Human rights – before was the idea of natural rights
539 BC – Cyrus the Great – King of Persia – conquered
Babylon. People chose religion, freed slaves to return home.
Cyrus cylinder tablet known as the first human rights
declaration, it quickly spread the idea of human rights.
1215 – first magna carta/ great charter in England – enumerated
and later taught of human rights
1. right if church to be free from gov’tal interference
2. the right of all free citizens t inherit and own property
3. the right to be protected from exclusive taxes
1628 – petition of right - set out the rights of people
- produced by English parliament
- sent to Charles I
- statement of Civil Parliament
1. no taxes maybe levied without the consent of parliament
2. no subject maybe imprisoned without just cause shown
3. no soldier maybe quartered upon the citizens
4. martial law may not be used in the time of peace
July 4 1776 – US declaration of independence
- proclaimed the right to life, liberty, in pursuit of happiness
- US congress approved by Thomas Jefferson
1787 – US CONSTI
1791 – us bill of rights- freedom of speech, religion, assembly,
right to keep and bare arms
- prohibited unreasonable search and seizure
1789 – France – declaration of rights of man and citizens
- all citizens under the law are equal
- abolished absolute monarchy
- 1 french republic
- guaranteed rights of liberty, property, security
st
1864 – 1977 – Geneva convention –
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international red cross - provided case for wounded soldiers
all the treaties focused on alleviating effects of war
1945 – UN - 50 nations signed in october 24 aimed to protect
and promote peace
1948 – UDHR – spearheaded by widow of Franklin Roosevelt,
Eleanor.
1961 – Amnesty International – Peter Benenson – people
sparked solidarity and freedom
1976 – International covenant on Civil and Political Rights
1978 – international covenant on economic, social and cultural
rights – right to fair wages, holiday, rest time, protection of
family, adequate food, housing, clothing, ratified in New
Zealand.
- it was the offspring of HR
Human Rights – Spring from being a member of the human
specie , aggregate of human privileges and claims, benefits,
entitlements, and moral guarantees that pertain to man because
of humanity
independent national human rights commission – E.O. 163 –
1987
- mandated to conduct investigations on HR violations
particularly vulnerable sectors of the society.
Vision – come up with just and humane Philippine Society of
person equal in opportunity, living a life of dignity and forever
vigilant
issues:
- BBL – peace and self determination
- cordillera autonomy
- sister Patricia Fox – missionary visa, australian nun
Right of person to due process – People on strike – Nutri Asia –
violent dispersal
- Makati bar issues
- oplan tambay – Genesis Tisay
- Anti drug campaign – Cebu
Any human being anywhere has human rights, and cannot be
taken. it is inalienable and personal
bill of rights – duty of government to uphold rights under article
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3, constitution
declaration – accepted under the doctrine of incorporation
UDHR – 30 articles
Article 1
Article 2
Article 3
Article 4
Article 5
Article 6
Article 7
Article 8
Article 9
Article 10
Right to Equality
Freedom from Discrimination
Right to Life, Liberty, Personal Security
Freedom from Slavery
Freedom from Torture and Degrading Treatment
Right to Recognition as a Person before the Law
Right to Equality before the Law
Right to Remedy by Competent Tribunal
Freedom from Arbitrary Arrest and Exile
Right to Fair Public Hearing
Right to be Considered Innocent until Proven
Article 11
Guilty
Article 12 Freedom from Interference with Privacy, Family,
Home and Correspondence
Article 13 Right to Free Movement in and out of the Country
Right to Asylum in other Countries from
Article 14
Persecution
Right to a Nationality and the Freedom to Change
Article 15
It
Article 16 Right to Marriage and Family
Article 17 Right to Own Property
Freedom of Belief and Religion (One’s thoughts
Article 18
and belief)
Article 19 Freedom of Opinion and Information
Article 20 Right of Peaceful Assembly and Association
Right to Participate in Government and in Free
Article 21
Elections
Article 22 Right to Social Security
Article 23 Right to Desirable Work and to Join Trade Unions
Article 24 Right to Rest and Leisure (Play)
Right to Adequate Living Standard (Live with
Article 25
dignity)
Article 26 Right to Education
Right to Participate in the Cultural Life of
Article 27
Community
Right to a Social Order that Articulates this
Article 28
Document
Community Duties Essential to Free and Full
Article 29
Development
Freedom from State or Personal Interference in
Article 30
the above Rights
The Doctrine of Impunity – problem of people being unpunished
for crimes or violations of the law. i.e. alleged EJKs.
