Pergamon
PII:
European Management Journal Vol. 19, No. 2, pp. 195–202, 2001
 2001 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved
Printed in Great Britain
S0263-2373(00)00094-3
0263-2373/01 $20.00
IT Outsourcing:
Evidence from France and
Germany
JÉRÔME BARTHELEMY, Groupe ESC, Nantes Atlantique
DOMINIQUE GEYER, Groupe ESC, Nantes Atlantique
In this article, we study IT outsourcing in two European countries. A survey carried out on 160 large
French and German firms highlights the main differences between French and German IT outsourcing practices. First, German firms tend to outsource
less critical activities than French ones. Second, IT
outsourcing joint-decisions (i.e. top and IT
management) are more frequent in Germany than
in France. Third, IT outsourcing operations more
frequently entail personnel transfers and layoffs in
France than in Germany. Fourth, the proportion of
quasi-outsourcing operations is larger in Germany
than in France. The differences between French and
German IT outsourcing practices are explained
through cultural and economic differences. French
and German findings are also compared to existing
empirical evidence in the United States and the
United Kingdom.  2001 Elsevier Science Ltd. All
rights reserved
Keywords: Outsourcing, France, Germany, Information Technology
The outsourcing of Information Technology (IT) does
not appear to be a new phenomenon. Time sharing,
which involves purchasing computer time, was very
popular in the 1960s and 1970s. From the mid-1980s
on however, a new type of IT outsourcing started
blossoming. According to Cheon et al. (1995), five
main differences stand out between this new type of
IT outsourcing and more traditional IT outsourcing:
❖ a greater range and depth of services is outsourced;
❖ people and equipment are transferred to the supplier;
❖ suppliers often accept profit and loss responsibility;
❖ the nature of the relationship with suppliers
evolves towards partnerships;
European Management Journal Vol 19 No 2 April 2001
❖ larger companies are outsourcing (i.e. not only
small and medium sized companies that do not
possess their own IT infrastructure).
Though this new type of IT outsourcing started
developing in the mid-1980s, it really took off after
the very much-heralded contract between Kodak and
IBM in 1989. According to Loh and Venkatraman
(1992), this landmark deal legitimized the practice of
IT outsourcing among US Fortune 500 firms. The socalled ‘Kodak effect’ led to a quick increase in the
adoption rate of IT outsourcing.
The literature on IT outsourcing generally revolves
around two main topics: the IT outsourcing decision
and the management of IT outsourcing operations.
Case studies of firms that have been successful with
IT outsourcing such as Continental Bank (Huber,
1993), British Petroleum (Cross, 1995) and Eastman
Kodak (McFarlan and Nolan, 1995) have often been
used to develop ‘best practices’ regarding both IT
outsourcing decision and management. Theoretical
frameworks such as Transaction Cost Economics
(Williamson, 1975, 1985) have also been frequently
used to devise IT outsourcing ‘best practices’. For
instance, Aubert et al. (1996) have turned the Transaction Cost Economics framework upside down, suggesting that activities can be successfully outsourced
only if they: (1) do not rely on specific assets, (2) are
not subject to a high degree of external uncertainty,
and (3) are those that the firm relies on infrequently.
In that case, the costs of outsourcing (i.e. direct purchase price and costs associated with managing the
outside supplier) are lower than the costs of carrying
out the activity internally (i.e. costs of internal procurement and costs associated with managing the
internal IT department).
As Transaction Cost Economics is mainly concerned
with transaction and production cost efficiency
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IT OUTSOURCING
(Williamson, 1991b), the management literature has
sought to integrate performance elements in outsourcing frameworks. For instance, Quinn and
Hilmer (1994) propose a framework that
encompasses insights from both Transaction Cost
Economics and the Resource-Based View of the firm
(Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991; Grant, 1991). According to Quinn and Hilmer (1994), companies should
‘outsource everything except those special activities
in which they could achieve a unique competitive
edge’ but also take transaction costs into account as
‘most supplier markets are imperfect (and) outsourcing entails unique transaction costs — searching, contracting, controlling, and recontracting — that at
times may exceed the transaction costs of having the
activity directly under management’s in-house control’ (Quinn and Hilmer, 1994, pp. 47–48).
Contrary to the bulk of the work on IT outsourcing,
our aim is not to develop ‘best practices’. Our goal
is to study the differences between IT outsourcing
practices in these two European countries: France
and Germany. So far, IT outsourcing in France and
Germany has received little empirical attention (e.g.
