208
C hapter 6
FRAMEWORK
FOR A SEXUAL ETHIC
Just Sex
TUST LOVE
Yet the underm ining of sex and love is not a necessary consequence of a "law " of justice. Like W. H. Auden we m ight demur:
"Law is the o ne all gardeners observe___Law is the wisdom of the
old, T h e im potent grandfathers shrilly sco ld . . . Law, says the priest
with a priestly lo o k . . . is the words in my priestly book— Law, says
the judge. . . is T h e Law." Bu t lovers shyly propose th at the law is
"Like love I s a y . . . Like love we ca n 't com pel or fly, Like love we often
weep, Like love we seldom keep."1 T h e law of justice need carry none
of these m eanings, however, as I hope to show.
Ju s tice
I
T
is
n o
s u r pr is e
that the ethical framework I propose for the
sexual sphere of hum an life has to do with justice and with love.
I have been m oving steadily to this all along. It is also no surprise
that I propose, finally, a framework that is not ju stice an d love, but
justice in loving and in the actions w hich flow from that love. T he
m ost difficult question to be asked in developing a sexual ethic is
not w hether th is or that sexual act in the abstract is m orally good,
but rather, w hen is sexual expression appropriate, morally good and
just, in a relationship of any kind. W ith what kinds of m otives, under
w hat sorts of circum stances, in what forms of relationships, do we
render our sexual selves to one another in ways th at are good, true,
right, and just?
Arguing th at justice and love should be put together in th e ways
I suggest m ay be counterintuitive. Indeed, strong objections could
be raised: m any w'ill say that to m ake justice a requirement for love
underm ines to o m any understandings of love, especially rom antic
and sexual love. It introduces a kind of "tyran ny" of justice into the
glory of love. I t rcduccs sex to a contract or to som e kind of measure
that is unsuited to w hat sexuality is. It is too harsh a discipline for the
spontaneity o f love, the passion of sexual desire, and the intim acies
marked by jo y while safeguarded by privacy. Wc do not need one
m ore way for heavy-handed socially constructed norm s to shape and
to control personal relations, to the advantage of som e but perhaps
the detrim ent of all.
207
Justice, of course, can mean m any things. M y use of the term is
based sim ply on the classic fundam ental "form al" m eaning: to render to each h er or h is due. T h is is a m ore general no tion of justice
than our usual focus on certain kinds o f justice — for example, distributive justice, legal justice, retributive justice. But it is at the heart
of all form s o f justice, and when it com es to sexual justice, th is basic
m eaning rem ains relevant.
"Form al" m eanings, however, do not go very far in telling us w hat
really is just. T hey provide direction, but not sufficiently specific
content to be of m uch help in guiding our behaviors. Th ey do not,
in short, tell us w hat is "d u e." T h is is why whole system s of ju stice have, in fact, been unjust. W ithout critical spécification of what
"due" m eans, there can be — in the n am e of justice — system s in
which slavery is endorsed, certain groups of persons are m arginalized, and w om en and m en are "legitim ately" treated unequally It
is presumed and som etim es theoretically defended that it is "due"
som e individuals to be treated as m asters and "due" others to be
treated as slaves; it is right and just to place som e persons on the
m argins o f society because th is affirm s what is due th em and what
is due others; it is due women to be assigned certain roles and places
in social hierarchies because th is accords with what they are.
Although I am aware that there arc m any ways to spccify the
requirements of justice — through social contracts, longstanding
1.
W. H . A u d en , "L a w Lik e L ov e," in S e le c t e d P o etry o f W. H. A u d e n , 2 n d ed. (New
York: V in tag e B o o k s, 1 9 7 0 ), 6 2 - 6 4 .
Fram ew ork for a Sexual Ethic: Just Sex
210
custom s, certain kinds of noncontradictory reasoning— I move forward here w ith the perspective I have already introduced. I begin,
To acknowledge all of these difficulties and possibilities should make
us cautious in our interpretations of the concrete reality of persons,
then, by translating the formal m eaning of ju stice (render to each
w hat is due) in to the following basic form al ethical principle: Persons
but it does n o t contradict the requirem ent of discerning as b est we
can the reality that is part of w hat every person is or shares in some
form , the reality of persons as persons. Love itself may lead us to
an d groups o f p erson s ou ght to h e affirm ed according to th eir con crete
reality, ac tu al a n d p o te n tia l Depending on their circum stances and
the nature of their relationships, the concrete reality of persons can
include som e particularly relevant aspect of their reality — as, for
exam ple, buyer or lender, parent or child, professional caregiver or
patient, com m itted m em ber of a voluntary association, and so on.
But even a form al principle like this one is insufficient for discerning
w hat really is just. We therefore need to go on to determ ine ''m aterial" ethical principles of justice — that is, principles that do specify
and substantiate w hat is "due/ ' that do give substantive content to a
form al principle. If, as I have argued in the previous chapter, a formal
principle for justice in loving is to love in accord w ith the concrete
reality of persons, th en m aterial principles of ju stice will depend on
our interpretation of the realities of persons — their needs, capacities,
relational claim s, vulnerabilities, possibilities.
T h e C o n c rete Reality o f Persons
O ur knowledge o f hum an persons generally, as well as of individual
persons, differs and changes, sincc our interpretations of hum an experience are historical and social. Moreover, there are differences (not
ju st perceptions of differences) in the experienced concrete realities
of individuals and groups — differences that are or ought to be of
trem endous im portance to us. And who can not notice the myriad
nuances o f h um anity that appear in so m any ways in the searching
eyes of the lover?
. . . H ow m any loved your m om ents of glad grace,
And loved your beauty with love false or true,
But one m an loved the pilgrim soul in you,
And loved the sorrows of your changing face___2
2.
W. B . Y eats, "W h e n You A re O ld ," in T h e C o lle c t e d P o e m s o fW . B. Yeats (New
York: M a c m illa n , 1 9 5 6 ), 4 0 - 4 1 .
TUST LOVE
exam ine our interpretations of th e realities of persons and to test
these interpretations with w hat is available to us in th e sources of
m oral insigh t that w c saw in chapter 5. In this way w c can correct
or embrace th em again.
In general, what 1 propose is an inductive understanding of the
sh ared co n crete reality o f hu m an persons that includes the following:
Each person is constituted with a com p le x structure — embodied,
inspirited, with n eed s for food, clothing, and shelter, and at some
point usually a capacity for procréation; but also with a capacity for
fre e c h o ice and the ability to thin k an d to fe e l.3 Hum an persons are
also essentially relation al — w ith interpersonal and social needs and
capacities to open to others, including God, in knowledge, love, and
desire, as w ell as all the em otional capacities th at we experience,
such as fear, anger, sorrow, hope, joy. Persons exist in th e world, so
that their reality includes their particular history and their location
in social, political, econom ic, and cultural contexts. Further, persons
have some sort of relationship to institution s — w ithout total identification or lim itation to system s and institutions, and som etim es
3.
H ow w e in te rp r e t th is co m p le x stru ctu re w ill m ake a great deal o f d iffere nce in
w h a t w e affirm f o r o u rselv es and o th ers. A s 1 noted in P erson al C o m m itm e n ts , 141
n . 2 : If, fo r e xa m p le , w c th in k th a t e m o tio n s arc th e p rim ary e le m e n t in the hu m an
personality, w c w ill hav e a d iffe ren t view o f h u m a n w ell-be ing th a n if w e th in k th a t
e ach o n e’s re aso n or ra tio n ality is prim ary. Sim ilarly, if w e th in k th a t free ch o ic e is o f
c e n tr a l im p o rtan ce to every p erson, w e w ill w a n t fo r p erso n s so m e th in g q u ite d ifferent
th a n if w c th in k t h a t p e rso n s h av e a p la ce in a n o rg a n ic so ciety w h e re th e ir r o le s arc
pre scribe d and th e im p o rtan ce o f freedom is negligible. I c a n n o t resolve su ch d ifferences
here , thou g h m y overall th eo ry in th is bo o k n o t on ly r aise s th e q u e stio n s bu t a tte m p ts
to offe r a co h e ren t view o f so m e m o ral req u ire m e n ts b ased o n an in te rp re tatio n o f the
re ality o f p erso n s. I sh ou ld add, also, th a t I am n o t add ressing h e re th e q u estio n o f w ho
sh ou ld b e tre a ted as p e rson s if n o t ev eryone w e th in k of a s a p e rso n h a s th e p o ssibility
o f exe rcising th e cap acitie s I a m describin g (such as th in k in g , ch o osin g , procreating,
e tc.). T o describe w h a t b elongs to "p erso n h o o d " is a d iffe ren t ta s k from id entifyin g the
pool o f e n tit ie s t h a t are to be treated a s p e rso n s. For th e latter, all th o se b o rn o f p erson s
ca n b e included , w hatever th e ir p re sen t cap acitie s o r ca p a cities fo r d ev elo pm en t. B ut
th is inv o lv e s a d iscu ssio n of an o th e r se t o f issu e s th a n th e o n es th a t I a m addressing
in th is volume.
Fram ew ork for a Sexual Ethic: Just Sex
211
212
TUST LOVE
w ith only a rejecting relationship. And the reality of persons includes
n ot only their present actuality but their positive potentiality for development, for h um an and individual flourishing; as well as their
Indeed, such considérations may illum inate each one's concrete individual reality and m ay reveal som e of the central requirem ents of
love, and sexual love, of any person as a person. O b lig atin g features"
vulnerability to dim inishm ent. Finally, every person is unique as
well as a com m o n sharer in humanity. A ju st love of persons will
take all of th ese aspects of persons into account, though som e will
be m ore im portant than others, depending on the context and the
of persons constitute the basis of requirem ent to respect persons,
in whatever way wc relate to them , sexually or otherwise. Autonomy and relationality in particular are "obligating features" because
nature of a relationship.
O bligating Features o f Personhood
Contem porary understandings of th e hum an person lead us to a
special focus on at least two basic features of hum an personhood:
features that can be called au ton om y and relationality.4 "Basic" here
does not im ply th a t we can understand fully w hat the "essen ce" of
the hum an person is. There is a wariness in contem porary W estern thought about even acknowledging that there are "essences" to
be known, le t alone essences th at w e can k now My attem pt to delineate features of w hat it m eans to be a hum an person recognizes
the partiality o f our knowledge, the historical changeability of knowledge and the variations o f hum an self-understandings from culture to
culture and across tim e. N onetheless, it seem s to m e th a t we cannot
reasonably assert either that we know nothing at all about the hum an
person as person, or that we have nothing of a shared knowledge in
this regard.
It is not necessarily to abstract from the concrete reality of individual persons to consider w hat is central to the h um an personality.
4.
M y a p p roa ch m ig h t a t le a st m ee t th e p rag m atic level o f "stra te g ic e sse n tia lism ,"
in t h e se n se in w h ich S eren e Jo n e s and o th e rs u s e th is te r m . Se e S e ren e Jon es, Fem -
inism and Christian Theology: Cartographies o f Grace (M in n e a p o lis: F o rtr e ss , 2 0 0 0 } .
Y et m y co n ce rn is n o t p rim a rily w ith sp e cu la tiv e know led ge; it is w ith th e kin d of
know led ge t h a t w ill te ll us w h a t is h a rm fu l and w ha t helpful in h u m a n life. T o so m e
e xten t, th is co rre sp on d s w ith Beverly H arriso n 's v iew o f ju s tic e a s a p rim a ry m e tap h or
o f rig ht rela tio n sh ip , o n e th a t sh a p e s th e t elo s o f a good co m m u n ity and a n im ates
C h ristia n m oral se n sib ilitie s. S e e B everly W ild un g Fla rriso n , Ju s tic e in t h e M aking:
F em in is t S o c ia l E th ic s (L ouisville: W e stm in ste r Jo h n K no x, 2 0 0 4 } , 1 6 . I m ay b e even
clo se r to M a rth a N u ssb a u m 's d elin e atio n o f h u m a n "fu n c tio n a l c a p a b ilitie s " approach,
sin ce N u ssb au m and I sh a re n o t o n ly a so cia l e th ica l a im b u t a be lief in so m e rockb o tto m ca p ab ilities and n eed s fo r h u m a n be in gs th a t d em an d resp e ct and a ffirm atio n .