Doctrine of Transformation – requires that there should be
constitutional mechanism of legislation
Doctrine of Incorporation – general accepted principles are part
of the law of the land, even with no legislation
Hard law – binding laws such us resolutions of UNGA –
government must protect its citizens against torture, inhumane,
degrading treatment, treaties, charters
Constitutional provisions on human rights, government,
sovereignty
Civil and Political Rights:
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• Article II
• Article III
• Article IV
• Article V
• Article VI, Section 32 (Initiative and Referendum)
• Article XVII, Section 2
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
• Article II
• Article XII
• Article XIII
• Article XIV
• Article XV
historical origion of Human Rights – pre hispanic, spanish, american, commonwealth
pre hispanic – primitive
spanish – feudalism, rights were adhered to king of spain
freedom of colonization – non discrimination and equality
right to name, nationality, movement, abode, speech, expression
transparency, right to vote, social right to education, economic, cultural right
american – first system of rights – society under capitalism
first republic 0 malolos government, malolos constitution
ph bill of rights – 1902 – couper act. equality and independence
commonwealth – second generation of human rights
- focused on economic, social and cultural rights
- system – socialism under 1935 constitution
third generation – right to self determination, peace, non aggression
japanese to UN and UN charter – UDHR plus its protocols
PH under martial law – fear until 1987 Constitution
New democracy – characteristics of Human Rights – inherent, inalienable, imprescriptible.
Philosophical origions –
2 basic foundations – rationality and freedom
a. process of deliberating on the merits of the choices and consequently reasoning for one’s choice or
action
freedom: freewill to verbalize, the freewill to choose 1 option.
limited however, if your not transgressing on the freedom of
others and will end if you are encroaching the rights of others
state duty to promote rights: inherent rights
violation: disregard of basic rights, acts committed by
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instigation, consent of public officials or other person in
authority causing harm and suffering or death.
rights: decent/ human treatment and fundamental moral
entitlements.
genocide: intentional extermination of a single ethnic, racial or
religious group, causing bodily harm. regarded as most offensive
crime of humanity
individual non state actor violating the RPC i.e. human rights
violations
- 2 requisites for remedy –a. the state must enact to
criminalize
- b. the court provides adequate assistance.
if the state may act thru agents- it is deemed violated or
committed by the state itself, mostly committed by soldiers.
state as a guarantor of human rights – case of oposa v. factoran.
cases:
mejoff v director of prisons: Boris Mejoff was a Russian citizen who was arrested for being
suspected as a Japanese spy after the Philippine liberation. It was found out that he illegally
entered the Philippines in 1944. He was without inspection and admission by the immigration
officials at a designated port of entry. He was then ordered to be deported to Russia on the first
available transportation to said country. But Russian ships refused to take him due to their
alleged lack of authority to do so. He was then transferred to the Bilibid Prison and was kept in
detention as the Commissioner of Immigration believes it is of best interest to detain the
unwanted alien while arrangements for his deportation are being made. Mejoff contends that he
was legally brought to the Philippines by the then Japanese forces and he may not now be
deported. He also contends that the statutory period to deport him has long lapsed and that we
cannot detain him for an unreasonable period of time pursuant to the Universal Declaration on
Human rights.
ISSUE: Whether or not Mejoff shall remain in detention?
HELD: Yes. The government has the power and the authority to eject from the Philippines any
and all unwanted aliens. He entered the country illegally in 1944 and was arrested in 1948.
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Pursuant to Section 37 of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 an unwanted alien is subject to
deportation within 5 years from arrest. And he may be held for a reasonable period of time
(depending on the circumstances) while arrangements are being held for his deportation. There
is no allegation however as to the length of time that he has been detained. Hence, the same
cannot be construed as “unreasonable”. Further, there is no indication that the statutory period
to deport Mejoff had lapsed.
kuroda v. jalandoni: THE FACTS
Petitioner Shigenori Kuroda, the Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in the
Philippines during the Japanese occupation, was charged before the Philippine Military Commission of
war crimes. He questioned the constitutionality of E.O. No. 68 that created the National War Crimes Office
and prescribed rules on the trial of accused war criminals. He contended the Philippines is not a signatory
to the Hague Convention on Rules and Regulations covering Land Warfare and therefore he is charged of
crimes not based on law, national and international.
