1. Trenas v. People, 664 SCRA 355 RTC MAKATI HAS NO JURISDICTION
FACTS:
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Margarita wanted to buy a house-and-lot. It was then mortgaged with Maybank. The bank
manager recommended the appellant Hector to private complainant Elizabeth, who was an
employee and niece of Margarita, for advice regarding the expenses for the transfer of the title in
the latter’s name.
Thereafter, Elizabeth gave P150,000 to Hector who issued a corresponding receipt and prepared
a Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage.
Hector gave Elizabeth receipts however, when she consulted with the BIR, she was informed that
the receipts were fake.
o Hector admitted to her that the receipts were fake and that he used the P120,000.00 for
his other transactions.
To settle his accounts, appellant Hector issued in favor of Elizabeth a check but the same was
dishonored for the reason that the account was closed.
Petitioner asserts that the prosecution witness failed to allege that any of the acts material to the crime of
estafa had occurred in Makati City. Thus, the trial court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court has jurisdiction. NO
RULING:
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The overarching consideration in this case is the principle that, in criminal cases, venue is
jurisdictional. A court cannot exercise jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense
committed outside its limited territory. In a criminal case, the prosecution must not only prove that
the offense was committed, it must also prove the identity of the accused and the fact that the
offense was committed within the jurisdiction of the court.
In this case, the prosecution failed to show that the offense of estafa under Section 1, paragraph
(b) of Article 315 of the RPC was committed within the jurisdiction of the RTC of Makati City.
There is nothing in the documentary evidence offered by the prosecution that points to where the
offense, or any of its elements, was committed.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter in a criminal case cannot be conferred upon the court by the
accused, by express waiver or otherwise. That jurisdiction is conferred by the sovereign authority
that organized the court and is given only by law in the manner and form prescribed by law.
There being no showing that the offense was committed within Makati, the RTC of that city has
no jurisdiction over the case.
In case itanong:
Under Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC, the elements of estafa are as follows: (1) that money, goods or
other personal property is received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or
under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same; (2) that there be
misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender, or denial on his part of such
receipt; (3) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (4) there
is demand by the offended party to the offender.
PANFILO LACSON v. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
G.R. No. 128096; 20 January 1999
Facts:
Eleven (11) persons believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng, an
organized crime syndicate, were killed by the elements of Anti-Bank Robbery and
Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG). Said group was composed of several police units
including the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission Task Force Habagat (PACC-TFH)
headed by herein petitioner. Consequently, a police from the Central Investigation
Command (CIC), another unit belonging to ABRITG, stated that what transpired
between the ABRITG and the gang members was a summary execution. This led to
the investigation of the incident, finding that said encounter was a legitimate police
operation.
However, the review board modified the findings and recommended for the
indictment for multiple murder against all of the respondents of the case, including
herein petitioner. Information for murder were filed against the same before the
Sandiganbayan. The Ombudsman then filed an amended information to the
Sandiganbayan, charging herein petitioner only as an accessory.
The petitioner then moved to question the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan,
contending that since the amended information only charged him as an accessory,
his case would thereby fall within the Regional Trial Court’s jurisdiction. Petitioner
asserted that the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is limited only to cases where
one or more of the “principal” accused who are government officials with Salary
Grade 27 or higher, or PNP officials with the rank of Chief Superintendent or higher.
When the Sandiganbayan admitted the amended information, it ordered for the
case to be transferred to the RTC of Quezon City.
Consequently, while the case was pending to be resolved, a law was passed
defining and expanding the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan (RA 8249), removing
the word “principal” from “principal accused” in Section 2 of RA 7975 (Old
Sandiganbayan Law). Aggrieved, petitioner challenged the constitutionality of the
law and argued that it is prejudicial to his cause considering that the law shall apply
to all cases pending in any court over which a trial has not begun.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction to try and decide the
case.
HELD:
Yes. Sandiganbayan has the exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide
the case. The jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan also covers the felonies committed
by public officials and employees in relation to their office. Since herein petitioner
was charged with murder, what determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is
the official position or rank of the offender that is, whether he is one of those
officers enumerated in the law. The provisions of RA 7975 (Old Sandiganbayan Law)
do not make any preference to the criminal participation of the accused public
officer as to whether he is charged as a principal, accomplice, or accessory. In
effect, the Congress, in enacting RA 8249 (New Sandiganbayan Law), did not
mention the criminal participation of the public officer as a requisite to determine
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
No. Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction.
While the above-quoted information states that the above-named principal accused committed the crime of
murder "in relation to thier public office, there is, however, no specific allegation of facts that the shooting of the
victim by the said principal accused was intimately related to the discharge of their official duties as police officers.
Likewise, the amended information does not indicate that the said accused arrested and investigated the victim
and then killed the latter while in their custody.
In the aforecited case of People vs. Montejo, it is noteworthy that the phrase committed in relation to public office "
does not appear in the information, which only signifies that the said phrase is not what determines the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan. What is controlling is the specific factual allegations in the information that would indicate
the close intimacy between the discharge of the accused's official duties and the commission of the offense
charged, in order to qualify the crime as having been committed in relation to public office.
Consequently, for failure to show in the amended informations that the charge of murder was intimately
connected with the discharge of official functions of the accused PNP officers, the offense charged in the subject
criminal cases is plain murder and, therefore, within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Court,73 not the Sandiganbayan.
People v. Lagon, 185 SCRA 442
Facts:
In July 1976, a CRIMINAL INFORMATION was filed with the City Court of Roxas City,
charging private respondent Libertad Lagon with the crime of ESTAFA under paragraph
2 (d) of article 315 of the RPC which perpetrated in April 1975. The information charged
that the accused had allegedly issued a check in the amount of 4,232.80 pesos as payment
for goods or merchandise purchased, knowingly that she did not have sufficient funds to
cover the check, which check therefore subsequently bounced.
The city court dismissed the information upon the ground that the penalty prescribed by
law for the offense charged was beyond the court’s authority to impose. The judge held
that the authority of the court to try a criminal action is determined by the law in force
at the time of the institution of the action, and not by the law in force at the time of the
commission of the crime. At the time of the commission of the cime in April 1975,
jurisdiction over the offense was vested by law in the city court. However, by the time
the criminal information was filed, paragraph 2 (d) of art. 315 of the RPC had already
been amended and the penalty imposable upon a person accused thereunder increased,
which penalty was beyond the city court’s authority to impose. Accordingly, the court
dismissed the information without prejudice to it being refiled in the proper court.
Issue:
1.WON the city court of Roxas has jurisdiction over the case.
2. WON the application of the above-settled doctrine to the instant case would result in
also applying Presidential Decree No. 818 to the present case, in disregard of the rules
against retroactivity of penal laws.
Ruling
1. Court jurisdiction is determined by the law at the time of the institution of the
action. Therefore, the City Court has no jurisdiction over the case. Petition for
review dismissed.
Section 87 of the Judiciary Act of 1948:
jurisdiction of municipal and city courts... offense… in which the penalty… does
not exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for not more than six (6) years or
fine not exceeding P6,000.00 or both . . . ."
2.
RPC permits penal laws to have retroactive effect only "insofar as they favor the
person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, . . . "
Subject-matter jurisdiction is determined by the authority of the court to impose
the penalty imposable under the applicable statute given the allegations of
criminal information.
In People v.Purisima and People v. Buissan:
. . . The issue here is one of jurisdiction, of a court's legal competence to try a case
ab origine. In criminal prosecutions, it is settled that the jurisdiction of the court is
not determined by what may be meted out to the offender after trial, or even by
the result of the evidence that would be presented at the trial, but by the extent of
the penalty which the law imposes for the misdemeanor, crime or violation
charged in the complaint…”.
Should the information be refiled in the RTC, that court may only impose the
penalty provided in the law at the time of the commission of the crime.
Jocelyn Asistio y Consino was charged with violation of Section 46 of the Cooperative
Code of the Philippines (Republic Act No. [RA] 6938).
The prosecution sought to prove that the accused had entered into an exclusive
dealership agreement with Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc., (Coca Cola) for the sale
of softdrink products at the same school. The school principal then created an audit
committee to look into the financial reports of the Cooperative. Based on the
documents obtained from Coca-Cola, including the records of actual deliveries and
sales, and the financial statements prepared by Asistio, the audit committee found
that Asistio defrauded the Cooperative and its members for three (3) years. Despite
requests for her to return to the Cooperative the amounts she had allegedly
misappropriated, Asistio failed and refused to do so. Thus, the Cooperative issued a
Board Resolution authorizing the filing of criminal charges against her.
Trial ensued and after the presentation and offer of evidence by the prosecution,
Asistio moved to dismiss the case by way of Demurrer to Evidence with prior leave of
court. She argued, among other matters, that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila,
does not have jurisdiction over the case, as the crime charged (Violation of Section 46
of RA 6938) does not carry with it a sanction for which she can be held criminally
liable.
The RTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.
6938 would be punishable by imprisonment of not less than six (6) months nor more
than one (1) year and a fine of not less than one thousand pesos (P1,000.00)
Issue:
Whether or not RTC’s dismissal would warrant double jeopardy?
Held:
No. The requisites that must be present for double jeopardy to attach are: (a) a valid
complaint or information; (b) a court of competent jurisdiction; (c) the accused has
pleaded to the charge; and (d) the accused has been convicted or acquitted or the case
dismissed or terminated without the express consent of the accused.
Definitely, there is no double jeopardy in this case as the dismissal was with the
accused-appellee's consent, that is, by moving for the dismissal of the case through a
demurrer to evidence. As correctly argued by the People, where the dismissal was
ordered upon or with express assent of the accused, he is deemed to have waived his
protection against doubly jeopardy. In this case at bar, the dismissal was granted upon
motion of petitioners. Double jeopardy, thus, did not attach.
JOCELYN ASISTIO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 200465, April 20, 2015
DECISION: DENIED / Affirmed with CA
FACTS:
Petitioner Jocelyn Asistio y Consino was charged with violation of Section 46 of the Cooperative Code of the Philippines
(Republic Act No. [RA] 6938).[4] The accusatory portion of the Information filed against her reads:
That on or about July 27, 1998, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, being then the Chairperson and
Managing Director of A. Mabini Elementary School Teachers Multi-Purpose Cooperative, and as such, have a complete
control and exclusively manage the... entire business of A. Mabini Elementary School Teachers Multi-Purpose
Cooperative, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously acquires, in violation of her duty as such and the
confidence reposed on her, personal interest or equity adverse to A. Mabini Elementary School Teachers Multi-Purpose
Cooperative by then and there entering into a contract with Coca Cola Products at A. Mabini Elementary School Teachers
Multi-Purpose Cooperative in her own personal capacity when in truth and in fact as the said accused fully well knew,
the sale of Coca-Cola products at A. Mabini Elementary School Teachers Multi-Purpose Cooperative should have accrued
to A. Mabini Elementary School Teachers Multi-Purpose Cooperative to the damage and prejudice of A. Mabini
Elementary School Teachers Multi-Purpose Cooperative. After the presentation and offer of evidence by the prosecution,
petitioner moved to dismiss the case by way of Demurrer to Evidence with prior leave of court. She argued, among other
matters, that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 40, does not have jurisdiction over the case, as the crime
charged (Violation of Section 46 of RA 6938) does not carry with it a sanction for which she can be held criminally liable.
On October 14, 2008, the RTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, thus:
Considering that the MeTCs, MTC, MCTCs have exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with
imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory
or other penalties, including the... civil liability arising from such offense or predicated thereon, and considering that
violation of [Sec] 46 of R.A. 6938 would be punishable by imprisonment of not less than six (6) months nor more than
one (1) year and a fine of not less than one thousand pesos (P1,000.00), or both at the discretion of the Court, this Court
(RTC) has no jurisdiction to hear and determine the instant case which properly pertains to the first level courts. On
whether the dismissal of the charge against petitioner on demurrer to evidence amounts to an acquittal, hence, final and
unappealable, the Court rules in the negative... the RTC granted the demurrer to evidence and dismissed the case not for
insufficiency of evidence, but for lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged. On whether the remand of the criminal
case to the RTC violated her right against double jeopardy due to its earlier dismissal on the ground of lack of jurisdiction,
the Court rules in the negative and upholds the CA in ruling that the dismissal having been granted upon... petitioner's
instance, double jeopardy did not attach, thus: The accused-appellee cannot also contend that she will be placed in
double jeopardy upon this appeal. It must be stressed that the dismissal of the case against her was premised upon her
filing of a demurrer to evidence, and the finding, albeit erroneous, of the... trial court that it is bereft of jurisdiction.
ISSUE:
Whether the offense charged in the information for Section 46 of RA 6938 necessarily includes or is necessarily included
in a crime for falsification of private document under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended (RPC).
RULING:
The test to determine whether an offense necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the other is provided under
Section 5, Rule .120 of the Rules of Court:
An offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the
former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily included in
the offense proved, when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those constituting the latter.
After a careful examination of the Information filed against petitioner for falsification of private document in Criminal
Case No. 370119-20-CR and for violation of Section 46, RA 6938 in Criminal Case No. 01-197750, the Court holds that the
first offense for which petitioner was acquitted does not necessarily include and is not necessarily included in the second
offense.
The Information for falsification of private document, on the one hand, alleged that petitioner, being then the
Chairperson and Managing Director of A. Mabini Elementary School Teachers Multi-Purpose Cooperative, as part of her
duty to prepare financial reports, falsified such report for the School Year 1999-2000, in relation to the sales profits of
Coca-Cola products in violation of Article 172 (2)35 of the RPC. The elements of falsification of private document under
Article 172, paragraph 2 of the RPC are: (1) that the offender committed any of the acts of falsification, except those in
paragraph 7, Article 171;36 (2) that the falsification was committed in any private document; and (3) that the falsification
caused damage to a third party or at least the falsification was committed with intent to cause such damage.
The Information for violation of Section 46 of RA 6938 alleged, on the other hand, that being then such officer and
director of the Cooperative, petitioner willfully acquired personal interest or equity adverse to it, in violation of her duty
and of the confidence reposed upon her, by entering into a contract with Coca-Cola in her own personal capacity,
knowing fully well that the sales profits of such products should have accrued to the Cooperative. The essential elements
of violation of Section 46 of RA 6938 are (1) that the offender is a director, officer or committee member; and (2) that the
offender willfully and lcnowingly (a) votes for or assents to patently unlawful acts; (b) is guilty of gross negligence or bad
faith in directing the affairs of the cooperative; or (c) acquires any personal or pecuniary interest in conflict with their
duty as such directors, officers or committee member.
Verily, there is nothing common or similar between the essential elements of the crimes of falsification of private
document under Article 172 (2) of the RPC and that of violation of Section 46 of RA 6938, as alleged in the
Informations filed against petitioner. As neither of the said crimes can be said to necessarily include or is necessarily
included in the other, the third requisite for double jeopardy to attach�a second jeopardy is for the same offense as
in the first�is, therefore, absent. Not only are their elements different, they also have a distinct nature, i.e., the
former is malum in se, as what makes it a felony is criminal intent on the part of the offender, while the latter is
malum prohibitum, as what makes it a crime is the special, law enacting it.
Moreover, in People v. Doriguez,37 the Court held:
It is a cardinal rule that the protection against double jeopardy may be invoked only for the same offense or identical
offenses. A simple act may offend against two (or more) entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law, and if one
provision requires proof of an additional fact or element which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction or a
dismissal of the information under one does not bar prosecution under the other. Phrased elsewise, where two
different laws (or articles of the same code) defines two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to a
prosecution of the other, although both offenses arise from the same fact, if each crime involves some important act
which is not an essential element of the other.
Since the Informations filed against petitioner were for separate, and distinct offenses as discussed above�the first
against' Article 172 (2) of the Revised Penal Code and the second against Section 46 of the Cooperative Code (RA 6938)
one cannot be pleaded as a bar to the other under the rule on double jeopardy. Besides, it is basic in criminal
procedure that an accused may be charged with as many crimes as defined in our penal laws even if these arose from
one incident. Thus, where a single act is directed against one person but said act constitutes a violation of two or more
entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law, or by a special law and the Revised Penal Code, as in this case, the
prosecution against one is not an obstacle to the prosecution of the other.
5. Serana v. Sandiganbayan,
G.R. No. 162059 | 22 January 2008
Facts:
Petitioner Hannah Eunice D. Serana was a senior student of the University of the Philippines-Cebu. She
was appointed by then President Joseph Estrada as a student regent of UP, to serve a one-year term.
Hannah Serana with her siblings and relatives, registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission
the Office of the Student Regent Foundation, Inc. (OSRFI). One of the projects of the OSRFI was the
renovation of the Vinzons Hall Annex. President Estrada gave Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00) to
the OSRFI as financial assistance for the proposed renovation. The renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex failed
to materialize. The succeeding student regent consequently filed a complaint for Malversation of Public
Funds and Property with the Office of the Ombudsman.
The Ombudsman, after due investigation, found probable cause to indict the petitioner and her brother Jade
Ian D. Serana for estafa. Hannah Serana moved to quash the information and posited that the
Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over her person. As a student regent, she was not a public officer since
she merely represented her peers, in contrast to the other regents who held their positions in an ex
officio capacity. She added that she was a simple student and did not receive any salary as a student
regent.
The OMB opposed the motion. According to the Ombudsman, petitioner, despite her protestations, iwas a
public officer. As a member of the BOR, she has the general powers of administration and exercises the
corporate powers of UP.
The Sandiganbayan denied petitioner’s motion for lack of merit.
Issues: Whether or not, Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over Serana as she contended that she was not a
public officer.
Ruling:
It is P.D. No.1606, as amended, rather than R.A. No. 3019, as amended that determines the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan which is determined by Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019 (The Anti- Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, as amended). Section 4 (B) of P.D. No. 1606 states that “Other offenses of felonies whether
simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in
subsection of this section in relation to their office.” The Sandiganbayan has a jurisdiction over other felonies
committed by public officials in relation to their office and estafa is one of those felonies. The jurisdiction is
subject to these requirements: The offense is committed by public officials and employees as stated in P.D.
No. 1606. The offense is committed in relation to their office.
In Geduspan v. People, the Court held that while the first part of Section 4(A) covers only officials with
Salary Grade 27 and higher, its second part specifically includes other executive officials whose positions
may not be of Salary Grade 27 and higher but who are by express provision of law placed under the
jurisdiction of the said court. Hannah Serana falls under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as she is
placed there by express provision of law. Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explicitly vested the
Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned
or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations. Petitioner falls under
this category. As the Sandiganbayan pointed out, the BOR performs functions similar to those of a board of
trustees of a non-stock corporation. By express mandate of law, Hannah Serana is, indeed, a public officer
as contemplated by P.D. No. 1606.
CLAIRE R. GAUFO
2315-0319
BRIG. GEN. (Ret.) JOSE S. RAMISCAL, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (4th Division) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents
G.R. Nos. 169727-28 August 18, 2006
FACTS:
Petitioner Jose S. Ramiscal Jr. was a retired officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP),
with the rank of Brigadier General when he served as President of the AFP- Retirement and Separation
Benefits System (AFP-RSBS). The AFP-RSBS was established in December 1973 to established in
a separate fund to guarantee continuous financial support to the AFP military retirement system as
provided for in Republic Act No. 340. AFP-RSBS is a government-owned or controlled corporation
(GOCC) and its funds are in the nature of public funds.
In 1997, the Congresswoman Luwalhati Antonio filed a complaint-affidavit with the office of the
ombudsman for Mindanao. Citing anomalous real state transactions involving the Magsaysay Park at
General Santos City, she requested the Ombudsman to investigate the petitioner Retired Brig. Gen.
Jose S. Ramiscal Jr., President of AFP-RSBS together with 27 other persons, for conspiracy in
misappropriating AFP=RSBS funds and in defrauding the governmental millions of pesos in capital
gains and documentary stamp taxes.
After preliminary investigation, the Ombudsman found petitioner probably guilty of violation of Section
3 of RA 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and 12 information for
falsification of public documents. All were similarly worded except for the names of other accused, the
dates of the commission of the offense and the property involved. The Information alleged that
Ramiscal, et. al. misappropriated and converted the amount of P250,318,200.00 for their personal
use from the funds of AFP-RSBS.
On February 2, 1999, the petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to Dismiss the Information and to Defer
the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest, alleging want of jurisdiction. In a Resolution dated April 5, 1999,
the Sandiganbayan denied the earlier motions filed by the petitioner for lack of merit.
Consequently, a warrant of arrest against him was issued.19 He posted a cash bail bond for his
provisional liberty. cralawred
On April 6, 1999, the petitioner opposed the appearance of the law firm of Albano & Associates
as private prosecutors, contending that the charges brought against him were purely public crimes
which did not involve damage or injury to any private party; thus, no civil liability had arisen.21 He
argued that under Section 16 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, an offended party may be
allowed to intervene through a special prosecutor only in those cases where there is civil liability
arising from the criminal offense charged. He maintained that if the prosecution were to be allowed
to prove damages, the prosecution would thereby be proving another crime, in violation of his
constitutional right to be informed of the nature of the charge against him.
In its comment, the law firm contended that its clients, Commodore Aparri and Brig. Gen. Navarro,
were members of the AGFOI and contributors of AFP-RSBS. It alleged that as such members-
contributors, they have been disadvantaged or deprived of their lawful investments and residual
interest at the AFP-RSBS through the criminal acts of the petitioner and his cohorts. It posited
that its clients, not having waived the civil aspect of the cases involved, have all the right to
intervene pursuant to Section 16, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, the law firm averred
that its appearance was in collaboration with the Office of the Ombudsman, and that their
intervention in any event, was subject to the direction and control of the Office of the Special
Prosecutor.