S e e M a rth a C . N u ssb a u m , S e x a n d S o c ia l Ju s t ic e (N ew York: O xford U n iv e r sity Press,
1 9 9 9 ), 4 1 - 4 2 .
they ground an obligation to respect persons as ends in them selv es
and forbid, therefore, the use of persons as m ere m eans.5 T h is claim
bears exploration. I could argue here that persons arc of unconditional value, ends in themselves, because they are created so and
loved so by G od, who reveals to us a com m and and a call to treat
one another as ends, and not only as m eans. M y approach is in an
im portant sense warranted by this belief, and I am attem pting to
provide a way of understanding it. Yet I also think th at a plausible
elaboration of what characterizes hum ans — created and beloved as
we are — is also accessible to those w ho stand in diverse faith traditions or no faith tradition at all. So I continue to explore and to
argue on the basis of experience and our system atic understandings
of experience: First, persons are ends in themselves because they are
autonomous in the sense th at they have a capacity for fre e choice.
Why? Bccausc freedom of choice as w c cxpcricncc it is a capacity for
self-determ in ation as embodied, inspirited beings, w hich m eans a capacity to choose n ot only our own actions but our ends and our loves.
It is a capacity therefore to determ ine the m eaning of our own lives
and, w ithin lim its, our destiny. It is a capacity to set our own agenda,
w hether it is on e that is good for us and others or not. H ence, for me
to treat another hum an person as a mere m eans is to violate her insofar as she is autonomous; it is to attem pt to absorb her com pletely
into my agenda, rather than rcspccting the one that is her own.
Secondly, a hum an capacity for relationship (or relationality) also
grounds an obligation to respect persons as ends in themselves. W hy
5.
By iden tify in g p e rso n s as "e n d s in th e m selv e s" I do n o t a ssu m e th a t they are
su fficie n t in th e m se lv e s o r th at we ca n u nd erstand th e m in a v acu u m , a ll b y the m se lves.
M y secon d o b lig atin g featu re sh o w s th is exp licitly. M o re t h a n th is, however, I consid er
it q u ite p ossible t o e x ist as a b eing th a t is an en d it its e lf and y et to e x is t relativ e t o God.
S e c Farley, "A F e m in is t V ersio n o f R espect fo r P e rso n s," fo u r n a l o f Fem in ist S tu dies in
R eligio n 9 (Spring /Fall 1 9 9 3 ): 1 8 3 - 9 8 ; also , Farley, C o m p a s s io n a te R e s p e c t: A F e m im st
A p p r o a c h t o M e d ic a l E th ics a n d O th e r Q u es tio n s (N ew York: P au list, 2 0 0 2 ), 3 6 - 3 9 .
Fram ew ork for a Sexual Ethic: Just Sex
214
again? It is generally acknowledged that individuals do not ju st survive or thrive in relations to others; they cannot exist without some
have stretched our being through our knowing love and our loving
knowledge. In knowledge and love, and in being know n and being
form of fundam ental relatedness to others/’ T h is generally implies
dependence o n others, y et the cap acity for relation is a capacity to
reach beyond ourselves to other beings, especially to other persons.
loved, w c arc centered both w ithin and w ithout — both in what
we love and in ourselves, as we hold w hat we love in our hearts.
We are who we are n ot only because we can to som e degree determine
ourselves to be so by our freedom but because we are transcendent of
IUST
LOVE
T h e capacity to love one another and all things, and to love w hat
is sacredly transcendent and im m anent (that is, the divine), makes
persons worthy of respect. Each and every person is of unconditional
ourselves through our capacities to know and to love. T h e relational
value. Each person is a whole world in herself, yet her world is in
aspect of persons is not finally only extrinsic but intrinsic, the radical possibility of com ing into relation, into union, w ith all that can
w hat she loves. T h is is w hat interiority means for hum an persons,
and w hat it m eans in our relationships one w ith another.8
be known and loved — and especially with other persons, including
God, where union can take the form of com m union, knowing and
being known, loving and being loved. A s such, we are n ot bounded,
ground any norm s we articulate for general ethics or sexual ethics.
not com plete in ourselves once and for all, as if our world could be
closed upon itself. We rem ain radically open to un io n with others,
through knowledge and love; our interior world is transcendent of
itself, though w c hold also a whole world w ithin ourselves. To respect the world that we are and the world we are becoming requires
Freedom and relationality, then, are the obligating features that
Beings with these features ought n ot be completely scooped up into
som eone else's agenda. T h ey ought not be treated as m ere means
but a lso as ends in them selves. Moreover, freedom and relationality as features of hum an persons are profoundly co n n ected w ith one
another: we can n ot grow' in freedom except in som e nurturing relationships; and freedom ultim ately is for the sake of relationships —
respecting ourselves and other persons as ends, n ot only as means.
W hether or n ot pre-modern, modern, or postm odern philosophies
the loves, th e relationships we finally choose to identify with in our
deepest selves. Together autonom y (or freedom) and relationality also
find settled selves or unsettled selves (a series of selves with n o continuity or anchor), it is awe before the world of the self that can
generate respect and even reverence, if only we see it.7
provide the co n ten t for m ost of the basic norm s for right loving and
the basic m oral norm s for sexual ethics. N orm s for a general sexual
A nother way to say all of th is is th a t as persons we are term in al
cen ters , ends in ourselves, b ec au s e in s o m e w ay w e b oth transcend
ourselves an d y et belon g to ourselves. It is by our freedom that we
transcend ourselves, introduce som ething new, beyond our past and
present. By our freedom, w c also possess ourselves; our selves and
our actions are in som e sense our own. Besides the place of freedom
in self-transcendence and self-possession, it is also in and through
our relationality th at we as hum ans both transcend and possess ourselves; we belong to ourselves yet we belong to others to whom we
ethic, then, m ust n ot only satisfy th e demands of these two features
of personhood; they m ust serve to specify more clearly the meaning
of the features.
Despite all th at I have said above, it m ay n ot be superfluous to
draw one general conclusion here regarding norm s for sexuality. In
chapter 4 I spoke o f the m ultiple meanings and aim s, or motivations,
that are possible for hum an sexual activity and relationships — some
distortivc and destructive, som e accurate and creative. Now, given
our explorations of just love and desire, ju st sexual love and desire,
wc can say that the aim s of sexuality ought to accord w ith, or at the
very least, n o t violate the concrete reality of hum an persons. If they
6 . A lth o u g h I a m in te rp r etin g re la tio n a lity to re fe r t o rela tio n by know ledge and
love, I d o n o t th e re by deny t h e n e cessa ry re lated n css th a t in clu d es d epend ence o n God
for o n e 's very e xiste n ce .
7. Se e Farley, "H o w S h a ll W e Love in a P ostm o d ern W orld ?" A n n u a l o f t h e S ociety
o f C h ristian E th ic s {So ciety of C h r istia n E th ic s, 1 9 9 4 ) , 3 - 1 9 .
8.
I do n o t d e n y a kind of in te rio r ity in all be in g s, or ce rta in ly in higher level
a n im als o th e r th a n h u m a n s. I a m he re, however, ta lk in g abou t h u m an p e rso n s, for
w h ich th e re is a k in d o f in terio rity th a t appears to be d istin ctiv e to th e species.
Fram ew ork for a Sexual Ethic: Just Sex
216
do so accord, they will not be destructive or distortivc. Also in chapter 4 I identified elem ents th at characterize and can belong to m uch
specific n orm s arc not m utually exclusive. Although each of them
emphasizes som ething the others do not, they nonetheless overlap
of hum an sexual experience. T h ese included n ot only em bodiment
and em otion s, but pleasure, desire and love, language and com m un ication, procréation, and power. Pleasure, com m unication, the union
of love and its intim acy, em powerm ent, and a desire for offspring
enough that, as we shall see, som e sexual behaviors and relationships
are governed by more th an one norm . Fourth, since hum ans are em bodied spirits., inspirited bodies, theirs is an embodied autonom y and
TUST LOVE
are each great hum an goods. If sex is an expression of love th a t is
just, then each and all of these can be the aim or part of the aim
an embodied relationality. T h e n orm s th at I will lay out, therefore,
are to be understood as requiring respect for an embodied as well as
inspirited reality. I turn now to the specific norm s that I propose for
of sexual desire and activity.9 W hether they are so in a way that is
a contemporary hum an and C hristian sexual ethic.
ju st will be clearer w hen we identify m ore specific ethical norm s for
sexual activities and relationships. Power, especially in interpersonal
relationships can be, but need n ot be, a great hum an good. W hether
and w hen it is good in sexual relations m ust also be determined by
m ore specific norms.
N o rm s for Ju st Sex
Som e prelim inary clarifications are im portant for understanding the
specific n orm s for a sexual ethic. First, the norm s that I have in mind
are not m erely ideals; they are bottom -line requirem ents. Second, and
as a qualification of th e first, all of th ese norm s adm it of degrees. T h is
m eans th at there is a sense in which they are stringent requirements,
but they are also ideals. In both senses, they are all part of justice.
T h at is, they can be understood in different contexts as norm s of
w hat I shall call "m in im al" or "m ax im al" justice. W hile m inim al
justice is always required, m axim al justice can go beyond this to
w hat is "fitting ." M axim al justice may, in fact, point to an ideal that
exceeds th e exacting requirem ent o f m inim al ju stice.10 Third, the
9.
I a m n o t e sp ou sin g th e view th a t se x u al a ctiv ity ca n be ju stified o n ly w h en it
a im s a t o r is a t le a s t open to th e p o ssibility o f p ro creation . I d iscu ss th is a g ain in the
co n te x t o f o n e o f th e sp e cific n o rm s th a t follow s.
10.
W h at I m e a n by "fittin g " m a y n o t be co m p letely clear. B o th m in im a l and m a xim a l ju s tic e have to do w ith t h e co n cre te rea litie s o f p e rso n s and w h a t is "d u e " th em .
W ith m in im a l ju stic e , w hat is d ue is a b o tto m -lin e strin g en t req u irem en t; m axim al ju s tice in co rp o rate s m in im a l ju stice bu t goes beyond it. How ever, sim ply "g o in g beyond"
m ay n o t m ea n g re ate r ju s tic e . T h e r e arc w a y s in w h ich w c c a n th in k w c a rc exceeding
th e d e m a n d s o f ju s tice , b u t ren dering " m o r e " m a y n o longer be ju stic e a t a ll; it m ay be
in ju stic e if it is n o t fittin g o r ap propriate for an ind iv id ual o r group. I t m a y in fact be
d estru ctive . T h u s , fo r ex a m p le, a te a ch e r m ay go beyond w ha t is ord in arily required by
1. D o N o U njust H a rm
T h e first general ethical norm we m ay identify is the obligation not
to harm persons unjustly.11 T h is is grounded in both of the obligating features of personhood, for it is because persons are persons that
we experience awe of one another and the obligation of respect. "Do
n ot h arm " echoes through the experience of "do not k ill" the other.
T o harm persons m ay be to violate who they arc as ends in th em selves.12 But th ere are m any form s that harm can take — physical,
so m e o f h e r stu d en ts in te rm s o f a ssistan ce ; b u t h e r "g o in g bey o n d " m ay o r m a y n o t be
ju st. E veryth ing d epe nds o n th e co n crete re a lities o f th e stu d e n ts, w h a t is appropriate
in a p ro fession al/stu d e n t relation ship , and w h a t th e tc a c h c r c a n reason ably do, taking
in to acco u n t th e le g itim ate d em an ds o f o th er stu d en ts. S h e may, if sh e provides "to o
m u ch " a ss is ta n c e , be h a rm in g her stu d e n ts be cau se s h e d o e s n o t en cou rag e th eir ow n
cre ativ ity and d e v elo p m e n t o f sk ills. H e n ce , "m a x im a l" ju stice "g o es be yo nd " in ways
th a t a rc app rop riate or fittin g — as w h e n so m e o n e is in te rrib le need, w ith n o p articular
fu rth e r c la im o n so m e o ne else to m e et th a t ne ed, bu t so m e o n e h elp s o u t anyway. He
g oes th e "e x tra m ile " be cau se it is b o th needed and appropriate; it is fittin g fo r the
p e rso n s involved, th e situ atio n , and h is cap ab ilitie s. So m e m ig h t ca ll th is "su p ererogatory," above and beyond an y real m o ra l obligation ; b u t th e re are so m e in s ta n ce s |for
e xam p le, in th e d e m an d s o f friend sh ip as opposed to o rd inary d em and s in re lation to
anyone) w here th e r e re ally is a n o th e r leve l o f o blig atio n , th o u g h n o t as s tr ic t as th e
o b lig a tio n in v o lv ed in m in im a l ju stic e.