II. THE ISSUES
Was E.O. No. 68 valid and constitutional?
III. THE RULING
[The Court DENIED the petition and upheld the validity and constitutionality of E.O. No. 68.]
YES, E.O. No. 68 valid and constitutional.
Article 2 of our Constitution provides in its section 3, that –
The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy and adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the nation.
In accordance with the generally accepted principle of international law of the present day
including the Hague Convention the Geneva Convention and significant precedents of international
jurisprudence established by the United Nation all those person military or civilian who have been guilty of
planning preparing or waging a war of aggression and of the commission of crimes and offenses
consequential and incidental thereto in violation of the laws and customs of war, of humanity and
civilization are held accountable therefor. Consequently in the promulgation and enforcement of
Execution Order No. 68 the President of the Philippines has acted in conformity with the generally
accepted and policies of international law which are part of the our Constitution.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Petitioner argues that respondent Military Commission has no jurisdiction to try petitioner for acts
committed in violation of the Hague Convention and the Geneva Convention because the Philippines is
not a signatory to the first and signed the second only in 1947. It cannot be denied that the rules and
regulation of the Hague and Geneva conventions form, part of and are wholly based on the generally
accepted principals of international law. In facts these rules and principles were accepted by the two
belligerent nations the United State and Japan who were signatories to the two Convention. Such rule
and principles therefore form part of the law of our nation even if the Philippines was not a signatory to
the conventions embodying them for our Constitution has been deliberately general and extensive in its
scope and is not confined to the recognition of rule and principle of international law as contained in
treaties to which our government may have been or shall be a signatory.
REPUBLIC V SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS:
One of the foremost concerns of the Aquino Government in February 1986 was the recovery of the
unexplained or ill-gotten wealth reputedly amassed by former President and Mrs. Ferdinand E. Marcos, their
relatives, friends and business associates. Thus, the very first Executive Order (EO) issued by then President
Corazon Aquino upon her assumption to office after the ouster of the Marcoses was EO No. 1, issued on February
28, 1986. It created the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) and charged it with the task of
assisting the President in the "recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President Ferdinand E.
Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates, whether located in the Philippines or
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abroad, including the takeover or sequestration of all business enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them
during his administration, directly or through nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public office and/or
using their powers, authority, influence, connections or relationship."
In all the alleged ill-gotten wealth cases filed by the PCGG, this Court has seen fit to set aside technicalities
and formalities that merely serve to delay or impede judicious resolution. This Court prefers to have such cases
resolved on the merits at the Sandiganbayan. But substantial justice to the Filipino people and to all parties
concerned, not mere legalisms or perfection of form, should now be relentlessly and firmly pursued. Almost two
decades have passed since the government initiated its search for and reversion of such ill-gotten wealth. The
definitive resolution of such cases on the merits is thus long overdue. If there is proof of illegal acquisition,
accumulation, misappropriation, fraud or illicit conduct, let it be brought out now. Let the ownership of these funds
and other assets be finally determined and resolved with dispatch, free from all the delaying technicalities and
annoying procedural sidetracks.
Issue:
Whether or not President Marcos committed prohibited and inhibited acts as a president during his term of office
Held:
Yes
Ratio:
It is settled that judicial admissions may be made: (a) in the pleadings filed by the parties; (b) in the course of
the trial either by verbal or written manifestations or stipulations; or (c) in other stages of judicial proceedings, as in
[82]
the pre-trial of the case. Thus, facts pleaded in the petition and answer, as in the case at bar, are deemed
admissions of petitioner and respondents, respectively, who are not permitted to contradict them or subsequently
[83]
take a position contrary to or inconsistent with such admissions.