ISSUE:
Whether or not that the resolution of the Sandiganbayan is interlocutory in nature and not final.
RULING:
The assailed resolution of Sandiganbayan is interlocutory in nature. The word interlocutory refers
to something intervening between the commencement and the end of a suit which decides some
point or matter but is not a final decision of the whole controversy. The Court distinguished a final
order or resolution from an interlocutory one in Investments, Inc. v. Court of Appeals as
follows:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary
A final judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more to be done
by the Court in respect thereto, e.g., an adjudication on the merits which, on the basis of the
evidence presented at the trial, declares categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties
are and which party is in the right; or a judgment or order that dismisses an action on the ground,
for instance, of res adjudicata or prescription. Once rendered, the task of the Court is ended, as
far as deciding the controversy or determining the rights and liabilities of the litigants is concerned.
Nothing more remains to be done by the Court except to await the parties next move (which,
among others, may consist of the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration, or the taking
of an appeal) and ultimately, of course, to cause the execution of the judgment once it becomes
final or, to use the established and more distinctive term, final and executory.
Conversely, an order that does not finally disposes of the case, and does not end the Courts task
of adjudicating the parties contentions and determining their rights and liabilities as regards each
other, but obviously indicates that other things remain to be done by the Court, is interlocutory,
e.g., an order denying a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules, or granting a motion for
extension of time to file a pleading, or authorizing amendment thereof, or granting or denying
applications for postponement, or production or inspection of documents or things, etc. Unlike a
final judgment or order, which is appealable, as above pointed out, an interlocutory order may not
be questioned on appeal except only as part of an appeal that may eventually be taken from the
final judgment rendered in this case.
The rule is founded on considerations of orderly procedure, to forestall useless appeals and avoid
undue inconvenience to the appealing party by having to assail orders as they are promulgated
by the court, when all such orders may be contested in a single appeal.
Under Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only final judgments, orders or resolutions of the
Court of Appeals or Sandiganbayan may be assailed therein. The remedy is a mode of appeal on
questions of law only.
ARNEL ESCOBAL VS GARCHITORINA
GR NO. 124644 05 February 2004
FACTS:
Petitioner is a graduate of PMA, member of AFP, Philippine Constabulary and Intelligence Group
of PNP. While petitioner is conducting surveillance operations on drug trafficking in a restaurant located
in Naga City he was involved in a shooting incident resulting to the death of one Rodney Rafael Nueca, an
information was filed in Naga City for murder .
The RTC issued a preventive suspension of service petitioner and a warrant of arrest he then
filed for bail for his temporary liberty.
During the pendency of the case, he requested for reinstatement citing RA No. 6975 his
suspension should last for 90 only and having served the same he should now be reinstated. The PNP
Chief wrote Judge David Naval requesting information whether he will issued an order lifting the
suspension. The court did not answer that prompted petitioner to file motion but the RTC denied. He
filed instead Motion to Dismiss citing the case of Philippines V. Asuncion since he committed the crime in
the performance of his duty, the Sandigan Bayan has the exclusive jurisdiction over the case.
ISSUE:
1. Whether Sandigan Bayan presiding judge erred in remanding the case to RTC
2. Whether the Sandigan Bayan or the RTC has jurisdiction over petitioner’s case
RULING:
1.
The respondent presiding judge acted in accordance with law and ruling of this Court when
he ordered the remand of the case to the RTC, the court of origin.
The jurisdiction of the court over criminal cases is determined by the allegations in the
information of the complaint and the statue in effect at the time of the commencement of
the action, unless such statues provides for a retroactive application thereof. The
jurisdictional requirements must be alleged in the Information. Such jurisdiction of the court
acquired at the inception of the case continues until the case is terminated.
Under Section 4(a) of P.D. No. 1606 as amended by P.D No. 1861, the Sandigan had exclusive
jurisdiction in cases involving1. Violations of RA No. 3019 known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt practices Act, RA No.
1379 and Chapter II, Sec. 2 Title VII of the RPC;
2. Other offenses committed by public officers and employees in relation to their
office, including those employed by GOCCs, whether simple or complex with other
crimes, when the penalty prescribed by law is higher that prison correccional or
imprisonment for six (06) year or a fine of P6,000.00
Under the law, even if the offender committed the crime charged in relation to his office but
occupies a position corresponding to a salary grade below "27," the proper Regional Trial Court or
Municipal Trial Court, as the case may be, shall have exclusive jurisdiction over the case. In this case, the
petitioner was a Police Senior Inspector, with salary grade "23." He was charged with homicide punishable
by reclusion temporal. Hence, the RTC had exclusive jurisdiction over the crime charged conformably to
Sections 20 and 32 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7691.
The petitioner’s contention that R.A. No. 7975 should not be applied retroactively has no legal
basis. It bears stressing that R.A. No. 7975 is a substantive procedural law which may be applied
retroactively.23
Petition is dismissed.
44. People v. Henry T. Go G.R. No. 168539 (March 25, 2014)
Re: Jurisdiction of Courts
Facts:
 The Information filed against respondent is an offshoot of this Court's Decision in Agan, Jr. v.
Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc.
 Subsequent to the above Decision, Pesayco filed a complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman
against several individuals for alleged violation of R.A. 3019 aka ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT
PRACTICES ACT. Among those charged was herein respondent Henry Go, who was then the
Chairman and President of PIATCO, for having supposedly conspired with then DOTC Secretary
Arturo Enrile (Secretary Enrile) in entering into a contract which is grossly and manifestly
disadvantageous to the government.
 On September 16, 2004, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found probable cause
to indict them for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019.
 Thus, in an Information dated January 13, 2005, respondent was charged before the SB in
conspiracy of late Arturo Enrile, Sec of Department of Transportation and Communications
(DOTC).
 The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 28090.
 Prosecution:
a. SB has already acquired jurisdiction over the person of respondent by reason of his voluntary
appearance, when he filed a motion for consolidation and when he posted bail.
b. SB has exclusive jurisdiction over respondent's case, even if he is a private person, because he was
alleged to have conspired with a public officer.
 Respondent:
a. filed a Motion to Quash the Information filed against him on the ground that the operative facts
adduced therein do not constitute an offense under Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019.
b. citing the show cause order of the SB, also contended that, independently of the deceased Secretary
Enrile, the public officer with whom he was alleged to have conspired, respondent, who is not a public
officer nor was capacitated by any official authority as a government agent, may not be prosecuted for
violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019.
 SB resolution:
a. grants respondent’s Motion to Quash.
b. appearing that Henry T. Go, the lone accused in this case is a private person and his alleged coconspirator-public official was already deceased long before this case was filed in court, for lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the accused, the Court grants the Motion to Quash and the Information
filed in this case is hereby ordered quashed and dismissed.
 Hence, the instant petition.
Issue:
1. Whether the ruling of the Sandiganbayan granting the motion to quash be applied in the
present case
Ruling:
1. No. The Court does not agree.
 Respondent should be reminded that prior to this Court's ruling, he already posted bail for his
provisional liberty. In fact, he even filed a Motion for Consolidation. The Court agrees with
petitioner's contention that private respondent's act of posting bail and filing his Motion for
Consolidation vests the SB with jurisdiction over his person. The rule is well settled that the act
of an accused in posting bail or in filing motions seeking affirmative relief is tantamount to
submission of his person to the jurisdiction of the court.
 Thus, it has been held that:
When a defendant in a criminal case is brought before a competent court by virtue of a
warrant of arrest or otherwise, in order to avoid the submission of his body to the jurisdiction of the
court he must raise the question of the court’s jurisdiction over his person at the very earliest
opportunity. If he gives bail, demurs to the complaint or files any dilatory plea or pleads to the
merits, he thereby gives the court jurisdiction over his person. (State ex rel. John Brown vs.
Fitzgerald, 51 Minn., 534)
 As ruled in La Naval Drug vs. CA [236 SCRA 78, 86]:
"[L]ack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant may be waived either expressly
or impliedly. When a defendant voluntarily appears, he is deemed to have submitted himself to
the jurisdiction of the court. If he so wishes not to waive this defense, he must do so seasonably
by motion for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court; otherwise, he shall be
deemed to have submitted himself to that jurisdiction."
Moreover, "[w]here the appearance is by motion for the purpose of objecting to the
jurisdiction of the court over the person, it must be for the sole and separate purpose of
objecting to said jurisdiction. If the appearance is for any other purpose, the defendant is
deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. Such an appearance gives the
court jurisdiction over the person."
 As a recapitulation, it would not be amiss to point out that the instant case involves a contract
entered into by public officers representing the government.
 More importantly, the SB is a special criminal court which has exclusive original jurisdiction in all
cases involving violations of R.A. 3019 committed by certain public officers, as enumerated in
P.D. 1606 as amended by R.A. 8249.
 This includes private individuals who are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories
with the said public officers.
 In the instant case, respondent is being charged for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019, in
conspiracy with then Secretary Enrile.
 Ideally, under the law, both respondent and Secretary Enrile should have been charged before
and tried jointly by the Sandiganbayan.
 However, by reason of the death of the latter, this can no longer be done.
 Nonetheless, for reasons already discussed, it does not follow that the SB is already divested of
its jurisdiction over the person of and the case involving herein respondent. To rule otherwise
would mean that the power of a court to decide a case would no longer be based on the law
defining its jurisdiction but on other factors, such as the death of one of the alleged offenders.
Facts:
In this case, the Office of the Ombudsman initiated two forfeiture proceedings against former Maj. Gen.
Carlos Garcia, his wife Clarita, and their two children to recover allegedly ill-gotten properties and funds.
Initial Forfeiture Case (Forfeiture Case 1): The Ombudsman filed a petition to forfeit properties valued at
Php 143,052,015.29, which were purportedly acquired by Maj. Gen. Carlos Garcia, Clarita Garcia, and
their two children. This case was assigned to the 4th Division of the Sandiganbayan.
Subsequent Forfeiture Case (Forfeiture Case 2): After the initiation of Forfeiture Case 1 but prior to the
filing of Forfeiture Case 2, the Ombudsman charged the Garcias and three others with violating Republic
Act (RA) 7080, known as plunder. This criminal charge alleged that the property and funds amassed by
the Garcias amounted to Php 303,272,005.99. Crim. Case No. 28107 was assigned to the Second Division
of the Sandiganbayan.
Service of Summons for Forfeiture Case 1: The Sheriff's office issued summons related to Forfeiture Case
1, which were all personally served on Maj. Gen. Carlos Garcia while he was detained. Subsequently, the
Sandiganbayan issued a writ of attachment in favor of the Republic. The Garcias responded by filing a
motion to dismiss, arguing that the Sandiganbayan lacked jurisdiction over separate civil actions for
forfeiture. However, the Sandiganbayan denied the motion to dismiss and declared the Garcias in
default. Despite this default order, the Garcias sought the consolidation of Forfeiture Case 1 with the
plunder case, claiming that it was mandatory under RA 8249. The Sandiganbayan denied this motion for
consolidation.
Service of Summons for Forfeiture Case 2: The Sheriff's office of the Sandiganbayan served summons for
Forfeiture Case 2. The sheriff handed the summons to the OIC/Custodian of the PNP Detention Center,
who subsequently gave them to Gen. Garcia. While Gen. Garcia acknowledged receiving the summons,
he added a note indicating that he received the copies for Clarita, Ian, Carl, Juan Paolo, and Timothy but
couldn't guarantee their service to the other respondents.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the Sandiganbayan possesses jurisdiction over the forfeiture case despite the
commencement of the plunder case.
2. Whether the Sandiganbayan maintains jurisdiction over Garcia’s case due to improper service of
summons.
RULING:
1. Yes. The 4th Division of the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the civil case because the
forfeiture cases represent the corresponding civil actions for recovering civil liability ex
delicto. The civil liability in forfeiture cases does not originate from the commission of a
criminal offense; instead, it is based on a statute that safeguards the state's right to reclaim
unlawfully acquired assets. Furthermore, a forfeiture case under RA 1379 stems from a
distinct cause of action separate from a plunder case. This undermines the idea that the
criminal charges of plunder absorb the forfeiture cases. In a prosecution for plunder, the
objective is to prove the commission of criminal acts to obtain ill-gotten wealth. In contrast,
RA 1379 merely requires demonstrating a disproportion between the respondent's
properties and their legitimate income, without the need to establish how these properties
were acquired.
2. No. Fundamental to this issue is the principle that a court must establish jurisdiction over a
party for its decisions or orders to be binding. Valid service of summons, in accordance with
the appropriate Rules, is the method by which a court obtains jurisdiction over an individual.
The summonses for the forfeiture cases should have been personally served on Maj. Gen.
Carlos Flores Garcia, who was detained at the PNP Detention Center, and he should have
acknowledged receipt by signing. However, it is evident that substituted service of summons
was attempted for both Forfeiture cases on the petitioner and their children through Maj.
Gen. Garcia at the PNP Detention Center. Nevertheless, these substituted service attempts
were considered invalid due to their irregular and defective nature. To be valid, substituted
service of summons must meet specific requirements, including impossibility of prompt
personal service, providing specific details in the return, and serving a person of suitable age
and discretion residing at the defendant's house or residence, or a competent person in
charge of the defendant's office or regular place of business. None of these criteria were
met, rendering the substituted service invalid. Additionally, Clarita Garcia's act of
questioning the court's jurisdiction through a special appearance does not equate to a
voluntary appearance. Therefore, filing a motion to dismiss that challenges the court's
jurisdiction, along with other grounds, does not constitute a voluntary appearance before
the court.
Notes:
Key Issues:
Jurisdiction Over Petitioner Despite Improper Service of Summons: The first issue centers on whether
the Sandiganbayan (SB) has jurisdiction over the petitioner, despite alleged irregularities in the service
of summons.
Jurisdiction Over the Forfeiture Case Despite the Plunder Case: The second issue questions whether the
SB has jurisdiction over the forfeiture cases, considering the simultaneous existence of the plunder case.
Court's Rulings:
Jurisdiction Over Petitioner Despite Improper Service of Summons: The court ruled that the SB did not
have jurisdiction over the petitioner due to improper service of summons. It emphasized that valid
service of summons is crucial for a court to have jurisdiction over a party. Summons for both Forfeiture
Cases 1 and 2 were served personally on Maj. Gen. Carlos Garcia, who was detained at the PNP
Detention Center. While he acknowledged receipt, substituted service was also attempted on the
petitioner and her children through Maj. Gen. Garcia, which was found to be irregular and defective. The
court outlined three requirements for valid substituted service, which were not met in this case.
Additionally, the petitioner's special appearance to challenge the court's jurisdiction was deemed not a
voluntary appearance.
Jurisdiction Over the Forfeiture Case Despite the Plunder Case: The court ruled that the SB had
jurisdiction over the forfeiture cases despite the concurrent existence of the plunder case. It clarified
that civil liability in forfeiture cases does not arise from the commission of a criminal offense but is
based on a statute aimed at recovering unlawfully acquired properties. Furthermore, a forfeiture case
under RA 1379 is separate and distinct from a plunder case. In a plunder case, the focus is on proving
the commission of criminal acts to acquire ill-gotten wealth, while RA 1379 simply requires
demonstrating the disproportion of the respondent's properties to their legitimate income without the
need to prove how those properties were acquired.
In summary, the court held that the SB did not have jurisdiction over the petitioner due to improper
service of summons. However, it maintained jurisdiction over the forfeiture cases, finding them to be
separate from the plunder case and governed by different legal principles.
People v. Benipayo, 586 SCRA
April 24, 2009
Two consolidated cases: G.R. No. 154473 and 155573
Facts:
In the first case, Alfredo L. Benipayo, then Chairman of the COMELEC, delivered a speech in the
"Forum on Electoral Problems: Roots and Responses in the Philippines" held at the Balay
Kalinaw, UP-Diliman Campus, Quezon City. The speech was subsequently published in the
issues of the Manila Bulletin.
Petitioner corporation, believing that it was the one alluded to by the respondent when he stated
in his speech that: “Now, they are at it again, trying to hoodwink us into contract that is so grossly
disadvantageous to the government that it offends common sense to say that it would be worth
the 6.5 billion-peso price tag.” filed, through its authorized representative, an Affidavit-Complaint
for libel.
Arguing that he was an impeachable officer, respondent questioned the jurisdiction of the Office
of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City. Despite the challenge, the City Prosecutor filed an
Information for libel against the respondent with the RTC of Quezon City.
Petitioner later filed a Motion for Inhibition and Consolidation, contending that Judge Salazar could
not impartially preside over the case because his appointment to the judiciary was made possible
through the recommendation of respondent's father-in-law. Petitioner further moved that the case
be ordered consolidated with the other libel case pending with another RTC Branch.
While the said motion remained unresolved, respondent, for his part, moved for the dismissal of
the case on the assertion that the trial court had no jurisdiction over his person for he was an
impeachable officer and thus, could not be criminally prosecuted before any court during his
incumbency; and that, assuming he can be criminally prosecuted, it was the Office of the
Ombudsman that should investigate him and the case should be filed with the Sandiganbayan.
RTC issued the challenged Order dismissing the criminal case and considering as moot and
academic petitioner's motion to inhibit. While the RTC found that respondent was no longer an
impeachable officer because his appointment was not confirmed by Congress, it ruled that the
case had to be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction considering that the alleged libel was committed
by respondent in relation to his office — he delivered the speech in his official capacity as
COMELEC Chair. Accordingly, it was the Sandiganbayan that had jurisdiction over the case to the
exclusion of all other courts.
On motion for reconsideration, RTC adhered to its ruling that it was not vested with jurisdiction to
hear the libel case.
In the second case, the Respondent, as COMELEC Chair, and COMELEC Commissioner
Tangcangco were guests of the talk show "Point Blank", hosted by Ces Drilon and televised
nationwide on the ANC-23 channel. The television show's episode that day was entitled
"COMELEC Wars". In that episode, respondent alleged that that Photokina funds are being used
for a "PR" campaign against him.
Petitioner considered respondent's statement as defamatory, and, through its authorized
representative, filed a Complaint-Affidavit for libel. Respondent similarly questioned the
jurisdiction of the OCP-QC. The City Prosecutor, however, consequently filed the corresponding
Information with the RTC. Respondent also moved for the dismissal of the information raising
similar arguments.
RTC issued the assailed Order also dismissing the criminal case for lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the respondent. The RTC, in the further assailed Order, denied petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration.
Hence, this petition.
Issue:
If the trial court erred in ruling that it had no jurisdiction over the case.
Ruling:
YES. Jurisdiction of the court to hear and decide a case is conferred by the law in force at the
time of the institution of the action, unless a latter statute provides for a retroactive application
thereof. Article 360 of the RPC, as amended by RA4363, is explicit on which court has jurisdiction
to try cases of written defamations, thus: “The criminal and
civil action for damages in cases of written defamations as provided for in this chapter, shall be
filed simultaneously or separately with the court of first instance [now, the RTC] of the province
or city where the libelous article is printed and first published or where any of the offended parties
actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense…”
Although RA7691 was enacted to decongest the clogged dockets of the RTC by expanding the
jurisdiction of first level courts, said law is of a general character. Even if it is a later enactment, it
does not alter the provision of Article 360 of the RPC, a law of a special nature. "Laws vesting
jurisdiction exclusively with a particular court, are special in character, and should prevail over the
Judiciary Act defining the jurisdiction of other courts (such as the Court of First Instance) which is
a general law." A later enactment like RA7691 does not automatically override an existing law,
because it is a well-settled principle of construction that, in case of conflict between a general law
and a special law, the latter must prevail regardless of the dates of their enactment. Jurisdiction
conferred by a special law on the RTC must therefore prevail over that granted by a general law
on the MTC.
Moreover, from the provisions of RA7691, there seems to be no manifest intent to repeal or alter
the jurisdiction in libel cases. If there was such intent, then the amending law should have clearly
so indicated because implied repeals are not favored. Absent an express repeal, a subsequent
law cannot be construed as repealing a prior one unless an irreconcilable inconsistency or
repugnancy exists in the terms of the new and old laws.
Lastly, in AO 104-96, this Court delineated the proper jurisdiction over libel cases, hence settled
the matter with finality:
"LIBEL CASES SHALL BE TRIED BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS HAVING
JURISDICTION OVER THEM TO THE EXCLUSION OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS,
MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS IN CITIES, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS AND MUNICIPAL
CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS."
12. SANCHEZ V. DEMETRIOU, G.R. No. Nos. 111771-77
November 9, 1993 | CRUZ, J.:
DOCTRINE: “The crime of rape with homicide imputed to the petitioner was not connected with the
discharge of his functions as municipal mayor nor that there is an "intimate connection" between the offense
and his office. It follows that the said crime, being an ordinary offense, is triable by the regular courts and
not the Sandiganbayan.”
Facts: On July 28, 1993, the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission requested the filing of appropriate
charges against several persons, including the petitioner, in connection with the rape-slay of Mary Eileen
Sarmenta and the killing of Allan Gomez. Acting on this request, the Panel of State Prosecutors of the
Department of Justice conducted a preliminary investigation on Petitioner Sanchez was not present but
was represented by his counsel, Atty. Marciano Brion, Jr.
An “invitation” issued by PNP Commander Rex Piad was also served on Sanchez and he was immediately
taken to Camp Vicente Lim. Sanchez was placed on “arrest status” upon the positive identification by
Centeno and SPO3 Malabanan that Sanchez was the principal in the rape-slay case. The respondent
prosecutors conducted an inquest upon Sanchez’ arrival, with Atty. Panelo as his counsel. After the hearing,
a warrant of arrest was served on Sanchez in connection with a criminal case for violation of RA 6713. The
Informations for Rape with Homicide were filed in RTC Laguna and warrants of arrest were issued against
all of the accused. The venue of the case was then transferred to Pasig, Metro Manila upon the expressed
apprehension of the Secretary of Justice.