11. H a rm " u n ju s t ly " helps to clarify th a t th e in ju n ctio n "d o n o h a r m " is n o t a
g en e ral a bsolu te p ro h ib itio n . W e do h a rm p erso n s w hen th e h a rm is n e ce ssa ry t o bring
abo ut a greate r good. A n exam p le o f t h is is in th e p ra ctice o f m e d icin e . A lm o st every
m ed ical t r e a tm e n t (especially surgery) involves so m e h ar m to a p atie n t, bu t it is a harm
th a t is "ju s tifie d " for a sig n ifican t g reater good.
12. O f co u r se , w e a lso have o b lig atio n s n o t to h ar m o t h e r beings besid es persons.
W c co n sid e r s o m e of th e m to have in trin sic w orth — as, for exam p le , n o n h u m an a n im a ls and the w h o le n etw o rk o f b eing s t h a t co n stitu te our "natu ral e n v ir o n m e n t." I do
n o t w an t h e re t o engage th e d iscu ssion o f w h eth e r so m e o f th e se be ing s arc o f " u n co n d itio n a l" w o rth , tho ugh w h e n th e liv es o f h u m a n p e rso n s co n flict w ith th e lives of
n o n h u m a n b ein g s, I a m read y to sa y th a t th e w o rth o f persons ta k e s priority. T h is is a
Fram ew ork for a Sexual Ethic: Just Sex
218
psychological, spiritual, relational. It can also take the form of failure
to support, to assist, to care for, to honor, in ways that are required
by reason of context and relationship. I include all of th ese form s in
well as pornography, prostitution, sexual harassment, pedophilia,
sadom asochism . M ost of these are controversial today, so that they
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this norm .
In the sexual sphere, "do no unjust harm " takes on particular
significance. Here each person is vulnerable in ways that go deep
cannot be rejected out of hand, judged without assessm ent of their
in justice or justice. M any of these are governed by o ther principles
for a sexual eth ic th at we have yet to explore. I will therefore return
to th em again, though all too briefly, placing th em in the whole of
within. As Karen Lebacqz has said, "Sexuality has to do w ith vulnerability. Eros, the desire for another, the passion th at accom panies
the framework for sexual ethics th at I am proposing.
"D o no u nju st h arm " goes a long way toward specifying a sex-
the w ish for sexual expression, m akes one vulnerable___capable of
being wounded.13 And how m ay we be wounded or harmed? We know
the myriad ways. Precisely because sexuality is so intim ate to persons, vulnerability exists in our em bodim ent and in the depths of
our spirits. D esires for pleasure and for power can become bludgeons
in sexual relations. As inspirited bodies we are vulnerable to sexual
exploitation, battering, rape, enslavement, and negligence regarding
w hat wc know w c m ust do for sex to be "safe sex." As embodied
spirits we are vulnerable to deceit, betrayal, disparity in com m itted
loves, debilitating "bonds" of desire,14 seduction, the pain of unfulfillm ent. We have seen in previous chapters the role sex can play in
conflict, the ways in w hich it is connected w ith sham e, the potential it has for instrum entalization and objectification. We have also
seen human vulnerability in the con text of gender exclusionary practices and gender judgments: "Terrible things arc done to those who
deviate."15
ual ethic, but not far enough. It is necessary to identify additional
principles for a sexual eth ic th at aim s to take account of th e com plex concrete realities o f persons. I said above that autonom y and
relationality, two equally primordial features of hum an persons, provide th e ground and th e content for sexual ethics. Th ey provide a
ground or basis, as we have seen, for the principle that forbids un justifiable h arm . Together they yield six m ore specific and positive
norm s: a requirem ent of free choice, based on th e requirem ent to respect persons-' autonomy, and five further norm s that derive from the
requirement o f respect for persons' relationality.16 H ence, wc move
from our first norm , "do no u njust h a rm " to a second norm for a
sexual ethic: freedom of choice.
2. F ree C on sen t
We have already seen the im portance of freedom (autonomy, or a
A ctions and social arrangem ents that are typically thought to
be harmful in the sexual sphere include all form s o f violence, as
capacity for self-determ ination) as a ground for a general obligation to respect persons as ends in themselves. T h is capacity for
self-determ ination, however, also undergirds a more specific norm.
top ic tor a n o th e r day, however. W h a t I a m co nce rne d w ith h ere is n o t o n ly th a t h u m an s
a re en d s in th e m se lv e s, b u t th a t the y are so be cau se o f th e o b ligating featu re s o f th eir
T h e requirem ent articulated in th is norm is all the m ore grave because it directly safeguards the autonom y of persons as embodied
p e rso n h o o d . I t is th e re fo r e p rec is e ly b e c a u se h u m a n s a re s e lf -tra n sc e n d e n t y e t b elo n g
to th em se lv es t h a t I id en tify and groun d m y n o rm t h a t p ro hib its u n ju s t h arm in g of
them .
13. Lebacqz , "A ppropriate Vu ln erability," 4 3 6 .
14. S e c ic s s ic a B e n ja m in , T h e B on d s o f L o v e: P sy ch oan alysis. F e m in is m , a n d th e
P rob lem o f D om in a tio n (N ew York: P a n th eo n B oo ks, 1 9 8 8 ); and B e n ja m in , " T h e Bonds
of Love: R a tio n al V io le n ce and E ro tic D o m in a tio n ," in T h e Fu ture o f D iffe r e n c e , ed.
H e ste r E ise n ste in and A lic e Jard in e (N ew B ru n sw ick , N J: R utgers U n iv ersity P ress,
1 9 8 5 ), 4 1 - 7 0 .
15. C h ristin e M . K orsgaard, "A N o te o n th e Value of G c n d e r-Id cn tifica tio n ," in
W om en , C u ltu re a n d D e v e lo p m e n t, ed. M a rth a C . N u ssb a u m and Jo n a th a n G lover
(O xford : C la ren d o n P ress, 1 9 9 5 ), 4 0 1 - 3 .
and inspirited, as transcendent and free.171 refer here to the particular obligation to respect th e right of hum an persons to determine
16. Se e be lo w th e diagram o f all the n o rm s o n page 2 3 1 .
17. In so m e ap p ro ach es to m edical e t h ic s, fo r exam ple, th e p rinciple req uiring resp e ct fo r p erso n s red uces to respect for a p erson ’s au ton om y, and th e p rim ary specific
ru le b e co m es th e req u irem en t for in form ed c o n s e n t in re latio n to m ed ical tre atm e n t.
It is a m istak e , how ever; to e q u a te rcsp cct fo r p erso n s w ith resp ect fo r auton om y . T h is
need n o t lessen th e im p o rtan ce o f respect fo r au to n o m y as a n e sse n tial p art o f w hat
re sp ect fo r p e rso n s as p erso n s requires. S e e Farley, C o m p a s s io n a te R es p e c t: A F em in ist
A p p r o a c h t o M e d ic a l E th ics a n d O th e r Q u estio n s (N ew York: P au list, 2 0 0 2 ), 2 2 - 4 4 .
Fram ew ork for a Sexual Ethic: Just Sex
219
220
TUST LOVE
their own actions and their relationships in the sexual sphere of their
lives. 18 T h is right or this obligation to respect individual autonomy
sets a m in im um but absolute requirem ent for the free co nsent of
im portant sense coerced you. Similarly, if I make a prom ise to you
w ith no in ten tion of keeping the promise, and you m ake decisions
on the basis o f th is promise, I have deceived, coerced, and betrayed
sexual partners. T h is m eans, of course, that rape, violence, or any
harm ful use of power against unwilling victim s is never justified.
Moreover, seduction and m anipulation of persons who have limited
capacity for choice because of imm aturity, special dependency, or loss
of ordinary power, are ruled out. T h e requirement of free consent,
you.20 Along with the requirem ent of free consent, then, these other
obligations belong to a sexual ethic as well.
Relationality, I have argued, is cquiprimordial with autonom y as
an essential feature of h um an personhood, and along w ith autonomy grounds th e obligation to respect persons as ends in them selves.
then, opposes sexual harassment, pedophilia, and other instances of
disrcspcct for persons' capacity for, and right to, freedom of choice.
Derivative fro m the obligation to respect free consent on the part of
sexual partners are also other ethical norm s such as a requirem ent
Like autonomy, relationality does m ore than ground obligations to respect persons as persons; it specifies the co ntent of th is obligation.
To treat persons as ends and n ot as mere m eans includes respecting
their capacities and needs for relationship. Sexual activity and sexual
for truth-telling, promise-keeping, and respect for privacy. Privacy ,
despite contentions over its legal meanings, requires respect for what
today is nam ed "bodily integrity." "D o not touch, invade, or use" is
the requirem ent unless an individual freely conse nts.19 W hat this
recognizes is th a t respect for embodied freedom is necessary if there
pleasure are in strum ents and modes of relation; they can enhance
relationships or hinder them , contribute to th em and express them .
Sexual activity and pleasure are optional goods for hum an persons in
the sense th at they arc n ot absolute, peremptory goods which could
never be subordinated to other goods, or for th e sake of othe r goods
be let go; but they are, or certainly can be, very great goods, mediating
is to be respect for th e intim acy of the sexual self.
W hatever other rationales can be given for principles of truthtelling and prom ise-keepin g , their violation lim its and h ence hinders
the freedom o f choice of the other person: deception and betrayal are
ultim ately coercive. If I lie to you, or dissem ble when it com es to
com m unicating m y in tentions and desires, and you act on the basis
of w hat I have told you, I have limited your options and hence in an
18. I realize 1 a m intro d u cin g y e t a n o th e r e th ica l te rm here: "r ig h t ." I t goes beyond
th e sco p e of th is v o lu m e t o try t o clarify th is. I a m the re fo re going to assu m e so m e
general u n d e rsta n d in g o f a "rig h t" a s a cla im — w h e th e r legal o r m o ra l, grounded in
th e law, in a so cia l co n tra ct, o r in w h at h u m a n persons are. In m y c o n te x t he re I
acknow led ge m o r a l rights, cla im s th a t p lace m o ral o b lig a tio n s o n o th e rs to respect,
sccu re, and p ro tcc t. So m e o f th ese cla im s c a n a nd ou g ht to be secured a lso by law.
19. A "d o n o t to u c h " ru le h o ld s d ifferently in th e sex u al sp here th a n in th e m edical (a lthough th e y so m e tim e s co m e together, o f cou rse}. I n th e latter, it undergirds
th e req u ire m en t of inform ed c o n se n t for tre a tm e n t, th o u g h it ad m its o f excep tion s
in e a se s o f em ergency , p ublic h e a lth th re a t, and so forth . A s fa r as I know, th e term
"b o d ily in t eg rity " w as first u sed in re la tio n to a u to n o m y (to e sta b lish p e rso nal physical
bound aries) by B e ve rly W ild u ng H a rriso n . Se e h e r "T h e o lo g y o f P ro -C h o ice: A F em in ist
P ersp ectiv e," T h e W itn ess 6 4 (Sep te m b er 1 9 8 1 ): 2 0 ; a lso, A Right to C h o o s e : T ow ar d a
N e w E th ic o f A b or t io n (B o ston: B eacon , 1 9 8 3 ); M ak in g t h e C o n n ec tio n s , cd . C arol S.
R obb (B oston : B eaco n , 1 9 8 5 ), 1 2 9 - 3 1 . N ee d less to say, w hile H arriso n 's appeal t o th e
co n ce p t w as fre q u e n tly in th e c o n te x t of a b o rtion , it h a s m u ch broad e r m e an in g — for
h e r and for o th ers.
relationality and the general well-being of persons.