The sum of $304,372.43 should be held as the only known lawful income of respondents since they did not file
any Statement of Assets and Liabilities (SAL), as required by law, from which their net worth could be
determined. Besides, under the 1935 Constitution, Ferdinand E. Marcos as President could not receive any other
[84]
emolument from the Government or any of its subdivisions and instrumentalities. Likewise, under the 1973
Constitution, Ferdinand E. Marcos as President could not receive during his tenure any other emolument from the
[85]
Government or any other source. In fact, his management of businesses, like the administration of foundations to
accumulate funds, was expressly prohibited under the 1973 Constitution:
Article VII, Sec. 4(2) The President and the Vice-President shall not, during their tenure, hold any other office
except when otherwise provided in this Constitution, nor may they practice any profession, participate directly or
indirectly in the management of any business, or be financially interested directly or indirectly in any contract with,
or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government or any other subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including any government owned or controlled corporation.
Article VII, Sec. 11 No Member of the National Assembly shall appear as counsel before any court inferior to a
court with appellate jurisdiction, x x x. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any
contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof including any government owned or controlled corporation during his term of office. He
shall not intervene in any matter before any office of the government for his pecuniary benefit.
Article IX, Sec. 7 The Prime Minister and Members of the Cabinet shall be subject to the provision of Section 11,
Article VIII hereof and may not appear as counsel before any court or administrative body, or manage any business,
or practice any profession, and shall also be subject to such other disqualification as may be provided by law.
Their only known lawful income of $304,372.43 can therefore legally and fairly serve as basis for determining
the existence of a prima facie case of forfeiture of the Swiss funds.
Respondents argue that petitioner was not able to establish a prima facie case for the forfeiture of the Swiss
funds since it failed to prove the essential elements under Section 3, paragraphs (c), (d) and (e) of RA 1379. As the
Act is a penal statute, its provisions are mandatory and should thus be construed strictly against the petitioner and
liberally in favor of respondent Marcoses.
We hold that it was not for petitioner to establish the Marcoses other lawful income or income from
legitimately acquired property for the presumption to apply because, as between petitioner and respondents, the
latter were in a better position to know if there were such other sources of lawful income. And if indeed there was
such other lawful income, respondents should have specifically stated the same in their answer. Insofar as petitioner
Republic was concerned, it was enough to specify the known lawful income of respondents.
Section 9 of the PCGG Rules and Regulations provides that, in determining prima facie evidence of ill-gotten
wealth, the value of the accumulated assets, properties and other material possessions of those covered by Executive
Order Nos. 1 and 2 must be out of proportion to the known lawful income of such persons. The respondent Marcos
couple did not file any Statement of Assets and Liabilities (SAL) from which their net worth could be
determined. Their failure to file their SAL was in itself a violation of law and to allow them to successfully assail the
Republic for not presenting their SAL would reward them for their violation of the law.
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sen. estrada v ombudsman
Facts:
Sometime in November and December 2013, the Ombudsman served on Sen. Estrada
two (2) criminal complaints for plunder, among others. Eighteen (18) of Sen. Estrada’s corespondents in the two complaints filed their counter-affidavits between 9 December 2013 and
14 March 2014. On 20 March 2014, Sen. Estrada filed his “Request to be Furnished with Copies
of Counter-Affidavits of the Other Respondents, Affidavits of New Witnesses and Other Filings”
(the “Request”). Sen. Estrada’s request was made “[p]ursuant to the right of a respondent ‘to
examine the evidence submitted by the complainant which he may not have been furnished’
(Section 3[b], Rule 112 of the Rules of Court) and to ‘have access to the evidence on record’
(Section 4[c], Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman).” The
Ombudsman denied Sen. Estrada’s Request, which is not the subject of the present certiorari
case.
Issue:
What is the quantum of evidence necessary during preliminary investigation?
Held:
First, there is no law or rule which requires the Ombudsman to furnish a respondent with copies
of the counter-affidavits of his co-respondents. Sections 3 and 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure, as well as Rule II of Administrative Order No. 7, Rules of Procedure of
the Office of the Ombudsman do not provide for the relief sought by Sen. Estrada in his Request.
Second, it should be underscored that the conduct of a preliminary investigation is only for the
determination of probable cause, and “probable cause merely implies probability of guilt and
should be determined in a summary manner. A preliminary investigation is not a part of the trial
and it is only in a trial where an accused can demand the full exercise of his rights, such as the
right to confront and cross-examine his accusers to establish his innocence.” Thus, the rights of a
respondent in a preliminary investigation are limited to those granted by procedural law.
