Finance Research Letters 49 (2022) 103054
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Finance Research Letters
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/frl
Narcissistic leaders do not share! The relationship between top
managers’ narcissism and the distribution of value added
Carlos F. Alves a, Maria João Guedes b, *
a
b
Faculdade de Economia, CEF.UP, Universidade do Porto, Rua Dr. Roberto Frias, 4200-464 Porto, Portugal
ISEG (Lisbon, School of Economics and Management), Universidade de Lisboa, Rua do Quelhas 6, 1249-078 Lisboa, Portugal
A R T I C L E I N F O
A B S T R A C T
Keywords:
Narcissism
Value added
Top managers
Stakeholder theory
Stakeholder theory implies that firms’ economic and social purpose is to create value for all their
stakeholders, without favoring any group. However, the distribution of the value created is a
matter of choice for each firm. Thus, it may reflect the top managers’ characteristics. Accordingly,
this paper examines whether the narcissism of top managers impacts the creation and distribution
of value added. The results show that narcissism does not impact the total value added. However,
narcissistic top managers capture more value for themselves, paying less to employees. Other
stakeholder groups are not affected by the narcissism of top managers.
1. Introduction
Stakeholder theory states that "the economic and social purpose of the corporation is to create and distribute wealth and value to all
its primary stakeholder groups, without favouring one group at the expense of others" (Clarkson, 1995, p. 112). Thus, this perspective
implies maximizing the firm’s contribution to the wellbeing of society and the value added that it creates (Jensen, 2002). Although the
benefits for stakeholders may not be exclusively financial, and employee wellbeing may translate into an improved firm performance
but may not be observable in employee salaries (Bernerth et al., 2021), this view implies fair distribution of the value created.
However, such distribution is a matter of choice for each firm. The board of directors has the lawful responsibility and entitlement to
distribute the rents to various stakeholders. Apart from shareholders (who have a clear agency relationship with the managers), there
are usually no representatives of other stakeholders in firms’ governance. The exception is Germany, where the co-determination law
places the interests of employees and shareholders on an equal footing, with the supervisory board comprising both shareholder and
employee representatives. The board of directors determines the interests of the various stakeholders. Thus, what each stakeholder
receives will reflect board member characteristics.
One of the characteristics that has attracted attention is the narcissism of top managers, which relates to firm outcomes (Grijalva
et al., 2015). Narcissism has been defined as: "admiration and exaggerated attention to the self" (Guedes, 2017, p. 182). On the one hand,
narcissists will manage their relationship with different stakeholders to serve their own ambitions and desires (Chatterjee and Pollock,
2017), even resorting to manipulation (Campbell et al., 2005), conceit and deceit (O’Reilly and Doerr, 2020). Higher compensation
attracts narcissists because it signifies their prestige and magnificence and differentiates them from others (O’Reilly et al., 2014).
Therefore, they may hoard the value created for themselves in the form of high salaries, even if that comes at the expense of other
The authors contributed equally to the article.
* Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: calves@fep.up.pt (C.F. Alves), mjguedes@iseg.ulisboa.pt (M.J. Guedes).
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.frl.2022.103054
Received 22 December 2021; Received in revised form 23 April 2022; Accepted 6 June 2022
Available online 8 June 2022
1544-6123/© 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Finance Research Letters 49 (2022) 103054
C.F. Alves and M.J. Guedes
stakeholders. This may be because they lack empathy (Watson et al., 1984), have lower ethical standards, and are willing to transgress
social norms. Narcissists engage in self-serving behavior and are willing to expropriate others to fulfill their interests (Böckler et al.,
2017; O’Reilly and Doerr, 2020). Not all stakeholders will be susceptible to exploitation in the same way. Some stakeholder groups,
such as banks, tax authorities, and shareholders, have a greater opportunity to monitor or control top managers (see, among others,
Weinstein and Yafeh, 1998; Tirole, 2001; Bauer et al., 2018) . On the other hand, narcissism may also have some benefits, and past
studies have provided evidence of a "bright side" to this characteristic for firms. For example, narcissistic top managers are adept at
helping firms recover from economic shocks (Patel and Cooper, 2014) and their interventions may not lead to adverse outcomes for
shareholders – for example, in the context of takeover processes (Aktas et al., 2016). In fact, recent research shows that firms led by
narcissistic managers have higher ESG scores (Larcker et al., 2021). Whether this should be interpreted to mean that they are con­
cerned with social responsibility or rather that they are seeking to attract positive media attention is still the subject of scrutiny.
