Disaster Risk Reduction
Methods, Approaches and Practices
Chandra Bahadur Shrestha
Building Back
Better After
the 2015 Nepal
Earthquake
Laying the Foundation for Resilience
Disaster Risk Reduction
Methods, Approaches and Practices
Series Editor
Rajib Shaw, Keio University, Shonan Fujisawa Campus, Fujisawa, Japan
Disaster risk reduction is a process that leads to the safety of communities and
nations. After the 2005 World Conference on Disaster Reduction, held in Kobe,
Japan, the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) was adopted as a framework for
risk reduction. The academic research and higher education in disaster risk reduction has made, and continues to make, a gradual shift from pure basic research
to applied, implementation-oriented research. More emphasis is being given to
multi-stakeholder collaboration and multi-disciplinary research. Emerging university networks in Asia, Europe, Africa, and the Americas have urged process-oriented
research in the disaster risk reduction field. With this in mind, this new series
will promote the output of action research on disaster risk reduction, which will
be useful for a wide range of stakeholders including academicians, professionals,
practitioners, and students and researchers in related fields. The series will focus
on emerging needs in the risk reduction field, starting from climate change adaptation, urban ecosystem, coastal risk reduction, education for sustainable development,
community-based practices, risk communication, and human security, among other
areas. Through academic review, this series will encourage young researchers and
practitioners to analyze field practices and link them to theory and policies with
logic, data, and evidence. In this way, the series will emphasize evidence-based risk
reduction methods, approaches, and practices.
Chandra Bahadur Shrestha
Building Back Better After
the 2015 Nepal Earthquake
Laying the Foundation for Resilience
Chandra Bahadur Shrestha
National Reconstruction Authority
Kathmandu, Nepal
ISSN 2196-4106
ISSN 2196-4114 (electronic)
Disaster Risk Reduction
ISBN 978-981-19-6675-0
ISBN 978-981-19-6676-7 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-6676-7
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Singapore
For Pami, Shamesh, Sofi, Saujanya and Richa
Enduring Earthquake inflicted agony together
Foreword
Earthquakes produce indelible scars in the subconscious mind of the people while the
conscious mind tends not to remember the sufferings, pains and disruptions caused in
the lives of the affected population. Usually, a devastating earthquake occurs at least
once in the life of a person living in high seismicity Himalayan region, one of the
global bastions of human civilizations. Learning from the experience of sufferings
and internalization of the lessons learned is what is required for a society to ensure
continuity of its culture, traits, and historical identity for the next generation. Nepalese
are apt in expressing the devastation and human sufferings traditionally in folklore
songs and in modern times, by writing books. There are many books dedicated to the
descriptions of the impact of M7.8 Gorkha earthquake of 2015 that inflicted more
than nine thousand casualty and destroyed the lives and livelihoods built around a
million houses in Nepal. Chandra Bahadur Shrestha’s book—Building Back Better
After the 2015 Nepal Earthquake: Laying the Foundation for Resilience has tried also
to fulfill this historic mission of transferring the lessons learned to the next generation
by continuing the tradition set by late Major General Brahma Shamsher J. B. R., who
already in 1936, presented not only detailed accounts of death and devastation but
also a sincere and objective analysis of the cause effect relations of the impact of the
1934 Great Nepal–Bihar earthquake and drew lessons that are so relevant even now.
Unfortunately, the memories and lessons learned from the 1934 Maha Bhukampa
(Great Earthquake) collected dust. Even the beautiful earthquake monument in the
center of Kathmandu’s business district of New Road, which is perhaps one of the
oldest earthquake monuments in Asia, with excellent description and lessons learned
inscribed in six marble plates, was looking dejected, when the 1981 Bajhang earthquake shook the mind and mindset of Nepalese to the high seismic hazard in the
country. The earthquake monument was cleaned, and facelifted, new disaster legislations were enacted, Nepal established its first seismic network of four short period
seismographs. Such “seismic renaissance” got further strengthened after the devastating M6.6 Udaipur earthquake of 1988, when the country took scientific steps
toward reconstruction and realized the need to formulate a National Building Code,
update disaster legislations. With many lessons learned from the earthquake event
and from regional and international practice, Nepal formulated a unique National
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Foreword
Building Code that covered even the owner driven non-engineered building construction practices and became an active member of the UN-led global paradigm shift from
reactive disaster response to proactive disaster risk reduction (DRR). International
development partners and financial institutions (IFIs) started factoring in DRR into
their strategies of development assistant to Nepal. Several Nepalese individuals and
institutions derived inspiration from this positive change and dedicated themselves in
the national task of disaster risk reduction as guided by the UN conferences on DRR
in Yokohama (1994), Kobe (2005) and Sendai (2015), the biennial conferences—
Global Platform for DRR (GPDRR), and the Asia Pacific Ministerial Meeting on
DRR (APMCDRR), being a part of the global, regional, and SAARC levels as well as
national discourses and initiatives on DRR. I was invited to lead a National Society for
Earthquake Technology—Nepal (NSET) team of professionals and mason to share
Nepal’s experience in earthquake scenario and action plan implementation including
mason training for earthquake resistant construction and implementing strategies for
public awareness and capacity building of stakeholders in the immediate aftermath
and reconstruction of 2001 Gujarat earthquake, 2003 Bam earthquake, and 2005
Pakistan earthquake. We Nepalese learned how Gujarat reconstruction identified
owner driven method as one of the best approaches for reconstruction in developing
countries with prevalence of non-engineered houses, and how Pakistan decided to go
for owner driven approach with distribution of housing reconstruction grants through
the banking system with code compliance as prerequisite for obtaining any of the
three tranches of financial support from the government.
Chandra Bahadur Shrestha is one of such professionals who has contributed
greatly to the last link of an often not understood intrinsic continuum of earthquake
disaster risk management from the early stage of emergency response to that of rehabilitation, reconstruction and preparedness. When after a successful management
of the initial financial support to the families of dead and injured, and a successful
PDNA, the earthquake reconstruction was stalled for several months until December
2015 when the government installed the Nepal Reconstruction Authority (NRA) with
a bona fide CEO and an Executive Committee under a Directive Committee led by
the Prime Minister. Dr. Chandra Bahadur Shrestha, appointed as a member of the
Executive Committee, radiated energy and hope, a rare phenomenon in government
bureaucracy of Nepal, from the very first day of his joining NRA. As the leader of
NSET, who voluntarily tasked itself to bring along the earthquake reconstruction
experience of India, Iran, Banda Aceh and Pakistan to Nepal and intensify technical
assistance to Nepalese public schools for seismic retrofitting and to the municipalities in building code implementation and training of masons, it was always a
sheer joy to plan and work with Mr. Shrestha for our works with NRA in developing reconstruction policies and legislation, training curricula, and implementing
owner driven approaches for earthquake resistant and code-compliant reconstruction
of about 60,000 houses in four earthquake affected districts of Kathmandu, Dolakha,
Nuwakot and Dhading of Nepal. Therefore, when Dr. Shrestha asked me to write a
preface to his book, I felt it a huge responsibility as well as a matter of great professional pride. I am thankful to him for emphasizing time and again to be objective
and critical in my review of the book.
Foreword
ix
The book Building Back Better After the 2015 Nepal Earthquake: Laying the foundation for Resilience presents detailed analysis of Nepal’s experience of handling
the 2015 M7.8 Gorkha earthquake of 2015, specially handling of private housing, by
examining the experience along ten topics that include implication of policy decisions
by different governments on the reconstruction progress, links between the damage
and municipal efforts on building code implementation; reasons for non-compliance
or reluctance for code compliance and a guidance for resilient construction of settlements in the mountainous regions of Nepal, opportunities of urban regeneration
offered by a sincere earthquake reconstruction, earthquake reconstruction, importance of financial transparency in earthquake reconstruction, aid effectiveness in
Nepal’s earthquake reconstruction, contribution of Gorkha earthquake reconstruction to Nepal’s efforts toward implementation of the Sendai Framework for Disaster
Risk Reduction (SFDRR 2015–2030), importance of Nepal earthquake reconstruction compared to similar efforts globally, and a critical assessment of the housing
recovery and reconstruction in terms of major achievements, actual expenses for
private housing reconstruction and recovery in other sector as against what were
estimated by PDNA and PDRF, funding sources and confirmation of Nepal’s abilities in building back better by own resources, transparency and accountability in
governance, and the changes in the mindset of the politicians and decision-makers
and the psyche of the people. The author has offered his conclusions and take aways
for future at the end of each chapter which is the most beautiful way of transferring
the lessons learned to the next baton holders of disaster reconstruction and management. Each chapter also lists relevant references making it easy for any researcher
to go to the sources of information and data or reasoning.
The author served as a member of the Executive Committee, a responsible position that could influence the reconstruction operations and conduct specific research
on reconstruction processes. He also had the opportunity to observe from a vantage
point the entire reconstruction scenario not necessarily only from the housing reconstruction sector. Additionally, Dr. Shrestha served as the Convener of the International Conference on Nepal’s Reconstruction (ICNR-2021) and one of the drivers
of the national conference on earthquake reconstruction. These tasks, together with
his experience as a technical expert of management in his previous tenure with a
bilateral development partner organization and his total immersion in the task of
reconstruction in NRA made him to meet, interact, and negotiate with many national
and international stakeholders. That explains the authenticity of the data and information used and the credibility of the logics and conclusions made. Furthermore,
he and his family members themselves were victims of Gorkha earthquake. That
perhaps explains the esprit a reader finds continuously everywhere in the book even
though this was the author’s first professional experience with any aspect of DRR in
the country.
The book is extremely valuable because it provides not only trustworthy authentic
data and information but it also walks the reader through the entire process and facts
of Nepal’s handling of the Gorkha earthquake from the days of emergency response,
rescue and relief operations to that of recovery and, especially, of reconstruction,
offers critical explanations for all the important decisions and their implications
x
Foreword
offering his own view points, at the same time allows the reader to question and
make their own observation. The author has very successfully explained the process
playing simultaneously the role of one of the operations decision-makers of earthquake reconstruction, and at the same time also that of a critical observer and a
strategic analyst. In doing so, he has not fallen victim to ego, prejudice, and biasness toward anybody including himself. His sincerity in the storytelling is amazing,
which makes the book an important depositor of the lessons learned from Gorkha
earthquake reconstruction and a sincere account of Nepal’s journey toward disaster
resilience along the paths of post-earthquake building back better through earthquake
resistant reconstruction.
Prior to the Gorkha earthquake in 2015, many so called international experts
used to portray a wretched picture of Nepal saying, “Nepal may not resurrect after
a devastating earthquake because Nepal is like a Haiti-like political economy situation with a Japan-like earthquake hazard.” This book once again tells the story of
how Nepal could proudly complete the earthquake reconstruction works within the
prescribed time frame and, most importantly, using its own resources for meeting
more than 75% of the earthquake reconstruction cost. I personally congratulate Dr.
Shrestha for telling a true story sincerely with critically indicating toward many
areas where improvements could be done. He has rightly observed that “disaster
preparedness pays substantially,” and “Nepal’s vitality in reconstruction has been
self-evident.” I wish that he does not lose the momentum gained in this glorious
storytelling and continues writing about Nepal’s path of earthquake resilience in the
two decades proceeding the Gorkha earthquake that made Nepal prepared for the
Gorkha earthquake and instilled the “vitality” required for a successful earthquake
reconstruction.
Kathmandu, Nepal
Amod Mani Dixit
President, NSET
Chair, Asian Disaster Reduction and
Response Network (ADRRN)
Chair, College Management
Committee, Universal Engineering and
Science College (affiliated to Pokhara
University)
Governing Board Member, South
Asian Alliance of Disaster Research
Institutions (SAADRI)
Preface
25 April 2015 was one of the worst days in my life when I lost my house and
vehicle for which I worked for years. Fortunately, my family members remained
unscathed. However, around 9000 my countrymen lost their lives and more than
22,000 injured. Having witnessed and experienced this excruciating mayhem, I was
determined mentally that I need to contribute something around this. As I was fully
absorbed rowing my own boat, I did not find time to approach the government for
public responsibility. However, for some reason, the government nominated me as
an Executive Committee Member of the National Reconstruction Authority (NRA).
This book is partly recollection of the trajectory of my firsthand endurance in NRA. In
addition, as the convener for the International Conference on Nepal’s Reconstruction
(ICNR—2021), I sensed various views from their origin which were not necessarily
similar to those of NRA.
The profound challenge for me was to present unbiased views which necessitated me to adopt scientific approach rather than descriptive one. I relied on the
proven empirical evidences. However, the cause-and-effect relationships are not
always linear.
The book’s themes were identified based on my own hard-boiled sustenance. For
creating knowledge base, I led various studies which created abundance of information that was instrumental for me to analyze in this book. My hard-earned social
capital was also used for mitigating data gap. As the author of a number of scientific
papers, I was anyway sitting on the mountain of the background literature on various
facades of reconstruction.
Quite naturally, the private housing is the central theme of this book which grabbed
a substantial amount of resources and drawn more than 90% point of NRA’s attention.
The first chapter elucidates the chronological order of events from starting to the
end. The middle five chapters scrutinize some of the most crucial issues in the
housing sector. The last four chapters shed light on the macro-level outcomes rather
holistically covering all recovery and reconstruction sectors.
How such disasters can be ringfenced from the political transactional behavior
is the central crux of the gamut. Delayed formation of the reconstruction authority,
resurveying of disqualified households from technical screening and decision for
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Preface
disbursing non-complied houses with the general building standards were guided by
such motives. Sloganeering for the single tranche of housing grant is another example.
Local governments’ recommendations for grant eligibility without screening has
also intended to placate their voters. Ensuring professional integrity of the political
appointees in the executive positions, clarity in division of labor between politically appointed executives with government’s regular bureaucrats is indispensable.
Despite rhetoric, the overall donors’ practice is far from the agreed principles of
aid effectiveness. Will the government garner enough courage to refuse aid packages not complying with the Paris Declaration of Aid Effectiveness? Despite some
limitations, the Nepal’s reconstruction was on the crest of the wave because of the
dedicated professionals who worked for the cause rather than publicity.
The voyage kicked off by the NRA is the first step in the journey of a thousand miles. Further progress requires responsible local governments and accountable
federal and provincial governments. The earthquake resilient technology diffused in
32 districts has to be replicated nationwide. Not only strengthening private houses
is sufficient but also the government buildings, schools and hospitals have to be
earthquake resilient. Basic resilient provisions for roads, airports, hydropower and
irrigation schemes are unavoidable. Resilience drive has direct implications on land
use, banking, supply chain of construction materials and availability of skilled
human resources which must be factored in. In addition, the NRA’s roadmap toward
resilience has to be customized for the federal context.
I hope the book will be able to contribute toward resilient development not only
of Nepal but also other disaster-prone countries. Particularly to those vulnerable
people who are forced to live-in disaster-prone locations and rickety shelters will be
benefitted with the propositions in this book.
Bagdole, Lalitpur, Nepal
Dr. Chandra Bahadur Shrestha
Acknowledgements
I owe a major debt to the K. P. Sharma Oli-led government in 2015 for trusting me
to take up the historical responsibility of the post-earthquake recovery and reconstruction. My thanks are due to Puspa Kamal Dahal “Prachanda” and Sher Bahadur
Deuba, the successive Prime Ministers for allowing continuity. The second innings
of K. P. Sharma Oli proved to be particularly significant as the political stability
allowed to deliver substantially. I enjoyed working with my team in the Executive Committee: Mr. Sushil Gyewali—Chief Executive Officer, Mr. Dhruba Prasad
Sharma, Dr. Bishnu Bhandari and Dr. Hariram Parajuli—the Executive Committee
Members. Other two CEOs: Prof. Dr. Govinda Raj Pokharel and Mr. Yubaraj Bhusal
are also worth mentioning. As a convener of the International Conference on Nepal’s
Reconstruction, I was mainly supported by Mr. Manohar Ghimire and Dr. Adi
Walker. Other colleagues Dr. Taranidhi Bhattarai, Dr. Nigel Fisher, Dr. Ram Manohar
Shrestha, Mr. Jitendra Bothara, Mr. Vivek Rawal, Mr. Surya Narayan Shrestha and
Mr. Ranjan Dhungel also supported in various different capacities. In addition, there
are hundreds of other government, donor and NGO colleagues with whom I received
support and revelations. Heartfelt appreciation is due to Mr. Werner Paul Meyer, my
longtime family friend, who always puts my ideas into the broader perspective. I am
particularly indebted to Dr. Amod Mani Dixit, a legendary figure in Nepal’s earthquake science for agreeing to write foreword of this monograph. Also, accolades are
due to the distinguished personalities who contributed back page quotes: Mr. Kanak
Mani Dixit, a renowned journalist, Mr. Vivek Rawal, an international personality
in the post-disaster reconstruction and Mr. Loren Lockwood, then Team Leader of
the Housing Recovery and Reconstruction Platform (HRRP). HRRP colleagues Mr.
Minar Thapa Magar, Mr. Keshab Shrestha, and Ms. Ambica Joshi helped me for
graphic design and formatting. I particularly would like to extend my thanks to Dr.
Rajib Shaw who encouraged me to publish through Springer. The Springer staffs
Mr. Arulmurugan Venkatasalam and Mr. Yosuke Nishida Editor—Earthscience and
Geography—deserve my heartfelt thanks for their kind cooperation.
Bagdole, Lalitpur, Nepal
Dr. Chandra Bahadur Shrestha
xiii
Contents
1
2
Implications of Steering Committee Decisions on Private
Housing Reconstruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.2 Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.3 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.3.1 Government Headed by Mr. Sushil Koirala (25
April to 12 October 2015) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.3.2 Mr. K. P. Oli-Led Government (12 October 2015
to 24 July 2016) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.3.3 Mr. Pushpa Kamal Dahal-Led Government (03
August 2016 to 24 May 2017) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.3.4 Mr. Sher Bahadur Deuba-Led Government (07
June 2017 to 15 February 2018) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.3.5 Mr. K. P. Oli-Led Government (15 February 2018
to 13 July 2021) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.3.6 Mr. Sher Bahadur Deuba-Led Government (13
July 2021 to 24 Dec 2021) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.4 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.4.1 Formation of the Reconstruction Authority . . . . . . . . . . .
1.4.2 Size of Housing Grant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.4.3 Decision Making . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Linking Post-Gorkha Earthquake Housing Damage
Assessment with Municipality’s Building Standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.2 Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.2.1 Nepal’s and Foreign Experiences
on Post-earthquake Damage Assessment
Survey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.2.2 Survey Questionnaires . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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4
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2.2.3 Linking Beneficiary Survey to Long-term Planning . . . .
Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.3.1 Institution for Implementing Housing Integrity
Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.3.2 Questionnaire for the Housing Structural Integrity
Assessment (HSIA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.3.3 Policy Reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.3.4 Government’s Resolve in Housing Resilience . . . . . . . . .
2.3.5 Incentivizing Retrofitting of Vulnerable Houses . . . . . . .
2.4 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Annex 1: Household Registration for Housing Reconstruction
Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2.3
3
4
Transparency and Financial Inclusion in Nepal’s
Reconstruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.1 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.2 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.3 Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.3.1 Distribution of Beneficiaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.3.2 Formal Housing Grant Distribution Arrangement . . . . . .
3.3.3 Difficulties in Accessing Housing Grant . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.3.4 Progress in Housing Grant Distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.3.5 Increase in Number of Bank Account Holders . . . . . . . .
3.4 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Understanding Building Code Non-compliance for Setting
Future Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.1 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.2 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.3 Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.3.1 Features of Foundation, Wall and Roofing
Materials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.3.2 Traditional Housing Typologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.3.3 Post-earthquake Housing Reconstruction
Catalog-Based Typologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.3.4 Mandatory Rule of Thumb for Housing
Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.3.5 Major Non-compliant Features . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.3.6 Reasons for Non-compliance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.4 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.4.1 Characteristics of Sample Districts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.4.2 Current Trend of Housing Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.4.3 Non-compliant Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.4.4 Addressing Economic Issue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.4.5 Raising Technological Awareness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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4.4.6
4.5
5
6
Administrative Adherence and Observation
of Ethical Values . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4.4.7 Inappropriate Land . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
How Can Disaster Prone Mountainous Municipalities Create
Resilient Settlements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.2 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.3 Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.3.1 NRA Process of Integrated Settlements . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.3.2 Identification of Vulnerable Settlements . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.3.3 Transition from Geological Study to Integrated
Settlement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.3.4 Comparative Overview of Integrated Settlements . . . . . .
5.3.5 Resettlement in the New Legal Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.4 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.4.1 Conceptualizing Paraphernalia of Integrated
Settlement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.4.2 Identifying and Planning for Vulnerable
Settlements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.4.3 Securing Land for Resettlement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.4.4 Initial Investment and Operating Capital . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.4.5 Ethnic Dimension in Resettlement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Scoping Urban Regeneration from Post-earthquake
Reconstruction Lens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6.2 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6.3 Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6.3.1 Constraints in Urban Housing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6.3.2 Lackluster Response to Retrofitting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6.3.3 Housing Reconstruction in Heritage Settlements . . . . . .
6.3.4 Post-earthquake Urban Regeneration in Some
Selected Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6.3.5 Urban Regeneration from Global Experience . . . . . . . . .
6.3.6 Nepalese Experience of Urban Renewal . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6.3.7 Legal Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6.4 Discussions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6.4.1 Binding Constraints for Heritage Private Housing . . . . .
6.4.2 Making Strides Toward Retrofitting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6.4.3 Legal Frameworks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6.4.4 Nepalese Models of Urban Renewal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6.4.5 Potential Candidates for Urban Renewal . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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Contents
6.5
7
8
9
6.4.6 Funding Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
Aid Effectiveness in Nepal’s Post-earthquake Reconstruction . . . . . .
7.1 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
7.2 Data and Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
7.3 Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
7.3.1 Development Partners’ Pledge, Commitment
and Disbursement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
7.3.2 Operational Modality of Representative Donor
Funded Projects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
7.3.3 Ownership and Priorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
7.3.4 Development Partnership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
7.3.5 Focus on Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
7.3.6 Accountability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
7.4 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
7.4.1 Implementation of Reconstruction Projects . . . . . . . . . . .
7.4.2 Nepali’s Systemic Reliability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
7.4.3 Learning from Neighbors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
7.5 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Contribution of Post-Gorkha Earthquake Reconstruction
Toward Localizing Sendai Framework of Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
8.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
8.2 Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
8.3 Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
8.3.1 Private Houses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
8.3.2 Heritage Monuments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
8.3.3 School and Educational Institutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
8.3.4 Other Structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
8.4 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
8.4.1 Understanding the Disaster Risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
8.4.2 Strengthening Disaster Risk Governance . . . . . . . . . . . . .
8.4.3 Investing on Disaster Risk Resilience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
8.4.4 Disaster Preparedness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
8.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A Comparative Overview of Nepal’s Reconstruction in Global
Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
9.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
9.2 Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
9.3 Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
9.3.1 Economic Condition of Comparator Countries . . . . . . . .
9.3.2 Earthquake Characteristics and Magnitude
of Casualty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
9.3.3 Earthquake’s Relationship with Housing Damage . . . . . .
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122
125
126
127
127
128
129
129
130
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133
135
135
135
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142
144
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146
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148
149
151
151
153
153
153
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156
Contents
9.4
9.5
xix
9.3.4 Institutional Efficiency of Reconstruction . . . . . . . . . . . .
9.3.5 Reconstruction Efficiency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
9.3.6 Outputs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
9.4.1 Did Economic Condition Ensure Speedy
Reconstruction? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
9.4.2 An Assessment of Institutional Set Up . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
9.4.3 Implementation Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
9.4.4 Gateway to Resilience Society . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
10 Assessing Impact of Post-Gorkha Earthquake Recovery
and Reconstruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
10.1 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
10.2 Data and Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
10.3 Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
10.3.1 Estimated and Actual Reconstruction Allocation
Among Various Sectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
10.3.2 Funding Source . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
10.3.3 Contribution of Reconstruction Expenditure
to the National Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
10.3.4 Transparency and Accountability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
10.3.5 Transforming Political Mindset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
10.4 Discussions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
10.4.1 Reconstruction Achievements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
10.4.2 Post-disaster Reconstruction Financing . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
10.4.3 Scope of Reconstruction Authority . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
10.4.4 Governance and Accountability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
10.4.5 Translating Constitutional and Legal Provisions
into Practice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
10.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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179
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
Acronyms
AD
ADB
AI
AMPA
BBB
BDP
BECTP
BFI
BLB
BMC
BMM
BPS
BS
CA
CBRI
CBS
CERA
CERC
CGI
CLPIU
COVID
CPN UML
CSEB
CTEVT
DACFC
DDRC
DFID
DoA
DoMG
DPDS
DRRNP
Anno Domini
Asian Development Bank
Amnesty International
The Ancient Monument Preservation Act
Build Back Better
Bhaktapur Development Project
Bandipur Eco-cultural Tourist Project
Banks and financial institutions
Branchless Banking
Brick Masonry in Cement Mud Mortar
Brick Masonry in Mud Mortar
Building Permit System
Bikram Sambhat
Constituent Assembly
Central Building Research Institute
Central Bureau of Statistics
Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority
Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Commission
Corrugated Galvanized Iron
Central-Level Project Implementation Unit
Corona Virus Disease
Communist Party of Nepal Unified Marxist Leninist
Cement stabilized earth brick
Council of Technical Education and Vocational Training
Development Agency Coordination and Facilitation Committee
District Disaster Relief Committee
Department for International Development
Department of Archeology
Department of Mines and Geology
Development Project Design and Services Ltd.
Disaster Risk Reduction National Policy
xxi
xxii
DSCWM
DTCO
DUDBC
DWIDM
EAARRP
EHDC
EHRP
EQC
ERRA
EU
FCDO
FGD
FY
GDP
GFCF
GI
GMALI
GoN
GSDMA
HMGN
HRHRS
HRRP
HSIA
IATI
ICNR
IDA
IHRC
INGO
INR
INTACH
IPERR
JDA
JICA
KII
KMC
KVDA
KVEMP
LMBIS
LMC
MDTF
MIS
ML
MoEST
MoF
MoFAGA
Acronyms
Department of Soil Conservation and Watershed Management
District Treasury Controller Office
Department of Urban Development and Building Construction
Department of Water Induced Disaster Management
Earthquake Affected Areas Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Project
Earthquake Household Damages and Characteristics
Earthquake Housing Reconstruction Program
Earthquake Commission
Earthquake Reconstruction and Rehabilitation
European Union
Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office-UKAid
Focus Group Discussion
Fiscal Year
Gross Domestic Product
National Gross Fixed Capital Formation
Galvanized Iron
Grant Management and Local Infrastructure
Government of Nepal
Gujarat State Disaster Management Authority
His Majesty Government of Nepal
Household Registration for Housing Reconstruction Survey
Housing Recovery and Reconstruction Platform
Housing Structural Integrity Assessment
International Aid Transparency Initiative
International Conference on Nepal’s Reconstruction
International Development Association
Interim Haiti Recovery Commission
International Non-Governmental Organization
Indian Rupees
India and Indian National Trust for Art and Culture
Integrated Post-Earthquake Reconstruction and Rehabilitation
Johannesburg Development Agency
Japan International Cooperation Agency
Key Informants Interview
Kathmandu Metropolitan City
The Kathmandu Valley Development Authority
Kathmandu Valley Earthquake Management Project
Line Ministry Budget Information System
Lalitpur Metropolitan City
Multidonor Trust Fund
Management Information System
Richter Scale measurement unit
Ministry of Education, Science and Technology
Ministry of Finance
Ministry of Federal Affairs and General Administration
Acronyms
MoHA
MoLMCPA
MoLRM
MoUD
Mukesh
NBA
NBC
NDMA
NDRC
NDRRMA
NEOC
NGO
NPC
NRA
NRA-Japan
NRB
NRs
NSET
OCHA
OPMCM
PDNA
PDRF
PM
PPP
RCC
RoW
RRA
SDGs
SIDA
SMC
SMM
SOP
SPV
SRFDCL
SWN
TI
TSA
UNCDF
UNDP
UNESCO
UNISDR
UNOPS
US$
USAID
USGS
xxiii
Ministry of Home Affairs
Ministry of Land Management, Cooperatives and Poverty Alleviation
Ministry of Land Reform and Management
Ministry of Urban Development
Mukesh and Associates
Nepal Bankers Association
Nepal Building Code
National Disaster Management Authority -Pakistan
National Development and Reform Commission
National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Authority
National Emergency Operation Center
Non-Governmental Organization
National Planning Commission
National Reconstruction Authority- Nepal
National Reconstruction Agency, Japan
Nepal Rastra Bank
Nepal Rupees
National Society for Earthquake Technology
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
Office of Prime Ministers and Council of Ministers Nepal
Post-Disaster Need Assessment
Post-Disaster Reconstruction Framework
Prime Minister
Public Private Partnership
Reinforced Cement Concrete
Right of Way
Reconstruction and Recovery Agency
Sustainable Development Goals
Structural Integrity and Damage Assessment
Stone Masonry in Cement Mortar
Stone Masonry in Mud Mortar
Standard Operating Procedure
Special Purpose Vehicle
Sabarmati Waterfront Development Corporation Ltd.
Scott Wilson Nepal
Transparency International Nepal
Treasury Single Account
United Nation Capital Development Fund
United Nations Development Program
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction
United Nations Office for Project Services
US Dollars
United States Agency for International Development
Unite States Geological Survey
xxiv
VDC
WB
YOY
Acronyms
Village Development Committees
World Bank
Year-Over-Year
Chapter 1
Implications of Steering Committee
Decisions on Private Housing
Reconstruction
Abstract The Gorkha earthquake induced quagmire was compounded with the
politically turbulent transition which increased complexity drastically. As the
National Reconstruction Authority (NRA) had to deliver the reconstruction mission
in such a roiled environment, the cross-sectional and longitudinal policy implications
are expected to be the trailblazer for the future generations. Hence, this chapter examined how the policy and procedural decisions affected the overall performance. Desk
survey method was used for collecting data. The government demonstrated implementation dexterity through successful rescue and relief operation could not cascade
down to reconstruction as the NRA was constituted after eight months. Further,
introducing populist packages without due consideration of the national fiscal space
overstretched the government’s coffer. Exemption of minimum housing standards
compromised the objective of creating earthquake resilient society.
Keywords Earthquake · Reconstruction · Decisions
1.1 Introduction
The 2015 Gorkha Nepal earthquake struck amidst tumultuous socio-political environment. The Constituent Assembly (CA) elected in 2008 had witnessed its own
demise after failing to promulgate the Statute (Bhandari 2012). The second CA
elected in 2013 had been procrastinating for a considerable time (Jha 2015). The
tremor forced them to devise solution immediately (Hutt 2020). The constitution
was eventually promulgated on 20 September 2015 despite some grievances of all
involved parties. Disagreeing with Nepal’s independent decision on the constitution,
India imposed a “trade embargo” with the pretext of the Nepal’s Madhesh-based
parties along the border (Baral 2016) which was used as an alibi to blame transport
disruptions. Both earthquake and Indian embargo caused Nepal’s GDP to decline
from targeted 6−4% (Acharya et al. 2015). In the Fiscal Year 2014/015, annual
average growth rate remained 0.8% (NPC 2020). The non-agricultural growth rate
shrank down to 0.6% in FY 2014/015 against 3.1% in FY 2013/014. Industries that
relied on Indian raw material were severely impacted (MoF 2016).
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022
C. B. Shrestha, Building Back Better After the 2015 Nepal Earthquake,
Disaster Risk Reduction, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-6676-7_1
1
2
1 Implications of Steering Committee Decisions …
The GoN responded to the earthquake swiftly by issuing an international appeal for
assistance. The National Emergency Operation Center (NEOC) coordinated rescue
and relief operation. Overall, a total of 22,500 civil servants, 65,059 staff of the Nepal
Army, 41,776 staff of Nepal Police and 24,775 staff of the Armed Police Force and
4000 government and private health workers were mobilized to aid rescue and relief
efforts (NPC 2015a). The National Planning Commission (NPC) followed this up
with the Post-Disaster Need Assessment (PDNA) that estimated the total disaster
damage to be about US$7 billion, or about a third of GDP in FY 2014/015. In
addition, the damage was equivalent to 100% of the Gross Fixed Capital Formation
for FY 2013/014 (NPC 2015a).
After taking over in December 2015, the NRA completed 81% of 818,455 private
houses. (NRA 2021f) by June 2021. More than 90% of total 4720 households whose
homestead was vulnerable due to earthquake induced landslides were resettled.
Further, all 12,788 landless households that had been identified had safe shelters,
including land of their own. Against this background, the main objective of this
chapter is to track NRA Steering Committee decisions and assess their impact in the
private housing sector under various governments.
1.2 Methods
This chapter is largely based on desk-research. The timeline prepared by the NRA
and the Housing Recovery and Reconstruction Platform (HRRP) was verified with
the web-based historical newspapers and other records. All the Steering Committee
decisions were reviewed.
1.3 Results
There have been six governments headed by Mr. Sushil Koirala, Mr. K. P. Oli, Mr.
Pushpa Kamal Dahal (Prachanda), Mr. Sher Bahadur Deuba, Mr. K. P. Oli and Mr.
Sher Bahadur Deuba between April 2015 and end Dec 2021. Four of these governments were in place before the general election in year 2017/018. Mr. K. P. Oli became
the Prime Minister for the second time after the election. The following paragraphs
analyze the major contributions of the six governments headed by different Prime
Ministers who ex-officio chaired the NRA’s Steering Committee. The progress in
grant disbursement is shown in Fig. 1.1. However, the figures require cautions interpretation as disbursement is the accumulated result of the historical decisions not
only the outcomes of the decisions of the government at the time it was disbursed.
1.3 Results
3
Fig. 1.1 Progress in grant disbursement (HRRP 2021b)
1.3.1 Government Headed by Mr. Sushil Koirala (25 April
to 12 October 2015)
Mr. Sushil Koirala was sworn in as the Prime Minister of Nepal on 11 February 2014.
The Communist Party of Nepal, Unified Marxist-Leninist (UML) was its coalition
partner (PTI 2015b). Having a down to earth and humble lifestyle, Mr. Koirala
was expected to deliver good governance. However, he was caught by a whirlpool
resulting from the death of 16 Sherpas in the April 2014 Everest avalanche (Jenkins
2014). As such, the Koirala Government handled rescue and relief operation well
(Paul et al. 2017). Paul et al. argued that it was possible due to logical decisions,
need-based and impartial distribution of relief materials, and the government’s onedoor policy through the Prime Minister’s Disaster Relief Fund. International support
greatly enhanced the effectiveness of the operation. Surprisingly, they continued that
the Nepali government provided services that was as good as that the NGOs had
provided. Over 100 international search and rescue and medical teams arrived in
Nepal within 24 h of the earthquake. More than 450 aid organizations had responded
to the emergency (OCHA 2015). Paul et al. concluded that Nepal implemented a fairly
successful rescue and relief operation. However, the study found that the survivors
were deprived of emergency aid due to lack of information; enhancing access in
remote mountain terrain was another challenge.
The government had formed a reconstruction authority through an ordinance
(Shrestha 2015). However, Seiff (2015) mentioned that the failure to enact the Reconstruction Act by parliament led to the expiry of the ordinance and dismissal of the
CEO which was the major setback of the government.
Table 1.1 shows the major activities of the Koirala Government during the period
of 25 April to 12 October 2015. The Koirala Government concluded the PDNA, organized International Conference on Nepal’s Reconstruction (ICNR-2015) and signed
agreements with several donors. The first meeting of the NRA on 25 August 2015 had
declared 14 districts as “severely affected,” 11 districts as “affected” and six districts
as “moderately” affected. (NRA 2015). This was the only formal meeting under Mr.
Sushil Koirala, as Prime Minister. Having aborted the reconstruction ordinance, the
4
1 Implications of Steering Committee Decisions …
Table 1.1 Major activities of the Sushil Koirala-led government (April to October 2015)
Date
2014
Total days
11 February
Mr. Sushil Koirala sworn in as Prime Minister
166
2015
25 April
Gorkha earthquake
12 May
Biggest aftershock ((ML 7.3)
June
Temporary shelter support of cash grant NRs. 15,000
June 25
International Conference in Nepal’s Reconstruction (ICNR)
July
Release of PDNA
August 25
Steering committee meeting
October 12
Mr. Sushil Koirala resigns
HRRP 2021d
government could not initiate reconstruction interventions as result of which there
was no progress in grant disbursement (Fig. 1.1).
1.3.2 Mr. K. P. Oli-Led Government (12 October 2015 to 24
July 2016)
Mr. K. P. Oli took over the premiership when the country was in a turmoil (PTI 2015a).
After promulgation of the constitution on 20 September 2015, the Madhesh-based
parties had launched protests that resulted in blockage of all road links between Nepal
and India resulting in shortages of supply of daily necessities including petroleum
products. The earthquake had battered the productive sectors and the country was
poised to transit to a federal regime from the centralized system creating confusions
in all echelons of the governance (Dixit 2015).
Oli introduced a historical shift in foreign policy by opening up transit routes to
China, which terminated the historical reliance on India (Iyengar 2016). A number of
development collaborations were also agreed with China which had led to additional
Indian displeasure, widening the chasm in the relations between the two countries.
The Oli Government enacted the Reconstruction Act on 21 December and
appointed the Chief Executive Officer, Secretary and Executive Committee Members
in January 2016 (Table 1.2). It also enabled the NRA Executive Committee to formulate the reconstruction policy and various working procedures (Bhattarai 2016). The
first Consultative Council’s meeting held on 13 January 2016 instructed the Executive Committee to initiate planned implementation of reconstruction. Similarly, the
first Steering Committee meeting held on 11 January 2016 approved the organizational structure and budget, which had far reaching consequences. This meeting also
activated district-level coordination committees by designating the Assistant Chief
District Officer as Secretary of the District Coordination Committee as mandated by
1.3 Results
5
Table 1.2 Major activities of the Mr. K. P. Oli-led government (12 October 2015−24 July 2016)
Date
2015
Total days
12 Oct
Mr. K. P. Oli sworn in as Prime Minister
282
21 Dec
Reconstruction Act 2072 B.S. enacted
25 Dec
Mr. Sushil Gyewali appointed as NRA CEO
27 Dec
Mr. Madhu Sudan Adhikari appointed as acting secretary of NRA
05 Jan
Appointment of executive members: Mr. C. B. Shrestha, Mr. D. P.
Sharma, Mr. B. Bhandari
2016
13 Jan
Consultative council meeting
15 Jan
Damage assessment survey (15 January−20 June in 11 most
affected districts)
11 Jan
First steering committee meeting
14 Feb
Second steering committee meeting
04 April
Mr. Madhu Sudan Adhikari confirmed as secretary of NRA
10 April
Third steering committee meeting
19 April
Fourth steering committee meeting
21 April
Fifth steering committee meeting
12 May
Launching of post-disaster reconstruction Framework (PDRF)
24 June
Sixth steering committee meeting
24 July
Mr. K. P. Oli resigns
HRRP 2021d
the Act for reconstruction of the earthquake affected infrastructure—2072 (An Act
Made To Provide For Reconstruction of the Earthquake Affected Structures 2015).
The second Steering Committee meeting on 14 February laid corner stone
for reconstruction by approving reconstruction and recovery policy—2072 (NRA
2016d). The meeting also approved working procedures for housing grant, which
was a major decision for the reconstruction of private houses. For streamlining NGO
activities, NRA’s third Steering Committee (10 April 2016) approved the Procedure
related to the mobilization of NGO for reconstruction and rehabilitation—2016.
Any delay of the approval could have discredited government and created chaos in
NGO operations as almost all NGOs were concentrated in seven northern districts
(Sharma 2016b). The procedure for the management of grievances related to reconstruction—2017 recognized the probable oversight in the beneficiary identification
system and expressed commitment to ensure justice to all genuine victims. This
was approved by the sixth Steering Committee meeting. The PDRF which assessed
financial requirements realistically was finalized on 12 May 2016.
The beneficiary survey had been kicked off in September 2015 but did not
start until receiving a nudge from NRA. The beneficiary survey enabled NRA to
sign reconstruction agreements with beneficiaries on 13 March 2016 (NSET 2016).
Having laid institutional, legal and financial foundation, NRA disbursed the first
6
1 Implications of Steering Committee Decisions …
tranche to over 32,000 beneficiaries-initiated disbursement of the second tranche as
shown in Fig. 1.1. The government’s tenure ended on 24 July 2016.
1.3.3 Mr. Pushpa Kamal Dahal-Led Government (03 August
2016 to 24 May 2017)
Mr. Pushpa Kamal Dahal (Prachanda) headed government undertook a number of
activities of national importance including the holding of local-level election in 2017
(PTI 2017). In addition, Mr. Dahal signed on the “One Belt One Road” initiative of
Mr. Xi Jinping, the President of Peoples Republic of China. He is also credited for
relaxing the power crisis, as load-shedding ended during his tenure. The country had
also witnessed substantial growth in GDP (Rawal 2017).
Table 1.3 shows the major reconstruction activities undertaken during the tenure
of Mr. Dahal. This government increased grant amount from NRs. 200,000 (about
US$2000) NRs. 300,000 (about US$3000). Similarly, the retrofitting grant was
increased from NRs. 50,000 (about US$500) to NRs. 100,000 (US$1000), which
increased the government liability by NRs. 80 billion (US$727 million). This increment offered a respite to deprived communities. However, was it appropriate to
increase GoN’s financial liability beyond its affordability (Sangraula 2016) is the
question which remains unanswered so far. In addition, the decision was based on
the simple logic that NRs. 200,000 was inadequate without deliberating the grant
from other strategic perspectives.
The government also introduced interest-free loan of NRs. 300,000 (US$3000),
which never materialized (Panthi 2018). The Seventh Steering Committee meeting
took a number of decisions including livelihood loans of NRs. 200,000 (US$2000)
and vocational training for 500,000 people, which were also never implemented.
The Eighth Steering Committee meeting further enunciated overall economic development of the earthquake affected districts (NRA 2016a). Moreover, this meeting
also permitted the Non-Resident Nepali Association (NRNA) to construct the Laprak
settlement in Gorkha district as model village. The NRNA were exempted the requirement to furnish payments through banking system, the NRA’s mandatory provision
for NGOs.
The Ninth Steering Committee mandated the Executive Committee to revise the
proposed working procedure for the operation of reconstruction fund in consultation
with the Chief Secretary. This procedure was never adopted. The second decision
was the instruction to the Executive Committee to resurvey of the households that
had been declared as non-beneficiaries (NRA 2017a). Before this decision, the NRA
Grievance handling sub-committee had assessed grievances based on pre-defined
technical criteria. Consequently, NRA received 634,973 cases out of which 174,146
households were declared as beneficiaries.
Many of the decisions of the Dahal-led government such as interest-free loan and
vocational training remained unimplemented. The Laprak settlement was handed
1.3 Results
7
Table 1.3 Major activities of the Mr. Pushpa K. Dahal-led government (03 August 2016 to 24 May
2017)
Date
2016
Total days
291
03 Aug
Mr. Pushpa Kamal Dahal sworn in as Prime Minister
16 Sep
Seventh Steering Committee meeting
16 Oct
Mr. Madhu Sudan Adhikari transferred from NRA
07 Nov
Mr. Sanjaya Sharma appointed as secretary of NRA
26 Oc
Eighth steering committee meeting
29 Dec
Grant distribution procedure approved
29 Dec
GoN asked clarification from Mr. Sushil Gyewali, CEO
2017
05 Jan
GoN sacked Mr. Sushil Gyewali from the position of CEO
10 Jan
GoN appointed Dr Govinda Raj Pokharel as new CEO
31 Jan
GoN approved first amendment of NGO mobilization Act
13 Feb
Ninth steering committee meeting
7 April
Cabinet approved second revision of NRA NGO guidelines
13 April
Mr. Sanjaya Sharma, secretary got transferred
03 May
Mr. Sarvajeet Mahato appointed as NRA secretary
24 May
Mr. Pushpa Kamal Dahal resigns
HRRP 2021d
over to NRNA without adequate preparation. In terms of disbursing housing grants,
NRA concluded 516,196 agreements between the GoN and grant beneficiaries during
the period. The Dahal-led government was in office for one full working season of
FY 2016/017, which enabled the conclusion of the highest number of beneficiary
partnership agreements. However, disbursement of second tranche was limited to
16,473 households as the beneficiaries required to progress up to the plinth level for
receiving the second tranche.
1.3.4 Mr. Sher Bahadur Deuba-Led Government (07 June
2017 to 15 February 2018)
During his nine months long stint, Mr. Sher Bahadur Deuba conducted both the
local and federal elections (TET 2018b), the major activities in his tenure. Table 1.4
shows the major activities undertaken in reconstruction. Most of the 10th Steering
Committee decisions had routine characteristics. The proposal for topping up of
NRs. 50,000 (US$500) for the houses in the heritage settlements was submitted by
the NRA’s Executive Committee after thorough due diligence. Another constructive decision of the 10th Steering Committee was to set a deadline for completing
8
1 Implications of Steering Committee Decisions …
Table 1.4 Major activities of Mr. Sher B. Deuba-led government (07 June 2017−15 February
2018)
Date
2017
07 June Mr. Sher Bahadur Deuba sworn in as Prime Minister
17 July
10th steering committee meeting
23 Oct
Dr Govinda Raj Pokharel resigned and Mr. Yuba Raj Bhusal appointed as
NRA CEO
Total days
247
12 Nov Mr. Sarvajeet Mahato, secretary of NRA retired
13 Nov Mr. Madhusudan Adhikari appointed as NRA secretary
2018
25 Jan
Cabinet decision to increase housing grant to NRs. 400,000 (US$4000)
9 Feb
11th steering committee meeting
15 Feb
Mr. Sher Bahadur Deuba resigns
HRRP 2021d
private housing, which pressurized the beneficiaries to expedite housing reconstruction. The 11th Steering Committee meeting was also limited to routine decisions.
The government also took the most populist decision to increase housing grant from
NRs. 300,000 (US$3000) to NRs. 400,000 (US$4000), which would have increased
government’s liability by NRs. 8 billion (US$800 million). However, this decision
was neither recorded and nor implemented. During Deuba’s tenure Dr Govinda Raj
Pokharel resigned as NRA Chief Executive Officer and was replaced by Mr. Yuba
Raj Bhusal.