A preliminary investigation is defined as an inquiry or proceeding for the purpose of determining
whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime cognizable by
the Regional Trial Court has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof,
and should be held for trial. The quantum of evidence now required in preliminary investigation
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is such evidence sufficient to “engender a well-founded belief” as to the fact of the commission
of a crime and the respondent’s probable guilt thereof. A preliminary investigation is not the
occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties’ evidence; it is for the presentation of
such evidence only as may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed
and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. We are in accord with the state prosecutor’s
findings in the case at bar that there exists prima facie evidence of petitioner’s involvement in the
commission of the crime, it being sufficiently supported by the evidence presented and the facts
obtaining therein.
Third, the technical rules on evidence are not binding on the fiscal who has jurisdiction and
control over the conduct of a preliminary investigation. If by its very nature a preliminary
investigation could be waived by the accused, we find no compelling justification for a strict
application of the evidentiary rules.
Fourth, the quantum of evidence in preliminary investigations is not akin to those in
administrative proceedings as laid down in the landmark doctrine of Ang Tibay. The quantum of
evidence needed in Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, is greater than the evidence needed in a
preliminary investigation to establish probable cause, or to establish the existence of a prima
facie case that would warrant the prosecution of a case. Ang Tibay refers to “substantial
evidence,” while the establishment of probable cause needs “only more than ‘bare suspicion,’ or
‘less than evidence which would justify . . . conviction’.” In the United States, from where we
borrowed the concept of probable cause, the prevailing definition of probable cause is this:
In dealing with probable cause, however, as the very name implies, we deal with probabilities.
These are not technical; they are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on
which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act. The standard of proof is
accordingly correlative to what must be proved.
Thus, probable cause can be established with hearsay evidence, as long as there is substantial
basis for crediting the hearsay. Hearsay evidence is admissible in determining probable cause in
a preliminary investigation because such investigation is merely preliminary, and does not finally
adjudicate rights and obligations of parties. However, in administrative cases, where rights and
obligations are finally adjudicated, what is required is “substantial evidence” which cannot rest
entirely or even partially on hearsay evidence. Substantial basis is not the same as substantial
evidence because substantial evidence excludes hearsay evidence while substantial basis can
include hearsay evidence. To require the application of Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, in
preliminary investigations will change the quantum of evidence required in determining probable
cause from evidence of likelihood or probability of guilt to substantial evidence of guilt.
Simon v CHR: Ruling; CHR has no quasi judicial power to hear
and decide on cases, imposing a penalty. CHR may only
investigate and assist possible victims of HR violations. CHR
ruling penalizing is void.
pbm v pbm employees union
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PBM Employees vs PBM
Facts:
The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization (PBMEO) is a legitimate labor union
composed of the employees of the respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., and petitioners.
Benjamin Pagcu and Rodulfo Munsod are officers and members of the petitioner Union. Petitioners claim
that on March 1, 1969, they decided to stage a mass demonstration at Malacañang on March 4, 1969, in
protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police. PBMEO thru Pagcu confirmed the planned
demonstration and stated that the demonstration or rally cannot be cancelled because it has already been
agreed upon in the meeting. Pagcu explained further that the demonstration has nothing to do with the
Company because the union has no quarrel or dispute with Management. The Management, thru Atty.
C.S. de Leon, Company personnel manager, informed PBMEO that the demonstration is an inalienable
right of the union guaranteed by the Constitution but emphasized that any demonstration for that matter
should not unduly prejudice the normal operation of the Company. Workers who without previous leave of
absence approved by the Company, particularly , the officers present who are the organizers of the
demonstration, who shall fail to report for work the following morning shall be dismissed, because such
failure is a violation of the existing CBA and, therefore, would be amounting to an illegal strike. Because
the petitioners and their members numbering about 400 proceeded with the demonstration despite the
pleas of the respondent Company that the first shift workers should not be required to participate in the
demonstration and that the workers in the second and third shifts should be utilized for the demonstration
from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M. on March 4, 1969, filed a charge against petitioners and other employees who
composed the first shift, for a violation of Republic Act No. 875(Industrial Peace Act), and of the CBA
providing for 'No Strike and No Lockout.' Petitioners were held guilty in by CIR for bargaining in bad faith,
hence this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or Not the petitioners right to freedom of speech and to peaceable assemble violated.
