6 Use Sources 4, 5 and 6 and your own knowledge. (June 2010)
To what extent do you agree with the view that Hitler was ‘a non-interventionist
dictator’ (Source 4, line 32)?
Explain your answer, using Sources 4, 5 and 6 and your own knowledge of the
issues related to this controversy.
(Total for Question 6 = 40 marks)
SOURCE 4
(From Ian Kershaw in The Third Reich, edited by Christian Leitz, published 1999)
Hitler was, on the whole, a non-interventionist dictator as far as government
administration was concerned. His sporadic directives, when they came, tended
to be unclear and to be conveyed verbally, usually by Lammers, the head of the
Reich Chancellery. Hitler chaired no formal committees after the first years of
the regime, when the Cabinet (which he hated chairing) faded into nonexistence.
SOURCE 5
(From Joseph W. Bendersky, A History of Nazi Germany, published 1985)
Government in the Third Reich was characterized by jealousy and bureaucratic
empire-building. Party officials, more often than not, tended to view the will of
the Führer and the welfare of the nation from the point of view of their own
career advancement, or the narrow interests of their own particular
organisation. Party officials engaged in bureaucratic wars to expand their power
as well as to prevent encroachments by rival organisations.
SOURCE 6
(From Richard J. Evans, The Third Reich in Power, published 2005)
Hitler’s Bohemian lifestyle did not mean that he was lazy or inactive, or that he
withdrew from domestic politics after 1933. When the occasion demanded, he
could intervene powerfully and decisively. Albert Speer, who was with him often
in the second half of the 1930s, observed that, while he appeared to waste a
great deal of time, ‘he often allowed a problem to mature during the weeks when
he seemed entirely taken up with trivial matters. Then, after the “sudden insight”
came, he would spend a few days of intensive work giving final shape to his
solution.’ Hitler, in other words, was erratic rather than lazy in his working
habits. He wrote his own speeches, and he frequently engaged in lengthy and
exhausting tours around Germany, speaking, meeting officials and carrying out
his ceremonial functions as head of state. In areas where he did take a real
interest, he did not hesitate to give a direct lead, even on matters of detail. In art
and culture, for instance, Hitler laid down the policy to be followed, and
personally inspected the pictures selected for exhibition or suppression. His
prejudices – against the composer Paul Hindemith, for example – invariably
proved decisive. In racial policy, too, Hitler took a leading role, pushing on or
slowing down the implementation of antisemitic and other measures as he
thought circumstances dictated. In areas such as these, Hitler was not merely
reacting to initiatives from his subordinates, as some have suggested.
How far do you agree Hitler was a non-interventionist dictator?
Kershaw claims that Hitler was a “non-interventionist dictator" suggesting Hitler
was not omnipotent; Bendersky supports this pointing to “rival organisations”,
implying Hitler’s rule cause confusion. However Evans opposes this
interpretation, claiming Hitler “did not hesitate to give a direct lead”. By
examining areas of weakness in Hitler’s rule, alongside areas of decisiveness, the
extent to which Hitler was an interventionist can be examined. It is likely that
despite Hitler’s shortcomings as an interventionist the nature of government
produced the results he wanted regardless.
There is significant evidence to suggest Hitler was a non-interventionist dictator.
Kershaw points to Hitler's "sporadic directives”, suggesting Hitler’s intervention
was indecisive. This is evident with the growing rivalry and confusion, for
example appointing Todt as inspector of roads when Rubenach was minister of
transport. Bendersky’s argument corroborates with this, pointing to “jealousy”
and “rival organisations”. Hitler’s indecision in resolving rivalry created a
confused state, which worsened over time with growing duplication and
redundancy; this would tend to suggest that Hitler’s interventions were rare and
ineffective. Evans points to Hitler “reacting to initiatives from his subordinates”
suggesting Hitler’s intervention was open to manipulation. Kershaw mentions
the fact that Lammers often conveyed orders supporting this. In fact, Hess was
the top of the circulation process and all proposals went through him before
Hitler. This highlights that other officials could also intervene. Evans also points
to “Hitler’s bohemian lifestyle” suggesting Hitler took no interest in intervention.
This is evident with his trips to the Berghof and afternoons spent watching
cartoons. Kershaw supports this, pointing to the decline of the “cabinet”, which
met 76 times in 1933 but not once in 1938. This point strongly presents Hitler as
a non-interventionist and highlights how the decline in government worsened
over time. Overall it is clear Hitler’s intervention was at least indecisive and at
times non-existent, while subordinates had a level of control. This lack of
intervention caused gradually worsening confusion.
However, there is also evidence pointing to strong intervention. Evans highlights
Hitler “wrote his own speeches”; Hitler in fact engaged audiences for up to six
hours solid, at the Nuremburg rallies, with his oratorical skills. This created a
level of popularity that made people willing to obey orders. Kershaw claims his
lack of intervention was only “as far as government administration was
concerned”, suggesting Hitler intervened in other areas. Evans supports this
claiming he was “erratic rather than lazy” and intervened in areas of “interest”.
This can be seen in the realm of foreign policy, for example when Hitler declared
war on Poland in September 1939 against the advice of Goering. This highlights
Hitler’s ability to intervene strongly, contradicting the suggestion that
subordinates manipulated him. Evans also points to his “direct lead” in areas
such as “racial policy”. This is clear when examining the 1935 Nuremburg laws.