Another possibility is to look to particular narcissism displays, such as overconfidence. Overconfident top managers have been
associated with potentially advantageous effects, such as greater return volatility, greater investment in innovation, and exploitation of
growth opportunities (Hirshleifer et al., 2012).
In the current study, we propose that narcissistic top managers are less willing to share the value created. We base our standpoint on
the work of Aabo et al. (2021) who built upon the notion of "narcissistic supply" by Fenichel (1938) – the extent to which narcissists can
exert their influence depends on the admiration, attention, and affirmation of their superiority. Given that our sample consists of
non-listed firms, smaller in size and with a reduced scope for influence by narcissistic top managers, it is reasonable to expect that they
have insufficient narcissistic supply and will be more likely to crave attention and admiration from stakeholders. In addition, as
advanced by de Vries and Miller (1985), narcissism influences relations with subordinates. Past studies have shown that narcissists use
strategies to enhance their power and their need for glory and admiration, using other people to enhance their self-image (e.g.,
Wallace and Baumeister, 2002). Consequently, employees, in particular, are more likely to be on the radar of narcissistic managers due
to the proximity of working relationships and are more vulnerable to being used as a tool to serve their needs (Chatterjee and
Hambrick, 2007). Taking everything together, the hypothesis of this study is:
H1: Greater levels of narcissism in top managers are positively associated with their capture of a greater share of firm value creation.
To the best of our knowledge, no study has investigated whether narcissistic top managers compromise the firm’s ability to create
value for the stakeholders as a whole and manipulate its distribution to their own best advantage.
2. Data and methodology
2.1. Participants
The present study is part of a broader project that uses an online questionnaire for managers from all hierarchical levels in 2015 of
non-listed firms in Portugal, aimed at evaluating whether narcissism affects firm outputs. The contact list was obtained from Informa
D&B, which provided us with the general contact email of the firms. In order to assess the comprehensibility and readability of the
questionnaire, it was pre-tested by ten individuals from different hierarchical levels. Their feedback helped us correct some sentences
and exclude unnecessary questions, reducing the time necessary to complete the survey.
Subsequently, about 15,000 questionnaires were dispatched and a total of 1105 responses (7.4%) were received. This study uses a
sub-sample of 489 top managers (368 males and 121 females). We consider top managers as belonging to the firm’s management body.
Our final sample does not contain listed or very large firms. Therefore, it is more often than not that executive, non-executive, and
supervisory roles are indistinguishable or accumulated over time by the same manager.
The mean age is 46.31 (SD=9.63, range 24–71), with a mean of 23.06 years of work experience (SD=10.18, range 3–54). Addi­
tionally, 78.5% of the participants are married, 38.2% have an undergraduate degree, and 26% have a master’s, executive, or PhD
degree. The most representative industry is the "wholesale trade, except motor vehicles and motorcycles" at 11.9% of the sample. The
seven least representative industries account for 0.4% each.
2.2. Measures
Informa D&B provided the financial information, which included data from the IES ("Informação Empresarial Simplificada"), an
annual form that all Portuguese firms are required to file for tax and accounting purposes.
Value added (VA). The value added represents the contribution of a firm to the economy. It can be calculated in two ways. From the
production perspective, it is the value of the firm’s production (sales and services) minus the cost of all inputs and raw materials
directly attributable to that production. From the distribution perspective, it is the sum of the different components into which value
added is divided – namely, staff expenses, interest expenses, income taxes, dividends, and reinvestment or self-funding (retained
earnings, provisions, and depreciation). This study uses the distribution perspective because it aims not only to understand the
contribution of narcissism to total firm value added but also to understand how it influences its distribution among various stake­
holders. Value-added is scaled by total assets. Therefore, it refers to the value added for each unit of assets under management.