Heinzl, 1993). Most empirical studies on IT outsourcing have focused on either the United States (e.g. Lacity and Hirschheim, 1993) or the United Kingdom
(e.g. Willcocks et al., 1995) or both countries (e.g. Lacity et al., 1996). At first glance, IT outsourcing appears
to be a universal practice. This apparently universal
character should not disguise the fact that IT outsourcing may be influenced by national contexts.
making. Regarding the management of IT outsourcing operations, we focus on three important topics:
(1) personnel transfers and layoffs; (2) IT outsourcing
vs. quasi-outsourcing and (3) concerns with IT outsourcing. Our model is summarized in Figure 1.
IT Outsourcing Decision
Attitude Towards IT Outsourcing
A casual reading of the French press (e.g. Le Monde
Informatique, 01-Informatique) and German press (e.g.
Computerwoche) suggests than German firms are more
reluctant to outsource IT than their French counterparts. However, this evidence is only anecdotal. No
large-scale empirical study has tackled this issue so
far.
Empirical studies on IT outsourcing generally distinguish between firms that outsource their IT and
firms that do not. In our opinion, this ‘IT outsourcing
vs. no IT outsourcing’ dichotomy does not account
for the full range of attitudes towards IT outsourcing.
Basically, we suggest that firms should be split into
four groups:
❖ firms that have not considered IT outsourcing;
Our findings are based on a large-scale survey in
France and Germany. A questionnaire was mailed to
the 500 largest firms in both countries. 160 questionnaires were returned (i.e. 12.2 per cent of the French
and 19.8 per cent of the German mailings). The breakdown of the sample by country and by industry is
summarized in Table 1. Overall, the structure of the
French and German samples is very similar.
In this article, we investigate the two main dimensions of IT outsourcing: the IT outsourcing decision
and the management of IT outsourcing operations.
Regarding the IT outsourcing decision, we focus on
the following topics: (1) attitude towards IT outsourcing; (2) type of outsourced IT activities; (3) IT outsourcing motivations and (4) IT outsourcing decision-
Table 1
Distribution of Firms across Sectors
Sector
Energy and extraction
Raw materials and chemicals
Manufacturing industry
Trade/Food/Catering
Banking/Finance/Insurance
Others
Total number of firms
196
Figure 1 Model Used in the Study
French sample
5
9
13
14
15
5
61
8%
16%
21%
23%
24%
8%
100%
German sample
13
14
17
21
24
10
99
13%
14%
17%
22%
25%
9%
100%
Both samples
18
23
30
35
39
15
160
11%
15%
19%
22%
24%
9%
100%
European Management Journal Vol 19 No 2 April 2001
IT OUTSOURCING
❖ firms that are examining the question of IT outsourcing but have not yet finalized their decision;
❖ firms that have made a negative decision regarding IT outsourcing;
❖ firms that have made a positive decision regarding
IT outsourcing.
The classical ‘outsourcing vs. no outsourcing’ dichotomy collapses the first three categories in a single one
(i.e. ‘no outsourcing’). Thus, information is lost on
two important dimensions:
❖ the percentage of firms that have not yet finalized
their IT outsourcing decision gives valuable
insight on the maturity of the IT outsourcing
phenomenon;
❖ the percentage of firms that have made a negative
decision regarding IT outsourcing gives information on the reluctance to IT outsourcing. Simply
stating that a firm does not currently outsource
is insufficient to determine whether it is actually
reluctant to outsource.
The attitudes of French and German firms towards
IT outsourcing are summarized in Figure 2.
Our data show that 47.5 per cent of French firms and
43.4 per cent of German firms have outsourced at
least part of their IT. Hence, IT outsourcing has
become a central concern for a significant proportion
of French and German firms. The figures for French
and German firms are comparable. As expected, both
countries are lagging behind the United States. For
instance, a survey carried out by Sobol and Apte
(1995) has shown that 77.1 per cent of their sample1
had outsourced at least one IT function.
As regards firms that have not yet made their IT outsourcing decision, there are a few differences
between France and Germany. While the percentage
of firms that have not considered IT outsourcing at
all is only slightly superior in France (19.7 per cent)
than in Germany (16.2 per cent), the percentage of
firms that are currently considering IT outsourcing is
significantly superior in Germany (15.2 per cent) than
in France (6.6 per cent). Hence, these results suggest
that German firms are lagging a little behind their
French counterparts. However, they are bridging the
gap by examining the feasibility of IT outsourcing
more intensively.