As shown in Fig. 1.1, the agreement between NRA and beneficiary had reached
117,953 households whereas 139,385 households had received the second, and
35,085 households the third tranche. Following slow in the disbursement of second
tranche, NRA introduced deadlines for receiving the tranches: first tranche up to 16
November 2017, second tranche up to 13 January 2018, and third tranche up to 15
July 2018. Deuba’s term in office was largely during the rainy and the festive season,
which was why progress in tranche disbursement was limited.
1.3.5 Mr. K. P. Oli-Led Government (15 February 2018 to 13
July 2021)
Mr. K. P. Oli took over the premiership after a securing a landslide victory that later
added up to nearly a two-third majority in the lower house. The situation of the
upper house was also similar (TET 2018a). The formation of a majority government brought hope for rapid economic development, peace and prosperity among
citizens (Bhattarai 2018), to match which, Oli announced the government’s “Prosperous Nepal Happy Nepali Campaign” (Thapa 2018). However, after two years of
the government formation, Mr. K. P. Oli and Mr. Pushpa Kamal Dahal—who had
1.3 Results
9
unified their parties to form the Nepal Communist Party—started locking their horns
culminating the decision of the government to dissolve parliament and seek fresh
elections in December 2020. The Supreme Court reversed the Prime Minister’s decision and another court decision on March 09, 2021, declared the unification between
the communist parties led by Oli and Dahal as null and void since there was another
party legally possessed the name (TKP 2021). The political instability resulting from
the decisions of the government after December 2020 has remained unsettled in June
2021 (Sangraula 2021).
The 12th Steering Committee meeting and the first meeting in Oli’s second tenure,
decided to bring the Central-Level Project Implementation Units (CLPIUs) under
NRA’s command. Before this decision, the CLPIUs had double accountability: the
administrative accountability toward their parent Ministries and functional accountability toward the NRA. This arrangement was not in consonance to the chain of
command, the back bone of the bureaucratic principle. After this decision, NRA
enjoyed complete authority that significantly enhanced delivery. This meeting had
taken another decision which was rather controversial. The houses constructed before
the commissioning of NRA’s technicians did not comply with NRA’s standards
but the Steering Committee instructed it to make the payments to such houses,
slightly compromising NRA’s principle to build earthquake resilient houses. This was
followed by another decision on 24th June 2021 to allow disbursement of all installments to the non-compliant houses on recommendation of the local governments
(NRA 2021a).
The 13th and 14th Steering Committee meetings largely dealt with regular issues.
The 16th meeting formed a committee for drafting the NRA exit strategy. The 17th
meeting also dealt with regular issues. The 18th meeting took the decision such
as one to initiate campaign of disaster resilient Nepal. In addition, the NRA was
also mandated to develop strategy for urban renewal. This was in recognition to the
sluggish progress in housing reconstruction in urban core area and also after realization that NRA’s present policies were not adequate for addressing urban housing
complexities (NRA 2021g). Table 1.5 shows the major activities during Oli’s second
stint.
As shown in Fig. 1.1, overall housing reconstruction was meaningfully concluded
during Oli’s tenure as 185,563 households had received the first; 549,542 received
the second, and 605,827 the third tranche respectively. In a way, it was also natural
because the tenure period largely coincided with the second half of mandated term
of the NRA.
1.3.6 Mr. Sher Bahadur Deuba-Led Government (13 July
2021 to 24 Dec 2021)
Mr. Sher Bahadur Deuba took over the premiership on 13 July 2021 amidst rather
chaotic political environment. After the Supreme Court’s decision to award the Nepal
10
1 Implications of Steering Committee Decisions …
Table 1.5 Major activities of the Mr. K. P. Oli-led government (15 February 2018−13 July 2021)
Date
2018
Total days
15 Feb
Mr. K. P. Oli sworn in as Prime Minister
1164+
3 April
12th steering committee meeting
09 April
Mr. Madhusudan Adhikari, secretary of NRA got transferred
19 April
Mr. Arjun Kumar Karki appointed as NRA secretary
14 August
Mr. Sushil Gyewali reappointed as NRA CEO
6 September
13th steering committee meeting
20 December
GoN approved NDRRMA’s regulations
25 December
Prime Minister laid foundation stone of Dharahara
reconstruction
2019
17 January
14th steering committee meeting
05 May
15th steering committee meeting
13 September
Mr. Shiva Hari Sharma appointed as NRA secretary
2020
13 January
16th steering committee meeting
16 March
Mr. Shiva Hari Sharma, secretary got retired
24 March
Nationwide lockdown due to COVID-19 (Coronavirus) global
pandemic
14 April
Mr. Ram Krishna Sapkota appointed as the NRA secretary
25 May
Nationwide lockdown extended to June 2
09 August
Revised national building code approved
21 September
17th steering committee meeting
30 November
Cabinet approves NRA’s extension by one year
29 November
Secretary Mr. Ram Krishna Sapkota retired
13 December
Appointment of Mr. Suresh Acharya as NRA secretary
20 December
GoN dissolves the parliament
2021
15 February
PM inaugurates Singhdurbar
22 February
Mr. Mani Ram Gelal assumes responsibility of NRA secretary
23 February
Supreme court reinstated the parliament
07 March
Supreme court invalidated NCP led by Mr. Oli and Mr. Dahal
13 April
18th steering committee meeting
19 April
Inauguration of Patan secondary school
22 April
Laprak settlement handed over to beneficiaries
24 April
Oli inaugurated Dharahara
25 April
Sixth memorial day
(continued)
1.3 Results
11
Table 1.5 (continued)
Date
2018
29 April
Valley district administration imposes lock down to curb
COVID-19
25 May
Transfer of secretary Mr. Mani Ram Gelal
29 May
Finance minister defines exit strategy
24 June
19th steering committee meeting
7 July
Sushil Chandra Tiwari assumes the responsibility of NRA
secretary
13 July
KP Oli resigned from the position of the Prime Minister of
Nepal
Total days
Source HRRP 2021d
Communist Party to Mr. Rishi Ram Kattel, the unification between the CPN UML
and CPN Maoist Center returned back to the pre-merger stage. The Supreme Court’s
verdict was handed down when the NCP factions were battling for majority in the
House of Representatives. With resurrected CPN Maoist Center, CPN UML splinter
group led by Madhav Nepal and some other parties’ support, Mr Deuba formed the
government.
The major activities during the Deuba’s stint are shown in Table 1.6. The Steering
Committee’s 20th meeting took decision to handover all remaining private housingrelated activities to the Ministry of Urban Development with effect from 16 July
2021. The logic was natural break of fund flow which is governed by the fiscal
year. In retrospection, if NRA would have been allowed handling until the end of
its tenure, it would have wrapped up private housing. Similarly, the school buildings
were handed over to the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology, heritage
monuments to the Department of Archeology. All the rest activities were handed over
to the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Authority (NDRRMA).
Table 1.6 Major activities of the Mr. Sher Bahadur Deuba-led government (13 July 2021 to 24
Dec 2021)
13 July
Sher Bahadur Deuba became the new Prime Minister again as per the order of
the Supreme Court of Nepal citing article 76 (5) of the constitution of Nepal
25 August
NRA’s 20th steering committee meeting decided NRA to hand over its
operation to the relevant agencies
15 September
NRA handed over its operation to concerned line agencies
07–09 Dec
International conference on Nepal’s reconstruction
22 Dec
21st steering committee meeting—wrap up
24 Dec
NRA closes down
Source NRA 2021m
12
1 Implications of Steering Committee Decisions …
The International Conference on Nepal’s Reconstruction was held during 07–
09 December 2021. The box 1 contains the conference declaration which is selfexplanatory.
Box 1
….from Reconstruction to Resilience
International Conference on Nepal’s Reconstruction 2021
7−9 December 2021
Conference Declaration
Participants from around the world and from Nepal came together on
7–9 December 2021, to attend the International Conference on Nepal’s
Reconstruction 2021 (ICNR-2021).
The Conference, organized by the National Reconstruction Authority of
Nepal (NRA) and chaired by the Honorable Foreign Minister of Nepal, Dr.
Narayan Khadka, was inaugurated by The Right Hon President of Nepal, Shree
Bidya Devi Bhandari. All high-level development partners involved in the
reconstruction sector including bilateral agencies: India, China, USA, UK,
EU, Japan, Canada, Switzerland, Norway and multilateral agencies including
World Bank, ADB and UN Agencies also participated.
Understanding the high levels of multihazard risk in Nepal;
Acknowledging the political consensus in reconstruction, National Reconstruction Authority’s leadership with proactive support from the development partners and moreover strong dedication demonstrated by the affected
households and communities behind the successful implementation of the
post-earthquake reconstruction and recovery;
Reflecting the spirit of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction,
committing to Build Back Better to strengthen national resilience in the face of
the inevitable multihazard disaster risks that are confronting and will continue
to confront Nepal;
Appreciating the citizen’s participation in disaster preparedness, rescue
and relief operations, and the post-disaster reconstruction and recovery with a
special focus on marginalized and vulnerable populations;
Considering the proven track record of the owner driven housing reconstruction approach with public support in all technical aspects, and strict
adherence to the earthquake resistant construction technologies;
Streamlining and empowering the federal and sub-national governments
for ensuring housing standards through technical and social handholding of
the affected populations;
Valuing the significance of research and innovation in resilient post-disaster
reconstruction and development;
Mindful of enhancing national capacity in the heritage sector;
1.4 Discussion
13
Emphasizing the urgency for bolstering disaster management and authority
in legal, institutional, and financial terms;
Accentuating the development partner’s commitment for collaborative
resilient development.
The ICNR agrees to the declaration and relevant stakeholders commit to the
following:
• Strengthening local governments in planning, technological and managerial terms;
• Promotion of appropriate technology and human resource capacities for
the conservation of heritage monuments and sites;
• Strategic intervention for urban regeneration in the local government’s
leadership with federal government’s technical handholding;
• Linking up reconstruction with livelihood initiatives;
• Further enhancing functional relationships between federal, provincial and
local governments;
• Informing the construction of public building and infrastructure with
disaster resilient technologies and scaling up replication of the lessons learned
of reconstruction and recovery retrofitting technology nationwide, both in
private and public sectors;
• Endowing the national apex institution—the National Disaster Risk
Reduction and Management Authority—with clear mandate, and governance
structure with considerable authority, autonomy and financing for building
disaster resilience.
Source NRA 2022
The Steering Committee meeting of 22 December concluded the entire reconstruction activities which was followed by the closing down of the NRA on 24 December
2021.
1.4 Discussion
The findings section leads to a number of questions: what were the factors for delaying
formation of reconstruction authority which would have allowed rescue and relief
operation to dovetail with reconstruction; what is the appropriate amount of housing
grant; how to interpret heavy handedness of the higher authority in decision making;
and, was it appropriate to waive technical standards? This section elucidates on the
pertinent issues revolving around decision making and implementation.
14
1 Implications of Steering Committee Decisions …
1.4.1 Formation of the Reconstruction Authority
Despite the approval of an ordinance to establish a reconstruction authority (BSN
2015), the political parties failed to reach a consensus on the modality and functions of the authority. The main opposition party, Communist Party of Nepal Maoist
Center preferred that the bill be approved by the parliament. However, the government
wanted to prepare a legal structure of the authority before the International Conference on Nepal’s Reconstruction (ICNR), planned for on 25 June 2015 (Pradhan
2015). According to Pradhan, even the coalition partner Communist Party of Nepal
(Unified Marxist–Leninist) opposed the ordinance. The government had organized
a four-party meeting to reach an agreement but the Maoist Center walked out of
the meeting over disagreement in the process of forming the authority. The opposition leader Mr. Pushpa Kamal Dahal (Prachanda) had said that the coalition partners Nepali Congress and CPN UML had unilaterally taken the decision; or wanted
a greater say in the authority. Consequently, the parliament failed to approve the
reconstruction bill (Shrestha 2015). The devastation had provided enough reason for
them to have come to a negotiated settlement, which did not happen. In hindsight,
the disagreement between the coalition partners was the key problem as they had the
majority needed to ratify the ordinance. The responsibility for this lapse goes to then
Prime Minister and the coalition partner CPN UML.
1.4.2 Size of Housing Grant
The size of the housing grant remained a contentious issue throughout the reconstruction process. The initial grant of NRs. 200,000 (US$2000) must have based on the
MoUD’s People’s Housing Program (OPMCM 2018). This program sought to guarantee people’s right for shelter and was targeted to marginalized population. However,
as mentioned in the findings section, it was increased from NRs. 200,000 (US$2000)
to NRs. 300,000 (US$3000) once, and another increase was also announced by the
Nepali Congress and the CPN-MC to NRs 400,000 (US$4000) (even though it was
not implemented). The UN Habitat (UN-Habitat 2018) argues that the amount of the
housing grant depends on the household and community resources, fiscal space of
the government, humanitarian resources and access, housing construction cost and
access to financial resources.
Nepal’s poverty data offer some indications of household affordability. In 2010,
the urban poverty rate was 15.5%, which was significantly lower than rural poverty
rate of 27.4% (NPC, 2018). Nepal’s northern mountainous region had 6.73% of the
population of which 42.27% was below the absolute poverty line, whereas only 24%
in the mid hill and 23.44% of population in the Terai were in absolute poverty. The
incidence of poverty was more severe in the rural (44%) and mountain (56%) areas
(Pokharel 2016). The people below the poverty line have lower affordability and it
1.4 Discussion
15
was also likely that the earthquake could have pushed even more people below the
poverty line.
With respect to the government’s fiscal space, Poudel (Poudel 2016) had suggested
that only 65% of the total appropriation could be funded through government revenue
and committed grant and the remaining 35% had to be funded through foreign loan
and domestic borrowings. This indicated that the government did not have much
fiscal flexibility.
With regard to the housing cost, the minimum construction cost of a 1000 ft2 . house
in Kathmandu Valley is around NRs. 3,200,000 (US$32,000) (HN 2021). For rural
housing, the government’s People’s Housing Program provides grants ranging from
NRs. 350,000 (US$3500) to NRs. 400,000 (US$4000) based on geographic location
(B.K 2019). These figures could have served as the basis for the construction cost.
However, as evident in the reconstruction, with NRs. 300,000 (US$3000) one can
build a two-roomed basic house, which, however, is not sufficient for a family of 5–6
members. A basic housing unit in the rural area cost around NRs. 675,000 (US$6750)
(HRRP 2017) and this meant that the government grant was not adequate.
The GoN had attempted to improve access to additional finance through soft loans.
The Nepal Rastra Bank had issued a policy for the purpose under which Kathmandu
Valley-based households were entitled to receive NRs. 2.5 million (US$25,000) and
non-Kathmandu-based households NRs. 1.5 million (US$15,000) (BFIRD 2015).
The loan tenure was to range of 5–10 years, and the interest rate was 2%. This policy
came at a time when the normal interest rate was more than 10% (EBL 2021). For
obtaining the loan, borrowers had to have both bankable property and income from
a formal source, that was not possible for most people affected by the earthquake.
This policy was largely worthless because the needy households could not comply
with bank regulations. Realizing this, GoN (GoN 2018b) made another attempt to
facilitate loans with the “Unified Procedure for Interest Subsidy on Concessional
Loan-2075. However, this attempt also failed (NRARD 2018).
The analysis shows that earthquake affected households from the lower income
bracket could not afford the new houses. The unaffordability of the affected households was compounded with the government’s overstretched fiscal space and the
dysfunctional housing credit system. Under these circumstances, government should
have explored alternative strategies, which was not the case. Instead, all political
parties attempted to increase housing grant ignoring state coffer. Alternative strategies
for urban settlements could have been considered. These could have included policy
interventions to facilitate unban reconstruction without substantially increasing
government’s and affected family’s liability. Public Private Partnership (PPP) or
mobilization of the private developers could have been other options. In rural areas,
encouraging meaningful usage of salvages materials, facilitating the availability of
construction materials and promotion of cost-effective construction technology and
materials could have been some ideas that could have been considered.
16
1 Implications of Steering Committee Decisions …
1.4.3 Decision Making
The Steering Committee commanded authority to approve the reconstruction policies
and plans submitted by the Executive Committee (An Act Made To Provide For
Reconstruction of the Earthquake Affected Structures 2015). The Ninth Steering
Committee had decided to resurvey of the households for which NRA declared
as non-beneficiaries (NRA 2017a) and the Executive Committee did not propose
resurvey to the Steering Committee. In retrospection, the issue should have been
handled differently because the decision dispensed message to both the claimants
and surveyors to adopt a soft surveying approach. Consequently, NRA received
634,973 applications of which 174,146 households were declared as beneficiaries.
A number of ineligible households created situations for qualifying as beneficiaries.
In addition to creating additional liability, the decision was also not compatible to
social justice.
Another decision—to waive earthquake resilient technical standards for houses
was also questionable. Largely, such houses had adopted traditional construction
methods that did not comply with building codes. Such beneficiaries declined
retrofitting to integrate resilient building elements such as diaphragms, sheer walls,
cross bracing, trusses, and moment resisting frames. NRA covered policy-level nudity
by asking local governments for ensuring building compliance. However, the infantile
local governments conditioned with populist mental structure will not have enough
motivation to ensure compliance. This decision contradicted with the core of NRA’s
principle to build back better and reconstructing earthquake resilient buildings. The
households will realize the cost of fooling formal system when another major jolt
impacts on inhabitants and property.
1.5 Conclusion
NRA operated in a socio-politically grueling environment over and above the
earthquake induced challenges to grapple with. The NRA leadership worked
with six different governments during its six-year tenure. This chapter intended
to assess the effects of Steering Committee decisions on both financial obligations and implementation efficiency. Nepal was unable to start reconstruction seamlessly after rescue and relief operation, which was the major weakness
of the ruling government. The timely promulgation of the Reconstruction
Act would have reduced human sufferings and generated economic savings.
It is evident that the size of housing grant was a point of intense interest
for all governments as all Prime Minister-led Steering Committees remained
tempted to increase the housing grant without consideration of the fiscal space.
1.5 Conclusion
17
Adequate attention was not given to housing credit system. Further, the non-financial
policy interventions that could have been made to tackle the structural problems
of urban and rural housing were not considered. Some of the Steering Committee
decisions even disempowered the NRA Executive Committee and not only created
additional liabilities but also compromised basic reconstruction principles.
Chapter 2
Linking Post-Gorkha Earthquake
Housing Damage Assessment
with Municipality’s Building Standards
Abstract The National Reconstruction Authority (NRA) provided housing grants
to the earthquake affected households based on a household survey. However, its efficacy in terms of both time and money was questionable. The objective of this paper is
to review the survey methods and link this up with local governments’ housing administration for taking forward resilient housing agenda. This chapter relied largely on the
secondary sources of information. Despite some weaknesses, the household survey
has potential for trailblazing the municipal resilient housing system. The municipality in support with the Ministry of Urban Development (MoUD) need to build on
housing database and carryout housing integrity assessment. In rural areas, NRA’s
policy on housing grant can be continued. However, urban settlements will require
proper access to finance and intensive socio-technical assistance. Some ambitious
agenda under consideration could be: redevelopment and land readjustment, house
pooling and relaxation in housing loan policy for enhancing vulnerable households’
access to finance.
Keywords Earthquake · Damage survey · Beneficiary · Resilient · Housing
2.1 Introduction
Indian subcontinent’s formation is largely shaped by earthquakes which have been
pummeling since time immemorial. Ten earthquakes impacted Nepal severely during
last 750 years including 1934 Nepal–India Earthquake, 1988 Udayapur Earthquake
and 2015 Gorkha Nepal Earthquake (Bilham 2019). The 2015 Gorkha Nepal earthquake damaged 755,549 houses requiring US$3276 million (NPC 2015a). The GoN
adopted owner driven housing reconstruction approach for which Earthquake Household Damages and Characteristics (EHDC) survey was mandatory. Before such
survey, relief packages were distributed based on District Disaster Relief Committee
(DDRC) administered identification of victims.
Nepal’s housing typologies are influenced by ethnic background, geographic
and climatic conditions and availability of skills, materials and resources (NRA
2021m). Irrespective of the typologies, a majority of walls are of stone masonry
with mud mortar. Other materials such as adobe and brunt bricks are also used.
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022
C. B. Shrestha, Building Back Better After the 2015 Nepal Earthquake,
Disaster Risk Reduction, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-6676-7_2
19
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2 Linking Post-Gorkha Earthquake Housing Damage Assessment …
Traditionally thatched roofs used to be the common sight which has been gradually
replaced by Corrugated Galvanized Iron (CGI) sheets roofing due to convenience
and safety perspective. Traditionally upper-class households would use stone slate
which requires relatively strong underpinning. Wooden shingles mainly of pine used
commonly in high altitude houses. Clay tiles were mainly used in the Kathmandu
Valley and Terai Region due to availability of suitable clay and adequate fire wood for
baking. However, more recently corrugated iron sheet, cement brick masonry and
reinforced cement concrete have been pervading urban landscape which has been
permeating down to rural areas as well.
The owners construct their own house by engaging some hired construction
workers mostly on daily wages basis. Trust on contractors is rather weak as households believe that the contractors extract profit from cheating on the quality of
construction materials and downgrading workmanship. However, some professionalization in the construction industry is evolving. More recently, some housing developers have been supplying housing stocks to quench the demand triggered by evolution of overly occupied nuclear family. It is obvious that the country will witness an
increasing number of professional developers.
The 1988 Udayapur Earthquake compelled policy makers to ponder on the
National Building Code (NBC) which was procrastinated until 1998 for its approval.
Implementation remained almost unattended till 2015 when the earthquake tremored
not only houses and structures but also tormented entire housing governance. Considering 60% vulnerable housing stock, around 3.4 million houses nationwide should
have been vulnerable to the earthquake (EMI 2010).
NRA adopted three different survey methodologies: census in 11 districts,
mixed—census and verification in 3 districts and verification in 17 moderately
impacted districts. Under verification model, those households which received relief
package and those who consider themselves as earthquake victim were considered
as total population for surveying (CBS 2017b).
Against this background, this chapter reviewed the NRA survey methodology
in conjunction with Nepal’s own and other countries’ identical past experiences.
Secondly, the survey questionnaire was scrutinized in the light of further replication.
The third and more important objective was to link this database with the local
governments’ housing planning and administration.
2.2 Findings
Three sections corresponding to the study objectives are deliberated in this section.
The first section grapples with Nepal’s post-earthquake damage assessment methodology which is reviewed along with Nepal’s own experience of 1934 and 1988 and
is collated with the practice of New Zealand, India, Pakistan and China. The second
section elucidates Nepal’s survey questionnaire. Thirdly, the damaged assessment
survey is attempted to juxtapose with the local level housing provisions.
2.2 Findings
21
2.2.1 Nepal’s and Foreign Experiences on Post-earthquake
Damage Assessment Survey
The 1934 Nepal–India Earthquake of 8.4 Richter scale (ML ) killed 4300 people.
It was estimated that the earthquake damaged roughly 20% of all houses in the
eastern and central Nepal. The menace was more pronounced in the Kathmandu
Valley with one fourth of housing destruction (EH 2020). Understandably, all heritage
monuments were also seriously affected. The government then conducted rather
simplistic damage assessment where a two membered team comprising with an
officer and a soldier were fielded with authority to take decision and distribute money
(Sumsher 1935). After more than a half century, another 6.9 ML Udayapur Earthquake
killed 709 people and injured thousands with effect on 50,000 houses. The Village
Panchayats (local governments of that time) were mobilized to identify damaged
houses.
The private housing damage assessment of 2005 Pakistan earthquake which killed
73,000 people and rendered 2.8 million people homeless followed something similar
to Nepal’s 1934 post-earthquake damage assessment methodology. A team consisting
of an army officer, local school teacher, revenue officer, local leader and a local
facilitator visited to the earthquake affected household for filling out a simplified
form, based on which a memorandum of understanding was signed for housing
grant (NDMA 2007).
India adopted separate damage assessment methodologies for urban and rural
areas after 2001 Gujarat earthquake. A senior structural engineer, a junior engineer, a camera person and a representative of the local authority were mobilized.
In rural areas, one engineer, one revenue or Panchayat representative and an NGO
representative or social worker were mobilized (Mishra 2004).
Nepal conducted post-2015 earthquake damage assessment survey in two stages.
First for the relief distribution and second for the housing reconstruction. The District
Disaster Relief Committee (DDRC) acted immediately after the earthquake mobilizing Sub-Inspector and Constable who collected information on housing damage.
After endorsement of the Municipality’s Ward Secretary, the DDRC issued an Earthquake Victim Household Identify Card which was the basis for providing relief
package of US$1400 for deceased family, US$50 for the fully damaged houses and
US$30 for partially damaged houses. An additional US$20 was provided as food
relief and US$150 for warm clothing (MoHA 2016). This survey was combination
of the methodology of 1934 and 1988 Nepal’s earthquake and Pakistan earthquake.
In the second phase, the survey was much comprehensive. A comprehensive Household Registration for Housing Reconstruction Survey (HRHRS) was conducted with
objectives of ascertaining the housing damage, preparing the list of beneficiaries
eligible for housing grants, and ensuring site safety for reconstruction. The survey
team comprised of an engineer and a social mobiliser. The engineer was provided
with a tablet with software and was expected to collect and upload data that was
accessible from the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS)-based processing unit. The
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2 Linking Post-Gorkha Earthquake Housing Damage Assessment …
team was monitored by the district and central-level monitoring and supervision
teams (CBS 2017b).
The questionnaire—for the HRHRS—had two sections (CBS 2015b): Part 1:
Detailed Information on Damage Assessment of Residential Buildings and Part 2:
Demographic and Socio-Economic Information (Annex-1). Part 1 has information
of owners and detail assessment of house, including information on legal ownership of land, condition of the house before and after earthquake, foundation of the
building, damage grade of house, technical solution for damaged house, type of
house, position of house, plan configuration of the house, building damage assessment and geotechnical risk. Under Part 2, the survey included demographic and
socio-economic information including information on the income of the household
head, age, sex, disability, educational status, size of family, social security allowance,
facilities used by the household, etc.
In the first phase, 11 most affected districts were surveyed following the census
method, starting with Dolakha district. More than 72% of the houses surveyed were
declared as beneficiaries based on the damage grade. Households in the damage
grades of 2 (major), 3, 4 and 5 were defined as beneficiaries. However, the households
in these categories were disqualified if they had another house that was not damaged.
Of the total beneficiaries, nearly 97% were categorized as full beneficiaries and
3% houses were identified as retrofittable. Further, nearly 15,000 households had
more than one house. The data also showed that the magnitude of destruction was
overwhelming, and that very few of the buildings were earthquake resilient.
In the second stage, the CBS conducted a beneficiary survey in the Kathmandu
Valley covering 22 municipalities and 19 Village Development Committees (VDCs).
The census method was applied in the 19 VDCs and the verification model was used
in the municipalities—meaning that the survey would cover only households who
had received the DDRC’s relief identity card and those who considered themselves
victims of the 2015 Gorkha earthquake. Other institutional arrangements were similar
to the first beneficiary survey in 11 districts. The only difference was that the NRA’s
role became prominent in this phase. This survey was funded by the World Bank (WB)
but was undertaken directly by government agencies rather than the United Nations
Office for Project Services (UNOPS). Of the total beneficiaries, more than 98% were
full beneficiaries, and 2% were declared as partial beneficiaries. The criteria used
earlier for defining beneficiaries was the basis. The criteria for categorization are
shown in Table 2.1.
The HRHRS was rolled out in 17 moderately affected districts in January 2017.
The verification model, previously used in Kathmandu Valley municipalities, was
used. The NRA led the survey and mobilized 364 engineers and 364 social mobilisers.
There were 17 districts covered in the third phase, which after the process of federalization resulted in 18 owing to the split of the erstwhile Nawalparasi district into two
districts. Survey identified 105,168 beneficiaries suggesting that the DDRC number
was close to the final count. The survey output is presented in Table 2.2.
The survey revealed a number of policy agenda. The first one was that the mud
mortar-based buildings require urgent attention as 87% of them were affected. 5%
of the timber buildings and the cement mortar buildings experienced severe damage.
2.2 Findings
23
Table 2.1 Damage categorization
Grade 1
Thin or hairline cracks in plaster on few walls
Falling of plasters in some or very little parts
Falling of loose stone and plasters from upper parts of buildings
May require aesthetic repairs only
Grade 2
Cracks in many walls
Falling of large portion of plaster in last bits over large area
Damage to non-structural parts like chimney, projecting cornices
The load carrying capacity is not reduced appreciably
Grade 3
Large and extensive cracks in most of the walls
Collapse of small portion non-load bearing walls
Detachment of roof tiles, failure of individual non-structural elements such as
partition/gable walls, delamination of stone/adobe walls
Load carrying capacity of structure reduces and repair may be required for
Grade 4
Large gaps occur in walls, walls collapse, partial structural failure of floor/roof,
building takes a dangerous state
Grade 5
Total or near total collapse
The Reinforced Cement Concreate (RCC) buildings were found safer in comparison
to other categories as survey manifested that only little more than 14% sustained
damage. These statistical findings somehow misled general public that the mud
mortar and timber buildings are not safe whereas structures with all construction
materials can be earthquake resilient provided proper methodology is adopted. The
RC structures were regarded as life protecting shield which took NRA a protracted
effort to rectify this public perception.
2.2.2 Survey Questionnaires
CBS was mandated to implement the HRHRS along with complete count of family
members (CBS 2015a). Other specific objectives were: enumerate private housing
damage assessment, collect socio-economic status of earthquake affected households
and prepare electronic database of the collected information. Having no long-term
objective was the HRHRS’ major limitation which was realized after mobilization
of 30,000 person days.
There were two sections in the questionnaire—Part 1: Detailed Information on
Damage Assessment of Residential Building; and Part 2: Demographic and SocioEconomic Information. There were three sub-sections under Part 1: details of household head, building information, building damage assessment. Under Part 2, detail
of household head and details of household members are included. Under Part 1, the
information of landownership was highly contentious. Having legal implications, it
was impossible to establish ownership with such a survey. The housing grant was
awarded based on the ownership as established by the survey which had ample legal
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2 Linking Post-Gorkha Earthquake Housing Damage Assessment …
Table 2.2 Extent of housing damage district wise
S. No
District
Grade 1
Grade 2
Grade 3
Grade 4
Grade 5
Total
Severely affected 14 districts
1
Okhaldhunga
7961
8605
9220
7946
5620
39,352
2
Sindhuli
13,087
14,470
17,085
15,917
8191
68,750
3
Ramechhap
2116
7156
16,951
20,910
11,490
58,623
4
Dolakha
1353
2993
6520
14,409
35,364
60,639
5
Sindhupalchok
1233
2009
3271
10,796
71,432
88,741
6
Kavrepalanchok
8330
11,726
25,130
28,974
23,859
98,019
7
Lalitpur
1746
2125
5282
11,152
12,788
33,093
8
Bhaktapur
1022
1083
4560
12,720
10,812
30,197
9
Kathmandu
1926
2177
6106
16,105
24,810
51,124
10
Nuwakot
2615
2745
8209
23,284
40,295
77,148
11
Rasuwa
277
343
782
2064
9178
12,644
12
Dhading
4952
7526
15,218
26,080
35,346
89,122
13
Makwanpur
32,540
21,135
18,525
10,928
7866
90,994
14
Gorkha
4351
8555
15,507
22,536
27,125
78,074
Sub-total of 14
districts
83,509
92,648
152,366
223,821
324,176
876,520
1350
1142
769
1015
4561
Moderately affected 18 districts
1
Dhankuta
285
2
Sankhuwasabha
1092
1637
1356
585
499
5169
3
Bhojpur
638
2457
3143
1268
1873
9379
4
Solukhumbu
867
3644
5361
3826
3762
17,460
5
Khotang
880
3154
3365
2727
2773
12,899
6
Chitwan
2100
5117
3834
1639
2579
15,269
7
Lamjung
1895
5521
6316
5597
3032
22,361
8
Tanahu
3272
7467
7610
3847
3340
25,536
9
Syangja
1358
5143
4860
2396
2354
16,111
10
Kaski
994
3404
3663
1744
1269
11,074
11
Myagdi
163
308
470
197
275
1413
12
Parbat
1786
3309
3233
1444
1168
10,940
13
Baglung
418
934
1108
438
949
3847
14
Gulmi
782
1726
2097
1226
1219
7050
15
Palpa
1739
3608
3267
1184
929
10,727
16
Nawalparasi (east),
Nawalparasi (west)
5
90
256
183
450
984
17
Arghakhanchi
35
485
738
244
146
1648
Sub-total of 18
districts
18,309
49,354
51,819
29,314
27,632
176,428
Source CBS (2017b)
2.2 Findings
25
space for challenging such decisions. Consequently, a majority of 635,973 complaints
were received on the ground of ownership.
All the information related to the building characteristics such as house status,
foundation, roof, floor, super structure and plan configuration were relevant.
However, there are a number of weaknesses in the building damage assessment
section. First of all, the damage level is sub-divided into four categories: severe–
extreme, moderate–heavy, insignificant and non. The categories except non are subdivided into further three groups based on the magnitude of damage: > 2/3; 1/3–2/3;
< 1/3. The enumerator ultimately has to use one’s discretion for classification which
made all individual indicators redundant. There are other structural questions such
as: foundation, roof, walls, pillars and non-structural elements. All these individual
elements are not tied up for determining ultimate damage grade as asked under question 7 where options are given as: Grade 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5. The intention of objective
decision making was ended up with subjective judgment. This section also includes
question on geological status which undermined its significance significantly. Question no. 14 deals with the number of family members inhabiting in the house which is
clearly a redundant as the question 1 of the first section and the entire second section
deal with family.
Part 2 basically deals with the family’s demographic characteristics, transitional
settlements, status of relief package, earthquake impact of psycho-social behavior
and current physical facilities such as drinking water, fuel source and other household
amenities. In principle, each question is sensible. However, how such questions were
used for public and social responses demand proper elaboration. First of all, housing
grant was provided to a household irrespective to their family members which made
the data almost irrelevant. Secondly, it was too late to ask question of transitional
settlement as the data collection and processing took more than a year until then
most of the people made some form of transitional arrangement. It would have been
extremely inappropriate to wait for the result of such survey to formulate relief
policy. The death and casualties are the issues handled by the DDRC hence parallel
question here does not make much sense for policy response. These questionnaires
did not support for responding post-disaster psycho-social provisions. Impact of the
earthquake on water supply, fuel and toilet is relevant but public response does to
rely on such findings. The question 9 was concentrated on socio-economic impact
which as such is relevant. But what is the policy response of this question is unclear.
This inappropriate questionnaire costed the country dearly. With rather longer
survey period, the NRA had to succumb unsurmountable socio-political pressure.
Moreover, delay of a few months implicates the whole year due to the seasonality
of housing construction. For example, the CBS was able to dispense initial housing
data only in March 2016 then construction season remained only two months which
the beneficiaries would require for preparing housing construction (Sharma 2016a).
Hence, the real construction could begin only from Nov. of 2016 as the Nepal
monsoon season prevails during June to September which is followed by festive
season in October every year. In addition, each questionnaire required 30–45 min
(CBS 2017b), whereas it could have been decreased down to maximum 30 min
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2 Linking Post-Gorkha Earthquake Housing Damage Assessment …
which would have shortened surveying period, reduced resource requirement and
would enable housing reconstruction earlier.
2.2.3 Linking Beneficiary Survey to Long-term Planning
The outcome of damage assessment survey is directly related to the MoUD’s “Basic
Construction Standards on Settlement Development, Urban Planning and Building
Construction—2072 B.S.” (MoUD 2015) and the NBC (MoUD 2020). In addition, the local governments have adopted the MoUD’s Basic Construction Standards
on Settlement Development, Urban Planning and Building Construction and has
promulgated of their own such as the Building Construction Standard 2018 (KMC
2018) which will be also directly related to the building damage assessment survey.
Both the federal and local construction standards are mainly directed toward
the new construction rather than the exiting private houses. There are some rather
vague provisions such as the clause 8 of the federal construction standards intend
to regularize the old structures within the basic guidelines. There is no provision
of housing integrity assessment. Under such circumstance, the new private houses
comply with the building guidelines and standards, whereas the old structures remain
vulnerable which will have potential to induce mass scale fatality and destruction in
the event of the great or major earthquakes. In addition to inducing human sufferings,
the public sector has to bear the brunt with immense liability. Approximately, threefifth of the total current housing stock of 5.64 million is susceptible to be vulnerable
to major and great trembler. It is indispensable to upgrade these about 3.38 million
housing stock as the pent-up energy has been waiting to outburst particularly in the
western Nepal. The trembler has not struck since 8.5 (ML ) in 1505 AD. Avouac
et al. (2015) maintain that lives can be saved by drilling school children, retrofitting
schools and private houses. It is quite possible that the 2015 earthquake seismic
waves were a lower frequency than expected which may not be the case next time.
2.3 Discussion
The findings section revealed that the damage assessment survey was an essentially
highly constructive effort but had some shortcomings. Although it was conceived
as a tool for the post-earthquake reconstruction, it has potential to link up with the
drive to housing resilience. However, a number of questions have to be answered for
replicating NRA’s damage assessment exercise. Some of the major questions are:
• Which institution should carry out housing integrity assessment in the federal
context?
• What revisions are required in the post-2015 damage survey questionnaire?
2.3 Discussion
27
• What policy reform will be required for streamlining disaster resilient interventions?
• Is Nepal competent enough for strengthening vulnerable houses technologically
and availability of human resources?
• Does it require some incentive package to rollout the interventions and to
strengthen the vulnerable houses?
2.3.1 Institution for Implementing Housing Integrity
Assessment
The Nepal’s Constitution 2015 has vested authority to the local governments (Parliament 2015) to administer the issue of housing resilience. The Local Government
Operation Act (2017) further elucidated the jurisdiction of authority (Local Government Operation Act 2074 2017). Similar to building standards, the local governments
are empowered to administer private housing including the integrity assessment.
This activity can be considered as part of the building permit system. However, the
nationwide policy formulation on housing integrity assessment falls under the MoUD
(2012). In addition, handholding for developing questionnaire, developing database
system and augmenting local skills for enabling them to handle the entire activities
are of MoUD’s responsibilities.
2.3.2 Questionnaire for the Housing Structural Integrity
Assessment (HSIA)
The HRHRS questionnaire and housing structural integrity assessment grapple with
identical issues but with different emphasis. The erstwhile was meant for distributing
grant for house reconstruction whereas the latter is intended to strengthen vulnerable
houses for averting damage in the event of impending earthquakes. The municipalities need to decree to house owners to submit ownership and housing details for
which the municipality has to provide a form similar to the housing registration form.
Based on the submitted information, the municipality has to depute an engineer and
a social mobiliser for housing integrity assessment. The housing integrity assessment team should have a checklist which should contain housing unit details such
as number of stories, age, plinth area, height, foundation type, roofing, superstructure and plan configuration. Key structural elements of foundation, walls, pillars,
non-structural elements and roof also should be collected. This information should
lead to three outcomes whether the building is safe, needs retrofitting or requires
demolishing. The registered safe houses require no action. The unregistered safe
buildings will require some registration-related administrative actions. The house
needing retrofitting will require municipality’s handholding for designing and also
28
2 Linking Post-Gorkha Earthquake Housing Damage Assessment …
retrofitting. The building needing to demolish will require elaborated administrative
procedures and also incentive for rebuilding.
2.3.3 Policy Reform
A few policy reforms are required for linking the post-earthquake housing survey
to the municipality’s building standards. The basic construction standards, housing
loan, insurance schemes, construction norms and skill development are the areas for
further working.
The “Basic Construction Standards on Settlement Development, Urban Planning
and Building Construction 2072 B.S.” has to incorporate housing integrity assessment and also create ground for government handholding for promoting resilient
housing. The basic question is whether the building structure complies with the
building code or not. In case of vulnerability, the municipality has to persuade or
even compel the household either to strengthen the existing house or reconstruct if
not retrofittable. For this the NRA database of around one million houses can be
the basis which should be under the custody of the MoUD but the Municipal data
has to be handed over to the concerned entity. An interactive system between the
municipality and MoUD has to be ensured.
The retrofitting has to be the second element to be incorporated in the construction
standards. In addition, there has to be a provision of retrofitting in the building code.
Retrofitting may not ensure equivalent strength of new construction but the existing
buildings must be safer enough for inhabitants. The NRA developed retrofitting
norms and rate analysis which were baked through 6 years long experimentation is
ready for approval which opens new horizon for effective implementation.
Access to finance is essential for both rural and urban dwellers. However, the mode
of intervention should be tailor made based on their requirements. For rural area, the
federal government can adopt identical policy with that of the NRA which means
provide grant based on households’ compliance. However, this policy was ineffective
in the urban environment which requires higher level of financial requirement. For
this the GoN—Ministry of Finance (MoF) along with the Nepal Rastra Bank (NRB)
have to devise loan policy with a long gestation and repayment provision with nominal
interest rate. The loanee’s repayment capacity should not be considered as one of the
mandatory requirements. However, the asset with distress valuation should support
the loan. In addition, the retrofitting has to be eligible for loan package. Moreover,
the MoF and NRB have to work on propagating housing insurance not only in the
urban areas but also in the rural environment.
NRA along with other partner organizations such as National Society for Earthquake Technology—Nepal (NSET) and Japan International Cooperation Agency
(JICA) trained thousands of masons (NRA 2021l) other technicians which will lose
their skills if the public sector marsupial pouch is not provided. It will require immediate formation of a guild of trained masons on retrofitting technology. In addition, they need entrepreneurial skills, basic accounting and managerial capacity. The
2.3 Discussion
29
Council of Technical Education and Vocational Training (CTEVT) will need to work
for accreditation.
Retrofitting requires a long journey for getting fully established as a proven technology for which a number of research and development initiatives are indispensable. How does seismic load work in row housing and what are design parameters for
strengthening? How to bolster strength of the local materials like stone and timber?
Academic institutions with external support need to work continually for deriving
optimal solutions.
2.3.4 Government’s Resolve in Housing Resilience
The government has two different options: status quo and proactive intervention
toward housing resilience. Following the state restructuring process in the federal
context, the number of municipalities increased from 58 in 2011 to 293. Consequently, urban population swelled significantly and reached to 19,291,031—66.08%
of total population in 2021. However, mandatory implementation of the building
code is expected irrespective of municipal status of urban or rural. No comprehensive
survey has been conducted on the housing building compliance status. However, only
very few municipalities have introduced building permit system which they verify
for new construction. If the old building stock are also considered, the total compliant
houses could be in the range of 40% of the entire housing stock of 5.6 million which
means around 3.4 million houses are non-compliant.
Against this backdrop, the MoUD has demonstrated sensitivity verbally however
the commitment has not been demonstrated in action. On the NRA’s ground work
of largest housing database covering 32 districts, 100,000 plus trained masons and
other frontline skilled workers, thousands of trained engineers and technicians and
cutting edge documented technologies, the MoUD along with the local governments
have to introduce building permit system in all municipalities—urban and rural—for
ensuring building code compliance. A nationwide private housing resilience project
has to be introduced for creating enabling environment. The retrofitting drive of
schools, hospitals and government buildings will diffuse technologies at the local
level which will contribute for creating conducive environment for private housing
retrofitting.
2.3.5 Incentivizing Retrofitting of Vulnerable Houses
Incentivizing retrofitting has to be contextualized in conjunction with policy reform
and nationwide private housing resilience program. The rural households require
incentivizing with targeted housing grant in conjunction with robust socio-technical
30
2 Linking Post-Gorkha Earthquake Housing Damage Assessment …
assistance. It is unlikely that the households would comply with the building standards of their own with punitive administrative measures alone. An optimal enforcement of administrative directives in parallel to incentive mechanism yields desirable
outcome—carrot and stick strategy.
It is evident that the urban housing issue requires further creativity beyond grant
and punitive action. Several alternative strategies are under policy disposal: introducing radical policy of readjustment and redevelopment—a form of house pooling
regime where developers create and supply additional space under the agreed provision. Under this arrangement, the original landowners enjoy almost same area of
modern space with all modern amenities including sufficiently wide alleys and open
green space in their neighborhood. With this arrangement, the original households
will not be displaced and modern amenities are blended in traditional architecture.
With productive infrastructures, the city generates additional income benefiting to
the entire economy. However, this redevelopment and land readjustment is extremely
challenging and ambitious. Under the second alternative, the individual households
can choose other households for joint housing. For such households, the state will
need to provide subsidized loan with only property evaluation. The present one of
the banking eligible criteria of repayment capacity has to be desirable but not the
mandatory. Such seismic resilient structures will require flexibility in terms of floors.
Under third option, the state does not interfere in landownership but supports to the
existing land lord with liberal loan policy. For example, relaxing recipient income
for guaranteeing repayment. However, the assets earning power must be reckoned
with.
2.4 Conclusions
This study reviewed the household registration for housing reconstruction survey
which was conducted for assessing housing damage and ascertaining socio-economic
impact after 2015 Gorkha Nepal Earthquake. The analysis revealed that the questionnaire’s objectives were rather myopic which could have linked with beyond reconstruction endeavor. In addition, there were a number shortcomings in the survey questionnaire which could have been avoided. Delinking damage information to ultimate
decision making and loading redundant and irrelevant questions, the validity and
authenticity of survey outcomes were compromised. In spite of all these limitations,
the housing database has potential to become launching pad for housing resilience
nationwide. All municipalities—urban and rural—can build up on NRA’s housing
database and conduct housing structural integrity assessment. The local governments
will need to devise strategy to either strengthen vulnerable houses or encourage the
concerned household to rebuild. For this the local governments will need to provide
technical handholding and the Ministry of Finance and Nepal Rastra Bank (NRB)
will need to work for availing housing grant to rural areas and subsidized loan for
urban areas. In addition, the federal government may come up with more radical
strategies such as urban house pooling or resettlement intervention in rural areas.
Annex 1: Household Registration for Housing Reconstruction Program
31
Annex 1: Household Registration for Housing
Reconstruction Program
Government of Nepal
National Planning Commission Secretariat Central Bureau of Statistics
Household Registration for Housing Reconstruction Program
1.
2.
HOUSEHOLD QUESTIONNAIRE
Part 1: Detailed Information on Damage Assessment of Residential Buildings
(Strongly advised to ask this part of the questionnaire to the House Owner)
Introductory
Details
Surveyor’s Code:
Date of Survey: 2072/ /
House Address:
District Name
1.
V.D.C. / Municipality Ward No.