Hence, insofar as one person is sexually active in relation to another, sex m u st n ot violate relationality, but serve it. Another way of
saying this is th at it is n ot sufficient to respect the free choice of sexual partners. In addition to "do no h arm " and th e requirem ent of free
consent, relationality as a characteristic of hum an persons yields five
specific norm s for sexual activity and sexual relationships: m utuality, equality, com m itm ent, fruitfulness, and w hat I w ill designate in
general term s, "so cial ju stice." For an adequate contem porary sexual
ethic, we need to explore th e m eaning and im plications o f each of
these norm s.
3. Mutuality
Respect for persons together in sexual activity requires m utuality
of participation. It is easy for u s today to sing the songs of m utuality in celebration of sexual love. We are in disbelief when we
20.
T h is is d ifferen t from m ak in g a p ro m ise and th en b e in g u n able to fulfill it,
e ith e r be cau se o f ch ang e in circu m stan ces, w e ak n e ss o n the p a rt of th e prom isor, or
w hatever.
Fram ew ork for a Sexual Ethic: Just Sex
221
learn th at it h as n ot always been so. Yet traditional interpretations
of heterosexual sex are steeped in images of the male as active
and the fem ale passive, th e wom an as receptacle and th e m an as
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w hat contem porary philosophers have called a "double reciprocal incarn atio n," o r m utuality of desire and embodied unio n.22 N o one can
fulfillcr, the w om an as ground and the m an as seed. No other in-
deny that sex m ay in fact, serve m any functions and be motivated by
m any kinds o f desire. N onetheless, central to its meaning, necessary
terpretation o f the polarity between the sexes has had so long and
deep-seated a n influence o n m en's and w om en's self-understandings.
for its fulfillm ent, and normative for its m orality w hen it is within
an interpersonal relation is som e form and degree of mutuality.
Today w c th in k such descriptions quaint or appalling, and wc rec-
Yet we have learned to be cautious before too high a rhetoric of
ognize th e danger in them . For despite the seeming contradiction
between the active/passive model of sexual relations and the som e-
mutuality, too m any songs in praise of it. Like active/passive relations, mutuality, too, has its dangers. Insofar as, for example, we
tim e interpretations of w om en's sexuality as insatiable, the model
assum e it requires total and utter self-disclosure, we know that harm
lurks unless sexual relations have matured into justifiable and m u-
formed im aginations, actions, and roles which in turn determined
that he who em bodied the active principle was greater than she who
sim ply waited — for sex, for gestation, for birthing w hich was not of
her doing and no t under her control.
Today we believe we have a completely different view. We have
learned that m ale and fem ale reproductive organs do n ot signal activity only for one and passivity for the other; n or do universalizable
m ale and fem ale character traits signal this. We can even appreciate all the ways in which, even at the physical level, m en's bodies
receive, encircle, em brace, and all the ways w om en's bodies are active, giving, penetrating. Today we also know that the possibilities
of m utuality ex ist for m any form s of relationsh ip— w hether heterosexual or gay w hether w ith genital sex or the multiple other ways
of embodying our desires and our loves. T h e key for us has become
not activity/passivity but active receptivity and receptive activity —
cach partner active, each one reccptivc. Activity and rcccptivity partake of one another, so that activity can be a response to som ething
received (like loveliness), and receptivity can be a kind of activity, as
in "rccciving" a guest.21
U nderlying the norm of m utuality is a view of sexual desire that
does not see i t as a search only for the pleasure to be found in the
relief of libidinal tension, although it may includc this. H um an sexuality, rather, because it is fundamentally relational, seeks ultim ately
21.
S e e G a b rie l M arcel, C rea tiv e Fidelity, tra n s. R obert R osen th a l |New York:
N oonday, 1 9 6 4 ), 8 9 - 9 1 .
tual trust.23 Insofar as we th ink th at sex is just and good only if
m utuality is p erfected , we know that personal incapacities large and
sm all can undercut it. We know that patience, as well as trust, and
perhaps unconditional love arc all needed for m utuality to become
what we dream it can be. But what is asked of us, demanded of us,
for the m utuality of a one night stand, or of a short-term affair, or of
a lifetim e of co m m itted love, differs in kind and degree.
Indeed, th e m utuality that makes sexual love and activity just
(and, one m u st add, that m akes for "good sex" in the colloquial sense
of the term) can be expressed in m any ways; and it does adm it of degrees. No m atter what, however, it entails som e degree of m utuality
in the attitudes and actions of both partners. It entails som e form
of activity and receptivity, giving and receiving — two sides of one
shared reality on the part of and w ithin both persons. It requires, to
som e degree, m utuality of desire, action, and response. Tw o liberties
m eet, two bodies m eet, two hearts com e together — metaphorical
and real descriptions of sexual mutuality. Part of each person's eth ical task, or the shared task in each relationship, is to determ ine the
2 2 . T h e c o n ce p t w as originally Sa rtr e's, alth ou gh h e used it to refer m o re to the
arousa l o f se x u a l attr a ctio n and d esire. S e e Jea n Paul Sa rtre , B ein g a n d N oth in g n ess,
tran s. H aze l E . B a rn e s (N ew York: P h ilo so p h ical Library, 1 9 6 6 ). For m o re con te m p o rary
u se s and ad ap tatio n s o f th is, see T h o m a s N ag el, "S e x u a l P e rv ersio n ," in P hilosophy
o f S ex: C o n te m p o r a r y R ea din gs , ed. A la n So ble (To tow a, N J: L ittlefield A d am s, 19 80 ),
7 6 - 8 8 ; So lo m o n , "S e xu a l P arad ig m s," ibid., 8 9 - 9 8 ; Ja n ice M o u lton , "S e x u a l B ehavior:
A n o th e r P o s itio n ," ibid ., 1 1 0 - 1 8 .
2 3 . For a d is cu ssio n of th is d anger in a w id er co n te x t, s e e R ich ard S e n n e tt,
"D e stru ctiv e G e m e in s c h a ft," ib id ., 2 9 9 - 3 2 1 .
Fram ew ork for a Sexual Ethic: Just Sex
TUST LOVE
threshold at w hich this norm m ust be rcspcctcd, and below w hich it
is violated.
the C h ristian com m unity's understanding of the placc of sexuality
in hum an and C hristian life has been the notion that som e form
4. Equality
of co m m itm en t, some form of covenant or at least contract, m ust
characterize relations that include a sexual dim ension. In the past,
this com m itm ent, of course, was largely identified with heterosexual
O ur considerations of m utuality lead to yet another norm th a t is
based on respect for relationality. Free choice and mutuality arc not
sufficient to respect persons in sexual relations. A condition for real
freedom and a necessary qualification of m utuality is equality. Th e
equality th at is a t stake here is equality of power. M ajor inequalities
in social and econom ic status, age and maturity, professional identity, interpretations of gender roles, and so forth, can render sexual
relations inappropriate and unethical prim arily bccausc they entail
power inequalities — and hence, unequal vulnerability, dependence,
and lim itatio n of options. T h e requirement of equality, like th e requirem ent of free consent, rules out treating a partner as property, a
commodity, o r an elem ent in m arket exchange. Jean-Paul Sartre describes, for example, a supposedly free and m utual exchange between
persons, but an exchange marked by unacknowledged domination
and subordination: "It is ju st that one of them preten ds. . . n ot to n otice th at th e O ther is forced by the constraint o f needs to sell himself
as a m aterial o bject."24
O f course here, too, equality need n ot be, m ay seldom be, perfect
equality. N onetheless, it has to be close enough, balanced enough,
for each to appreciate the uniqueness and difference of the other, and
for each to respect one another as ends in themselves. If the power
marriage. It was tied to the need for a procreative order and a discipline of unruly sexual desire. It was valued more for the sake of
fam ily arrangem ents than for the sake of the individuals themselves.
Even when it was valued in itself as a realization of the life of the
church in relation to Jesus C hrist, it carricd what today arc unwanted
connotations of inequality in relations between men and wom en. It
is possible, nonetheless, th at when all m eanings of com m itm en t in
sexual relations arc sifted, wc arc left with powerful reasons to retain
it as an ethical norm.
As we have already noted, contem porary understandings of sexuality point to different possibilities for sex than were seen in the p a st—
possibilities o f growth in the hum an person, personal garnering of
creative power with sexuality as a dim ension not an obstacle, and the
m ediation of hum an relationship. O n the other hand, no one argues
that sex n ecessarily leads to creative power in the individual or depth
of u nion betw een persons. Sexual desire left to itself does not seem
able even to sustain its own ardor. In the past, persons feared that
sexual desire would be too great; in the present, the rise of im potency
and sexual boredom m akes persons m ore likely to fear th at sexual desire will be too little.25 T h ere is growing cvidcnce that sex is neither
the indomitable drive th a t early C hristian s (and others) thought it
differential is too great, dependency will lim it freedom, and m utuality
will go awry. T h is norm , like the others, can illum inate the injury or
evil th at characterizes situations of sexual harassm ent, psychological
was nor the primordial im pulse of early psychoanalytic theory. W hen
it was culturally repressed, it seemed an inexhaustible power, under-
and physical abuse, at least som e form s of prostitution, and loss of
self in a process th at m ight have led to genuine love.
way or another. Now th a t it is less repressed, more and m ore free
5.
C o m m itm en t
Strong argum ents can be made for a fifth norm in sexual ethics,
also derivative of a responsibility for relationality. At the heart of
24.
Sa rtre, C ritiq u e o f D ia le c tica l R ea s o n , tran s. A . S h e rid a n -S m ith (Lond on: N LB,
1 9 7 6 ), 11 0 .
lying other m otivations, always struggling to express itself in one
25.
I a m n o t g ainsayin g F oucault’s critiq u e o f th e "repressive p rin cip le" here. In
fact, I m ay be re in fo rcin g it, sin c e so -calle d "rep re ssio n " m ay co n stru ct th e s o r t of
sex u a lity th a t is th e op p osite of w h a t rep ressio n a im s to do. M oreover, th e so rts of
w an in g se x u al d esire th at I d escribe fo r today m ay signal a d iffe ren t kind o f social
co n stru ctio n of se x u a l desire a n d se x u al p o ssibility : i t m ay be th e re su lt n o t o f too
m u ch sex bu t o f so cial and cu ltu ra l e m p h a sis o n org asm as th e sign o f accep table
and valued se x. O rg a s m ic an d o th e r e x p e cta tio n s o f sex ual perfo rm an ce m ay actu ally
un d ercu t th e po w er o f sex .
Fram ew ork for a Sexual Ethic: Just Sex
226
and in the open, it is easier to sec other com plex m otivations behind
O n the other hand, there is reason to believe that sexuality can be
the object of co m m itm ent, that sexual desire can be incorporated into
a covenanted love w ithout distortion or loss, but rather, w ith gain,
with en hancem ent. Given all the caution learned from contemporary
it, and to recognize its inability in and of itself to satisfy the affective
yearning of persons. M ore and more readily com es th e conclusion
drawn by m any th at sexual desire w ithout interpersonal love leads
to disappointm ent and a growing disillusionment. T h e other side of
this conclusion is th at sexuality is an expression o f som ething beyond itself. Its power is a power for union, and its desire is a desire
for intimacy.
O ne of th e central insights from contemporary ethical reflection
on sexuality is that norm s of justice cannot have as their whole goal
to set lim its to th e power and expression of hum an sexuality. Sexuality is of such im portance in hum an life that it needs to be nurtured,
sustained, as w ell as disciplined, channeled, controlled. Th ere appear
to be at least two ways w hich persons have found to keep alive the
power of sexual desire w ith in them . One is through novelty of persons with whom they are in sexual relation. Moving from one partner
to another prevents boredom, sustains sexual interest and the possibility of pleasure. A second way is through relationship extended
sufficiently through tim e to allow the incorporation of sexuality into
a shared life and an enduring love. T h e second way seem s possible
only through com m itm ent.
Both sobering evidence of the inability of persons to blend their
lives together, and weariness with the high rhetoric that has traditionally surrounded hum an covenants, yield a contemporary reluctance
to evaluate th e two ways of sustaining sexual desire and living sexual
union. At th e very least it may be said, however, that although brief
encounters open a lover to relation, they cannot m ediate the kind of
union — of knowing and being known, loving and being loved — for
w hich hum an relationality offers the potential. Moreover, the pursuit of m ultiple relations precisely for the sake of sustaining sexual
desire risks violating the norm s of free consent and mutuality, risks
m easuring oth ers as apt m eans to our own ends, and risks inner disconnection from any kind of life-process of our own or in relation
w ith others. D iscrete m om ents of union are n o t valueless (though
they may be so, and m ay even be disvalucs), but they can serve to
isolate us from others and from ourselves.