Finally, it should also be noted that about a quarter
of the firms seems to be totally opposed to IT outsourcing (26.2 per cent of French firms and 25.3 per
cent of German firms). A further analysis of the
reasons for rejecting IT outsourcing was conducted.
The analysis clearly showed that satisfaction with the
current performance of internal services was the
main reason for rejecting IT outsourcing. This motivation was quoted by 75 per cent of French firms and
52 per cent of German firms as an important reason
for rejecting IT outsourcing. Hence, our findings corroborate those of Teng et al. (1995). In an empirical
study of 188 US firms, these authors showed that IT
outsourcing is more likely to happen when the performance of the internal IT department falls short
of expectations.
Finding 1: IT outsourcing is a widespread practice in both
France and Germany. While German firms lag a little behind
French firms, they are currently bridging the gap.
Type of Outsourced IT Activities
As we have suggested in the preceding section, the
dichotomy ‘IT outsourcing vs. no IT outsourcing’
does not encompass every possible attitude of firms
towards IT outsourcing. The second drawback of this
dichotomy is that it does not consider the heterogeneity of the IT outsourcing phenomenon. Hence, it is
important to distinguish between different types of
IT outsourcing operations. Based on Grover et al.
(1996), we distinguish between the outsourcing of:
❖ the entire IT function;
❖ applications development (i.e. software tailored to
the specific needs of the firm);
❖ networks (i.e. systems that make it possible to
exchange files, access the same programs, share
applications at the corporate level …);
❖ data centers;
❖ microcomputers.
The differences between France and Germany are
summarized Figure 3.
Figure 2 Attitudes of French
Towards IT Outsourcing
and German
European Management Journal Vol 19 No 2 April 2001
Firms
The first important finding is that the entire IT function is frequently outsourced in both countries. In the
subsample of firms that outsource at least a part of
their IT, 44.8 per cent of French firms and 32.6 per
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IT OUTSOURCING
trary, French firms outsource more specific parts of
IT, which is in line with the current North American
IT outsourcing trend. For instance, a paper on IT outsourcing in Canada reported that 72 per cent of firms
outsource their data centers, 76 per cent of firms outsource their networks and 48 per cent of firms outsource their applications developments (Saint-Amant
and Lequin, 1998).
Finding 2: While French firms outsource specific IT activities,
German firms predominantly outsource standardized IT
activities. This may be attributed to the ‘organizational
shamelessness’ of German managers towards the current IT
outsourcing trend.
IT Outsourcing Motivations
Figure 3 Type of Outsourced IT Activities in France
and in Germany
cent of German firms outsource the entire IT function. However, the French figure is significantly
higher than the German one. As regards the outsourcing of other IT activities, there are also major
differences between France and Germany:
❖ two activities are more frequently outsourced in
France than in Germany: applications development (31 per cent of French cases vs. 20.9 per cent
of German cases) and microcomputers (17.2 per
cent of French cases vs. 4.7 per cent of German
cases);
❖ two activities are more frequently outsourced in
Germany than in France: networks (25.6 per cent
of German cases vs. 6.9 per cent of French cases)
and data centers (44.2 per cent of German cases
vs. 10.3 per cent of French cases).
The differences between France and Germany are
quite significant and need to be explained. Recently,
Grover et al. (1996) argued that some IT functions had
become increasingly standardized. According to
these authors, the most commoditized IT functions
were respectively data centers and network management. On the other hand, applications development
and the entire IT function remained far less commoditized. Hence, our results suggest that German firms
outsource less standardized activities than their
French counterparts. This significant discrepancy
may be attributed to ‘organizational shamelessness’.
