the government, the
investigation of such cases.
In other words, respondent DOJ Panel is not precluded from conducting any investigation of cases against
public officers involving violations of penal laws but if the cases fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, the respondent Ombudsman may, in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction take over at
any stage.
Thus, with the jurisprudential declarations that the Ombudsman and the DOJ have concurrent jurisdiction
to conduct preliminary investigation, the respective heads of said offices came up with OMB-DOJ Joint
Circular No. 95-001 for the proper guidelines of their respective prosecutors in the conduct of their
investigations.
To reiterate for emphasis, the power to investigate or conduct preliminary investigation on charges
against any public officers or employees may be exercised by an investigator or by any provincial or city
prosecutor or their assistants, either in their regular capacities or as deputized Ombudsman prosecutors.
The fact that all prosecutors are in effect deputized Ombudsman prosecutors under the OMB-DOJ circular
is a mere superfluity. The DOJ Panel need not be authorized nor deputized by the Ombudsman to conduct
the preliminary investigation for complaints filed with it because the DOJ’s authority to act as the principal
law agency of the government and investigate the commission of crimes under the Revised Penal Code is
derived from the Revised Administrative Code which had been held in the Natividad case citation omitted
as not being contrary to the Constitution. Thus, there is not even a need to delegate the conduct of
the preliminary investigation to an agency which has the jurisdiction to do so in the first place. However,
the Ombudsman may assert its primary jurisdiction at any stage of the investigation.
WHEREFORE the petition is DISMISSED The Resolutions of the Ombudsman dated 17 April 2009 and11 October
2010 are AFFIRMED.
SY V EUFEMIO
G.R. NO. L-30977
FACTS:
Carmen Lapuz-Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio Eufemio on August 1953. They were
married civil y on September 21, 1934 and canonically after nine days. They had lived together as
husband and wife continuously without any children until 1943 when her husband abandoned her. They
acquired properties during their marriage. Petitioner then discovered that her husband cohabited with a
Chinese woman named Go Hiok on or about 1949. She prayed for the issuance of a decree of legal
separation, which among others, would order that the defendant Eufemio should be deprived of his share of
the conjugal partnership profits.
Eufemio counterclaimed for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Lapuz-Sy on the ground of his prior
and subsisting marriage with Go Hiok. Trial proceeded and the parties adduced their respective
evidence. However, before the trial could be completed, respondent already scheduled to present
surrebuttal evidence, petitioner died in a vehicular accident on May 1969. Her counsel duly notified the
court of her death. Eufemio moved to dismiss the petition for legal separation on June 1969 on the grounds
that the said petition was filed beyond the one-year period provided in Article 102 of the Civil Code and
that the death of Carmen abated the action for legal separation. Petitioner’s counsel moved to
substitute the deceased Carmen by her father, Macario Lapuz.
ISSUE: Whether the death of the plaintiff, before final decree in an action for legal separation, abate
the action and wil it also apply if the action involved property rights.
HELD:
An action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff, even if property rights are involved.
These rights are mere effects of decree of separation, their source being the decree itself; without
the decree such rights do not come into existence, so that before the finality of a decree, these claims
are merely rights in expectation. If death supervenes during the pendency of the action, no decree can
be forthcoming, death producing a more radical and definitive separation; and the expected consequential
rights and claims would necessarily remain unborn.
The petition of Eufemio for declaration of nullity is moot and academic and there could be no further
interest in continuing the same after her demise, that automatically dissolved the questioned union. Any
property rights acquired by either party as a result of Article 144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines 6
could be resolved and determined in a proper action for partition by either the appellee or by the heirs of
the appellant.
SIOCHI V GOZON
G.R. NO. 169900
FACTS
A 30,000 sqm. parcel of land situated in Malabon is registered in the name of “Alfredo Gozon, married to
Elvira Gozon.“ In 1991, Elvira filed a petition for legal separation against Alfredo and in 1992, filed a notice of
lis pedens which was annotated on the Transfer Certificate Title of the aforementioned land. During the
pendency of the case for legal separation, Alfredo entered into an Agreement to Buy and Sell the said
land for P18M with Mario Siochi. Sichi took possession of the property after delivering a partial payment. On
June 29, 1994, the RTC Cavite rendered a decree of legal separation between the spouses Gozon and
dissolved and liquidated the conjugal partnership. The same court held that the land in question is
deemed conjugal property. Alfredo executed a deed of donation in favor of Winifred (daughter). Executed
in his favor by Winifred, Alfredo sold the property to Inter-dimensional Realty, Inc. (IDRI) for 18 mil ion. Siochi
filed a complaint for the annulment of donation and sale before the RTC which was granted and ordered
Alfredo to exclude the property and rights of Elvira to the undivided one-half share and to deliver a Deed
of Absolute sale to Siochi over his one-half undivided share of the said property. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the trial court and was appealed only by Mario and IDRI.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the offending spouse, Alfredo Gozon has right to sell their conjugal partnership without the
consent of the other spouse and share of the net profits earned by the conjugal partnership.
HOLD
This issue involves the conjugal property of Alfredo and Elvira. Despite being separated in fact, Alfredo
stil cannot sell the property without the written consent of Elvira or the authority of the court.