Narcissism. Narcissism was measured using the Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI-16) (Ames et al., 2006). This self-reported
measure of the grandiose narcissism scale comprises 16 paired statements where 1 indicates a narcissistic response and 0 indicates a
non-narcissistic response in domains such as leadership, dominance, grandiose beliefs, and a sense of entitlement. Cronbach’s alpha
coefficient is 0.75.
Control variables. We included the set of control variables that are standard in the literature. Size is defined as the natural logarithm
2
C.F. Alves and M.J. Guedes
Table 1
Descriptives and correlation matrix.
3
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
Narcissism
Value added
Value added for top managers
Value added for employees
Value added Government
Value added Creditors
Value added Shareholders
Size
ROA
Asset turnover
Debt-to-assets
Currrent ratio
Tangibility
Intangibility
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
Size
ROA
Asset turnover
Debt-to-assets
Currrent ratio
Tangibility
Intangibility
Mean
4.51
0.26
0.09
0.06
0.02
0.01
− 0.3
12.3
− 0.07
1.6
1.01
3.77
0.25
0.02
8
1
0.33***
− 0.34***
− 0.38***
0.04
0.05
− 0.03
SD
3.14
1.53
0.24
0.16
0.03
0.02
1.59
1.76
0.86
1.88
1.79
9.48
0.27
0.09
9
Min.
0
− 15.56
0
0
− 0.05
0
− 17.27
6.29
− 12.83
0
0.02
0.03
0
0
10
Max.
15
14.04
3.06
1.98
0.23
0.35
1.04
18.58
1.02
18.23
18.28
157.31
0.96
0.74
11
1
1
− 0.01
0.06
− 0.01
0.10**
0.01
− 0.01
− 0.01
− 0.06
0
0.03
− 0.03
0.02
− 0.01
12
1
− 0.07
− 0.63***
0.06
0
0
1
0.36***
− 0.09
− 0.14***
0.01
1
− 0.08*
− 0.04
0.06
1
− 0.07
− 0.05
3
4
5
6
7
1
0.10**
0.01
0.16***
− 0.02
0.78***
0.07
0.05
0.02
− 0.58***
0
0.03
− 0.08*
13
1
0.20***
0.09*
0.09**
− 0.32***
− 0.47***
− 0.39***
0.38***
0.39***
− 0.06
− 0.10**
− 0.04
14
1
− 0.01
0.12**
− 0.41***
− 0.43***
− 0.29***
0.52***
0.41***
− 0.05
0.03
− 0.01
1
− 0.12**
0.07
− 0.14***
0.19***
0.15***
− 0.10**
− 0.02
− 0.13***
− 0.03
1
− 0.09**
0.09**
− 0.21***
− 0.02
0.16***
− 0.05
0.07
− 0.01
1
0.34***
0.27***
− 0.41***
− 0.84***
0.05
0.07
− 0.07
1
− 0.09*
1
Finance Research Letters 49 (2022) 103054
Note: Min. is the minimum; Max. is the maximum; SD is the standard deviation.
*
p<0.10,.
**
p<0.05,.
***
p<0.01.
2
Finance Research Letters 49 (2022) 103054
C.F. Alves and M.J. Guedes
of assets. Top managers of larger firms may have lesser influence over decisions and need greater management capacity (Ling et al.,
2008, 2015). The return on assets controls profitability, defined as the ratio of EBIT to total assets. Here, the managers of more
profitable firms have greater latitude to use the excess cash flow in their own interest (Jensen, 1986). Asset turnover is the ratio of sales
and services to total assets. It determines the ability to generate value from the available assets, capturing differences between in­
dustries and business models. The debt-to-assets ratio captures the degree of leverage. The rationale is that it disciplines top managers
and reduces the discretion at their disposal (Ortiz-Molina, 2007). Additionally, more indebted firms are more likely to be influenced by
banks, who are liable to exert pressure to moderate agency costs – namely, executive compensation (Elston and Goldberg, 2003). We
use the current ratio to assess the pressure on firms to pay short-term debt. Given its nature as a disciplining device, this places limits on
managers and curbs the scope of their decision making (Arping and Sautner, 2010). Tangibility and intangibility are the ratios of
tangible assets to total assets and intangible assets to total assets. The visibility of firms is determined by their size and depends on the
type of assets owned. Narcissistic top managers may be attracted to asset visibility (Chatterjee and Hambrick, 2007), which more
readily confers status and influence. Moreover, narcissistic top managers are inclined to accept smaller monetary compensation if they
are "paid" with fame (Aabo et al., 2022). Finally, we control for industry fixed effects.