Lawrence (1980) termed ‘organizational shamelessness’ the unwillingness to conform to conventional wisdom on business practices just for the sake
of doing so. According to this author, German managers have generally been less open to external
influences than managers from other countries. In
other words, German managers are only moderately
concerned with management fads. Regarding IT outsourcing, our findings suggest that German firms are
still reluctant to outsource specific parts of their IT,
which they may consider as a mere fad. On the con198
Based on Sobol and Apte (1995), we distinguish
between three main motivations to IT outsourcing:
(1) economic motivations; (2) performance motivations and (3) control motivations:
❖ Economic Motivations. Through IT outsourcing,
firms can access the economies of scale enjoyed by
specialized IT suppliers. Economies of scale help
reduce average costs by spreading fixed costs over
more units of output and by receiving volume discounts inputs. Both human and technological
resources are likely to be concerned by economies
of scale. For instance, while the management of
one mainframe requires four employees, the management of ten mainframes requires less than forty
employees. Seven or eight employees is enough,
which entails significant cost savings for large
firms and specialized IT suppliers;
❖ Performance Motivations. Through outsourcing,
firms can access the expertise of leading edge IT
suppliers. Specialized IT suppliers are better performing and more technologically advanced than
other firms because they focus their entire
resources on IT. They also manage to attract the
best IT employees, who prefer to work for a firm
whose ‘core business’ is IT (Quinn and Hilmer,
1994);
❖ Control Motivations. Through outsourcing, firms
can better control IT, which eventually results in
lower costs. In the case of the Continental Bank
for instance, outsourcing was a way to gain tighter
control over legal services and IT (Huber, 1993).
In order to study these three major motivations of IT
outsourcing, we used five items in our questionnaire.
As it is quite straightforward, the economic motivation was assessed with only one item: ‘cost
reduction’. The performance motivation was measured with two items: ‘general expertise of IT suppliers’ and ‘technological expertise of IT suppliers’.
Finally, the control motivation was measured with
two items: ‘overall control’ and ‘cost control and
awareness’. The results are summarized in Figure 4.
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IT OUTSOURCING
Hence, we focus on this particular type of IT outsourcing decision (see Figure 5).
The decision to outsource the entire IT function
appears to be more frequently made by the CEO than
by the CIO. This finding is consistent in both France
(50 vs. 41.7 per cent of all cases) and Germany (41.7
vs. 33.3 per cent of all cases). On the other hand, there
is a large difference between the two countries as
regards joint decisions. The number of joint decisions
is actually far higher in Germany (i.e. 25 per cent)
than in France (8.3 per cent).
Figure 4 IT Outsourcing Motivations
Two main findings emerge from the data:
❖ first, cost reduction appears to be the leading
motivation for IT outsourcing in both countries.
The French rating is 3.9 and the German one is
4.1, while no other motivation is superior to 3.1 in
either country. Thus, the difference between the
cost reduction motivation and all the other motivations is significant. Through IT outsourcing,
French and German companies essentially expect
to take advantage of the economies of scale
enjoyed by outside IT suppliers. This finding is
consistent with British and American results. For
instance, Lacity et al. (1996) found that cost savings
was quoted as the major incentive for IT outsourcing by 85 per cent of the managers they interviewed;
❖ second, there are few differences between French
and German motivations for outsourcing all or
part of the IT function. The only slight difference
is that German firms seem to be more frequently
motivated by control. While there is no significant
difference on the ‘overall control’ item (with ratings of 2.7 in France and 2.9 in Germany), the ‘cost
control and awareness’ item is significantly more
important in Germany (rating of 3.1) than in
France (rating of 2.5).
This large difference between France and Germany
stems from cultural discrepancies. The original system of co-management (Mitbestimmung) makes the
German economy very different from that of other
European countries. According to the German law of
1976 on co-management, a large part of the board of
directors is composed of employee representatives2.
The co-management system has substantial implications regarding the overall management of firms.
One of them is that the relationships between
employer and employees are more cooperative in
Germany than in other European countries. Therefore, decisions that have a huge impact on IT are
more likely to be made by both CEOs and CIOs in
Germany. ‘Total IT outsourcing’ is clearly one of
them.
Finding 4: IT outsourcing operations are more frequently
initiated by CEOs than CIOs in France and in Germany. Due
to the co-management system, strategic decisions such as the
outsourcing of the entire IT function also involve more jointdecisions in Germany than in France.
Management of IT Outsourcing
Operations
Outsourcing and Personnel Transfers or
Reductions
One important characteristic of recent IT outsourcing
operations is that they often entail a transfer of equip-
Finding 3: The motivations for IT outsourcing are very similar in France and Germany. Cost reduction is the most significant motivation in both countries.
IT Outsourcing and Decision-Making
The last important topic regarding the IT outsourcing
decision is that of the actual decision-maker. Basically, IT outsourcing decisions can be made by either
the Chief Information Officer (CIO) or the Chief
Executive Officer (CEO) or both. The outsourcing of
the entire IT function is the most strategic decision.