Sanchez filed a Motion to Quash on the following grounds: 1) he was denied the right to present evidence
at the preliminary investigation; 2) only the Ombudsman had the competence to conduct the investigation;
3) his warrantless arrest is illegal and the court has therefore not acquired jurisdiction over him, 4) he is
being charged with seven homicides arising from the death of only two persons; 5) the informations are
discriminatory because they do not include Teofilo Alqueza and Edgardo Lavadia; and 6) as a public officer,
he can be tried for the offense only by the Sandiganbayan.
The Motion to Quash was denied. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case.
Ruling: The crime of rape with homicide with which the petitioner stands charged obviously does not fall
under paragraph (1), which deals with graft and corruption cases. Neither is it covered by paragraph (2)
because it is not an offense committed in relation to the office of the petitioner.
There is no direct relation between the commission of the crime of rape with homicide and the petitioner's
office as municipal mayor because public office is not an essential element of the crime charged. The
offense can stand independently of the office. Moreover, it is not even alleged in the information that the
commission of the crime charged was intimately connected with the performance of the petitioner's official
functions to make it fall under the exception laid down in People v. Montejo.
In that case, a city mayor and several detectives were charged with murder for the death of a
suspect as a result of a "third degree" investigation held at a police substation. The appearance of
a senator as their counsel was questioned by the prosecution on the ground that he was inhibited
by the Constitution from representing them because they were accused of an offense committed
in relation to their office. The Court agreed. It held that even if their position was not an essential
ingredient of the offense, there was nevertheless an intimate connection between the office and
the offense, as alleged in the information, that brought it within the definition of an offense
"committed in relation to the public office."
In the case at bar, the crime of rape with homicide imputed to the petitioner was not connected with
the discharge of his functions as municipal mayor nor that there is an "intimate connection"
between the offense and his office. It follows that the said crime, being an ordinary offense, is triable
by the regular courts and not the Sandiganbayan.”
Disposition:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The respondent judge is DIRECTED to continue with the trial
of Criminal Cases Nos. 101141, 101142, 101143, 101144, 101145, 101146 and 101147 and to decide them
with deliberate dispatch.
*Assailed jurisdiction of the RTC re: De lima Drug case
13. DE LIMA VS. GUERRERO, G.R. No. 229781, (OCTOBER 10, 2017)
FACTS:
That within the period from November 2012 to March 2013, Leila M. De Lima, accused
Rafael Marcos Z. Ragos, by taking advantage of their public office, conspiring and
confederating with accused Ronnie P. Dayan, being then the employee of the Department of
Justice detailed to De Lima, all of them having moral ascendancy or influence over inmates in
the New Bilibid Prison, did then and there commit illegal drug trading.
De Lima and Ragos, with the use of their power, position, and authority demand, solicit
and extort money from the high profile inmates in the New Bilibid Prison to support the
Senatorial bid of De Lima in the May 2016 election; by reason of which, the inmates, not being
lawfully authorized by law and through the use of mobile phones and other electronic devices,
did then and there willfully and unlawfully trade and traffic dangerous drugs, and thereafter give
and deliver to De Lima, through Ragos and Dayan, the proceeds of illegal drug trading
amounting to millions of pesos.
Soon, charges were filed against the Senator as a result of the allegations against her.
ISSUES:
Whether the Regional Trial Court or the Sandiganbayan has the jurisdiction over the violation
of Republic Act No. 9165 averred in the assailed Information.
RULING:
*THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT HAS JURISDICTION
Petitioner argues that, based on the allegations of the Information, the Sandiganbayan has the
jurisdiction to try and hear the case against her. She posits that the Information charges her not
with violation of RA 9165 but with Direct Bribery-a felony within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan given her rank as the former Secretary of Justice with Salary Grade 31. For
the petitioner, even assuming that the crime described in the Information is a violation of RA
9165, the Sandiganbayan still has the exclusive jurisdiction to try the case considering that the
acts described in the Information were intimately related to her position as the Secretary of
Justice. Some justices of this Court would even adopt the petitioner's view, declaring that the
Information charged against the petitioner is Direct Bribery.
The respondents, on the other hand, maintain that the RTC has exclusive jurisdiction to try
violations of RA 9165, including the acts described in the Information against the petitioner.
The Sandiganbayan, so the respondents contend, was specifically created as an anti-graft court.
It was never conferred with the power to try drug-related cases even those committed by public
officials. In fact, respondents point out that the history of the laws enabling and governing the
Sandiganbayan will reveal that its jurisdiction was streamlined to address specific cases of graft
and corruption, plunder, and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth.
From the very designation of the crime in the Information itself, it should be plain that the crime
with which the petitioner is charged is a violation of RA 9165. As this Court clarified in Quimvel
v. People, the designation of the offense in the Information is a critical element required
under Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court in apprising the accused of the offense
being charged.
It is basic that jurisdiction over the subject matter in a criminal case is given only by law in the
manner and form prescribed by law. It is determined by the statute in force at the time of the
commencement of the action. Indeed, Congress has the plenary power to define, prescribe and
apportion the jurisdiction of various courts. It follows then that Congress may also, by law,
provide that a certain class of cases should be exclusively heard and determined by one court.
Such would be a special law that is construed as an exception to the general law on jurisdiction
of courts.92
The pertinent special law governing drug-related cases is RA 9165, which updated the rules
provided in RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. A plain reading of
RA 9165, as of RA 6425, will reveal that jurisdiction over drug-related cases is exclusively
vested with the Regional Trial Court and no other. The designation of the RTC as the court with
the exclusive jurisdiction over drug-related cases is apparent in the following provisions where
it was expressly mentioned and recognized as the only court with the authority to hear drugrelated cases.
Notably, no other trial court was mentioned in RA 9165 as having the authority to take
cognizance of drug-related cases. Thus, in Morales v. Court of Appeals, this Court
categorically named the RTC as the court with jurisdiction over drug related-cases.
For those in the dissent, the failure to reproduce the phrase "exclusive original jurisdiction" is a
clear indication that no court, least of all the RTC, has been vested with such "exclusive original
jurisdiction" so that even the Sandiganbayan can take cognizance and resolve a criminal
prosecution for violation of RA 9165.
As thoroughly discussed by Justice Peralta in his Concurring Opinion, such deduction is
unwarranted given the clear intent of the legislature not only to retain the "exclusive original
jurisdiction" of the RTCs over violations of the drugs law but to segregate from among the
several RTCs of each judicial region some RTCs that will "exclusively try and hear cases
involving violations of [RA 9165)." If at all, the change introduced by the new phraseology of
Section 90, RA 9165 is not the deprivation of the RTCs' "exclusive original jurisdiction" but the
further restriction of this "exclusive original jurisdiction" to select RTCs of each judicial region.
The exclusive original jurisdiction over violations of RA 9165 is not transferred to the
Sandiganbayan whenever the accused occupies a position classified as Grade 27 or higher,
regardless of whether the violation is alleged as committed in relation to office. The power of
the Sandiganbayan to sit in judgment of high-ranking government officials is not omnipotent. The
Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction is circumscribed by law and its limits are currently defined and
prescribed by RA 10660, which amended Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1606.
Duncano V. Sandigan
72 SCRA 2015
Facts: Petitioner Danilo A. Duncano is, at the time material to the case, the Regional Director of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) with Salary Grade 26 as classified under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6758.
On March 24, 2009, the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), Office of the Ombudsman, filed a
criminal case against him for violation of Section 8, in relation to Section 11 of R.A. No. 6713, allegedly
committed as follows:
That on or about April 15, 2003, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Quezon City, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused DANILO DUNCANO y ACIDO, a high
ranking public officer, being the Regional Director of Revenue Region No. 7, of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, Quezon City, and as such is under an obligation to accomplish and submit declarations
under oath of his assets, liabilities and net worth and financial and business interests, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally fail to disclose in his Sworn Statement of Assets and
Liabilities and Networth (SALN) for the year 2002, his financial and business interests/connection in
Documail Provides Corporation and Don Plus Trading of which he and his family are the registered
owners thereof, and the 1993 Nissan Patrol motor vehicle registered in the name of his son VINCENT
LOUIS P. DUNCANO which are part of his assets, to the damage and prejudice of public interest.
Issue: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the petitioner.
Held: No. The Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over violations of Section 3(a) and (e), Republic Act
No. 3019, as amended, unless committed by public officials and employees occupying positions of
regional director and higher with Salary Grade “27” or higher, under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758) in relation to their office.
The creation of the Sandiganbayan was mandated by Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution.
By virtue of the powers vested in him by the Constitution and pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081,
dated September 21, 1972, former President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued P.D. No. 1486. The decree was
later amended by P.D. No. 1606, Section 20 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, P.D. No. 1860, and P.D. No.
1861.
With the advent of the 1987 Constitution, the special court was retained as provided for in Section 4,
Article XI thereof. Aside from Executive Order Nos. 14 and 14-a, and R.A. 7080, which expanded the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, P.D. No. 1606 was further modified by R.A. No. 7975, R.A. No. 8249,
and just this year, R.A. No. 10660.
For the purpose of this case, the relevant provision is Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, which states: SEC. 4.
Section 4 of the same decree is hereby further amended to read as follows:
“SEC. 4. Jurisdiction.– The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases
involving:
“A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the
Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following
positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of
the commission of the offense:
“(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and
higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
“
(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other
provincial department heads;
“(b) City mayor, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city
treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;
“(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and
higher;
“(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher
rank;
“(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of provincial
director and those holding the rank of senior superintendent or higher;
“(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in
the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
“(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled
corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations.
“(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade 27 and up under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
“(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
“(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commission, without prejudice to the
provisions of the Constitution; and
“(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 and higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
“B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed
by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation
to their office.
“C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order
Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
Yet, those that are classified as Salary Grade 26 and below may still fall within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, provided that they hold the positions enumerated by the law. In this category, it is
the position held, not the salary grade, which determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The
specific inclusion constitutes an exception to the general qualification relating to “officials of the
executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as
Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.”38 As ruled in
Inding:
Following this disquisition, the paragraph of Section 4 which provides that if the accused is
occupying a position lower than SG 27, the proper trial court has jurisdiction, can only be
properly interpreted as applying to those cases where the principal accused is occupying a
position lower than SG 27 and not among those specifically included in the enumeration in
Section 4 a. (1) (a) to (g). Stated otherwise, except for those officials specifically included in
Section 4 a. (1) (a) to (g), regardless of their salary grades, over whom the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction, all other public officials below SG 27 shall be under the jurisdiction of the proper
trial courts “where none of the principal accused are occupying positions corresponding to SG
27 or higher.” By this construction, the entire Section 4 is given effect. The cardinal rule, after
all, in statutory construction is that the particular words, clauses and phrases should not be
studied as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part of the statute must
be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce a harmonious
whole. And courts should adopt a construction that will give effect to every part of a statute, if
at all possible. Ut magis valeat quam pereat or that construction is to be sought which gives
effect to the whole of the statute – its every word.
Inocentes v, People
PROMULGATION July 16 2016 G.R. No. 205963-64
Doctrine
1. Jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired upon (1) his arrest or
apprehension, with or without a warrant, or (2) his voluntary appearance or
submission to the jurisdiction of the court.
2. Violations of R.A. No. 3019 committed by presidents, directors or trustees, or
managers of government-owned or -controlled corporations, and state universities
shall be within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
3. The Sandiganbayan maintains its jurisdiction over those officials specifically
enumerated in (a) to (g) of Section 4(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, regardless of
their salary grades. It is the position held, not the salary grade, which determines the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
FACTS
• Inocentes, and 4 others, was charged with violating Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act).
• The crime was committed in Tarlac City, PH.
• The accused are all public officers who conspired with a certain De Guzman.
• They processed and approved the housing loans of 491 borrowers of De Guzman’s
housing project under the GSIS Bahay Ko Program, with a total amount of loans
amounting to PhP241,053,600, even though they were not qualified and were not
under the territorial jurisdiction of the Tarlac Field Office.
• The Sandiganbayan issued a minute resolution finding probable cause and ordered
the issuance of a warrant of arrest against all the accused.
• Inocentes immediately posted bail.
• Inocentes filed an omnibus motion for judicial determination of probable cause, to
quash information, among others. He argued that the information filed did not allege
the specific acts done by him which would constitute the offense, and that he argued
that his position with a salary grade of 26 does not make him fall under the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. He likewise claimed that his position as department
manager cannot be equated to those enumerated under RA 3019.
• The Sandiganbayan argued that it already determined the existence of probable
cause when it issued the warrant of arrest against the accused, and that PD 1606
includes managers of GOCCs, whose position may not fall under SG 27.
• Inocentes questions before the SC the finding of the Sandiganbayan of probable
cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, and the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan over his person.
ISSUE
1. W/N a judicial redetermination of probable cause is proper when the accused
voluntary surrenders to the jurisdiction of the court.
NO. Judicial redetermination of probable cause is not proper.
It is well-settled that Jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired upon (1)
his arrest or apprehension, with or without a warrant, or (2) his voluntary appearance
or submission to the jurisdiction of the court. In our jurisdiction, posting bail is
tantamount to voluntary surrender.
In this case, the petitioner posted bail. This gives the court the jurisdiction over his
person. The question whether the findings of probable cause was tainted with grave
abuse of discretion does not matter anymore, the Sandiganbayan acquired jurisdiction
over the person of Inocentes. The outcome would have been different if Inocentes have
brought the matter before he had posted bail or without voluntarily surrendering
himself.
NO. Judicial redetermination of probable cause is not proper.
2. W/N the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over Inocentes, a department manager (of
GSIS) with the salary grade of 26.
Yes. SG has jurisdiction over Inocentes, a department manager (of GSIS) with the
salary grade of 26.
Violations of R.A. No. 3019 committed by presidents, directors or trustees, or managers
of government-owned or -controlled corporations, and state universities shall be within
the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan maintains
its jurisdiction over those officials specifically enumerated in (a) to (g) of Section 4(1) of
P.D. No. 1606, as amended, regardless of their salary grades. It is the position held, not
the salary grade, which determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Simply put, those that are classified as Salary Grade 26 and below may still fall within
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, provided they hold the positions enumerated by
the law. In this category, it is the position held, not the salary grade, which determines
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Furthermore, as the Sandiganbayan correctly held, even low-level management
positions fall under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. We settled this point in
Lazarte v. Sandiganbayan and Geduspan v. People.
In this case, the petitioner is the branch manager of Tarlac branch. SG has jurisdiction
over Inocentes, a department manager (of GSIS) with the salary grade of 26.
3. WN the case must be dismissed because his right to speedy disposition of the case is
violated.
Yes. The case must be dismissed because his right to speedy disposition of the case is
violated.
A person’s right to a speedy disposition of his case is guaranteed under Section 16,
Article III of the Constitution:
All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all
judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies.
This constitutional right is not limited to the accused in criminal proceedings but
extends to all parties in all cases, be it civil or administrative in nature, as well as in
all proceedings, either judicial or quasi-judicial.30 In this accord, any party to a case
may demand expeditious action of all officials who are tasked with the administration
of justice.31
In Tatad v. Sandiganbayan,32 we held that the long delay of close to three (3) years in
the termination of the preliminary investigation conducted by the Tanodbayan
constituted a violation not only of the constitutional right of the accused under the
broad umbrella of the due process clause, but also of the constitutional guarantee to
"speedy disposition" of cases as embodied in Section 16 of the Bill of Rights
Applying in the instant case, the delay of at least seven (7) years before the
informations were filed skews the fairness which the right to speedy disposition of
cases seeks to maintain. Undoubtedly, the delay in the resolution of this case
prejudiced Inocentes since the defense witnesses he would present would be unable to
recall accurately the events of the distant past.
Considering the clear violation of Inocentes’ right to the speedy disposition of his case,
we find that the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in not acting on the case
within a reasonable time after it had acquired jurisdiction over it.
Therefore, the case must be dismissed because his right to speedy disposition of the
case is violated.
STA. ROMANA, DONABEL
EDGAR CRISOSTOMO, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, respondent.
G.R. No. 152398.
April 14, 2005
FACTS:
Petitioner, a member of the Philippine National Police and a jail guard at the Solano Municipal
Jail was charged with the murder of Renato Suba, a detention prisoner at the Solano Municipal
Jail. The Information alleged that Crisostomo conspired with his co-accused, Dominador C. dela
Cruz, Efren M. Perez, Raki T. Anggo, Randy A. Lumabo, Rolando M. Norberte and Mario
Calingayan, all inmates at the Solano Municipal Jail, in murdering Renato. Deceased, Renato
Suba, was brought to the police station on the night of February 13, 1989 for investigation for
allegedly hitting the head of a certain Diosdado Lacangan, thereafter, he was brought to the
detention cell. At 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon the following day, the deceased was visited by his
brother, Rizalino Suba and asked to bring him a blanket, toothbrush, clothes and foods. Rizalino
Suba left the municipal jail on February 14, 1989, at almost 5:20 p.m., while his other brother,
Rolando, brought the things to the deceased in jail who came back at 6:00 pm. Deceased was in
good health, in good condition, and not complaining anything about his body as he was then 26
years old, single, had finished advance ROTC, and worked in a logging concession. Accused
Mario Calingayan saw the deceased still alive lying down after 6:00 p.m. when he was about to
take a bath; thereafter he went to his cell and played cards with his cellmates. At around 9:00
p.m. of the same day, upon the information of Mr. Baldovino, a barangay councilman, per request
of the policemen, Rizalino Suba, David Suba and Manuel Rollo, a barangay councilman, arrived
at the municipal building and saw the dead body of the deceased lying on the cement floor
outside the cell. Calingayan was detained with five (5) others at the second cell among four (4)
cells in the jail. The four (4) cells, although having their own separate doors, made of iron grills
and equipped each with a padlock, were always open. It was up to them whether to close the
doors, and any detention prisoner could go to any cell inside the prison. Petitioner Edgar
Crisostomo was the only one on duty at the time of the death of the victim.
The Sandiganbayan found accused Edgar Crisostomo and Mario Calingayan guilty of the crime
of murder.
ISSUE:
Whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the crime of murder charged against
Crisostomo who is a Senior Police Officer 1 at the time of the filing of the Information?
RULING:
Yes. The Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction to try the case.
Since the crime was committed on 14 February 1989, the applicable provision of law is Section 4
of PD 1606, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1861 ("PD 1861"), which took effect on 23
March 1983. The amended provision reads:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise:
(a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
xxx
(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in relation to
their office, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations,
whether simple or complexed with other crimes, where the penalty prescribed by law is
higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00:
PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that offenses or felonies mentioned in this paragraph where the
penalty prescribed by law does not exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for six
(6) years or a fine of P6,000.00 shall be tried by the proper Regional Trial Court,
Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court.
Crisostomo was charged with murder, the penalty for which is reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to death, a penalty within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Indeed, murder and homicide will never be the main function of any public office. No public
office will ever be a constituent element of murder. When then would murder or homicide,
committed by a public officer, fall within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan? People v. Montejo7 provides the answer. The Court explained that a public
officer commits an offense in relation to his office if he perpetrates the offense while performing,
though in an improper or irregular manner, his official functions and he cannot commit the
offense without holding his public office. In such a case, there is an intimate connection between
the offense and the office of the accused. If the information alleges the close connection between
the offense charged and the office of the accused, the case falls within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.
Thus, the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over this case will stand or fall on this test: Does the
Information allege a close or intimate connection between the offense charged and Crisostomo's
public office?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The Information passes the test.
The Information alleged that Crisostomo "a public officer, being then a member of the Philippine
National Police stationed at Solano Police Station and a jailer thereat, taking advantage of his
public position and thus committing the offense in relation to his office" conspired, confederated
and connived with his co-accused who are inmates of the Solano Municipal Jail to kill Renato,
"a detention prisoner."
If the victim were not a prisoner, the Information would have to state particularly the intimate
relationship between the offense charged and the accused public officer's office to vest
jurisdiction on the Sandiganbayan. This is not the case here. The law restrains the liberty of a
prisoner and puts him under the custody and watchful eyes of his jail guard. Again, the two-fold
duties of a jail guard are to insure the safe custody and proper confinement of
persons detained in the jail. The law restricts access to a prisoner. However, because of the very
nature of the work of a jail guard, he has access to the prisoner. Crisostomo, as the jail guard,
could not have conspired with the inmates to murder the detention prisoner in his cell if
Crisostomo were not a "jailer."
The Information accused Crisostomo of murdering a detention prisoner, a crime that collides
directly with Crisostomo's office as a jail guard who has the duty to insure the safe custody of the
prisoner. Crisostomo's purported act of killing a detention prisoner, while irregular and contrary
to Crisostomo's duties, was committed while he was performing his official functions. The
Information sufficiently apprised Crisostomo that he stood accused of committing the crime in
relation to his office, a case that is cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, not the Regional Trial Court.
There was no prejudice to Crisostomo's substantive rights.
Assuming that the Information failed to allege that Crisostomo committed the crime in relation
to his office, the Sandiganbayan still had jurisdiction to try the case. The Information was filed
with the Sandiganbayan on 19 October 1993. Deloso v. Domingo,8 promulgated on 21 November
1990, did not require that the information should allege that the accused public officer committed
the offense in relation to his office before the Sandiganbayan could assume jurisdiction over the
case.