Held:
Yes. A constitutional or valid infringement of human rights requires a more stringent criterion, namely
existence of a grave and immediate danger of a substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent.
This is not present in the case. It was to the interest herein private respondent firm to rally to the defense
of, and take up the cudgels for, its employees, so that they can report to work free from harassment,
vexation or peril and as consequence perform more efficiently their respective tasks enhance its
productivity as well as profits. Herein respondent employer did not even offer to intercede for its
employees with the local police. In seeking sanctuary behind their freedom of expression well as their
right of assembly and of petition against alleged persecution of local officialdom, theemployees and
laborers of herein private respondent firm were fighting for their very survival, utilizing only the weapons
afforded them by the Constitution — the untrammelled enjoyment of their basic human rights. The
pretension of their employer that it would suffer loss or damage by reason of the absence of its
employees from 6 o'clock in the morning to 2 o'clock in the afternoon, is a plea for the preservation merely
of their property rights. The employees' pathetic situation was a stark reality — abused, harassment and
persecuted as they believed they were by thepeace officers of the municipality. As above intimated, the
condition in which the employees found themselves vis-a-vis the local police of Pasig, was a matter that
vitally affected their right to individual existence as well as that of their families. Material loss can be
repaired or adequately compensated. The debasement of the human being broken in morale and
brutalized in spirit-can never be fully evaluated in monetary terms. As heretofore stated, the primacy of
human rights — freedom of expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition for redress of grievances —
over property rights has been sustained. To regard the demonstration against policeofficers, not against
the employer, as evidence of bad faith in collective bargaining and hence a violation of the collective
bargaining agreement and a cause for the dismissal from employment of the demonstratingemployees,
stretches unduly the compass of the collective bargainingagreement, is "a potent means of inhibiting
speech" and therefore inflicts a moral as well as mortal wound on the constitutional guarantees of free
expression, of peaceful assembly and of petition. Circulation is one of the aspects of freedom of
expression. If demonstrators are reduced by one-third, then by that much the circulation of the Issue
raised by the demonstration is diminished. The more the participants, the more persons can be apprised
of the purpose of the rally. Moreover, the absence of one-third of their members will be regarded as a
substantial indication of disunity in their ranks which will enervate their position and abet continued
alleged police persecution.
david v. arroyo
In February 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo members and the discovery of a plan
(Oplan Hackle I) to assassinate the president, then president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA)
issued Presidential Proclamation 1017 (PP1017) and is to be implemented by General Order
No. 5 (GO 5). The said law was aimed to suppress lawlessness and the connivance of
extremists to bring down the government.
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Pursuant to such PP, GMA cancelled all plans to celebrate EDSA I and at the same time
revoked all permits issued for rallies and other public organization/meeting. Notwithstanding the
cancellation of their rally permit, Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) head Randolf David proceeded to
rally which led to his arrest.
Later that day, the Daily Tribune, which Cacho-Olivares is the editor, was raided by the CIDG
and they seized and confiscated anti-GMA articles and write ups. Later still, another known antiGMA news agency (Malaya) was raided and seized. On the same day, Beltran of Anakpawis,
was also arrested. His arrest was however grounded on a warrant of arrest issued way back in
1985 for his actions against Marcos. His supporters cannot visit him in jail because of the
current imposition of PP 1017 and GO 5.
In March, GMA issued PP 1021 which declared that the state of national emergency ceased to
exist. David and some opposition Congressmen averred that PP1017 is unconstitutional for it
has no factual basis and it cannot be validly declared by the president for such power is reposed
in Congress. Also such declaration is actually a declaration of martial law. Olivares-Cacho also
averred that the emergency contemplated in the Constitution are those of natural calamities and
that such is an overbreadth. Petitioners claim that PP 1017 is an overbreadth because it
encroaches upon protected and unprotected rights. The Sol-Gen argued that the issue has
become moot and academic by reason of the lifting of PP 1017 by virtue of the declaration of PP
1021. The Sol-Gen averred that PP 1017 is within the president’s calling out power, take care
power and take over power.
ISSUE: Whether or not PP 1017 and GO 5 is constitutional.