European Management Journal Vol 19 No 2 April 2001
Figure 5 Entire IT Function Outsourcing Decision
199
IT OUTSOURCING
ment and personnel to the supplier. While a significant proportion of IT employees may be transferred,
some others may even be laid off. Figure 6 shows the
difference between France and Germany regarding
personnel transfers and layoffs.
Our data reveal an important gap between French
and German firms. While 69 per cent of IT outsourcing operations entail personnel transfers and layoffs
in France, the percentage is only 41.9 per cent in Germany. Once again, this large difference between
French and German IT outsourcing operations can be
explained through cultural factors.
Outsourcing operations with personnel changes are
likely to entail hostile reactions from IT employees.
Due to the greater power of German trade unions,
German employees can more effectively oppose such
operations than French employees can. Among the
OECD countries, France has the lowest unionization
rate. There are a large number of unions in France
but none of them is very powerful. On the other
hand, there are a small number of powerful unions
in Germany. For instance, the D.G.B. (Deutsche
Gewerkschaftsbund) has an almost hegemonic position.
Contrary to French unions, German ones can use
their sheer strength to deter personnel transfers and
layoffs following IT outsourcing operations.
Finding 5: Due to the power of trade unions, IT outsourcing
operations in Germany entail fewer personnel transfers and
layoffs than in France.
Outsourcing vs. Quasi-Outsourcing
As regards the management of IT outsourcing operations, a further important distinction must be made
between outsourcing and quasi-outsourcing. Outsourcing consists in transferring all or part of the IT
function to an outside supplier. Quasi-outsourcing
consists in setting up a subsidiary and transferring
all or part of the IT function to this subsidiary. The
Figure 6 Personnel Transfers and Layoffs
200
idea is to transform an internal IT department into
an external entity that is empowered to behave like
a vendor. Quasi-outsourcing also has one clear
advantage over outsourcing: it enables a better control of the outsourced activities than through a simple
contract. The results from our survey are summarized in Figure 7.
Actually, there is a huge difference between France
and Germany. The proportion of quasi-outsourcing
operations is significantly larger in the latter country
than in the former. While only 17.2 per cent of French
firms use quasi-outsourcing, 46.5 per cent of their
German counterparts resort to this technique.
This finding can be explained through important cultural and economic differences. The German economy is characterized by the presence of industrial
groups (i.e. Konzerns). Interlocking ownership in Konzerns creates a high degree of interconnectedness
between most German firms (Pohl, 1992). This interconnectedness primarily rests on the tight bonds
between German banks and manufacturers3. The
presence of Konzerns in German helps explain an
important difference between IT outsourcing practices in France and Germany. Konzerns often create
their own subsidiary companies to which they outsource their IT (i.e. quasi-outsourcing). These subsidiaries can then propose their services to the firms
belonging to the Konzern. These firms are easier to
attract than ‘external’ customers (i.e. firms that do not
belong to the Konzerns). Hence, such subsidiaries can
be relatively successful even if they have no real competitive advantage compared to other IT suppliers.
As a rule, the larger the Konzern, the more frequently
subsidiaries are created in order to benefit from economies of scale.
Finding 6: Due to the existence of Konzerns, the proportion
of quasi-outsourcing operations is larger in Germany than
in France.
Figure 7 Quasi-outsourcing Operations in France and
Germany
European Management Journal Vol 19 No 2 April 2001
IT OUTSOURCING
Concerns with IT Outsourcing
We eventually focused on the problems that can arise
when firms outsource their IT. As with the IT outsourcing motivations, we distinguished between
three categories of concerns based on Sobol and Apte
(1995). The two main disadvantages listed by Sobol
and Apte (1995) were: (1) control issues; (2) cost and
performance issues. Contrary to American and British studies, we believe that personnel issues are also
likely to cause trouble in European IT outsourcing
operations. Hence, we distinguish between three concerns:
❖ Control Concerns. Once firms have outsourced IT,
they may be afraid to lose control over this
activity. The contract plays a central role in controlling the IT supplier. A tight contract is necessary to avoid being too dependent on the supplier.