Sub Ward No.
House Owner Information
1.1
Number of households having the ownership in this house?
1.2
Please write the full name of the house owner/s:
S. No.
Village/Locality
First Name
Middle Name
Photograph/s of House
Owner/s or Respondent
(Strongly advised to take
photograph/s of House
Owner)
Last Name
Sex
1.
2.
3.
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
1.3
Are the House Owner and the respondent the same person?
1.4
Give the respondent’s full name
First
Name
Middle Name
Last Name
Sex
1.5
1.
(2)
(3)
1. Yes -> Q 1.6
Male
Female
Third Gender
(5)
Serial Number of
VDC/Mun. certified list
(For Verification Method
only)
2. No
Male
Female
02. Husband/Wife
03. Son/Daughter
04. Daughter/Son-in-law 05.Father/Mother
06. Mother-in-law/Father-in-law 07. Brothers/Sisters
08. Grandson/Granddaughter 09. Others
(4)
(5)
Reason for not being able to interview the house owner
Absentee - Inside country
(6)
What is the relationship of the house owner to the respondent?
1.
2.
3.
Third
Gender
(1)
House Owner Serial
No./Form Serial No.
2. Absentee - Abroad
1.6 How many residential buildings does the house owner owns?
3. Too Old/Sick
4. Others…(Specify)………
32
2 Linking Post-Gorkha Earthquake Housing Damage Assessment …
1.
What is the number of residential buildings owned by the house owner/s mentioned in Q 1.2 in this
enumeration area?
What is the number of residential buildings owned by the house owner/s or his/her family members outside
2.
this ward/Sub-ward/enumeration area? (If this is 0, do not fill Q. 1.7)
1.7 Details of the houses owned by the house owner outside this ward/Sub-ward/enumeration area.
Serial
No.
District
V.D.C/ Municipality
Ward No.
(2)
(3)
(4)
Condition of the house
1.
Not Damaged
2.
Partially damaged
but possible to live
3.
Completely
damaged
Name of the house owner
(1)
(5)
1.8 What are the other building structures such as (sheds/machan) etc. not used for residential purpose?
Number (Not damaged)
Number (Partially damaged)
Number (Completely
Collapsed)
1.9 Telephone Number of House Owner or Respondent ………………………………………
Name of District
V.D.C/Municipality
Ward No.
Sub Ward No.
Village/Locality
Note: Q. 2 to 14 of this section has to be filled for every residential building/s of the house owner
serial mentioned in Q 1.6
Building Number:
2.
Building Information
2.1 What is the legal ownership status of the plot of land of this house?
1. Personal
2. Institutional/Community(Guthi)
3. Governmental/Public
4. Others
2.2 What is the condition of the house after the earthquake and its aftershocks?
1.
Damaged, debris removed and premises cleared
2.
Damaged but debris not removed
3.
Building has been covered by landslide
4.
Damaged, debris removed and rebuilt
5.
Damaged, building is still there but no one is living
6.
Damaged, building is still there and people are living there despite the risk
7.
damaged, repaired and people are living/not living
8.
No damage at all
2.3 Details of the house before earthquake
House Owner Serial
No./Form No.
Annex 1: Household Registration for Housing Reconstruction Program
Number of
storeys (Before
Earthquake)
Number of storeys Age of House Plinth area
(Now)
(How many
of
years old)
house
(sq.ft.)
(1)
(2)
(3)
33
Height of house before Height of house after
earthquake
earthquake
(ft.)
(ft.)
Slope of the land
where house stands
1.
Flat
2.
3.
(4)
(5)
Moderate Slope
Steep Slope
(6)
(7)
2.4 What is/was type of foundation of the building?
1. Fired brick/ stone in mud
2. Fired brick/ stone in cement
4. Bamboo/ timber posts
5. Others
3. Reinforced concrete pads
2.5 What is/was the roof made of?
1.
Light roofing material (GI sheet, thatch, wood) on timber/ bamboo/steel structure
2.
Heavy roofing materials (tile, slate, soil) on timber/ bamboo/ steel structure
3.
RC/RB/RBC slab
2.6 What is/was floor made of?
1. Mud
2. Bricks/Stone
3. Wood
4. Concrete Slab
5. Others
2.7 What are the other floors of the house (other than ground floor and roof) made of?
1.
Wooden plank in wooden structure
2.
Mud in Timber/Bamboo/Fired Brick
3.
RCC/RB/RBC
4.
Not applicable (Single Storey house)
2.8 What is/was construction material for superstructure (lateral and vertical load resisting system) (Multiple choices possible)
1. Adobe/ mud
4. Stone in cement
7. Timber frame
10. RC frame (engineered)
2. Stone in mud
5. Fired brick in mud
8. Bamboo frame
11.Other (Specify)
3. Dry stone
6. Brick/ block in cement
9. RC frame (non-engineered)
2.9 What is/was the position of house?
1.
Detached house
2.
Adjoining house on one side
3.
Adjoining houses on two sides
4.
Adjoining houses on three sides
2.10 What is/was the plan configuration of the house?
1. Square
3. T-shape
5. U-shape
7. H-shape
9. House with central courtyard
3.
2. Rectangular
4. L-shape
6. E-shape
8. Multi projected
10. Others (specify)
Building Damage Assessment
(To be filled only when Q 2.2 has the answers between 5 to 8). Please tick the appropriate answer. This should be filled by the surveyor by
observing the building without asking the house owner.
>2/3: More than two third, 1/3 – 2/3: Between one third to two third, <1/3: Below one third
S.N.
Details
Severe - Extreme
>2/3 1/3-2/3
<1/3
Moderate - Heavy
>2/3
1/3-2/3
<1/3
Damage Level
Insignificant
>2/3
1/3-2/3
None
<1/3
Comment
34
2 Linking Post-Gorkha Earthquake Housing Damage Assessment …
3.1
3.1.1
3.1.2
3.1.3
3.2
3.2.1
3.2.2
Overall hazard
Collapse or
Partial Collapse
Building or storey
leaning
Adjacent building
hazard
Structural hazards
Foundation
3.3.2
Roof/Floor Collapse
/Partial Collapse
For Masonry Buildings
Corner
Separation
Diagonal Cracking
3.3.3
In-plane-failure of walls
3.3.4
Out-of-plane
failure-of walls
carrying floor/roof
3.3.5
Out - of - plane failure
of walls not carrying
floor/roof
Gable wall damage/
collapse
3.3
3.3.1
3.3.6
3.3.7
Delamination
3.4
3.4.1
For Reinforced Concrete Buildings
Column Failure
3.4.2
Beam Failure
3.4.3
3.5
3.5.1
Infill/partition walls
damage/toppling
Non-Structural Hazards
Staircase
3.5.2
Parapets
3.5.3
Cladding/Glazing
3.6
General Comments
4.
Does this place have Geo-Technical risks?
5.
What are the Geo-Technical risks in this place? (Multiple answers are possible)
1. Ground Displacement
Flood
6.
3. Liquefaction
4. Landslide
2. Interior 3. Both
4. House cleared
5. Cannot be inspected
What is the Damage Grade of this building?
1. Grade 1
8.
2. No -> Q. 6
What part of the building was inspected?
1. Exterior
7.
2. Ground Fissures
1. Yes
2. Grade 2
3. Grade 3
What is the Technical Solution of this building?
4. Grade 4
5. Grade 5
5. Rock fall
6.
Annex 1: Household Registration for Housing Reconstruction Program
1. Not required
2. Minor Repair
3. Major Repair
35
4. To be rebuilt
Have you started rebuilding/repair due to damage caused by the April 25 earthquake and its aftershocks?
9.
1. Yes
2. No
10. Is/was there any secondary use in this building?
1. Yes
2. No -> Q. 12
11. What is/was the secondary use of the building? (Multiple answers possible)
1. Shed/Agricultural purpose
2. Hotel/Restaurant/Shop
3. Rent
6. Industry
7. Health center
8. Government Office
4. Institution
9. Police Office
5. School
10. Others
12. Pictures of building (Maximum 6)
1. 4 sides of the building (if possible)
2. Damaged areas inside the building
3. If the building is completely collapsed, then take the photo of the building site
13. Location of house
Latitude
Longitude
14. What is the number of households living now/at the time of earthquake in this
Elevation
building? Number:
(Note: All demographic and socio-economic details of the families mentioned in this house must be taken in the next section)
36
2 Linking Post-Gorkha Earthquake Housing Damage Assessment …
Part 2: Demographic and Socio-Economic Information
(To be asked to the Head of the household)
Name of District
V.D.C/Municipality
Ward Number
Sob-ward
Village/Locality
Building Structure S.N.:
House Owner Serial
No./Form No.
Household S. N.:
If there are two or more than two families, then the family serial number of the head of the family should be 1
1 . Details of Household Head
1.5 Is the respondent Household Head?
1.
Yes -> Q1.8
2. No
1.1 Name of Household Head
………………………..
…………………..
………………. First Name
Middle
Name
Sur Name
1.2 Gender of Household Head
1.
Male 2. Female 3. Third Gender
1.6
Photograph of
Household
Head
Name of the respondent:
1.3 Date of birth of Household Head: ……….Year
……..Month…….Day
1.7 What is the relationship of the Household Head to
the respondent?
1.4 Age completed by Household
Head (No. of Years):
1.8 Type of ID card of Household Head
1.
Nepali Citizenship
2.
3.
4.
Driver’s License
Voter’s ID card
Social Security ID Card
5.
2.1
6.
Foreigner (Name of the country…….) -> Q
1.11 Caste/Ethnicity of Household Head (Code)……..
Picture of ID card
of HH Head
(Front side
only.) of Q. 1.8
None -> Q 1.11
1.9 Identity card number: ……………….
1.10 District from where the ID card is issued (Code)
………………………..
1.12 Completed Educational level of Household Head
………….. (Code of educational level)
1.13 Does Household Head have a bank account?
1. Yes -> Name of the bank & address 2.
No
Annex 1: Household Registration for Housing Reconstruction Program
37
1.18. What category of Earthquake Victim Identity Card has your family
received from the Government of Nepal?
1.14 Where is your Household staying after earthquake?
1.
Own house
2.
3.
Rented house
Organization/Relative/Friend’s house
1.
2.
ID card showing full damage
ID card showing partial damage
4.
5.
Temporary settlement/Tent
Others
3.
No ID card received
4.
Not applicable
Picture of
ID
card.
(Front side)
Picture of ID
card.
(Back Side)
1.15 What is your usual place of residence before earthquake?
1.
The same V.D.C/Municipality
2.
The Same district, but another V.D.C/Municipality
3.
Another district (Please Specify)………………………..
If the answer is 1 or 2
1.
1.16 What is your present place of residence?
1.
The same V.D.C/Municipality
Identity Card Number ……………………………
1.19 What is the average monthly income of your household?
2.
The Same district, but another V.D.C/Municipality
3.
3. Another district (Please Specify)
……………………………..
1. Less than Rs. 10,000
2. Between Rs 10,000 – Rs 20,000
3. Between 20,000 – Rs 30,000
1.17 Which of the following Victim Relief Cash distributed by the
4. Between 30,000 – Rs 50,000
Government of Nepal has your Household received? (Multiple options
4. Above Rs. 30,000
possible) 1. Rs 15,000
2.
Rs. 10,000
3.
1st Installment of Rs. 2 lakhs.
1.20 Contact telephone number of Household Head
………………………
4.
Rs. 3000 as social security allowance (additional amount)
5.
6.
2.
Did not receive any afore mentioned money
6. Not Applicable
Details of household members:
2.1 Total number of members in the HH including the Household head:
(For the first phase 11 districts: If the HH is a foreigner, mention the number of family members who
usually stay in the house and finish the interview; For other phases: No foreigner HH was visited)
What is the usual
S. No. Name of
Relationship to the
Date of birth
Gender
place of residence of
Household
1.
Male Household Head
( ……Name) in the
members (Please
1.
Household
Head
2.
Female
HH?
write the HH's
2.
Husband/Wife
3.
Third
Name in the first
3.
Son/Daughter
Gender
row)
1.
Usually
4.
Daughter/Son-in-law
stays in
HH
5.
Father/Mother
Absent –
6.
Mother in law/Father in 2.
Inside country
law
3.
Absent –
7.
Brothers/Sisters
Abroad
8.
Granddaughter/Grandson
4.
Unknown
9.
Domestic Helper
(Onley ask
questions from
10. Others
6- 8)
First
Middle Last
Year Month
Name Name Name
(1)
1.
2.
3.
(3)
(4)
1.Household Head
(5)
Age
completed
by
(…Name)
Yrs.
Day
(7)
38
2 Linking Post-Gorkha Earthquake Housing Damage Assessment …
S. Does (…..Name) have ≤ 5 years
N any kind of
Disability?
1.
1.
Elderly
Citizen
Has (….Name’s)
birth been registered
at
V.D.C/Municipality?
1.Yes
2.No
(8)
3.
(9)
4.
(1)
5.
What is the marital
status of
(…….Name)?
What is the
Level of
education
Completed
by
(….Name)?
(Code for
Level of
education)
Unmarried
1.
2.
Married 3.
Widow/
Widower
4.
Divorced
5.
Separated
(10)
(11)
2.
Single
Woman
3.
Disabled
4.
Endangered
Ethnicity
Since whe n
What is the
has
name of
father or
(……Name
ving husband of
)
been recei nce? (….Name)?
such kind
of allowa
YY MM
What is the
name of
mother or
wife of
(….Name)?
5.
Child
Protection
6.
Pension
7.
Others 8. Not
received -> Next
person 9. Not
applicable -> Next
person
(12)
(13)
(14)
Has there been any deaths in your family in the last 12 months?
1. Yes, Number:
S. No.
What kind of social
security allowance has
(…..Name) received ?
≥ 10 years
No
2.
Yes/Recei
v ed red card 3.
Yes/Receiv ed blue
card 4. Yes/Receiv
ed yellow card
5.
Yes/Receiv
ed white card
6.
Yes/No
card
(1)
≥ 5 years
2. No -> Q. 5
Details of deceased person
Full Name of the
deceased person
(2)
Gender
1.
2.
3.
Gender
Date of Death
Male
MM
Female YY
Third
(3)
DD
What was the
Reasons of death
completed age
1.
April 25
of (….Name)
Earthquake &
when s/he died? it’s aftershocks
2.
Others
(5)
(4)
(6)
Has
th
e
death
been registered?
1.
Yes
2.
No
(7)
Has any of your family been severely injured/handicapped or missing due to the April earthquake and its aftershocks ?
1. Yes Number: …………………………..
2. No -> Q.7
6.
If yes, please give the details of the severely injured/handicapped or missing family members.
S. No.
Name of the severely injured/handicapped or Gender
Age in completed years
missing family members
1.
Male
2.
3.
Female
Third Gender
Type of injury
1.
Severely injured
2.
Handicapped
3.
Missing
(15)
Annex 1: Household Registration for Housing Reconstruction Program
7.
S.
No.
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
Has there been any changes to any of your household members due to earthquake?
Details
39
1.
Yes
2.
No
3.
Not
applicable
If yes, number of people
Has any of the students attending up to class 10 dropped out of school?
Did the pregnant woman had to quit going for regular checkup?
Did the children below 5 years had to miss taking regular immunization?
Has any members in the HH aged 10 or more had to quit their job or changed the job
due to earthquake?
8.
What was/is the use of the following utilities in your HH before/after the earthquake?
S. No. Source/Facilities
Before Earthquake
After Earthquake
1. Tap/Pipe Water 2. Tubewell/Hand Pump
8.1
What was/is the main source
1. Tap/Pipe Water 2. Tubewell/Hand Pump
3. Covered well 4. Open Well/Kuwa
of drinking water?
3. Covered well 4. Open Well/Kuwa
5. Source water 6. River/Rivulets 7. Others
5. Source water 6. River/Rivulets 7. Others
8.2
What did/do you use mostly to
cook food?
1. Wood
4. Biogas
2. L.P.G
5. Electricity
8.3
What did/do you use mostly to
light in your HH?
1. Electricity
5. Generator
8.4
What kind of toilet did/does your 1.
family use?
sewage)
3. Kerosene
6. Others
2. Kerosene 3. Biogas
6. Others
With flush (connected to public
2.
With flush (septic tank)
Simple 4. No toilet
9.
3.
1. Wood
Biogas
2. L.P.G
5. Electricity
1. Electricity
5. Generator
1.
sewage)
3. Kerosene
6. Others
2. Kerosene 3. Biogas
6. Others
With flush (connected to public
2.
With flush (septic tank)
Simple 4. No toilet
3.
What are the following facilities does your family had/have? (Multiple options possible)
Before Earthquake
1. Land 2.TV 3. Cable TV 4. Computer/Laptop 5. Internet
6. Telephone 7. Mobile Phone 8. Refrigerator 9. Motorcycle
10.
Four wheeled Vehicle/Car/Jeep/Van for personal use
11.
Four wheeled Vehicle/Car/Jeep/Van for business use
12. None of the above
After Earthquake
1. Land 2.TV 3. Cable TV 4. Computer/Laptop 5. Internet
6. Telephone 7. Mobile Phone 8. Refrigerator
9. Motorcycle
10.
Four wheeled Vehicle/Car/Jeep/Van for personal use
11.
Four wheeled Vehicle/Car/Jeep/Van for business use
12. None of the above
I declare that I have provided accurate and true information related to me, my household and the details of the damage of my house by
earthquake. I fully agree to let Nepal Government use the information related to my household for Social Security and Housing
Reconstruction. Likewise, I assure you that neither I nor any of my HH members has enrolled twice in this data collection program. Should
it happen, I am ready to be punished as per law.
Central Bureau of Statistics would like to thank you for providing us your truthful information and cooperating with us in the
survey.
Chapter 3
Transparency and Financial Inclusion
in Nepal’s Reconstruction
Abstract This chapter intended to capture achievements of the National Reconstruction Authority (NRA) in terms of transparency and contribution toward financial inclusion. Secondary sources of information were used mainly. The primary
data collected by the Housing Recovery and Reconstruction Platform (HRRP) was
also used. It is substantiated that NRA’s strategy to disburse housing grants through
commercial banks helped avoid corrupt practices and minimize fiduciary risks. More
importantly, NRA’s decision brought an additional 20% of the population to the
banking net who may be motivated to continue using banking system for savings
and raising loan. The GoN may consider connecting other scattered populations
to banks through branchless banking. Banking coverage can also pave the way
for rural housing insurance which will enhance resilience both at household and
national levels. Some policy reforms, however, will be required for boosting universal
financial inclusion.
Keywords Housing · Grant · Transparency · Rural banking · Financial inclusion
3.1 Background
Nepal’s socio-economy was greatly influenced by the 7.8 ML 2015 Gorkha Nepal
earthquake. The PDNA (NPC 2015b) estimated that 755,549 houses had either
collapsed or were damaged and the value of the loss was estimated at NRs. 350.5
billion (US$3.46 billion), which was 58% of the estimated total loss (NRs. 706 billion
or US$7 billion). NPC further estimated that the total damage was one third of the
GDP in FY 2013/014 and was more than 100% of the Gross Fixed Capital Formation
(GFCF) in FY 2013/014. The private sector suffered severely as the damage was 3.3
times more than that of the public sector.
Commercial banks and financial institutions can play catalytic role in recovery
provided that the constraining factors are addressed. The United Nation Capital
Development Fund (UNCDF) had identified that 18% of the adult population was
financially excluded (UNCDF 2014). However, further scrutiny showed that only
61% adults used some form of formal financial services and 21% adults used informal
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022
C. B. Shrestha, Building Back Better After the 2015 Nepal Earthquake,
Disaster Risk Reduction, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-6676-7_3
41
42
3 Transparency and Financial Inclusion in Nepal’s Reconstruction
services. When overlaps in use of financial channels were considered, informal channels occupied 57%, which is an overwhelming share (UNCDF 2014). Poor financial
infrastructure in rural area and psychological deterrence of the lower-income rural
consumer to access formal banking, unavailability of bankable collateral and no
insurance coverage were the major barriers for 57% of the people.
Efficient access to financial services is essential for economic growth. Schumpeter emphasized that innovations are carried out using borrowed money (Schumpeter 1939). It is instrumental to pool savings from disparate depositors, allocate the resources efficiently to the most feasible projects and to allocate risks to
capable investors. Gonzalez elucidated that the association between access to finance
and economic development is not only positive, but also causal. Financial access
instigates economic growth mainly through productivity gains rather than capital
accumulation (Gonzalez−Paramo 2005).
The discussion leads to the inference that access to finance is indispensable for
economic development. The fact that 57% people were deprived of this is therefore
alarming. The commercial banking sector was very primitive until 1990 when Nepal
began democratizing and introduced economic liberalization (Bimali and Subedi
2020). Bimali and Subedi further argued that the growth rate accelerated during
2000–2012 after which the focus was on consolidation. Table 3.1 shows the number
of banks and financial institutions (BFI) and economic growth.
The general impression from Table 3.1 is that the number of banking and financial
institutions contributes to the GDP growth in the long term. There exists a weak
correlation between BFI and GDP, which is 0.033. The BFI’s relation with bank
credit is paradoxically negative and there is weak positive relation between BFI and
bank deposits (0.26). The trend showed that the BFI number does not instigate GDP
instantly. As all other infrastructure, BFIs create environment but other variables
have to be activated for the economic development.
Under these circumstances, the GoN decided to provide housing grants of NRs.
200,000 (US$2000) to each earthquake affected household, which was later increased
to NRs. 300,000 (US$3000) (NRA 2020). In order to ensure earthquake resilience,
NRA decided to disburse grants in three installments: after signing the grant agreement, then after completion of the plinth-level construction and finally after the
completion of the roof band of the house (Earthquake Affected Private Housing
Reconstruction Grant Working Procedure—2073, 2016). However how to distribute
the grant amount was a challenge given the limited number of bank branches in the
affected areas.
Against the above background, this paper intends to capture NRA’s achievement
in ensuring transparency and in contributing to the national objective of the universal
financial access.
3.2 Methodology
43
Table 3.1 BFI and GDP, bank credit and deposits
FY
No. of licensed
BFIs
Growth Year-Over-Year (YOY)
Total
Class
A
GDPa (%)
Bank
credit
(%)
Bank
deposit
(%)
Closing
credit/Nominal
GDP
YOY credit
growth/YOY
nominal GDP
growth (%)
2008
161
25
12
34
30
48
114
2009
166
26
21
31
33
52
70
2010
185
27
21
19
16
51
48
2011
197
31
15
15
11
51
51
2012
189
32
12
12
23
51
50
2013
176
31
11
21
17
56
99
2014
167
30
16
18
18
57
64
2015
154
30
8
20
20
63
137
2016
137
28
6
24
19
74
263
2017
96
28
19
18
13
74
73
2018
86
28
14
22
19
80
120
2019
80
28
14
20
18
84
119
2020
73
27
17
12
a
Gross value added by industrial division at current (nominal) prices; FY2019 GDP is the revised
estimate of the Central Bureau of Statistics (revised in April 2020); Source (Bimali and Subedi
2020)
3.2 Methodology
This is descriptive paper and is based mainly on secondary data drawn from the
NRA and the HRRP, including primary data for the NRA-wide impact study (HRRP
2021a). The survey’s sampled districts were Bhaktapur, Bhojpur, Chitawan, Dhading,
Dolakha, Gorkha, Gulmi. Kavrepalanchok, Kaski, Kathmandu, Khotang, Lalitpur,
Lamjung, Makawanpur, Nuwakot, Okhaldhunga, Parbat, Ramechhap, Rasuwa, Sindhuli, Sindhupalchok, Solukhumbu, Syangja and Tanahu. Among them, 14 districts
were severely affected and 10 were moderately affected. The survey covered 4042
households from the severely affected districts and 782 households from moderately
affected districts. Of the 4042 respondents from the severely affected districts; 3856
were earthquake victims and remaining were unaffected households. Similarly, out
of 244 households from moderately affected districts, 186 households were selected
from earthquake affected households and remaining were selected from unaffected
households.
It is assumed that the increase in banking coverage was the impact of NRA’s
decision to disburse housing grants through bank accounts. The decision to make
payments through the banking system brought eligible beneficiaries without bank
accounts into the banking net. However, other factors such as access to banks nearby
44
3 Transparency and Financial Inclusion in Nepal’s Reconstruction
and others may also have contributed to this. These aspects, however, were not
covered by this study, and hence remains as the limitations.
3.3 Findings
This section discusses the formal grant distribution arrangement, actual disbursement through various bank branches, problems encountered and contribution of this
intervention to the universal finance access.
3.3.1 Distribution of Beneficiaries
The PDNA had estimated that 498,852 houses had completely collapsed and another
256,679 were severely damaged (NPC 2015a), which was subject to verification
by the Household Registration for Housing Reconstruction Survey (HRHRS) (CBS
2017a). The distribution of beneficiaries for housing grant is shown in Table 3.2,
which is also depicted in Fig. 3.1.
As shown in Table 3.1 and Fig. 3.1, the devastation was mainly concentrated
in the mid-hills and the Churia range. Sindhupalchowk, Dhading, Kavrepalanchok,
Nuwakot, Gorkha and Dolakha had the highest number of beneficiaries and earthquake affected households. Tentatively districts are on an axis between the first jolt’s
epicenter at Barpak of Gorkha and second tremor’s epicenter at Singati of Dolakha
district. All of the earthquake affected district settlements either were not accessible
or seasonally accessible through dirt road which made commuting from remote settlements to the district headquarters extremely difficult. Further, the Maoist insurgency
(1996–2006) had led to a reduction of commercial bank presence in the rural areas.
Hoffmann and Grossmann (Grossmann and Hofmann 2005) argued that the conflict
had caused severe problems for state-owned regional development banks because
the Maoists had targeted them. A number of banks were looted or robbed during
the insurgency and that had caused other banks to withdraw from remote areas and
operate only from the district headquarters. This was largely the situation until the
2015 earthquake. The mountainous terrain, poor accessibility due to earthen roads
and low coverage of banking had created huge challenges in grant distribution.
3.3.2 Formal Housing Grant Distribution Arrangement
NRA pondered on various options for distributing grants to the housing beneficiary after singing the beneficiary agreement. How to avoid malpractices and leakages was the crux of the discussion. The influencing factors for decision were the
financing agreement between Nepal and the International Development Association
3.3 Findings
45
Table 3.2 Number of housing (grant) beneficiaries
S. No
District
Beneficiaries
Reconstruction
Total
Retrofitting
1
Sindhupalchok
89,171
421
89,592
2
Dhading
80,238
2256
82,494
3
Kavrepalanchok
77,213
3837
81,050
4
Nuwakot
76,536
588
77,124
5
Gorkha
68,592
2392
70,984
6
Dolakha
69,456
969
70,425
7
Ramechhap
54,207
2409
56,616
8
Sindhuli
38,815
12,757
51,572
9
Makawanpur
35,776
9529
45,305
10
Kathmandu
43,614
1065
44,679
11
Lalitpur
26,806
1065
27,871
12
Okhaldhunga
25,787
1295
27,082
13
Bhaktapur
25,153
655
25,808
14
Tanahu
14,139
1134
15,273
15
Lamjung
14,048
673
14,721
16
Solukhumbu
12,291
952
13,243
17
Rasuwa
12,324
107
12,431
18
Khotang
9622
443
10,065
19
Syangja
8914
768
9682
20
Chitawan
8129
797
8926
21
Kaski
6414
726
7140
22
Bhojpur
6186
761
6947
23
Parbat
5665
320
5985
24
Palpa
4573
646
5219
25
Gulmi
4205
315
4520
26
Dhankuta
3181
261
3442
27
Baglung
2369
119
2488
28
Sankhuwasabha
2036
332
2368
29
Arghakhanchi
1191
111
1302
30
Nawalparasi
1071
33
1104
31
Myagdi
901
50
951
Total Beneficiaries
828,623
47,786
876,409
Source NRA EHRP MIS (NRA-CLPIU 2021)
46
3 Transparency and Financial Inclusion in Nepal’s Reconstruction
Fig. 3.1 Spatial distribution of damaged houses
(IDA), spatial distribution of bank branches and NRA’s commitment to put money
in the hands of the beneficiaries. After confirming bank branches at the district headquarters and major market centers, NRA considered introducing branchless banking
(BLB) as well. The BLB system offers banking facilities in the far-flung rural settlements through local merchants (Sakchyam 2021). However, owing to the operational
complexity involved with BLB, NRA decided to mobilize standard bank branches.
The NRA’s Executive Committee’s 15th meeting endorsed an understanding
with GoN-MoF, NRB and Nepal Bankers Association (NBA) (NRA 2016b). The
understanding reached said:
• The housing grant is to be distributed through Treasury Single Account (TSA) and
the commercial banks are required to deposit housing grant within seven days.
• NRA to avail electronic data of beneficiaries and banks to open account even in
the absence of the account holder.
• All financial institutions of Category I, II and III to open such bank accounts.
No service charge would be required for up to 50 beneficiaries in the district
headquarters, and 20 outside of district headquarters for daily transaction. In
excess of the designated upper ceiling, the BFI will charge NRs. 225 (US$2) per
transaction. The debit card would cost NRs. 100 (US$1) which is optional.
• BFIs were encouraged to employ biometric systems.
• A coordination committee was formed under the chairmanship of the NRA’s
Secretary with representation of the Ministry of Finance (MoF), Financial
3.3 Findings
47
Comptroller General’s Office, NRB, MoHA, Ministry of Energy and Ministry
of Communication for facilitating the understanding.
Based on the Executive Committee’s decision framework, a Standard Operating
Procedure (SOP) was outlined as shown in Fig. 3.2 (NRA 2021 m). NRA was
committed to provide housing grants to fully damaged houses and partial grants
for retrofitting. The CLPIU—GMALI identified beneficiaries based on the housing
damage assessment survey, which was subject to verification by the NRA Executive
Committee and this was the basis of the agreement between the local government and
the beneficiary. Thereafter the beneficiary was entitled to receive the first tranche.
After completion up to the plinth level and recommendation following inspection
by the DLPIU-deployed technician the beneficiaries became eligible for receiving
the second installment. The objective of the inspection was to ensure the building
standard compliance. The District Treasury Controller Office (DTCO) would then
issue a check after verification with the Line Ministry Budget Information System
(LMBIS), created after NRA Executive Committee approval. Based on the issued
check, the concerned bank deposited the second tranche in the house owner’s account.
The payment from the banks was documented in the NRA’s MIS system. The third
installment was disbursed following a similar process after completion of the lintel
level.
Figure 3.2 assumed the existence of the functional local governments during the
period of 2016 but that was not the case. Ojha et al. (2017) argued that reconstruction
could not pick up momentum as Nepal did not have local government for 16 years. As
indicated in Fig. 3.2, the local governments were mandated to conclude agreements
with beneficiaries and such agreements had to be digitized. However, having no
capacity at the local governments and unavailability of required logistics, the NRA
had to digitize the agreements until 2019 (GMALI 2019). No tranche payment could
be done until the documents were digitized.
The second requirement was the availability of engineers for inspection and certification. For issuing the second and third installments, a designated engineer had to
certify that the building was compliant to engineering standards. However, the HRRP
study (HRRP 2018) revealed that 51% engineers had inadequate training, 85% had
to walk to the houses for inspection, 45% respondents had faced pressure or threats
from households to approve their house and 29% had faced pressure or threats from
ward/municipal officials for approving certain houses. This was because banks could
make payments only after this certification.
3.3.3 Difficulties in Accessing Housing Grant
Beneficiaries said there were several hurdles they had to overcome to receive the
housing grant. Poudel (2018) stated that the process was too lengthy, and other
requirements such as NRA deadlines, controversy in beneficiary identity and unavailability of construction materials were the major problems. The Nepali press also
48
3 Transparency and Financial Inclusion in Nepal’s Reconstruction
Fig. 3.2 Grant disbursement procedure. Source NRA 2021m
reported a number of inconveniences for accessing housing grant, which the NRA
took up with the NRB, Commercial Banks and Nepal Bankers’ Association (NRA
2018a). The major reported issues were inaccessible banking facility, bending of
rules by the banks and NRA’s communication mechanism.
Due to unavailability of commercial banks near their residences, the rural housing
beneficiaries had to travel to the district headquarters, which involved an arduous
journey of more than a day. The beneficiaries had to spend additional resources
on food and accommodation. In addition, security was also a concern (KP 2016).
However, after the local governments’ election, the NRB issued directives requiring
banks to establish at least one commercial bank in each municipality (Subedi 2017).
With this new arrangement, beneficiaries were able to do banking within reasonable
distances from their homes, and also saved additional costs that were involved with
travel. However, expansion of branches was hindered because all municipalities were
not connected to the Internet. With NRA’s persuasion, the Nepal Telecom expanded
its service to rural areas (Aryal 2020) which not only facilitated banking expansion,
but also ameliorated the need for NRA to digitize grant agreements.
There were some complaints against the banks. Some bank branches had denied
efficient payments of housing grant with a tendency to generate additional revenue.
The bilateral agreement between NRA and bank required banks to make up to 50
payments per day at the district headquarters and up to 20 payments in rural settlements. Denying payment on the first day would lead to accumulation and the number
would exceed the threshold on the second day (NRA 2018a). This was brought to the
3.3 Findings
49
attention of the NRB and Nepal Bankers Association. In addition, the banks intended
to maintain their liquidity by withholding disbursement for few days.
After recommendation of a tranche, it took a few days for depositing money in the
beneficiary’s bank account. There were cases of overcrowding of beneficiaries at the
district headquarters, and sometimes they even found that the money had not reached
their bank accounts (Economy-Development 2017). The banks, however, were not
solely responsible for this. Communication to beneficiaries about the delayed deposit
could have helped avoid the situation.
3.3.4 Progress in Housing Grant Distribution
Despite the obstacles in payment through banks, NRA had almost completed grant
distribution in July 2021. As of 12 July 2021, NRA had disbursed NRs. 203.6 billion
(US$1711 million) as housing grant to 971,036 beneficiaries through 723 branches
of 74 commercial banks (Table 3.3).
A discrepancy between EHRP and NRA record keeping systems was observed.
The central record keeping system indicated that there were 829,667 agreement
holder beneficiaries on 03 August 2021. However, the Earthquake Housing Reconstruction Program (EHRP) database showed 971,036 households, indicating some
error in the system. Irrespective of the discrepancy, Table 3.2 shows that NRA
disbursed NRs 203.6 billion (US$1.72 billion) as grants through 74 commercial
banks and financial institutions. The Rastriya Banijya Bank and Agriculture Development Bank, both government-owned banks, distributed 9.87 and 5.02% of the
grant amount, respectively. Both banks had large networks and being government
owned may have also taken additional steps to implement the government policy.
3.3.5 Increase in Number of Bank Account Holders
The proportion of male bank account holders was 51.83% in 2015, which increased to
69.8% in 2021 (HRRP 2021a). During the same period, the number of female bank
holders increased from 55% to 70.4%. The statistics show that women’s account
holding was at par with the male population, and growth rate was also more or
less the same. With the increased access to commercial banks, there was a decline in
accounts at financial institutions. The male population with account at financial institutions decreased from 45.1% to 42.2% and the decrease with the female population
was sharper—from 42.2% in 2015 to 25.2% in 2021. Generally, people preferred
commercial banks over financial institution after the banks became more accessible.
The share of cooperatives was insignificant in both cases.
The banking status of earthquake affected housing beneficiaries in Bhojpur, Gulmi
and Solokhumbu increased from zero to almost 100%, which was a major achievement. Similar trend was observed in Okhaldhunga, Nuwakot, Sindhupalchowk and
50
3 Transparency and Financial Inclusion in Nepal’s Reconstruction
Table 3.3 Disbursement of grants through various commercial banks and financial institutions
S. No Bank
No. of
%
branches
No of beneficiary %
Total amount
%
1
Rastriya Banijya
Bank
47
6.50 80,075
8.25 20,097,850,000
9.87
2
Agricultural
Development
Bank
40
5.53 44,919
4.63 10,228,229,641
5.02
3
Mega Bank
28
3.87 52,114
5.37 9,959,650,000
4.89
4
Century Bank
25
3.46 46,324
4.77 9,752,882,000
4.79
5
Nepal Bank
25
3.46 38,516
3.97 9,200,550,000
4.52
6
Prabhu Bank
28
3.87 32,173
3.31 8,342,100,000
4.10
7
Civil Bank
16
2.21 32,261
3.32 7,789,650,021
3.83
8
Global IME Bank
38
5.26 31,426
3.24 7,441,455,011
3.65
9
NMB Bank
26
3.60 28,406
2.93 7,129,950,000
3.50
10
Sindhu Bikash
Bank
9
1.24 25,770
2.65 6,858,050,000
3.37
11
NCC Bank
13
1.80 27,143
2.80 6,653,650,028
3.27
12
Deva
Development
Bank
2
0.28 21,614
2.23 6,457,620,228
3.17
13
Prime
16
Commercial Bank
2.21 23,452
2.42 5,648,322,000
2.77
14
Sanima Bank
13
1.80 22,350
2.30 5,176,650,136
2.54
15
Himalayan Bank
10
1.38 20,304
2.09 5,111,165,817
2.51
16
Muktinath Bikas
Bank
28
3.87 21,780
2.24 4,967,585,024
2.44
17
Lumbini Bikas
Bank
8
1.11 24,695
2.54 4,860,300,000
2.39
18
Laxmi Bank
17
2.35 18,024
1.86 4,542,710,000
2.23
19
Nepal Investment
Bank
11
1.52 17,913
1.84 4,317,600,370
2.12
20
Machhapuchchhre 12
Bank
1.66 18,990
1.96 3,978,750,000
1.95
21
Tourism
Development
Bank
10
1.38 21,419
2.21 3,665,400,000
1.80
22
Mahalaxmi
Development
Bank
9
1.24 15,636
1.61 3,404,900,000
1.67
23
Om Development
Bank
15
2.07 15,600
1.61 3,170,015,001
1.56
(continued)
3.3 Findings
51
Table 3.3 (continued)
S. No Bank
No. of
%
branches
No of beneficiary %
Total amount
%
24
Shangrila
Development
Bank
8
1.11 13,598
1.40 3,021,650,000
1.48
25
Bank of
Kathmandu
12
1.66 13,561
1.40 2,942,800,004
1.45
26
Garima
Development
Bank
20
2.77 12,179
1.25 2,848,050,000
1.40
27
Everest Bank
11
1.52 10,502
1.08 2,471,200,000
1.21
28
Citizens Bank
International
9
1.24 11,599
1.19 2,391,050,000
1.17
29
Hamro Bikash
Bank
3
0.41 9906
1.02 2,271,650,000
1.12
30
Kumari Bank
11
1.52 10,955
1.13 2,132,950,000
1.05
31
Janata Bank
16
2.21 8620
0.89 2,028,650,000
1.00
32
Nabil Bank
7
0.97 8261
0.85 1,976,177,408
0.97
33
Vibor Society
Development
Bank
6
0.83 19,219
1.98 1,901,400,000
0.93
34
Siddhartha Bank
11
1.52 8893
0.92 1,801,100,000
0.88
36
Sunrise Bank
12
1.66 10,054
1.04 1,756,550,000
0.86
37
Araniko
Development
Bank
7
0.97 12,431
1.28 1,628,500,000
0.80
38
Nepal Bangladesh 11
Bank
1.52 8151
0.84 1,609,200,000
0.79
39
Yeti Development
Bank
9
1.24 13,479
1.39 1,525,350,000
0.75
40
Kailash Bikas
Bank
11
1.52 5302
0.55 1,213,750,000
0.60
41
Nepal SBI Bank
12
1.66 4,331
0.45 955,050,000
0.47
42
Kalinchowk
Development
Bank
5
0.69 17,628
1.82 881,400,000
0.43
43
Alpine
Development
Bank
9
1.24 7497
0.77 834,800,000
0.41
44
Kamana Sewa
Bikas Bank
6
0.83 4580
0.47 827,500,000
0.41
45
NIC Asia Bank
14
1.94 4532
0.47 823,450,000
0.40
(continued)
52
3 Transparency and Financial Inclusion in Nepal’s Reconstruction
Table 3.3 (continued)
S. No Bank
46
Cosmos
Development
Bank
47
48
No. of
%
branches
5
No of beneficiary %
Total amount
%
0.69 11,705
1.21 781,250,000
0.38
Jyoti Development 4
Bank
0.55 5325
0.55 772,950,000
0.38
Sahayogi Bikash
Bank
0.14 3076
0.32 738,950,000
0.36
1
49
Salpa Bikash Bank 4
0.55 2856
0.29 684,300,000
0.34
50
Manaslu
Development
Bank
4
0.55 8537
0.88 507,200,000
0.25
51
Kaski Finance
Company
2
0.28 2296
0.24 465,850,000
0.23
52
Reliable
Development
Bank
2
0.28 5088
0.52 465,650,000
0.23
53
Gandaki
Development
Bank
2
0.28 1294
0.13 316,600,000
0.16
54
Professional
Diyalo Bank
5
0.69 5341
0.55 267,050,000
0.13
55
Shine Resunga
Development
Bank
5
0.69 174
0.12 264,500,000
0.13
56
Narayani National 1
Finance Company
0.14 1178
0.12 246,100,000
0.12
57
Sagarmatha
3
Finance Company
0.41 3093
0.32 226,100,000
0.11
58
Triveni
Development
Bank
6
0.83 3631
0.37 199,500,000
0.10
59
Country
Development
Bank
2
0.28 2684
0.28 197,000,000
0.10
60
International
Development
Bank
1
0.14 3633
0.37 181,650,000
0.09
61
ICFC Finance
Company
1
0.14 6045
0.62 172,420,000
0.08
62
Mahalaxmi
4
Finance Company
0.55 3237
0.33 161,950,000
0.08
(continued)
3.3 Findings
53
Table 3.3 (continued)
S. No Bank
63
Matribhumi
Development
Bank
64
No. of
%
branches
2
No of beneficiary %
Total amount
%
0.28 2938
0.30 146,900,000
0.07
Guheshwori
1
Merchant Banking
& Finance
Company
0.14 234
0.02 61,550,000
0.03
65
Ace Development
Bank
1
0.14 374
0.04 60,950,000
0.03
66
Siddhartha
Development
Bank
1
0.14 140
0.01 35,300,000
0.02
67
Subhechha Bikash 1
Bank
0.14 495
0.05 27,600,000
0.01
68
Green
Development
Bank
2
0.28 128
0.01 16,550,000
0.01
69
Reliance Finance
Company
1
0.14 67
0.01 15,450,000
0.01
70
Sewa Bikas Bank
2
0.28 130
0.01 8,450,000
0.00
71
Supreme
Development
Bank
1
0.14 112
0.01 6,000,000
0.00
72
Kamana
Development
Bank
1
0.14 18
0.00 1,950,000
0.00
73
Infrastructure
Development
Bank
1
0.14 20
0.00 1,000,000
0.00
74
Birat Laxmi
Development
Bank
1
0.14 5
0.00 250,000
0.00
Total
723
100
100
971,036
203,628,232,689
Source MIS EHRP NRA-CLPIU 2021
Syangja. Some other districts such as Bhaktapur and Kaski had a good base in terms
of accounts. The district wise changes before and after 2015 scenario is presented in
Fig. 3.3.
54
3 Transparency and Financial Inclusion in Nepal’s Reconstruction
Fig. 3.3 Percentage of households with bank account. Source HRRP (2021c)
3.4 Discussion
The major objective of this study was to assess whether payment through the banking
system helped to avoid malpractices and how it contributed toward the national
objective of attaining universal banking.
The Gorkha earthquake 2015 had struck after the decade long Maoist insurgency
which had wiped out rural formal institutions including the local governments and
commercial banks. As the mountainous region and mid-hills ranges were impacted,
the accessibility to the far-flung settlements was limited by poor quality roads and foot
trails. Despite the odds, NRA decided to make grant payments through the banking
system to reduce the possibility of embezzlement and to ensure building code compliance. Branch less banking (BLB) was considered but could not be implemented due
to inadequate infrastructure. However, the banking system was not flawless as inaccessibility created drudgery to beneficiaries, which was further compounded by the
banks attempts to bend rules to their advantage. It was also realized that the NRA’s
communication was not optimal. Despite the challenges, the private housing reconstruction was nearing completion and NRs. 203 billion (US$1.72 billion) had been
disbursed to nearly one million households with no irregularity. The NRA decision
also contributed toward increasing the number of bank account holders from 52 to
70%. The district wise analysis suggested that in some districts such as Bhojpur,
Gulmi and Solokhumbu, the banking coverage among the beneficiaries increased
from zero to 100%. Other districts also witnessed spectacular growth in banking
coverage.
Against this finding, a number of policy issues are suggested: the use of the
banking system to avoid malpractices, to unlock constraints in the credit and savings
market, to promote payment system, to bolster risk mitigation capabilities and to
enhance capacity of locally based financial service providers.
Avoiding shady tendencies: The possibility of malpractices while distributing cash
grant was high. In order to counteract also other legal complications such as ascertaining individual identity and authenticating the payment, NRA employed the
3.4 Discussion
55
banking system. Transparency International Nepal’s (TI) investigative report on
reconstruction concluded that reconstruction was successfully implemented despite
initial hick-ups (TI Nepal 2020). TI added that the payments made through banking
system had not only reduced delivery time but also eliminated malpractices like
unnecessary delays and bribery, and disbursements of installments also helped toward
ensuring proper use of reconstruction support. The release of grant support for reconstruction of private houses was largely fair with some grievances of intentional
delays. The TI conclusions justified NRA’s disbursement policy. In the country ranked
120th in the scale of 90–154 in TI’s index (TI 2020), such flawless disbursement of
US$1.72 billion to more than 800,000 households can be considered as a herculean
accomplishment.
Unlocking constraints in the credit and saving market: By end of July 2021, the
number of NRA beneficiaries had reached to 828,813. Based on a survey, 51.83%
beneficiaries had bank accounts before 2015, which increased to 69.8%. This means
that the NRA’s is attributable for 149,000 households for bringing them to banking
net which is the noteworthy contribution toward unlocking constraints in the credit
and saving market. The new entrants’ exposure to the banking system leads them
to benefit from savings and credit facilities, a crucial precursor for prosperity. On
the other hand, Banks’ proximity to their customers enabled them to customize
their policies. This is particularly important because most rural households neither
possess bankable collateral nor formal income. The bank’s transaction cost for property evaluation increases substantially with additional distance. To unblock such
constraints, the NRB introduced concessional housing loan. However, the concessional loan was accessed by less than 2000 out of more than 800,000 earthquake
affected households (My Republica 2019). The first attempt therefore was not very
successful. However, the initial attempt toward unlocking constraints in credit market
is expected to enhance substantially in the days to come.