In the present case, the Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan upon the recommendation
of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman in a Resolution dated 30 June 1993. That Crisostomo
committed the crime in relation to his office can be gleaned from the Deputy Ombudsman's
resolution as it stated that: (1) Crisostomo was the jail guard on duty at the time that Renato was
killed; (2) from the time that Crisostomo assumed his duty up to the discovery of Renato's body,
no one had entered the jail and no one could enter the jail, as it was always locked, without the
permission of the jail guard; (3) the key is always with the jail guard; (4) Renato sustained severe
and multiple injuries inflicted by two or more persons indicating conspiracy; and (5) the relative
position of the jail guard to the cell is in such a way that any activity inside the cell could be heard
if not seen by the jail guard.
Based on the foregoing findings, as well as on the Deloso v. Domingo ruling and the Court's
instructions in Republic v. Asuncion, the Sandiganbayan had every reason to assume jurisdiction
over this case. Crisostomo waited until the very last stage of this case, the rendition of the verdict,
before he questioned the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction. Crisostomo is already estopped from
questioning the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction.
CASE NO. 12
ESTEBAN v. SANDIGANBAYAN
TOPIC: JURISDICTION OF SANDIGANBAYAN
PARTIES: THE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Ana May V. Simbajon, VERSUS Judge
Rogelio M. Esteban,
COMPLAINANT: Judge Rogelio M. Esteban FILED a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, assailing the Resolution dated December 18, 2000 of the Sandiganbayan (1st Division) and
Order dated January 11, 2000 in Criminal Cases Nos. 24703-04.
DEFENDANT: THE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS:
In her complaint, Ana May alleged that she was a casual employee of the City Government of Cabanatuan City.
Sometime in February 1997, she was detailed with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 1, Cabanatuan
City, upon incessant request of Presiding Judge Reogelio Esteban, herein petitioner.
After her detail with Branch 1, the item of bookbinder became vacant. Thus, she applied for the position but
petitioner did not take any action on her application. On July 25, 1997, when she approached petitioner in his chambers
to follow up her application, he told her, "Ano naman ang magiging kapalit ng pagpirma ko rito? Mula ngayon, girlfriend
na kita. Araw-araw papasok ka dito sa opisina ko, at araw-araw, isang halik."
Ana May refused to accede to his proposal as she considered him like her own father.
Petitioner nonetheless recommended her for appointment. Thereafter, he suddenly kissed her on her left cheek. She
was shocked and left the chambers, swearing never to return or talk to petitioner.
On August 5, 1997, at around 9:30 in the morning, Virginia S. Medina, court interpreter, informed Ana May that
petitioner wanted to see her in his chambers regarding the payroll. As a subordinate, she complied. Once inside,
petitioner asked her if she has been receiving her salary as a bookbinder. When she answered in the affirmative, he
said, "Matagal na pala eh, bakit hindi ka pumapasok dito sa kuwarto ko? Di ba sabi ko say iyo, girlfriend na kita?"
Again, Ana May protested to his proposal, saying he is like a father to her and that he is a married man with two
sons.
Petitioner suddenly rose from his seat, grabbed her and said, "Hindi pwede yan, mahal kita." He embraced her,
kissing her all over her face and touching her right breast.
Ana May freed herself and dashed out of the chambers crying. She threw the payroll on the table of her co-employee,
Elizabeth Q. Manubay. The latter sensed something was wrong and accompanied Ana May to the restroom. There she
told Elizabeth what happened.
ANA MAY:
On March 9 and July 1, 1998, two Informations for violation of R.A. 7877 (Anti-Sexual Harassment Law of 1995)
were filed against petitioner with the Sandiganbayan, docketed therein as Criminal Cases Nos. 24490 and 24702.
On July 1, 1998, two Informations for acts of lasciviousness were filed with the same court, docketed as Criminal
Cases. 24703-04.
JUDGE ESTEBAN:
On September 18, 1998, petitioner filed a motion to quash the Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 24703-04 for
acts of lasciviousness on the ground that he has been placed four (4) times in jeopardy for the same offense.
SANDIGANBAYAN:
The Sandiganbayan denied the motion to quash but directed the prosecution to determine if the offenses
charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 24703-04 were committed in relation to petitioner’s functions as a judge.
PROSECUTION:
The prosecution filed Amended Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 24703 and 24704 quoted as follows:
Criminal Case No. 24703:
That on or about the 5th day of August 1997 in Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija... within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court... JUDGE ROGELIO M. ESTEBAN, a public officer, being then the
Presiding Judge of Branch 1 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cabanatuan City, who after having been
rejected by the private complainant, Ana May V. Simbajon, of his sexual demands or solicitations to be
his girlfriend and to enter his room daily for a kiss as a condition for the signing of complainant’s
permanent appointment as a bookbinder in his Court, thus in relation to his office or position as such,
with lewd design and malicious desire, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously planted a
kiss on her left cheek against her will and consent, to her damage and detriment.
Criminal Case No. 24704
That on or about the 25th day of June 1997 in Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija ... and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court... JUDGE ROGELIO M. ESTEBAN, a public officer, being then
the Presiding Judge of Branch 1 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cabanatuan City, who after having been
rejected by the private complainant, Ana May V. Simbajon, of his sexual demands or solicitations to be
his girlfriend and to enter his room daily for a kiss as a condition for the signing of complainant’s
permanent appointment as a bookbinder in his Court, thus in relation to his office or position as such,
with lewd design and malicious desire, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously planted a
kiss on her left cheek against her will and consent, to her damage and detriment.
JUDGE ESTEBAN:
On September 29, 1999, HE filed a motion to quash the Amended Informations on the ground that the
Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the crimes charged considering that they were not committed in relation
to his office as a judge.
SANDIGANBAYAN:
On November 22, 1999, before the Sandiganbayan could resolve the motion to quash, the prosecution filed the
following Re-Amended Information in Criminal Case No. 24703 which was admitted by the Sandiganbayan.
"That on or about the 5th day of August 1997 in Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, JUDGE ROGELIO M.
ESTEBAN, a public officer, being then the Presiding Judge of Branch 1 of the Municipal Trial Court in
Cabanatuan City, who after having been rejected by the private complainant, Ana May V. Simbajon, of
his sexual demands or solicitations to be his girlfriend and to enter his room daily for a kiss as a
condition for the signing of complainant’s permanent appointment as a bookbinder in his Court, thus in
relation to his office or position as such, with lewd design and malicious desire, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously grab private complainant, kiss her all over her face and touch
her right breast against her will and consent, to her damage and detriment.
Sandiganbayan denied petitioner’s motion to quash the Amended Informations, holding that "the act of approving or
indorsing the permanent appointment of complaining witness was certainly a function of the office of the accused so that
his acts are, therefore, committed in relation to his office."
JUDGE ESTEBAN:
He moved for a reconsideration, but was denied. Hence, the instant petition for certiorari.
ISSUE/S: Whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over Criminal Cases Nos. 24703-04 for acts of lasciviousness
filed against petitioner.
PETTIONER’S ARGUMENT/S:
He contends that the alleged acts of lasciviousness were not committed in relation to his office as a judge; and the
fact that he is a public official is not an essential element of the crimes charged.
DEFENDANT’S ARGUMENT/S:
The Ombudsman, represented by the Office of the Special Prosecutor, maintains that the allegations in the 2
Amended Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 24703-04 indicate a close relationship between petitioner’s official
functions as a judge and the commission of acts of lasciviousness.
RULING/SC’S DISCUSSION/LAWS MENTIONED:
YES, SANDIGANBAYAN HAS JURISDICTION. Sandiganbayan did not gravely abuse its discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting the Amended Information for acts of lasciviousness
Petition is DISMISSED. Assailed Resolution and Order of the Sandiganbayan are AFFIRMED.
“An offense is said to have been committed in relation to the office if the offense is "intimately connected" with
the office of the offender”
Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended by Republic Act No. 8249:
SEC. 4. Jurisdiction. – The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
xxx
b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crime committed by the public officials and
employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their office.
People v. Montejo: an offense is said to have been committed in relation to the office if the
offense is "intimately connected" with the office of the offender and perpetrated while he was in
the performance of his official functions. This intimate relation between the offense charged and the
discharge of official duties must be alleged in the Information. This is in accordance with the rule that
the factor that characterizes the charge is the actual recital of the facts in the complaint or
information. Hence, where the information is wanting in specific factual averments to show the intimate
relationship/connection between the offense charged and the discharge of official functions, the
Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the case.
Under Supreme Court Circular No. 7 dated April 27, 1987, petitioner, as presiding judge of MTCC, Branch 1,
Cabanatuan City, is vested with the power to recommend the appointment of Ana May Simbajon as bookbinder. As
alleged in the Amended Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 24703-04, she was constrained to approach petitioner on
June 25, 1997 as she needed his recommendation. But he imposed a condition before extending such recommendation she should be his girlfriend and must report daily to his office for a kiss. There can be no doubt, therefore, that petitioner
used his official position in committing the acts complained of. While it is true, as petitioner argues, that public office
is not an element of the crime of acts of lasciviousness, defined and penalized under Article 336 of the Revised
Penal Code, nonetheless, he could not have committed the crimes charged were it not for the fact that as the
Presiding Judge of the MTCC, Branch I, Cabanatuan City, he has the authority to recommend the appointment of
Ana May as bookbinder. In other words, the crimes allegedly committed are intimately connected with his office.
The jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information.The Amended Informations
in Criminal Cases Nos. 24703-04 contain allegations showing that the acts of lasciviousness were committed by
petitioner in relation to his official function.
LAWS MENTIONED:
REPUBLIC ACT No. 8249: AN ACT FURTHER DEFINING THE JURISDICTION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN, AMENDING FOR
THE PURPOSE PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1606, AS AMENDED, PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES
Section 4. Section 4 of the same decree is hereby further amended to read as follows:
"A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No.
1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying
the following positions in the government whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the
offense:
"(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade '27'
and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
"(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan and provincial treasurers, assessors,
engineers and other provincial department heads;
"(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors engineers and other city
department heads;
"(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;
"(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;
"(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of provincial director and those holding the rank of
senior superintendent or higher;
"(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and
special prosecutor;
"(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or -controlled corporations, state universities or
educational institutions or foundations;
"(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade'27'and up under the Compensation and Position Classification
Act of 1989;
"(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
"(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; and
"(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade'27'and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act
of 1989.
"B. Other offenses orfelonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and employees
mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their office.
"C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
"In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary grade '27' or higher, as prescribed in the
said Republic Act No. 6758, or military or PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the
proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court and municipal circuit trial court ' as the case may be, pursuant to
their respective jurisdiction as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
"The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or orders or regional trial
courts whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction orof their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided.
"The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for the issuance of the writs of mandamus, prohibition,
certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction and over petitions of
similar nature, including quo warranto, arising or that may arise in cases filed or which may be filed under Executive Order Nos. 1,2,14
and 14-A, issued in 1986: Provided, That the jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be exclusive of the Supreme Court.
The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the implementing rules that the Supreme Court has promulgated
and may hereafter promulgate, relative to appeals/petitions for review to the Court of Appeals, shall apply to appeals and petitions for
review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court,
the Office of the Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor, shall represent the People of the Philippines, except in cases filed
pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
"In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public officers or employees,
including those employed in govemment-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and
employees in the proper courts which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them.
"Any provisions of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the criminal action and the corresponding civil action for
the recovery of civil liability shall at all times be simultaneously instituted with, and jointly determined in, the same proceeding by the
Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts, the filing of the criminal action being deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil
action, and no right to reserve the filing of such civil action separately from the criminal action shall be recognized: Provided, however,
That where the civil action had therefore been filed separately but judgment therein has not yet been rendered, and the criminal case is
hereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, said civil action shall be transferred to the Sandiganbayan or the
appropriate court, as the case may be, for consolidation and joint determination with the criminal action, otherwise the separate civil
action shall be deemed abandoned."
Bonifacio v. RTC of Makati, Br. 149
FACTS:
Petitioners Bonifacio et al were charged with the crime of libel. Gimenez, on behalf of Yuchengco
family and Malayan Insurance Co., filed a criminal complaint for libel under Article 355 in relation
to Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code. The complaint alleged that petitioners publicly and
maliciously with intention of attacking the honesty, virtue, honor and integrity, character and
reputation of Malayan Insurance Co. Inc., and Yuchengco family for exposing them to public
hatred and contempt, and published in the said website http://www.pepcoalition.com a
defamatory article persuading the public to remove their investments and policies from the said
company after the petitioners filed to seek their redress for their pecuniary loss under the policies
they obtained from the company.
Petitioners filed before the respondent RTC of Makati a Motion to Quash on the grounds that it
failed to vest jurisdiction on the Makati RTC. Petitioners maintained that the Information failed
to allege a particular place within the trial courts jurisdiction where the subject article was printed
and first published or that the offended parties resided in Makati at the time the alleged
defamatory material was printed and first published, and the prosecution erroneously laid the
venue of the case in the place where the offended party accessed the internet-published article.
ISSUE:
Whether the RTC Makati erred in admitting an amended information?
RULING:
Yes, Venue is jurisdictional in criminal actions such that the place where the crime was committed
determines not only the venue of the action but constitutes an essential element of jurisdiction.
The venue of libel cases where the complainant is a private individual is limited to only either of
two places such as the place where the complainant actually resides at the time of the
commission of the offense and the place the alleged defamatory article was printed and first
published.
Further, RA 4363 amended Art 360 of the RPC which sets the venue for the filing of an information
for a libel case. The old rule allows the filing of an action for libel in any jurisdiction where the
libelous article was published or circulated.
Disini v. Secretary of Justice
G.R. No. 203335
February 2014
Facts: The consolidated petitions seek to declare several provisions of R.A.
10175, the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012, unconstitutional and void. The
cybercrime law aims to regulate access to and use of the cyberspace. The
cyberspace is a boon to the need of the current generation for greater
information and facility of communication. However, all is not well with the
system since it could not flter out a number of persons of ill will who would want
to use cyberspace technology for mischiefs and crimes. The government
certainly has the duty and the right to prevent these tomfooleries from
happening and punish their perpetrators, hence the Cybercrime Prevention Act.
Meanwhile, petitioners claim that the means adopted by the cybercrime law for
regulating undesirable cyberspace activities violate certain of their constitutional
rights. The government of course asserts that the law merely seeks to
reasonably put order into cyberspace activities, punish wrongdoings, and prevent
hurtful attacks on the system. Pending hearing and adjudication of the issues
presented in these cases, on February 5, 2013 the Court extended the original
120-day temporary restraining order (TRO) that it earlier issued on October 9,
2012, enjoining respondent government agencies from implementing the
cybercrime law until further orders.
Issues: Whether or not the following provisions of the cybercrime law that
regard certain acts as crimes and impose penalties for their commission
as well as the provisions that would enable the government to track down
and penalize violators are constitutional:
a. Section 4 (a) (1) on Illegal Access;
b. Section 4 (a) (3) on Data Interference;
c. Section 4 (a) (6) on Cyber-squatting;
d. Section 4 (b) (3) on Identity Theft;
e. Section 4 (c) (1) on Cybersex;
f. Section 4 (c) (2) on Child Pornography;
g. Section 4 (c) (3) on Unsolicited Commercial Communications;
h. Section 4 (c) (4) on Libel;
i. Section 5 on Aiding or Abetting and Attempt in the Commission of
Cybercrimes;
j. Section 6 on the Penalty of One Degree Higher;
k. Section 7 on the Prosecution under both the Revised Penal Code (RPC)
and R.A. 10175;
l. Section 8 on Penalties;
m. Section 12 on Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data;
n. Section 13 on Preservation of Computer Data;
o. Section 14 on Disclosure of Computer Data;
p. Section 15 on Search, Seizure and Examination of Computer Data;
q. Section 17 on Destruction of Computer Data;
r. Section 19 on Restricting or Blocking Access to Computer Data;
s. Section 20 on Obstruction of Justice;
t. Section 24 on Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC);
and
u. Section 26 (a) on CICC's Powers and Functions.
Whether or not Articles 353,354, 361, and 362 of the Revised Penal Code
on the crime of libel is constitutional
Ruling:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
Section 4(a)(1) is valid and constitutional. The strict scrutiny
standard is not applicable since freedom of speech is not what is punished
but only the access of a computer system without right. Besides, the
ethical hacker does his job with prior permission from the client according
to their agreement.
Section 4(a)(3) is valid and constitutional. It does not encroach on
any freedom under the overbreadth doctrine. It simply punishes a form of
vandalism on computer data, electronic document or electronic data
message. There is no freedom to destroy other people’s computer systems
and private documents.
Section 4(a)(6) is valid and constitutional. The law is reasonable in
penalizing the offender for acquiring the domain name in bad faith to
proft, mislead, destroy reputation, or deprive others who are not illmotivated of the rightful opportunity of registering the same.
Section 4(b)(3) is valid and constitutional. The press has nothing to
fear since a special circumstance is present to negate intent to gain which
is required in this section.
Section 4(c)(1) is valid and constitutional. Engaging in sexual acts
privately through internet connection, perceived by some as a right, has to
be balanced with the mandate of the State to eradicate white slavery and
the exploitation of women.
Section 4(c)(2) is valid and constitutional. The intensity or duration of
penalty is a legislative prerogative. There is also a rational basis for such
higher penalty. The potential for uncontrolled proliferation of a particular
piece of child pornography when uploaded in the cyberspace is
incalculable.
Section 4(c)(3) is void and unconstitutional. To prohibit the
transmission of unsolicited ads would deny a person the right to read his
emails, even unsolicited commercial ads addressed to him. Unsolicited
advertisements are legitimate forms of expression.
Section 4(c)(4) on online libel is valid and constitutional with
respect to the original author of the post but void and
unconstitutional with respect to others who simply receive the post
and react to it. The internet encourages a freewheeling, anything-goes
writing style. They are a world apart in terms of quickness of the readers’
reaction to defamatory statements posted in cyberspace, facilitated by
one-click reply options offered by the networking site as well as by the
speed with which such reactions are disseminated down the line to other
internet users.
i.
j.
k.
l.
m.
n.
o.
p.
q.
Section 5 that penalizes aiding or abetting and attempt in the
commission of cybercrimes is valid and constitutional only in relation
to Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access, Section 4(a)(2) on Illegal Interception,
Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference, Section 4(a)(4) on System
Interference, Section 4(a)(5) on Misuse of Devices, Section 4(a)(6) on
Cyber-squatting, Section 4(b)(1) on Computer-related Forgery, Section 4(b)
(2) on Computer-related Fraud, Section 4(b)(3) on Computer-related
Identity Theft, and Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex; but void and
unconstitutional with respect to Sections 4(c)(2) on Child
Pornography, 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial Communications, and 4(c)
(4) on online Libel. Penal laws should provide reasonably clear guidelines
for law enforcement officials and triers of facts to prevent arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement.
Section 6 is valid and constitutional. It merely makes commission of
existing crimes through the internet a qualifying circumstance. In using
technology, the offender often evades identifcation and is able to reach
far more victims or cause greater harm. This creates a basis for higher
penalties for cybercrimes.
Section 7 is void and unconstitutional only in respect to (1) Online
libel charged under both Section 4(c)(4) of R. A. 10175 and Article 353 of
the RPC, and (2) Online child pornography charged under both Section 4(c)
(2) of R.A. 10175 and R.A. 9775 or the Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009
because of double jeopardy. The Court resolves to leave the
determination of the correct application of Section 7 to actual cases.
Section 8 is valid and constitutional. It is the prerogative of the
lawmaking body to prescribe a measure of severe penalties for what it
regards as deleterious cybercrimes.
Section 12 is void and unconstitutional. The supposed limitation is no
limitation at all since it is the law enforcement agencies that would specify
the target communications. The power is virtually limitless, enabling law
enforcement authorities to engage in “fshing expedition,” choosing
whatever specifed communication they want. This threatens the right of
individuals to privacy.
Section 13 is valid and constitutional. The data that service providers
preserve on orders of law enforcement authorities are not made
inaccessible to users by reason of the issuance of such orders. The process
of preserving data will not unduly hamper the normal transmission or use
of the same.
Section 14 is valid and constitutional. It envisions only the
enforcement of a duly issued court warrant. The prescribed procedure for
disclosure would not constitute an unlawful search or seizure nor would it
violate the privacy of communications and correspondence. Disclosure can
be made only after judicial intervention.
Section 15 is valid and constitutional. It does not supersede existing
search and seizure rules but merely supplements them. It does not pose
any threat on the rights of the person from whom they were taken.
Section 17 is valid and constitutional. It does not deprive the user’s
right against deprivation of property without due process of law because it
is unclear that the user has a demandable right to require the service
provider to have a copy of the data saved indefnitely for him in its storage
r.
s.
t.
u.
system. If he wanted them preserved, he should have saved them in his
computer. He could also request the service provider for a copy before it is
deleted.
Section 19 is void and unconstitutional which authorizes the DOJ to
restrict or block access to suspected Computer Data. It is in violation of
the constitutional guarantees to freedom of expression and against
unreasonable searches and seizures.
Section 20 is valid and constitutional in so far as it applies to the
provisions of Chapter IV which are not struck down by Court. There must
be judicial determination of guilt, during which defense and justifcations
for non-compliance done knowingly or wilfully may be raised.
Section 24 is valid and constitutional. The formulation of the
cybersecurity plan is consistent with the policy of law to prevent and
combat cyber offenses by facilitating their detection, investigation, and
prosecution at both the domestic and international levels, and by
providing arrangements for fast and reliable international cooperation.
Section 26(a) is valid and constitutional. For the same reason in the
preceding number, the policy adopted is in the interest of law and order,
which has been considered as sufficient standard.
Articles 353, 354, 361, and 362 of the Revised Penal Code that penalizes libel are valid
and constitutional.
Case Digest
DISINI V. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
G.R. No. 203335
February 18, 2014
Jimenez v. Sorongon, 687 SCRA 151
G.R. No. 178607
BRlON, J.