However, no contract can provide the same control as hierarchy (Williamson, 1991a);
❖ Cost and Performance Concerns. An important concern with IT outsourcing is that it may not live up
to expectations. For instance, costs may increase
and quality may decrease. More and more reports
show that phenomenal savings due to IT outsourcing simply do not materialize. For instance, Saunders et al. (1997) found that the average savings
were a mere 15.4 per cent. Moreover, almost half
of the surveyed firms could not provide an estimate of the cost savings;
❖ Internal Opposition Concerns. IT outsourcing is very
likely to have a negative impact on the internal IT
employees. As it often entails personnel transfers
and layoffs, it may be opposed by IT employees
either directly (i.e. strikes) or indirectly (i.e. lower
employee productivity). It should also be remembered that outsourcing is generally perceived as
betrayal by the internal IT employees;
We used ten items in our questionnaire. Control concerns were operationalized using four items: ‘data
leakage’, ‘know-how leakage’, ‘contract incompleteness’ and ‘dependency’. Cost and performance
concerns were measured with three items: ‘cost’, ‘quality’ and ‘transition period’4. Internal opposition concerns were assessed with three items: ‘union opposition’, ‘personnel opposition’ and ‘plummeting
personnel morale’. The empirical results are summarized in Figure 8.
Our main finding is that both French and German
firms are generally satisfied with IT outsourcing. The
most significant single concern (i.e. ‘union opposition’
in Germany) is only quoted in 16.5 per cent of the
cases. There are also a few differences between France
and Germany. German firms are mainly concerned
with internal opposition. For instance, the ‘union
opposition’ item is significantly more important in
Germany (i.e. 16.5 per cent) than in France (i.e. 3.5 per
cent). This can be largely attributed to the power of
trade unions in Germany (cf. 2.1). On the other hand,
European Management Journal Vol 19 No 2 April 2001
Figure 8 IT Outsourcing Concerns
French firms are more concerned with cost and performance issues. For instance, the transition period
item is significantly more important in France (14 per
cent) than in Germany (7 per cent). This may be attributed to the fact that French firms generally outsource
less standardized activities (cf. 1.2). As regards control,
concerns are shared in both countries. For instance, 14
per cent of firms in both countries are concerned with
the dependency entailed by IT outsourcing. On the
other hand, a large percentage of German firms (i.e.
14 vs. 7 per cent in France) are concerned with the
issue that IT outsourcing contracts may be incomplete.
Finding 7: Concerns with IT outsourcing are low in both countries. While French firms are more concerned with cost and
performance issues, German ones are generally more concerned
with internal opposition issues.
Conclusion
Despite an apparent homogeneity, there are a few significant differences between IT outsourcing in France
and Germany. The most salient differences are the following. First, German firms tend to outsource less
critical activities than French ones, which may be attributed to their ‘organizational shamelessness’. Second,
IT outsourcing joint-decisions (i.e. top and IT
management) are more frequent in Germany than in
France, which may be attributed to the German system of co-management (i.e. Mitbestimmung). Third, IT
outsourcing operations more frequently entail personnel transfers and layoffs in France than in Germany.
This may essentially be attributed to the power of
unions in Germany. Fourth, the proportion of quasioutsourcing operations is larger in Germany than in
France. Once again, this reflects a difference between
the German and French economic systems. German
Konzerns often create their own subsidiaries, to which
they outsource their IT. Apart from these differences,
IT outsourcing practices are very similar in France
and Germany.
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IT OUTSOURCING
Notes
1. The sample was comprised of 48 firms belonging to the
most effective users of IT according to the 1991 and 1992
surveys of Computerworld.
2. In most sectors, employee representatives represent one
third of the members of the board of directors.
3. On the other hand, the French banking structure is weaker
and far more fragmented. It also works less closely with
industry.
4. The time required by the supplier to take over the outsourced IT activity.
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JÉRÔME BARTHELEMY,
ESCNA Graduate School of
Management, Route de la
Jonelière, 44312 Nantes
Cedex 3, France.
DOMINIQUE GEYER,
ESCNA Graduate School of
Management, Route de la
Jonelière, 44312 Nantes
Cedex 3, France.
Jérôme Barthelemy is Assistant Professor of Strategic
Management at ESCNA
Graduate School of Management. He holds a Ph.D. from
HEC, Paris and has published several articles on outsourcing and contractual
agreements.
Dominique Geyer is Assistant Professor of Business
Administration
in
the
Accounting and Control
area of ESCNA Graduate
School of Management. He
received his Ph.D. from the University of Lille. His
research focuses on Information Technology outsourcing in France and Germany and Institutional Analysis.
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European Management Journal Vol 19 No 2 April 2001