The absence of the consent of one of the spouses renders the entire sale void, including the portion of
the conjugal property pertaining to the spouse who contracted the sale. Even if the other spouse
actively participated in negotiating for the sale of the property, that other spouse’s written consent to
the sale is stil required by law.
The Agreement entered into by Alfredo and Mario was without the written consent of Elvira. Thus, the
Agreement is entirely void. Article 63 (2) of the Family Code provides that the absolute community or the
conjugal partnership shall be dissolved and liquidated but the offending spouse shall have no right to any
share of the net profits earned by the absolute community or the conjugal partnership, which shall be
forfeited.
MAQUILAN V MAQUILAN
G.R. NO. 155409
Facts
Virgilio and Dita were spouses. Their relationship turned bitter when Virgilio discovered that Dita had a
paramour. Virgilio filed a case of adultery against Dita and her paramour. The two were convicted of the
crime charged. Subsequently, Virgilio filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, Dissolution and
Liquidation of Conjugal Partnership of Gains and Damages before the RTC, imputing psychological incapacity
on Dita. During the pre-trial, Virgilio and Dita entered into a Compromise Agreement wherein they agreed
to partial y separate their conjugal properties without prejudice to the outcome of the pending case of
declaration of nullity of marriage. The RTC approved the compromise agreement.
Virgilio, however, later filed an Omnibus Motion, praying for the repudiation of the Compromise Agreement and
the reconsideration of the Judgment on Compromise Agreement by the respondent judge on the grounds
that his previous lawyer did not intelligently and judiciously apprise him of the consequential effects of the
Compromise Agreement. The respondent Judge denied the motion.
Virgilio appealed, contending that the Compromise Agreement is void because it circumvents the law that
prohibits the guilty spouse, who was convicted of either adultery or concubinage, from sharing in the conjugal
property. Since the respondent was convicted of adultery, the petitioner argues that her share should be
forfeited in favor of the common child under Articles 43(2) and 63 of the Family Code.
To the petitioner, it is the clear intention of the law to disqualify the spouse convicted of adultery from
sharing in the conjugal property; and because the Compromise Agreement is void, it never became final
and executory. Moreover, the petitioner cites Article 2035 of the Civil Code and argues that since
adultery is a ground for legal separation, the Compromise Agreement is therefore void. He also argued
that since the proceedings before the RTC were void in the absence of the participation of the
provincial prosecutor or solicitor, the voluntary separation made during the pendency of the case is also
void.
ISSUE
Do Articles 43 and 63 of the Family code applies to the instant case?
RULING
No. The foregoing provisions of the law are inapplicable to the instant case. Article 43 of the Family Code
refers to a subsequent marriage that is terminated because of the reappearance of an absent spouse;
while Article 63 applies to the effects of a decree of legal separation. The present case involves a
proceeding where the nullity of the marriage is sought to be declared under the ground of psychological
capacity.
GOITIA V CAMPOS-RUEDA
35 PHIL 252 (1916)
FACTS: Eloisa Goitia De La Camara and Jose Campos Rueda were legally married in the City of Manila
on Jan. 7, 1915. They established their residence at 115 Calle San Marcelino, where they lived together
for about a month, when the plaintiff returned to the home of her parents. It was alleged that respondent
demanded her to perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his genital organs. The plaintiff spurned the
obscene demands of the defendant and refused to perform any act other than legal and valid
cohabitation. Since Goitia kept on refusing, defendant maltreated her by word and deed, inflicting injuries
upon her lips, face and different parts of her body; and that, as Goitia was unable by any means to
induce her husband to desist from his repugnant desires and cease from maltreating her, she was obliged
to leave the conjugal abode and take refuge in the home of her parents.
Goitia filed a complaint against defendant for support outside the conjugal home. The CFI ruled in favor of
defendant Rueda and held that the defendant cannot be compelled to support the plaintiff, except in his
own house, unless it be by virtue of a judicial decree granting her a divorce or separation from the
defendant. The plaintiff appealed.
ISSUE: Whether Goitia can compel her husband to support her outside the conjugal home.
HELD: YES. The obligation on the part of the husband to support his wife is created merely in the act
of marriage. Article 149 of the Civil Code provides that the person obliged to give support may, at his option,
satisfy it, either by paying the pension that may be fixed or by receiving and maintaining in his own home
the person having the right to the same. However, this option granted by law is not absolute. The law does
not permit the husband to evade or terminate his obligation to support his wife if the wife is driven away
from the conjugal home because of his wrongful acts.
In the case at bar, the wife was forced to leave the conjugal home abode because of the lewd designs
and physical assault of the husband. Therefore, it is only but right, to claim support from the husband for
separate maintenance albeit outside the conjugal home.