Petitioners: DANTE LA. JlMENEZ, in
his capacity as president and
representative of UNLAD SHlPPlNG
&
MANAGEMENT CORpORATlON,
December 5, 2012
JM Tolentino
Respondents: HON. EDWlN SORONGON (in his
capacity as presiding Judge of Branch 214 of
the Regional Trial Court of
Mandaluyong City), SOCRATES
ANTZOULATOS, CARMEN ALAMlL, MARCELl
GAZA and MARKOS
AVGOUSTlS
TOPIC: RULE 110 - PROCECUTION OF OFFENSES
Facts:









Petitioner is the president of Unlad Shipping & Management Corporation, a local manning
agency.
Private respondents are some of the listed incorporators of Tsakos Maritime Services, lnc.
(TMSl), another local manning agency
Unlad Shpping filed a complaint-affidavit against the TMSI for syndicated and large scale
illegal recruitment.
Petitioner alleged that the respondents falsely represented their stockholdings in TMSl’s
articles of incorporation to secure a license to operate as a recruitment agency from the
Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA)
City prosecutor filed the corresponding criminal information with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Mandaluyong City
RTC ordered the issuance of warrants of arrest against the respondents upon finding the
existence of probable cause to hold respondents for trial
Respondent Alamil filed a motion for judicial determination of probable cause with a request
to defer enforcement of the warrants of arrest
Petitioner filed his opposition with motion to expunge, contending that respondent AIamiI,
being a fugitive from justice, had no standing to seek any reIief and that the RTC already
found probable cause to hold the respondents for trial
The RTC granted respondent Alamil’s motion for reconsideration. It treated respondent
Alamil’s motion for judicial determination as a motion to dismiss for lack of probable cause.
It found:
 (1) no evidence on record to indicate that the respondents gave any false information to
secure a license to operate as a recruitment agency from the POEA; and
 (2) that respondent Alamil voluntarily submitted to the RTC’s jurisdiction through the
filing of pleadings seeking affirmative relief.
 Thus, the RTC dismissed the case, and set aside the earlier issued warrants of arrest.


On October 18, 2006, the petitioner elevated his case to the CA via a Rule 65 petition for
certiorari assailing the RTC’s March 8, 2006, May 10, 2006, and August 7, 2006 orders.
In its November 23, 2006 resolution, the CA dismissed outright the petitioner’s Rule 65
petition for lack of legal personality to file the petition on behalf of the People of the
Philippines.
Issue/s and Ratio:
Whether the CA committed a reversible error in dismissing
outright the petitioner’s Rule 65 petition for certiorari for
lack of legal personality to file the petition on behalf of the
P e o p l e o f t h e P h i l i p p i n e s ? NO
The petitioner has no legal personality to assail the dismissal of the criminal case
It is well-settled that "every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real
party in interest[,]" "who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or by the
party entitled to the avails of the suit." Interest means material interest or an interest in issue
to be affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere interest in
the question involved. By real interest is meant a present substantial interest, as distinguished
from a mere expectancy, or a future, contingent, subordinate or consequential interest. When
the plaintiff or the defendant is not a real party in interest, the suit is dismissible.
Procedural law basically mandates that "[a]ll criminal actions commenced by complaint or by
information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of a public prosecutor." In
appeals of criminal cases before the CA and before this Court, the OSG is the appellate
counsel of the People, pursuant to Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987
Administrative Code. This section explicitly provides:
SEC. 35. Powers and Functions. — The Office of the Solicitor General shall represent the
Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents
in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers. . . . It
shall have the following specific powers and functions:
(1) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal
proceedings; represent the Government and its officers in the Supreme Court and Court of
Appeals, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in which
the Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party. (emphasis added)
The People is the real party in interest in a criminal case and only the OSG can
represent the People in criminal proceedings pending in the CA or in this Court. This
ruling has been repeatedly stressed in several cases and continues to be the controlling
doctrine.
While there may be rare occasions when the offended party may be allowed to pursue the
criminal action on his own behalf (as when there is a denial of due process), this exceptional
circumstance does not apply in the present case.
In this case, the petitioner has no legal personality to assail the dismissal of the criminal case
since the main issue raised by the petitioner involved the criminal aspect of the case, i.e., the
existence of probable cause. The petitioner did not appeal to protect his alleged
pecuniary interest as an offended party of the crime, but to cause the reinstatement of
the criminal action against the respondents. This involves the right to prosecute which
pertains exclusively to the People, as represented by the OSG.
Whether or not respondent Alamil has no legal standing to seek any
relief from the RTC since she is a fugitive from justice?
Alamil can seek relief from the RTC
Respondent Alamil voluntarily submitted to the RTC’s jurisdiction
As a rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction
of the court. Filing pleadings seeking affirmative relief constitutes voluntary appearance, and
the consequent jurisdiction of one's person to the jurisdiction of the court.
Thus, by filing several motions before the RTC seeking the dismissal of the criminal case,
respondent Alamil voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the RTC. Custody of the law is
not required for the adjudication of reliefs other than an application for bail.
Ruling:
WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the appeal. The twin resolutions of the CoUJt of Appeals
dated November 23, 2006 and June 28, 2007 in CAG. R. SP No. 96584 are AFFIRMED. Costs
against the petitioner.
People vs. Valdez
it is unavoidable for the Court to pronounce PO2 Valdez guilty of three homicides,
instead of three murders, on account of the informations not sufficiently alleging the
attendance of treachery.
663 SCRA 272 . January 18, 2012
Ponente: BERSAMIN, ItJ.cannot be otherwise, for, indeed, the real nature of the criminal charge is determined
not from the caption or preamble of the information, or from the specification of the
provision of law alleged to have been violated, which are mere conclusions of law, but
FACTS:
by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or information
The Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City charged the two accused, Eduardo
Valdez and Edwin Valdez, in the RTC with three counts of murder for the killing of
Ferdinand Sayson, Moises Sayson, Jr., and Joselito Sayson.
The RTC convicted the two accused of three counts of murder and sentenced them
to suffer reclusion perpetua for each count of murder and ordered to pay to the heirs
of each victim P93,000.00 as actual damages, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, and
P50,000.00 as moral damages.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) upheld the RTC on July 18, 2006, subject to
the modification that each accused pay to the heirs of each victim P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, P25,000.00 as temperate damages, and
P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, plus costs of suit.
The accused came to the Court to seek acquittal. On May 9, 2007, however, accused
Edwin Valdez filed a motion to withdraw appeal, which the Court granted on October
10, 2007, thereby deeming Edwin’s appeal closed and terminated. Hence, the Court
hereby resolves only the appeal of PO2 Eduardo Valdez.
ISSUE:
Whether the information is sufficient considering the failure to mention the
aggravating circumstance of the crime.
HELD:
NO. Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Information; Pleadings and Practice; The real
nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the
information, or from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been
violated, which are mere conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of the facts in
the complaint or information.—The real nature of the criminal charge is determined
not from the caption or preamble of the information, or from the specification of the
provision of law alleged to have been violated, which are mere conclusions of law,
but by the actual recital of the facts in the complaint or information. In People v.
Dimaano, 469 SCRA 647 (2005), the Court elaborated: For complaint or information
to be sufficient, it must state the name of the accused; the designation of the offense
given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense;
the name of the offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the
offense, and the place wherein the offense was committed. What is controlling is not
the title of the complaint, nor the designation of the offense charged or the particular
law or part thereof allegedly violated, these being mere conclusions of law made by
the prosecutor, but the description of the crime charged and the particular facts
therein recited. The acts or omissions complained of must be alleged in such form as
is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is
intended to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment. No
information for a crime will be sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly allege
the elements of the crime charged.
FERNANDO Q. MIGUEL v. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 172035, July 4, 2012 (SECOND DIVISION)
BRION, J.
FACTS: A letter-complaint was filed with the Ombudsman charging Miguel with violation
of RA 3019. The Ombudsman directed Miguel to submit his counter-affidavit. The
Ombudsman found probable cause against Miguel and some private individuals for
violation of RA 3019 and against Miguel alone for Falsification of Public Document [Art.
171(4), RPC]. Subsequently, the Ombudsman filed Informations with the Sandiganbayan.
Miguel moved for a reinvestigation, which the Sandiganbayan granted. Despite the
extension period asked and given multiple times, Miguel failed to file his counter-affidavit,
prompting Prosec. Ruiz to declare that Miguel had waived his right to submit
countervailing evidence.
After several extensions sought and granted, Miguel filed a Motion to Quash and/or
Reinvestigation for the criminal cases against him. The Sandiganbayan denied his motion
because of the pending OSP reinvestigation. Miguel was arraigned and pleaded not guilty
in both criminal cases. The OSP filed a Motion to Suspend Miguel Pendente Lite. Miguel
filed his Opposition based on the “obvious and fatal defect of the information” in failing to
allege that the giving of unwarranted benefits and advantages was done through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. A resolution was promulgated,
suspending Miguel from his position as City Mayor for 90 days. Miguel moved for
reconsideration of his suspension order and demanded for a pre-suspension hearing. The
Sandiganbayan denied his motion, prompting him to file this petition to challenge the
validity of his suspension order.
ISSUE: Whether the information charging Miguel with violation of Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019 is
valid.
HELD: YES. In deference to the constitutional right of an accused to be informed of the
nature and the cause of the accusation against him, Sec. 6, Rule 110 requires that the
information shall state the designation of the offense given by the statute and the acts or
omissions imputed which constitute the offense charged. Additionally, the Rules require
that these acts or omissions and its attendant circumstances "must be stated in ordinary and
concise language" and "in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to
know what offense is being charged and for the court to pronounce judgment." A reading of
the information clearly reveals that the phrase "acting with evident bad faith and manifest
partiality" was merely a continuation of the prior allegation of the acts of Miguel, and that
he ultimately acted with evident bad faith and manifest partiality in giving unwarranted
benefits and advantages to his co-accused private individuals. Given the supposed
ambiguity of the subject being qualified by the phrase "acting with evident bad faith and
manifest partiality," the remedy of Miguel, if at all, is merely to move for a bill of
particulars and not for the quashal of an information which sufficiently alleges the
elements of the offense charged.
PEOPLE vs SORIA G.R. No. 179031, November 14, 2012
Facts:
“AAA”after eating, went to the bedroom to rest. Thereafter, appellant entered the room and
positioned himself on top of “AAA”, took off her clothes and inserted his penis into her vagina. “AAA”
felt intense pain from her breast down to her vagina and thus told her father that it was painful. At that
point, the appellant apologized to his daughter, stood up, and left the room. This whole incident was
witnessed by “AAA’s” brother, “BBB”. The trial court rendered its judgment finding appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape against “AAA”, his daughter of minor age, as charged in
the Information. While the appellate court was convinced that appellant raped “AAA”, it nevertheless
noted the prosecution’s failure to present her birth certificate as competent proof of her minority. Thus,
the CA concluded that the crime committed by appellant against his daughter was only simple rape and
accordingly modified the penalty imposed by the trial court from death to reclusion perpetua. Still
insisting on his innocence, appellant comes to this Court through this appeal.
Issue:
Whether the information against the accused for the crime of Rape is sufficient
Held:
Yes, The Information stated that appellant inserted his penis into the genital of “AAA,” which
constituted rape by sexual intercourse under the first paragraph of Article 266-A. At the same time, the
Information alleged that appellant used force and intimidation to commit an act of sexual assault. While
these allegations cause ambiguity, they only pertain to the mode or manner of how the rape was
committed and the same do not invalidate the Information or result in the automatic dismissal of the
case. “[W]here an offense may be committed in any of the different modes and the offense is alleged to
have been committed in two or more modes specified, the indictment is sufficient, notwithstanding the
fact that the different means of committing the same offense are prohibited by separate sections of the
statute. The allegation in the information of the various ways of committing the offense should be
regarded as a description of only one offense and the information is not thereby rendered defective
on the ground of multifariousness.”17 Any objection from the appellant with respect to the
Information is held to have been waived failing any effort to oppose the same before trial.18 He
therefore can be convicted of rape through sexual intercourse or rape by sexual assault, depending on
the evidence adduced during trial.
UNION BANK VS PEOPLE (Perjury)
G.R. No. 192565, February 28, 2012
En Banc
Brion, J
Nature of the Case: Petition for the reversal of RTC Decision &
Petition to Quash the Information for Perjury against Tomas
Brief:
This is an appeal of the decision rendered by the Lower Court on the
constitutionality of Ordinance No. 84, series of 1975 of the
Municipality of Bocaue, Bulacan.
FACTS:
 Certification against Forum Shopping was made integral
parts of two complaints for sum of money with prayer for a
writ of replevin against the respondent spouses Eddie
Tamondong and Eliza B. Tamondong,
 Spouses filed a complaint-affidavit against Tomas for
violation of Article 183 of the RPC, for making a false
narration in a Certificate against Forum Shopping.
 OSG shared the petitioner’s view and issued Manifestation
and Motion in lieu of Comment relying also in Ilusorio case
and the crime of perjury is the deliberate or intentional
giving of false evidence in the court where the evidence is
material.
 The case was referred to En Banc because of the conflicting
rulings in the case of Ilusorio (basis of the petition) and the
Sy Tiong case that was the basis of the assailed RTC-Makati
City ruling
ISSUE: WON perjury is committed?
ACTIONS OF THE COURT:
MTC of Makati:
 Denied the Petition to Quash on the ff. ground:
a) It has jurisdiction since the Certificate against
Forum Shopping was notarized in Makati City;
and
b) Information sufficiently charged Tomas with
perjury
 Dismissed the Motion for Reconsideration filed by
Petitioner
RTC-Makati- Dismissed the Petition for Certiorari on the ground of
abuse of discretion. Basis of the ruling is quoted as
follows “the criminal action shall be instituted and
tried in the court of the municipality or territory
where the offense was committed, or where any of its
essential ingredients occurred.”
 RTC-Makati City also observed that the facts in
Ilusorio [the case used by the petitioner] are
different from the facts of the present case
 MTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion since
since the order denying the Motion to Quash was
based on jurisprudence later than Ilusorio.
Supreme Court: Dismissed the petition.
Rationale:
The constitutive act of the offense is the making of an affidavit; thus,
the criminal act is consummated when the statement containing a
falsity is subscribed and sworn before a duly authorized person.
The following are the elements of Perjury vis-à-vis the applicability
in the herein case:
ELEMENT
APPLICABILITY
1. That the accused made a  The
petitioner
executed
statement under oath or
Certificate Against Forum
executed an affidavit upon a
Shopping, duly notarized in
material matter
Makati City

2. That the statement or  The
petitioner
executed
affidavit was made before a
Certificate Against Forum
competent officer, authorized to
Shopping, duly notarized in
receive and administer oath.
Makati City.
3. That in the statement or  Deliberate falsehood was also
affidavit, the accused made a
sufficiently alleged to have
willful and deliberate assertion
been committed in Makati
of a falsehood.
City, not Pasay City. The
Information indicates that the
Petitioner has not commenced
any
other
action
or
proceeding involving the
same issues in another
tribunal or agency, accused
knowing well that said
material statement was
false
4. That the sworn statement or  Certificate Against Forum
affidavit containing the falsity
Shopping is required by law.
is required by law or made for a
legal purpose.
As to the venue (criminal proceedings), when the crime is committed
through false testimony under oath in a proceeding that is neither
criminal nor civil, venue is at the place where the testimony under
oath is given. If in lieu of or as supplement to the actual testimony
made in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil, a written
sworn statement is submitted, venue may either be at the place where
the sworn statement is submitted or where the oath was taken as the
taking of the oath and the submission are both material ingredients of
the crime committed. In all cases, determination of venue shall be
based on the acts alleged in the Information to be constitutive of the
crime committed.
NOTE: In my opinion, other topics discussed in the case are more
applicable to the proper venue of action which is covered in
Criminal Proceeding subject. As to the Criminal Law subject, the
essence of the case is only to determine whether Perjury is
committed.
25.Solidum v. People, 718 SCRA 263
Facts: Gerald Albert Gercayo (Gerald) was born on June 2, 1992 with an imperforate anus. Two days after
his birth, Gerald underwent colostomy, a surgical procedure to bring one end of the large intestine out
through the abdominal wall, enabling him to excrete through a colostomy bag attached to the side of his
body.
On May 17, 1995, Gerald, then three years old, was admitted at the Ospital ng Maynila for a pull-through
operation. Dr. Leandro Resurreccion headed the surgical team, and was assisted by Dr. Joselito Luceño,
Dr. Donatella Valeña and Dr. Joseph Tibio. The anesthesiologists included Dr. Marichu Abella, Dr. Arnel
Razon and petitioner Dr. Fernando Solidum (Dr. Solidum). During the operation, Gerald experienced
bradycardia, and went into a coma. His coma lasted for two weeks, but he regained consciousness only
after a month. He could no longer see, hear or move.
Agitated by her son’s helpless and unexpected condition, Ma. Luz Gercayo (Luz) lodged a complaint for
reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries with the City Prosecutor’s Office of Manila against
the attending physicians.
The RTC found Dr. Solidum guilty beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence resulting in serious
physical injuries. Solidum failed to monitor and to properly regulate the level of anesthetic agent
administered on Gerald.
CA affirmed and applied the doctrine of res ipsa liquitor.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor applies to this case.
(2) Whether or not CA correctly affirmed the conviction of Dr. Solidum for liable for criminal negligence.
Ruling:
1. The Court held that the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor in the case at bar is inappropriate.
Res Ipsa Loquitor is literally translated as “the thing or the transaction speaks for itself.” It means that
“where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under the management of the defendant, and the
accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management
use proper case, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the defendant,
that the accident arose from want of case.” It is applied in conjunction with the doctrine of common
knowledge.
However, the doctrine is not a rule of substantive law, but merely a mode of proof or a mere procedural
convenience. The doctrine, when applicable to the facts and circumstances of a given case, is not
meant to and does not dispense with the requirement of proof of culpable negligence against the party
charged. It merely determines or regulates what shall be prima facie evidence thereof, and help the
plaintiff in proving a breach of duty. It can be invoked on when, under the circumstances involved, direct
evidence is absent and not readily available.
Essential requisites: a) The accident was of a kind that does not ordinarily occur unless someone is
negligent; b) The instrumentality or agency that caused the injury under the exclusive control of the
person charged; and c) The injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or
contribution of the person injured.
Elements 2 and 3 were present in this case. However, the first element was undeniably wanting.
2. No, the prosecution failed to prove the existence of the elements of reckless imprudence beyond
reasonable doubt.
Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the interest of another person that
degree of care, precaution, and vigilance that the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other
person suffers injury. Reckless imprudence, on the other hand, consists of voluntarily doing or failing to
do, without malice, an act from which material damage results by reason of an inexcusable lack of
precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act.
The prosecution did not prove the elements of reckless imprudence BRD because the circumstances
cited by the CA were insufficient to establish that Dr. Solidum had been guilty of inexcusable lack of
precaution in monitoring the administration of the anesthetic agent of Gerald.
An action upon medical negligence – whether criminal, civil or administrative – calls for the plaintiff to
prove by competent evidence each of the following 4 elements, namely; a) The duty owned by the
physician to the patient, as created by the physician-patient relationship, to act in accordance with the
specific norms or standards established by his profession; b) The breach of the duty by the physician’s
failing to act in accordance with the applicable standard of care; c) The causation, i.e., there must be a
reasonably close and causal connection between the negligent act or omission and the resulting injury;
and d) The damages suffered by the patient.
The standard of care is an objective standard by which the conduct of a physician sued for negligence
or malpractice may be measured, and it does not depend, therefore, on any individual physician's own
knowledge either. In attempting to fix a standard by which a court may determine whether the physician
has properly performed the requisite duty toward the patient, expert medical testimony from both
plaintiff and defense experts is required. The judge, as the trier of fact, ultimately determines the
standard of care, after listening to the testimony of all medical experts
The testimonies the prosecution presented did not prove beyond reasonable doubt that Dr. Solidum
had been recklessly imprudent in administering the anesthetic agent to Gerald. Dr. Solidum was
criminally charged for “failing to monitor and regulate properly the levels of anesthesia administered to
said Gerla and using 100% halothan and other anesthetic medications.” However, the findings of Dr.
Vertido, one of the anesthesiologists, was revealingly concluded that “although the anesthesiologists
followed the normal routine and precautionary procedures, still hyproxia3 and its corresponding side
effects did occur.” Hence, 100% halothan is not what should be administered, it should be 100%
oxygen.
G.R. No. 192123
March 10, 2014
DR. FERNANDO P. SOLIDUM, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
FACTS:
This appeal is taken by a physician-anesthesiologist who has been pronounced
guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries by the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) and the Court of Appeals (CA). He had been part of the team of
anesthesiologists during the surgical pull-through operation conducted on a threeyear old patient born with an imperforate anus.
Gerald Albert Gercayo (Gerald) was born on June 2, 1992 with an imperforate anus.
Two days after his birth, Gerald underwent colostomy, a surgical procedure to bring
one end of the large intestine out through the abdominal wall, enabling him to
excrete through a colostomy bag attached to the side of his body.
On May 17, 1995, Gerald, then three years old, was admitted at the Ospital ng
Maynila for a pull-through operation. The petitioner Dr. Fernando Solidum (Dr.
Solidum) was the anesthesioligist. During the operation, Gerald experienced
bradycardia, and went into a coma. He regained consciousness only after a month.
He could no longer see, hear or move.
Agitated by her son’s helpless and unexpected condition, Ma. Luz Gercayo (Luz)
lodged a complaint for reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries
with the City Prosecutor’s Office of Manila against the attending physicians.
Upon a finding of probable cause, the City Prosecutor’s Office filed an information
solely against Dr. Solidum.