HELD: PP 1017 and its implementing GO are partly constitutional and partly unconstitutional.
The issue cannot be considered as moot and academic by reason of the lifting of the questioned
PP. It is still in fact operative because there are parties still affected due to the alleged violation
of the said PP. Hence, the SC can take cognition of the case at bar. The SC ruled that PP 1017
is constitutional in part and at the same time some provisions of which are unconstitutional. The
SC ruled in the following way;
Resolution by the SC on the Factual Basis of its declaration
The petitioners were not able to prove that GMA has no factual basis in issuing PP 1017 and
GO 5. A reading of the Solicitor General’s Consolidated Comment and Memorandum shows a
detailed narration of the events leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with supporting reports
forming part of the records. Mentioned are the escape of the Magdalo Group, their audacious
threat of the Magdalo D-Day, the defections in the military, particularly in the Philippine Marines,
and the reproving statements from the communist leaders. There was also the Minutes of the
Intelligence Report and Security Group of the Philippine Army showing the growing alliance
between the NPA and the military. Petitioners presented nothing to refute such events. Thus,
absent any contrary allegations, the Court is convinced that the President was justified in
issuing PP 1017 calling for military aid. Indeed, judging the seriousness of the incidents, GMA
was not expected to simply fold her arms and do nothing to prevent or suppress what she
believed was lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. However, the exercise of such power or
duty must not stifle liberty.
Resolution by the SC on the Overbreadth Theory
First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for testing ‘on their
faces’ statutes in free speech cases. The 7 consolidated cases at bar are not primarily ‘freedom
of speech’ cases. Also, a plain reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not primarily directed to
speech or even speech-related conduct. It is actually a call upon the AFP to prevent or
suppress all forms of lawless violence. Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not intended for
testing the validity of a law that ‘reflects legitimate state interest in maintaining comprehensive
control over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct.’ Undoubtedly, lawless violence,
insurrection and rebellion are considered ‘harmful’ and ‘constitutionally unprotected conduct.’
Thus, claims of facial overbreadth are entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their
terms, seek to regulate only ‘spoken words’ and again, that ‘overbreadth claims, if entertained at
all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be
applied to protected conduct.’ Here, the incontrovertible fact remains that PP 1017 pertains to a
spectrum of conduct, not free speech, which is manifestly subject to state regulation.
Resolution by the SC on the Calling Out Power Doctrine
On the basis of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution, GMA declared PP 1017. The SC considered
the President’s ‘calling-out’ power as a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom, it
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stressed that ‘this does not prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised within
permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave
abuse of discretion. The SC ruled that GMA has validly declared PP 1017 for the Constitution
grants the President, as Commander-in-Chief, a ‘sequence’ of graduated powers. From the
most to the least benign, these are: the calling-out power, the power to suspend the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare Martial Law. The only criterion for the
exercise of the calling-out power is that ‘whenever it becomes necessary,’ the President may
call the armed forces ‘to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.’ And such
criterion has been met.
Resolution by the SC on the Take Care Doctrine
nd
Pursuant to the 2 sentence of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution (He shall ensure that the laws
be faithfully executed.) the president declared PP 1017. David et al averred that PP 1017
however violated Sec 1, Art 6 of the Constitution for it arrogated legislative power to the
President. Such power is vested in Congress. They assail the clause ‘to enforce obedience to
all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon
my direction.’ The SC noted that such provision is similar to the power that granted former
President Marcos legislative powers (as provided in PP 1081). The SC ruled that the assailed
PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants GMA the authority to promulgate ‘decrees.’
Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Sec 1, Article 6
categorically states that ‘[t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives.’ To be sure,
neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify GMA’[s exercise
of legislative power by issuing decrees. The president can only “take care” of the carrying out of
laws but cannot create or enact laws.
Resolution by the SC on the Take Over Power Doctrine
The president cannot validly order the taking over of private corporations or institutions such as
the Daily Tribune without any authority from Congress. On the other hand, the word emergency
contemplated in the constitution is not limited to natural calamities but rather it also includes
rebellion. The SC made a distinction; the president can declare the state of national emergency
but her exercise of emergency powers does not come automatically after it for such exercise
needs authority from Congress. The authority from Congress must be based on the following:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by
Congress.