Promoting payment system: This objective of financial inclusion strategy is to move
from a cash based toward a digital economy. The greatest concern for NRA on
this issue was to deliver housing grants to the far-flung hamlets that takes them a
couple of days to reach the bank outlet. NRA’s consideration of BLB could not be
operationalized which must be included in the central bank’s banking policy for
the future. This issue needs to be in the forefront of the discourse of settlement
consolidation interventions. As it stands now, with the introduction of “one local
government one bank” must have ameliorated the situation drastically.
Bolstering risk mitigation capabilities: Nepal’s vulnerability to natural disasters
including earthquake is obvious. Had there been insurance coverage of housing units,
the government could have focused only on public infrastructure, which would have
been fraction of the present liability. However, not only rural but a majority of urban
houses are uninsured. There is a strong tendency to insure houses for fulfilling housing
loan criteria of commercial banks, which ends after repayment. In rural areas the
concept of insurance is yet to be introduced. NRA took this up with Insurance Board of
Nepal, the GoN’s insurance regulating agency. The MoF demonstrated some appetite
56
3 Transparency and Financial Inclusion in Nepal’s Reconstruction
for this. However, the Insurance Board wanted NRA to frontload with government
incentivized premiums, whereas NRA preferred the reimbursement modality. The
dialogue remained inconclusive. It will be sensible for the government to initiate such
insurance schemes all across the municipalities in conjunction with compliance to the
National Building Code (NBC). At the initial stages, the Insurance Board will need
to consider subsidies for operating in rural areas, which can be withdrawn later when
insurance-related sensitivity picks up. This disaster preparedness initiative not only
minimizes government liability but also increases disaster resilience of households.
Mainstreaming financial inclusion in national policies: NRA’s grant distribution
was a major intervention to mainstream financial inclusion in national policy. It
was manifested in its collaboration with more than 60 commercial and financial
institutions in consultation with the MoF and the central bank, a first attempt of grant
disbursement of this scale. By doing this, a number of inconsistent government and
NRB’s policies were put to the litmus test with respect of their practicality. However,
there still are policies that need further strengthening or rewriting. For example, those
relating to the introduction of BLB and housing insurance.
Strengthen consumer empowerment, protection and education: Based on the Nepal
Rastra Bank’s findings, only 25% of the total adult population use one type of financial
product (NRB 2017), which means also that a large proportion of the population is still
outside the banks’ reach. This is not a conducive situation for economic development,
which demands adequate access and massive awareness. In addition, tailor made
financial products and services are vital. The NRA’s contribution to bringing rural
households within the reach of commercial banks was the first step toward consumer
empowerment. Secondly NRA communicated message on grant distribution through
media in local languages had raised both disbursement-related awareness and also
educated people about the banking system. The financial institutions will need to
build up on the NRA laid foundation.
3.5 Conclusion
This study showed that NRA’s strategy to channel housing grants through commercial banks helped to avoid malpractices and ensured transparency. Although there
were some shortcomings in housing grant distribution, NRA also contributed to
unlocking constraints by bringing an additional 20% households in the banking net.
With regard to easing the payment system, NRA’s success was rather lukewarm as
it could not mainstream the BLB. The existing merchants, savings and credit groups
and other local informal financial institutions should be incentivized and linked to
formal financial intermediaries. The GoN will need to prepare policy on housing
insurance not only for the urban settlements but also for the rural municipalities as
a strategy to manage its liabilities during disasters. The MoF and the NRB need to
review all legal provisions to ensure universal access to finance to all citizens.
Chapter 4
Understanding Building Code
Non-compliance for Setting Future
Strategies
Abstract Despite lining up of technicians across 32 earthquake affected districts and
having provided with housing grant, the National Reconstruction Authority (NRA)
witnessed a sizeable amount of non-compliant housing stock. This chapter intended
to identify non-compliant features and underlying reasons behind for which the World
Bank collected more than 34,000 household data which was analyzed. In addition, the
key informant survey with 150 house owners, local political leaders and field technicians was also conducted. Fifteen non-compliant issues were identified; among them,
deviation in horizontal band was the prominent. The economic factor was identified
as the principal contributing factor to the non-compliance followed by the paucity of
technical knowledge and poor access to finance. Mandatory building permit system
along with capacitating the local governments for technical handholding will lead to
resilient housing. Token financial support combined with improved access to finance
and by availing good quality construction materials in cost-effective price are other
instruments. Introducing rural housing insurance policy could be another resilience
instrument which has been successful in the developed countries.
Keywords Building code · Compliance · Building permit system
4.1 Background
Based on the preliminary 2021 census report, Nepal possesses a housing stock of
5.64 million which accommodate 6.76 million households (CBS 2022). The CBS
is yet to publish detailed census report which would reveal present housing status.
The housing census of 2011 reported that the foundation of housing units comprised
with 10% RCC, 17.57% cement-bonded bricks, 24.9% wooden pillar, 44.21% mudbonded bricks and 2.33% other type (CBS 2012). The Amnesty International (AI)
reported that less than 30% houses are safe (AI 2019) and the GoN intends to double
safe housing stocks by 2030 (NPC 2017). The 2015 Gorkha Nepal earthquake’s
destruction of above 800,000 houses was mainly due to the earthquake non-resilient
structure which costed 8790 lives, 22,300 injuries and a loss of US$7.065 billion
(NPC 2015b).
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022
C. B. Shrestha, Building Back Better After the 2015 Nepal Earthquake,
Disaster Risk Reduction, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-6676-7_4
57
58
4 Understanding Building Code Non-compliance …
Gautam et al. (2016) found that the unreinforced rubble stone and adobe buildings
sustained major damage by 2015 Gorkha Nepal earthquake. The major weaknesses
were structural integrity, heavy load, absence of bracing and pounding. In addition,
binding structure, heavy gable and weak roofing structures were other causes. The
RC structures incurred localized damage such as soft story, pounding, shear failure
and building symmetry. In comparison to other structures, wooden-framed houses
survived the most. Dizhur et al. (2016) further confirmed that the unreinforced structures were the major segment of failed buildings by the earthquake. Other studies
detailed out that the shear failure in the concrete buildings was caused by stirrups
spacing, buckling of longitudinal rebar and poor confinement of the core concrete
(Sharma et al. 2016).
For making progress toward the earthquake resilient society, NRA was mandated
and internally committed to ensure earthquake resistant housing reconstruction using
housing grant as leverage. For achieving that end, NRA mobilized 1146 engineers,
714 sub-engineers and 709 assistant sub-engineers. Technician’s number fluctuated
over the period due to staff turnover and varying volume of work. However, the
earthquake affected households received a consistent handholding (NRA 2021m).
These deployed human resources were capacitated through various training and other
on-the-job skill enhancement interventions. More than 70,000 masons, plumbers
and carpenters burnished their skills. NRA also disseminated reconstruction-related
messages through television, radio and released monthly bulletins with regular
updates of decisions and policies (NRA 2021m). Various agencies contributed to
expand skill base including the National Society for Earthquake Technology (NSET)
through USAID funding, Japan International Cooperation Agency and other NGOs.
Despite NRA’s attempt to ensure full earthquake resilient reconstruction, there are
still 5446 non-compliant houses out of 828,194 total reconstruction caseload (EHRP
2022) which excludes those non-compliant households which were constructed prior
to engineer’s mobilization (NRA 2021j). It means the actual non-compliant housing
number was much larger than reported which compromised NRA’s drive to making
progress toward earthquake resilient housing.
It is thus important to understand characteristics of non-compliance and underlying reasons to that effect. Secondly a policy-level intervention is also discussed
for ensuring earthquake resilience. There could be some issue of replicability as the
post-earthquake housing was undertaken in rather peculiar environment leveraged by
the housing grant and handholding with the tailored technical assistance. This study
did not factor in the geographical and ethnic variation which assumed uniformly
distributed geographic space with equally competent households.
4.2 Methodology
This paper used data collected by the World Bank (2020) which was conducted
during July 2019 to December 2020. The objective of the monitoring was to assess
compliance to the NRA’s criteria which were derived from the NBC. The draft
4.3 Findings
59
Table 4.1 Sample size for assessing compliance of building standards
S. no
District
1
Dhading
Beneficiaries
77,761
Sample size (Nos.)
Percentage (%)
6048
7.78
2
Dolakha
68,761
5893
8.57
3
Nuwakot
75,136
6145
8.18
4
Kavre
75,786
2977
3.93
5
Makawanpur
33,267
2404
7.23
6
Gorkha
30,146
1682
5.58
7
Rasuwa
11,713
901
7.69
8
Okhaldhunga
18,696
1053
5.63
9
Ramechhap
43,153
2253
5.22
10
Sindhuli
35,987
1917
5.33
11
Sindhupalchowk
Total
60,670
531,076
3084
5.08
34,357
6.47
methodology was piloted for further burnishing which was followed up with the
data collection through stratified random sampling method considering geographical
location, survey area and other contextual issues. Selective follow-up visits were also
administered. Table 4.1 shows the sample size of 11 severely earthquake affected
districts.
The causes of non-compliance were collected through telephonic interview of
100 house owners, 25 political leaders and 25 technicians involved in the housing
supervision.
4.3 Findings
This section incorporates building typologies and identified deviations while
reconstructing houses and causes for such deviations.
4.3.1 Features of Foundation, Wall and Roofing Materials
Nepal’s National Population and Housing Census 2011 has classified houses based
on foundation, walls and roofs (CBS, 2012). Table 4.2 classifies houses based on
foundation, Table 4.3 categorizes based on outer walls, and Table 4.4 groups the
roofing materials.
The mud-bonded, wooden pillar and cement-bonded foundation constituted 87%
of the total housing stock. Although RCC pillar’s share was less than 10% in 2011,
60
Table 4.2 Foundation types
4 Understanding Building Code Non-compliance …
S. No
Foundation
Numbers
Percentage (%)
1
Mud bonded: brick or
stone
2,397,441
44.21
2
Wooden pillar
1,350,151
24.90
3
Cement bonded: brick
or stone
952,702
17.57
4
RCC with pillar
539,004
9.94
5
Others
126,281
2.33
6
Not stated
57,718
1.06
Total
5,423,297
100.00
Percentage (%)
Source (CBS 2012)
Table 4.3 Outer wall
Table 4.4 Roofing materials
S. No
Outer wall
Numbers
1
Mud bonded: brick or
stone
2,244,112
41.38
2
Cement bonded: brick
or stone
1,558,823
28.74
20.23
3
Bamboo
1,096,988
4
Wood or planks
287,859
5.31
5
Others
112,694
2.08
6
Not stated
61,504
1.13
7
Unbaked bricks
61,317
1.13
Total
5,423,297
S. No
Roofing
Numbers
100.00
Percentage (%)
1
Galvanized Iron
1,532,804
28.26
2
Tile or slate
1,446,998
26.68
3
RCC
1,219,060
22.48
4
Thatched or straw
1,032,282
19.03
5
Not stated
66,352
1.22
6
Mud
59,029
1.09
7
Wood or planks
44,069
0.81
8
Others
22,703
Total
5,423,297
0.42
100.00
it must have increased by now which will be revealed once the census data of 2021
will get released.
4.3 Findings
61
The outer wall-based classification is shown in Table 4.3 which shows that mudbonded, cement-bonded and bamboo wall constitute nearly 87% of the total housing
stock.
The CBS also classified buildings based on the roofing materials which shows CGI
sheets are the principal roofing material which must have been further intensified
(Table 4.4). Tile and slate must have been diminishing as these roofing materials
are rather heavy; thus, robust underpinning is required. In addition, such roofing
materials are vulnerable to earthquakes and are maintenance hungry. RCC is another
emerging roofing material particularly in accessible urban set up. Thatched or straw
has been diminishing over the period. The government plans to replace the thatched
with CGI sheet roofing which means increased CGI sheet roofing and diminishing
thatched roofing.
4.3.2 Traditional Housing Typologies
Traditionally, stone masonry in mud mortar with thatched roof had been used in
rural mid-hills. Shallow foundation and inadequate ventilation were common characteristics. Ground floor kitchen and grain silos on the first floor were the general
practice. Cattle shed could be observed on the close vicinity. Some communities
reared animals on the ground floor and use first floor as kitchen, living and bedding
purposes. The second floor was used as granary (Fig. 4.1).
Normally, three- to four-story rectangular-shaped Newari houses are organized
vertically. Bedrooms are located on the first floor, and second floor is used for
Fig. 4.1 Stone masonry in mud mortar hill house. Source (HRRP 2022)
62
4 Understanding Building Code Non-compliance …
Fig. 4.2 Traditional Newari house in the Kathmandu valley (Photo credit Saujanya Shrestha)
living purpose. Toilets are allocated on the ground floor and kitchen on the top floor
(D’Ayala and Bajracharya 2003). Having single flight staircase and up to 2.5 m interstory height, the Newari houses are organized either in long arrays or around a court.
The timber structures blended with brick masonry are designed for improving seismic
performance. However, these traditional structures have been getting replaced with
the concrete structures (Fig. 4.2).
The traditional high altitude mountainous settlers use stones for foundation and
walls. Timbers are used most extensively for flooring, ceilings, wall cladding and
roofing which insulate extreme external weather conditions. Wooden shingles or
stone slates are used as roofing materials. However, CGI sheet has been replacing
the traditional roofing materials as shown in Fig. 4.3. The entire housing philosophy
of housing construction in Himalayan region is to conserve thermal energy generated
internally or gained from rare sunlight.
The traditional houses in Nepal’s plain region are made up of wood and thatch
(THT 2019b). The ground floor consists of guest room, kitchen and bedrooms. The
tiled roof houses are made up of timber, tiles and grass plastered with alluvial clay
(Fig. 4.4).
More recently, all these traditional architectures and structures have been undergoing rapid transformation. The elite households prefer reinforced concrete structures, and low-income bracket people aspire for stone masonry in mud mortar with
CGI sheet roofing. In this process, the traditional ethnicity-based architecture has
been losing ground which vented route for more class-based housing structures.
Figure 4.5 shows the RCC structure in the Kathmandu Valley.
4.3 Findings
63
Fig. 4.3 Typical Sherpa house (Photo credit All Three Media Ghar)
Fig. 4.4 A typical plain area house in the Terai Region (Photo credit All Three Media Ghar)
4.3.3 Post-earthquake Housing Reconstruction
Catalog-Based Typologies
The Department of Urban Development and Building Construction (DUDBC)
promulgated the design catalog for reconstruction of earthquake resistant houses:
Volume I has incorporated mainly four types of building typologies—(i) stone
64
4 Understanding Building Code Non-compliance …
Fig. 4.5 RCC house in the
Kathmandu Valley
masonry in cement mortar; (ii) brick masonry in cement mortar; (iii) stone masonry
in mud mortar; and (iv) brick masonry in mud mortar (DUDBC 2015). The Volume
II contains 12 different hybrid structures (DUDBC 2017). The RCC structures will
be governed by the Nepal Building Code itself (MoUD 2020).
Although NRA endorsed those catalogs as indicative, beneficiaries and the NRA
engineers regarded them as mandatory model designs. Consequently, most rural
houses were constructed following them irrespective of their ethnic background
or even geographic diversity. Such practice addressed shelter issue but left behind
cultural identity and also undermined space requirement (Parajuli2019). Some of
the households constructed single roomed houses for satisfying NRA’s mandatory
requirements. Such houses either are not utilized or extended horizontally and vertically for meeting space requirements after securing NRA’s housing grant (BBC
2018).
4.3 Findings
65
4.3.4 Mandatory Rule of Thumb for Housing Construction
Having paucity of professional engineers outside of the Kathmandu Valley, the
MoUD promulgated a mandatory rule of thumb which can be administered by an
experienced technician (DUDBC 1994). Three building codes: NBC 201: Reinforced
Concrete Building with Masonry Infill; NBC 202: Load Bearing Masonry; and NBC
205: Reinforced Concrete Building without Masonry Infill were the background
documents for the NRA’s Technical Inspection Guidelines (NRA 2016f). As housing
grant was released in three installments, the technical inspection was mandatory
for three times: for recommending the second and last installments and for issuing
the completion certificate. The inspection checklist includes site specific situation,
housing shape, materials, foundation details, vertical members, plinth, wall, columns,
joints and roofing details. The ultimate objective was to ensure compliance to the
construction standards which would ensure resilience against all vulnerabilities. Any
deviation to such standards would be considered as non-compliance.
4.3.5 Major Non-compliant Features
WB Nepal collected non-compliant information through three agents: Development
Project Design and Services Ltd. (DPDS), Scott Wilson Nepal (SWN) and Mukesh &
Associates (Mukesh). The result is presented in Table 4.5.
Nearly half of the non-compliance was related to horizontal band, and five major
deviations: horizontal bands, story and attic height, openings, excess stories and rebar
occupy 80% of the total non-compliant cases. Some of the non-compliant cases are
shown in Fig. 4.6.
4.3.6 Reasons for Non-compliance
The result of telephone interview of house owners, technicians and political leaders
is presented in Table 4.6.
All prioritized causal factors need to be unpacked for contextualization. The
economic factor secured 0.77 as priority index, highest on the series. Respondents
opined that savings in the subsistence economy are rare and the housing grant of
US$3000 is not sufficient for constructing a normal house. Such situation compelled
house owners to economize expenditure wherever they felt is not essential. And the
worst victim was the horizontal band as shown in Table 4.5. Traditionally, such bands
were not used for the house construction which may have triggered feeling that a
house can sustain without them. In the absence of technological dexterity, the crucial
earthquake resistant element like horizontal band was grossly undermined. NRA
engineer’s ignorance on some of the critical earthquake know-how compounded
66
4 Understanding Building Code Non-compliance …
Table 4.5 Status of non-compliant features
S. No Major deviation
DPDSa
SWNb
Mukeshc
Total
1
Horizontal bands (absent,
discontinuities)
982
2091
745
3818
45.63
2
Floor and attic height
12
442
430
884
10.56
3
Openings (excess and improper)
38
580
78
696
8.32
4
Others
24
345
298
667
7.97
5
Excess story
247
230
16a7
644
7.70
6
Rebar
54
267
39
360
4.30
7
Beams and columns
62
111
112
285
3.41
8
Wall (inadequate span length, thickness, 23
and height)
231
24
278
3.32
9
Landslide prone area
7
189
38
234
2.80
10
Building shape
6
129
34
169
2.02
11
Plinth height
94
24
118S
1.41
12
Roof
27
69
96
1.15
13
Bracing
59
24
83
0.99
14
Incomplete house
34
34
0.41
15
Improper retrofitting
2
2
Total
1671
Source (WB 2020)
a = Development Project Design and Services Ltd.;
Associates, India
b
4615
2082
= Scott Wilson Nepal;
0.02
8368
c
%
100.00
= Mukesh &
with their inadequate field visits also played some role. It is widely suspected that
some of the homeowners-built house is not for the purpose of living there but to
secure housing grant only. Particularly migrated house owners wanted to retain their
foothold in the village for their accommodation during their annual trip.
4.4 Discussion
This heading deals with the underlying reasons behind non-compliance. In addition, characteristics of sample districts and dynamics in housing typology are also
elaborated. The central issues of discussion are the potential areas of intervention for improving access to finance, raising technological awareness and ensuring
administrative adherence. The land feature is also touched upon.
4.4 Discussion
67
Hollow Concrete Block Masonry
without vertical reinforcement
BMC building with discontinuous lintel band
Building constructed in landslide prone
area
Excess storey
elements
House without Gable Bands.
Extension of cantilever from lintel band
Heavy roofing material
Inadequate connection of wall with vertical concrete
post at corners
Missing roof level band
One room SMM building with
excessive attic height and opening
Placement of Horizontal Bands at wrong locations
than prescribed by NRA guideline
Slab on stone masonry building with
cement mortar without placement of beam
without
resilient
Fig. 4.6 Some illustration of non-compliant cases (Photo credit Scott Wilson Nepal 2022)
Table 4.6 Causal factors for
non-compliance
Causal factors
Priority index
Ranking
Economic
0.77
I
Technological
0.72
II
Administrative
0.58
III
Land
0.49
IV
Ethical
0.49
V
Human resources
0.37
VI
68
4 Understanding Building Code Non-compliance …
4.4.1 Characteristics of Sample Districts
First, it is important to understand characteristics of the districts from where noncompliance survey was conducted. All the sample districts were severely earthquake
affected and fall around the axis of the first trembler’s epicenter Barpak, Gorkha
district on 25 April 2015 and the second aftershock on 12 May 2015 at Singati of the
Dolakha district. The Kathmandu Valley’s three districts: Kathmandu, Lalitpur and
Bhaktapur, although severely affected, were not included in the survey which means
the non-compliance in the urban set up may not have been adequately captured.
Secondly, a majority of the sampled districts were hill and mountainous which may
not represent policy implications for the Terai districts.
4.4.2 Current Trend of Housing Construction
The traditional housing architecture, construction materials and technology are on
decline which are replaced by the reinforced concrete structure and stone mud mortar
with CGI sheet roofing. The NRA’s token support of US$500 to the heritage settlement houses (NRA 2018b) for maintaining at least the façade had limited success.
Crumbling down of a majority of load bearing structures by the 2015 earthquake
goaded people for reinforced structures. Moreover, low fire hazard, high timber
cost and structural flexibility of concrete structures contributed to bolster reinforced
structures. However, such reinforced concrete structures in the remote hamlets cost
horrendously as construction materials have to be transported by helicopters. Moreover, the western indoctrinated academic programs have no mention of the Nepal’s
indigenous construction techniques and materials. NRA’s persuasion for using traditional and indigenous construction materials with additional earthquake resistant
elements of plinth, sill, lintel and roof bands was not appealing for general public.
The recommended catalogs factored in the earthquake resistant elements but paid
little heed on household’s requirement and traditional architecture. With all these
factors, two models: RCC and load bearing structures with CGI sheet roofing have
been replacing all traditional housing models. This trend will remain unabetted which
requires formulating policies considering this inexorable trend.
4.4.3 Non-compliant Characteristics
Among 15 odd non-compliant issues, five deviations occupy more than 80% share
including band, floor height, openings, excess stories and rebar. Improper band
contributes more than 45% of total deviations for which awareness seems to be the
primary factor. No conscious house owner would intend to economize by reducing
thickness by one or two centimeters. Similar logic prevails for excessive or improper
4.4 Discussion
69
opening and rebar. However, attic floor height and excess story were outcome of
necessity. Brick mud mortar design allows only 37.5 cm tall side walls and 1.375 m
of the ridge height which does not allow a person with average height of 1.7 m to
stand on the first floor which triggers temptation to increase wall height.
4.4.4 Addressing Economic Issue
Economic as a causal factor for non-compliance can be ameliorated with several
interventions. First, raising technological awareness that low-cost local materials
can also make the earthquake resistant houses can minimize financial requirement
substantially. Secondly, salvaging earthquake damaged house materials also minimize financial requirement which requires proper skill for storing stone, timbers and
other construction materials. Designating proper quarry for stone, sand, aggregate
and regulating mines for sustainability and pricing ensure low cost but high-quality
construction materials. However, politicians and contractors’ nexus is believed to
have created cartel in the construction industry which is rather a structural issue.
Awareness and preparing ground for activism to fight against injustice and malpractices directly contribute toward lowering liability which, however, may realize only
in the long term. Aggregating demand of construction materials in the sparsely populated settlement could offer cost-effective deal with suppliers. This arrangement also
lowers transport cost and effort. However, it demands household’s own initiative or
handholding by external agency.
Access to credit always plays out against the boondocks population as their
property is not collateral worthy and their income does not guarantee repayment.
With severe financial constraint, they have strong temptation of a shelter which
sometimes compromises with longer term safety. Despite having leverage through
housing grant and opening their eyes up through intense awareness campaigns, NRA
could not ensure global compliance which signals challenges for future. Even if the
local governments introduce the building permit system all across the country, the
non-compliance among lower economic strata of people will perpetuate. The Kathmandu Metropolitan City, the most resourceful local government which introduced
the housing permit system long back, has only 6% houses as earthquake resistant
(Giri 2017) which demands a concerted effort.
The US Department of Agriculture provides loans, grants and loan guarantees
for single and multifamily housing (USDA 2022). It is supplemented with technical
assistance. Bhutan provides insurance premiums to the rural houses (MoF 2012).
Several other countries have identical insurance mechanisms with local customization. Such arrangement enhances housing resilience as the insurance company scrutinizes housing structural strength for withstanding tremblers. In case of unpredictable
damage, the insured household is prevented from financial trauma. It also reduces
government’s liability substantially.
For laying foundation of insurance, NRA kicked off initial steps for insuring the
reconstructed houses for which the insurance companies wanted upfront housing
70
4 Understanding Building Code Non-compliance …
premium. The NRA offered reimbursement model. The bone of contention was the
transactional cost for fielding insurance agents in scattered rural settlements and
convincing uneducated households of low-income bracket.
4.4.5 Raising Technological Awareness
The educated, well-connected and generally economically well-off households
comply with the building standards. On the other hand, the economically downtrodden and socially underprivileged are the most susceptible for non-compliance.
Having inadequate awareness is at the center of the entire spectrum of noncompliance. They would not have compromised on thickness of the horizontal bands
or rebar’s diameter if they would have knowledge that this frugality may cost their
own and their loved one’s lives. Even in the context of financial constraint, improperly placed windows and doors could have been prevented. Even though there are
economic dimensions in adding excess stories and floor attic, awareness would have
minimized such non-compliant issues considerably.
Sensing such potential problem, NRA initiated vigorous awareness campaign.
However, NRA was perceived as beneficiary of the engineering standards not households themselves. This distorted notion prompted non-compliance. The issue is how
to make households realize that the technical standards are meant for safeguarding
their own lives and properties not for the bureaucratic pleasure of government apparatus. For this, the message has to be disseminated in their own language and nature of
people. Directive, instructive with sophisticated language style was less productive.
4.4.6 Administrative Adherence and Observation of Ethical
Values
Despite a plethora of positive features of governing through elected representatives,
public grew their belief that they are immunized from administrative requirements.
The tantamount political pressure forced NRA to release housing grant to the noncompliant houses which were constructed prior to NRA’s mobilization of technicians
(NRA 2021a). The central and local politicians expressed their opinions against
damage grading and technical compliance. The federal parliament was interrupted
with demand of single tranche payment of housing grant which had to be responded
by the World Bank (THT 2016). Had the demand for single tranche enacted, the entire
resilience drive would have been foundered. The ineligible households networked
for accessing grant for which they received tacit support from the local government
(Khabarhub 2020). The local government’s ineptitude may have emanated from
paucity of municipal employees. All this chronological evidence suggests that the
4.5 Conclusion
71
political front was not supportive for complying with building standards which may
have contributed to violating generic construction standards.
4.4.7 Inappropriate Land
In addition to constructing earthquake resilient structures, the land on which a house
is positioned needs to be obviously robust for supporting structure. The NRA’s Technical Inspection Guidelines (NRA 2016c) require a parcel free from geological fault
and ruptured area, should have slope lesser than 30° , no visible symptoms of landslide,
reasonable distance from river and free from water logging. In addition, land must
be free from rock fall hazard and should not have liquefaction. However, this issue
is rather complicated than other structural parameters. A sizeable number of households in hilly and mountainous regions have excessive slope which is compounded
with other negative attributes. Such households selected the house construction site
as it was safer than other land under their possession. NRA provided land for the
vulnerable households without having suitable land for house construction, and such
households must have to vacate their vulnerable land. The government allocates
small land parcel which is just enough for constructing house, and such resettlement
site may not be located in close proximity to the original community which creates
tension for livelihood. In the future, resettlement must be planned along with the
provision of livelihood.
4.5 Conclusion
The analysis showed that the remote and marginalized households have higher probability of non-compliance with the housing standards. Compliance can be ensured
only with coordinated and integrated efforts. Mandatory building permit system in
urban as well as rural municipalities, conducting intensive technological awareness
and educating benefits of compliance are instrumental for making progress toward
resilient housing. As the de facto leading agencies, the local governments must have
to be capacitated particularly in the front of human resources with adequate handholding of the MoUD. Such awareness could be leveraged with some token financial
support as minnow which goads households for constructing new or strengthening
old houses. In addition, some policy reforms are indispensable for ameliorating
access to finance. Introduction of rural housing insurance, tailored housing loan and
grant packages and setting conditions for strengthening supply side of construction
materials such as sand, aggregate, timber, cement and reinforcement is required. The
households in vulnerable land require special attention as land and livelihoods are at
the stake.
Chapter 5
How Can Disaster Prone Mountainous
Municipalities Create Resilient
Settlements
Abstract A sizeable number of Nepal’s Himalayan, Hills and Terai households
have settled on vulnerable locations, and most of such settlements are impossible to
stabilize. The National Reconstruction Authority (NRA) implemented 73 integrated
settlements for vulnerable households from the earthquake triggered landslides. This
study intended to chart out for making progress toward landslide resilient society.
Four sample NRA implemented integrated settlements were studied. It was manifested that the integrated settlements help progressing toward resilient settlement.
However, small plot size, inadequate housing space and absence of effective livelihood provisions have limiting benefits. Scarcity of land and unavailability of financial
resources were the hindering factors. It was found that effective implementation of
land banking addresses the issue of land scarcity and minimizes liability of both
government and user. It benefits both land depositors and lessee. The government
has to establish the land banking system on rock solid legal basis. On the other hand,
the households need financial and technical handholding for at least initial few years.
With these arrangements, the nation will not only move toward resilient society but
also create basis of enhanced production. The land depositors and lessees both will
benefit from the enhanced production system.
Keywords Vulnerable · Integrated settlement · Land bank
5.1 Introduction
The fact that Nepal’s width of around 128 km with 59 m lowest point elevation at
Mukhiyapatti Musharniya Rural Municipality, Dhanusha district and 8848 m of the
Mount Everest located in the Solukhumbu district means nearly 7% gradient if the
land formation would have been uniformly sloped. However, the glacier fed rivers
gush from the world highest peaks through falls, slopes and plains. High gradient
slopes compounded with inappropriate land use and exacerbated by rampant spree
of haphazardly excavated rural roads contribute to create juggernaut for menacing all
settlements and infrastructures on riverbanks. Moreover, the climate change inflicted
accelerated snow melting process stokes the process further causing landslides and
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022
C. B. Shrestha, Building Back Better After the 2015 Nepal Earthquake,
Disaster Risk Reduction, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-6676-7_5
73
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flooding. The geologically fragile land mass cripples down during the event of
tremblers which was evident in the 2015 Gorkha Nepal earthquake.
Nepal suffers an average 500 disasters annually and take toll of physical infrastructure, livelihood and human lives (MoHA 2018a). MoHA further elucidates that
40,000 people lost their life during the period of 1971–2015 comprising of 2 deaths
per day. Adhikari et al. (2019) found that the disaster loss as a percentage point against
GDP ranges between 0.1 and 15.23. However, the 2015 Gorkha Nepal triggered
disaster loss to increase to 354.48% which obviously is exceptional.
In Nepal, landslides kill hundreds of people and ravage infrastructures annually.
During the period of 1972 to 2016, a total of 5190 people lost their lives due to 3419
landslides (Bhushal 2020). Forbes and Broadhead (Forbes and Broadhead 2011)
mentioned that Nepal is one of the highest landslide prone countries. Others are
China, Indonesia, India, the Philippines, Japan and Pakistan which account for 87%
of global landslides. The situation is further substantiated with the relief-web series
of articles (Reliefweb 2020) which mentions landslide triggered fatality rate and
destruction of houses.
International databases have also shown that natural hazards doubled from 2000
to 2009, in comparison to the period of 1980−1989 (Correa et al. 2011). The
upward trend was mainly induced by the hydrological factors rather than geological
which remained almost constant. Although disasters pummel with similar fashion to
countries irrespective of their developmental status, fatality rate and infrastructural
destruction remain at the lower level in the developed countries due to their effective
preparedness.
Resettlement approach depends upon a country’s legal system. It is extremely
convenient for the country like China where the government owns land. China
intended to restructure settlements and modernize infrastructure in the post 7.9 ML
2008 China-Wenchuan earthquake. China replaced mountain manufacturing industries with tourism enterprises, and almost all rustic population were shifted to urban
housing. Within the period of 3 years, two million rural and 290,000 urban housing
units were made available for accommodation (Yong et al. 2011). However, it would
be almost impossible to acquire private land in other countries. The resettlement in
Balkot of Pakistan turned out to be tough nut to crack which did not see the daylight
after 15 years of 2005 India-Kashmir earthquake (Ali 2020). Local people were not
receptive of the new settlers (Rahman and Khan 2013). Having constitutional right
for landownership, Nepal also follows the Pakistan route in land acquisition.
On one hand, steep slope inhabitants have been dying annually; on the other
hand, the geologically safe habitable land has been underutilized. Khanal (2018)
found about 40% of households had kept at least one of their farm plots uncultivated
for more than two consecutive years, and about 28% of the total farm plots owned by
the sampled households were kept fallow. Jaquet et al. (2019) further substantiated
fallow land in hilly region.
Mismatch between land deprivation of the marginalized population and increasing
trend of migration triggered fallow cultivable and habitable land has been the central
problem in rural Nepal. This phenomenon has been deterrent toward achieving
Sustainable Development Goals, degrading production potential and stagnating
5.3 Findings
75
economic growth. Hence, the objective of this chapter is to link post-earthquake
reconstruction experience of integrated settlement with activating land use-related
existing national policies and reforming deficient legal system.
5.2 Methodology
This chapter reviewed the Disaster Risk Reduction National Policy—2075 (2018),
Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Act—2074 (2017) and Disaster Risk
Reduction and Management Regulation—2076 (2019) and the Disaster Risk Reduction National Strategic Plan of Action (2018–2030). All national policies have indicated significance of the preventative measures for disaster risk reduction. However,
effective disaster risk reduction has to be underpinned by the scientific land use policies. With this respect, the GoN’s Land Use Policy—2075 (MoLRM 2015), Land
Use Act—2076 (Land Use Act 2076 2019) and Land Act (Amendment)—2076
(Act Related to Land 2020) were also reviewed. It is obvious that the NRA’s working
procedures on assessing vulnerability induced by the earthquake triggered landslides
were analyzed.
This paper used NRA conducted primary survey of the selected integrated settlements. Altogether 73 NRA’s integrated settlements adopted three different modalities: government as the sole implementor, NGO implemented and combination of
both. Some of the settlements were implemented in the public land; others were
constructed in the acquired private land. This study selected four cases: Kharanitar, Panipokhari, Thakle and Norbuling. The Kharanitar Integrated Settlement was
implemented jointly by an NGO and NRA. The NRA implemented the Panipokhari
Integrated Settlement. A community played crucial role in Norbuling Community,
while NGO played catalytic role in Thakle Integrated Settlement. It is expected that
these four sites represent the entire integrated settlement population. The integrated
settlement’s locations are shown in the Fig. 5.1.
5.3 Findings
This section reviews evolutionary process of integrated settlements, locating process
of vulnerable settlements, comparative overview of four NRA implemented integrated settlements and the legal provision of availing land for integrated settlements.
5.3.1 NRA Process of Integrated Settlements
The NRA promulgated the “Procedure Related to Integrated Settlement Development—2075 (2018) (NRA 2018c) which offered three options to the earthquake
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5 How Can Disaster Prone Mountainous Municipalities …
Fig. 5.1 Location of sampled integrated settlements
triggered landslide affected households: relocation of an entire settlement, selective
relocation and integrated settlement. Eligibility criteria for accommodating integrated settlements were household of vulnerable settlement, physically impaired
and elderly households and landless households. A minimum threshold size of 10
eligible households could propose for an integrated settlement for which NRA would
provide developed land. Alternatively, NRA had provision of land grant for households who intended to settle in their preferred location. There was a special provision
for the heritage settlement under which additional grant of NRs. 50,000 (US$500) per
household was provisioned. The procedure also mentioned about income generating
resources for the migrated households. A project proposal would require physical,
financial, social, economic, managerial, cultural and environmental aspects. The
NRA approved integrated settlement with households ranging between 10 and 99
had to be implemented by local governments. NRA would designate implementing
agency for the integrated settlement with households exceeding 100. Infrastructure development could be funded through per household grant of NRs. 500,000
(US$5000) for mountainous, NRs. 400,000 (US$4000) for hilly and NRs. 300,000
(US$3000) for urban hilly and Terai Region. The basic infrastructural standards in
the integrated settlement are presented in Table 5.1.
5.3.2 Identification of Vulnerable Settlements
Xu (2018) concluded that 2015 Gorkha Nepal earthquake triggered at least 47,200
landslides occupying a total area about 110 km2 resulting 964 million cubic meters
of debris. Rosser et al. (2021) located 20,000 odd landslides in 14 districts triggered
by 2015 ML 7.8 Gorkha Nepal earthquake. They further conducted time-series landslide mapping to monitor the evolution of coseismic landslides and the initiation
5.3 Findings
Table 5.1 Basic standards of
infrastructure in integrated
settlement
77
Infrastructure
Standard
Road
Road: 4 m; and Main
Trail—1.2 m
Drinking water
1 tap for 7 households
Sewerage and drainage
surface drain and sewerage
Open space
80 m2 space for 20 housing units
Housing plot
Minimum area and frontage as
prescribed by the local body
Solid waste management
• 1 toilet one household
• Public toilet (male and female)
School
One primary school
Health services
One health center
Building bylaws
As per the local government rules
of new post-seismic landslides. They concluded that landslide hazard was higher
in November 2019 as compared to immediately after the 2015 earthquake. The
MoHA collected the earthquake triggered landslide impacted settlements immediately after the trembler. Having inconclusive identification of MoHA study, the NRA
studied all earthquake triggered landslides scientifically and divided settlements into
three categories: Category I: safe for reconstruction; Category II: safe after installing
safety measures; and Category III: unsafe for reconstruction–resettlement inevitable.
The NRA guidelines for the field investigation of earthquake-impacted vulnerable
settlements consisted of: assessment of geological, geomorphological, engineering
geological, geotechnical and pertinent social parameters (NRA 2016h). The objective of these guidelines was to evaluate the state of geohazards. The study team
comprised of engineering geologist, civil engineer and watershed engineer.
The geological study began with the preparatory study by locating vulnerable
settlements on the Google Map, reviewed geological map and cross section supplemented by relevant literature review. The field data collection included: settlement information, problem statement (tendency of mass movement, cracks, overhanging rocks, seepage, flooding), landslide details, landslide impacts, geotechnical
aspect of landslide and geological and geomorphological information. Based on all
these features, the study team comes up with recommendations. Other pertinent
information was also collected such as possibility of temporary shelter.
5.3.3 Transition from Geological Study to Integrated
Settlement
This section presents four case studies: Kharanitar in Nuwakot, Panipokhari in
Dolakha, Norbuling and Thakle in Sindhupalchowk district.
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A. Kharanitar Integrated Settlement
In Tadi Rural Municipality of the Nuwakot district, the village of Kalche, Thing Tole,
Syangtan Tole, Chihan Dada and Chhelun Village were hard hit by the earthquake
triggered landslides (Silwal 2016). These narrow plane tracts bordering with steep
cliffs on both mountain and valley sides lie on the gentle slope of colluvium soil.
Rock fall, shallow slide on steep slope and mudslide in the thick colluvium soil are
common characteristics in these settlements. The 2015 Gorkha Nepal earthquake
reactivated the old landslides with fresh shallow sheeted landslides. Unmanaged
drainage system exacerbated the earthquake instigated fissures which caused land
subsidence in the Khalche area. About 80 houses in Kalche, Thing Tole, Syangtan
Tole and Chihan Danda required relocation, and Chhelun Village requires mitigating
measures such as managing run-off drainage system and cracks needed burying.
Figure 5.2 shows Map of Tadi Rural Municipality with landslides indicated with red
color and resettlement options with blue color.
Based on the geological study, NRA declared Urleni Village as Category III
settlement which required relocation. The landslide affected households identified Kharanitar as the appropriate location for resettlement which was identified
as safer from natural disaster perspective. The NRA’s geological study approved
the river valley paddy land for the integrated settlement. This is a unique example
of joint collaboration of NRA, Oxfam—Great Britain, UKAid and the Tadi Rural
Fig. 5.2 Landslide zones in the tadi rural municipality
5.3 Findings
79
Municipality. NRA procured land, Oxfam provided technical assistance and housing
grant, and UKAid assisted for water supply system. The Tadi Rural Municipality
constructed the approach road (Shrestha and Bhatta 2021). The Integrated Settlement Development Committee with Oxfam’s handholding constructed 71 houses
for the displaced households. The Kharanitar Integrated Settlement Master Plan is
shown in Fig. 5.3. Figures 5.4 and 5.5 show the integrated settlement after handing
over to the households.
The beauty of this integrated settlement was access to the river basin’s irrigated
fertile land for cultivation on sharecropping basis. In addition, having proximity to the
market center, the displaced people obtained employment opportunity as construction workers. Others were engaged in the Oxfam imparted skill of weaving. Integrating migrants in a new locality was a challenge particularly for sharing the natural
resources and waste disposal. However, the Oxfam incentivized through shared
public utilities such as water and educated locals about the abundant labor supply
which enhanced economic efficiency.
The abandoned land by migrated people is in abundant supply in Nepal. Normally,
such people who leave behind their property in the rural village either refrain from
selling because of their psychological attachment or land is not on demand as everybody waits for migrating opportunity. The deprived households fail to secure adequate
resources for migrating which compels them to continue in vulnerable locations. A
state-level facilitation proved to be catalytic for transforming livelihood and living
standard as a whole.
Fig. 5.3 Master plan of the Kharanitar integrated settlement
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Fig. 5.4 An overview of the
Kharanitar settlement
Fig. 5.5 Individual house
B. Panipokhari Integrated Settlement
The Bosimpa Village is located in the Bhimeshwor Municipality (former Suspa
Ksamawati Village Development Committee) of the Dolakha district which accommodated 70 households. Earthquake triggered cracks formed two major landslides
(Maskey et al. 2017). A landslide originated from upslope of the village deposited
debris on the small stream flowing through the middle of the village and merged with
another landslide on the downslope. Both landslides converged on the Sundrawati
River. The steep downfall triggered erosion at massive scale. After casualty of two
villagers, loss of cattle, property and having defined as Category III settlement,
the discussion on resettlement was initiated for accommodating 84 households
of Bosimpa and Buma Village. The community leaders and politicians identified
Panipokhari as an appropriate site for the integrated settlement which was ratified
by the Chief District Officer with his NRA delegated authority. NRA conducted
geological study testified the site for settlement.
Developed in the government land, the Panipokhari Integrated Settlement with
an area of 38,200 m2 . accommodates 78 households from Bosimpa Village which is
located at a distance of 2 km away from their original home settlement. Each family
5.3 Findings
81
is allocated 127−191 m2 of land which is sufficient for 2–3 roomed house and a small
kitchen garden. However, land area does not ensure livelihood. The households have
been rearing their cattle in the original village and cultivate their own land which is
cumbersome as commuting requires about one hour. Having two prototype buildings,
the settlement also has community center, children sport ground and a park with open
space. A 3.7 m wide road, two schools, a health post and a temple are the attraction
of this settlement. It enjoys proximity to the Charikot Market Centre, the Dolakha
district headquarters. The Panipokhari Master Plan is presented in Figs. 5.6 5.7 and
5.8 show the houses and infrastructure in the settlement.
C. Thakle Integrated Settlement
Unlike to Kharanitar and Panipokhari, Thakle settlement was developed to integrate sparsely distributed settlements not because of earthquake triggered landslide’s
menace. Thakle followed more of the land pooling concept. Located in Ward 9 of the
Melamchi Municipality of the Sindhupalchok district, the local leaders promoted the
concept of the integrated settlement and convened a meeting of 31 households for
seeking their interest for proceeding toward the integrated settlement. After securing
consent for land pooling of 6107 m2 of land, the local government submitted a
proposal to NRA for approval. Figure 5.9 shows masterplan of the Thakle Integrated
Settlement.
The NRA’s geological study confirmed that the site is safe against natural disasters.
This settlement also enjoyed external support from Oxfam-Great Britain. Thirtyone land parcels of 127.23–190.84 m2 were demarcated. Five aspirants from other
scattered settlement also joined in the integrated settlement against NRs. 120,000
(US$1020) for a plot. The single-storied houses consisted of living cum dining room,
two bedrooms and a toilet. Attic floor was used for storage. Self-made interlocking
cement blocks were used for walls with CGI sheet roof. The salvaged stones of
old houses were recycled. The Oxfam contributed NRs, 725,000 (US$7500) toward
total housing cost of NRs. 11,00,000 (US$11,000). Owners mitigated the rest. The
households have constructed livestock sheds in their own land. Six-meter-wide stone
paved internal road and 24 h water supply were funded by the National Reconstruction
Authority. In addition, other infrastructure such as community house, main gate, solar
light and railing was also included in NRA’s infrastructural grant of NRs. 14,000,000
(US$14,000). Figures 5.10, 5.11, 5.12 and 5.13 show housing and other infrastructure
in the Thakle settlement. For livelihood, the Oxfam sponsored trips to Taragaon and
Madi inspired settlement households for initiating homestay which is up and running
but has marred by the COVID-19.
D. Norbuling Integrated Settlement
The 2015 earthquake triggered landslide displaced 11 households in Gijet Village
which paved the way for establishing Norbuling Integrated Settlement in the
Kharkadanda. Located at the elevation of 2250 m, the settlement initially was
intended for 128 households who wanted to enjoy conglomerate milieu. However,
only 35 Hyolmo and 6 Hindu Sunar households could make inroads to the formation
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Fig. 5.6 Master plan of the Panipokhari integrated settlement
5.3 Findings
83
Fig. 5.7 Prototype houses in
Panipokhari
Fig. 5.8 Some glimpses of
infrastructure
of Norbuling Integrated Settlement. The 11 vulnerable households received NRA’s
NRs. 200,000 (US$2000) housing grant; other 30 households had to cough their own
resources up for land purchase. The integrated settlement with an area of above one
hectare land was bell weathered by 7 membered committee with 3 female representations. The Oxfam’s technical assistance for designing floor space had to be revised
integrating spiritual requirement of worshipping. All south faced houses with floor
area of 83.64 m2 consist of a bedroom, kitchen cum worshipping room and a toilet.