The case was initially filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, but was
transferred to the RTC pursuant to Section 5 of Republic Act No. 8369 (The Family
Courts Act of 1997).
On July 19, 2004, the RTC rendered its judgment finding Dr. Solidum guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence resulting to serious physical injuries. On
January 20, 2010, the CA affirmed the conviction of Dr. Solidum.
ISSUE(S):
1) whether or not Dr. Solidum was liable for criminal negligence.
2) Wether or not Dr. Solidum was civilly liable
HELD:
1) No
2) No
RATIO:
Issue 1:
Dr. Solidum was criminally charged for "failing to monitor and regulate properly the
levels of anesthesia administered to said Gerald Albert Gercayo and using 100%
halothane and other anesthetic medications." However, the foregoing
circumstances, taken together, did not prove beyond reasonable doubt that Dr.
Solidum had been recklessly imprudent in administering the anesthetic agent to
Gerald. Indeed, Dr. Vertido’s findings did not preclude the probability that other
factors related to Gerald’s major operation, which could or could not necessarily be
attributed to the administration of the anesthesia, had caused the hypoxia and had
then led Gerald to experience bradycardia. Dr. Vertido revealingly concluded in his
report, instead, that "although the anesthesiologist followed the normal routine and
precautionary procedures, still hypoxia and its corresponding side effects did occur."
The existence of the probability about other factors causing the hypoxia has
engendered in the mind of the Court a reasonable doubt as to Dr. Solidum’s guilt,
and moves us to acquit him of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to serious
physical injuries. "
Issue #2
We have to clarify that the acquittal of Dr. Solidum would not immediately exempt
him from civil liability. But we cannot now find and declare him civilly liable because
the circumstances that have been established here do not present the factual and
legal bases for validly doing so. His acquittal did not derive only from reasonable
doubt. There was really no firm and competent showing how the injury to Gerard
had been caused. That meant that the manner of administration of the anesthesia
by Dr. Solidum was not necessarily the cause of the hypoxia that caused the
bradycardia experienced by Gerard. Consequently, to adjudge Dr. Solidum civilly
liable would be to speculate on the cause of the hypoxia. We are not allowed to do
so, for civil liability must not rest on speculation but on competent evidence.
CASTILLO VS SALVADOR
G.R. NO. 191240, JULY 30, 2014
FACTS:
Respondent Phillip R. Salvador was charged with estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code. The Regional Trial Court and the Court of
Appeals acquitted him of the same but the civil aspect of the case remained.
Respondent Salvador then filed a petition for review on Certiorari to the Supreme Court.
Petitioner Cristina B. Castillo is a businesswoman engaged in real estate
business, educational institution, boutique, and trading business. She was then enticed
by Salvador and his brother, Ramon Salvador to engage in freight and remittance
business.
As petitioner had deeply fallen in love with respondent Salvador and since she
trusted him very much as he even acted as a father to her children when her annulment
was ongoing, she agreed to embark on the remittance business. She agreed with
respondent and Ramon that any profit derived from the business would be equally
divided among them and that respondent would be in charge of promotion and
marketing in Hong Kong, while Ramon would take charge of the operations of business
in the Philippines and she would be financing the business.
The business has not operated yet as petitioner was still raising the amount of
US$100,000.00 as capital for the actual operation. When petitioner already had the
money, she handed the same to respondent Salvador which was witnessed by her
disabled half-brother Enrico B. Tan. However, the proposed business never operated as
respondent only stayed in Hong Kong for three days. When she asked respondent
about the money and the business, the latter told her that the money was deposited in a
bank. However, upon further query, respondent confessed that he used the money to
pay for his other obligations. Since then, the US$100,000.00 was not returned at all.
ISSUE: WON award of damages may be retained despite acquittal of the criminal case.
HELD:
The award of damages must be removed. Our law recognizes two kinds of
acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability of the accused. First is an acquittal on
the ground that the accused is not the author of the actor omission complained of. This
instance closes the door to civil liability, for a person who has been found to be not the
perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can never be held liable for such act or
omission. There being no delict, civil liability ex delictois out of the question, and the civil
action, if any, which may be instituted must be based on grounds other than the delict
complained of. This is the situation contemplated in Rule III of the Rules of Court. The
second instance is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused.
In this case, even if the guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily established, he is
not exempt from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only.
This is the situation contemplated in Article 29 of the Civil Code, where the civil action
for damages is "for the same act or omission.
A reading of the CA decision would show that respondent was acquitted because the
prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Said the CA:
The evidence for the prosecution being insufficient to prove beyond reasonable doubt
that the crime as charged had been committed by appellant, the general presumption,
"that a person is innocent of the crime or wrong, stands in his favor. The prosecution
failed to prove that all the elements of estafa are present in this case as would
overcome the presumption of innocence in favor of appellant. For in fact, the
prosecution's primary witness herself could not even establish clearly and precisely how
appellant committed the alleged fraud. She failed to convince us that she was deceived
through misrepresentations and/or insidious actions, in venturing into a remittance
business. Quite the contrary, the obtaining circumstance in this case indicate the
weakness of her submissions.
Thus, since the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt, respondent is not exempt from
civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. In Encinas v.
National Bookstore, Inc., the higher court explained the concept of preponderance of
evidence as follows:
x x x Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate
evidence on either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term
"greater weight of the evidence" or "greater weight of the credible evidence."
Preponderance of evidence is a phrase which, in the last analysis, means probability of
the truth. It is evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than
that which is offered in opposition thereto.
However, in this case, no such civil liability is proved even by preponderance of
evidence.
In discrediting petitioner’s allegation that she gave respondent US$100,000.00 in May
2002, the CA found that: (1) petitioner failed to show how she was able to raise the
money in such a short period of time and even gave conflicting versions on the source
of the same; (2) petitioner failed to require respondent to sign a receipt so she could
have a record of the transaction and offered no plausible reason why the money was
allegedly hand-carried to Hong Kong; (3) petitioner’s claim of trust as reason for not
requiring respondent to sign a receipt was inconsistent with the way she conducted her
previous transactions with him; and (4) petitioner’s behavior after the alleged fraud
perpetrated against her was inconsistent with the actuation of someone who had been
swindled.
The petition for the award of damages is denied.
DY VS. PEOPLE
GR NO. 189081, August 10, 2016, Jardeleza
SUMMARY:
Petitioner Dy was a former General Manager of MCCI, was charged with estafa by the company
through its president Willian Mandy. Petitioner assisted MCCI in its business and one business pertained
to the construction of a warehouses over Numancia Property that MCCi leased from Philippine National
Bank. He proposed to Willian Dy the purchase of a property owned by Pantranco. Since it involves a
large amount of money, Mandy agreed to obtain a loan from International China Bank of Commerce
(ICBC) the amount of 20M. As a security, MCCI issued a chattel mortgage where he entrusted to
petitioner the obligation to manage the payment of the loan thru cheks, where it was evidently
defaulted. Petitioner claimed that he encashed the checks and returned the cash to Mandy. ICBC
eventually foreclosed the mortgaged property. Mandy filed a case of Estafa to petitioner before the RTC
Manila who rendered the decision acquitting the petitioner having failed to establish the guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
The accused is however civilly liable to the complainant for the amount of P21,706,281.00. He
filed an appeal with CA but denied affirming the RTC’s decision.
ISSUE/S:
The propriety of making a finding of civil liability in a criminal case for estafa when the accused is
acquitted for failure of the prosecution to prove all the elements of the crime charged.
RULING OF THE COURT:
The lower courts erred when they ordered petitioner to pay her civil obligation arising from a
contract of loan in the same criminal case where she was acquitted on the ground that there was no
crime. Any contractual obligation she may have must be litigated in a separate civil action involving the
contract of loan. In case where the accused is acquitted on the ground that there is no crime, the civil
action deemed instituted with the criminal case cannot prosper precisely because there is no delict from
which any civil obligation may be sourced. The peculiarity of this case is the finding that petitioner, in
fact, has an obligation arising from a contract. This civil action arising from contract is not necessarily
extinguished. It can be instituted in the proper court through the power of civil action.
DECISION:
The petition granted, the decision of the CA is reversed, without prejudice to any civil action
which may be filed to claim civil liability arising from the contract.
G.R. No. 145391
August 26, 2002
AVELINO CASUPANAN and ROBERTO CAPITULO, petitioners,
vs. MA RIO LLAVORE LA ROYA, respondent.
CARPIO, J.:
FACTS:
An accident occurred involving two vehicles, one driven by respondent Laroya and the other owned by
petitioner Capitulo and driven by petitioner Casupanan. Subsequently, two cases were filed in the MCTC
of Capas Tarlac: first, a criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property filed by
the respondent against Casapunan; and second, a civil case arising from a quasi-delict filed by the
petitioners against the respondent. The civil case was initiated while the criminal case was still
undergoing preliminary investigation. The respondent, who was the defendant in the civil case, filed a
motion to dismiss, citing forum shopping due to the pendency of the criminal case. The MCTC granted
the motion for dismissal on the grounds of forum shopping. The petitioners then filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, arguing that a separate civil action can be independently instituted from the criminal
case. The MCTC denied the motion. Subsequently, the petitioners filed a petition for Certiorari before
Capas RTC to challenge the MCTC’s Order, but the RTC dismissed it for lack of merit. Hence, a petition
for Review on Certiorari was brought before the Court.
ISSUE:
Whether an accused in a pending criminal case for reckless imprudence can validly file a separate civil
action for quasi-delict against the private complainant in the criminal case, simultaneously and
independently.
RULING:
Yes. The right of the accused to initiate a separate civil action for quasi-delict is similar to the right of the
offended party to file an independent civil action, as provided in Section 1 of Rule 111. Under this rule,
the independent civil action based on Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code is not considered
initiated with the criminal action but can be filed separately by the offended party without any
reservation. The initiation of the criminal action does not suspend the prosecution of the independent
civil action as per these articles of the Civil Code. The suspension mentioned in Section 2 of the current
Rule 111 pertains only to the civil action arising from the crime, provided that such civil action is either
reserved or filed before the commencement of the criminal action. Consequently, the offended party
can initiate two separate lawsuits for the same act or omission: first, a criminal case where the civil
action to recover civil liability ex-delicto is considered initiated, and second, a civil case for quasi-delict,
all without violating the prohibition against forum shopping. These two cases can proceed
simultaneously and independently. The only limitation is that the offended party cannot recover
damages twice for the same act or omission by the defendant.
Similarly, the accused can initiate a civil action for quasi-delict based on the same act or omission for
which they are accused in the criminal case. This is explicitly permitted in paragraph 6, Section 1 of the
current Rule 111, which states that the accused's counterclaim may be litigated in a separate civil action.
This approach is fair for two reasons. First, the accused is barred from raising any counterclaim in the
civil aspect that is regarded as initiated in the criminal case. Consequently, the accused must litigate
separately to assert their counterclaim against the offended party. If the accused does not file a
separate civil action for quasi-delict, the prescriptive period may lapse because the period continues to
run until the civil action for quasi-delict is initiated. Second, the presumed innocent accused has the
right to invoke Article 2177 of the Civil Code, just as the offended party can utilize this remedy, which is
independent of the criminal action. Denying the accused the option to file a separate civil action for
quasi-delict while refusing to recognize their counterclaim in the criminal case would violate their due
process rights, access to the courts, and equal protection under the law.
Consequently, the separate civil action filed by the petitioners based on quasi-delict is appropriate.
NOTES:
Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, the independent civil action in Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of
the Civil Code is not deemed instituted with the criminal action but may be filed separately by the
offended party even without reservation. The commencement of the criminal action does not suspend
the prosecution of the independent civil action under these articles of the Civil Code. The suspension in
Section 2 of the present Rule 111 refers only to the civil action arising from the crime if such civil action
is reserved or filed before the commencement of the criminal action.
Caterpillar, Inc. v. Samson, 808 SCRA 90
November 9, 2016
Facts:
On July 26, 2000, upon application of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 56, in Makati City issued Search Warrants Nos. 00-022 to 00-032, inclusive, all for unfair
competition,9 to search the establishments owned, controlled and operated by Samson. The
implementation of the search warrants on July 27, 2000 led to the seizure of various products bearing
Caterpillar's Core Marks.
Caterpillar filed against Samson several criminal complaints for unfair competition in the Department of
Justice (DOJ), docketed as LS. Nos. 2000-13 54 to 2000-13 64, inclusive.
Additionally, on July 31, 2000, Caterpillar commenced a civil action against Samson and his business
entities, with the IPO as a nominal party10 - for Unfair Competition, Damages and Cancellation of
Trademark with Application for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction
- docketed as Civil Case No. Q-00-41446 of the RTC in Quezon City. In said civil action, the RTC denied
Caterpillar's application for the issuance of the TRO on August 17, 2000.
The DOJ, through Senior State Prosecutor Jude R. Romano, issued a joint resolution dated November 15,
200111 recommending that Samson be criminally charged with unfair competition under Section 168.3
(a),12 in relation to Section 123.l(e),13 Section 131.114 and Section 170,15 all of Republic Act No. 8293,
or the Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines (IP Code).
However, because Samson and his affiliate companies allegedly continued to sell and distribute products
clothed with the general appearance of its own products, Caterpillar again applied for another set of
search warrants against Samson and his businesses. The RTC, Branch 172, in Valenzuela City issued
Search Warrants Nos. 12-V-00,16 13-V-00,17 20-V-0018 and 29-V-0019 upon application of the NBI, by
virtue of the implementation of which several goods were seized and confiscated by the NBI agents.
As a consequence, Caterpillar filed 26 criminal complaints for unfair competition on January 31, 2001,
docketed as LS. Nos. 2001-42 to 2001-67, against Samson and/or the occupants of his affiliate entities
before the DOJ.20 In due course, the DOJ, through State Prosecutor Zenaida M. Lim, issued a joint
resolution dated September 28, 200121 recommending the filing of criminal complaints for unfair
competition under Section 168.3(a), in relation to Section 123 .1, Section 131.1 and Section 170 of the IP
Code. Accordingly, six criminal complaints were filed in the RTC, Branch 256, in Muntinlupa City, presided
by Judge Alberto L. Lerma, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 02-238 to 02-243.
Issue:
If there is a prejudicial question between the civil action in the IPO for unfair competition and the
criminal cases filed in the RTC.
Ruling:
No. Regarding the second issue, petitioner failed to substantiate his claim that there was a prejudicial
question. In his petition, he prayed for the reversal of the March 26, 2003 order which sustained the
denial of his motion to suspend arraignment and other proceedings in Criminal Case Nos. Q-02-10804344. For unknown reasons, however, he made no discussion in support of said prayer in his petition and
reply to comment. Neither did he attach a copy of the complaint in Civil Case No. Q-00-41446 nor quote
the pertinent portion thereof to prove the existence of a prejudicial question.
At any rate, there is no prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can, according to law,
proceed independently of each other. Under Rule 111, Section 3 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure, in the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the independent civil
action may be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and
shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
In the case at bar, the common element in the acts constituting unfair competition under Section 168 of
R.A. No. 8293 is fraud. Pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code, in cases of defamation, fraud, and
physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may
be brought by the injured party. Hence, Civil Case No. Q- 00-41446, which as admitted by private
respondent also relate to unfair competition, is an independent civil action under Article 33 of the Civil
Code. As such, it will not operate as a prejudicial question that will justify the suspension of the criminal
cases at bar.
(31) People vs. Romero, G.R. No. 112985, April 21, 1999 [Pardo, J.]
Issue: Whether the death of the accused extinguishes his/her civil liability.
Facts: Ernesto A. Ruiz was a radio commentator of Radio DXRB, Butuan City. In August,
1989, he came to know the business of Surigao San Andres Industrial Development Corporation
(SAIDECOR), when he interviewed Martin Romero, president and general manager, and Ernesto
Rodriguez, operations manager, regarding the corporation’s investment operations in Butuan
City and Agusan del Norte. SAIDECOR started its operation on August 24, 1989 as a marketing
business. Later, it engaged in soliciting funds and investments from the public. The corporation
guaranteed an 800% return on investment within fifteen (15) or twenty one (21) days. Investors
were given coupons containing the capital and the return on the capital collectible on the date
agreed upon. It stopped operations in September 1989.
Ruiz made an investment in SAIDECOR, after paying P150,000 to Rodriguez, he
received a postdated Butuan City Rural Bank check instead of the usual redeemable coupon. The
check indicated P1,000,200.00 as the amount in words, but the amount in figures was for
P1,200,000.00, as the return on the investment. Ruiz did not notice the discrepancy.
When the check was presented to the bank for payment on October 5, 1989, it was
dishonored for insufficiency of funds, as evidenced by the check return slip issued by the bank.
On October 25, 1989, Butuan City acting fiscal Ernesto M. Brocoy filed with the Regional Trial
Court, Butuan City, an Information against the two (2) accused for estafa and another
Information for violation of BP Blg 22, arising from the issuance of the same check. During the
pendency of the appeal, on November 12, 1997, Ernesto died.
Ruling: Yes, the death of the accused, prior to final judgment or pending appeal, extinguishes
his/her civil liability. Pursuant to the doctrine established in People vs. Bayotas, the death of the
accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil
liability ex delicto. The criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a
defendant to stand as the accused, the civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability
ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal case. Corollarily, the claim
for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of the accused, if the same may also be
predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Thus, the outcome of this appeal pertains
only to the remaining accused-appellant, Martin L. Romero.
32. Magistrado V. People, G.R. No. 148072
July 10, 2007 | Chico-Nazario, J.:
Facts: Private respondent Elena M. Librojo filed a criminal complaint for perjury against petitioner with the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City.
After the filing of petitioners counter-affidavit and the appended pleadings, the Office of the City Prosecutor
recommended the filing of an information for perjury against petitioner. Thus, Assistant City Prosecutor
Josephine Z. Fernandez filed an information for perjury against petitioner with the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC) of Quezon City.
Petitioner filed a motion for suspension of proceedings based on a prejudicial question of the civil case
pending which was filed by the Private Respondent. Petitioner alleged that the civil case must be resolved
first before Criminal Case No. 90721 may proceed since the issues in the said civil cases are similar or
intimately related to the issues raised in the criminal action. MeTC denied Motion for Lack of Merit.
Respondent appealed to the RTC and CA whom denied the motion respectively. Hence this case.
Issue/s: Whether there was a Prejudicial Question to suspend the hearing of the Criminal case of the
Petitioner.
Ruling: A prejudicial question is defined as that which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical
antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. The
prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before the court but the jurisdiction to try and resolve
the question must be lodged in another court or tribunal. It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate
from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused.
For a prejudicial question in a civil case to suspend criminal action, it must appear not only that said case
involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that
in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would
necessarily be determined.
Thus, for a civil action to be considered prejudicial to a criminal case as to cause the suspension of the
criminal proceedings until the final resolution of the civil case, the following requisites must be present: (1)
the civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based;
(2) in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused
would necessarily be determined; and (3) jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in another tribunal.
It is evident that the civil cases and the criminal case can proceed independently of each other. Regardless
of the outcome of the two civil cases, it will not establish the innocence or guilt of the petitioner in the criminal
case for perjury. The purchase by petitioner of the land or his execution of a real estate mortgage will have
no bearing whatsoever on whether petitioner knowingly and fraudulently executed a false affidavit of loss
of TCT No. N-173163.
Disposition: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Resolutions dated 5 March 2001 and 3
May 2001of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 63293 are hereby AFFIRMED and the instant petition
is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 43, is
hereby directed to proceed with the hearing and trial on the merits of Criminal Case No. 90721, and to
expedite proceedings therein, without prejudice to the right of the accused to due process. Costs against
petitioner.
33. PIMENTEL VS. PIMENTEL, G.R. No 172060 (SEPTEMBER 2010)
FACTS:
Maria Chrysantine Pimentel filed an action for frustrated parricide against Joselito R.
Pimentel before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
Petitioner received summons to appear before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch
72 (RTC Antipolo) for the pre-trial and trial of Civil Case No. 04-7392 (Maria Chrysantine Lorenza
L. Pimentel v. Joselito Pimentel) for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Section 36 of the
Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity.
On 11 February 2005, petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the proceedings before the RTC
Quezon City on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question. Petitioner asserted that since
the relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in parricide, the outcome of
Civil Case No. 04-7392 would have a bearing in the criminal case filed against him before the
RTC Quezon City.
The RTC Quezon City issued an Order dated 13 May 2005 holding that the pendency of the case
before the RTC Antipolo is not a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the criminal
case before it.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. The Court of Appeals ruled that in the criminal case
for frustrated parricide, the issue is whether the offender commenced the commission of the crime
of parricide directly by overt acts and did not perform all the acts of execution by reason of some
cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.
ISSUES:
The only issue in this case is whether the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is a
prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case for frustrated parricide
against petitioner.
RULING:
The petition has no merit. Clearly, the civil case for annulment was filed after the filing of
the criminal case for frustrated parricide. As such, the requirement of Section 7, Rule 111 of the
2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure was not met since the civil action was filed subsequent to the
filing of the criminal action.
The resolution of the civil action is not a prejudicial question that would warrant the
suspension of the criminal action. There is a prejudicial question when a civil action and a criminal
action are both pending, and there exists in the civil action an issue which must be preemptively
resolved before the criminal action may proceed because howsoever the issue raised in the civil
action is resolved would be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal
case.
The subsequent dissolution of their marriage will have no effect on the alleged crime that
was committed at the time of the subsistence of the marriage. In short, even if the marriage between
petitioner and respondent is annulled, petitioner could still be held criminally liable since at the
time of the commission of the alleged crime, he was still married to respondent.