TUST LOVE
experience, w e may still hope that our freedom is sufficiently powerful to gather up our love and give it a future; that thereby our sexual
desire can be nurtured into a tenderness that has no t forgotten passion. We m ay still believe th at to try to use our freedom in this way
is to be faithful to the love that arises in us or even the yearning that
rises from us. R hetoric should be lim ited regarding com m itm ent,
however, for particular forms of com m itm ent are them selves only
m eans, n ot ends. As Robin M organ notes regarding the possibility of
process only w ith an enduring relation, "C om m itm en t gives you the
leverage to bring about change — and the tim e in which to do it."26
A C hristian sexual ethic, then, m ay well identify com m itm en t as
a norm for sexual relations and activity. Even if com m itm ent is only
required in th e form of a com m itm en t not to harm one's partner, and
a co m m itm ent to free consent, mutuality, and equality (as I have described these above), it is reasonable and necessary. M ore than this,
however, is necessary if our concerns are for the wholeness of the
hum an person — for a way of living th at is conducive to th e integration of all of life's im portant aspects, and for the fulfillm ent of sexual
desire in the highest form s of friendship. Given these concerns, the
norm m ust be a com m itted love.
6. Fruitfulness
A sixth norm derivative from the obligating feature of relationality is
what I call "fruitfulness." Although the traditional procreative norm
of sexual relations and activity no longer holds absolute sway in
C hristian sexual ethics in either Protestant or Rom an C atholic traditions, there rem ains a special concern for responsible reproduction of
the hum an species. Traditional arguments th at if there is sex it m ust
26.
R ob in M o rg an , "A M arriag e M a p ," Ms. M a ga zin e 11 (Ju ly-A u g ust 1 9 8 2 ): 2 0 4 .
For fu rth e r elab o ratio n o n th e m ean in g o f interp e rso n al co m m itm e n ts, s e c Farley, Pers o n a l C o m m itm e n t s . In th is boo k , th ere arc w ay s o f d e scribing c o m m itm e n t itse lf th at
co u ld allow it t o b e th o u g h t of a s a t le a st part of an end — for e xa m p le th e en d o f love
and friendship. I t h as o r ca n have in trin sic v alu e in th a t it is c o n stitu te d by th e one
givin g to th e o th e r h e r "w o rd ," w ith a n e w fo rm of relatio n sh ip now established.
Fram ew ork for a Sexual Ethic: Just Sex
228
be procrcativc have changed to arguments that if sex is procrcativc it
m ust be w ith in a context that assures responsible care of offspring.
T h e connection between sex and reproduction is a powerful one, for
it allows individuals to reproduce and to build families; it allows a
who love. T h e new life w ithin the relationship of those who share it
m ay move beyond itself in countless ways: nourishing other relationships; providing goods, services, and beauty for others; inform ing the
fruitful work lives of the partners in relation; helping to raise other
sharing of life full enough to issue in new lives; and it allows the
hum an spccics to perpetuate itself. Relationality in the form of sexual reproduction, moreover, does n ot end w ith the birth of children,·
it stretches to include th e rearing of children, th e in itiation of new
people's children; and on and on. All o f these ways and m ore may
constitute the fruit of a love for w hich persons in relation arc responsible. A ju st love requires the recognition of this as the potentiality
of lovers; and it affirms it, each for the other, both together in the
generations in to a culture and civilization, and th e ongoing building
fecundity of their love. Interpersonal love, then, and perhaps in a
special way, sexual love insofar as it is just, m ust b e fruitful.
T h e articulation of this norm , however, moves us to another perspective in the development of a sexual ethic. T h ere are obligations
in justice th at the wider com m unity owes to those who choose sexual
relationships. Hence, our final norm is of a different kind.
of th e h um an community.
At first glance, it appears that "procreation" belongs only to, is
only possible for, som e persons; and even for them , it has com e to
seem quite optional. How, then, can it constitu te a norm for sexual
activity and relations? Even if it were recognized as a norm for fertile
TUST LOVE
heterosexual couples, what would th is m ean for infertile heterosexual
couples or for heterosexual couples who choose not to have children,
for gays and lesbians, for single persons, for ambiguously gendered
persons? For these other individuals and partners, would it signal,
as it has in the past, a lesser form of sex and lesser form s of sexual
T h is norm derives from our obligation to respect relationality, but
n ot o nly from this. It derives more generally from the obligation to
respect all persons as ends in themselves, to respect th eir autonomy
relationships? Or is it possible that a norm of fruitfulness can and
ought to characterize all sexual relationships?
It is ccrtainly true th at all persons can participate in the rearing
of new generations; and some o f those w ho cannot reproduce in traditional ways do even have their own biological children by means
and relationality, and thus not to harm them but to support them . A
social justice norm in the context of sexual eth ics relates no t specifically to the ju stice betw een sexual partners. It points to the kind of
justice th at everyone in a com m unity or society is obligated to affirm for its m em bers as sexual beings. W hether persons are single
of th e growing array of reproductive technologies — from infertility
treatm ents to artificial insem ination to in vitro fertilization to surrogate m othering. All of this is not only true but significant. Yet an
ethically norm ative claim on sexual partners to reproduce in any of
or married, gay or straight, bisexual or ambiguously gendered, old or
young, abled or challenged in the ordinär)' forms of sexual expression, they have claim s to respect from the C hristian com m unity as
well as th e wider society. Th ese are claim s to freedom from unjust
these ways seem s unwarranted.
harm , equal protection under th e law, an equitable share in the goods
Som ething m ore is at stake. Beyond the kind of fruitfulness that
brings forth biological children, there is a kind of fruitfulness that is
a measure, perhaps, of all interpersonal love. Love between persons
violates relationality if it closes in upon itself and refuses to open to
a wider co m m unity o f persons. W ithout fruitfulness of som e kind,
and services available to others, and freedom of choice in their sexual lives — w ithin the lim its of no t harm ing or infringing on the
ju st claim s of the concrete realities of others. W hatever the sexual
status of persons, their needs for incorporation into the community,
for psychic security and basic well-being, m ake the sam e claim s for
social cooperation am ong us as do those o f us all. T h is is why I call
any significant interpersonal love (not only sexual love) becom es an
ég oism e à deux. If it is completely sterile in every way, it threatens
the love and the relationship itself. But love brings new life to those
7. S ocia l Ju s tice
the final norm "social ju stice." If our loves for one another are to be
just, then this norm obligates us all.
Fram ew ork for a Sexual Ethic: Just Sex
TUST LOVE
T h ere is o ne way in which, of coursc, this norm qualifies sexual
relationships themselves, obligating sexual partners as well as the
bias would b e high on the list of the issues I have in m ind.31 Th e
m yths and doctrines of religious and cultural traditions th at reinforce
com m unity around them. T h a t is, sexual partners have always to
be concerned about n ot harm ing "third parties." As Annette Baier
observes, "in love there are always third parties, future lovers, ch il-
gender bias and u njust constriction of gender roles becom e im portant
here as w ell.32 Included, too, m ust be the disproportionate burden
that w om en bear in the world-wide A ID S pandem ic.33
We have already seen in the previous chapter the kinds of injustices
dren who m ay be born to one of the lovers, their lovers and their
children."27 A t th e very least, a form of "so cial ju stice" requires of
sexual partners th at they take responsibility for the consequences of
their love and their sexual activity — w hether the consequences are
pregnancy and children, violation o f the claim s that others may have
on each of them , public health concerns, and so forth. No love, or at
least no great love, is just for "th e two of u s,"28 so th at even failure
to share in som e way beyond the two of us the fruits of love m ay be
a failure in justice.
My focus in articulating th is norm, however, is primarily on the
larger social world in w hich sexual relationships arc formed and sustained. It includes, therefore, the sorts of concerns I identified above,
but larger concerns as well. A case in point is the struggle for gender
equality and (in particular) w om en's rights in our own society and
around th e world. T h is is relevant to the sexual eth ic I am proposing
because it h as a great deal to do w ith respect for gender and sexuality
as it is lived in concrete contexts of sexual and gender injustice.
Here we could identify numerous oth er issues of utm ost importance. Sexual and dom estic violence m ight head the list, both at
inflicted on persons whose gender and sexuality do not fall into the
usual categories. We should add issues surrounding the explosion
of reproductive technologies — many of which have proven to offer a
great benefit for individuals, but m any of w hich rem ain questionable,
such as technologies for sex-selection.34 Other issues also require
m oral assessm ent, such as the availability (or not) of contraceptives,
and the repercussions for som e w omen of the m arketing of male
remedies for im potence. It is neither possible nor necessary to detail
all of these issues here. M y point is only that they, too, fall within
the concerns of an adequate hum an and C hristian sexual ethic. T hey
signal social and com m unal obligations not to harm one another
unjustly and to support one another in what is necessary for basic
well-being and a reasonable level of hum an flourishing for all. T hese
obligations stretch to a com m on good — one that encompasses the
sexual sphere along with the other significant spheres of hum an life.
In sum mary, w hat I have tried to offer here is a framework for sexual ethics based on norms of justice — those norm s which govern all
hom e and abroad.29 But it would include also racial violence that is
perpetrated on m en and w om en and th at all too often has to do with
false sexual stereotypes.30 Development, globalization, and gender
3 1 . Se e, for e x am p le: N u ssb au m , S e x a n d S o c ia l Ju stice·, N u ssba u m and Glover,
W om en , C u ltu re, a n d H u m a n D e v e lo p m e n t ; A m artya S e n , "O v er 1 0 0 M illio n W om en
A re M iss in g ," N e w York R e v ie w o f B o o k s (D e cem be r 2 0 , 1 9 9 0 ): 6 1 - 6 6 .
2 7 . A n n e tte C . Baier, M oral P r eju d ice s: E ssay s o n E th ics (Ca m brid g e, M A : Harvard
U n iv e r sity P re ss, 1 9 9 4 ), 147.
2 8 . M a ry M c D e r m o tt Shid eler, T h e T h e o lo g y o f R o m a n tic L o v e : A Stu d y in th e
Writings o f C h a r le s W illiam s (G ra nd R apid s, M I: E erd m a n s, 1 9 6 2 ), 1 1 5 .
2 9 . T h e m a n y w ritin gs o f M arie F ortun e provide d escriptive a n d n o rm a tiv e analy ses
of th e se issu e s. S e e e sp ecia lly th e new v ersion o f h e r e arliest w o rk o n se xual vio len ce
a s " t h e u n m en tio n a b le s in ," in M a rie M a rsh a ll Fortu ne, S ex u a l V io len c e : T h e Sin R ev is ite d (C le ve la n d : P ilgrim , 2 0 0 5 ). For co n sid era tio n s o f the se issu e s in te rn atio nally,
sec M ary Jo h n M a n a n za n e t al., ed s., W om en R esistin g V iolen c e: S p iritu ality fo r Life
(M a ry kn oll, NY: O rb is, 1 9 9 6 ).
3 0 . Se e, for e x a m p le, th e d iverse e ssay s in E m ilie M . T ow n es, e d ., A T ro ubling in
m y S o u l (M a ry k n o ll, NY: O rb is, 1 9 9 3 ).
C a lifo r n ia P r e ss , 1 9 9 5 ).
3 2 . T h e r e a re co u n tless w orks by th eo log ians o n th e se issu es now , b u t se c, in particular, H ow ard E ilb erg-S ch w artz an d W endy D onige r, e d s., O ff w ith H er H e a d ! T h e
D e n ia l o f W o m e n ’s Id e n tity i n M yth, R eligion , a n d C u ltu re (Berkeley: U n iv ersity of
3 3 . S e e Farley, C o m p a s s io n a t e R e s p e c t, 3 - 2 0 ; s e c also L in d a Singer, "R eg u latin g
W o m en in th e A ge o f S ex u al E p id e m ic," in E rotic W elfare: S e x u a l T h e o r y a n d Politics
in th e A ge o f t h e E p id e m ic , ed. Ju d ith B u tle r and M au re en M acG rogan (New York:
R outledge, 1 99 3 ).