Cement stone masonry walls with CGI sheet roofing are the general construction
standard. NRA’s infrastructural support of NRs. 12,600,000 (US$126,000) was used
for road, school building and other infrastructure. Unlike to Thakle and Panipokhari,
the Norbuling households rear their livestock in their own premises. Figures 5.14,
5.15, 5.16 and 5.17 show various façades of the Norbuling Integrated Settlement.
Norbuling households have quite ambitious future plans which include joint livestock and poultry farming in a 20-ha land, commissioning a brewery and installing
33 m tall Buddha statue on a surrounding hilltop which they hope will promote
tourism.
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Fig. 5.9 Master plan of the Thakle integrated settlement
Fig. 5.10 A view of Thakle
integrated settlement
5.3 Findings
Fig. 5.11 Closer view of
housing
Fig. 5.12 A prototype house
Fig. 5.13 Community hall
Fig. 5.14 Norbuling
integrated settlement
85
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5 How Can Disaster Prone Mountainous Municipalities …
Fig. 5.15 A typical
norbuling house
Fig. 5.16 An overview of
road and houses
Fig. 5.17 School building
5.3.4 Comparative Overview of Integrated Settlements
All the integrated settlements were commissioned with the same working procedure.
However, all of them customized with the local reality. Table 5.2 has captured the
data from Sect. 5.3 which depicts variation against different parameters.
The integrated settlements have two different objectives: to resettle the vulnerable households and offer agglomerate economy by encouraging sparsely populated households to join a viable settlement. Resettling vulnerable households to
a safer location is the state responsibility which does not require further elaboration. However, promoting agglomerate economy is the development objective which
5.3 Findings
87
Table 5.2 Variation of settlements against various parameters
Comparators
Kharanitar
Panipokhari
Thakle
Norbuling
Settlement type
Resettlement
Resettlement
In situ
Resettlement
2
0
1
Government land
Land
readjustment
Procured private
land
Distance from the 16
original
settlement (km)
Land
Procured private
land
Household nos
71
78
31
41
Dominating
Tamang
ethnic households
Thami
Tamang
Hyolmo
Total land area
(m2 .)
19,703.42
38,200
6107
10,178.43
Lead
implementing
agency
Oxfam
NRA
Oxfam
Community
Supporting
agencies
NRA, DFID,
TRM
No
NRA
NRA
Cattle shed
No
No
No
Yes
Livelihood
Sharecropping
Original village
land
Original land
Original village
land
enhances economic efficiency by delivering services rather efficiently. Following the
2008 Wenchuan earthquake, the Chinese government used that event as an opportunity for accelerating ongoing policies including concentrating rural residents into
new urban centers and urbanization of the existing cities (Johnson and Olshansky
2016). Nepal could not restructure rural space at the Chinese standard but piloted
ideas which can be replicated later. Among four cases, Kharanitar, Panipokhari and
Norbuling fall under state’s responsibility of resettling vulnerable people, but Thakle
represented a move toward urbanization of the rustic sparsely populated settlement.
One of the crucial factors connected to resettlement and livelihood is the distance
between the original village and the resettlement site. The households in Panipokhari,
Thakle and Norbuling cultivate their own land in the vulnerable zone which facilitates
their livelihood tremendously. However, the distance of 16 km between the original
and newly relocated area of Kharanitar deters cultivating households’ ancestral land.
The market value of such land is almost zero after migration of all villagers. Fortunately, the Kharanitar settlers had access to the tropical fertile river valley irrigated
land. However, such opportunities may not prevail for all victims.
There is interesting revelation that all resettlers are found to have janajati background. There are three interpretations: First, the janajati settlements are vulnerable.
Although these four-settlement sample size is too small for stating this fact with
confidence, the anecdotal evidence suggests that the probability of Janajaties and
Dalits settling down in vulnerable area is quite high. Either it could be their preferential area or they might have been an intergenerational process of marginalization.
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Secondly, Janajaties are more cohesive in the community and they normally take
collective decision which makes it easier to live and share facilities together. Thirdly,
they are physically competent for contributing labor. The future policies have to be
informed with these determinant factors.
Among four case settlements, Panipokhari has a highest land coverage followed
by Kharanitar. Norbuling and Thakle which have second, third and fourth rank,
respectively. Having government land, the Panipokhari settlers could acquire large
swath of land as immediate liability was zero. The Kharanitar settlement area was
basically determined by the number of households, and the land was procured by
the NRA. The Norbuling followed the Kharanitar suit. Thakle followed largely land
pooling principle; hence, the households pooled according to their need. The availability of land in the mountainous region is arduous and particularly in the vicinity
of the vulnerable settlement which demands creative solution like Kharanitar.
NRA’s role was omnipotent in all reconstruction-related interventions which may
slightly delude the discussion. However, in spite of the NRA’s overall accountability,
there was a variation in implementation. For example, Oxfam was mandated by NRA
for handholding in Kharanitar and Thakle. Having limited scope of intervention,
Oxfam exercised flexibility in terms of housing grant which provided more than
NRs. 700,000 (US$7000) to each household whereas NRA’s upper limit was NRs.
300,000 (US$3000). Oxfam also enjoyed supporting other ancillary activities which
were beyond NRA’s rigid protocol as it had to ensure egalitarianism across its scope.
Consequently, Oxfam supported settlements seem more attractive in comparison
to NRA grant recipient settlements such as Panipokhari and Norbuling. Although
supporting mechanism in Panipokhari and Norbuling was similar, Norbuling had
rather intensive community engagement which is reflected in the matrix above.
With respect to the supporting agencies, Kharanitar enjoyed multiplicity of agencies as the intervention was quite challenging and capital hungry. Other settlements
have generic supporting agency mostly NRA as the institution behind all integrated
settlement interventions.
Traditionally, cattle shed used to be close to the house for convenience for feeding,
milking and taking care of the livestock. However, convenience was earned at the
cost of health hazard which prompted integrated settlements to maintain distance
with the barn, which was also practiced in Kharanitar, Thakle and Panipokhari. The
only settlement it allowed was the Norbuling. Nonetheless, Norbuling has a grand
plan of cooperative farming in an area of 20 ha. After materializing this ambitious
plan, they may remove their byre. Second determinant factor is the land size. NRA’s
policy allowed only NRs. 200,000 (US$2000) as land grant which could procure
only small land parcel of around 100−300 m2 . which could accommodate only a
house of reasonable size. This factor forced either abandon idea of rearing livestock
or have provision away from home.
Success of integrated settlements is contingent upon the livelihood opportunity
which seems to be the Achilles heel for all NRA promoted settlements. This situation
is identical in other countries as well (Bradlow et al. 2011). Bradlow et al. found that
the small houses which are far from livelihoods and services were found not appropriate policy interventions. Pakistan also witnessed similar reality (Ali 2020). Out
5.3 Findings
89
of four cases, three settlement households cultivate their ancestral land which they
abandoned with the earthquake triggered landslide. However, the remaining land has
been used for cultivation which perpetuates their livelihood albeit with some distance
created inconvenience. Kharanitar settlement is surrounded by the abandoned fertile
land. With sharecropping arrangement, both the migrated landowners and newly
settled households found symbiotic benefits.
5.3.5 Resettlement in the New Legal Context
The National Land Policy—2019 (MoLMCPA 2019) has defined four landownership types: private, trust, government and public. The private land if required for
public good needs to go through land acquisition act (Land Acquisition Act 2034
1977). Acquiring trust land also requires compensation. The government land can
be used for the public good with cabinet decision. However, the NRA enjoyed that
cabinet’s authority as per the act related to the reconstruction of earthquake damaged
infrastructure 2072 (An Act Made To Provide For Reconstruction of the Earthquake
Affected Structures 2015).
With NRA’s abrogation, the local governments are mandated to prepare their land
use plan based on Ministry of Land Management, Cooperative and Poverty Alleviation (MoLMCPA) prepared land use map. In the absence of the MoLMCPA land use
map, the local governments have to work on the available most recent topographic
map where geohazards have to be indicated clearly. The local governments may replicate NRA’s settlements’ risk-based category: I, II and III. The safe settlements can
continue in situ; the Category II settlements require mitigating measures for which
resources have to be earmarked. There has to be provision for safe land for Category
III households as they must be relocated.
However, the central question is where to relocate those vulnerable households.
As NRA practiced, there are two possibilities: procure private land or allocate government land. The availability of habitable government land is pretty limited (Adhikari
2008) which necessitates to buy private land which entails a huge government
liability. Moreover, having small land parcel size, the government procured land
do not ensure agro-based livelihoods. For this, the Kharanitar Integrated Settlement
could be a trailblazer. Although the homesteads were installed in the NRA procured
land, sharecropping of surroundings land has proven win–win arrangement for both
landowners, tenants and the entire society.
The MoLMCPA introduced concept note on the land bank is a glimmer of
hope for settling down and engaging them in meaningful employment opportunities
(MoLMCPA 2020). The concept note was introduced in the context of underutilization of land triggered by the rural–urban migration which has been leading to
the verge of food insecurity. Under such circumstances, a municipality can establish
a land bank collecting expression of interest from landowners who are unable to
cultivate themselves for depositing their land to the land bank. The total inventory
of such land needs to be publicized and based on which the interested individuals
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can bid for using such land. The terms and conditions for owners and land users
should be defined by the local government. It is obvious that the land user should be
allowed to construct farmhouse in the leased land. In addition, an explicit provision
of handholding for constructing farm facilities in the newly occupied land would be
indispensable.
5.4 Discussion
The development objective of consolidating sparsely populated households in a
compact rural settlement has been government’s policy objective (NPC 2013). The
NRA Act (An Act Made To Provide For Reconstruction of the Earthquake Affected
Structures 2015) also emphasized the promotion of the integrated settlements. Consequently, NRA translated this noble objective to the reality by realizing 73 integrated
settlements. After NRA’s termination, it is opportune time to look back NRA’s
integrated settlement policies which needs to be contextualized in the long-term
development perspective.
5.4.1 Conceptualizing Paraphernalia of Integrated
Settlement
First of all, the NRA concept of integrated settlement was perceived from urban
angle as there was no provision for cattle shed which is indispensable in rural set up
not only for direct consumption but also for agricultural manure. Norbuling allowed
cattle shed attached to the house, but Thakle and Panipokhari households used their
original village land for the barn. Kharanitar had no choice but to relinquish rearing
cattle. Unlike to Thakle and Panipokhari, it was not possible for them to use the
original land as a distance of 16 km was real deterrent factor. The key informants
of all settlements have the opinion that adjacent barn to house creates health and
hygiene problems at the cost of efficiency of feeding, milking and overseeing.
Another issue was the nexus between the housing space and construction cost.
With NRA provided land of 127.23−190.84 m2 and grant of US$3000 prohibited
them to construct adequately spacious house. Particularly, disposable income of the
vulnerable households is nominal. Consequently, they satisfied NRA with small
compliant house with respect to the construction standards but they conjured real
intention of vertical and horizontal extension after NRA’s termination which may
not be earthquake resilient. What mechanism will enable households for constructing
adequately spacious house while complying with earthquake resilient construction
standards is the central issue to grapple with.
5.4 Discussion
91
5.4.2 Identifying and Planning for Vulnerable Settlements
A number of areas are defined as vulnerable by the Department of Geology which
are prohibited for housing construction (MoUD 2015). In addition, the land with
geological fault or ruptured area and swampy and reclaimed land from lakes and
ponds are also vulnerable. Land exceeding 30° slope within 10 m from small stream
and 30 m from perennial river is also risky. The houses constructed in such lands
can be defined as vulnerable settlement. However, the local government has to organize a study team consisting of engineering geologist, civil engineer and watershed
management expert for ascertaining the vulnerability of a given spot.
For addressing the issue more systematically, a topographic map of the municipality has to be taken as base map where updated information from the satellite
map and other supplementary information should be populated. The vulnerability
status layer has to categorize the entire municipal space for housing purpose as: safe,
requiring mitigating measures and unsafe. The households in the unsafe zones have
to be evacuated and settled down in other safe zones. The zone requiring mitigating
measures is straight forward as the intervention measures can be integrated in the
municipal development budget.
5.4.3 Securing Land for Resettlement
In four sampled settlements, three different models were adopted. Kharanitar and
Norbuling procured the private land. Panipokhari was settled on the government
land, whereas Thakle adopted land pooling. However, all these settlements allocated
below 200 m2 of land which is inadequate for livelihood. Under these circumstances,
an innovative approach has to be adopted. Among various possibilities, provision of
land bank seems the most promising one. There are some reservations from different
quarters (THT 2020) who are of opinion that the small holders will be disadvantaged
with this arrangement. This arrangement they opine will benefit to the industrial
establishment and subsequently decrease agricultural land. Although the debate has
to continue and need to ensure that the underutilized and abandoned land has to be
used for the productive purpose. Kharanitar has demonstrated miniature evidence
that such land banking system works if administered and regulated properly.
The land bank seems to be an appropriate medium for allowing access to the
vulnerable people who must have to be evacuated from their ancestral land. On
the other hand, the migration triggered unproductive fallow land has potential for
converting as productive parcels. This requires legal, administrative and psychological handling, and the local governments must set examples. At least one successful
example will pave the way for mass scale replication.
The evacuated households should have offered option for individual or collective
leasing arrangement. It is sensible to initiate cooperative which necessitates commitment from all members and ensure discipline for justice. The motivated cooperatives
92
5 How Can Disaster Prone Mountainous Municipalities …
will have synergistic effect producing and marketing more outputs than the total
sum of individual production. However, this theoretical proposition may not work in
reality as individualistic tendency is in the upbringing of all Nepali individuals. This
issue requires voluntary picking rather than directive decision.
The land availability for land banking purpose has to be integrated in the municipal
plan. In addition, the legal basis has a number of loose ends which requires mending.
5.4.4 Initial Investment and Operating Capital
The weakest façade of the NRA’s resettlement was the absence for livelihood investment. Although there is a desultory proposition for livelihood in the NRA’s working
procedure, the real support package is ringfenced for land, housing and infrastructure
(NRA 2018c). The commercial banks will not accept the lease land as collateral, and
vulnerable households’ repayment remains up in the air at least for the initial first few
years. During this transitional period, the small holder production unit needs direct
handholding in terms of finance and technical assistance. For this, support has to be
tailored based on the individual requirement which demands flexible support package
not the rigid and uniform government support packages. NGOs have successful track
record under such circumstances. The NRA’s best practice that government support
for procuring land, housing and installing infrastructure and NGO’s support for technical assistance and initial operating capital seems sensible. Oxfam’s handholding in
Kharanitar and Thakle demonstrated that blending of government support provisions
with the NGOs soft power yields synergistic outcome.
5.4.5 Ethnic Dimension in Resettlement
All four vulnerable vis-a-vis integrated settlements belong to the Janajati communities: Tamang,Thami and Hyolmo. Normally, it is believed that the Janajati communities are marginalized socially, culturally, economically and politically. Constituting
nearly 36% of the national population, they have little control over their ancestral
land and resources which led them to live with poverty, ignorance and illiteracy
(Jha 2019). Through this historical reason, they live in the vulnerable marginalized
land. Due to their tribal social fabric, Janajaties are extremely loyal to their leaders
who are nominated through their traditions. This leadership style converges toward
uniformity in approach which is instrumental for living together in the compact environment. In addition, Janajaties are physically active and strong which enables them
to contribute precious labor for the integrated settlement.
Not among the four samples but there is a sizeable Dalit community as well in the
integrated settlement. Dalits are further disadvantaged than Janjaties as they are on
5.5 Conclusion
93
the last rung of caste system. However, they have traditional skills for making agricultural tools, household utensils, jewelry, handicrafts and stitching and weaving which
will enable them to establish various cottage industries in the integrated settlements.
5.5 Conclusion
This chapter studied four integrated settlements which were implemented with
slightly different modalities. The post-earthquake experience of integrated settlement shows that it is vitally significant intervention for moving toward the resilient
society. Overlooking scattered households on the steep mountain slope with utterly
subsistence farming perpetuates their acute poverty which definitely deters country’s
commitment on the Sustainable Development Goals and national objectives of
ensuring accessible modern infrastructure and intensive connectivity and development and full utilization of the human capital potential. Although the post-earthquake
reconstruction acted as trailblazer, there are a number of areas for further improvements. Small plot size, insufficient housing space and, moreover, no active provision for livelihoods were some of them. Unavailability of land in the disaster-prone
mountains and hills and financial paucity of vulnerable households are recognized
as constraints. However, the Kharanitar Integrated Settlement showed possibility of
using fallow abandoned land triggered by the rural–urban migration. The newly introduced land banking system will kill three birds with one bullet: utilization of fallow
abandoned land bolstering national production, disaster preparedness by shifting
vulnerable households to safer zones and efficiency in delivering basic services.
All these goodies will lead toward more happy and prosperous society. However,
additional firming up of land banking is essential. In the transitional phase, the
local governments may consider taking forward with the prevailing legal system.
Secondly, there is a need of a clear strategy for constructing required infrastructure,
constructing houses and securing livelihood opportunities in the integrated settlement. Nepal’s reconstruction proved that the governmental hardware support needs
to go hand in hand with NGO’s soft power.
Chapter 6
Scoping Urban Regeneration
from Post-earthquake Reconstruction
Lens
Abstract After experiencing sluggish urban housing progress, the National Reconstruction Authority (NRA) unpacked binding constraints as small parcel size and
acute dearth of finance. This paper intended to chart out way forward for removing
binding constraints and make progress toward urban renewal. Data collected from
an urban study during the NRA stint is further analyzed. International and national
experience of urban renewal has been contextualized for exploring future prospect.
Based on the analysis, it is concluded that the implementation of existing legal provisions will not bear fruition rather a radical intervention of “redevelopment and land
readjustment” has ample leverage for transformation. For implementing this concept,
a municipality promoted powerful Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) seems the most
appropriate institution which can be funded through municipal, provincial and federal
transfer, private sector and proceeds from the sales of additional space that can be
created with limited vertical extension of private buildings. The transitional period
has to be managed with conserving public and private heritage elements which can
be achieved with the existing legal frameworks.
Keywords Municipality · Constraints · Urban renewal · Heritage · Special
purpose vehicle
6.1 Introduction
Out of the world population of 7.63 billion in 2018, the urban population consisted
of 4.22 billion (55.3%) which will reach to nearly 62% in 2030 and 68% in 2050
with the global total population of 9.77 billion (UN 2018). Nepal’s course is no
different from the world trend. Out of total 29,192,480, the urban population reached
to 66.8% in 2021 (CBS 2022). Actual urban population could be slightly lesser than
stated as some of the rural settlements are declared as urban municipalities. Irrespective of some degree of misinterpretation, the population density in the Kathmandu Metropolitan City (KMC) exceeded 5000 per km2 and other cities have been
following the suit.
The urban centers are not prepared to receive such a rural urban exodus. Moreover, the Kathmandu Valley core urban streets which evolved during the last two
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022
C. B. Shrestha, Building Back Better After the 2015 Nepal Earthquake,
Disaster Risk Reduction, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-6676-7_6
95
96
6 Scoping Urban Regeneration from Post-Earthquake …
millenniums were not designed for such a population pressure. Consequently, the
urban core—the engine of the entire urban and rural economy has been decaying.
Rai (2022) argues that the deterioration of heritage settlements leading to abandonment and loss of cultural heritage allows or even encourages for modernization which
instigates irreversible damage to the inherent spirit.
Rimal et al. (2017) monitored urban growth and conducted cross-sectional analysis of Kathmandu Valley. They confirmed that the Kathmandu’s urban coverage
increased from 20.19 km2 in 1996 to 139.57 km2 in 2015, a growth of 7 times.
With this, they indicated high risk for the Kathmandu Valley which demands urgent
compatible land use planning.
Moreover, the post-earthquake reconstruction in urban center in general and the
Kathmandu Valley in particular has remained sluggish. By 2021 January, when nearly
70% houses outside of the Kathmandu Valley were completed, the Valley could
achieve only 39%. Shrestha et al. (2021) found that the financial and land-related
constraints were the major culprit. It is suspected that some of the houses in urban core
will never be completed as the land parcels are below municipality’s threshold size
and concerned households have meager source of income from informal sources.
Pandey (2021) confirmed that financial tools play a crucial role for safeguarding
Kathmandu’s decay.
Under such circumstance, devising way out toward revitalizing urban centers for
serving the dependent population while retaining the existing population in situ is
the major objective of this chapter. Retaining aboriginal population is indispensable
for conserving heritage and perpetuating non-tangible heritage.
6.2 Methodology
The HRRP with NRA’s support collected the primary data for finding out reasons for
the lackluster progress in urban centers. Mainly, Focus Group Discussion (FGD) and
Key Informants Interview (KII) were used. The FGDs were conducted in Lalitpur,
Bhaktapur, Ramechhap, Dhading, Dolakha, Kavrepalanchowk and Gorkha districts.
The major objective of FGD was to identify the binding constraints for urban housing
reconstruction.
In addition, an Internet-based survey was conducted for collecting international
experience on urban renewal. Particularly, the World Bank’s compilation of best
practices from Ahmedabad, Buenos Aires, Johannesburg, Santiago, Seoul, Shanghai,
Singapore and Washington DC was used extensively. The international experience
was collated with Nepal’s own experiences of Bhaktapur and Bandipur municipalities
and two projects in the Lalitpur district: WB funded urban regeneration project
and local philanthropist promoted Pilachhen Project. Based on international and
national experience, an urban renewal model is proposed. A telephonic interview
was conducted with 6 community leaders—two each from three Kathmandu Valley
districts and 6 technicians—two each from the Kathmandu Valley district. Some of
6.3 Findings
97
the policy reviews were drawn from the NRA study on Proposed Urban Recovery
Strategies.
6.3 Findings
This section presents constraints of urban housing including the issue of retrofitting
and provisions of urban settlements. In addition, how post-earthquake urban housing
was handled in five representative countries and what elements of global experience
in urban regeneration could be relevant for Nepal are also elucidated.
6.3.1 Constraints in Urban Housing
Fifty urban constraints were identified and categorized in 10 cluster (Shrestha et al.
2021): finance, heritage, land, masons, NRA process and policy, reconstruction
technology, retrofitting, communication, vulnerable beneficiaries and women. This
chapter discarded the reconstruction-related temporary phenomena and only factored
in the structural issues such as access to finance and land.
The urban households who failed to reconstruct their houses were found to be
employed in the informal sectors such as street vendors and daily wage earners who
are not eligible to secure loan from the formal banks. In addition, such households
have joint housing ownership which makes the property unfit for collateral.
GoN introduced soft loan for the period of 5–10 years with 2% interest rate
(BFIRD 2015). The Kathmandu households were eligible for US$25,000, and nonKathmandu households were provisioned for US$15,000. Such loans were immunized with additional charges, but banking regulations prevailed which means the
bankable property with repayment capacity of the prospective loanee. After realizing
the contradiction with central bank’s other provisions, the soft loan was rescinded
and was replaced with another package of concessional loan (MoF 2018). Under
this new provision, a household would receive US$3000 with about 7% interest rate.
However, only 1534 earthquake affected households benefitted out of more than
800,000 (MR 2019) and it is suspected that the affluent households benefitted from
this provision. Only 200 households enjoyed the second offer (NRARD 2018). This
shows that the penurious urban households must have radical offer rather than the
existing formal provisions.
Land is another constraining factor for urban housing. A parcel must have to
be 80 m2 for house construction. However, city core households fail to meet this
requirement (Wily et al. 2009). The dwelling size decreased from 55 m2 in 2001
to 52 m2 in 2011 (CBS 2012). Shrestha et al. (2021) mentioned that around 15%
urban housing stock fail to meet official threshold parcel size. There are a myriad
cases concerning landownership which restricts households constructing their houses
(Nougaret and Danuwar 2016; Shrestha 2022). The third land-related issue is the
98
6 Scoping Urban Regeneration from Post-Earthquake …
Right of Way (RoW) as there are several conflicting parallel RoW standards. The
Kathmandu Valley Development Authority (KVDA) standard is 11 m, whereas the
Ministry of Federal Affairs and General Administration (MoFAGA) and the MoUD
standards are 6 m, and in exceptional cases, it can be lowered down to 4 m with setback
width of 1.5 m (Standard for Settlement Development, Urban Planning and Housing
Construction, 2072 2015). There is another standard for the heritage settlements
which follows existing footprints but the setback width is 1 m (MoUD 2015).
6.3.2 Lackluster Response to Retrofitting
Despite policy framework and technical ground works, NRA’s progress in retrofitting
remained at the basic level (NRA 2021e). Moreover, the retrofitting technology for
urban row housing is yet to be fully established which led insignificant number of
urban retrofitting. The NRA survey respondents mentioned insufficient technical
guidance, inadequate funding and high retrofitting cost as deterrent factors
6.3.3 Housing Reconstruction in Heritage Settlements
The UNESCO declared heritage sites (UNESCO 1979): Hanumandhoka, Patan and
Bhaktapur Durbar Squares, Boudhha, Changunarayan, Swayambhu and Lumbini
and NRA declared heritage settlements: Bungamati, Khokana, Sankhu, Nuwakot,
Gorkha and Dolakha (NRA 2018c) were eligible for NRs. 50,000 (US$500) heritage
grant. There are more than 50 Newari heritage settlements and host of other heritage
settlements belonging to other ethnic communities such as Lomangthang (Chapagain
2008) and Black Village on the Tamang Heritage Trail (Pokharel 2016). All those
settlements need an urgent intervention as the heritage houses are in the process of
extinction as have been replaced with concrete or CGI structures.
The formal documents recognize Newari streets as heritage settlements not the
settlements of other ethnic community which needs to widen up urgently. The existing
heritage provisions include 80% building ground coverage, height of 35’ (10.67 m)
and maximum four floors, setback of 1 m on the front side, façade complying with
Nepali traditional architecture and traditionally tiled and sloped roof including others.
However, there is strong resistance of the heritage households against those formal
standards. The permissible height does not guarantee space requirement, and the
sloped roof deprives households from enjoying winter sunshine for warming up
inhabitants, drying food grains and clothes. Non-compliance of these provisions led
non-progress in housing reconstruction.
6.3 Findings
99
6.3.4 Post-earthquake Urban Regeneration in Some Selected
Countries
Table 6.1 shows a comparative overview of five different countries how did they
tackle the post-earthquake urban reconstruction. The Chinese centrally led model
has the least resistance from public which allows to implement the way the government intends. The Japanese model adopted private sector as implementing agent
and government as regulator which minimized government’s liability; however,
implementation is only possible after settling concerns of all community households. New Zealand’s housing insurance model can be applicable when insurance
coverage increases significantly as New Zealand coverage exceeds 95% (Morrall
2012). Indonesia’s situation is extremely unique as the Tsunami wiped out everything which influenced the trajectory. Employment generation was the key element
for people’s survival which required community contracting. India adopted largely
ownerdriven approach.
6.3.5 Urban Regeneration from Global Experience
The World Bank (2022) captured eight urban regeneration models: Ahmedabad,
Buenos Aires, Johannesburg, Santiago, Seoul, Shanghai, Singapore and Washington
DC. During their historical urban evolution, the ancient glory perishes, and the
bustling cities turn out to be the ghost towns. However, those historical cities continue
to possess potential of growth given that some externalities and internalities are fixed.
The summary of eight urban regeneration program is presented in Table 6.2.
The global experience demonstrates that three elements are indispensable for
successful urban regeneration: strong and visionary leadership, supportive community and enthusiastic private sector. The strong and visionary leadership must be
exhibited through a transformative vision how a dilapidated township can be transformed into an environment friendly and vibrant city center. It also requires, preparation of the plan and securing buy in from the community and private sector. Such
leadership in almost all cases has assumed by the municipal governments. Being a
city-state, Singapore was an exception. Although the municipal leadership catalyzes
the process, it must have to secure active endorsement from the federal or provincial
government. The supportive local community is another integral element. The squatting settlers are the main stakeholders to grapple with. In the absence of amicable
understanding, the issue may trigger social unrest which may jeopardize the entire
initiative. The private sector is behind all successful urban renewal initiatives as their
greed for profitability is the energy that can be transformed squalid townships to
vibrant urban landscape. The private sector’s contribution is not only limited to the
initial investment but also requires for initiating business venture in the precincts of
intervention. The entrepreneurial surplus creates basis for municipal revenue in the
form of taxation, fees, etc.
100
6 Scoping Urban Regeneration from Post-Earthquake …
Table 6.1 Post-earthquake urban reconstruction
Earthquake
Scale of damage
Adopted approach
Bhuj, Gujarat,
India. 2001. (7.7
ML )
More than 1.2
million homes
damaged/
destroyed
Owner driven reconstruction with partial
relocation intervention
The government provided INR 90,000 (US$2117
in 2001) for rural housing up to 45 m2 and INR
175,000 (US$4117 in 2001) for urban housing up
to 50 m2 (Trohanis and Read 2010)
In “Bhuj Walled City,” the public land at the
periphery was allocated to the victim’s households
in city core area. The earthquake victims received
proportionately reduced land area (Byahut and
Mittal 2017)
Wenchuan, Sichuan, 5 million homes
destroyed: 25
China. 2008; (8.0
million damaged
ML )
(Mohammad, 2008)
Central government implemented model
The reconstruction was planned and implemented
by the central government which cost US$147
billion (Johnson and Olshansky 2016). The
operation was funded by loans from financial
institutions, transfers from the central government,
help from eastern provinces under the “pair
assistance” program, land-based financing and
land swaps (Xiao et al. 2018)
Christchurch, New
Zealand. 2010 (7.1
ML ) and 2011 (6.3
ML )
Destruction or
damage to 170,000
buildings (CERA
2012); (Law 2015);
(Chang et al. 2010)
Insurance-led model and compensation for
vulnerable land
The Earthquake Commission (EQC) which was
primarily formed for housing insurance was asked
to take responsibility for the repairs or rebuilding
of insured homes rather than simply paying cash
settlements to homeowners (Brownlee 2010)
Indonesia
Sumatra–Andaman
Earthquake. 2004
(9.1 ML )
More than 100,000
homes destroyed;
50,000 homes
damaged (Sibuet
et al. 2007)
Community-led implementation model
The national development planning agency,
Bappenas, prepared the Master Plan for
Rehabilitation and Reconstruction which
emphasized community participation. They were
more effective over the long term because the
plans have “full community support” (ADB 2011).
Two organizations were promoted: The MDTF
and the ministerial-level Reconstruction and
Rehabilitation Agency (Badan Rehabilitation dan
Rekonstruksi [BRR]). BRR implemented through
the contractors (RRA 2005). In April 2009, the
BRR reached the end of its four-year life, and its
responsibilities passed to local, provincial and
central government agencies. In the reconstruction
of the 2006 Java earthquake as well, the Ache
model of community contracting was adopted
(continued)
6.3 Findings
101
Table 6.1 (continued)
Earthquake
Scale of damage
Adopted approach
Japan
Great Hanshin
Awaji. 1995 (6.9
ML )
East Japan
earthquake. 2011
(9.1 ML )
Over 512,880
houses damaged
(ASF 1995)
250,000 destroyed
houses (Kawase
2012)
Redevelopment and land readjustment
Japan linked reconstruction with their long-term
planning system which made this operation most
sustainable. Two major planning tools were
adopted—redevelopment and land readjustment.
The reconstruction is financed through the sale of
additional floor space beyond replacing what was
there before (Sorensen 2002). Land readjustment,
which sub-divides existing parcels, which involves
modification of property boundaries to widen
roads and to provide new open spaces and other
public facilities. Under land readjustment, each
landowner loses some land area, but the new
infrastructure and improved accessibility add
value to each parcel. It promotes high density
redevelopment which results in raising additional
land. Secondly, the intervention takes place with
joint ventures between the central and local
governments (Johnson and Olshansky 2016)
6.3.6 Nepalese Experience of Urban Renewal
There are four urban renewal initiatives in Nepal: Bhaktapur, Bandipur, Lalitpur and
Pilachhen. However, characteristics of each renewal intervention are different from
other ones.
Bhaktapur city’s glory started before two millennia as an entrepot trading center
between the Tibetan plateau and the Indian sub-continent. Disintegration of Bhaktapur began after its division among king’s sons and daughters in the fifteenth century.
After Shah dynasty’s takeover in 1968, the higher class people fled away for their
physical security leaving behind only farmers which was compounded with the alteration of trade route and climaxed after closure of border with Tibet following IndoChinese war (Dorji 2019). Grimm (2012) mentioned how the medieval city of Bhaktapur was restored. The German marriage gift of Deutsch Mark 100,000 to the then
Crown Prince Birendra Bir Bikram Shah Dev was the catalytic fund for initiating
the Bhaktapur Development Project (BDP)—the first urban renewal project in the
country. The BDP conducted an extensive analysis of heritage monuments, buildings
and sites and scrutinized socio-economic condition of the urban center. The analysis
was instrumental for immediate and long-term interventions such as restoration of
heritage sites, upgrading water supply and sewerage system, road pavement and solid
waste management (Parajuli 1992). The initial plan had to be readjusted after emergence of the new reality. As a consequence of the BDP’s intervention and further
follow-up intervention in conservation of heritage and environment, the Bhaktapur
city has been able to draw 181,350 tourist in FY 2016/17 in comparison to 158,079
by Basantapur and 108,828 by Patan (MR 2017). Preservation of cultural heritage is
Planning
− Make
riverfront
accessible
− Sewage free
river
− Permanent
house for
squatters
− Riverfront
Park, promenade
and ghat
− Generate
resources for
funding the
project
Scoping
− Establishment
of sabarmati
riverfront
development
corporation
limited
SRFDCL;
− Sale of
reclaimed for
financing road
project
Context
Encroached sabarmati
river
City
Ahmedabad
Table 6.2 Summary of world experience of urban renewal
Institutions
Sabarmati
riverfront
development
corporation
limited
(SRFDCL)
− HUDCO
Loan—US$ 114
Mio
− AMC loan
US$58 Mio
Financing
− Kicked off
implementation
in 2003
− Subsidized
housing grants
to poor
households
Implementation
(continued)
− Consensual
strong leadership
− Civic
improvement
rather partisan
political project
− External
managerial support
Outcome
102
6 Scoping Urban Regeneration from Post-Earthquake …
Scoping
Revitalization of
the central
business district
Context
Dilapidated puerto
madero port
City
Buenos aires
Table 6.2 (continued)
City
Self-financed by
administration in proceeds of land
collaboration
sales
with the federal
government
− A number of
iterative planning
efforts basically
involving
professional
organizations not
the local people
− Planned high
density
settlement
Financing
Institutions
Planning
Outcome
(continued)
− Corporacion − Effective
Antiguo Puerto implementation
Madero
instrument
Sociedad
− Skillful urban
Anonima
planning
(CAPMSA), the − Flexible zoning
quasi-private
corporation
represented by
the federal and
local
government
− CAPMSA
handed over to
the local
government for
operation called
Ciudad
Autónoma de
Buenos Aires
[CABA]), an
independent
district
Implementation
6.3 Findings
103
Context
Johannesburg Johannesburg’s inner
city dilapidated after
relocation of city
council and
introduction of the
stringent parking rules
City
Table 6.2 (continued)
Planning
− Inner city
regeneration
business plan
− A number of
intermediate
efforts
− Inner-city
Road Map by the
Johannesburg
City
Scoping
− Local
community-led
central
johannesburg
partnership (cJP)
− Tripartite
collaboration of
the Johannesburg
Inner City
Community
Forum (JICCF),
city council and
private sector
through
Johannesburg
Inner City
Business
Coalition
(JICBC) which
formed the
Central
Johannesburg
Partnership
(CJP)
− Johannesburg
Metropolitan
Municipality
− Johannesburg
Development
Agency
(JDA)—a private
sector entity
− Utility
companies
− Provincial
government
− Community
Institutions
− City of
Johannesburg,
− Government
Departments,
− National
Treasury
− Department of
Public Works
− Public and
private
Financing
− Johannesburg
Metropolitan
Municipality
− Johannesburg
Development
Agency (JDA)
Implementation
(continued)
− Crime rate
decreased by 85%
− City revived
with public and
private sector
investment
− However, the
marginalized
communities
displaced
Outcome
104
6 Scoping Urban Regeneration from Post-Earthquake …
Planning
− Formation of
Santiago
Development
Corporation
(SDC) in 1985
for developing
vision,
conducting
research and
assessing project
impact
− Active
collaboration
with the private
sector
Scoping
− Ongoing
deterioration of
Santiago city
center further
exacerbated by
the earthquake in
1985 resulting to
mass scale
depopulation
− 1990s
Santiago
Repopulation
Programs (SRP)
− Santiago
Renovation Plan
− Housing
Rehabilitation
Program
(REHA)
Context
To reestablish the
central, historical role
that Santiago by
attracting
middle-income
residents to the city
center
City
Santiago
Table 6.2 (continued)
− Santiago
Development
Corporation
(SDC) with the
strong backing
of Santiago
Municipal
district
Institutions
− Municipality
transfer (72%)
− Private sector
developers
Financing
− Santiago
Development
Corporation
(SDC)
− Land bank,
repopulation
agreements,
− Housing
subsidy
− Private
sector-led
process
− Combined
repopulation
drive with
post-earthquake
reconstruction
Implementation
(continued)
− Vibrant city
center with
increase of 55%
population and two
times housing
stock
− 10,000 housing
units under PPP
arrangement
− Resentment
against high-rise
buildings
Outcome
6.3 Findings
105
Context
Cheonggyecheon—the
downtown area
degraded over the
period of time
Commercial
renovation while
conserving traditional
heritage
City
Seoul
Shanghai
Table 6.2 (continued)
Shanghai
Municipal
Government’s
initiative
The 18-lane
elevated highway
that covered the
Cheonggyecheon
Stream was the
major
impediment for
city renewal
Scoping
− Municipal
Govt
− District Govt
− SoLL
− US$228 Mio
− Shanghai
Municipal Govt
− District Govt
− Community/
Street Office
Taipingqiao
redevelopment
project—1996
Budget US$323
million—basically
coughed up from
the municipality
resources
−
Cheonggyecheon
restoration
project initiated
by the Municipal
Mayor
−
Cheonggyecheon
Research Group
−
Cheonggyecheon
Citizens’
Committee
− Downtown
Devt. Plan in
2003
−
Choenggyecheon
restoration
master plan in
2004
− Traffic and
transport
interventions
Financing
Institutions
Planning
− Shui On
Land Limited
(SoLL)
−
Municipality-led
operation with
an active
representation
from citizens’
committee, the
project
headquarters
and a research
group
Implementation
(continued)
Internationalization
of Shanghai’s
amenities
− Increased real
state value
− Revitalization of
Seoul’s downtown
Outcome
106
6 Scoping Urban Regeneration from Post-Earthquake …
Context
Urban waterfront
along with other
interventions
City
Singapore
Table 6.2 (continued)
Planning
− 1958
conservative
master plan
− 1966 UN
supported urban
renewal
− Singapore
River Concept
Scoping
− Private sector
led
redevelopment
of the golden
shoe district
−
Transformation
of Singapore
river
− Ministry of
National
Development
(MND)
− Urban
Redevelopment
Authority (URA)
− Housing and
Development
Board (HDB)
− Singapore
Land Authority
(SLA)
− Public
Utilities Board
(PUB)
Institutions
− Proceeds from
land sales
− Direct and
indirect taxes
− Licenses and
permits
− User fees and
charges
Financing
− Completion
of 54,430 units
by 1965
− Sale of public
land through
public tender
− Public
infrastructure
development
− Pedestrian
promenade
− Financial
center
− Integrated
resort
− Collyer Quay
development
Implementation
(continued)
− Long-term
planning horizon
– 50 years with
review every
10 years
− Effective
implementation of
plans
− Work with the
market
− Lead with
vision and
pragmatism
Outcome
6.3 Findings
107
Context
Renewal of
poverty-stricken
Anacostia Waterfront
Initiative (AWI) with
dilapidated housing of
African American
residents
City
Washington
D.C
Table 6.2 (continued)
A joint endeavor
of district of
columbia and
federal agencies
Scoping
Institutions
− District of
Columbia Office
of Planning (OP)
as the lead
agency
− National Park
Service and the
General Services
Administration
(GSA)
− Anacostia
Waterfront
Corporation
(AWC)
Planning
− The national
capital planning
commission
(NCPC) Legacy
Plan
− Extending the
legacy: planning
America’s
Capital for the
21st Century
− Planning
mainly focused
on:
− Environment:
−
Transportation:
− Public realm:
− Culture and
institutions:
− Economic
development
− Tax Increment
Financing (TIF),
− Federal PILOT
bonds, and grants
− District and
Federal US$1.2
Bio
− PrivateUS$1.8 bio
Financing
−
Implementation
of smaller
projects leading
to overall
objective:
− Capitol
riverfront
− Southwest
waterfront
Implementation
− Projected
incremental tax
revenue US$ 1.5
bio. Annual
− Reduced sewer
overflow by 36%,
− 50% decrease in
the concentrations
of the oxides of
nitrogen and sulfur
− Establishment
of washington
nationals stadium
and the mandarin
hotel
− Population
increased from
16,675 to 23,280
− Annual real
property tax
revenues increased
from USD 35
million in 2005 to
US$109 million in
2009
Outcome
108
6 Scoping Urban Regeneration from Post-Earthquake …
6.3 Findings
109
the key for being able to attract such many tourists. Unique architecture, traditional
alleys and courtyards and authentic Newari culture and tradition are other attractions. With this evidence, the BDP’s efforts have been bearing fruition directly and
indirectly.
Unlike to Bhaktapur, Bandipur was established in the seventeenth century by
Bhaktapur’s Newars to benefit from the flow of India—Tibet trade route transformed
a sleepy Magar settlement to the prosperous trading center. However, the construction
of the Kathmandu—Pokhara Prithivi Highway and shifting of the district headquarters to the road head of Damauli degraded Bandipur to a semi-ghost township (Dorji
2019). In the quest of revival, the Bandipur diaspora in Nepal and abroad conceived
the idea of the Bandipur Eco-cultural Tourist Project (BECTP). Greece’s Municipal
Development Company of Hydra and the Bandipur Development Committee were
also brought in as project stakeholders. Later, the European Union also extended
its helping hand by supporting for organizing workshops and various tours. House
restoration, trail improvement, mountain viewpoints and picnic spots and conservation of Thanimai temple were other interventions. Training to tour guides, launching
promotional materials and websites further capacitated local people. All physical
interventions including trails were implemented by the local implementation committees (Dorji 2019). Consequently, Bandipur receives more than 200 tourists a day in
average (TH 2021) which is in increasing trend which turned out the semi-ghost town
to a bustling tourist hub.
The Pro-poor Urban Regeneration Pilot Project of Lalitpur Metropolitan City
intended to improve local services and public spaces, promote local heritage and
develop income generating activities linked to cultural industries for empowering
poorest and most vulnerable communities (WB 2013). The project prepared the action
plan, conducted need assessment and undertaken market assessment which were
used for launching urban generation and community grant and capacity building.
The generic rituals of monitoring and evaluation were also ingrained obviously. The
Lalitpur Metropolitan City (LMC) has started boasting the program saying that it
started to paying off by being able to extend tourists stay (RSS 2017). However, it is
yet to be substantiated fully.
One of the private business house called R.B. Diamond Jewelers promoted the
Pilachhen Tourism Village under its corporate social responsibility (Onlinekhabar
2015). This was part of the post-Gorkha earthquake reconstruction drive. In addition
to reconstructing houses, the project intended to offer employment opportunities to
the Pilachhen denizens. Traditional Newari architecture was promoted, and houses
have been used for crafting various handicrafts. In addition to promoting homestay, the house also serves residential purpose of the households. The project would
contribute 70% of the total investment and 30% would be contributed by the owners
themselves. Several generous individuals and charitable organizations contributed
to the reconstruction of the Pilachhen neighborhood. Some components have been
supported by the international agencies like the European Union (UN-Habitat 2022).
This project is still ongoing, and it will be too early to state conclusively with regard
to the outcomes.
110
6 Scoping Urban Regeneration from Post-Earthquake …
6.3.7 Legal Context
This section highlights the caveats in urban housing-related acts, policies, guidelines
and working procedure. The Ancient Monument Preservation Act (AMPA) 1956
has direct implication on urban regeneration (GoN 2010). The AMPA empowers
government to declare a certain area as the heritage settlement. However, installation
of the utilities such as water supply and sewerage pipes is of the individual household responsibility which is unrealistic. The utility agency under the guidance of
the archeological department has to plan and install facilities, and individual households need to be directed to follow the guidelines. On the other hand, the act was
formulated and amended under the previous constitution. With promulgation of the
new constitution in 2015 (Constitution of Nepal 2015), the division of responsibility
among the federal agencies, provincial governments and local governments has been
redefined which has to be reflected in the act. The MoUD has promulgated the Basic
Construction Standards on Settlement Development, Urban Planning and Building
Construction (MoUD 2015) which is not referred or incorporated in the AMPA.
Responsibility of the heritage sector is divided among the Department of Archeology and the Guthi Corporation. The Guthi Corporation Act—2033 was promulgated to abdicate the Guthi under the jurisdiction of the Government of Nepal and
for incorporating contemporary dynamics and maintaining cordial relation between
the people of various classes with divergent economic interest (An Act Made to
Provide for Amending and Consolidating Laws Relating to Guthi Corporation 1976).
However, the Guthi Corporation has failed safeguarding land from impingement. At
present, it holds 73,794 hectare of land (Karki 2019). The GoN attempted to reform
the chronic issue of incompetent organization to grapple with herculean challenges
by nationalizing all Guthi land which met with a stiff resistance from the Guthirelated people (Devkota and Devkota 2019). This Guthi land issue has a serious
implication on urban renewal. Some of the Guthi owned monuments have been used
for dirt cheap price while monopolizing with various leverages which sometimes
plays out against urban renewal drive. There is some scope for dictating land use in
Guthi land which is improbable in the private land.