Even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent is declared null and void, petitioner
could still be held liable since at the time of the alleged commission of the crime, he was still
married to respondent. A declaration of nullity of the marriage on the ground of psychological
incapacity is of no moment insofar as the State’s penal laws are concerned.
JM Dominguez Agronomic Company vs. Liclican
G.R. No. 208587, July 29, 2015
Facts:
During the annual stockholders meeting of petitioner JM Dominguez Agronomic Company, Inc.
(JMD) held on December 29, 2007 at the Baguio City Country Club, the election for its new set of
directors was conducted. This event was presided by then company president, and herein
respondent, Cecilia Liclican, and attended by her co-respondents Norma Isip and Purita
Rodriguez, and by petitioners Helen Dagdagan, Patrick Pacis, Kenneth Pacis, and Shirley
Dominguez as well. Conflict ensued when petitioners Patrick and Kenneth Pacis were allegedly
not allowed to vote on the ground that they are not registered stockholders of JMD. As pointed
out, it was their mother and grandmother, both deceased, who are the stockholders in JMD, and
that there is still no settlement of their respective estates to effectively transfer their shares in the
company
to
Patrick
and
Kenneth
Pacis.
Tensions rose and respondents, allegedly, walked out of the meeting. But since the remaining
stockholders with outstanding shares constituted a quorum, the election of officers still proceeded.
Subsequently, JMD, represented by petitioners Dagdagan and Patrick Pacis, executed an
Affidavit-Complaint dated December 15, 2008 charging respondents Liclican and Isip with
qualified theft. Petitioners alleged in the complaint, docketed as I.S. No. 3011 with the Office of
the City Prosecutor in Baguio City, that on January 2, 2008, Liclican and Isip, without any authority
whatsoever, conspired to withdraw the amount of P852,024.19 from the corporation’s savings
account with the Equitable-PCI Bank; and that the following day, they issued Check No.
C00024899018in the amount of P200,000, payable to cash, and to be drawn against JMD’s
account
with
Robinson’s
Savings
Bank.
In a separate complaint,docketed as I.S. No. 3118, the corporation claimed that respondents
Liclican and Isip likewise issued Equitable-PCI Bank Check No. 32095311 payable to one Atty.
Francisco Lava, Jr. for P200,000 to be debited from the corporation’s account.
Issue:
Whether there exists a prejudicial question that could affect the criminal proceedings for qualified
theft against respondents.
No. The resolution of the prejudicial question did not, in context, cure the grave abuse of discretion
already committed. The fact remains that when the RTC, Branch 7 issued its challenged Orders
on March 10, 2009, the Judgment in favor of petitioners was not yet rendered. Consequently,
there was still, at that time, a real dispute as to who the rightful set of officers were. Plainly, Judge
Tiongson-Tabora should not have issued the challenged Orders and should have, instead,
suspended the proceedings until Civil Case No. 6623-R was resolved with finality.
To grant the instant petition and rule that the procedural infirmity has subsequently been cured
either by the Judgment or by Judge Tiongson-Tabora’s inhibition would mean condoning the
continuation of the criminal proceedings despite, at that time, the existence of a prejudicial
question. Such condonation would create a precedent that renders inutile the doctrine on
prejudicial question, such that the court trying the criminal case will be permitted to proceed with
the trial in the aberrant assumption that the resolution of the prior instituted civil case would benefit
the private complainant in the criminal proceedings. Criminal Case Nos. 29175-R and 29176-R
may already proceed, and ought to be re-raffled to re-determine the existence of probable cause
for the issuance of warrants of arrest against respondents.
ROSA H. FENEQUITO, ET. AL, VS. BERNARDO VERGARA, JR.
G.R. No. 172829, July 18, 2012
Facts:
1. An information for falsification of public documents was filed with the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila by the Assistant City Prosecutor of
Manila against herein petitioners.
2. petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss the Case Based on Absence of Probable
Cause.3
3. The MeTC dismissed the criminal case filed by respondent Bernardo Vergara, Jr.
for falsification of public documents against petitioners Rosa H. Fenequito, et.
al., upon motion of the petitioners based on lack of probable cause.
4. With the express conformity of the public prosecutor, the respondents appealed
the dismissal to the RTC.
5. The RTC set aside the order of dismissal and remanded the case to the MeTC for
trial.
6. Petitioners questioned the order of the RTC by Petition for Review before the CA
which was dismissed for being improper because the order of the RTC is
interlocutory in nature and therefore not appealable.
7. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the CA denied it in its
Resolution, hence, the instant petition.
Issue:
Whether the decision of the RTC, being interlocutory, is final that can be appealed on
petition for review on certiorari under rule 45 before the CA.
Held:
No. The decision of the RTC, being interlocutory, is not final and this cannot be
appealed on petition for review on certiorari under rule 45 before the CA.
A final order is one that which disposes of the whole subject matter or terminates a
particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing to be done but to enforce by execution
what has been determined. Upon the other hand, an order is interlocutory if it does
not dispose of a case completely, but leaves something more to be done upon its
merits.
Section 1, Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure contemplates of an appeal from
a final decision or order of the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.
In the present case, the assailed Decision of the RTC set aside the Order of the MeTC
and directed the court a quo to proceed to trial by allowing the prosecution to present
its evidence. Hence, it is clear that the RTC Decision is interlocutory as it did not
dispose of the case completely, but left something more to be done on its merits.,
And since it is not a final decision, the CA cannot exercise its appellate jurisdiction
over the matter. Tested against the above criterion, the RTC Decision is beyond cavil
interlocutory in nature. It is essentially a denial of petitioners' motion to quash
because it leaves something more to be done which is the continuation of the criminal
proceedings until the guilt or innocence of the accused is determined.
Therefore, the decision of the RTC, being interlocutory, is not final and this cannot be
appealed on petition for review on certiorari under rule 45 before the CA.
Issue:
Whether respondent can appeal the dismissal made by the MeTC to the RTC.
Held:
Yes. The respondent can appeal the dismissal made by the METC to the RTC.
Petitioners' reliance on Presidential Decree No. 911 is misplaced, as the cited provision
refers only to cases where the assistant fiscal or state prosecutor's power to file
information or dismiss a case is predicated or conditioned upon the prior authority or
approval of the Provincial or city fiscal or the Chief State Prosecutor. There is nothing
in the said law, which provides that in cases of appeal, an Assistant City Prosecutor or
a State Prosecutor may file the same only upon prior authority or approval of the City
Prosecutor or the Chief State Prosecutor. In other words, unless otherwise ordered, an
Assistant City Prosecutor or a State Prosecutor may file an appeal with the RTC,
questioning the dismissal by the MeTC of a case for lack of probable cause, even without
prior authority or approval of the City Prosecutor or the Chief State Prosecutor.
Presidential Decree No. 911 refers only to cases where the assistant fiscal or state
prosecutor's power to file information or dismiss a case is predicated or conditioned
upon the prior authority or approval of the Provincial or city fiscal or the Chief State
Prosecutor. There is nothing in the said law, which provides that in cases of appeal, an
Assistant City Prosecutor or a State Prosecutor may file the same only upon prior
authority or approval of the City Prosecutor or the Chief State Prosecutor. In other
words, unless otherwise ordered, an Assistant City Prosecutor or a State Prosecutor may
file an appeal with the RTC, questioning the dismissal by the MeTC of a case for lack of
probable cause, even without prior authority or approval of the City Prosecutor or the
Chief State Prosecutor.
Since the appeal, in the instant case was made with the RTC of Manila, it is clear that
the City Prosecutor or his assistant (in this case, the Assistant City Prosecutor) had
authority to file the same.
Suffice it to say that the appeal filed with the RTC was made with the express conformity
of the public prosecutor who handles the case. It is wrong for petitioners to argue that
it is the OSG which has authority to file an appeal with the RTC. The Administrative
Code of 1987 mandates the OSG to represent “the Government in the Supreme Court
and the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings.” On the other hand, Section 11 of
Presidential Decree No. 1275, entitled “Reorganizing the Prosecution Staff of the
Department of Justice and the Offices of the Provincial and City Fiscals, Regionalizing
the Prosecution Service, and Creating the National Prosecution Service,” which was the
law in force at the time the appeal was filed, provides that the provincial or the city fiscal
(now referred to as prosecutor) “shall have charge of the prosecution of all crimes,
misdemeanors and violations of city or municipal ordinances in the courts of such
province or city and shall therein discharge all the duties incident to the institution of
criminal prosecutions.” In consonance with the above-quoted provision, it has been held
by this Court that the fiscal represents the People of the Philippines in the prosecution
of offenses before the trial courts at the metropolitan trial courts, municipal trial courts,
municipal circuit trial courts and the regional trial courts.
Remember:
1. The Administrative Code of 1987 mandates the OSG to represent “the
Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal
proceedings.”
2. The fiscal represents the People of the Philippines in the prosecution of offenses
before the trial courts at the metropolitan trial courts, municipal trial courts,
municipal circuit trial courts and the regional trial courts.
RULE 112 – PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION
A. Definition/Description
- when a matter of right
- distinguish from Preliminary Examination
Read: Fenequito vs. Vergara, Jr., 677 SCRA 113
Burgundy Realty Corporation vs. Reyes, 687 SCRA 524
B. Who may conduct P. I.
Read: Abanado vs. Bayona, 677 SCRA 595
Heirs of Nestor Tria vs. Obias, 635 SCRA 91
C. Procedure in Metro Manila vs. Outside Metro Manila
Read: Uy vs. Javellana, 680 SCRA 13
D. Inquest, what is
- when applied
- waiver of Art. 125 of RPC
Read: People vs. Valencia
E. Quantum of Evidence
- probable cause vs. prima facie
A. Definition/Description
Josue
FENEQUITO vs. VERGARA, JR.
G.R. No. 172829 July 18, 2012
Criminal Procedure; Office of the Solicitor General; Prosecutors; Administrative Code of 1987, mandates
the Office of the Solicitor General to represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of
Appeals in all criminal proceedings, whereas, Section 11 of Presidential Decree no. 1275 provides that
the provincial and city prosecutor shall have charge of the prosecution of all crimes, misdemeanours and
violations of city or municipal ordinances in courts of such province or city and shall therein discharge all
the duties incident to the institution of criminal prosecutions. – It is wrong for petitioners to argue that it is
the OSG which has the authority to file an appeal with the RTC. Section 35 (1), Chapter 12, Title III of
Book IV of Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, mandates the
OSG to represent the “Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal
proceedings.” On the other hand, Section 11 of Presidential Decree No. 1275, entitled “reorganizing the
Prosecution Staff of the Department of Justice and the Offices of the Provincial and City Fiscals,
Regionalizing the Prosecution Service, and Creating the National Prosecution Service,” which was the
law in force at the time the appeal was files, provides that the provincial or the city fiscal (now referred to
as prosecutor) “shall have charge of the prosecution of all crimes. Misdemeanours and violations of city
of municipal ordinances in the courts of such province or city and shall therein discharge all the
duties incident to the institution of criminal prosecution.”
54
Same; prosecutors; unless otherwise ordered, an Assistant City Prosecutor or a State Prosecutor may file
an appeal with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), questioning the dismissal by the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC) of a case for lack of probable cause, even without prior authority or approval of the City
Prosecutor or the Chief State Prosecutor. – Petitioners’ reliance on the Presidential Decree No. 911 is
misplaced, as the cited provision refers only to cases where the assistant fiscal or state prosecutor’s
power to file an information or dismiss a case is predicated or conditioned upon the prior authority or
approval of the provincial or city fiscal or the Chief State Prosecutor. There is nothing in the said law
which provides that in cases of appeal an Assistant City Prosecutor or a State Prosecutor may file the
same only upon prior authority or approval of the City Prosecutor or the Chief State Prosecutor. Stated
differently, unless otherwise ordered, an Assistant City Prosecutor or a State Prosecutor may file an
appeal with the RTC, questioning the dismissal by the MeTC of a case for lack of probable cause, even
without prior authority or approval of the City Prosecutor or the Chief State Prosecutor.
Facts
On February 11, 2004, an information for falsification of public documents was filed with the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila by the Assistant City Prosecutor of Manila (representing
Bernardo Vergara Jr.) against Rosa Fenequito, Corazon E. Hernandez, and Lauro H. Rodriquez. On April
23, 2004, Fenequito, et al. filed a Motion to Dismiss the Case Based on Absence of Probable Cause. The
MeTC issued an order granting the said motion. Upon appeal by the public prosecutor, however, the RTC
set aside the MeTC’s order and directed the latter to trial. Fenequito, et al, filed an appeal before the CA,
which subsequent ruled that the RTC’s assailed decision was interlocutory in nature and was therefore
not appealable. Hence, the instant petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Issue
Whether or not RTC’s decision was interlocutory and can be appealed.
Held
RTC’s decision was interlocutory in nature. As such, it cannot be appealed.
One of the grounds for the CA’s outright dismissal of Fenequito et al.’s petition for review was
because of the latter’s failure to submit copies of pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent to the
petition filed, as required under Section 2, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court.
It is settled rule that the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process; it is
merely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the
provisions of law. An appeal being a purely statutory right, an appealing party must strictly comply with
the requisites laid down in the Rules of Court. The rationale for this strict attitude is not difficult to
appreciate as the Rules are designed to facilities the orderly disposition of appealed cases.
But even if the Court bends its Rules to allow the present petition, the Court still finds no cogent
reason to depart from the assailed ruling of the CA. This is because Fenequito et al. erroneously
assumed that the RTC Decision is final and appealable, when in fact it is interlocutory. An order is
interlocutory if it does not dispose of a case completely, but leaves something more to be done
upon its merits. In contrast, a final order is one that which dispose of the whole subject matter or
terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing to be done but to enforce by
execution what has been determined.
Granted, the assailed Decision of the RTC set aside the Order of the MeTC and directed the
court a quo to proceed to trial by allowing the prosecution to present its evidence. Hence, it is clear that
the RTC Decision is interlocutory as it did not dispose of the case completely, but left something more to
be done on its merits.
55
Note: The doctrine promulgated in the case does not particularly relate to the topic indicated in
the outline, i.e., preliminary investigation distinguished from preliminary examination.
Probable Cause
Quiniquini
Burgundy Realty Corporation v.
Josefa “Jing” C. Reyes and SEC Raul Gonzalez of the DOJ
GR no: 181021 December 10, 2012
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Appeals; Decisions or resolutions of prosecutors are subject to
appeal to the Secretary of Justice who, under the Revised Administrative Code,exercise the power of
direct control and supervision over said prosecutors; and who may thus affirm, nullify, reverse or modify
their rulings. – It is not disputed that decisions or resolutions of prosecutors are subject to appeal to the
Secretary of Justice who, under the Revised Administrative Code, exercise the power of direct control
and supervision over said prosecutors; and who may thus affirm, nullify reverse or modify their rulings.
Review as an act of supervision and control by the justice secretary over the fiscals and prosecutors find
basis in the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies which holds that mistakes, abuses or
negligence committed in the initial steps of an administrative activity or by an administrative agency
should be corrected by higher administrative authorities, and not directly by courts.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Preliminary Investigation; A preliminary investigation constitutes
a realistic judicial appraisal of the merits of a case. – It must be remembered that the finding of probable
cause was made after conducting a preliminary investigation. A preliminary investigation constitutes a
realistic judicial appraisal of the merits of a case. Its purpose is to determine whether (a) a crime has been
committed; and (b) whether there is a probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof.
Same; same; same; In a preliminary investigation, the public prosecutor merely determines whether
there is probable cause or sufficient ground to engender a well founded belief that a crime has been
committed, and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial; A preliminary
investigation does not require a full and exhaustive presentation of the parties’ evidence. – This Court
need not overemphasize that in a preliminary investigation, the public prosecutor merely determines
whether there is probable cause or sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has
been committed, and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. It does not
call for the application of rules and standards of proof that a judgment of conviction requires after trial on
the merits. The complainant need not present at this stage proof beyond reasonable doubt. A preliminary
investigation does not require a full and exhaustive presentation of the parties’ evidence. Precisely, there
is a trial to allow the reception of evidence for both parties to substantiate their respective claims.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Probable cause; Words and Phrases; Probable cause has been
defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind,
acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime
for which he was prosecuted; A finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is
sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. – Probable cause has been defined as the existence of such
facts and circumstance as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the
knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was
prosecuted. Probable cause is a reasonable ground of presumption that a matter is or may be, well
founded on such state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as would lead a person of ordinary caution
and prudence to believe, or entertain an honest or strong suspicion, that a thing is so. The term does not
mean “actual or positive cause” nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on
56
opinion and reasonable belief. Thus, a finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into
whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the
act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charge.
Facts
Private respondent offered her services to petitioner as the latter’s real estate agent in buying
parcels of land in Laguna. She informed petitioner that more or less ten lot owners are her clients who
were willing to sell their properties. Convinced of her representations, petitioner released the amount of P
23,432,327.50 in her favor to buy those parcels of land. Instead, Reyes misappropriated the money given
by the petitioner to her personal use and benefit. Petitioner then sent formal demand to Reyes to return
the amount given. Reyes denied the fact that she had received such amount of money and
misappropriated it.
A Preliminary investigation was conducted against Reyes in Makati City. Thereafter, an
Information for the crime of Estafa was filed against Reyes in RTC Br.149 Makati City.
Undeterred, Reyes filed a petition for review before the DOJ but it was dismissed by the
Secretary of Justice (SOJ) through the State Prosecutor. Aggrieved, Reyes filed a motion for
reconsideration and the said motion was granted.
SOJ issued a resolution granting the petition of Reyes and ordering the City Prosec of Makati to
cause the withdrawal of the information for estafa.
Hence the petition.
Issue
Whether there is a probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof.
Held
Yes.
Preliminary investigation constitutes a realistic judicial appraisal of the merits of the case. In a
preliminary investigation, the public prosecutor merely determines whether there is a probable cause or
sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, and that the
respondent is probably guilty and should be held for trial.
In the case at bar, the investigating prosecutor was correct in finding the existence of all the
elements of the crime of estafa. Reyes did not dispute that she received in trust the amount of
P23,423,327.50 from petitioners as proven by the checks and vouchers to be used in purchasing the
parcels of land. Thus, the mere presumption of misappropriation or conversion is enough to conclude that
a probable cause exists for the indictment of Reyes for estafa. Finding probabe cause does not require an
inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that
the act of omission complained of constitutes the offense charged.
Therefore, the court ordered to proceed with the arraignment of Josefa “Jing” C. Reyes.
Lozada
CITY PROSECUTOR ARMANDO P ABANADO VS JUDGE ABRAHAM A BAYONA
677 SCRA 595
Criminal Procedure; Preliminary Investigation; The conduct of a preliminary investigation is
primarily an executive function. – The conduct of a preliminary investigation is primarily an executive
function. Thus, the courts must consider the rules of procedure of the Department of Justice in conducting
57
preliminary investigations whenever the actions of a public prosecutor is put in question. An examination
of 2008 Revised Manual for Prosecutors of the Department of Justice- National Prosecution Service
(DOJ-NPS Manual), therefore, is necessary.
Same; Same; The Department of Justice-National Prosecution Service(DOJ-NPS) Manual states
that
the
resolution
of
the
investigating
prosecutor should be attached to the information only “as far as practicable.” Thus, such
attachment is not mandatory or required under the rules. ―We find that there is nothing in the DOJNPS Manual requiring the removal of are solution by an investigating prosecutor recommending the dismissal
of a criminal complaint af t er it was r e ver s ed b y th e pr o v inc i al , c i t y or c h i ef
state prosecutor. Nonetheless, we also note that attaching such a resolution to aninformation filed in court
is optional under the aforementioned manual. The DOJ-NPS Manual states that the resolution of the
investigating prosecutor should be attached to the information only “as far as practicable.” Thus, such
attachment is not mandatory or required under the rules.
Administrative Law; Judges; Gross Ignorance of the Law; Not every judicial error is tantamount t
o ignorance of the law and if it was committed in good faith, the judge need not be subjected to
administrative sanction.
―Not every judicial error is tantamount to ignorance of the law and if it was committed in good faith, the
judge need not be subjected to administrative sanction. While complainant admitted thathe erred in
insisting on the production of the Jarder Resolution despite the provisions of the DOJNPS Manual, such error cannot be categorized asgross ignorance of the law as he did not appear to be
motivated by bad faith. Indeed, the rules of procedure in the prosecution office were not clear as to
whether or not an investigating prosecutor’s resolution of dismissal that had been reversed by the
city prosecutor should still form part of the records.
Same; Same; Gross Misconduct; Gross misconduct presupposes evidence of grave irregularity in
the performance of duty. ―Neither did respondent’s action amount to gross misconduct. Gross
misconduct presupposes evidence of grave irregularity in the performance of duty. In the case at bar,
respondent’s act of requiring complainant to explain why he should not be cited in contempt for his failure
to submit the Jarder Resolution in court was in accordance with established rules of procedure.
Furthermore,
complainant
did
not
abuse
his
contempt
power
as
he
did
not pursue the proceedings in view of the May 29, 2009 and June 15, 2009Gellada orders. Lastly, as
previously discussed, respondent issued those orders in good faith as he honestly believed that they
were necessary in the fair and just issuance of the warrant of arrest in Criminal Case No. 0903-16474.
Facts
This administrative complaint stemmed from Criminal Case entitled People of the Philippines vs
Cresencio Palo, Sr. which Information was filed by complainant before the Metropolitan Trial Court in
Cities of Bacolod City and was eventually raffled to Branch 7 presided by respondent judge. In connection
with the issuance of the warrant of arrest as regards the criminal complaint, respondent judge issued an
Order (April 13, 2009) ordering complainant to submit, among other records, a Memorandum of the
transfer of the case from designated Investigating Prosecutor to the City Prosecutor. Complainant,
however, explained on a letter that there was no Memorandum of transfer as complainant disapproved
the recommendation of dismissal by Assistant City Prosecutor Dennis S. Jarder, the investigating officer
for the Palo case, pursuant to Sec 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. Unsatisfied,
respondent issued another Order (May 5, 2009) requiring complainant to submit the Jarder resolution but
was answered by a letter from complainant that such Memorandum was no longer part of the records.