3 4 . S e e C o m m itt e e o n E th ic s, " S e x S e le ctio n " (W ashington, D C : A m e rican C o llege o f O b s te tric ia n s and G y n e co lo g ists, N o v e m be r 1 9 9 6 ). Fo r a care fu l probing of
rep roductive te ch n o lo g ies m o re generally, se c M au ra A. R yan, E thics a n d E con o m ic s
o f A ssis ted R ep r od u c tio n : T h e C ost o f L on gin g (W ashington, D C : G e org etow n U n ive rsity P re ss, 2 0 0 1 ). S e e also Lisa So w ie C a h ill, " T h e N e w B irth T ech n o lo gie s and Pu blic
M o ra l A rg u m e n t," in C a h ill, Sex, G e n d e r a n d C h ristia n E thics (C am b rid ge : C am brid ge
U n iv e rsity P re ss , 1 9 9 6 ), 2 1 7 - 5 4 .
Fram ew ork fo r a Sexual Ethic: fust Sex
TUST LOVE
Norms for Sexual Justice
B a s is
N o rm
R e s p e c t f o r t h e a u t o n o m y a n d r e la tio n a li t y
t h a t c h a r a c t e r i z e p e r s o n s a s e n d s in th e m s e l v e s ,
a n d h e n c e r e s p e c t f o r t h e i r w e ll- b e in g :
1 . D o n o u n ju s t h a r m
R e sp ect fo r a u to n o m y :
2 . F re e c o n s e n t o f p a r t n e r s
R e s p e c t f o r r e la tio n a lit y :
3 . M u t u a l it y
4 . E q u a lity
5 . C o m m itm e n t
6 . F r u itf u ln e s s
R e s p e c t f o r p e r s o n s a s s e x u a l b e in g s i n s o c ie t y :
7 . S o c ia l ju s t ic e
hum an relationships and those w hich are particular to the intimacy
of sexual relations. M ost generally, th e norm s derive from the concrete reality o f persons and are focused on respect for their autonomy
and relationality. T h is is to respect persons as ends in them selves. It
yields an in ju nctio n to do no unjust harm to persons. It also yields
spécifications both of w hat it m eans to respect autonomy and relational! ty and what it m eans to do n o harm . Autonom y is to be
respected through a requirem ent of free consent from sexual partners, w ith related requirem ents for truthtclling, promise-keeping,
and respect for privacy. Relationality is to be respected through requirem ents o f mutuality, equality, com m itm ent, fruitfulness, and
social justice.
Even m ore specifically, we m ay in term s of this framework say
things like: sex should not be used in ways th a t exploit, objectify, or
dom inate; rape, violence, and harmful uses of power in sexual relationships arc ruled out; freedom, wholeness, intim acy, pleasure arc
values to be affirmed in relationships marked by mutuality, equality,
and som e form of com m itm ent; sexual relations like other profound
interpersonal relations can and ought to be fruitful both w ithin and
beyond th e relationship; the affections of desire and love that bring
about and sustain sexual relationships are all in all genuinely to
affirm both lover and beloved.
I rccognizc full well that it is not an easy task to introduce co nsiderations o f justice into every sexual relation and the evaluation of
every sexual activity C ritical questions rem ain unanswered, and serious disagreem ents are all too frequent, regarding the concrete reality
of persons and th e m eanings of sexuality. W hat can be norm ative
and w h at exceptional — th at is, what is governed by the norm s I have
identified and w hat can be exceptions to these norm s — is sometim es
a m atter of all too delicate judgment. But if sexuality is to be creative
and not destructive in personal and social relationships, then there is
no substitute for discerning ever m ore carefully the norm s whereby
it will be just.
Sp ecial Q uestions
I hope th at w hat I have delineated above as a justice ethic for the
sphere of sexuality in hum an life already speaks of the practice of this
ethic. It is n o t intended to be merely an abstract outline of ethical
principles and rules. T h e chapter that follows will attem pt to show
w hat this e th ic m eans in response to particular aspects of our lives.
T h ere are further questions th at bear consideration, however, before I
leave the substance of th is chapter. Som e of these questions challenge
the ethic I have proposed; som e of th em expand it in ways that may
be particularly im portant to the C hristian com m unity
A n Ethic O nly fo r Adults*
Insofar as a justice ethic m akes sense at all, can it m ake any difference to teenagers whose reported sexual practices today appear
untouchable by traditional or new ethical frameworks? I am not here
referring to th e exploitation of the young by adults in th e multiple
form s that sexual harm is perpetrated. T h e ethical norm s I have
outlined are clearly intended to protect the young in special ways
from the violence and m anipulation of adults who would use the
vulnerable sexuality of children and adolescents for their own (that
is, the adults1') pleasure or m onetary gain. I am , rather, referring to
the practices o f teenagers am ong themselves. M y focus is, of course,
on practices th at arc no doubt time-bound and culture-bound, but I
Fram ew ork for a Sexual Ethic: Just Sex
suspcct there are analogues th at will emerge again and again, at least
in W estern culture.
T h e phenom enon of "hooking up" is an example of a practice
among teenagers that seem s to elude any norm s other than acceptance am ong peers.33 "H ooking up" is precisely w hat it depicts:
sex w ithout any relationship and w ithout any strings. "Friends with
benefits" differs in th at there is som e form of friendship prior to
sexual activity, but still, no strings. D ating still exists, but at least
according to som e reports, appears not to be the sexual relationship
of choice. "W e might date— I don't know. It's just that guys can get
so annoying w hen you start dating th em ."36 "Now that it's easy to get
sex outside o f relationships, guys don't need relationships."37 Many
teenagers, according to these reports, are looking for anything but
com m itm ent — or even m utuality in any sense other than physical.
T h ere m ay be a growing concern am ong teen-agers for "safe sex,"
in the sense o f protection especially against sexually transm itted diseases. W hether or n ot this fuels the reported wide-spread practice of
oral sex is hard to determine. W h at is clcar, however, is th at adolescents are m isinform ed about the health consequences of oral sex
and other sexual practices, so th at it is hard to believe th a t "concrete
realities" of persons arc m uch taken into account. If a justice cth ic is
to make any difference at all in the choices th at young people make
regarding their sexuality, the first step will have to be education about
sex and its dangers as well as sexuality and the ways it may be not
only harm less but good.
TUST LOVE
that they represent some. W hat can a justice eth ic say to these particular practices and experiences? W hat can it say to adolescents for
whom these practiccs arc not part of their experience? W hat have wc
to offer young girls who, in th e m idst of this kind of sexual activity, or on the outside looking in, say that they do this or want this
because their lives are boring? O r because they want relationships,
though they seek them in vain in the practices that aim to make relationships unnecessary? And what can we say to young boys, who
appear to enjoy these practices more th an girls; who find in them a
way to stay uncom m itted yet have access to sexual partners alm ost
w ithout lim it?38
I do no t here, as I have said, attem pt to assess how widespread
these practices may be. Nor do I attem pt to judge the practices th em selves — at least n ot w ithout longer term em pirical studies of the
consequences and n ot w ithout a careful consideration of the to tal situation in w hich W estern teenagers find themselves today. I do w ant
to raise the m odest but urgent question: Suppose these practices are
harm ful to young people. Suppose some of them enjoy these practices, but som e do not. Suppose som e of them feel used, but their
partners have no understanding of this. Would sexual taboo morality
change the situation? Perhaps so, perhaps not, but its lasting effect
m ight have to do with developing sham e and guilt more than wisdom
and prudence about hum an sexuality.39
W hether o r not published reports about the sexual lives of teenagers and even of pre-teen children actually reflect the m ajority of
teenage experiences (and I do no t assume that they do), it is clear
3 8 . F o r so m e in sig h ts in to the se e x p erie nces, se e Blodgett, C on str u ctin g th e E ro tic,
e sp ecially ch a p te r s 4 - 5 .
3 9 . In 1 9 9 4 t h e Se x u ality In fo rm a tio n and E d ucation C o u n c il o f t h e U n ited States
(SIE C U S1 co n v en ed th e N a tio n al C o m m issio n o n A d o lesce n t Sexu al H e a lth . T h is
C o m m issio n developed a co n se n su s s ta te m e n t th a t high lighted th e need fo r ad ults
3 5 . Se e, for e x am p le, B e n o it D en iz et-L ew is, "Friend s, F riend s w ith B e n e fits, and
th e B en e fits o f th e L oca l M a ll/ ’ N e w York T im e s M a g az in e {M ay 3 0 , 2 0 0 4 ) : 3 0 - 3 5 ,
5 4 - 5 6 ; D o n n a F re ita s, "L e t’s T a lk A b o u t S e x ," C h ristia n C e n tu ry (June 1 4 , 2 0 0 5 | : 2 9 3 1 ; L au re n F. W in n er, R e a l S e x: T h e N a k e d T ru th ab o u t C h a s tit y (G ra nd R apids, M I:
B ra zos, 2 0 0 5 ); C a itlin F lan ag an , "A re You T h e r e G o d ’ I t's M e M o n ica: H ow N ice G irls
G o t S o C asu a l a b o u t O ral S e x ," A tlan tic (Jan u ary-F ebru a ry 2 0 0 6 1 : 1 6 7 - 8 2 . S ee also
th e m u ltip le stu d ie s reported b y Barbara I. Blodg ett in C o n stru ctin g t h e E rotic: S exu al
E thics a n d A d o le s c e n t G irls (C leveland : Pilgrim , 2 0 0 2 ), ch ap ter 4.
3 6 . Q u oted in B e n o it D cn iz ct-L ew is, "F rie n d s, Friend s w ith B en e fits, an d th e
B e n e fits o f th e L o cal M a ll," 3 2 .
3 7 . Ibid , 3 4 .
to e n cou rag e ad o le sce n t sex u al h e alth by providing ac cu ra tc in fo rm a tio n and éd ucatio n , fosterin g re sp on sib le d ecision -m ak in g sk ills, offering su pp ort and g u id an ce in the
e xp lo ratio n o f yo u n g p eo ple's ow n v alu es, and m o de lin g h e a lth y se x u a l attitu d e s and
be haviors. It en cou rag ed a d o lesce n ts to "d elay se xu al be h av iors u n til the y are ready
physically, cognitively, and em o tio n ally fo r m a tu re sex u al relatio n sh ip s and th e ir c o n se q u e n ces." I t sup ported e du cation ab o u t in tim acy, sex ual lim it se ttin g , resistin g peer,
partner, so cia l, a n d m edia p ressu re s, and co n sid e ra tio n o f th e be n efits o f ab stin e n ce
of ge nital in te rco u rse, a s w ell as pre v ention o f p regnancy and sexu ally tran sm itte d
d iseases. In a ba la n ced pu blicatio n elab o ra tin g o n th e se issu e s, it a lso provided p o sitiv e a sse ss m e n ts o f ad o le sce n t be haviors in rc cc n t years. See D ebra W. H affncr, ed.,
F acing F acts: S e x u a l F lealth fo r A m e r ic a 's A d o le s c e n t s (N ew Y ork: S IE C U S N atio n al
C o m m issio n o n A d o lescen t S ex u al H e a lth , 1 9 9 5 ).
Fram ew ork for a Sexual Ethic: Just Sex
236
T h e real question here may be whether young people are capable
of ju stice — w hether their socially constructed interests and desires,
and their still largely hidden and unrecognized (by themselves) desires and hopes, can respond to the challenge and call of justice.
sin/ ' "on anism ," "sclf-abusc," and judged it harshly until the tw entieth century, although perhaps not so harshly in every prior century.