Resolution by the SC on the Issue that PP 1017 is a Martial Law Declaration
The SC ruled that PP 1017 is not a Martial Law declaration and is not tantamount to it. It is a
valid exercise of the calling out power of the president by the president.
zulueta v ca
This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming
the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch X) which
ordered petitioner to return documents and papers taken by her from
private respondent's clinic without the latter's knowledge and consent.
Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin.
On March 26, 1982, petitioner entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of
medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver and private
respondent's secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her
husband's clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private
correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings
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cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin's passport, and photographs.
The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for
legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine
which petitioner had filed against her husband.
Issue:
(1) Whether or not the documents and papers in question are inadmissible
in evidence;
Held:
(1) No. Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in
evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring "the privacy of
communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable" is no less applicable
simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husband's
infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to
be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if
there is a "lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order
requires otherwise, as prescribed by law." Any violation of this provision
renders the evidence obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any
proceeding."
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in
breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for
any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting
marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an
individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to
her.
The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses
by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against
the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage
subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to
any communication received in confidence by one from the other during
the marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of
communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what
one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of
fidelity that each owes to the other.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANDRE MARTI (193
SCRA 57) Case Digest
Facts:
On August 14, 1987, the appellant and his common-law wife, Shirley Reyes went to Manila Packaging
and Export Forwarders to send packages to Zurich, Switzerland. It was received by Anita Reyes and ask
if she could inspect the packages. Shirley refused and eventually convinced Anita to seal the package
making it ready for shipment. Before being sent out for delivery, Job Reyes, husband of Anita and
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proprietor of the courier company, conducted an inspection of the package as part of standard operating
procedures. Upon opening the package, he noticed a suspicious odor which made him took sample of the
substance he found inside. He reported this to the NBI and invited agents to his office to inspect the
package. In the presence of the NBI agents, Job Reyes opened the suspicious package and found driedmarijuana leaves inside. A case was filed against Andre Marti in violation of R.A. 6425 and was found
guilty by the court a quo. Andre filed an appeal in the Supreme Court claiming that his constitutional right
of privacy was violated and that the evidence acquired from his package was inadmissible as evidence
against him.
Issue:
Can the Constitutional Right of Privacy be enforced against private individuals?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held based on the speech of Commissioner Bernas that the Bill of Rights governs the
relationship between the individual and the state.
The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a restraint
directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. It is not
meant to be invoked against acts of private individuals. It will be recalled that Mr Job Reyes was the one
who opened the box in the presence of the NBI agents in his place of business. The mere presence of the
NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search effected by Mr. Reyes into a warrantless search and
siezure proscribed by the constitution. Merely to observe and look at that which is in plain sight is not a
search.
The judgement of conviction finding appeallant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged was
AFFIRMED.
Oposa vs Factoran
Natural and Environmental Laws; Constitutional Law: Intergenerational Responsibility
GR No. 101083; July 30 1993
FACTS:
A taxpayer’s class suit was filed by minors Juan Antonio Oposa, et al., representing their
generation and generations yet unborn, and represented by their parents against Fulgencio
Factoran Jr., Secretary of DENR. They prayed that judgment be rendered ordering the
defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to:
1. Cancel all existing Timber Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the country;
2. Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing, or appraising new
TLAs;
and granting the plaintiffs “such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises.” They
alleged that they have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and
are entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as parens patriae. Furthermore, they claim
that the act of the defendant in allowing TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining forests
constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resources property he holds in
trust for the benefit of the plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds:
1. Plaintiffs have no cause of action against him;
2. The issues raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the
legislative or executive branches of the government.
ISSUE:
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Do the petitioner-minors have a cause of action in filing a class suit to “prevent the
misappropriation or impairment of Philippine rainforests?”
HELD:
Yes. Petitioner-minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations to
come. The Supreme Court ruled that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation, and
for the succeeding generation, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of succeeding
generations is based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right considers the “rhythm and harmony of
nature” which indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization,
management, renewal and conservation of the country’s forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries,
wildlife, offshore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration,
development, and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as the future
generations.
Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and
harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the
minor’s assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes at the same time, the
performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to
come.
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