3. Results and discussion
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics. The mean value of Narcissism is 4.51, a value that is in line with previous studies for Portugal
(e.g., Guedes and da Conceição Gonçalves, 2019). The average VA is 0.26. The disaggregation of VA shows that the largest portion is
for top managers, with a mean of 0.09, followed by VA for employees, with a mean of 0.06. The lowest value is for shareholders, with a
negative mean of − 0.3. On average, the profitability of these firms is negative (− 7%). They are highly leveraged (1.01) but have large
values of liquidity (3.77), translated into high values of current assets but smaller values of noncurrent assets, with approximately 25%
of fixed tangible assets and just 2% of intangible assets.
Table 2 presents the regression results using a linear regression absorbing by industry at a two-digit level.
The results show that narcissism does not impact the value added (Model 1, β=− 0.010, p>0.10). Thus, narcissistic top managers do
not create more value for society than other managers. There is a particular trade-off between the firm’s profitability from the
shareholder perspective and its capacity to create value for all stakeholders, as shown by the negative impact of ROA on VA.
Relative to the distribution of value added to the various stakeholders, neither the state (as tax collector) nor the creditors benefit
from the narcissism of top managers. In both cases, narcissism is not significantly different from zero (Models 4 and 5). Similarly,
shareholders do not seem to be impacted by the distribution of value added (Model 6). However, the same does not apply to employees
– their salaries are directly affected. Employees of firms led by narcissistic top managers receive less remuneration than those of other
firms (Model 2, β=− 0.002, p<0.10).
On the contrary, narcissistic top managers tend to capture more for themselves (Model 3, β=0.002, p<0.05). This result clarifies the
Table 2
Regression results.
Value added for
Narcissism
Size
ROA
Asset turnover
Debt-to-assets
Current ratio
Tangibility
Intangibility
Constant
Industry effects
Observations
R-squared
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Overall
Employees(salaries)
Government (taxes)
Creditors (interest paid)
− 0.007
(− 0.786)
0.009
(0.258)
− 1.119***
(− 7.404)
0.329**
(2.532)
− 0.968***
(− 9.517)
− 0.001
(− 0.185)
0.275
(1.384)
0.320
(1.111)
0.468
(0.930)
Yes
489
0.676
− 0.002*
(− 1.977)
− 0.015***
(− 4.152)
− 0.023
(− 0.670)
0.037***
(2.967)
0.009
(0.952)
0.001*
(1.691)
0.056*
(1.779)
− 0.003
(− 0.070)
0.167***
(3.630)
Yes
489
0.478
Top managers
(salaries)
0.002**
(2.032)
− 0.036***
(− 4.400)
− 0.070
(− 0.891)
0.037**
(2.377)
0.004
(0.116)
− 0.000
(− 0.125)
− 0.035
(− 0.860)
− 0.112
(− 1.618)
0.465***
(3.811)
Yes
489
0.409
0.000
(1.226)
− 0.002
(− 1.642)
0.007**
(2.187)
0.002***
(3.265)
− 0.001***
(− 2.801)
− 0.000
(− 0.443)
− 0.007
(− 1.379)
− 0.013
(− 1.201)
0.036***
(3.010)
Yes
489
0.249
− 0.000
(− 0.339)
0.003
(1.304)
− 0.005
(− 1.068)
0.000
(0.304)
0.002
(0.960)
− 0.000**
(− 2.174)
0.005
(1.196)
0.005
(1.017)
− 0.036
(− 1.094)
Yes
489
0.164
Shareholders
(dividends and self-funding)
0.002
(0.305)
0.071**
(2.177)
− 0.814***
(− 6.922)
− 0.022
(− 0.953)
− 0.963***
(− 28.984)
− 0.001
(− 0.666)
0.101
(0.691)
0.418***
(3.898)
− 0.263
(− 0.673)
Yes
489
0.837
Robust t-statistics in parentheses.