The Local Government Operational Act 2017 (2074) has the most crucial implication on urban renewal (Local Government Operational Act 2074, 2017). The phenomenal issue is the municipal eligibility criteria. Total population has been considered
as one of the principal criteria where population density is discounted. This provision
encouraged overstretching municipal territory for ensuring minimum required population. Consequently, a vast swath of rustic land is declared as municipality which
blurred definition of rural and urban municipality. The act has vested dual responsibility for declaring cultural or touristic area by the provincial and local government
which creates utter confusion. Secondly, the criteria for defining cultural or touristic
area have to be articulated by the respective municipality which is quite incremental
strategy rather than comprehensive. Thirdly, how the local people would be engaged
in this process has to be ensured. In addition, the local governments’ preparation for
6.4 Discussions
111
implementing the Local Government Operational Act has not started until the end
of their first stint.
With a noble intention of increasing urban density, GoN introduced the Apartment
Ownership Act—1997. A promoter is considered as a catalytic agent in the entire
operation of the apartment which could not address the issue of multiowner joint
houses in the urban area for the purpose of reconstruction. For addressing shelter
problem of small parcel holders, NRA promulgated a working procedure for joint
housing (NRA 2019b). The central point is the households should have flexibility to
follow the operator route or joint housing mode.
The National Urban Policy (2007) should have factored in the issue of urban
renewal which has not been the case. There are some elements of urban renewal
such as regulating standards of group housing, discouraging squatter settlements
and encroachment, promoting people’s housing and encouraging and facilitating
cooperative mechanism for the production of housing for the economically weaker
segment of society (MoUD 2017).
Other two legal instruments: Town Development Act—1988 (Town Development
Act, 1998) and the KVDA Act—1988 (Kathmandu Valley Development Authority
Act 1988) are somehow redundant in the context of federalization as the local governments are the de facto in-charge of development initiatives. Other distantly related
policies such as the National Land Use Policy—2015 (MoLMCPA 2019) and NBC
203:15 guidelines (Nepal National Building Code 2003) also may need to factor
while detailing out the urban renewal strategies.
6.4 Discussions
The findings section revealed that the present state of the affairs of urban system
which was evolved over the last two millenniums could not cope for modern aspiration and requirements. On the other hand, necessity for conserving heritage is
of the paramount importance. Against this background, this section delves upon
how to tackle with the structural urban private housing constraints, i.e., land and
finance. Potential for taking forward retrofitting is also touched upon. Appropriate
legal framework and institution based on Nepal’s own experience and international
best practices are elucidated. Potential heritage centers requiring an immediate intervention are outlined. The most viable institutional arrangement including funding
source is elaborated. In each of those discussion, the lessons from global experience
on the post-earthquake reconstruction and urban renewal efforts are referred.
6.4.1 Binding Constraints for Heritage Private Housing
The poor urban core households with small parcel size than the government threshold
land area and their employment in the informal sector failed to reconstruct their
112
6 Scoping Urban Regeneration from Post-Earthquake …
houses. Such category of households’ property is neither bankable nor has capacity of
settling installments (Bhattarai 2018). The government’s targeted concessional loan
packages failed to address urban poor households’ requirement as the commercial
banks were extremely cautious in lending.
Handling of the India-Bhuj earthquake was similar to Nepal’s policies: owner
driven approach, certain amount of government grants and housing loan (Thiruppugazh 2016). However, the certain urban households in Bhuj were offered land
outside of the city area which was not practiced in Nepal (Byahut and Mittal 2017).
The highly acclaimed Chinese model of reconstruction followed complete restructuring of settlement pattern and creation of cities in the most convenient locations
(Johnson and Olshansky 2016). This model has less relevance in Nepal due to private
landownership and limited fiscal space of the government. New Zealand followed
housing insurance route which was well developed there while responding to the 2010
Canterbury and 2011 Christchurch earthquakes. The affected households could buy
new land parcel in case of faulty geological condition. One can either retrofit house
or reconstruct new in case of damaged house (Brownlee 2010). This approach seems
quite attractive in the long run but is not appropriate tool for resolving problem in
hand. Japan’s historical tradition of land adjustment was used for reshaping parcels,
creating public spaces and reserve lands, recovering development cost, developing
public facilities and promoting public and private participation (Matsui et al. n.d.).
This is the logical approach which has tremendous scope of replication. However, it
requires strong commitment from local and central government and there has to be a
guarantee of continuation for a long period beyond the stint of a single government.
Post-Sumatra–Andaman earthquake reconstruction in Indonesia had rather typical
characteristics as everything in Ache was washed and wiped out (RRA 2005).
Considering the urban core poor households’ limitation of land and repayment
capacity, the Japanese “redevelopment and land readjustment model” seems feasible.
Contextualizing other models seem unviable. The redevelopment and land readjustment require sincere and assertive leadership which are in short supply in Nepal.
Consensual decision making, administrative overview and scrutiny of implementation process and engagement of the whistle blower journalists are some of the
mitigating points. However, migrating to the new regime will require legal foundation which may take rather longer time. Incremental approach of compliance with
heritage building code and improving public amenities could be pragmatic strategy
until the legal foundation for redevelopment is laid out.
6.4.2 Making Strides Toward Retrofitting
Some of the heritage monuments need strengthening as those ancient structures lack
seismic elements. Same rule applies to the private houses in the heritage settlement. NRA piloted retrofitting technology for all discrete non-heritage structures.
However, the reliable retrofitting technology for row housing is yet to be worked out.
6.4 Discussions
113
Retrofitting technology for heritage buildings and monuments has to be further sharpened. As it stands, the NRA developed norms of specification require imprimatur
from the DUDBC which paves way for the mass scale replication. Secondly, further
deliberation will be required for row housing and heritage buildings and monuments.
6.4.3 Legal Frameworks
The international experience shows that all urban renewal initiatives were municipal governments’ endeavor with the central government’s backing. Ahmedabad’s
Sabarmati Waterfront Development Corporation Ltd. (SRFDCL) was a municipality
initiated SPV. The city administration in collaboration with the federal government
of Buenos Aires kicked off the Puerto Madero regeneration project. Johannesburg
Metropolitan Municipality in collaboration with the private sector, provincial government and local community initiated the SPV called Johannesburg Development
Agency (JDA). In a similar fashion, the SPVs were promoted by the municipalities in Santiago, Seoul, Shanghai and Washington DC. As a city-state, the national
Ministries undertook the urban renewal project in Singapore. The global experience shows that the municipalities are appropriately placed to initiate the SPV for
taking forward urban renewal which also has to be the case in Nepal. However,
the Nepalese municipalities have not shown credible evidence to undertake such a
complex project. The KMC failed to execute the Ranipokhari Renovation Project
(NT 2017), whereas the federal government created the NRA and a SPV and delivered the entire post-Gorkha earthquake reconstruction satisfactorily (Devdiscourse,
2021) which indicates that a board with representation from the local government
but with federal government’s handholding will be able to deliver effectively.
6.4.4 Nepalese Models of Urban Renewal
All Nepalese urban renewal models have very little similarity with one another neither
in scope nor scale of operation. The BDP was a fully fledged donor supported project
where all project attributes of planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation
were prevalent. However, this intervention was limited to public infrastructure and
heritage monuments. The private houses were untouched. The Bandipur project was
community driven without any holistic planning but largely successful. The WB
funded Lalitpur Urban Regeneration Project is broadly a non-infrastructural intervention basically focused on software. The Pilachhen Project is an outcome of a
philanthropist who intended to contribute to the society. Among those four models,
the BDP Model and Bandipur community models can be considered as successful.
However, the BDP’s replication is only viable with availability of foreign grants
which depends on a plethora of factors. Having not any follow-up urban renewal
intervention in the post-BDP period shows donors’ limited appetite for engaging
114
6 Scoping Urban Regeneration from Post-Earthquake …
in the urban areas. On the other hand, having very small size of intervention and
wealthy diaspora in influential positions must have played crucial role behind the
success in Bandipur. Replicability is the real issue. Other two projects: WB funded
urban regeneration project and Pilachhen have yet to prove their worthiness. Under
these circumstances, policies have to be formulated for own source revenue-based
initiatives where Nepal lacks any trailblazer but to invent one.
6.4.5 Potential Candidates for Urban Renewal
Among UNESCO’s eight world heritage sites, six: Pashupatinath Temple area, Boudhanath Stupa area, Swayambhunath Stupa area, Kathmandu Durbar Square, Patan
Durbar Square and Bhaktapur Durbar Square can be considered for urban renewal.
Among those six heritage settlements, Pashupati, Boudhanath and Swayambhunath
settlements are relatively new which may create some challenge to promote them
as heritage settlements. However, the heritage settlements of Kathmandu, Patan and
Bhaktapur have evolved since last couple of centuries and have their own identity
which makes them rather easier to carry out urban renewal. In addition, NRA declared
additional six heritage settlements: Sankhu, Bungamati, Khokana, Nuwakot, Gorkha
and Dolakha (NRA 2018b). Furthermore, there are hundreds of other heritage settlements which belong to various ethnic communities such as Newar, Gurung, Magar,
Rai, Sherpa, Limbu and Tharu, who have their own identity in terms of architecture
which can be candidate settlements on priority basis. This action requires an urgent
attention as traditional houses are replaced with modern concrete buildings without
a trace of heritage identity.
6.4.6 Funding Sources
After the establishment of a municipality promoted SPV, the promoting municipality
has to ensure funding sources at least for the initial stage which is contingent upon
the local situation. The international experience has shown that the proceeds of land
sales have been the principal funding source in almost all urban renewal programs.
However, how realistically it can be translated in Nepalese context particularly in the
Valley Durbar Square areas is rather dubious as scope for delineating precinct for sales
is not visible. The Japanese model of “redevelopment and land readjustment” seems
to be the most relevant for the Nepalese urban renewal which generates resources by
proceeds of sales of vertically created floor space. For this, the municipalities will
need to readjust heritage height limit which allows to expand buildings vertically
generating additional resources. Additional revenue can be generated reconstructing
Guthi buildings which have been rented out for a through away price. There exists
a sizeable potential for cashing the underutilized high-end assets which can used
6.5 Conclusion
115
as one of the major sources for urban renewal. The federal, provincial and local
government’s fund transfer has to be utilized for infrastructure.
6.5 Conclusion
Decaying heritage urban centers resulted diseconomies of scale which has impaired
not only progress of the respective cities but also all dependent rural settlements.
The entire country falls under the sphere of influence of the capital city like Kathmandu, and other metropolitan cities have their respective sizeable orbit. As touristic
attraction spots and service providing hubs, such nucleuses have to be managed efficiently. However, the private housing—one of the crucial heritage elements—of the
core heritage centers is mired with financial and land-related binding constraints.
Under the present context, no breakthrough can be expected which will perpetuate
tailspin further. This requires radical big bang in the form of redevelopment and
land readjustment which demands new legal structure and strong socio-political
commitment. A municipality promoted SPV with strong backing from the federal
government with adequate flexibility, but strong accountability mechanism has higher
probability to deliver. In the renewal process, all heritage elements have to be reconciled with modern amenities without compromising with heritage integrity. Allowing
flexibility for vertical extension with due consideration of heritage monuments will
enable to generate revenue which can contribute to the entire renewal initiative. If the
urban renewal is not introduced urgently, the heritage centers will be irrecoverable
loosing national identity and lost opportunity for economic prosperity. During the
transitional period, the incremental approach of ensuring building code of the private
housing and revamping public heritage amenities can be considered.
Chapter 7
Aid Effectiveness in Nepal’s
Post-earthquake Reconstruction
Abstract This chapter assessed the aid effectiveness in the post-Gorkha earthquake
reconstruction. The secondary sources of information from the National Reconstruction Authority (NRA) and the Ministry of Finance (MoF) were chiefly used.
The initial pledge of foreign assistance encouraged Nepal during its most distressful
period. However, realization of only 34% of the committed amount restricted NRA
for planning realistically. However, the multilateral banks not only contributed the
committed financial resources but also transferred best practices from around the
globe. The post-earthquake reconstruction experience suggests that the bilateral aid
has to be accepted selectively based on their historical and strategic comparative
advantages. Other interested donors may wish to channelize their funds through
either multilateral agencies or INGOs. Nepal’s progress in the overall institutional
competence and financial prowess will determine the conditions of aid architecture whether it can afford to impose its own conditions or submit itself to donor’s
conditions. The earlier situation is favorable and thus preferable.
Keywords Aid effectiveness · Donors · Pledge · Disbursement · Policy
7.1 Background
Mutual cooperation among the human being must have been started from the early
dawn of the human civilization. With the emergence of the nation state, one kingdom
supported their friendly principalities. However, it was more prominent as colonialism progressed ahead when the aid would be provided for benefitting the colonizer’s interest and general public’s benefit would enhance loyalty toward them.
Gradually with diminishing empire, the foreign aid was tied up with economic and
political interest. In addition, the humanitarian movements in the colonial countries
also influenced the aid architecture profoundly. Over the past 100 years, foreign aid
structures are either tied to economic and political interests or are conditioned by
the growing humanitarian movement (Phillips 2013). The Marshall Plan set a new
precedence in the aid world which was followed with the political allegiance-oriented
aid architecture. During the cold war period, the aid environment was governed
by the strategic interest which took totally new trajectory after the collapse of the
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022
C. B. Shrestha, Building Back Better After the 2015 Nepal Earthquake,
Disaster Risk Reduction, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-6676-7_7
117
118
7 Aid Effectiveness in Nepal’s Post-earthquake Reconstruction
Soviet Union in 1991. After the entry of China as one of the key players in the
world economy, it painted slightly different picture on the aid canvas—helping for
economic and social infrastructure and buying industrial raw materials from the
recipient country.
For all 29 countries, during the period of 2014–2018, the health sector was the
highest recipient with the highest average annual ODA contribution (US$20.34
billion—13.21%), followed by humanitarian aid at US$18.04 billion (11.72%),
government and civil society at 13.06 billion (8.48%) and education at US$10.89
billion (7.07%). The lowest recipient was the tourism sector at 0.15 billion (0.10%),
followed by trade policy food aid and industry and construction and mining (Nomura
et al. 2021). Nelson (2012) found that the humanitarian element is profoundly
dominant rather than political with some exceptions. The trading partners, former
colonies and military allies receive generous allocation than the countries without
such attributes.
Nepal started receiving ODA since 1950s after liberating itself from the Rana
regime’s shackles, an autocratic regime. The earliest donors were Government of
India, USA and UK. However, later the multilateral agencies have gained prominence in the aid landscape (OECD 2019). In FY 2018/19, IDA provided US$541.5
million ODA followed by US$280.6 million by the Asian Development Bank (ADB).
ODA from USA, Japan and UK ranges between US$100 and 200 million. Other
donors such as EU, Germany, Switzerland, Norway and UNICEF contribute less
than US$100 million. The OECD statistics do not include India and China which
are among the largest donors but implement directly which is not reflected in the
government statistics.
Nepal has remained a great proponent of the Paris Declaration of Aid Effectiveness
and Accra Agenda of Action (OECD n.d.). Nepal particularly owned the Paris’ principle of ownership, alignment, harmonization, results and mutual accountability. The
sharpened focus on Acara’s Agenda for Action on ownership, inclusive partnership,
delivering results and capacity development has appealed to Nepal (Addis Ababa
Action Agenda of the Third International Conference on Financing for Development
2015) particularly its emphasis on improving quality, effectiveness and impact of
development cooperation. The Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation—2011 further continued previous resolutions and consolidated principles
as: ownership and development priorities, focus on results, inclusive development
partnership and transparency and accountability (HLFAE 2011). Nepal has reflected
these international conventions in its aid effectiveness policies (International Development Cooperation Policy 2019). For translating formal understanding to action,
Nepal has been volunteering as a steering committee member of the Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation, an initiative that aims to enhance
effectiveness of development efforts (MoF 2021), and has also participated in the
GPEDC monitoring round. Nepal’s accession to the Governing Board of the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI), a platform for publishing information
on development and humanitarian aid, manifests its commitment for the cause of aid
effectiveness.
7.3 Findings
119
Having this background, this chapter intends to assess adherence of the formal
provisions of aid effectiveness in Nepal’s post-earthquake reconstruction and locate
shortcomings for shaping up future ODA strategies. Nepal may consider using these
learnings in the international forums where it represents. The development partners
also may use the findings for developing their aid strategy.
7.2 Data and Methods
Mainly secondary sources of information from the MoF and NRA were used. Moreover, the published project documents and project completion reports and other relevant documents from the WB, ADB, USAID, UK’s Foreign Commonwealth and
Development Office (FCDO), Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) and
Chinese and Indian Embassy were analyzed against aid effectiveness targets: ownership, development partnership, focusing on results and accountability. In addition,
the key stakeholders from each organization were interviewed.
7.3 Findings
In this section, donors’ pledge and commitment are compared with actual disbursement. Operation modality of seven representative donor funded projects is also
analyzed in terms of ownership, development partnership, focus on results and
accountability.
7.3.1 Development Partners’ Pledge, Commitment
and Disbursement
The development partners were called upon on 25th June 2015 for the International
Conference on Nepal’s Reconstruction (ICNR-2015) when 58 countries and agencies participated (IECCD 2015). The objectives were to secure economic and moral
support from the international community for the post-earthquake reconstruction,
recovery and rebuilding. Table 7.1 shows the pledged, committed and disbursed
amount from various development partners.
Table 7.1 shows Australia, World Bank and South Korea exceeded disbursement to
pledge and commitment ratio. Four development partners: EU, Japan, UK, Switzerland and Norway remained between 0.5 and 1 disbursement–commitment ratio. USA,
ADB, Germany, Finland and Saudi Arabia are the group of development partners
who contributed 0.1–0.5 disbursement–commitment ratio. Nine development partners: Turkey, Sweden, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Netherlands, Canada, Bangladesh and
Netherlands
21
26
1
2.5
Sri Lanka
Pakistan
19
20
10
Sweden
18
50
2
IMF
Turkey
16
17
2.24
Finland
15
4.6
30
Australia
Saudi Arabia
1400
13
India
12
33.57
16
10
25
14
Norway
Germany
10
11
Korea
9
767
China
Switzerland
7
8
130
USA
6
117.48
110
EU
UK
4
5
260
600
Japan
ADB
2
3
Pledge
500
Development partners
World Bank
S. No
1
50
1.12
29.16
1078.8
34
5.6
8.4
767
170.2
165.5
194.3
322.6
360.38
699
Commitment
Table 7.1 Development partners pledge, commitment and disbursement
Disbursement
0
0.43
3.11
4.77
6.8
9.46
12
12.67
19.37
20.32
54.57
87.07
112.4
210.46
232
623.34
Com./pledge ratio
0
0
0
0
0
1
0.5
0.97
0
0.77
1.01
0.35
0.84
0
1
1.31
1.5
1.65
0.54
1.39
1.4
0.89
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.19
0.1
1.04
0.004
0.28
0.75
1.27
0.77
0.03
0.42
0.79
0.96
0.35
(continued)
Disbursement/commitment ratio
1.25
120
7 Aid Effectiveness in Nepal’s Post-earthquake Reconstruction
1408.77
0.95
3886.06
4109.59
Fig. in Million US$
Total
0
0.5
1.2
Bangladesh
Austria
0
0
23
Com./pledge ratio
24
Disbursement
10.5
Canada
Commitment
Pledge
Development partners
S. No
22
Table 7.1 (continued)
0.34
0
0
0
Disbursement/commitment ratio
7.3 Findings
121
122
7 Aid Effectiveness in Nepal’s Post-earthquake Reconstruction
Austria were limited to the stage of pledging only. Among them, Sri Lanka directly
contracted out reconstruction of the Rato Machhindra Nath Temple which fell in
quagmire with contractual controversy leading to withdrawal (Bajracharya 2020b).
The Canadian Embassy channeled funds through the WB administered MDTF which
was not visible on the MoF record (WB n.d.). Hence, Table 7.1 requires cautious
interpretation. India and China’s direct funding system has not been well reflected
in the MoF’s accounting system. And some of their projects have been continuing
during the post-NRA period.
In terms of absolute disbursement figure, the World Bank stood out on the top of the
list US$623.34 million followed by Japan, ADB, EU, UK, USA, China, Switzerland
and Korea. Other development partners down on the list are Norway, Germany, India,
Australia, Saudi Arabia and Finland.
The public received exaggerated perception of NRA with abundant liquidity which
goaded them to blame NRA for not delivering quickest possible. It is extremely
important for the reconstruction agency to command respectful public opinion which
is essential for maintaining optimist social psychology. To start working with small
but confirmed envelop is much effective than the fictitious large trove which plays
out negatively.
7.3.2 Operational Modality of Representative Donor Funded
Projects
Seven representative donor funded major reconstruction projects are picked up for
examining their credential in terms of aid effectiveness (Table 7.2). All the selected
projects are examined against Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness (Development
Assistance Committee 2008), the Accra Agenda for Action 2008 (OECD 2008) and
the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (HLFAE 2011).
7.3.3 Ownership and Priorities
The PDNA was prepared by the NPC based on the field work during 22 May–
10 June (Seddon 2015). The process involved all governmental agencies, donors,
NGOs and local communities which was essential for avoiding overlapping and
gaps. This exercise clearly revealed not only the governmental leadership through
broad consultative process but also culminated to the estimation of the financial
requirements. The PDNA was presented in the International Conference on Nepal’s
Reconstruction (ICNR-2015) on 25 June 2015 which was participated by 58 countries
and agencies (IECCD 2015). Nepal received pledge for support as indicated in Table
7.1. From ownership perspective of aid effectiveness, the reconstruction initiative
was highly successful.
2015–2022 July
Dec. 2015–July
2021
UK Recons.
Project
JICA Recons.
Project
20.7
1000
Indian Recons.
Project
275.2
USAID Recons.
Project
2015–2022
232
2015 June–2018
June
EEAP (ADB)
80
200
31 July 2015–31
July 2020
EHRP (WB)
Allocation in US$
million
Project period
Target
GoN/UNDP/UNOPS/CBRI/INTACH
USAID direct implementation
JICA direct implementation
UK-based implementing agent
GoN—PMU, PIU and DIU
GoN—PMU and PIU
Implementation partner
Table 7.2 Supporting modalities of the major donor funded reconstruction projects
Indian Embassy and
Concerned
Departments
USAID
JICA
DFID
Executing agencies
PIU
Monitoring
52,335 housing support
Capacity dev.—9546
300 schools
26 Quick Impact Projects
1272 livelihood support
Foot trails
WATSAN schemes
Recovery
Enrollment support
700 schools
585 km road
300 Govt buildings
DRM capacity building
•
•
•
•
•
•
(continued)
50,000 houses
70 schools
2 libraries
157 health facilities
Harihar Bhawan
Balmiki Campus
• 13,550 construction
professionals trained
• Housing grant
• Communication
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
• 55,000 housing units
• DRR management
Major outputs
7.3 Findings
123
483
2015–2022
Chinese Recons.
Project
Chinese construction companies and
consultants
Implementation partner
Chinese Embassy
Monitoring
• Emergency Relief Goods
• Ring Road—10 km
• Tatopani Frontier
Inspection Station
• Earthquake Monitoring
Network
• Durbar High School
• Arniko Highway
Maintenance
• Civil Service Hospital
• Basantapur Tower
• Medical Support
Major outputs
Source WB (2015a), WB (n.d.), ADB (2015), DFID (2016), JICA (2015), USAID (2015), Embassy of India (2020), PRC Embassy (2020)
Allocation in US$
million
Project period
Target
Table 7.2 (continued)
124
7 Aid Effectiveness in Nepal’s Post-earthquake Reconstruction
7.3 Findings
125
Table 7.3 Sources of reconstruction financing
Funding
agencies
2015/16 2016/17 2017/18 2018/19 2019/20 2020/21 Total
On budget
208
456
1136
772
460
453
381,844 44.00
Nepal
government
190
278
653
499
287
272
239,234 27.56
DPs grants
1
45
84
5
0
17
16,205 1.87
DPs loan
17
133
399
267
173
164
126,404 14.56
Off budget
456
992
1335
884
514
315
486,046 56.00
DPs direct
grants
244
362
365
51
26
15
113,290 13.05
I/NGO grants
126
352
248
118
31
1
278
722
715
457
299
282,575 32.56
1448
2471
1656
974
732
867,891 100
Own-A/C
86
housing const
Total
663
%
90,181 10.39
Amount in US$ million
Sources a. National Reconstruction Authority (NRA, CLPIU) database; b. Ministry of Finance,
post-earthquake-assistance-portal; c. Ministry of Finance, budget details (red book); d. Ministry of
Finance, Development Cooperation Nepal 2015–2020; e. NRA Socio-economic Impact Assessment
Survey 2021. Cited from: (NRA 2021b)
As shown in Table 7.3, the GoN funded nearly 28% of total reconstruction expenditures. The loan received from the development partners was nearly 15%, and
individual households funded nearly 33% of total reconstruction expenditure. The
Nepal’s internal sources accounted for more than three fourth of total expenditure.
The donors’ grant accounted nearly 12% including bilateral and NGO sources.
If the actual allocation is considered as proxy indicator, the World Bank has
claimed ownership of reconstruction interventions by allocating 25% more resources
than their commitment and 40% more than the pledge amount. They are the largest
donor in terms of allocation as well. Although Japan was short of commitment
(0.89 commitment: disbursement ratio), the left-over activities will make up the
gap. The commitment: disbursement ratio of UK, USA and ADB was 0.79, 0.42
and 0.35, respectively. In terms of absolute disbursement, ADB was one of the
largest contributors with 210.46 million USD followed by UK (US$87.07) and USA
(US$54.57).
7.3.4 Development Partnership
Alignment is one of the most contentious issues and the bone of contention between
the government and donors. Reliability of the country system is the backbone
of alignment. The reliable country system demands effective planning, management and implementation of reconstruction and development interventions. Sluggish
126
7 Aid Effectiveness in Nepal’s Post-earthquake Reconstruction
implementation, employer’s inaction for sub-standard delivery and tacit policy-level
persuasion for approving lowest bidders are some of the contributing factors for the
unreliability (Neupane 2020). The development partners, particularly bilateral and
NGOs, bring forward these arguments for direct funding. However, it is suspected
that development partners bypass the country system not only because of the unreliable country system but sometimes it is used as covert argument for bolstering inputs
from the donors’ country of origin. In reality, there are problems on both ends and
can be ameliorated only when donors use government system. The weaknesses can
be addressed rather efficiently with effective conditionality.
Ownership is also inclusive of the capacity development. There was intensive technical support in the project areas of USAID funded reconstruction program implemented by the NSET—Nepal and JICA funded project. The UK supported reconstruction project also incorporated capacity development component. The uncovered
settlements from such donor interventions were limited with basic government technical assistance which bred discriminatory feelings. Community’s discriminatory
perception breeds anti-government mass sentiment which is a worrying state.
Whether aid was tied up to the economic and strategic interest of the donor countries is rather difficult to substantiate. However, the circumstantial evidences demonstrate adequately that the reconstruction aid packages were tied up with other untold
objectives.
NRA regulated supporting mechanism to all multilateral, bilateral and INGOs
(NRA 2016g). Some elements of programmatic approach prevailed between the
World Bank and JICA reconstruction projects. Similarly, by pooling resources in
WB’s MDTF, four donors: USAID, DFID, Canadian and Swiss Embassies harmonized their approaches following the WB’s norms. From this point of view, the
donors’ interventions were harmonized and collectively effective. However, a long
and arduous journey is required in harmonization as monitoring missions were not
streamlined. Cross-project learning remained nominal. The donor’s comparative
advantage could have been utilized more intensively. WB’s comparative advantage
in handling fiduciary risk, DFID’s prowess in governance and social inclusion and
JICA’s dexterity in technology were not used to the fullest extent.
7.3.5 Focus on Results
The entire orientation of the Paris declaration seems to be the programmatic approach
which would have allowed to manage results more efficiently. Donors’ support mechanism in reconstruction followed rather projectized supporting various different bits
of reconstruction. In addition, the project’s intervention was largely designed by
the donors’ themselves considering the comparative advantage of their partners. For
example, USAID was engaged with the NSET for a long time which they customized
based on NSET’s comparative advantage. The Government of Japan supported reconstruction through both loan and grant resources. Unlike to other loan projects, JICA
administered procurement and implementation of the loan component of their own.
7.4 Discussion
127
UK funded project supported local-level planning, leave no one behind, community infrastructure and challenge fund. As procured by the DFID, the Management
Contractor was accountable to them including reporting requirements. The WB and
ADB funded reconstruction projects followed the government’s reporting requirement as they were procured by the NRA’s Project Implementation Units. Managing
results ultimately follows formal accountability rather than wish full thinking. It
is almost impossible to streamline reporting system if the implementing partners
are engaged by their parent employers. Indian and Chinese direct implementation
mechanism created further complexity in managing results.
7.3.6 Accountability
The GoN intended to ensure mutual accountability by setting the Development
Agency Coordination and Facilitation Committee (DACFC) which comprised with
all development partners including NGOs. This entity was also mandated to monitor
the reconstruction activities (An Act Made To Provide For Reconstruction of the
Earthquake Affected Structures 2015). The ultimate objective was to ensure mutual
accountability. However, the DACFC became rather ritualistic platform rather than
as a forum of mutual assessment. Almost all reconstruction issues were deliberated
and resolved in the bilateral meetings. The DACFC meetings were largely symbolic
where NRA would present its progress followed by each donor agencies.
As NRA was the government’s SPV formed under office of Prime Minister, there
was overwhelming interest from various parliamentary committees including development and technology committee (MR 2016; RW 2021). The NRA issues were
tabled and discussed in the parliament which involved a broad range of development
partners in NRA’s progress (THT 2016). For mutual accountability, donors provided
information but most of the times such information was inadequate and superfluous.
On the other hand, the government officials were not keen to learn progress in donor
funded directly implemented projects.
7.4 Discussion
There are some countries and institutions which exceeded their pledged amount in
actual disbursement. Others contributed lesser than pledged and committed amount.
And some of the countries never remembered their pledge and commitment. The
government’s procedural reliability occupies a greater share of aid effectiveness
discourse.
128
7 Aid Effectiveness in Nepal’s Post-earthquake Reconstruction
7.4.1 Implementation of Reconstruction Projects
The WB was the most trusted partner which not only supported the PDNA process
but also brought in its world-wide best practices in the implementation stage. The
World Bank adopted reimbursement model in housing grant for securing compliance with all its prerequisites. In addition, it mobilized additional human resources
through MDTF resources for bolstering government’s capacity. This arrangement
ensured compliance, capacitated government personnel and also satisfied World
Bank’s requirements. Tentatively, similar route was adopted by the ADB.
The Indian assistance had two components: grant and loan. The grant was provided
directly to the national treasury. The technical assistance was provided through
UNDP, UNOPS, Central Building Research Institute (CBRI)—India and Indian
National Trust for Art and Culture (INTACH)—India. The Indian grant component followed somehow World Bank’s route by channeling housing grant through
the government system and providing technical assistance through various different
specialized agencies. However, the World Bank procured technical assistance support
with recommendation of the GoN’s Project Implementation Unit which was not the
case with the Indian Embassy procured technical assistance. The real problem was
encountered with the loan component. The Government of India channeled loan
amount through Axim Bank of India which had a number of stringent covenants that
prohibited efficient utilization of these resources: requirement of substantial Indian
inputs in goods and services disabled Nepal to use that credit facility (TET 2017).
After an arduous bilateral dialog for liberalizing input criteria, some of the resources
are used during the post-NRA period.
Chinese grant is implemented in turn-key basis where NRA’s role was limited to
only facilitate the process. And it is suspected that the regular development initiatives
were labeled as reconstruction projects for creating positive impression. The Ring
Road, Earthquake Monitoring Network Project, Ariko Highway and Civil Service
Hospital are the glaring examples which have more developmental attributes rather
than reconstruction. The Nine-Story Basantapur Tower and Durbar High School were
only the reconstruction projects.
Different donors adopted different approaches toward strengthening systemic
weaknesses. The JICA procured the Japanese agency for direct implementation. They
sought government’s policy and managerial support only. This approach ensured
quality delivery but government’s capacity remained unaffected. Tentatively, similar
route was adopted by the UK and USA—implemented parent country-based management vendor which procured local implementing partners. China also followed
the similar band wagon but implemented in tightly controlled environment with
extremely nominal coordination with NRA. The Government of India channeled
funds through the government’s channel and provided technical assistance through
UNDP and other Indian vendors. The Indian loan capital proved to be extremely
difficult to access as there were a number of conditionalities which was not in coherence with international convention of aid effectiveness which warrants untied aid.
7.4 Discussion
129
The Indian economic interest was pronounced in the Axim Bank administered loan
money as they required substantial amount of Indian inputs.
Nepal needs to understand the real reason for the absence of Turkey, Sweden, Sri
Lanka, Pakistan, Netherlands, Bangladesh and Austria. Although Canada was also
absent on the MoF list, they contributed through WB’s MDTF development projects
which have not been completed within the planned period and project’s estimated
cost increases beyond the acceptable limit.
7.4.2 Nepali’s Systemic Reliability
The Nepalese civil service has been suffering major deficiencies including low morale
and productivity. Particularly, political environment has been created in such a way
that civil servants have to use political influence for their career progression and
to secure plum jobs (Shakya 2009). Shakya further continues that no employee is
appreciated and rewarded for one’s adherence of code of conduct and ethical values.
The civil servants’ abhorrently low productivity is attributed to either their incompetence or their poor motivational level. The frequently changing acts, rules and
regulations are equally responsible. In Shakya’s opinion, the pervasive corruption
has been rotting the bureaucracy. Ultimately, he concludes that in the absence of a
high-level political commitment, the reform in bureaucracy is untenable.
Under this status quo scenario for the foreseeable future, the WB’s approach of
implementing through the government system with adequate safeguards for securing
value for money and minimizing fiduciary risk seems to be the most viable strategy.
The present International Development Cooperation Policy—2019 is sensitized with
the federalization of the country. In addition, this has attempted to gear foreign assistance toward achieving Sustainable Development Goals and other social inclusion
agenda (International Development Cooperation Policy 2019). The policy clearly
admitted and acknowledged the dearth of national capacity for implementing development projects. It also welcomes turn-key projects. Such provisions rationalize
the project support models of China, USA, UK and Japan. With these arrangements, bolstering national capacity is grossly undermined and such interventions
further intensify foreign dependence. Such developmental gifts are not conducive
for sustainable development as well. Hence, Nepal needs to take tough decision on
this sooner or later that no foreign aid to be accepted which does not engage national
system.
7.4.3 Learning from Neighbors
Although Nepal is not comparable to India and China in terms of economy, governance and the national level of confidence, it can replicate some of their best practices. India is particularly sensitive to the tied aid (Kumar 2021), and they refrain
130
7 Aid Effectiveness in Nepal’s Post-earthquake Reconstruction
from listening donors’ comments on their internal affairs. Secondly, it was simply
management hungry arrangement to handle a number of tiny aid packages. Indian
strategic decision in 2003 mandates to receive aid from UK, USA, Russia, Germany,
Japan and European Union. They accept aid for infrastructure and social sectors
only. Another notable policy shift was to prefer multilaterals rather than the bilateral agencies. Bilateral aid agencies are suggested to channel through NGOs or
multilateral agencies. Surprisingly, China still receives foreign aid to initiate reforms
which otherwise would have blocked by people with vested interest (Brant 2013).
Through the foreign aid, the Chinese government intends to infuse dexterity on
project management among remote rural denizens.
It is rather paradoxical that Indian refusal of tied aid while receiving was reflected
in the reconstruction loan for Nepal’s reconstruction. Axim Bank requirement of 75%
of goods and service including consultancy services of the contract price would be
supplied by seller from India. Remaining 25% goods and services may be procured
from outside India (TET 2017). Although this provision decapacitated NRA from
using these resources, the Ministry of Finance (MoF) kept on allocating Axim Bank
resources under NRA budget heading. Ultimately, NRA had to surrender it.
It was chagrin for Nepal as eight donor agencies which pledged and committed
reconstruction grant but never returned back. Other government and agencies’
commitment was not realized fully. The situation guides Nepal to reconsider aid
policy. It is sensible to work with less but confirmed resources rather than the
ballooned false promise.
The Indian policy on relying on multilaterals such as WB and ADB also proved to
be realistic based on Nepal’s reconstruction experience. Asking petty bilateral agencies to channel resources through multilateral or other NGOs is also well considered
policy. Otherwise, the government will need to invest a huge amount of efforts for
chasing them. In addition, Indian policy to accepting grant from six countries is
rather strategic decision. They intend to maintain good relationship with USA and
Russian with whom they have strategic relationship. As a member of the commonwealth nation, India inherently intended to maintain cordial relationship with the
United Kingdom. They have substantial trade relationship with Germany, Japan and
European Union. From this perspective, Nepal can continue accepting untied aid
from India, China, UK, USA, European Union and Japan. Except those countries,
all the rest can channelize their resources through INGOs or one of the relevant UN
Organizations. Having vastly different context, replicability of Chinese policies has
limited scope.
7.5 Conclusions
Solidarity of friendly nations and institutions during the most distressful context of
the post-earthquake period was encouraging for all affected households, society and
the entire country. However, indiscriminate acceptance of grant offer proved to be
counterproductive as it spoiled reconstruction planning and also tarnished image of
7.5 Conclusions
131
friendly nations and institutions who could not afford providing promised grant.
Based on this experience, Nepal should accept post-disaster support from credible partners after proper bilateral substantiation. Since the World Bank and the
Asian Development Bank proved their worthiness in action, Nepal can count on
their support in the future as well. Donors’ perpetual question on Nepal’s systemic
reliability deserves proper attention which requires a long-term vision. However,
having inadequate political commitment for bureaucratic reform, Nepal can continue
receiving foreign assistance through government system with adequate safeguard
measures for achieving value for money. The Ministry of Finance will need to amend
the present International Development Cooperation Policy which may promote provision for channelizing foreign assistance from the unspecified bilateral donors through
INGOs or multilateral agencies including the WB, ADB and UN Organizations. Ultimately, Nepal needs to aim to handle post-disaster rescue, relief and reconstruction
of its own or at least large part of it.
Chapter 8
Contribution of Post-Gorkha
Earthquake Reconstruction Toward
Localizing Sendai Framework of Action
Abstract Localization of the Sendai Framework mandates the formulation of
disaster risk reduction policies and act. Against this background, this chapter intended
to analyze the National Reconstruction Authority’s contribution toward Sendai
Frameworks’ priority action. This study which was based on the secondary sources
of information found that the NRA significantly contributed toward understanding
the disaster risk through damage assessment and structural integrity assessment of
houses and other structures. The authority also played role of a trailblazer in disaster
risk governance by piloting and devising functional institutional structure. In addition, the entire NRA’s investment was meant for promoting resilient society and
disaster preparedness. However, NRA’s work in progress activities such as structural integrity assessment of heritage monuments and promotion of sustainable integrated settlements with livelihood provisions has to be mended meticulously. Moreover, formation of the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Authority
(NDRRMA) was meant for ensuring disaster risk governance. However, the Government of Nepal (GoN) has to work further on NDRRMA to carve this out as fit for
purpose.
Keywords Disaster · Resilient · Sendai Framework · Localization
8.1 Introduction
The National Reconstruction Authority (NRA) handed over its entire operation after
completing 758,793 houses, 7746 schools, 62 integrated settlements, 751 health
buildings, 1139 government buildings and 586 heritage monuments. In the process,
the NRA innovated a number of construction technologies and piloted numerous
approaches for promoting sustainability with disaster resilient construction technology. In this reconstruction process, the NRA implemented with a number of
known earthquake resilient technologies and innovated some for mitigating caveats.
To initiate earthquake resilient housing reconstruction, the DUDBC published design
catalogs (DUDBC 2015). NRA promulgated policies ensured Build Back Better principles which guaranteed earthquake resilience (Earthquake Affected Private Housing
Reconstruction Grant Working Procedure—2073 2016). NRA experimented with a
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022
C. B. Shrestha, Building Back Better After the 2015 Nepal Earthquake,
Disaster Risk Reduction, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-6676-7_8
133
134
8 Contribution of Post-Gorkha Earthquake Reconstruction …
number of retrofitting technologies and documented systematically (NRA 2021d;
NRA 2021l; NRA 2021i). The structural integrity assessment of school buildings
will lead toward adopting mitigating measures which will save numerous lives in
the event of fatal tremors in the future. The conservation of historic heritage sites
through the earthquake resilient technology is an innovative approach which will be
a trailblazer for the future conservation. Consequently, NRA promoted amendment
of the NBC based on its field based experimentation (Nepal National Building Code
NBC: 105:2020; Seismis Designs of Buildings in Nepal 2020).
In addition, the NRA generated wealth of knowledge with regard to locational resilience and other socio-economic complexities while resettling nearly 5000
vulnerable households. Moreover, hundreds of other settlements were protected
through a number of mitigating measures. The landslide hazard mapping of
11 severely earthquake affected districts will guide the locational decision for
settlements.
The question is how all these NRA efforts contributed toward the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction. Is Nepal on track toward achieving Sendai Framework’s targets? Where are the gaps and how to proceed further are the glaring
questions to grapple with
The Sendai Framework (UNISDR 2015) aims to reduce disaster risk and losses in
lives, livelihoods and health and in the economic, physical, social, cultural and environmental assets of persons, businesses, communities and countries. For achieving
these outcomes, the framework also articulated seven global targets: reducing disaster
mortality, affected people, Gross Domestic Product and damage to critical infrastructure. In addition, the framework also emphasized on the disaster risk reduction
strategies at national and local level, international cooperation and multihazard early
warning system.
In order to localize the Sendai Framework, the GoN promulgated the National
Policy on Disaster Risk Reduction (MoHA 2075) and Disaster Risk Reduction and
Management Act (Nepal—Disaster Risk and Management Act, 2074 2017). In addition, the National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Authority (NDRRMA)
is formed (THT 2019a). The NRA was obviously there with focus on post-Gorkha
earthquake reconstruction. Moreover, the Nepal’s constitution has an explicit clause
of natural disaster risk reduction, early warning, rescue and relief and rehabilitation as state’s directive principle, policies and responsibilities (Constitution of Nepal
2015). The issue of disaster risk is the joint responsibility of the federal, state and
local governments.
The Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA) formulated disaster plan of action (MoHA
2018b) stipulated six indicators and 32 sub-indicators with baseline of 2015 and
short-, medium- and long-term targets. However, what are the achievements by 2020
are not publicized so far. Based on the 2019’s Disaster Report and other available
statistics, Nepal has been lagging behind dangerously (MoHA 2019). The action plan
intended to lower down annual disaster mortality rate from 900 in 2015 to 400 in
2020. However, it rather increased in FY 2017/018 and reached to 900. In 2019/20,
it reached to 13,760 which could be an outlier caused by the COVID-19. The traffic
accident induced mortality rose from 2000 in 2015 to 2719 in 2019 (NT 2021),
8.3 Findings
135
whereas target was 1700. The number of affected families decreased from 132,000
in 2015 to 126,730 (CBS 2021), whereas the target was of 110,000. In terms of the
economic loss, it seems around 1% as GDP for 2019/20 was US$33.66 billion and
economic loss was US$0.33 billion. The short-term target was to reduce 0.5%.
The statistics reveal that Nepal has not achieved targets set by the action plan. The
more intriguing question is with regard to the owner of this action plan as none of
the organizations took initiative to present progress. Under these circumstances, this
study intends to analyze institutional framework and accountability mechanism for
delivering the action plans. Secondly, it also analyses NRA’s contribution and best
practices with respect to each action points and identifies future way forward.
8.2 Methods
This chapter has mainly drawn information from the secondary sources which
includes Nepal’s attempts to localize the Sendai Framework and particularly achievements against Nepal’s Disaster Action Plan. Internalization of the action plan has to
be reflected in the documents of the respective agencies. NRA’s contribution toward
the disaster action plan were collected from various implementing agencies which
include NRA responsible officers and branches, the CLPIUs—Education, GMALI,
Building and DoA. The collected materials are tabulated in a matrix for analysis.
8.3 Findings
NRA worked for laying foundation stones on various facades of disaster resilience:
private houses including resilient settlements, heritage monuments and schools which
introduced innovations toward resilience. Other sectors such as public buildings,
hospitals, water supply schemes and hydropower projects also were reconstructed
complying with all disaster-related standards which are not elaborated in this analysis.
8.3.1 Private Houses
This section includes damage assessment survey, housing designs, Technical
Inspection Guidelines and retrofitting.
A. Damage assessment survey
NRA conducted housing survey of more than 1 million households (NRA 2021c).
The survey questionnaire included detailed information on damage assessment of
residential buildings: housing condition, foundation, house type, plan configuration,
building damage assessment and geotechnical risk. Out of total 2,287,719 households
136
8 Contribution of Post-Gorkha Earthquake Reconstruction …
in 31 earthquake affected districts, 46% households were surveyed and 36% were
declared as household beneficiaries (CBS 2012). NRA issued house completion
certificate to all 800,000 plus beneficiary households. This has created a largest
housing database ever recorded in Nepal’s history.
B. Housing designs
The concept of building code was initiated after 1988 Udayapur Nepal earthquake
of 6.7 Richter scale (ML ) on 21 August 1988 (Parajuli et al. 2000). After witnessing
fatality of 721 people, injury of nearly 6553 people and destruction of 66,541 private
houses, the then His Majesty’s Government of Nepal initiated the “Earthquake
Affected Areas Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Project (EAARRP).” The project
was supported by the WB and UNDP (WB 2010). Under the EAARRP’s auspices, the
UNDP provided technical assistance for drafting NBC. Other components included
seismic hazard mapping and risk assessment, and development of alternative building
materials and technologies. The building code received the GoN’s cabinet seal on 28
July 2003 (Nepal National Building Code 2003).
The Nepal National Building Code: NBC 105: 1994 specifies the principles
of ductile seismic design, design methods and load combinations and analytical methods. Other included elements are seismic weight, vibrating period and
earthquake induced deformation. Seismic coefficient, modal response and design
requirements for secondary structural elements are also enunciated.
Despite NBC’s approval, the NBC’s implementation did not gather momentum.
Only a few municipalities mainstreamed NBC such as the Lalitpur Metropolitan
City (LMC). Despite GoN’s executive order in 2004, it remained up to the municipal
authority to enforce it. Having inadequate technical capacity and required resources,
the NBC’s implementation has been hobbling (Arendt 2017). Ardent et al. (2017)
further argue that the country was embroiled in civil war when NBC was conceived
and approved. Furthermore, due to the transitional period from monarchy to republic
federal state, Nepal received the local governments only in 2017 (Pandeya 2019).