Trad itions of professional m edical opinion undergirded and joined
in the negative judgments made by religious authorities. Although
If justice m atters to them at all in their oth er relationships (and I
believe there is plenty of evidence th at it does), can it com e to m atter in their sexual relationships as well? If and insofar as they want
it to matter, o r are even intrigued by w hat this would mean, then
there are theologians and church traditions that continue to consider
m asturbation im moral, m any others (m ost, as far as I can tell, along
w ith m ost m edical practitioners) do n o t assess it in this m anner anym ore. M asturbation is m ore likely to be considered m orally neutral,
questions of respect — self-respect as well as respect for another —
and questions of freedom, mutuality, equality, and benefit or harm,
will n ot be uninteresting questions. We know the dangers as well as
ineffectiveness of m oralism , and the potential dangers of narrowly
construed m oral system s and rules. We do not yet know whether
an ethic o f ju s t love and just sex will transform any young person's
w hich could m ean th at it is either good or bad, depending on the
understanding or action. Insofar as we care about our children, it is
worth a try.
few, or that past dire predictions about dangerous physical or psychological injury from the practice are accurate. Anecdotal reports
today tend to show th at any evil or injury involved is the result of
m isinform ation, unsubstantiated m yths, and experiences of defilem ent and guilt in w hat is perceived to be the breaking of religious
Sexual Relations with O neself
M ost of the ju stice norm s that I have delineated in this chapter derive at least in part from "relationality," one of the basic obligating
features of hum an persons. T h e norm s as I have presented them are
clearly relevant to sexual relationships between persons, but it is not
so clear how this justice ethic relates to sexual relations with one's
self. I do no t thereby w ant to dism iss the im portance of questions
about "self-pleasuring" (or masturbation), especially since general
perceptions and attitudes regarding this form of sexual expression
have changed radically in the latter part of the tw entieth century.
Perhaps the m ost im portant insight we need in this regard is that
it, like other sexual activities, needs to be moved out of the realm of
taboo morality.
Through centuries of W estern thought m asturbation was judged
to be n ot only an im m oral sexual practice, but one that should be
particularly repugnant to hum an individuals and the hum an com m unity. As Im m an uel Kant insisted, it places hum ans "below the level
of an im als."40 C hristian traditions looked upon it as the "solitary
40.
Im m a n u el K an t, L e c tu r e s in E th ic s , tra n s. L ou is In fie ld (N ew York: H arp er &
Row, 1963 1, 17 0 .
TUST LOVE
circum stances and the individual. It could also m ean that, while the
practice may raise psychological questions (if it becomes obsessive,
for example), it usually docs no t raise any m oral questions at all.
Ever since the Kinsey studies, it has been impossible to claim
with any credibility that m asturbation is a practice of only a very
or cultural taboos. It is surely the case that m any women, following the "our bodies our selves" m ovem ent in th e fourth quarter of
the tw entieth ccntury, have found great good in self-pleasuring —
perhaps especially in the discovery of their own possibilities for pleasure — som ething m any had not experienced or even known about
in their ordinary sexual relations with husbands or lovers. In this
way, it could be said that m asturbation actually serves relationships
rather than hindering them.
M y final observation is, then, that the norm s of justice as I have
presented th em would seem to apply to the choice of sexual selfpleasuring only insofar as this activity may help or harm, only
insofar as it supports or lim its, well-being and liberty of spirit.41 T h is
rem ains largely an empirical question, n ot a moral one.
41.
Fo r a tra ditio n a l view , s e e G e rm a in G rise z , T h e Way o f t h e L o rd Jesu s, v o l. 3:
D ifficult M oral Q u es tio n s (Q uincy, 1L: F ran ciscan , 1 9 9 7 ), 13 4 , 2 4 7 . For critic al c o n te m -
porary analysis, in clu d in g co n ce p tu al a naly sis and b iblical a n d trad ition view points, se c
A n th on y K o sn ik c t a !., "M a s tu r b a tio n /' in R ea din gs in M o ra l T h eo log y N o. 8 : D ialogue
a b o u t C a th o h c S e x u a l T eaclm ig, ed. C h a rles E . C u rran and R ich ard A. M cC o rm ick
(N ew York: P au list, 1 9 9 3 ), 3 4 9 - 6 0 ; R onald Lawler, Josep h M . Boy le, and W illiam E.
Fram ew ork for a Sexual Ethic: Just Sex
238
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T h e N egative Potential o f S ex
in forms outside of traditional categories of acceptability. It cannot
I have tried throughout this chapter and previous chapters to em phasize the positive m eanings and values o f sexuality. I have not,
yield conclusions such as: Sex is always an expression o f human
however, ignored its negative potential. Along the way I have noted
serious instances of the injurious use of sexuality (such as rape) as
well as problem atic practices that have traditionally been challenged
as more evil than good (such as prostitution and pornography). I
conflict, and inevitably contains som e degree of violence.
Yet there are characteristics of som e hum an relationships that,
w hen expressed sexually, do wreak havoc on th e vulnerable individual and disrupt the hum an comm unity. Moreover, the harm that
is done, for exam ple, in sexual assault seem s to be more poten-
have left som e questions hanging, promising to return to them . I do
tially deadly than the harm s of nonsexual assault, em otional abuse,
so here, but w ith brief observations, less than the questions deserve,
yet im portant to probing them more fully.
T h e fram ework for sexual ethics that I have presented clearly does
notations of defilem ent of which Ricoeur spoke. It m ay also be so
not treat sex as evil in som e in trin sic way — not evil because of an
uncontrollable biological drive, n ot evil becausc pleasure-seeking is
inevitably self-centered, no t evil because th e hum an body is a burden
exploitation. T h is may be so because of the lingering cultural conbecause sexuality is uniquely in tim ate to hum an persons as embodied spirits, inspirited bodies. For whatever reasons, it does appear
that to be violated so intim ately in our bodied selves can entail harm
in a distinctively terrible way. H ence, for exam ple, the traum a of sus-
to the h um an soul. M y proposed framework, as a way of thinking
about sexual ethical questions, does not yield conclusions such as:
tained sexual abuse of children is more injurious than other forms
Sex without openness to biological reproduction is evil because it
involves unjustified "venereal pleasure."42 It cannot yield conclusions
such as: All s e x as se x requires divine forgiveness, since it is inevitably
at least note the significant difference in gravity between w hat have
been called "sin s of weakness" and "sin s o f m alice."
tainted by a previous cataclysm ic hum an "F all."43 It cannot yield
conclusions such as: A ll sex is defiling and shameful if it is expressed
that involve violence and exploitation, there are n ot m any w ho think
of physical and em otional abuse. It is perhaps here th at we should
Although there is som e reticence to judge the use of sex in ways
positively about the stories that appear daily in newspapers regarding
practices in our own and other parts of the world. T h e reticence is
May, "M a s tu r b a tio n ," ibid ., 3 6 1 - 7 1 ; A lan Soble, "M a stu rb a tio n : C o n ce p tu a l an d E th ical M a tte rs," in T h e P h ilos o p h y o f S e x : C o n te m p o r a r y R ead ing s, cd . A la n S o b le , 4th
ed . (New Y ork: R o w m an & L ittlefield , 2 0 0 2 ), 6 7 - 9 4 . For a critic a l e ssa y fro m th e sta n d p o in t of w o m e n 's e xp erience, se c Jacq u elin e F ortu nata, "M a stu rb a tio n a nd W om en's
Se x u ality ," in T h e P h ilo so p h y o f S e x , ed. A la n Soble, 1st ed. (N ew York: Littlefield
A dam s, 1 9 8 0 ), 3 8 9 - 4 0 8 .
4 2 . I am co n v in ced th a t th is ratio n ale is th e u n su b sta n tia te d p o sitio n be h in d , for
e xam p le, th e d ire ctio n s given by R o m a n C a th o lic h iera rch ical lead ers forbidding the
p ra ctice o f tubal lig atio n in C a th o lic h o sp ita ls— even in c ir cu m sta n ce s w h e re a w om an
m ay alread y ha v e m u ltip le ch ild re n and , b cca u se o f serio u s h e a rt d isea se , be a t risk of
d e ath shou ld s h e h a v e to su stain a n o th e r pregnancy. S e e M argaret A . Farley, "Pow er
and P ow e rlessn ess: A C a s e in P o in t," P roc eed in g s o f th e C a th o lic T h e o lo g ic a l S oc iety
o f A m e r ica 3 7 ( 1 9 8 2 ): 1 1 6 - 1 9 ; R ich ard A . M c C o rm ic k , "S te riliz a tio n : th e D ile m m a
o f C a t h o lic H o sp ita ls ," in T h e C r itical C a llin g R e fle ction s o n iMoral D ile m m a s s in c e
V atican 11 (W ashin gton, D C : G eorge to w n U n iv e rsity P re ss, 19 89 ), 2 7 3 - 8 8 .
4 3 . I do n o t h ereby q u arrel co m p le te ly o r o n ly w ith M a rtin L u th e r 's p o sitio n th a t
orig in al sin h a s le f t a ll h u m a n s still sin fu l in a w ay th a t goes beyond sin fu l action s
o f th e ir o w n . In sofa r a s L u ther held th e A ug u stinian p o sition th a t i t is s e x t h a t bears
pa ra d ig m a tically ev il co n se q u e n ce s o f o rigin a l sin , I oppose th is, as I h o p e m y no rm s
im p ly and w h a t I ha ve said ab ou t C h ristia n p erspectives o n s e x a rticu lates.
due largely to fear of critiquing practices from the standpoint of one
culture against another. Yet these practices appear to occur across
cultures, and a kind of moral repugnance seem s fully justified. I refer
here, for exam ple, to the use of rape as an accepted form of modern
warfare, or at least an accepted side-effect of it; the widespread trafficking of w om en and children for purposes of prostitution or sexual
slavery,· the m illions of children used in prostitution w hether trafficked from or sim ply used w ithin their own lands; and on and on.
A fall-out from som e practices produces an u njust stigm atization of
innocent victim s — as, for example, in th e som etim es lethal punishm en t o f wives, but not husbands, for adultery; the stigm atization
of w om en w h o have been raped and of children born from rape; the
shunning and stigm atization of wives w ho have been infected with
H IV by unfaithful husbands. I do n ot w ant or need to discuss these
Fram ew ork for a Sexual Ethic: Just Sex
crimes or even these terrible but unwarranted stigm as in further detail, since studies of th em are plentiful and readily available.44 W hat
is clear, however, is that they violate all of the sexual ethical norm s I
have identified above.
Pornography and traditional form s of prostitution are, as T have
indicated, two issues th a t have becom e highly contested in the
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his own introduction to an addictivc use of pornography by his father
and older brother, and who upon reflection bemoaned the distortions
in his own abilities to relate to wom en as a result. N orm s of justice
are clearly relevant here, but the m ajor task is to sort out w h at is
harm ful or not, w hat conditions people to distorted gender relations,
w hether and how pornography eroticizes sexual violence, and who is
ing sides of both of these issues, though often the debates are less
being exploited or coerced among those who work in the sex industry
itself.
about the practices them selves than about related issues. In regard to pornography, th e debate is about freedom of speech versus
Regarding prostitution, the debate tends to be about situational
issues — that is, the difference between, on the one hand, sex work-
censorship, although it inevitably involves som e assessm ent of the
conscqucnccs of pornography for gender relations, children used in
ers who argue that they are situationally free to choose th is work for
reasons related to their own interests and, on the other hand, sex
workers who are coerced physically or econom ically into prostitu-
past twenty-five years. Fem inists have found them selves o n oppos-
pornographic film s, the psychological outcom e of sustained use of
pornography over tim e, and what counts or does n ot count as pornography.45 T h e se are serious issues, and m ust be weighed carefully. Not
all use of pornography is harmful to individuals, no doubt, and it is
all too easy for zealots to lump even great literature and art into the
category of pornography. N onetheless, I have through the years been
unable to forget the poignant story of a young m a n w ho told m e of
4 4 . In a d d itio n to on going new sp ap er rep orts, see, (o r e xa m p le, B rian M . W illis and
B arry S . Levy, " C h ild P ro stitu tio n : G lo ba l H e a lth B urd en, R e se arch N eed s, and In te rv e n tio n s," T h e L a n c e t 3 5 9 (A pril 2 0 , 2 0 0 2 ) : 1 4 1 7 - 2 1 ; C a th e r in e P ante r-B rick , "S tree t
C h ild re n , H u m a n R igh ts, an d P u blic H e alth : A C ritiq u e a n d Future D ire c tio n s ," A n n u a l R e v ie w o f A n th ro p o lo g y 3 1 (2 0 0 2 ): 1 4 7 - 7 1 ; G ra ce W am uc, "G en d er V iolence
and E x p lo ita tio n : T h e W id ow 's D ile m m a ," in V io len c e A gainst W o m e n : R eflection s
b y K en y an W o m e n T h e o lo g ia n s , ed . G ra ce W am ue and M ary G e t u i (N airobi, Kenya:
A cton , 1 9 9 6 ), 4 0 - 4 8 ; Jad e C h ristin e A ng elica, A M or al E m e rg en c y : B r ea kin g t h e C y cle
o f C h ild S ex u a l A b u s e (K an sas City, M O : S lice d & W ard, 1 9 9 3 ). I sh ou ld n o te also
th a t th e re are m u ltip le o th e r issu es regarding e m o tio n a l and ph ysica l v io le n ce a s s o cia te d w ith se x , su c h as se x u al h a ra ssm e n t, d ate rape, and so forth . T h e literatu re
is v o lu m in o u s o n th e form er. O n th e la tter, see K risten T. L eslie, W h en V io le n c e is
N o S tran ger: P astora l C ou n s elin g w ith S urvivors o f A c q u a in t a n c e R a p e (M in n e ap olis:
Fortress, 2 0 0 3 ) .