***
p<0.01,.
**
p<0.05,.
*
p<0.1.
4
Finance Research Letters 49 (2022) 103054
C.F. Alves and M.J. Guedes
proposition that narcissistic top managers, whilst not creating more value than other managers, pay less to employees and more to
themselves. In sum, these results make clear that employees at firms with more narcissistic managers are paid less than employees at
firms led by non-narcissistic top managers.
We tested whether the coefficients of Narcissism in regressions (2) and (3) in Table 2 are equal, estimating a new regression where
the dependent variable is «Value-added Top managers minus Value-added Employees». The results, which are not reported here for
reasons of parsimony, confirm that the coefficient of Narcissism is positive for top managers and negative for employees. The dif­
ference of the coefficients is positive and significant at the 1% level. Additionally, we divided the observations into four quartiles
according to the remuneration of top executives. We then calculated the average of NPI-16 for each quartile. The difference between
the top and bottom quartile averages is 1.07377, and this difference is statistically different from zero at 1% of the level of significance.
Thus, this confirms that the top-paid CEOs are significantly more narcissistic than the lower-paid CEOs.
The economic significance of the results is striking. Considering the maximum and minimum values observed for narcissism and the
estimated coefficient for this variable (0.002), we may conclude that, ceteris paribus, the value-added differential captured by the most
narcissistic top managers vis-à-vis the least narcissistic top managers represents one-third of the value added distributed, on average, to
the top managers. Moreover, on average, for each standard deviation of the narcissism variable, the value added captured by top
managers increases 7.0%, and the value added distributed to each employee decreases 10.5%.
3.1. Robustness checks
We performed several robustness checks. First, we included gender and age as additional control variables, given female CEOs may
be more inclusive, and older CEOs may be less competitive. Second, we included the size of the board as a control variable to capture
the role of corporate governance and monitoring activities in controlling top manager behavior. Third, given the skew to the right of
the value added for top managers and employees, we performed regressions using the natural logarithm of the value added. In this
case, the coefficient of Narcissism explaining the salaries of top managers remains positive but is only significant in the one-sided test.
Our results on employees’ salaries are robust to the transformation of the dependent variable. Fourth, we checked the effect of the
interaction between Size and Narcissism, admitting, in line with Aabo et al. (2021), that narcissistic top managers of small firms may
have a higher unfilled need for narcissistic supply. Our results show that employees payments increase with the size of the firm
indicating, in line with Aabo et al. (2022), that narcissistic top managers of small firms may have a higher unfilled need for narcissistic
supply (because of the firm size) than narcissistic top managers of large firms, and they may, therefore, be more likely to squeeze the
employees.
Finally, in all robustness checks, a test of the difference of coefficients shows that the coefficient of Narcissism is positive for top
managers and negative for employees. The difference in the coefficients is positive and significant at the 1% level.
4. Conclusions and limitations
The present study’s results show that narcissistic top managers are no different from other managers in creating value added.
Therefore, they do not exhibit abnormal skills. However, narcissistic top managers abnormally capture the value created at employees’
expense. In effect, the share of the value added captured by narcissistic top managers as remuneration is higher than in other firms.
Conversely, the share captured by employees is lower than in other firms. Employees at firms with more narcissistic managers are paid
less than employees with less narcissistic managers. Other stakeholders are not affected, which is consistent with the idea that they are
less susceptible to exploitation. In sum, this paper shows that the narcissism of managers accounts for how the value created is
distributed to stakeholders.
This paper has its limitations. First, we have used only one year of data because collecting information from top managers, who are
always busy and have limited availability, is difficult and poses challenges for researchers. One data point in time limits the ability to
control for the endogenous choice of manager and other causal inferences. Nevertheless, future studies could use panel data and
address our caveat. Second, the data available on corporate governance is scarce. Therefore, future studies could more strictly control
the role of corporate governance and monitoring activities in overseeing top manager behavior.
Acknowledgment
Maria João Guedes acknowledges financial support from the Foundation of Science and Technology (Project funded: UIDB/04521/
2020). Carlos F. Alves also acknowledges financial support from the Foundation of Science and Technology (Project funded: UIDB/
04105/2020).
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