Against this anomaly, NRA revolutionized the housing construction not only in
urban areas but also the rural areas by introducing earthquake resistant housing technology by legitimizing the DUDBC promulgated design catalog for reconstruction
of earthquake resistant houses (DUDBC 2015). The catalogs are basically prepared
for rural housing and are based on the NBC (Nepal National Building Code: NBC
206:2015 2015). This catalog with illustrative intent emancipated 17 designs, drawings, material quantity and cost estimates including stone masonry in cement mortar
(SMC), brick masonry in cement mortar (BMC), stone masonry in mud mortar
(SMM) and brick masonry in mud mortar (BMM). The second volume of design
catalog incorporates non-conventional construction methodologies and materials
such as hollow blocks, compressed soil blocks, stone and mud construction with
containment reinforcement technology and steel and timber structures (DUDBC
2017).
8.3 Findings
137
C. Technical inspection
NRA did not leave the households after handing over the housing designs
but engaged through technical inspection for ensuring earthquake resilient house
construction. The Private Housing Reconstruction Technical Inspection Guidelines
(NRA 2016c) covered site selection techniques, housing shape, construction materials, foundation, vertical member, plinth, walls, openings, roofing and reinforcement
details. The technical inspections were tied up with the housing grant tranches for
ensuring compliance to building standards. All these covenants were directly drawn
from the respective covenants of the NBC. However, it had to be a living document
accommodating field-level unforeseen complexities which necessitated to amend
continually.
d. Retrofitting
Strengthening existing house to the earthquake resilient standard is referred as
retrofitting. The PDNA appreciated the retrofitting concept and provisioned for
256,697 houses with financial implication of NPR 31 billion (US$267 Million) (NPC
2015a). However, the GoN announced a single grant of NPR 200,000 (US$2000) for
housing reconstruction. Realizing the necessity, the NRA’s sixth steering committee
meeting on 24 June 2016 took a decision to separate out full house reconstruction
with retrofitting (NRA 2020). All Grade 2 Major and Grade 3 Minor category houses
were eligible for retrofitting. From Grade 3 Major, Grade 4 and Grade 5 categories
were eligible for house reconstruction. Based on the defined category, there was a
caseload of 78,000 houses categorized as retrofitting. Based on the detailed damage
assessment, the NRA identified more than 78,000 houses in need of retrofitting.
Although NRA could not make much stride on retrofitting, it developed entire technical packages based on its experience of around 1000 retrofitting houses. It produced
experience paper on retrofitting, manuals, roster of trained human resources and
norms for rate analysis (Nepal 2021; NRA 2021i; NRA 2021l; NRA 2021d).
There are several arguments in favor of retrofitting. They are cost effectiveness,
preservation of cultural heritage, earthquake resilience and adequate space for the
households. The psychological and emotional attachment with the house is another
factor. All these factors are pronounced in a number of studies (Pyakurel 2018).
Sthapit (Sthapit and Sthapit 2021) worked on the reinforced concrete structure and
generated convincing and satisfactory results.
E. Geohazard resilience
Roback et al. (2018) found that the 25 April 2015 Mw 7.8 Gorkha earthquake and its
aftershocks triggered about 25,000 landslides over an area of more than 30,000 km2
in the Greater and Lesser Himalaya of Nepal and China. Rosser et al. (2021) revalidated Roback’s proposition mentioning 20,000 Gorkha Nepal earthquake triggered
landslides. Rosser et al. argue with their detailed time-series data that the pre-existing
and new landslides occurred as a consequence of the earthquake. Among them, the
MoHA reported only 1200 landslides.
For preparing ground for interventions, NRA initiated detailed geological study
starting from December 2016 in collaboration with the Department of Mining and
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Geology (DMG), Department of Soil Conservation and Watershed Management
(DSCWM) and the Department of Water Induced Disaster Management (DWIDP).
Out of 1102 investigated settlements, 463 were defined as Category I which did
not require any intervention. The Category II of 340 settlements required modest
interventions. The 299 Category III settlements were required to resettle (NRA
2021m).
NRA collected data through a questionnaire which included settlement information and position of geohazard. Problem statement included problem of flooding,
landslide information and its impacts and geotechnical aspects of landslides. There
was a provision of geological and geomorphological investigation of settlement
and surroundings. Based on all these parameters, the team of investigators would
recommend for actions.
The outcomes of these extensive surveys would be to conclude whether the settlement is safe without intervention, requires some intervention or requires evacuation. In general, stability of slope is governed by slope angle, geology and moisture
condition (Rice 1977). In terms of slope angle, any land having slope greater than
30° is considered unsafe (Standard for Settlement Development, Urban Planning and
Housing Construction, 2072 2015). It is considered that convex curvatures of slope
are more stable as they disperse the runoff more down the slope, whereas concave
slopes concentrate water and cause impoundment (Şensoy and Kara 2014). Soft clay
needs avoiding. Presence of surface and sub-surface water requires proper drainage
management. Pre-existed landslides, localized faults and cracks and flooded areas
require precaution. In summary, landslide vulnerability should be defined based on
slope angle and shape, soil type, rock type, structure and strength, discontinuities
orientation, drainage condition and site history including landslide and flooding.
NRA not only customized methodology for assessing landslide induced vulnerability but also relocated in safe locations. All vulnerable households of 299 settlements were resettled in safe locations. Moreover, 106 integrated settlements are in
various stages of development (NRA 2021e). Based on working procedures, NRA
developed land based either on guided land development, land readjustment and site
and services. The feasibility of the location is assessed based on physical, financial, social, economic, managerial, environmental and cultural aspects. However, the
main focus is on geological and geographical feature of the land which is mainly
scrutinized (NRA 2019a).
Despite emphasis on earthquake resilience, the NRA’s present approach witnessed
some scope for further improvement. Shrestha and Bhatta (2021) argued that resettlers’ livelihood concern has to be addressed in addition to the shelter. At present,
NRA addresses shelter issue but livelihood is largely unattended. Agriculture is the
mainstay for a majority of rural households which needs sizeable plot for their subsistence. However, the NRA rule allowed up to the limit of NRs 200,000 (US$2000) for
land grant (NRA 2017b) which can buy 100–300 m2 of land which is just sufficient
for constructing a house. Even constructing cattle shed is challenging. The households are detached from their original settlement which creates rather precarious
situation for their livelihood. Employment is not available in the rural context.
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139
In addition, unavailability of land in mountainous district is another formidable
challenge (Dahal 2019). All lands suitable for homestead and cultivation are occupied; the remaining lands are not suitable for the integrated settlements. The displaced
settlers of the Khalte settlement, Rasuwa district have been still waiting for reasonable
settlement (DK 2019).
Further to this, NRA with support from the Department for International Development (DFID) conducted a time-series landslide study which revealed how landsliding
has evolved since the earth-quake, and how it has impacted those living in the affected
area (Rosser et al. 2021). Rosser et al. manually mapped landslides from freely available optimal satellite imagery (Landsat and Sentinel-2) between 2014 and 2019 with
two image periods before and after the monsoon each year and one immediately postearthquake. Based on these satellite imageries, a numerical modeling was conducted
for identifying future potential reactivation and runout of landslides and debris flows.
Based on the findings of such studies, the landslide prone area can be avoided for
the settlements. If the existing housing stock is at risk, such houses can be evacuated
and resettled in the safe locations.
8.3.2 Heritage Monuments
Immediately after 2015 Gorkha Nepal earthquake, the DoA promulgated the Basic
Directives on Earthquake Affected Heritage Conservation and Reconstruction—
2072 and Manual for Conservation and Reconstruction of Earthquake Affected
Monuments—2073. These directives opened up possibility of employing nontraditional construction materials for the conservation of heritage monuments. The
engineering requirements of soil testing were ingrained. Diagonal planking was
allowed for floor’s shear resistance. Earthen floors could be replaced with wooden
planks and oiled brick. Vertical posts have to be erected on corners and façade. Plinth,
sill and lintel bands were allowed for stone structures. Steel plates were allowed to
tie up vertical cracks horizontally. All wooden structures can be replaced. Similarly, Rana Palace’s wooden structures can be replaced with steel truss and red oxide
coated CGI sheet can be used as roofing materials. The dilapidated monuments can
be strengthened with modern construction materials and technique while maintaining
external appearance.
All the provisions were implemented in the restoration of heritage monuments.
The partially damaged temples of Gopinath, Rameshwor, Badri Narayan and Jetha
Ganesh Deo Chhen had diagonal cracks. Disintegrated foundation was replaced.
Wooden structural framing and stainless chicken wire mesh were used for further
strengthening (NRA 2021m). Similarly, Surkhi mortar replaced the mud mortar and
iron nails replaced the wooden and bamboo nails. One of the examples of wooden
reinforcement is illustrated in Fig. 8.1.
The Swayambhu Stupa’s horizontal and vertical cracks were repaired by using
epoxy grouting method which is graphically presented in Figs. 8.2, 8.3 and 8.4.
The damaged Anantapur temple was restored which is shown in Fig. 8.4.
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Fig. 8.1 Timber reinforcement arrangement of heritage monuments
Fig. 8.2 Swayambhunath
Stupa’s cracks
These illustrations are only representative samples. All nearly 1000 heritage
monuments were restored one of the techniques prescribed by the basic directives
and manual (DoA 2015). The Rana Palaces’ neo classical structures are significantly
different from the middle-aged architecture and construction technology. NRA renovated four Rana heritage buildings: Singha Durbar, Babar Mahal, Keshar Mahal and
Bal Mandir (NRA 2021e).
Motra et al. (2021) conducted structural analysis of the Shital Niwas, which typically represents Rana Palaces. Like all Rana Palaces, the square-shaped building has
8.3 Findings
141
Fig. 8.3 Anantapur temple’s damaged foundation
Plan of Anantapur
Elevation of Anantapur
Section of Anantapur
Fig. 8.4 Plan, elevation and section of Anantapur temple
a central open courtyard. The 750 mm thick brick masonry walls reduced gradually
as the building gains height and reaches to 500 mm at the third floor. Originally, mud
mortared building was renovated with lime Surkhi mortar after 1934 earthquake.
Having the load bearing structure, walls transfer gravity and seismic load to ground,
and floors act as flexible diaphragm. The walls are covered with 20–25 mm thick
lime Surkhi (Bajra) mortar and inside with mud mixed rice husk plaster. The flooring
system comprises of timber joists supported by steel I-beam girders, masonry jack
arches supported on steel I-beams and RCC slab on steel I-beams. The CGI sheeted
roof is supported by pinewood rafters and battens. The major halls are decorated
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with artistic carvings and ceilings. Sal wood (Shorea robusta) is used for doors and
window frames and Sal or pine wood is used for shutters. The entire building has
rested upon 2.45 m. deep and 1.85 m wide foundation structure. Ground floor is
suspended over air tunnels for safeguarding floor with damp.
Such Rana Palaces were retrofitted either with metal strip in inner and outer
walls or with carbon laminate and glass fiber in outer walls and metal strip in inner
walls. Carbon laminate and glass fiber wrapping techniques were recommended for
the outside wall to preserve the traditional architecture and heritage value (NRA
2021e). Micro-piling was used for increasing bearing capacity, and lime Surkhi
mortar replaced the mud mortar. In addition, structural anchoring of beam and joist
was implemented. The Corinthian pillars were stiffened with metal angle section
in its base vertical strips which were provided to case the circular pillar. The low
strength masonry sections were wrapped with GI wire mesh. Too long wooden beams
were replaced with MS “I” sections.
In Bal Mandir, the building’s columns were jacketed with vertical steel bars.
Arches were protected with steep strips and anchored them with vertical and
horizontal lintel bands. Diagonal bands were provided between rafters and were
connected with roof bands with steel strips. Gravel piles were provided around
the building for safeguarding against liquefaction. Similarly, the Babar Mahal was
retrofitted with carbon laminate and horizontal glass fiber on outer walls and MS
plate has been used for inner walls. Micro-piling was introduced for strengthening
foundation.
The reconstruction of Balgopaleshwor temple was the most controversial during
the NRA’s stint (Bajracharya 2020a). The crux of controversy involved two different
issues. The first was with the construction technology, and second was with method.
The Kathmandu Metropolitan City intended to use RCC structures for the reconstruction which was vehemently opposed by general public as it did not appreciate
heritage international convention. Secondly, whether to follow immediate past structure which was collapsed or to resurrect the original structure was another bone of
contention. Originally, Pratap Malla constructed the structure with the Granthakut
architecture which was changed during the Rana regime and reconstructed as Gumbaz
style. After a protracted debate, it was ultimately decided to follow the Granthakut
style. However, how to reconstruct in the earthquake resilient manner was another
challenge to grapple with. Ultimately, the structure was further strengthened with
internal timber structure and internal horizontal and vertical bands.
8.3.3 School and Educational Institutions
The 6.7 Richter scale (ML ) Udayapur Earthquake of August 1988 inflicted damage
of NRs. 4.2 billion (US$170 million) covering 31 eastern and central Nepal. More
than 2000 poorly bonded, stone walled schools were destroyed (WB 1989). The WB
included earthquake resilient design elements in the reconstruction. However, the
knowledge seems to be limited to the project.
8.3 Findings
143
Kandel et al. (2004) mentioned that the Kathmandu Valley Earthquake Management Project (KVERMP) found the entire sample of 1100 school buildings in the
Kathmandu Valley was not earthquake resilient. A series of interventions took place
after these diagnostics. Another follow-up study was carried out in Lamjung and
Nawalparasi districts (Dhungel et al. 2012) where 1381 building units from 580
schools were surveyed. All of them were found vulnerable due to their construction
methodology and workmanship.
The Nepal Safer Schools Program (NSSP) was one of the most fundamental
programs for enhancing school’s resilience which was initiated after the 2015 Gorkha
Nepal earthquake. The program was implemented in cooperation with the ADB,
JICA, the UNICEF, the USAID, the UKAid and the Australian Embassy in Nepal
(WB 2015b). This US$1.5 million project Development of the Structural Integrity
and Damage Assessment (SIDA) methodology intended to inspect 19,170 school
buildings of 5768 schools and to develop a web-based MIS platform. It also intended
to facilitate implementation of various donor funded projects including USAID
(US$10 million); ADB (US$78 million), JICA (US$112 million), Government of
India (US$150 million) and Government of China. The preliminary findings have
revealed that 50% buildings are structurally vulnerable and 20% have collapsed
completely. This study has to be replicated all across the country which will create
a comprehensive investment portfolio.
For further strengthening knowledge base, NRA conducted shake table test on the
four School Type Designs (Ali and Naveed 2019): Type Design 1 (SM_RC): semidressed stone masonry in cement stabilized mud, mortar with reinforced concrete
(RC) band, splints and Galvanized Iron (GI) containment mesh on wall surfaces; Type
Design 2 (SM_Gabion): semi-dressed stone masonry in mud mortar with GI gabion
band and containment mesh on wall surfaces; Type Design 3 (CSEB_RC): cement
stabilized earth brick (CSEB) in cement stabilized mud mortar with RC bands and
vertical bars at wall junctions and jambs; and Type Design 4 (SM_Timber): semidressed stone masonry in mud mortar with timber bands and GI containment mesh on
wall surfaces. Ali and Naveed concluded that maintaining integrity of low strength
masonry (LSM) is indispensable. They indicated need of codal provisions of the
building standards. With respect to releasing seismic energy, LSM is superior than
the reinforcement concrete which is the significant advantage over RCC structure.
However, the LSM’s strength capacity cannot be enhanced substantially due to limitation of mortar and masonry units. In conclusion, Ali and Naveed maintain that if
LSM building’s integrity could be maintained, it can survive very strong shaking.
Based on the recommendation of this shake table test, CLPIU Education promulgated Model School Design 1 which is implemented in all remote settlements in all 32
earthquake affected districts (Type 1 School Building Design 2019). The shake table
test’s recommendations will be instrumental for amending Nepal Building Codes.
There are 30 various types of school designs which are prepared fully complying
with earthquake resilient construction technology (CLPIU-Edu 2021).
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8.3.4 Other Structures
NRA implemented a number of other structures as well such as public buildings
and hospitals. However, all of these structures are implemented by the governmental
agencies where each construction units are designed as per approved national codes
(Nepal National Building Code Seismic Design of Buildings in Nepal 2020). All
schools, colleges, assembly buildings, police stations, water works and towers, radio
and television facilities, telephone exchanges and transmission facilities are designed
with the importance factor of 1.25. All hospitals, fire stations, police headquarters
and power stations are categories as Importance Class III with importance factor
of 1.5. The importance factor is used by the international seismic design codes for
increasing the structural design loads. It was found that overall reduction of 50–60%
in damage index can be achieved by increasing the importance value of 1–2.
No seismic resilient codes have been developed for roads, water supply and sanitation schemes’ linear structures. Large-scale structures such as hydropower projects
and bridges are designed considering the expected earthquake tremor.
8.4 Discussion
In what way, the NRAs interventions contributed to achieving Sendai Framework’s
targets and what further initiatives are required for making progress toward substantial reduction of disaster risk and losses in lives, livelihoods in the economic, physical,
social, cultural and environmental assets of persons, businesses and communities
(UNDRR 2015). The Sendai Framework further mandates all the national governments including Nepal to prevent new and reduce existing disaster risk through
the implementation of integrated and inclusive economic, structural, legal, social,
health, cultural, educational, environmental, technological, political and institutional
measures that prevent and reduce hazard exposure and vulnerability to disaster
preparedness for response and recovery and thus strengthen resilience. For this, the
Sendai Framework has set priority areas: understanding disaster risk, strengthening
disaster risk governance to manage disaster risk, investing in disaster risk reduction for resilience and enhancing disaster preparedness for effective response and to
“Build Back Better” in recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction.
This section mainly deals with NRA’s contribution toward the Sendai Framework’s
priority areas which will set ground for the areas which deserve synchronized and
coherent efforts of governmental and civil society organizations. In addition, general
public, academia and private sector entities will have also shared responsibilities.
8.4 Discussion
145
8.4.1 Understanding the Disaster Risk
The MoHA’s Disaster Risk Reduction National Strategic Plan of Action has identified
risk related to road accident, earthquake, landslide, flood, snowstorm, avalanche,
glacial lake outburst and fire as priority actions for assessing risk. Having mandate
of the earthquake, NRA implemented substantive activities on the earthquake risk.
The damage assessment survey of more than 1 million private houses has laid a
solid foundation on which the local governments can build on for creating housing
database. This survey covers almost half of the total houses in 32 earthquake affected
districts and more than 16% in overall Nepal. This proven database can be customized
by the local governments for developing their housing database.
For geohazard assessment, NRA’s field investigation of earthquake-impacted
vulnerable settlements can be replicated. This assessment was mainly focused on
the earthquake triggered landslides. This assessment should be supplemented with
the NRA modeling for forecasting future landslides. Both tools need to feed the
municipal-level land use plan which reveals comprehensive overview of geohazard
in the given municipality.
Although NRA gained extensive experience in the heritage monuments, the
systematic integrity assessment drive has not begun in this sector. This sector is
far more complicated than other modern structures. These structures which were
created over the period of last hundreds of years have different construction materials
and technology. Each individual element is invaluable. The archeological guidelines
mandate that all of them need to be reinstated precisely with some flexibility in
unavoidable circumstances. The Department of Archeology’s present manual and
guidelines do not address the challenges currently faced by the heritage sector. In
addition, the heritage monuments have not been inventoried. In the heritage sector,
first of all ownership by type of heritage monuments has to be grappled with. The
respective owner has to prepare a detailed inventory including structural and material
details. Also, photography of each artifact is required. This inventory will also need
to describe structural details and required intervention.
In the similar fashion, the structural integrity assessment of school, hospitals and
public buildings created basis for strengthening. The Nepal’s constitution (Constitution of Nepal 2015) has bestowed responsibility of different hierarchy of facilities to
different echelons of governments. The accountable agency has to conduct structural
integrity assessment of all facilities under their responsibility. With proactive initiative of the MoUD, other sectoral line agencies such as Ministry of Health, Ministry
of Education, Science and Technology (MoEST) have to launch assessment drive
in close collaboration with the local governments. The assessment process can be
phased or incremental which will create environment for gradual implementation as
well.
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8.4.2 Strengthening Disaster Risk Governance
The GoN conceived the NDRRMA as a nucleus for disaster risk governance as it is
mandated to formulate national policy and implement them. It is also mandated to
strengthen federal, provincial and local governments. Given the GoN’s hierarchical
structure, the NDRRMA will face a herculean challenge to implement disaster plans
through other line Ministries. Not being able to report progress against disaster action
plan could have resulted due to this complication. As it stands, it is formed as an
advisory body rather than the delivery machine.
NRA adopted rather pragmatic approach in strengthening the disaster governance.
It formed the Central Level Project Implementation Units under the generic line agencies: Urban Development, Education and Local Development. The DoA was the
implementing agency in its own right. The initial CLPIU’s accountability oriented
toward their respective line Ministries had to be readjusted toward NRA as it contravened with bureaucratic principle of synchronized line of command and functional
delivery. However, all CLPIUs were headed by the respective Ministries’ generic
cadres which was intended to continue NRA’s institutional memory. While working
with NRA, each agency was exposed to tools and techniques for delivering within
time and resource constraints.
In addition, NRA also engaged with the local governments intrinsically. Actually,
local governments were bedrocks for concluding beneficiary agreements which was
the starting point for the housing reconstruction. In addition, NRA deputed engineers for technical assistance to the local governments. They were also engaged in
grievance handling. In addition to facilitating NRA’s mandates, NRA intended to
strengthen the local governments for handling such post-earthquake reconstruction
activities.
The GoN has to build on NRA laid foundation. The local governments need
to streamline disaster resilience in their development intervention. In addition,
disaster preparedness and post-disaster reconstruction are also of local government’s
responsibilities. The present disaster-related challenges have been exacerbated by
the climate change inflicted phenomena. This scenario demands paradigm shift in
approach. The NDRRMA’s present institutional set up under a Ministry limits its
effectiveness. It is legitimate argument that the MoHA needs to lead for rescue and
relief operation. However, capacity development and preparedness activities require
additional leverage which can be gained with the institutional structure under the
office of Prime Minister.
8.4.3 Investing on Disaster Risk Resilience
NRA’s total outlay of nearly US$4 billion was meant for disaster resilience. Particularly, all private houses which occupied half of total investment directly contributed to
the reconstruction of more than 800,000 houses. Through masons’ hands on training
8.4 Discussion
147
and generated awareness initiatives, all 2.3 million households in the earthquake
affected districts benefitted. Indirectly, all 5.6 million households were exposed to
earthquake resilient technology nationwide. There are some additional interventions
which NRA could not take forward considerably. One of them was introduction
of housing insurance. Had there been housing insurance, the government liability
would be decreased drastically. On the other hand, earthquake victims’ predicament would have been lessened as they would receive substantially higher amount
from the insurance company. NRA initiated discussion around this but it could not
be conclusive. In future, this agenda has to be picked up again. NRA encountered
a lacuna in retrofitting as not more than 1000 households were retrofitted out of
78,000 cases. At the initial stage, poor technological understanding was the barrier,
and later on, ability to communicate was the issue. However, NRA has prepared
technological and institutional basis for retrofitting which has to be upscaled as there
are compelling logics behind except for row housing which remained unresolved
so far. As load calculation gets extremely complex due to contiguous multiple row
houses, a robust research is required for locating convincing solutions. Last but not
the least, NRA’s policy framework could not capture the urban core housing issues
for which appropriate investment models are essential.
NRA piloted with 106 integrated settlements with total outlay of NRs. 1461.9
million (US$12.23 million). The objectives were to resettle the earthquake triggered
landslide affected households and to consolidate scattered households in remote rural
areas where service delivery is challenging. However, these settlements have yielded
mixed results. On the positive side, these consolidated settlements have facilitated
effective service delivery such as health, education and security facilities. Inhabitants’
social cohesiveness has also enhanced considerably. However, limited land does
allow them to sustain their livelihood. Having agricultural skill base combined with
livestock, almost all rural dwellers require sizeable plot for farming and rearing cattle
which is practically not possible in NRA provided plot of around 100–150 m2 . Based
on this experience, the future policy has to be shaped up.
Educational institutions, health facilities, government and security buildings are
grouped under separate categories for accounting purpose. However, the fundamental attributes of all these structures are identical for which NRA allocated NRs.
167 billion (US$1398.3 million). All of those buildings constructed under NRA’s
premises are earthquake resilient. Not only the project technicians were exposed
with the disaster resilient design elements but also the consultants, contractors, user
committees and the construction workers have gained familiarity with the indispensable structural elements. Having disseminated knowledge to the entire industry, the
replication is expected to smoothened up.
Having an investment of NRs. 50.06 billion (US$419.30 million), the heritage
sector’s traction in terms of investment is quite significant. Some structures under
this allocation will be getting implemented next 2–3 years’ time period. However,
the NRA’s investment is miniscule in terms of overall requirement as systematic
maintenance regime in the heritage sector is yet to be introduced. This sector deserves
comprehensive long-term planning and resource allocation for conserving Nepal’s
rich architectural and historical identity.
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NRA also reconstructed other infrastructure such as roads, water supply and irrigation schemes, landslide protection works and memorial statues. The total outlay
was NR. 17 billion (US$143 million). However, all of these structures’ design standards were not revisited during NRA’s lifetime. Consequently, all structures were
constructed with the pre-existing design standards and norms. With NRA’s experience and empirical-based evidence in disaster science, the design codes of all
infrastructures need revisiting.
8.4.4 Disaster Preparedness
Disaster preparedness was not directly mandated to NRA as it includes an effective disaster response, early warning system, communication, search and rescue.
However, establishing “Build Back Better” was one of the formidable contributions toward disaster preparedness. The present challenge is to internalize these best
practices in the generic government system.
The Disaster Risk Reduction National Strategic Plan of Action (MoHA 2018a)
mandates mainly MoUD for ensuring “Build Back Better” approach. There are three
facades of this target: the appropriateness of land, process of resettlement and the
robustness of structure.
One of the major intervention with regard to the appropriateness of land was
the “Basic Construction Standards on Settlement Development, Urban Planning and
Housing Construction—2072 (MoUD 2015). However, it is urban focused. Experience shows that the rural areas’ vulnerability is much higher than the urban settlements. Urban areas’ vulnerability draws immediate attention of policy and decision
makers which creates conducive environment for preparedness activities.
Secondly, the Department of Mining and Geology (DoMG) has prepared Engineering and Environmental Geological Maps for some selected areas (DoMG 1998).
These maps have not entered in the mandatory housing approval process (MoUD
2015) even for the areas where maps are available. However, resilience remains unattended until the availability of maps and professional enforcement of them which
has a number of policy-level repercussions such as ability and will of government to
relocate vulnerable people in safe locations, livelihood of the migrated households,
utility of abandoned land, etc.
Process of resettlement is another challenging aspect. Normally, land is extremely
scarce in the mountainous region and habitable land is privately owned already
requiring eminent domain which is politically risky proposition. Additionally, the
vulnerable people refrain from moving to distant location as they naturally possess
nostalgia with their milieu.
The third factor relates to the housing structural elements which is contingent on
the building permit system (BPS) and enforcement of it. The BPS prevails only in
some municipalities which means it has to propagate not only in the municipalities but
also to the rural municipalities. Affordability of local governments and availability
of technical human resources are prerequisite. Irrespective of technical realities,
8.5 Conclusion
149
if country’s aspiration is for resilience, BPS has to be implemented and enforced
nationwide.
For school and hospital buildings, the local beneficiaries have to manage land.
Owing unavailability of land, they provide egregious land which requires horrendous
amount of resources for development sometimes exceeding prime area land cost.
Functionality and safety still remain questionable.
The Ministries develop prototype designs for constructing infrastructures nationwide, for example, school buildings, health centers, etc. However, these prototype designs and construction materials do not appreciate local needs and available
resources. As heritage monuments require case-specific strengthening, the en masse
“Build Back Better” solutions are irrelevant.
8.5 Conclusion
In addition to reconstructing earthquake damaged infrastructures, NRA’s contribution toward localizing the Sendai Framework was formidable. It laid foundation
in resilient housing, public buildings and heritage sector. However, sustainability
of NRA’s intervention will be achieved only when the government line agencies
streamline NRA’s best practices in their implementation modus operandi. Functional resettlement policy, enactment and enforcement of building permit system
in all local governments and introducing incentive mechanism for retrofitting of
private houses are crucial for creating resilient society. Inventorization and structural
integrity assessment and case-specific strengthening interventions are essential for
proper conservation of heritage monuments. Continuing NRA initiated structural
integrity assessment followed by strengthening interventions and compulsory usage
of local construction materials are some of the immediate action points for the public
building sector.
Chapter 9
A Comparative Overview of Nepal’s
Reconstruction in Global Context
Abstract The NRA’s delivery within six years’ time period amidst political transition and perilous COVID-19 pandemic context has been acclaimed nationally and
internationally. However, Nepal’s performance vis-a-vis other country has not been
assessed systematically. For mitigating this knowledge gap, this chapter compared
Nepal’s destruction and achievements with other seven earthquake affected countries: India, Pakistan, Haiti, Indonesia, China, New Zealand and Japan. All information was collected from the secondary sources. Comparator variables were magnitude of destruction, reconstruction organization, period and cost. Nepal wrapped
up reconstruction only next to China and India. Moreover, Nepal implemented the
world largest management hungry owner driven approach. Avoiding complacency,
Nepal must initiate next journey of resilience by complying with building codes
including private houses, schools and health posts. Other heritage monuments and
public buildings such as hospitals and schools also must be earthquake resilient
all across the country. Urban renewal and resettlement along with pervasive housing
insurance are other crucial agenda to take forward. All these paradigm shifting agenda
will be only viable under a powerful national institution in collaboration with the
sub-national-level governments.
Keywords Reconstruction · Global · Comparison · Long-term strategy
9.1 Introduction
The 2015 Gorkha Nepal earthquake of 7.8 Richter scale (ML ) killed 8970 lives and
injured 22,300 people. The tremor triggered devastation reached to US$7 billion.
The earthquake affected 38% of population and 35% of total land area. The PDNA
estimated 755,549 houses were damaged fully or partially (NPC 2015a). Similarly,
1197 health facilities; 7553 schools; 415 public buildings; 216 security buildings;
and 920 heritage monuments were obliterated.
After five and half years, the NRA disbursed third installment to 84.77% of
total beneficiaries of 829,667 households. Progress in school, government buildings is around 90%. Health and heritage seem to be laggard with just above 60%
achievements. With this, NRA proclaimed outstanding success at global standard
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022
C. B. Shrestha, Building Back Better After the 2015 Nepal Earthquake,
Disaster Risk Reduction, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-6676-7_9
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9 A Comparative Overview of Nepal’s Reconstruction …
(NRA 2021n) which is not well substantiated. Against this background, this chapter
intended to test NRA’s claim with respect to other sampled counties. Secondly, it is
aimed to derive best practices from the comparator countries.
This planet has witnessed deadly earthquakes in its recorded history. The 1950
Assam-Tibet earthquake of 8.6 Richter scale (ML ) was one of the largest jolts in
the Hindu Kush Himalayan Region (GNI 2021). In addition to killing 1500 people,
it triggered massive avalanches blocking river course which led to insurmountable
deluge washing away all valley floor settlements in downstream. The 2004 Sumatra
Indonesia earthquake of 9.1 Richter scale (ML ), the third largest earthquake in the
world, killed 227,898 people. The earthquake induced Tsunami was the largest of its
kind. The 2005 Northern Sumatra, Indonesia tremblor of 8.6 Richter scale (ML ) killed
more than 1000 people in Nias—Northern Sumatra. The 1965 Alaska tremor of 8.7
Richter scale (ML ) induced relatively nominal impact due to the remote location. The
1906 off the coast Ecuador earthquake of 8.8 Richter scale (ML ) triggered Tsunami
killed 500–1500 people. The 2010 Offshore Maule, Chile earthquake of 8.8 Richter
scale (ML ) killed 500 people in addition to devastating houses and infrastructures.
This quake occurred after a 7 Richter scale (ML ) Port-Au-Prince earthquake in Haiti
which killed more than 200,000 people. The 9 Richter scale (ML ) 1952 Kamchatka
Krai Russia earthquake induced 13 m high Tsunami which rocked the Crescent City,
California, USA. Despite releasing sheer energy size, no lives were lost and caused
nominal property damage. The 2011 Tohoku earthquake of 9 Richter scale (ML )
killed 20,000 people and damaged infrastructure including some nuclear reactors.
The 1964 Alaska earthquake of 9.2 Richter scale (ML ) took 128 lives and caused
economic loss of US$311 million. A massive tremblor of 9.5 Richter scale (ML )
struck Chile, the largest earthquake ever recorded, in 1960 which killed 1655 people
(USGS 2021).
In addition to those deadly earthquakes, hundreds of tremors jolt the earth in
different parts of the world which cause varying degree of fatality and destruction.
The earthquake prone countries have to invest a huge number of resources for rescue,
relief and reconstruction. Moreover, such incidences affect other economic activities adversely. Agricultural crop production falls with broken irrigation canal, and
production of industrial outputs gets interrupted due to collapsed industrial shed. Such
cataclysmic events not only destroy assets created during hundreds of years but also
guzzle nation’s resources which otherwise would have used for progressing ahead.
The cardinal sectors such as health and education deprive from required resources.
Developing countries are thwarted from attaining Sustainable Development Goals
(SDGs), and hence, poverty reduction turns out to be pipe dreams.
How to minimize destruction with earthquake resilient infrastructures and restore
damaged infrastructure with “Build Back Better” principle are the issues which
are grappled with by all governments globally. However, country’s socio-economic
and political environment influence on the resilient realm and reconstruction interventions including allocation of financial resources and formation of institutional
infrastructure. Against this context, comparative overview of reconstruction modalities under various socio-economic and political environment offers menu for policy
makers.
9.3 Findings
153
In order to offer potential options, this paper intends to compare various countries
with divergent socio-economic context against reconstruction methods, approaches,
institutions and financial allocation. This chapter intends to equip decision makers,
particularly Nepali, with various options which they can adopt; one of them or various
combination suits to the ground reality. The analysis will reveal that the approaches
are contingent upon ground realities; hence, dogmatic adoption of the best practice
from another country may prove counter-productive. This strategic approach will
save scarce time and resources and minimize denizens’ predicament.
9.2 Methods
Eight different countries with major and great earthquakes are picked up. Per capita
GDP in the preceding year of the earthquake has been considered. The socioeconomic context before the earthquake is analyzed which is followed by the degree
of destruction. The reconstruction process: institution, management and resource
allocation are also analyzed. Ultimately, the reconstruction outcomes are compared.
This analysis has revealed best practices under specific circumstances.
9.3 Findings
Table 9.1 presents earthquakes-related facts in Nepal, Pakistan, India, China, New
Zealand, Indonesia, Haiti and Japan. Among 8 comparators, earthquakes of Indonesia
and Japan were categorized as “Great” having magnitude greater than 8. All others
ranged between 7 and 8 categories which are defined as “Major.”
9.3.1 Economic Condition of Comparator Countries
The country’s economic condition explains the ability to reconstruct and recovery. In
addition, this also signifies law and order situation. However, this broad generalization may not hold true universally. Secondly, the GDP, per capita GDP and economic
growth rate preceding the earthquake year have been taken as pseudo-indicators for
ability to recover and governance status.
Japan stood first among eight comparator countries in terms of GDP and per
capita GDP which indicated its strength for expediting reconstruction and recovery.
The GDP growth rate of 4.2% was extremely healthy for the developed countries.
China stood second in terms of GDP and fourth in terms of per capita GDP but its
miraculous annual growth rate of 11.9% indicated that institutional and governance
factors were functioning satisfactorily. Indian third rank in terms of GDP and fifth
rank in terms of GDP per capita placed it as an average country in terms of ability.
2387
(2014)
3.3
(2013–14)
6
NRA
GDP per capita (US$)
GDP growth rate (%)
Completion period
Recon. agency
EERA
ongoing
7.54
(2003–04)
734.4 (2004)
106.64 (2004)
GSDMA
5
4.16
(1999 -00)
2018 (2000)
2077.9 (2000)
4
1,000,000
20,085
7.7
8:46 AM
26/01/2001
Kutch
India
CERC
NDRC
RRA
8
4.78
(2002–03)
−0.1
(2008–09)
ongoing
5465 (2003)
1204 (2003)
4
NS
227,898
9.1/6.3
7:58 AM
26/2/2004
Sumatra
Indonesia
28,209.36 (2009)
100.16 (2009)
32
11,240
185
7.1/6.2
4:35 AM
09/04/2010
Canterbury
New Zealand
3
11.9
(2006–07)
2693.97
(2007)
3140 (2007)
147
6,500,000
87,149
7.9
14:28 PM
12/05/2008
Wenchuan
China
NRA-Nepal—National Reconstruction Authority, Nepal
ERRA—Earthquake Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Authority—Pakistan
GSDMA—Gujarat State Disaster Management Authority—India
NDRC—National Development and Reform Commission
CERC—Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Commission
NRA-Japan—National Reconstruction Agency, Japan
RRA—Reconstruction and Recovery Agency
IHRC—Interim Haiti Recovery Commission
67.62 (2014)
GDP (US$, bio.)
2
500,000
769,817
10
Damaged houses
87,351
8789
Death
Recon. cost (US$ bio.)
8:52 AM
7.6
12:56 PM
7.8
Time
Balakot
08/10/2005
Gorkha
25/04/2015
Earthquake
Date
Richter scale (ML )
Pakistan
Nepal
Particulars
Table 9.1 Comparative overview of earthquake characteristics, destruction and reconstruction
IHRC
ongoing
0.9
(2008–09)
1561 (2009)
15.38 (2009)
8
699,677
92,000
7.3
5:00 PM
12/01/2010
Leogene
Haiti
NRA
ongoing
4.2
(2009–10)
35,157 (2010)
4485.9 (2010)
360
1,101,884
20,000
9
2:46 PM
11/03/2011
Tohoku
Japan
154
9 A Comparative Overview of Nepal’s Reconstruction …
9.3 Findings
155
The GDP growth rate was also not on its side. Indonesia is almost consistent in terms
of its ranking against GDP, per capita GDP and growth rate having the fourth and
third position—somewhere in the middle of the spectrum. Although Pakistan has the
fifth position in terms of GDP but seventh in terms of per capita GDP which placed
it as a country with modest capacity. New Zealand with population of 4.3 million
in 2009 has obviously contributed to lower ranked country GDP wise but occupied
second position in terms of per capita GDP which revealed its real vitality. This left
Nepal and Haiti in the bottom of the spectrum with seventh and eighth position,
respectively.
9.3.2 Earthquake Characteristics and Magnitude of Casualty
The 2015 Gorkha Nepal earthquake of 7.8 (ML ) killed 8789 people, whereas the
Pakistan’s Balakot earthquake of 7.6 Richter scale (ML ) killed 87,351 people. The
casualty of the Kutch earthquake of 7.7 (ML ) was limited to 20,085 which is much
lower in comparison of Wenchuan earthquake which killed 97,149 with people.
The New Zealand’s level of casualty remained lowest as only 185 people died
which shows their preparedness. The Haiti’s preparedness seems quite basic as 7.3
(ML ) Leogene earthquake killed 92,000 people. Having robust disaster preparedness,
Japan’s casualty remained only 20,000. Even the overwhelming majority of the total
number of casualties was caused by Tsunami. If the earthquake would have struck on
the ground, the casualty would have been much lower level. Similar is the case with
Indonesia’s death of 227,898 persons which was largely Tsunami induced number.
In terms of casualty, Indonesia was the first among all eight earthquake hit countries thanks to the inadequate early warning system for Tsunami. With relatively
modest tremor of 7.3 (ML ) Haiti witnessed second highest deaths which indicates
their inadequate preparedness. Similar was the situation of Pakistan with 87,351
casualties. Given the Chinese technological prowess, it is slightly paradoxical as
casualty of 87,149 was astonishingly high which placed China at the fourth among 8
countries. Indian death of 20,085 may have caused due to working day when pupils
may have reached to their school already. Having Saturday and daytime tremor minimized deaths in Nepal. Had there been no Tsunami, the Japanese death would have
been much lower level. And obviously, New Zealand’s advance level of preparedness
and relatively low population density kept death to the minimum level.
The day and timing also played crucial role for the size of death. Nepal’s trembler
during daytime on Saturday contributed for lower casualty as students were not
at school and people were outside of the house. However, the Chinese death toll
exceeded 87,000 despite the shaking took place on Saturday. This indicates that the
Chinese houses were extremely fragile.
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9 A Comparative Overview of Nepal’s Reconstruction …
9.3.3 Earthquake’s Relationship with Housing Damage
The Wenchuan earthquake damaged 6.5 million houses which placed China at the
first rank among eight comparator countries. It shows that Chinese housing condition was not earthquake resilient. The Japanese destruction of 1.1 million houses
was mainly induced by the Tsunami. The Kutch earthquake damaged one million
houses which placed it in third position among the earthquake hit countries. Nepal’s
destruction was nearly 770,000 and Haiti’s private housing destruction was nearly
700,000 placing them fourth and fifth position, respectively. Unlike to high human
casualty in Pakistan, the housing destruction was only 500,000 which means per
house casualty must be very high. Identical to the human casualty, the destruction
of houses was nominal in New Zealand. The destruction of the Sumatra earthquake
of 9.1 Richter scale (ML ) stretched out up to African Continent which was not only
due to the tremor but also from the Tsunami. Indonesia suffered highest in terms of
housing destruction as well.
9.3.4 Institutional Efficiency of Reconstruction
Various governments responded to the trembler differently which can be categorized into three broad categories: countries who formed the reconstruction institution
instantly after the jolt, countries which took quite some time to form the authority and
the countries which never formed the meaningful institution. The governments which
formed the reconstruction authority almost instantly were Pakistan, Gujarat StateGovernment of India, New Zealand, Japan, China and Indonesia. Nepal was the only
country which established the reconstruction authority after 8 months. Haiti was the
exceptional case which kicked off reconstruction without meaningful reconstruction
authority.
The Government of Pakistan swiftly established the Earthquake Reconstruction
and Rehabilitation Authority (ERRA), a hybrid institution amalgamating military’s
discipline with civilian flexibility and central government’s blueprint approach with
the local government’s bottom-up practice. In India, the Gujarat State Government swiftly established the GSDMA. The New Zealand Government formed an
ad hoc Cabinet Committee on Canterbury Earthquake Recovery almost immediately
after the Canterbury earthquake. The promulgation of the Canterbury Earthquake
Response and Recovery Act enabled the establishment of the Canterbury Earthquake
Recovery Authority (CERA) in New Zealand (New Zealand Parliament 2011). The
Earthquake Commission (EQC) was another instrument for reconstruction which
implemented insurance plus activities. Following the earthquake on 4 September
2010, the national government asked the EQC to take direct responsibility for the
repairs or rebuilding of insured homes rather than simply paying cash settlements
to homeowners (Brownlee 2010a). Indonesia promoted two organizations: MultiDonor Trust Fund (MDTF) to collectively manage international donations and the
9.3 Findings
157
ministerial-level Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Agency (Badan Rehabilitasi dan
Rekonstruksi [BRR]).
Nepal and Japan fall into the second category. Nepal promulgated the Reconstruction Act on 21 December 2021 after eight post-earthquake precious months which
paved the way for establishing the NRA on 25 December 2015. In Japan, the reconstruction agency was established after eleven months of Tohoku earthquake. The
NRA was mandated to report to the Prime Minister and managed national recovery
funds that flowed either through national Ministries or directly to local governments.
The agency was authorized to run until at least December 2020, with extendable
provision of one year. The NRA abrogated in December 2021. Haiti represents anarchic institutional arrangement as Interim Haiti Recovery Commission was formed
but none of the organizations reported to it. Even the government agencies by-passed
this agency. The humanitarian structures operated in parallel.
9.3.5 Reconstruction Efficiency
There are two indicators for measuring efficiency: cost and duration. The way how
figures are reported, comparing cost, has become highly contentious. For example,
Pakistan’s reconstruction spent only US$2 billion whereas Chinese reconstruction
gobbled US$147 billion. However, total reconstruction cost is the function of the
approach and unit cost of the construction industry. For example, the Chinese government consolidated settlements in the earthquake affected regions which involved a
huge reconstruction cost for housing stock and infrastructure. Pakistan and most of
other countries reconstructed in situ and even recycled salvaged materials which
lowered down cost drastically. Second factor could be how costs are reported.
Different socio-political systems have their own expenditure and reporting mechanism. In China, no private and also largely NGO sector investment can be conceived
whereas in all other countries the private sector plays prominent role but does not
reflect in the government accounting. The South Asian countries adopted owner
driven approach, whereas the New Zealand had not had flexibility other than developer implemented reconstruction. All these descriptions show that the cost factor is
a weak indicator which has to be contextualized.
Efficiency in terms of reconstruction period also needs contextualization; however,
it is not as sensitive as the cost. There are only three countries which wrapped reconstruction after reasonable period. The centrally implemented Wenchuan reconstruction was concluded within miraculous period of three years which is inconceivable
in other economies. It demonstrated Chinese prowess for handling such operations.
Completion of post-Kutch earthquake reconstruction within a period of five years
shows that the state government—a sub-national unit can also deliver with a high
level of efficiency. Despite draconian onslaught of COVID-19, Nepal concluded its
reconstruction within a stipulated period of six years which otherwise would have
been completed within a period of five years.
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9 A Comparative Overview of Nepal’s Reconstruction …
Pakistan, New Zealand, Haiti and Japan which began in 2005, 2010, 2010 and
2011, respectively, have been continuing their reconstruction. Not only relatively
feeble country on institutional and economic ground like Haiti but also developed counties like Japan and New Zealand have been taking relatively protracted
reconstruction period.
9.3.6 Outputs
Nepal’s NRA was successful to reconstruct 758,793 private houses out of total
827,340 total beneficiaries (NRA 2021h). Similarly, around 7000 school buildings,
nearly 1000 hospitals, more than 200 security buildings and nearly 600 heritage
monuments were reconstructed which stands nearly 79% of total reconstruction.
The remaining case load consists of outliers influenced by other exogenous factors
such as disinterested migrated households not requiring houses and disputed land for
constructing hospital buildings. Despite NRAs handholding, some vulnerable households have not been able to reconstruct their houses. At present, NRA handed over
the remaining work in progress and non-starters to the generic government agencies:
MoUD, MoEST and DoA (My Republica 2021).