4 5 . Se e, for e xam p le, C a th er in e A . M a cK in n o n , "P orn og rap h y L e ft a nd R ig h t," in
Sex, P r efer en c e, a n d F am ily , cd . D avid M . E stlu n d a nd M a rth a C . N u ssb au m (O xford:
O x fo rd U n iv e r sity P ress, 1 9 9 7 ), 1 0 2 - 2 5 ; M a cK in n o n , T ow ard a F em in is t T h e o r y o f
t h e S ta te (C am brid ge, M A : H arva rd U n iv ersity P ress, 1 9 8 9 ), ch a p te r 1 1 ; A lan Soble,
"P orn ography a n d th e S o cial S c ie n c e s," in T h e P h ilo so p h y o f S ex : C o n te m p o ra r y R ea d ings , cd . A la n S o b lc (New York: R o w m an & L ittlefield , 2 0 0 2 1 , 4 2 1 - 3 4 ; M a rth a C.
N u ssb au m , "O b je c tific a tio n ," P h ilo so p h y a n d P u blic A ffairs 2 4 ( 1 9 9 5 ): 2 4 9 - 9 1 ; Jeffrey
R ose an d D av id B . H art, "P ornogra phy a n d th e In te rn e t: A n E xch a n g e," N e w A tlan tis
no . 6 (Su m m e r 2 0 0 4 ): 7 5 - 8 9 .
tion. T h is debate also incorporates assessm ents of the right or good
of anyone's trading of bodily sexual favors for money. In a balanced
m oral evaluation of claim s and counterclaim s in these regards, Karen
Peterson-Iyer has acknowledged the freedom of at least som e prostitutes, but freedom w ithin limited options. Calling for a fair hearing of
the voices of prostitutes them selves, Peterson-Iyer nonetheless raises
questions about the possibilities of genuine m utuality or equality in
contexts that are all too conducive to the subjection of one sexual
partner to another, objectification of both parties, com m odification
of sex, and th e separation of sex from self-identity.46 W c arc left not
only w ith questions about the justification of prostitution as a practice but with a challenge to our own discernm ent of obligations in
social justice to prostitutes and the world around them.
C h aracter, F aith , and Sexual Ju stice
T h e justice framework for sexual eth ics outlined in th is chapter is,
as I have said, for a C hristian and a hum an sexual ethic. W h a t is distinctive about a C hristian sexual eth ic is n ot that it offers som ething
other than a justice eth ic but that it is contextualized differently and,
46.
K aren P eterson-Iyer, "P ro stitu tio n : A F em in ist E th ic a l A n aly sis," Jo u rn a l o f
F em in ist S tu d ie s in Religion 14 (Fall 19981: 1 9 - 4 4 . S ee also th e ex ce lle n t d iverse set
o f e ssay s in R onald Weitzer, e d ., S e x fo r S a le : P rostitu tion , P ornography, a n d t h e S e x
In d u s try (N ew York: R outled ge, 2 0 0 0 ).
Fram ew ork for a Sexual Ethic: Just Sex
24 1
like other religious traditions, it will no doubt give significance to additional n orm s. For example, norm s and ideals of faithfulness, loving
kindness, forgiveness, patience, and hope that are im portant for any
relationships w ithin the C h ristian com m unity will surely be relevant
to sexual relationships as well. Insofar as any sexual eth ic requires
taking account of the person as a whole, a C hristian sexual eth ic will
surely hold a t its center an understanding of the person before God.
C hristian traditions share an affirm ation of the goodness of création, the central significance of the in carnation of God in Jesus
C hrist, th e redemption of hum anity and all creation by th e saving
action of G od through Jesus C hrist, the com m and and the call of
hum ans to love God with all their heart and soul and strength and
to love their neighbors as themselves.
C hristians affirm also the call of hum an persons to a destiny of
friendship and ultim ate com m union with God and all persons in
God. C hristian s (at least m any C hristians) affirm beliefs in the role
of hum an persons as agents in cooperation w ith the ongoing creative activity of God; the im portance of n ot only the individual but
the com m unity; the responsibilities of hum an persons to promote
the health and well-being of one another; the shared ta sk of working for ju stice in th e world and the healing of creation; the equality
of persons not only before God but before one another. Christians
believe, too, in loves that, like the love of Jesus C hrist, are stronger
than death; and in th e possibility that tragedy is no t the last word
in th e m eaning of hum an lives. To som e persons, the whole world
m anifests som ething sacred — that is, the presence of God — so that
hum an sexuality, too, has a sacramental dim ension. A C hristian sexual justice eth ic is informed and sustained in the context of these
beliefs.
Moreover, for C hristians to love neighbors, near and far, as them selves is to love them justly, to love them on th e model given by a God
of com passionate justice. T h e questions of m orality that Christians
m ust address are, therefore, questions not only of what we m ust do,
but w hat we m u st be and become. A hum an justice ethic, and surely
a C hristian ju stice ethic, m ust attend n ot only to action guides but
to the kinds o f persons wc arc called to be. In the sphere of sexual
TUST LOVE
morality, for exam ple, w hat possible cffect can norm s for ju st relationships have in our lives if we do n ot attend to the "sort of person"
we w ant to be?47
W hen ethics addresses questions of w hat we ought to be, it is in the
realm o f w hat is standardly referred to as "virtue eth ics," or "ethics
of character." T hese questions presume that, in addition to all the
factors that go in to m aking us "who we are" — such as genetic in heritance, tem peram ent, environm ent, socialization, nurturance (or
lack thereof) — we ourselves have som e sort of influence on what
we becom e. For C hristians, these questions presum e that in addition to divine grace — or better, w ith the power of divine grace— wc
shape ourselves significantly by our freedom. O ur capacity for free
choice, however limited or expanded, is after all a capacity for "selfdeterm ination ." T o some degree, in som e respect, we are responsible
not only for our actions, but for the kind of person we come to be.
In a C hristian sexual ethic, therefore, w c should n ot be surprised
to find guidance not only from norm s of strict justice but from the
ideals and the challenge of the Serm on on the M ount.
Part of our concrete reality is that we live out our lives in time;
hence, our lives and our loves are in process. We are, as we say,
"developing." We develop physically and intellectually, culturally and
socially, but also spiritually and m orally We become generally kind
or unkind, h on est or dishonest, com passionate or callous. In other
words, we m ay develop well or badly, in every dim ension of our being.
Even w hen w e develop well, however, a little reflection tells us how
complicated we are. Being a certain sort of person does n ot m ean
that we are w ithout contradictions in our selves, or that we have no
weaknesses to bear or faults over w hich w c break our hearts.
Although religion in whatever tradition can function primarily as
a harsh rem inder of duty, a source of sham e and guilt, a producer
of tim idity or zealous m oralism s; it can also free us from the sort of
fear that keeps us away from God and fractures our selves. C h ristianity, like other religious traditions, has endured in part because
it helps people to m ake sense of their lives. It offers som e response
47.
T h is p h ra se is Jam e s G u sta fso n 's in " T h e 'S o r t o f ' P erson O n e I s ," C a n E thics
B e C hristia n f : A n In q u iry (C h icago: U n iv e rsity o f C h icago Press, 1 9 7 5 ), ch ap . 2.
Fram ew ork for a Sexual Ethic: Just Sex
to the large hum an questions of yearning and love, of suffering and
death, hope and transcendence. C hristianity itself offers hope in forgiveness, liberation from too narrow a view of hum an possibility, and
the promise o f a covenanted relationship w ith God th at will not be
broken. We know th e partiality of our loves and th e incapacities of
our hearts. We know the fragility of all hum an relationships. Yet we
arc able to believe that som e loves can be blessed w ith inexhaustible
life, that som e relationships can hold no m atter what the forces of
evil may th reaten against them, th at sexuality can becom e part of
the highest form s o f friendship, and that a call to justice rem ains.
T h e ideals of virtue th a t m ay m otivate as well as shape our efforts
to becom e ju s t in our sexual expressions and relationships can be
described in term s of wisdom , integrity, freedom, and great love. We
need refined capacities of self-knowledge and knowledge of the other;
wc need capabilities for reverent discernm ent of w hat is ju st in every
relationship. We can hope th at the development of such capacities
and abilities will m ake us m ore and m ore wise, though there are
clearly degrees and lim its to whatever wisdom we accrue. In turn,
we hope th at whatever th e wisdom we attain or receive will make
our discernm ents m ore thoughtful, m ore sensitive, and more just.
Wc who m ay begin with undisciplined loves, or find our desires
in conflict along the way, can rccognizc our needs for wholeness.
W holeness in this sense m ay bring unity and peace for ourselves,
but it will also allow us m ore and more to bring an undivided love
to every beloved. For C hristians, the ideal is to integrate our loves
somehow in an utter love of God. O ur desire is for an integration
that destroys no desire but transform s it, th at ignores no love but
makes it ju st, that harm s no one, not even ourselves. T h is is the
kind of integrity that nourishes our sexuality and makes it just.
Little by little, wisdom and integrity bring freedom. T h ey m ake liberty of spirit possible, and the creative use of free choice consistent.
Virtue in its classical meaning, after all, has to do with the refinement
of our capacities so th at we exercise them w ith consistency, greater
ease, and delight. T h is virtue is not the pinch-faced virtue of either
the fearful or the self-righteous; nor is it the scm blancc of "purity"
that is the enem y o f generosity, humility, and full-hearted care. It is
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not the kind of freedom that is finally attained only by experimentation, keeping all options open, all form s of genuine relationship at
bay. T h is freedom is, rather, the freedom of courage in the face of real
risk and fear; perseverance in the face of weakness and distraction,·
trust in the face of self-doubt; faithfulness in the face o f th e furies
or demons th a t would divert us bo th from the searches to w hich wc
are called and from our ch osen and already anchored loves. It is a
freedom that not only protects us from exploitation and harm , but
that positively affirms and lifts our loves w ith the whole of ourselves.
T h is, then, is th e freedom that unleashes ju st love, desire, and sex.
Finally, wisdom , integrity, and freedom serve great love. Insofar as
they all together approximate the conceptual core of the traditional
"cardinal" virtues — prudence, tem perance, fortitude, and justice —
they serve a ju st love. I m yself prefer these alternate nam es for central, com prehensive, and pivotal virtues (that is, alternate to the
traditional concepts of prudence, temperance, fortitude, and justice);
they garner th e best of the traditional theories but jettison culturcbound connotations that do not serve well our new understandings
of hum an sexuality. Great love is a love that is right, just, true, and
good. It does no t contradict the concrete reality of eith er lover or
beloved; it is true to the nature of the relationship between them ; it
is whole and w ise and brave and also humble, non-grasping, able to
laugh and to m ourn; it integrates multiple loves, even m ultiple great
loves, in harm ony w ith an utter love of God.
T h ese virtues, or characteristics of persons, are adm ittedly ideals.
Yet they, too, have a kind of bottom -line aspect. W itho ut any degree
of virtue, it is hard to im agine sex that is good; w ithout growing
m aturity in virtue, it is difficult to imagine sex that is great. So faith,
character, and m oral growth belong to an ethics of sexual justice just
as m uch as n orm s th at guide our actions. Each illum inate the other,
and each m akes the other more possible.