Here Hitler intervened powerfully to resolve growing racial violence. Earlier in
1934 Hitler also intervened to remove any opposition in the Night of the Long
Knives. This evidence highlights that despite the decline in “government
administration” over time, Hitler was able to intervene decisively in 1934, 1935
and 1939.
It is evident that there was growing confusion due to indecision from the Fuhrer;
however he was able to intervene strongly at times. This “erratic" intervention
can be explained by the theory of cumulative radicalisation, which Ian Kershaw
refers to as ‘working towards the Fuhrer’. Bendersky highlights the fact that
officials viewed the “will of the Fuhrer” in terms of "their own career
advancement". This points to subordinates aligning with Hitler's
Weltanschauung in order to gain approval. This can be seen with the T4 program
suggested by Bouler, proposing euthanasia of disabled children, which was
approved by Hitler and increased Bouler’s power. This striving to ‘work towards’
the Führer’s will resulted in a process of ‘cumulative radicalisation’. To take the
example of racial policy, the modest Jewish boycott in 1933, then the Nuremberg
laws of 1935 followed by Kristallnacht in 1938 (initiated by Goebbels). Although
Hitler did not always intervene specifically, the rivalry produced the policies he
wanted, hence the regime becoming more radical over time. In this sense the
“jealousy” and “rival organisations" (source 5) were pre-requisite to producing
the results Hitler wanted. Overall it is clear that although Hitler did not always
intervene, it was not necessary as the policies he wanted were still produced.
In conclusion, although the idea of ‘working towards the Fuhrer’ appears to
present Hitler as above government, and therefore unnecessary for him to
dictate, Hitler’s ability to intervene decisively must not be ignored. It was
supreme in foreign policy and in crushing opposition. Despite this, confusion and
chaos were present in the Third Reich and can be put down to Hitler’s nonintervention. However it seems most likely that the “rival organisations” (source
5) in fact produced policies in line with Hitler’s worldview. It is unlikely Hitler
deliberately intervened to produce this level of confusion - it seems more
plausible that he realised the system benefitted him and left it in place. In this
sense, although Hitler did not always intervene it was unnecessary as the results
he wanted were still produced.
I think this is again pretty good. My main question is whether it is A* standard at
the moment – somehow it doesn’t really pop, in the sense that I don’t yet get the
feeling that you are building up an irresistible case in either direction. This has
something to do with how you chain events and analyses together – a few “in
addition” and “moreover” and “furthermore” can do wonders for your prose in
what the mark scheme always calls “sustained evaluation”. Your examples are
well-chosen, generally – there are a couple more in the mark scheme below, and
you could develop the whole theme of the anti-Semitic project at much greater
length.
One person you could usefully contrast Hitler with is Stalin, who was notorious
for micro-managing his subordinates and spending his time countersigning
apparently insignificant orders that a less diligent dictator would tend to
delegate. When I did the Nazis for my own A2 level, I tended to call Hitler a
“passive” dictator in contrast to Stalin’s “active” version – which of course is
crucially different from Martin Broszat and Wolfgang Mommsen’s vision of Hitler
as a “weak dictator” (the so-called Structuralist school). Worth mentioning the
opposition between that and the “Intentionalist” school (which Evans tends
towards), and Kershaw’s attempt to synthesise the two positions through his
rubrics of “cumulative radicalisation” and “working towards the Führer”
As for your concern that it is “too chronological”, I actually think the opposite is
the case – you could get a lot of mileage out of discussing how Hitler increasingly
became withdrawn, or how the patterns of government changed with the arrival
of the war. There is a difference between just giving dates, and showing how
constellations of different dates tend to suggest larger trends.
The mark scheme has this:
The question addresses the role of Hitler in the government of the Third Reich.
Source 4 clearly provides the quotation and, as might be expected, goes someway
to support the proposition. Candidates will be able to develop this argument
with own knowledge possibly referring to the case of Walter Darre, in charge of
agriculture, who was unable to secure an interview with Hitler for many years.
Source 5 can be used inferentially to support Source 4 as the clear implication of
the source is the lack of close control over subordinates who went their own
way. Source 6 in contrast argues for a more pro-active Hitler, ‘erratic rather than
lazy’. The case here can of course be extensively developed from own knowledge.
At Level 2 there may be some cross referencing of the sources or extensive own
knowledge displayed on Hitler’s initiatives or lack of initiatives, but the approach
is likely to be essentially descriptive. At Level 3, candidates should begin to
integrate the sources and own knowledge, probably producing a rather onesided case either supporting the proposition or refuting it. References in the
sources to such important developments as the implementation of anti-semitic
policies may be expanded upon, using own knowledge. At Level 4 and above the
differing approaches of the three writers to the role and degree of control
exercised by Hitler will be appreciated and debated. Candidates at this level may
consider a range of policy areas appreciating the differences it terms of the
interest Hitler showed, e.g. almost nil in terms of agriculture but, as Source 6
indicates, extensive in the case of the arts. At the highest level candidates may
recognize the historiographical contexts and expand on the view points of both
the intentionalist and structuralist schools of thought, but this is not necessary.