Pakistan’s literature on non-housing reconstruction is relatively scarce. However,
ERRA definitely was successful in reconstructing 500,000 plus private housing.
However, the world community will need to wait for ERRA’s final report for achieving
complete overview. By 2021, reconstruction is ongoing. The India’s GSDMA
supported to reconstruct 201,000 private houses and repaired 911,000 houses by
March 2006. China almost mesmerized the international community by completing
2.29 million new houses along with millions of repaired units (Yong et al. 2011).
As of June 2015, the EQC of New Zealand had completed over 65,000 home
repairs and settled, through cash payments or repairs, nearly all of its buildingand contents-related claims (EQC 2015). This figure does not tally with the
damaged housing units of 11,240. However, there could be some detailed explanation
underneath.
Japan has introduced highly ambitious but fundamental policy of readjustment
and redevelopment for taking forward the urban renewal agenda along with reconstruction. Consequently, by the fifth anniversary of the disaster, most debris had been
cleared in Miyagi and Iwate Prefectures. Then, work was underway to elevate land,
relocate communities to higher ground and construct public housing.
By 2009, Indonesia’s Aceh saw the construction of 140,304 permanent houses;
3696 km of roads; 1759 schools; 1115 health facilities; 23 ports; and 13 airports.
The agency also reclaimed agricultural land, trained nearly 40,000 teachers and
provided more than 7000 fishing boats (BRR 2009a). After completion of 39%
housing units, BRR handed over its responsibilities to local, provincial and central
government agencies. The post-2006 Java earthquake also followed the Aceh model
of community contracting which enabled to reconstruct 300,000 houses. However,
Indonesia could not ensure earthquake resilience in all buildings.
9.4 Discussion
159
Haiti’s statistics in terms of outputs are rather sketchy. However, circumstantial
evidence suggests that the outputs were not satisfactory.
9.4 Discussion
In this section, Nepal’s delivery in comparison to other seven countries is logically
analyzed. Best practices are derived from the experience of an individual country or
with a comparative analysis.
9.4.1 Did Economic Condition Ensure Speedy
Reconstruction?
As revealed in the findings, the economic vitality does not guarantee an efficient
reconstruction. If economic prowess would have been the only determining factor,
Japan should have been able to wrap reconstruction up within a shortest period among
all comparator countries. Duration depends upon several different policy objectives
that a country intends to amalgamate with the reconstruction. Japan intended to
use earthquake destruction as an opportunity to revitalize the city landscape by
introducing redevelopment and readjustment approach. It was also innovative as
it enhanced private sector role minimizing the pressure on public sector’s coffer.
From that perspective, the duration was somehow secondary issue. However, the
public sector must have to work on transitional shelter for the affected populace. The
longer it takes deeper goes the discontent. For the countries like Nepal, it may be
herculean task to bring all stakeholders at the negotiation table and to stamp that out.
New Zealand was another rich country which grappled with post-earthquake
reconstruction but over stretched period. New Zealand’s modality of reconstruction
is to support the earthquake victim through insurance funds. For this to happen, all
houses had to be insured in advance as earthquake preparedness activity. In addition,
government had to vacate leached area which was also time-consuming act.
On the other hand, Chinese economy which was second on the array completed
reconstruction within 3 years’ period. There are a number of factors behind. The
Chinese top-down command-and-control system delivered swiftly. Land title was
another crucial factor which was non-issue in the Chinese environment as all land
belongs to the government. However, there are still several open questions with
regard to the Chinese reconstruction. Having too specific characteristics, the Chinese
approaches are not replicable in the countries with open economy and democratic
environment.
Completion of the Indian reconstruction within five years was a quite good
achievement despite its lower middle per capita. In 2003 when GSDMA was
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9 A Comparative Overview of Nepal’s Reconstruction …
converted from the society to the statutory authority, a seamless carryover arrangement was ensured which was sensible from the perspective of sustainability, cost
effectiveness and immaculate transition (GSDMA).
Having average gross and per capita GDP, Indonesia’s completion within 8 years
was quite significant. However, it is largely donor and NGO driven reconstruction
with government’s regulation. The deluge of NGOs and donors was mainly because
of unprecedented menace caused by 2004 Sumatra earthquake which stimulated
Tsunami.
Pakistan’s army-controlled operation could not enthuse an efficient delivery as
reconstruction of 2005 Balakot earthquake which has remained unabated. Haiti with
the lowest gross and per capita GDP and rabid political environment meaning that
the 2010 Leogene earthquake reconstruction is continuing in 2022.
This international comparison reveals that Nepal’s reconstruction which was
largely completed within 6 years was highly successful particularly with its almost
lowest level of gross and per capita GDP. The reconstruction was executed during
the turbulent period of political transition. Despite GoN’s relatively feeble economic
condition, it allocated US$2.8 billion (60%) out of the total US$4.7 billion. The
figure inches up if loan is also added. This allocation indicates government’s genuine
commitment toward reconstruction.
This analysis shows that the economic strength alone does not guarantee efficient delivery within a shortest time. It depends on the institutional and individual’s
dexterity, development objectives and socio-economic context of a country.
9.4.2 An Assessment of Institutional Set Up
Each country has its own historical, political and development context which hinders
generalization in terms of approaches. However, by and large, post-disaster reconstruction and recovery falls under the remit of the central government. Nonetheless, subtle variations were visible in terms of engagement of the central and local
governments.
China adopted undisputedly central government-led approach and implemented
reconstruction and recovery through command-and-control system. Japan’s centrally
led reconstruction sought a limited partnership from the local governments such as
land use planning. However, the private developers play pivotal role for reconstruction of urban houses. The large chunk of reconstruction expenditure is recovered
through residual floor space after distributing to the existing owners. New Zealand’s
central government’s role was pronounced in the Canterbury Earthquake Response
and Recovery Bill which bestowed extra ordinary power to the national governmental ministers. The CERC which also represented the local governments had rather
supporting role. Another glaring example of the centrally executed reconstruction
was Indonesia’s 2004 Sumatra earthquake. However, the communities were engaged
in the reconstruction process intrinsically.
9.4 Discussion
161
Haiti was rather special case which formed Interim Haiti Recovery Commission
(IHRC), a joint national and international entity. It indicates that Haiti’s government
lacked competence to lead the reconstruction drive which resulted into poor transition
between shelter and housing programming, incoherence in action between Haitian
and international actors.
The state managed recovery with intensive NGOs involvement was rather unique
in India as it was led by the sub-national entity but largely implemented through
NGOs. The Charity framework of GSDMA evolved as statutory body under the
Gujarat State Disaster Management Act—2003. This model delivered on the ground
and created sustainable basis for handling disaster preparedness and post-disaster
reconstruction.
Nepal’s formation of the NRA largely followed the centrally executed operation as
implemented in Japan, Pakistan, New Zealand and Indonesia. However, the Reconstruction Act was formulated before the promulgation of Nepal’s Constitution 2015
which make a stride from centrist to federal state. The taxonomy would have been
remarkably different had NRA would have formed under a new constitution.
The centrally led reconstruction has been the basic tenet of almost all countries
with Indian exception. India’s NGO implemented model under the leadership of
sub-national government was rather exception which could have been emanated
due to center–state relationship and also competent state capacity to handle such
reconstruction.
9.4.3 Implementation Approaches
Four reconstruction approaches were adopted among eight comparator countries.
Nepal, India and Pakistan adopted owner driven approach for reconstructing private
housing which could be due to similar socio-economic phenomena in these South
Asian countries. China introduced standard contractual process for reconstructing
all houses as it was fully government sponsored initiative. New Zealand and
Japan prompted developers for reconstructing private houses. However, there was
subtle variation between them. Japan introduced redevelopment and readjustment
policy, whereas New Zealand funneled insured resources through the Earthquake
Commission. The private house owners used developers for reconstructing their
houses.
As the entire settlements were wiped out, Indonesia intended to generate employment opportunity while affected people engaging with the reconstruction activities.
For this purpose, the community contracting was instrumental. Haiti was the exceptional case where earthquake victims reconstructed their shelter through informal
sector. Due to lack of both policy and political leadership, Haiti’s reconstruction was
largely relied upon the informal sector.
The analysis reveals that the reconstruction approaches are contingent upon the
development status of and socio-political system of a country. Generally, once
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9 A Comparative Overview of Nepal’s Reconstruction …
country progresses economically, the private sector developers’ role becomes prominent. In the milieu of middle- and lower-income countries with free market economy,
the owner driven approach was found successful. The Chinese modus operandi is
not replicable.
In the light of above discussion, Nepal’s reconstruction model was largely appropriate as demonstrated through delivery. However, there are some areas for further
burnishing. Nepal’s owner driven approach worked decently in rural and newly
emerged urban areas, but its efficacy dwindled in historical urban core areas. The
federal government had two options for urban housing reconstruction: follow the
Japanese model of readjustment and redevelopment or adopt Gujarat model of resettlement of the city core dwellers. The Japanese model was obviously ambitious, but
the Gujarat model would entail additional financial liability to the public sector but
would be promising in the Nepalese context. Secondly, the inherent limitation of
owner driven approach in handling vulnerable households was not reckoned with at
the outset. Thirdly, the resettlement parcels were too small and livelihood package
was almost absent. Fourthly, the provision of reconstruction fund which was meant to
be operated by the NRA did not become functional due to reluctance of the MoF. The
idealistic model of bringing together various different Ministries and Departments
such as MoUD and Department of Local Infrastructure was arduous task which was
not in consonance to the line of command principle. For such reconstruction, the
NRA should have absolute command-and-control authority.
9.4.4 Gateway to Resilience Society
There are two different but interrelated issues under the broader discussion of
resilience. First disaster preparedness before the earthquake and adopted resilient
instruments while implementing reconstruction.
Two countries Japan and New Zealand fared extremely well with astonishingly
lower level of earthquake induced casualties. In Japan, the Tsunami induced death
toll of 20,000 people by 9 (ML ) jolt is nominal which illustrates Japanese disaster
preparedness. Had there been no Tsunami, the number of casualties would have been
insignificant. Throughout the history, Japan has been pummeled by disasters: Great
Kanto earthquake (7.9 ML ), two nuclear bombs, over Hiroshima and Nagasaki in
1945, and the Kobe earthquake of 1995 (6.9 ML ), followed by the Tohoku region
in 2011 (9 ML ). All these natural and manmade adversities have fortified Japanese
society culturally which is reflected in their rules and regulations (Gardiner 2020).
Having located on the ring of fire, New Zealand also thrashed with several natural
disasters: 1955 Wairarapa earthquake of 8.2 (ML ), 1931 Hawke’s Bay earthquake
(7.8 ML ), 1968 Inangahua earthquake of 7.1 (ML ), 2010 Canterbury earthquake (7.1
ML ), 2011 Christchurch earthquake of 6.2 (ML ) and 2016 Kaikoura earthquake of
7.8 (ML ). In addition, New Zealand also experiences frequent devastating landslides,
storms, volcanos and shipwrecks. All these adversities compelled Kiwis to develop
robust system of preparedness which has been saving many lives and properties.
9.5 Conclusion
163
Unlike to Japan and New Zealand, Nepal and India fall somewhere in middle
of the comparator countries with 8789 and 20,085 deaths when jolt struck them in
2015 and 2001, respectively. Objectively, the earthquake preparedness in both of
those countries seems better than Pakistan, China, Indonesia and Haiti. However,
Nepal’s lower casualty figure could be a lucky coincidence of day and time. Midday of Saturday when people were awake and outside of their house and children
were not in the vulnerable school buildings. Whatsoever could be the magnitude of
destruction, it is clear that both countries needed to make further progress in disaster
preparedness.
On the array, the Chinese obliteration of 6.5 million houses and loss of 87,149
people were incredible despite Chinese meticulous planning and evolving economy.
Why China could not learn out of its previous disasters has remained open question.
However, China must have fixed its systemic failure after 2008 Wenchuan earthquake
particularly through revamping the rural settlements. Indonesian death was largely
caused by the Tsunami rather than the earthquake which would not have protected
with higher level of building standards. The primitive level of overall pre-warning
system was largely to blame. Pakistan and Haiti’s earthquakes induced menace were
enormous. The earthquake preparedness of both countries seems to be in primitive
level. However, the 2021 earthquake of 7.2 Richter scale (ML ), killed only 2248
people which shows that Haiti also could make progress in terms of resilience.
9.5 Conclusion
The comparative overview showed clearly that the disaster preparedness pays
substantially. The nominal destruction in Japan and New Zealand with high magnitude trembler is a glaring example. However, disaster preparedness is not the sole
function of the economic vitality. If that would have been the case, Chinese destruction would have been nominal. Although Nepal’s economic status was in the category of Haiti, it could wrap reconstruction up within the period of six years whereas
Pakistan’s protracted reconstruction is still ongoing after 17 years. It is also worth
noting that Nepal delivered amidst turbulent socio-political transition and in the
middle of COVID-19 pandemic. However, Nepal must work further on the urban
renewal and resettling vulnerable households. The owner driven approach will
continue to become relevant within foreseeable future which, however, will need to
integrate sound provision for vulnerable people. The lower level of fatality must not
be a source for complacency but be considered as fluke coincidence. The immediate
way forward must be the dedicated stride on stringent implementation of building
and infrastructural codes. The central government must play a catalytic role for such
resilience efforts in close collaboration of the local governments. Nepal needs to
work on preparing ground for the mass scale housing insurance which will provide
safety net not only to the house owners but also to the government.
Chapter 10
Assessing Impact of Post-Gorkha
Earthquake Recovery
and Reconstruction
Abstract This chapter intended to capture basically economic and sustainability
impact of the post-2015 Nepal Earthquake reconstruction. It is essential to record
the policy implications for informing future reconstruction works. Data were drawn
mainly from the study of socio-economic impacts of reconstruction. The National
Reconstruction Authority (NRA) data and information along with other relevant
institutional sources were also used. Considering the reconstruction period of six
years, sizeable contribution to GDP and mobilization of three-fourth resources from
the internal sources, the Nepal’s reconstruction was highly successful which has
been acknowledged internationally. However, some of the political conducts have
raised concerns on Nepal’s ability to sustain NRA implanted resilience features and
replicating them nationwide. Taking forward resilience agenda through the building
permit system and securing commitment, capacitating the local government and
raising awareness among the general public are found to be the recipe for resilience.
Consolidation of diffused knowledge base in 32 earthquake affected districts and
unfolding intervention in the remaining 45 districts will prepare ground toward
resilience nationwide.
Keywords Resilience · Reconstruction · Economy · Housing · Expenditure
10.1 Background
The 2015 Gorkha earthquake of 7.6 Richter scale (7.8 ML ) struck at Barpak of Gorkha
District (NEMRC 2022) at a depth of 8.2 km which was followed by 553 aftershocks
of local magnitude greater than 4.0 within the first 45 days (Adhikari et al. 2015)
and one of them was 6.7 Richter scale (ML ) on 12 May 2015 at Singati Village
of the Dolakha district. The tremor was felt as far as India, Bangladesh and Tibet
Autonomous Region of China (Subedi and Poudyal 2019). The NPC reported 8790
deaths and 22,300 injuries (NPC 2015a). Eight million people of thirty-one districts
out of 75 were affected. Total damage was estimated at the range of US$7 billion.
Consequently, the GDP growth rate slumped to 2.3% against the earlier estimate of
5.7%. Table 10.1 presents the key facts.
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022
C. B. Shrestha, Building Back Better After the 2015 Nepal Earthquake,
Disaster Risk Reduction, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-6676-7_10
165
166
10 Assessing Impact of Post-Gorkha Earthquake Recovery …
Table 10.1 Key facts of 2015 Gorkha Nepal earthquake
Parameter
Description
Damage estimates
Date of occurrence
25 April 2015
Time
UTC 06:11:25; NST:
11:56:25
Magnitude
7.8 Richter scale (ML )
Private housing damage
types
• Fully damaged
• Partially damaged
Unit
498,852
Nos
256,697
Nos
Epicenter
Barpak, Gorkha
Health facilities
1197
Nos
Depth
8.2 km
Schools
7553
Nos
Death
8790
Public buildings
415
Nos
Injuries
22,300
Security buildings
216
Nos
Affected districts
32
Heritage monuments
920
Nos
Affected population
8 million
Roads
964
km
Disaster effect
US$7.065
Road bridges
14
Nos
Source National Reconstruction Authority (NRA 2021m)
NRA’s institutional memory report reported NRA’s achievements by the end
of Ashad 2078 (15 July 2021) that it almost completed the entire reconstruction
interventions. The implementation status is shown in Table 10.2.
The leftover activities were handed over to the government’s generic agencies. All
private housing-related activities transferred to the MoUD, heritage’s conservation
efforts were shifted to the Department of Archeology (DoA) and reminiscent school
buildings were passed over to the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology
(MoEST). In a similar fashion, other infrastructure were trusted to the respective
owners (My Republica 2021).
After investing US$7.2 bio. (NRA 2021b), it is natural to question the economic
effect of 2015 Gorkha Nepal earthquake. With this respect, various international
scholars have assessed impact of such reconstruction and recovery interventions in
a various parts of the world. Cohen and Werker (2008) analyzed disaster from the
lens of political economy and emphasized disaster preparedness and also demonstrated that the international aid may persuade the governments to under-invest as
perverse incentive which may alleviate the problem. The central question of this
Table 10.2 Major achievements (all achievements are in absolute numbers)
Outputs
Achievement
%
Outputs
Achievement
%
Private housing
758,793
91.46
Schools
6647
87.66
Resettled households
4720
100
Health buildings
751
64.52
Landless households
12,788
100
Govt. buildings
388
93.72
Integrated settlement
62
58.49
Heritage
586
63.70
Road
657 km
85.99
Source National Reconstruction Authority (NRA 2021m)
10.2 Data and Methods
167
analogy is whether Nepal’s interventions were palliative or contributed to the disaster
prevention. Albala-Bertrand (1993) recommends not to rely on the indirect economic
benefits which he mentions as “possibility than reality.”
Alwis (2018) concluded that the low-income households increased their income
by a higher proportion compared to the higher income households. Alwis’ another
conclusion is that the affected regions were more income-equal ex-post compared
to the unaffected regions. The high- and low-income households recovered faster
than middle income households. However, the high-income households’ recovery
was long lasting.
Alesch et al. (2001), who studied post-disaster environment in the United States,
found that the disaster affected small businesses tend to underestimate the disaster
impact and hence remain unprepared for. Uninsured or partially insured assets,
lackluster disaster preparedness and sluggish early warning system were the major
culprits. Households’ unrealistic belief that life resumes in its natural normal course
also causes set back as they are not the one-off event but are watershed event which
exacerbate over the period. Becchetti and Castriota (2011) viewed the impact of
microfinance as a recovery tool and found that the microfinance have a positive and
significant effect on the change in real income and in weekly worked hours, and that
the impact on performance variables is significantly stronger for damaged than nondamaged borrowers. Loayza et al. (2012) conclude that the moderate disaster can
inflict positive growth but severe disasters have negative one. Moreover, the disasters
in developing countries are more severe than the developed countries.
Against this backdrop, Nepal’s post-Gorkha Nepal earthquake reconstruction
needs to be assessed in terms of impact it induced in the economy. In addition to the
macro-economic impact, its ramification on the resilience agenda has to be scrutinized. Did it impact on socio-political decision-making process? What improvements
are further required and how to ensure them? How was NRA perceived in term of
transparency and accountability? This chapter will respond to these questions.
10.2 Data and Methods
The PDNA and PDRF were taken as the baseline information for this study which
were collated with the progress reports until the end of FY 2020/21. Various NRA
sources have been used for assessing the impact. Moreover, the NRA concluded
impact evaluation’s data were analyzed further. The impact study conducted Focused
Group Discussion (FGDs) in Nuwakot, Kavrepalanchowk, Sindhupalchok and
Gorkha. The Key Information Interviews (KIIs) were also conducted with various
stakeholders—policy makers, NRA Chief Executive Officer and Executive Members,
Representatives of I/NGOs and various Ministries. Economic data from various
national statistics and NRA were also other sources of information. The TI Reports
were also used for assessing governance and accountability mechanism.
168
10 Assessing Impact of Post-Gorkha Earthquake Recovery …
10.3 Findings
This chapter deals with estimated and actual reconstruction allocation, funding
sources, contribution of reconstruction expenditure to the national economy and
level of transparency and accountability in the reconstruction interventions. The gulf
between the legal provisions and practiced realities are also elaborated.
10.3.1 Estimated and Actual Reconstruction Allocation
Among Various Sectors
The PDNA was concluded immediately after the 2015 Gorkha Nepal earthquake
which sketched the preliminary picture of damage and reconstruction requirements.
However, the NRA had to revisit the earlier tentative PDNA estimates for ground
truthing. The NRA regulation prioritized reconstruction activities as: buildings
related to essential services such as government, public sector and hospitals; rural
private housing, infrastructure, integrated settlements and educational institutions;
urban private housing, infrastructure and integrated settlement; public buildings;
heritage monuments and settlements and other infrastructures as deemed necessary.
However, the NRA revised this priority order and accorded highest priority to the
private housing later (NRA 2016e). The prioritization exercise hinted government’s
suspected inability to allocate required resources simultaneously to all sectors. As
indicated in Table 10.3, the private housing sector received the priority consistently
in terms of allocation which disbursed US$2670.14 billion by the end of FY 2020/21
which was 71.7% of PDRF estimation. The education sector was grossly underestimated by the PDNA with US$368 million which was revised to US$1657 but the
actual disbursement was limited to US$936 million.
There is spectacular variation between the actual allocations against the PDRF
estimation in certain sectors. Employment and livelihood received ninefold more
resources than estimated whereas the forestry and environment received only 3%
of the estimated amount. The situation of gender and social inclusion and financial
sector was rather pathetic having only 0.09% and 0.01, respectively. No allocation
was provisioned for six sectors: electricity and renewable energy, commerce and
industry, social protection, nutrition, communications and tourism.
Overall actual expenditure of 71.69% with respect to the PDRF estimation seems
quite promising. The leftover activities in housing and other infrastructure will bring
the expenditure to the tune of PDRF estimates. However, there is a fundamental
issue in sectoral allocation. First of all, some of the sectoral issues could be simply
accounting treatment as some of the resources were allocated directly to the sectoral
Ministries as normal development budget which was not reflected under reconstruction heading. Some provisions were rather abstract such as nutrition and social protection which requires close scrutiny and conscious intervention mechanism with a
long-term vision. Otherwise, it can be misallocated. The employment and livelihood
10.3 Findings
169
Table 10.3 Sector wise reconstruction estimates versus actual expenditure
Sectors
PDNA
est.
2015
Rank
PDRF
est.
2016
Rank
Actual
Rank
exp. 2015/16–2020/21
Actual
exp./PDRF
est.
Private housing
3034.83 I
3450.63 I
2670.14
I
71.70
Education
368.16
II
1657.14 II
936.35
II
52.36
Others*
–
XXII
–
XXII
836.75
III
Employment and 116.18
livelihood
XIV
53.93
XV
529.62
IV
910.04
Government
building
XXI
273.19
V
291.77
V
98.96
228.66
58.86
–
Transport
260.97
V
Community
infrastructure
41.20
XVIV –
VIII
145.26
VI
XXI
125.94
VII
Health
136.02
XIII
160.49
X
104.18
VIII
60.15
Water and
sanitation
167.65
XI
194.93
VIX
77.63
VIX
36.90
Agriculture
livestock and
irrigation
144.08
XII
246.73
VII
25.46
X
9.56
Cultural and
heritage
190.31
VIII
310.09
III
21.67
XI
6.48
Disaster risk
management
75.96
XV
38.97
XVIII 11.36
XII
27.00
Governance
170.76
X
28.12
XIV
10.21
XIII
36.20
Environment and 233.31
forestry
VII
261.02
VI
8.82
XIV
3.13
Gender and
social inclusion
XX
42.59
XVII
0.04
XV
0.09
10.06
Financial sector
309.93
IV
307.08
IV
0.01
XVI
Electricity and
renewable
energy
172.09
IX
137.87
XI
–
XVII
Commerce and
industry
253.78
VI
100.92
XII
–
XVIII
Social protection 59.24
Nutrition
46.63
Communications 45.73
Tourism
358.43
Sub total
6199.12
Own account
housing
reconstruction
XVI
71.17
XIII
–
XVIX
XVII
68.45
XIV
–
XX
XVIII 45.31
XVI
–
XXI
III
XX
–
XXII
8.41
7490.78
5795.21
–
2797.77
71.69
(continued)
170
10 Assessing Impact of Post-Gorkha Earthquake Recovery …
Table 10.3 (continued)
Sectors
PDNA
est.
2015
Rank
Total
PDRF
est.
2016
–
Rank
Actual
Rank
exp. 2015/16–2020/21
Actual
exp./PDRF
est.
8592.98
Amount in mio. US$
Mid period exchange rates are used for currency conversion
Sources PDRF sector reports; Nepal PDNA report 2015; National Reconstruction Authority (NRA,
CLPIU) database, MoF budget details (Red Book), post-earthquake assistance portal, Development
Cooperation Nepal 2015–2020, NRA Socioeconomic Impact Assessment Survey 2021, Cited from:
(NRA 2021b)
* Rescue, recovery and rehabilitation including cash and inkind transfers to households outside the
PDNA & PDRF
figure has blown up as all employment generated from the private housing and infrastructure were loaded there which is quite an interpretational issue. In general sense,
there was a huge scope for livelihood which did not receive justifiable attention.
10.3.2 Funding Source
Nepal’s vitality in reconstruction has been self-evident as 75% of US$7.94 billion is
funded from internal sources which includes also loan received from various development partners (Table 10.4). One-third of the entire investment was shouldered by
the individual households.
Table 10.4 carries a resounding message that Nepal can finance its own reconstruction with exception of some loan capital. From that perspective the bilateral
and non-governmental assistance can be restricted to the rescue and relief and technical assistance only. The discreet technical assistance created discrimination among
households in different precincts. Some were excessively benefitted in comparison to
others. The NGO’s engagement in implementation also raised smoldering discontent
as they provided additional assistance and intense handholding. The large swathes of
uncovered settlements’ households felt discriminated with basic government support
which played out against the government’s credibility.
10.3.3 Contribution of Reconstruction Expenditure
to the National Economy
Total reconstruction expenditure of US$7.94 billion followed a normal curve which
indicates efficiency in planning and implementation of reconstruction interventions. It is particularly appreciable because the NRA wade in in the environment
of rigid governmental frameworks mobilizing administration-oriented government
10.3 Findings
171
Table 10.4 Sources of reconstruction financing
Funding agencies
2015/16 2016/17 2017/18 2018/19 2019/20 2020/21 Total %
On budget
208
456
1136
772
460
453
3485 44.00
Nepal
Government
190
278
653
499
287
272
2179 27.56
DPs grants
1
45
84
5
0
17
152
DPs loan
17
133
399
267
173
164
1153 14.56
Off budget
456
992
1335
884
514
315
4496 56.00
DPs direct grants
244
362
365
51
26
15
1063 13.05
I/NGO grants
126
352
248
118
31
1
876
278
722
715
457
299
2557 32.56
1448
2471
1656
974
732
7944 100
Own-A/C housing 86
const.
663
Total
1.87
10.39
Amount in mio. US$
Sources a. National Reconstruction Authority (NRA, CLPIU) database; b. Ministry of Finance,
post-earthquake- assistance-portal; c. Ministry of Finance, budget details (red book); Ministry of
Finance, Development Cooperation Nepal 2015–2020, NRA Socio-economic Impact Assessment
Survey 2021. Cited from: (NRA 2021b)
employees. Nonetheless, as shown in Fig. 10.1, the expenditure which started from
FY 2015/16 picked up swiftly and reached to climax in FY 2017/18.
Table 10.5 shows that the private sector investment of house owners accounted
for nearly one-third of the entire operation followed by the public sector investment
in the private housing. The private sector housing expenditure including government
grant and households’ own resource investment totals to nearly two third of the
entire investment which was followed by educational buildings, employment and
livelihood, rescue and relief and other government buildings.
Table 10.5 shows NRA’s extremely light association with a host of sectors. In
retrospection, the NRA could have been trusted only for private housing and all
Amt in Mio. US $
3,000.00
2,500.00
2,000.00
1,500.00
1,000.00
500.00
2015-16
2016-17
2017-18
2018-19
2019-20
Fiscal Year
Total Exp.
Capital expenditure
Recurrent expenditure
Linear (Total Exp.)
Fig. 10.1 Expenditure trend of reconstruction
2020-21
172
10 Assessing Impact of Post-Gorkha Earthquake Recovery …
Table 10.5 Sector wise expenditure trend
Sector
2015–16 2016–17 2017–18 2018–19 2019–20 2020–21 Total %
Agri. lives.
and forestry
0.97
0.48
0.26
–
–
20
22
0.27
Cultural
heritage
0.12
2.48
4.52
2.86
10
–
20
0.25
Edu. bldg.
recons.
5.26
96.08
157.08
188.59
148
166
761
9.44
Education
support
7.27
24.09
27.07
23.21
16
–
98
1.22
Health
building
3.36
7.22
1.83
5.94
17
15
50
0.61
Health
support
5.43
19.83
7.94
7.27
6
–
46
0.58
Emp. and
livelihood
89.54
229.63
131.31
58.25
2
–
511
6.34
Govt. and
finance
3.51
3.26
3.13
–
–
–
10
0.12
Private
housing
68.15
524.83
1055.68
471.72
214
201
2535 31.46
Water and
sanitation
9.93
44.02
21.99
0.12
–
–
76
0.94
Integrated
settlement
6.89
0.60
8.35
–
–
–
16
0.20
Land imp. and –
dev.
0.12
0.16
–
–
–
0
0.00
Other public
const.
53.56
8.79
8.09
31.11
0
5
107
1.33
Rescue and
relief
85.82
128.37
150.01
3.11
4
–
371
4.61
Disaster risk
reduction
1.28
1.68
5.67
1.40
1
–
11
0.14
Shelter
5.46
58.36
39.99
27.46
17
1
149
1.85
R&D
31.65
19.38
3.11
–
0
–
54
0.67
Cash and kind 66.72
transfers
–
0.02
0.02
–
–
67
0.83
Gender based
violence
–
0.04
–
–
–
–
0
0.00
Other govt.
building
10.66
52.13
64.28
67.98
52
24
271
3.36
–
0.01
–
–
0
0
0.00
Finance sector –
reform
(continued)
10.3 Findings
173
Table 10.5 (continued)
Sector
2015–16 2016–17 2017–18 2018–19 2019–20 2020–21 Total %
Env. and land
conserve.
1.94
1.77
4.94
–
–
–
9
0.11
Road and
transport
0.90
13.52
39.21
53.33
28
–
135
1.67
Machinery
and equip.
–
0.09
–
–
–
–
0
0.00
Advocacy and –
awareness
0.53
14.77
13.09
–
–
28
0.35
Mis. admin.
expenditure
119.17
0.68
0.09
1.80
2
2
126
1.56
Own account
housing
85.75
294.25
721.96
727.97
457
299
2586 32.09
Total
663.34
1532.23
2471.46
1685.25
974
732
8058 100.00
Annual
distribution
(%)
8.23
19.01
30.67
20.91
12.09
9.09
100
Capital
expenditure
370.74
1253.69
2286.86
1581.61
947
709
7149 88.89
Recurrent
expenditure
292.60
278.54
184.59
103.64
27
23
909
Capital
expenses (%)
55.89
81.82
92.53
93.85
97.27
96.90
518
11.11
Amount in Mio. $ US
Source Evaluation of Socio-economic Impacts of Reconstruction in Nepal (NRA 2021b)
other infrastructure could have been handed over to the generic line agencies which
would have enabled NRA to concentrate on the housing sector for efficient delivery.
There are certain untouched sectors such as land improvement, gender-based violence
and financial sector. Part of the land improvement was embedded in the integrated
settlement and housing sector. However, handling the issue of gender-based violence
was an extremely cumbersome for the reconstruction authority for all of its practical
purposes. The financial sector was capable of handling its own issues. However,
NRA bolstered financial institutions’ operation through mandatory housing grant
payment through banking system. Overall capital expenditure of 89% shows efficient
reconstruction operation.
The NRA contribution to the national GDP climaxed at 3.28% in 2017/18 when
the expenditure was on the highest level (NRA 2021b). The contribution of 2.41% in
2016/17 decreased to 2.14% in 2018/19. Obviously, the contribution was directly
proportional to the expenditure amount. The reconstruction contribution to the
National Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF) was 0.34% in 2015/16 which rose to
3.17% in FY 2016/17 which declined gradually to 2.43% and 1.57% in FY 2017/18
174
10 Assessing Impact of Post-Gorkha Earthquake Recovery …
and 2018/19 respectively. However, COVID-19 contributed to plummet GFCF in
2019/20 to −12.41% which revived slightly on the following year.
10.3.4 Transparency and Accountability
The TI commissioned a specific project entitled “Integrated Post-Earthquake Reconstruction and Rehabilitation (IPERR) Project” for overseeing on the reconstruction
activities (TI Nepal 2020). The study found that the general technical and administrative awareness level increased during the reconstruction process. The post-earthquake
reconstruction was implemented under the tailored procurement procedure specifically designed for NRA. However, persuasion for accepting lowest bidder could not
ensure construction quality particularly in archeological and cultural heritage sectors.
The contractor implemented school construction encountered delays. Despite the
overwhelming NRA’s success, certain observed caveats were as: ineffective concessional loan provisions, inadequate timber supply particularly to the heritage monuments, non-implementation of act mandated reconstruction fund, inefficient resettlement of vulnerable settlements and ineffective livelihood recovery interventions.
Despite some structural limitations, TI concluded that households reconstructed their
houses complying with earthquake resilient construction technology and reconstruction of school buildings was on track. Conservation of the heritage sector was rather
sluggish thanks to government’s lower priority in allocating budget and intertwined
ritualistic requirements.
TI’s perceptional survey found that the reconstruction policy, timeliness of reconstruction grants, service delivery were moderately favorable. Only 80% of the donors’
commitment was realized leaving a huge funding gap. The security sector was
found to be highly efficient, and the archeological sector was on the other end of
the spectrum. The study concluded that the reconstruction interventions increased
public awareness in reconstruction technology and procedures, enhanced technical
skills, trailblazed integrated settlement, mobilized youths and community and generated employment opportunities. TI recommended to introduce housing insurance
policy for reducing fiscal burden, implement an effective and functional concessional
loan policy, emphasize recovery to the ultra-poor households, initiate an efficacious
building permit system and relocate vulnerable households from the disaster-prone
settlements.
10.3.5 Transforming Political Mindset
Hutt (2020) mentioned that the promulgation of Nepal’s constitution was impacted
by the 2015 earthquake. The post-disaster psychology influenced members of the
constituent assembly to promulgate the constitution within six months. Otherwise,
the issue which had been languishing since 2006 when the comprehensive peace
10.4 Discussions
175
agreement was concluded. More, importantly, the newly promulgated constitution
included disaster preparedness, early warning system, rescue, relief and recovery
in the state directive principle (Constitution of Nepal 2015) which was followed
by the policy on disaster risk reduction and management action plan (GoN 2018a).
Consequently, the NDRRMA was founded. (Nepal—Disaster Risk and Management
Act, 2074 2017).
All these cascading activities demonstrate that the disaster has received political
priority. However, this macro-level posturing has not been well translated into the
action. The political parties protested in the parliament for the single tranche of
housing grant (THT 2016) which would have played out against housing resilience
if NRA would have conceded. The steering committee’s decision for resurveying
of ineligible households as declared by NRA was perceived as tacit persuasion
for tampering NRA’s standards (Decisions of Ninth Meeting of the NRA Steering
Committee 2017). Releasing housing grant to non-compliant houses bred doubt on
political commitment on resilient reconstruction (NRA 2021k). The NRA’s good
intention to engage the local governments in the reconstruction process raised legitimate question as the local governments passed all household request to NRA without
scrutinizing properly (Shrestha and Ghimire 2021). All these political actions show
that the political behavior has not been demonstrated in consonance to the legal
background which is worrying and concerning.
10.4 Discussions
The findings raised a number of issues: reconstruction achievements, reconstruction
financing, scope of work for reconstruction authority, reinforcing transparency and
accountability, and way forward toward creating resilient society.
10.4.1 Reconstruction Achievements
Achieving 92% progress during the period of six years including settling down all
vulnerable households can be considered success as on the crest of the wave. The
school and government buildings and road construction was almost completed in
December 2021 when NRA handed over to the respective agencies. Only health and
heritage monuments will continue for maximum two years’ time as there were some
inherent structural issues. The Ministry of Health and Population (MoHP) aspired to
implement health-related buildings without adequate capacity which languished for
a considerable period. The sluggish progress in the heritage sector can be attributed
to inadequate capacity of the Department of Archeology (DoA), numerous stringent
heritage and ritualistic requirements and unclarity in roles among different layers of
governments.
176
10 Assessing Impact of Post-Gorkha Earthquake Recovery …
In the context of government’s limited absorption capacity of capital expenditure (Investopaper 2022), NRA exceeded expenditure than its allocation. It utilized
unspent budget toward the end of fiscal year which exemplifies its efficiency in planning and implementation. Consequently, NRA’s contribution of 2.41% in 2016/17
climaxed to 3.18% in 2017/18. With the decline of allocation, the contribution
reached to 2.14% in 2018/19. Consequently, the average economic growth which was
3.39% during 2011–2015 rose to 5% in the post-earthquake period of 2016–2020
(NRA 2021b).
The achievement proves that the NRA’s legal framework and institutional
arrangement was largely appropriate to grapple with the herculean challenge.
10.4.2 Post-disaster Reconstruction Financing
The allocation and political priority showed that private housing occupies the prominent attention in the post-disaster reconstruction intervention. It is obvious that the
shelter is apparently related to people’s life and wellbeing which draws political and
social attention. In principle the service delivery sectors such as schools, hospitals
should be of also on high demand. However, sizeable private sector’s presence in
both sectors mainly in the urban areas, the level of pressure for expediting reconstruction of schools and hospitals remained at low pitch. The heritage sector is directly
linked to the community’s psyche but could wait a bit longer than housing reconstruction. However, the artefacts get endangered if not properly protected immediately after disaster. The Gorkha Earthquake inflicted nominal damage to the technical infrastructure such as road, water supply and sanitation, irrigation schemes etc.
However, the earthquake triggered damage compounded with maintenance backlog
which artificially swelled up reconstruction requirement.
The post-Gorkha Nepal Earthquake reconstruction trailblazed for the future mode
of financing. The government’s own source expenditure, house owner’s contribution and development partners’ housing loan accounted for 75% of total expenditure
which indicates Nepal’s fiscal space for financing such a mammoth sized reconstruction. The bilateral and INGO grants are rather insignificant and moreover government
lags handle on allocation. With this experience, Nepal will have policy option to rely
on own source revenue for reconstruction confining bilateral and INGOs on rescue
and relief operation. Alternatively, the bilateral and INGO grant can be accepted
conditionally only for soft interventions such as livelihood and awareness raising.
The anecdotal evidences have shown that the bilateral and INGOs festooned their
pre-earthquake support under the banner of reconstruction which misled in terms
of reconstruction expenditures. In addition, the INGO support which normally is
focused on rather tiny precinct with additional top up. A majority of INGOs skillfully play with policy caveat for topping up resources which was not allowed by
NRA regulation. Such variation was perceived as discrimination which played out
against government. Such situation must have to be avoided.
10.4 Discussions
177
10.4.3 Scope of Reconstruction Authority
The PDNA identified 22 reconstruction and recovery sectors further stretched to 27
by PDRF. As shown in Table 10.3, if the sectors are classified by the natural breaks of
percentage points of total disbursement they received, three distinct ranges emerge:
0–1; 1–10; 10–30 and 30 and above. Sixteen sectors below 1; 9 sectors 1–10; 0
sector 10–30 and 2 above 30. All the sectors below 1% points unnecessarily dragged
NRA by creating managerial hassles. Among them, more interestingly, four sectors
received zero allocation. Among 1–10 range fall education, health, road and other
infrastructure. Among them a reconstruction authority can engage with selectively.
The housing is the only sector which occupies nearly two third allocation. This pattern
indicates that NRA type of organization needs to be focusing on few selective sectors
only. Among them private housing is the prominent one.
Partly this gravity-based arrangement was practiced by forming the CentralLevel Project Implementation Units (CLPIU) for education, building, grant management and infrastructure. Funds were channeled to all other sectors directly with
implementation responsibility to the concerned line agency.
The discussion suggests that the reconstruction authority has to take full responsibility of the private housing sector. Depending upon the damage, other few sectors can
be considered. In retrospection, NRA could have been accounted also for education,
heritage and health-related buildings. The implementation divisions had to be formed
under NRA itself where respective Ministries’ officials could have been pooled in.
All the rest responsibility should have been trusted to the concerned Ministries themselves. Such arrangement would have allowed NRA to fully focus on maximum four
sectors which would ensure implementation.
10.4.4 Governance and Accountability
The TI report appreciated NRA’s delivery and recommended for introducing housing
insurance policy, launching functional concessional loan policy, implementing propoor policies, replicating building permit system and relocating vulnerable settlements. However, the major crux of governance was the nurturing effective reconstruction agency for averting or minimizing natural disasters’ impact by integrating
disaster resistant measures, lead rescue and relief operation and take forward reconstruction interventions. Federalization of the country has a direct impact on the nature
of the Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) which has to be an enabler rather than NRA
like implementor. The present National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management
Authority (NDRRMA) which is constituted as a supporting wing of the Ministry of
Home Affairs but is not appropriately placed to bell the cat. Upgrading this institution
directly under the Prime Minister and authorizing not only for rescue and relief but
also for reconstruction and recovery activities will be essential to grapple with the
178
10 Assessing Impact of Post-Gorkha Earthquake Recovery …
entire disaster cycle. The NDRRMA will require an interlocutor unit in each provincial and local government unit for effective delivery and also capacitating the local
governments. The restructured NDRRMA will require donors’ technical assistance
for bolstering its capacity at least for few initial years.
Political parties obviously see rescue, relief, reconstruction and recovery from
political lens which has a number of positive impacts as level of motivation for
serving people receives enhanced impetus. However, another side of the coin could
be tampering formal rules for the political benefit. Such tendencies must be preempted
with transparent and objective decision-making process.
Effective governance is indispensable for administering NGO sector. Despite
NRA’s halter, the NGOs’ operation was outside of the NRA’s control. Dual administration with Social Welfare Council was another conflicting area which could not
be smoothened up until the end. NGO’s submission of proposal to their donors after
receiving their nod before applying to NRA preempted NRA’s priority order. The
situation complicates when donors’ objectives does not tally with NRA’s.
NRA persistently confronted with the Engineers’ administration which may not
be the case after emergence of the local government as engineers are embedded
within the system. However, the number of engineers could be estimated for the
normal time not for the post-disaster recovery period when there could be inflated
demand.
10.4.5 Translating Constitutional and Legal Provisions
into Practice
The political conduct is not perfectly in compliance to the constitutional and legal
provisions. This issue is linked to the sustainability of NRA created infrastructure as
well. How far the Cohen’s thesis of perverse incentive still continues to operate in
Nepal is the real question to grapple with. The local governments and even federal
government are still young to appreciate and adhere the principle of resilience. First
of all, the disaster-related institutions have a grave responsibility to raise awareness among the political personalities as they may not have epiphany on the consequence of built-in vulnerability. The politicians are pressurized to impress general
public sometimes at the cost of sustainability. For example, they rallied for the single
tranche grant in the parliament and on the street because the cash strapped households compelled them to act which the politicians considered as the populist move.
However, they would have acted more responsibly if they would have known consequent implication of vulnerable structures. Several lives and a great deal of property
would have been at the stake. Myopic people’s desire gets intertwined with political quest to win their heart for the next election prepares a conducive environment
for vulnerability. Under this circumstance, securing advance political approval on
such issues and implement the approved covenants by the government bureaucrats
or professionals seems an appropriate compromise. As rule bound rigid machinery,
10.5 Conclusion
179
the bureaucracy cherishes the approved documents. On the other hand, the politicians
also can flag up such approved instrument to quell the public petulant tendency.
The World Bank’s positioning for perpetuating three installments of the housing
grant played crucial role for quelling down the demand of single tranche. It is obvious
that a nation has to come up with genuine solutions internally not from the external
agencies. However, had there been no World Bank’s positioning, the possibility of
deciding toward single tranche was invincible. It suggests that under unavoidable
circumstances, the external thump on wrist alters trajectory which can be the last
resort in the future.
In the context when the federal government has been on the steep learning curve,
the local governments are far away. They are on the front line of the myopic and
petulant general public which goads them to adopt populist solutions rather than bitter
but genuine ones. In the context that the Kathmandu Metropolitan City’s compelled
ratification of non-compliant houses suggests that the far-flung rural municipalities
may not be interested to introduce the building code. The federal government has
only one leverage of federal grant which if somehow could be tied up with building
permit system will generate positive outcome.
Having bottom-up mode of polity, Nepal can only opt for bottom-up intervention
which mandates all professionals to operate in demand side rather than in supply
side which is tortuous trail on steep slope.
10.5 Conclusion
Completion of the post-2015 Gorkha Nepal Earthquake reconstruction within a
period of six years, contribution of additional 0.83–3.28% to the GDP, mobilization of three fourth resources from the internal sources and appreciation of the
Transparency International for maintaining immaculate delivery are self-explanatory
facts that Nepal’s reconstruction was exemplary in the international standards. These
claims have been substantiated by the international dignitaries all across the globe
(NRA 2022). However, complacency must be avoided as the major stakeholders have
not demonstrated whole-hearted commitment with the constitutional and other legal
provisions of disaster resilience. Instead, their conduct indicates their deep attachment to their myopic interest. If this process remains unabetted, Nepal’s resilience
drive may be derailed. For safeguarding, the only way out seems to be the demand side
management by raising awareness among general public, politicians and other social
workers. Securing policy-level decision from politicians and retaining implementation capacity at the bureaucratic level will work. Additionally, the reconstruction
SPV will deliver effectively if it focuses only on the private housing. Other sectors
could be delegated to the generic Ministries and Departments. Intensive intervention is urgent at the local level where principles are translated to action particularly
for raising awareness and ensuring housing resilience through the building permit
system. In addition, the resilience drive has to be consolidated in 32 earthquake
affected districts and freshly initiated in remaining 45 districts.
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