ARROYA V VASQUEZ DE ARROYO 42 PHIL 54 (1921)
Facts:
Mariano and Dolores were married 1910. They lived together with a few short intervals of separation. In
1920, Dolores left their common home and decided to live separately from Mariano. Mariano induced Dolores
to return home but the latter refused. Hence, Mariano filed a petition for permanent mandatory injunction
requiring the Dolores to return to the conjugal home and live with him as a wife under pain of contempt. By
way of defense, Dolores claimed that she was compelled to leave on the basis of cruel treatment on the
part Mariano. She in turn prayed for a decree of separation, a liquidation of their conjugal partnership,
and an allowance for counsel fees and permanent separate maintenance. The trial court ruled in favor
of Dolores.
On appeal, the SC ruled that Mariano has done nothing to forfeit his right to the marital society of
Dolores and that she is under an obligation, both moral and legal, to return to the common home and
cohabit with Mariano. The only question is whether it is within the province of the courts to attempt to
compel one of the spouses to cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the other.
Issue:
May the court order Dolores to return to the conjugal home under pain of contempt?
Held:
No. It is not within the province of the courts of this country to attempt to compel one of the spouses to
cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the other. Cohabitation is a purely personal obligation - an
obligation to do. To compel the wife to comply with such obligation would be an infringement of her personal
liberty. (Arroyo vs. Vasquez de Arroyo, G.R. No. L-17014, August 11, 1921) Jurado, Civil Law Reviewer
ILLUSORIO V BILDNER
G.R. NO. 139789
Facts
Erlinda filed with the CA a petition for habeas corpus to have the custody of her husband Potenciano
alleging that respondents refused petitioner’s demands to see and visit her husband.
The CA allowed visitation rights to Erlinda for humanitarian consideration but denied the petition for
habeas corpus for lack of unlawful restraint or detention of the subject of the petition.
Erlinda seeks to reverse the CA decision dismissing the application for habeas corpus to have the custody
of her husband and enforce consortium as the wife.
Potenciano seeks to annul that portion of the CA decision giving Erlinda visitation rights.
IssuE
May a wife secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her husband to live with her in their conjugal dwelling.
Held
No. Marital rights including coverture and living in conjugal dwelling may not be enforced by the extraordinary writ of habeas corpus.
A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of il egal confinement or detention, or by which the rightful
custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled thereto. It is available where a person continuous
unlawfully denied of one or more of his constitutional freedom. It is devised as a speedy and effectual
remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restrainment, as the best and only sufficient defense of personal
freedom.
The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary
restraint and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is il egal.
A person with full mental capacity coupled with the right choice may not be the subject of visitation rights
against free choice. The CA exceeded its authority when it awarded visitation rights in a petition for
habeas corpus where Erlinda never even prayed for such right.
No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his wife. Coverture cannot
be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by the sheriffs or by any other mesne
process.
TENCHAVEZ V ESCANO
G.R. No. L-19671
FACTS:
Vicenta EscANo, 27, exchanged marriage vows with Pastor Tenchavez, 32, on February 24, 1948, before
a Catholic chaplain. The marriage was duly registered with the local civil registrar. However, the two were
unable to live together after the marriage and as of June 1948, they were already estranged. Vicenta
left for the United Stated in 1950. On the same year she filed a verified complaint for divorce against
Tenchavez in the State of Nevada on the ground of “Extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character.“
A decree of divorce, “final and absolute“ was issued in open court by the said tribunal. She married an
American, lived with him in California, had several children with him and, on 1958, acquired American
Citizenship.
On 30 July 1955, Tenchavez filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, and amended on 31
May 1956, against Vicenta F. Escano, her parents, Mamerto and Mena Escano whom he charged with
having dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta from joining her husband, and alienating her affections, and
against the Roman Catholic Church, for having, through its Diocesan Tribunal, decreed the annulment of
the marriage, and asked for legal separation and one mil ion pesos in damages. Vicenta’s parents denied
that they had in any way influenced their daughter’s acts, and counterclaimed for moral damages.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the divorce sought by Vicenta Escano is valid and binding upon courts of the
Philippines.
2. Whether or not the charges against Vicenta Escano’s parents were sufficient in form.
RULING:
1. No. Vicenta Escano and Pastor Tenchavez’ marriage remain existent and undissolved under the
Philippine Law. Escano divorce and second marriage cannot be deemed valid under the Philippine Law to
which Escano was bound since in the time the divorce decree was issued, Escano, like her husband, was
stil a Filipino citizen. The acts of the wife in not complying with her wifely duties, deserting her husband
without any justifiable cause, leaving for the United States in order to secure a decree of absolute
divorce, and finally getting married again are acts which constitute a wil ful infliction of injury upon the
husband’s feelings in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy, thus entitling Tenchavez to
a decree of legal separation under our law on the basis of adultery.
2. No. Tenchavez’ charge against Vicenta’s parents are not supported by credible evidence. The
testimony of Tenchavez about the Escano’s animosity toward him strikes the court to be merely
conjecture and exaggeration, and were belied by Tenchavez’ own letters written before the suit had
begun. An action for alienation of affections against the parents of one consort does not lie in the
absence of proof of malice or unworthy motives on their part.
Plaintiff Tenchavez, in falsely charging Vicenta's aged parents with racial or social discrimination and with
having exerted efforts and pressured her to seek annulment and divorce, unquestionably caused them
unrest and anxiety, entitling them to recover damages.