Annabelle Higgins
The US and French in the Vietnam War
The French's central plan was to take over power started with dominating "The Road
without joy," in which the communists had sole control over the road and communications along
the central Annam coast. The French utilized their military high command in its assembly that
used reserves in the area to mobilize all forces. With guerrilla tactics, they used a united front of
troops to make moves on the coast of central Annum as well as utilizing coordinated movement
of military units. Land, air, and sea forces were the core basis of guerilla tactics. As well as
troops, supplies included infantry, airborne battalions, armored regiments, squadrons of armored
Launches, armored trains, aircraft, fighter-bombers, and Navy ships. They had scheduled raids
using four different military groups. Also, to the French aid, there was a 20 miles long and more
than 300 yards wide zone of villages that held the center of the Communist resistance zone along
the central Annam coast. However, not every attack was successful, and the Communists saw
and attackedthe weak spots in the French plans. The rugged terrain continued to cause
difficulties for the French, suppressing their ability to operate tanks and move quickly across the
land. Due to agreements with citizens living in the villages, there were limitations placed upon
the employment of their weapons, which reduced the effectiveness of the French attacks, mainly
when it came into direct contact with major Viet-Minh resistance center. The extended time of
transport and risky new tech caused many failures and extended uses of time in initial attacks. At
this time however, there was little communist resistance to the French’s favor. Attacks still
persisted shortly after many new tech military machines experienced failures due to the land and
new risky tech. Leaving the French behind in the early hours of the attack days which allowed
the Vietnamese to wait for the breaks of the French attacks to attack after the French’s guerilla
attacks had ceased. Strong wind and bad weather, and weak new technology ended up being
what brought the French down . Politically, France as a country on economic, social and political
fronts was growing weaker and weaker and continuously failed to establish Vietnam as a state,
Which prevented the French from ever taking a stronghold on Vietnam. Similarly to the French
struggles at “The Road without Joy” their losses at the battle of Dien Bien Phu due to the Viet
Minh's destruction of the Frenches airstrip, effectively preventing takeoffs and landings, leading
to fewer and fewer supplies reaching the French. Again weak spots in the technology aided to
France's demise.
According to the author Dunn in “Armed Forces and Counter Insurgency”, the US had
trained an army and air forces to their advantage in their battles with Vietnam. However they
were utilizing the wrong equipment, wrong tactics, and possibly the wrong war doctrines in their
plans of attack. At the height of American combat involvement in Vietnam there had also been
established patterns of disunity in the US, there were uncoordinated differences between the
CIA, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and the State Department on the one side and MACV
on the other in establishing the VC and North Vietnamese Army (NVA) Order of Battle. They
were significantly lower in numbers than those derived by the national intelligence agencies
despite strong internal disagreement they continued to underestimate the power of the
communist military forces, and self-defense. Forces refused to note the communists a substantial
threat. Which continued to give the communists the power as the so called underdog. Due to a
predicted easy victory, the US never received national levels of intelligence in the field. This
puts the US at a considerable disadvantage. To aid another significant failure, according to the
author, the US's fight was never a straightforward process of insurgents versus security forces,
and this makes any plans of American counterinsurgency techniques ineffiecent. The US
persisted with search-and-destroy tactics despite them not working due to an egomaniacal
persistence that continued to underestimate the communists and their lack of self-awareness to
change tactics. To a small amount of credit, the US didn't officially lost any battles, but the
communists had not yet won the war by 1973, nor had the US, whose forces were rarely able to
hold their ground after a battle. The core issue with both sides' inability to achieve lasting results
in Vietnam was the lack of fighting men in the Army. Since the US couldn't rely on the
workforce, they had to rely on central intelligence, which they failed to utilize in a united
function. The author, Dunn, believed the war was winnable in the first place; the communists,
unlike the Americans, could have held out for victory. According to Dunn, "while the
fragmented South Vietnamese were under siege equally by the communists and the Americans,
the
latter incessantly trying to clone the Vietnamese political system into an American image." So
yes, the war could have been won if there had been some severe tactic and military restructuring,
which the Americans would never have done, so in the end winning was a lost pipe dream for the
US.