Moreover, attached to the letter was an explanation by Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito Zuno that
58
resolutions disapproved by City/Provincial Prosecutors were not released to the parties and/or to their
counsels. Respondent judge insisted that such resolution was necessary for evaluation of the issuance of
warrant of arrest and issued an Order (May 14, 2009) requiring complainant to explain why he should not
be cited for contempt. Complainant filed for an Inhibition and subsequently a petition for certiorari with a
prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order for respondent to restrain from proceeding with
the contempt hearing. The petition was granted and complainant moved to file administrative complaint
against respondent judge for gross ignorance of the law procedure, gross misconduct, and violation of
Court Circular No. 12 dated June 30, 1987.
Issue
Whether or not complainant erred in not submitting the Jarder resolution.
Held
The Court held on the negative. As held by Judge Gelleda, “when a city or provincial prosecutor reverses
the investigating assisting city or provincial prosecutor, the resolution finding probable cause replaces the
recommendation of the investigating prosecutor recommending the dismissal of the case. The result
would be that the resolution of dismissal no longer forms an integral part of the records of the case. It is
no longer required that the complaint or entire records of the case during the preliminary investigation be
submitted to and be examined by the judge.
The rationale behind this practice is that the rules do not intend to unduly burden trial judges by requiring
them to go over the complete records of the cases all the time for the purpose of determining probable
cause for the sole purpose of issuing a warrant of arrest against the accused. "What is required, rather, is
that the judge must have sufficient supporting documents (such as the complaint, affidavits, counteraffidavits, sworn statements of witnesses or transcripts of stenographic notes, if any) upon which to make
his independent judgment or, at the very least, upon which to verify the findings of the prosecutor as to
the existence of probable cause.”
Summary Procedure
Montilla
UY VS. JAVELLANA
680 SCRA 13 , September 05, 2012
Arrests; The court shall not order the arrest of the accused except for failure to appear whenever
required.―Judge Javellana’s issuance of a Warrant of Arrest for the accused in People v. Cornelio, is in
violation of Section 16 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, categorically stating that “[t]he court
shall not order the arrest of the accused except for failure to appear whenever required.” Judge Javellana
never claimed that the accused failed to appear at any hearing. His justification that the accused was
wanted
for
the
crime
of
attempted
homicide,
being tried in another case, Crim. Case No. 04-096, is totally unacceptable and further indicative of his
ignorance of law. People v. Cornelio, pending before Judge Javellana’s court as Crim. Case No. 04-097,
is for malicious mischief, and is distinct and separate from Crim. Case No. 04-096, which is for attempted
homicide, although both cases involved the same accused. Proceedings in one case, such as the
issuance of a warrant of arrest, should not be extended or made applicable to the other.
Same; Preliminary Investigation; Revised Rule on Summary Procedure; The Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure does not provide for a preliminary investigation prior to the filing of a criminal case under said
Rule.―The Revised Rule on Summary Procedure does not provide for a preliminary investigation prior to
the filing of a criminal case under said Rule. A criminal case within the scope of the Rule shall be
commenced in the following manner: SEC. 11. How commenced.―The filing of criminal cases falling
59
within the scope of this Rule shall be either by complaint or by information; Provided, however, That in
Metropolitan Manila and in Chartered Cities, such cases shall be commenced only by information, except
when the offense cannot be prosecuted de oficio. The complaint or information shall be accompanied by
the affidavits of the complainant and of his witnesses in such number of copies as there are accused plus
two (2) copies for the court’s files. If this requirement is not complied with within five (5) days from date of
filing, the case may be dismissed.
Same; Same; Section 1, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure only requires that a
preliminary investigation be conducted before the filing of a complaint or information for an offense where
the penalty prescribed by law is at least four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day without regard to
the fine.―Section 1, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure only requires that a preliminary
investigation be conducted before the filing of a complaint or information for an offense where the penalty
prescribed by law is at least four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day without regard to the fine. As
has been previously established herein, the maximum penalty imposable for malicious mischief in People
v. Lopez, et al. is just six (6) months.
Same; Revised Rule on Summary Procedure; The Revised Rule on Summary Procedure was precisely
adopted to promote a more expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases, and to enforce the
constitutional rights of litigants to the speedy disposition of cases.―Judge Javellana did not provide any
reason as to why he needed to conduct a preliminary investigation in People v. Lopez, et al. We stress
that the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure was precisely adopted to promote a more expeditious and
inexpensive determination of cases, and to enforce the constitutional rights of litigants to the speedy
disposition of cases. Judge Javellana cannot be allowed to arbitrarily conduct proceedings beyond those
specifically laid down by the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, thereby lengthening or delaying the
resolution of the case, and defeating the express purpose of said Rule.
FACTS
This administrative case arose from a verified complaint for "gross ignorance of the law and procedures,
gross incompetence, neglect of duty, conduct improper and unbecoming of a judge, grave misconduct
and others," filed by Public Attorneys Uy and Bascug of PAO against Presiding Judge Javellana of the
Municipal Trial Court, La Castellana, Negros Occidental.
Public Attorneys Uy and Bascug alleged the following in their complaint: Judge Javellana was grossly
ignorant of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. Public Attorneys Uy and Bascug cited several
occasions as examples: Judge Javellana issued a warrant of arrest after the filing of said case despite
Section 16 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure; did not grant the motion to dismiss for noncompliance with the Lupon requirement under Sections 18 and 19(a) of the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure, insisting that said motion was a prohibited pleading; refused to dismiss outright the complaint
even when the same was patently without basis or merit, as the affidavits of therein complainant and her
witnesses were all hearsay evidence; and did not apply the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure and,
instead, conducted a preliminary examination and preliminary investigation in accordance with the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, then set the case for arraignment and pre-trial, despite confirming
that therein complainant and her witnesses had no personal knowledge of the material facts alleged in
their affidavits, which should have been a ground for dismissal of said case.
Judge Javellana violated Section 6(b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and
issued warrants of arrest without propounding searching questions to the complainants and their
witnesses to determine the necessity of placing the accused under immediate custody. As a result, Judge
60
Javellana issued warrants of arrest even when the accused had already voluntarily surrendered or when
a warrantless arrest had been effected.
Judge Javellana failed to observe the constitutional rights of the accused as stated in Section
12(1), Article III of the Constitution. Judge Javellana set Crim. Case No. 03-097, entitled People v.
Bautista, for preliminary investigation even when the accused had no counsel, and proceeded with said
investigation without informing the accused of his rights to remain silent and to have a counsel Judge
Javellana stressed that the charges against him were baseless and malicious; and the acts being
complained of involved judicial discretion and, thus, judicial in nature and not the proper subject of an
administrative complaint.
Consequently, Judge Javellana sought the dismissal of the instant complaint against him. The
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), in its report, found Judge Javellana liable for gross ignorance of
the law or procedure when he did not apply the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure in cases
appropriately covered by said Rule.
ISSUE
Whether or not the conduct of preliminary investigation by Judge Javellana is not valid for not following
the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.
HELD
YES. The Revised Rule on Summary Procedure does not provide for a preliminary investigation prior to
the filing of a criminal case under said Rule. A criminal case within the scope of the Rule shall be
commenced in the following manner: SEC. 11. How commenced.―The filing of criminal cases falling
within the scope of this Rule shall be either by complaint or by information; Provided, however, That in
Metropolitan Manila and in Chartered Cities, such cases shall be commenced only by information, except
when the offense cannot be prosecuted de oficio. The complaint or information shall be accompanied by
the affidavits of the complainant and of his witnesses in such number of copies as there are accused plus
two (2) copies for the court’s files. If this requirement is not complied with within five (5) days from date of
filing, the case may be dismissed.
Also, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure only requires that a preliminary investigation
be conducted before the filing of a complaint or information for an offense where the penalty prescribed
by law is at least four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day without regard to the fine.
The Revised Rule on Summary Procedure was precisely adopted to promote a more expeditious and
inexpensive determination of cases, and to enforce the constitutional rights of litigants to the speedy
disposition of cases. Judge Javellana cannot be allowed to arbitrarily conduct proceedings beyond those
specifically laid down by the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, thereby lengthening or delaying the
resolution of the case, and defeating the express purpose of said Rule.
Preliminary Investigation; Warrantless Arrest
Romero
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALEJANDRO C. VALENCIA
G.R. Nos. 94511-13
Information; can be filed without a preliminary investigation against an accused arrested without
warrant. We held under this case that a person who is lawfully arrested without a warrant pursuant to
paragraph 1(b), section 5, rule 113, rules of court should be delivered to the nearest police station and
proceeded against in accordance with rule 112, section 7. Under said section 7, rule 112, the prosecuting
61
officer can file the information in court without a preliminary investigation, which was done in the accusedappellant’s case.
Preliminary investigation; deemed waived when not invoked. Since the records do not show whether
the accused-appellant asked for a preliminary investigation after the case had been filed in court, as in
fact, the accused-appellant signified his readiness to be arraigned, the court can only conclude that he
waived his right to have a preliminary investigation, when he did, in fact, pleaded "Not Guilty" upon his
arraignment.
Facts
The antecedent events based on the summary given by the Solicitor General are as follows; Arlyn
Barredo-Jimenez, her two children, Annabelle and Samuel, Jr., aged five and three, respectively, and her
mother, are residents of 2008 F. Muñoz St., Paco, Manila. At about 9:00 p.m. of March 19, 1989, as she
was about to eat supper, she noticed appellant standing five steps away from the open door of her house
and holding a sumpak, a homemade shotgun. Seized with fear, she closed the door. After a few
moments, she heard a burst of gunfire. This was followed by cries of pain from her children inside the
house. Seeing her children bloodied, she immediately went outside and shouted for help. As she did so,
she saw appellant running away, carrying the sumpak. Two neighbors assisted Jimenez in bringing the
injured children to the Philippine General Hospital. Patrolman Renato Marquez, a homicide investigator,
interviewed Jimenez at the hospital about the shooting incident. Since she was still experiencing shock
over the incident Jimenez forgot to mention the name of appellant as the one who shot her children
Acting on the report of a barangay tanod, Patrolmen Roberto Cajiles, Romeo de la Peña and
Carlos Castañeda, assigned at the Ong Detachment, Police Station No. 5, conducted an investigation of
the shooting incident in the house of Jimenez. At the time, Jimenez and her injured children were already
in the hospital. Nevertheless, Pat. Cajiles was able to interview the mother of Jimenez, the barangay
captain, a certain Josie, and appellant’s brother, Rolando, who all mentioned appellant as the gunwielder.
Moreover, the policemen discovered the presence of six pellet holes and one big hole with the size of the
circumference of a shotgun bullet on the door of the house of Jimenez. Three pellets were also found at
the crime scene.
Early next morning, the three policemen were led by Rolando Valencia to the residence of Sonia
Castillo, his aunt, where he believed appellant was sleeping. The police apprehended appellant there and
took him to the Ong Detachment for initial investigation . He was indorsed to the police headquarters for
further investigation in the evening of March 22, 1989.
When arraigned, the accused-appellant pleaded "Not Guilty." Trial then proceeded resulting in
accused-appellant’s conviction as above stated.
On appeal, Accused-appellant raised as one of the errors of the trial court: B. In finding that the
prosecution was able to prove the guilt of the defendant-appellant beyond reasonable doubt in spite of the
fact that there was allegedly no preliminary investigation, and that no sufficient evidence exists proving
his guilt.
Issues
1. Whether or not a prosecuting officer may immediately file an information in court when an accused was
lawfully arrested without a warrant, even in the absence of a preliminary investigation.
2. Whether or not the accused-apellant, Alejandro Valencia, who did not invoked a preliminary
investigation after the case had been filed in court, may be deemed waiving his right to a preliminary
investigation, and thus be tried and validly convicted even in the absence of such.
62
Held
1. The court rules in the Affirmative.
In the case at bar, what happened was that the accused was lawfully arrested, without a warrant
pursuant to paragraph 1(b), Section 5, Rule 113, Rules of Court 23 should be delivered to the nearest
police station and proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7. Under said Section 7, Rule
112, the prosecuting officer can file the Information in court without a preliminary investigation.
2. The court rules in the Affirmative
Since the records do not show whether the accused-appellant asked for a preliminary
investigation after the case had been filed in court, as in fact, the accused-appellant signified his
readiness to be arraigned, the Court can only conclude that he waived his right to have a preliminary
investigation, when he did, in fact, pleaded "Not Guilty" upon his arraignment. Ponga was convicted
because all the circumstances pointed to no other person but him — Ponga — as the sumpak-wielder
Arlyn Barredo-Jimenez testified that while they were taking their supper that night of March 19, 1989, she
happened to glance through the open door of their hut and she saw the accused, outside, standing a few
meters away, holding a homemade shotgun (sumpak). Lest she may get embroiled in any untoward
incident, she hurriedly went to close the door. She recognized that person standing outside due to the
light in front of their house and the fluorescent lamp at the back of their neighbor’s house, thus
illuminating the place where the person was standing. Soon after she closed the door, there was a gun
blast and then she heard the moanings and cries of pain of her two children, Annabelle and Samuel, Jr.
When she looked at them, she saw them bloodied and writhing in pain. Immediately, she opened the door
of their hovel to ask for help. Once she opened the door, she saw the accused, Alejandro Valencia,
running away and carrying with his right hand the homemade shotgun.
In addition, the telltale bullet marks of the door proved without doubt that they were produced by a
shotgun bullet and pellets thereof. Pat. Renato Marquez testified that he saw those bullet and pellet holes
at the door when he went to investigate the place after he received a report of the incident from Pat.
Ramon Cajiles of the Ong Detachment. From his investigation, only one suspect has been consistently
mentioned and that is accused Alejandro Valencia who is identified by those he investigated as Ponga.
All these circumstances are found by the Court to be consistent with each other, consistent with
the hypothesis that the accused, Alejandro Valencia, is guilty thereof, and at the same time inconsistent
with any other hypothesis except that of his guilt. They constitute an unbroken chain which leads to a fair
and reasonable conclusion pointing to the defendant, Alejandro Valencia, to the exclusion of all others, as
the author or the two crimes, a chain of natural and rational circumstances corroborating each other and
they certainly cannot be overcome by the very inconcrete and doubtful evidence submitted by him
(Erlanger and Galinger, Inc. v. Exconde, L-4792 and L-4795, September 20, 1953) as will be pointed out
later. Then, too, the facts that no less than the accused’s brother, Ramon Valencia, brought the
policeman to their aunt’s house to arrest the herein accused is another circumstance to show that,
indeed, herein accused is guilty thereof.
The decision of the trial court is AFFIRMED
63
Probable Cause
Naca
PCGG v. NAVARRO-GUTIERREZ
GR No. 194159 21 October 2015
Same; Same; Probable Cause; It must be emphasized that in determining the elements of the
crime charged for purposes of arriving at a finding of probable cause, only facts sufficient to
support a prima facie case against the respondents are required, not absolute certainty.
In this regard, it must be emphasized that in determining the elements of the crime charged for purposes
of arriving at a finding of probable cause, only facts sufficient to support a prima facie case against the
respondents are required, not absolute certainty. Probable cause implies mere probability of guilt, i.e., a
finding based on more than bare suspicion, but less than evidence that would justify a conviction. To
reiterate, the validity of the merits of a party’s defense or accusations and the admissibility of testimonies
and evidences are better ventilated during the trial stage than in the preliminary stage. In sum, the Court
is convinced that there is probable cause to indict individual respondents of violating Sections 3(e) and (g)
of RA 3019. Hence, the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in dismissing the criminal complaint against them.
Ombudsman; Doctrine of Non-Interference; The Supreme Court (SC) has consistently refrained
from interfering with the discretion of the Ombudsman to determine the existence of probable
cause and to decide — whether or not an Information should be filed. Nonetheless, the Court is
not precluded from reviewing the Ombudsman’s action when there is a charge of grave abuse of
discretion.
At the outset, it must be stressed that the Court has consistently refrained from interfering with the
discretion of the Ombudsman to determine the existence of probable cause and to decide whether or not
an Information should be filed. Nonetheless, the Court is not precluded from reviewing the Ombudsman’s
action when there is a charge of grave abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious
and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. The Ombudsman’s exercise of
power must have been done in an arbitrary or despotic manner which must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Preliminary Investigation; Probable Cause; The conduct of
preliminary investigation proceedings whether by the Ombudsman or by a public prosecutor — is
geared only to determine whether or not probable cause exists to hold an accused-respondent for
trial for the supposed crime that he committed.
In this regard, it is worthy to note that the conduct of preliminary investigation proceedings — whether by
the Ombudsman or by a public prosecutor — is geared only to determine whether or not probable cause
exists to hold an accused-respondent for trial for the supposed crime that he committed. In Fenequito v.
Vergara, Jr., 677 SCRA 113 (2012), the Court defined probable cause and the parameters in finding the
existence thereof in the following manner, to wit: Probable cause, for the purpose of filing a criminal
information, has been defined as such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a
crime has been committed and that respondent is probably guilty thereof. The term does not mean “actual
or positive cause” nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable
belief. Probable cause does not require an inquiry whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a
conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense
charged. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a
64
crime has been committed by the suspects. It need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of
guilt, not on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and definitely not on evidence
establishing absolute certainty of guilt. In determining probable cause, the average man weighs facts and
circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of the rules of evidence of which he has no technical
knowledge. He relies on common sense. What is determined is whether there is sufficient ground to
engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, and that the accused is probably guilty
thereof and should be held for trial. It does not require an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient evidence
to secure a conviction.
Same; Same; Same; Preliminary investigation is merely an inquisitorial mode of discovering
whether or not there is reasonable basis to believe that a crime has been committed and that the
person charged should be held responsible for it. Being merely based on opinion and belief, a
finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient evidence to
secure a conviction.
Verily, Preliminary investigation is merely an inquisitorial mode of discovering whether or not there is
reasonable basis to believe that a crime has been committed and that the person charged should be held
responsible for it. Being merely based on opinion and belief, a finding of probable cause does not require
an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient evidence to secure a conviction. “[A preliminary investigation] is
not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of [the prosecution’s] evidence. The presence and
absence of the elements of the crime is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense that may be
passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits.” Hence, “the validity and merits of a party’s defense or
accusation, as well as the admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are better ventilated during trial
proper than at the preliminary investigation level.”
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Preliminary Investigation; Hearsay Evidence Rule; In the
recent case of Estrada v. Ombudsman, 748 SCRA 1 (2005), the Supreme Court (SC) declared that
hearsay evidence is admissible in determining probable cause in preliminary investigations
because such investigation is merely preliminary, and does not finally adjudicate rights and
obligations of parties.
It was error for the Ombudsman to simply discredit the TWG’s findings contained in the Executive
Summary which were adopted by the Ad Hoc Committee for being hearsay, self-serving, and of little
probative value. It is noteworthy to point out that owing to the initiatory nature of preliminary
investigations, the technical rules of evidence should not be applied in the course of its proceedings. In
the recent case of Estrada v. Ombudsman, 748 SCRA 1 (2015), the Court declared that hearsay
evidence is admissible in determining probable cause in preliminary investigations because such
investigation is merely preliminary, and does not finally adjudicate rights and obligations of parties. Citing
a case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States, it was held that probable cause can be
established with hearsay evidence, as long as there is substantial basis for crediting the hearsay.
Facts
On 8 October 1993, then President Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 14 creating the
Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-finding Committee on Behest Loans. The same was created to identify the
behest loans entered into by the past administrations. Subsequently, Memorandum No. 619 was issued.
It laid down the criteria to aid the said ad hoc committee in the determination of whether or not a loan is
behest in character.
65
The ad hoc committee and the technical working group then examined documents evidencing
loans granted to different institutions during the administration of former President Marcos. Among those
was a series of loans granted by the Developmental Bank of the Philippines (DBP) to the National
Galleon Shipping Corporation.
In total, the value of Galleon's obligations to DBP amounted to Php 2,039,284,390.85 while the
value of its collaterals was merely Php 539,000,000. The ad hoc committee concluded that the loans
obtained by Galleon from DBP possessed positive characteristics of behest loans, considering that: (a)
Galleon was undercapitalized; (b) the loan was undercollateralized; (c) the major stockholders of Galleon
were known to be Marcos cronies; and (d) certain documents pertaining to the loans were found to bear
marginal notes of the former President Marcos.
The PCGG then filed a criminal complaint before the Ombudsman against the individual
respondents. The respondents contended that the action was already barred by prescription for more
than 20 years has passed. Moreover, Roque also averred that he was not a crony of the President
Marcos.
The Ombudsman dismissed the criminal complaint filed by the PCGG. It held that the complaint
lacked probable cause as the executive summaries and technical reports were consisted mostly of
hearsay and of little probative value.
Issue
Whether or not the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in finding that there was no
probable cause for the complaint filed by the PCGG against the respondents.
Held
Yes. Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion. The petition of PCGG has merit.
The conduct of preliminary investigation proceedings is geared to determine whether or not
probable cause exists to hold an accused-respondent for trial for the supposed crime that he committed.
In this light, probable cause is defined as such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief
that a crime has been committed and that respondent is probably guilty of the same. It is merely based on
opinion and reasonable belief. It does not import absolute certainty.
A finding of probably cause needs only to rest on evidence that a crime has been committed by
the suspects. It does not need to be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. It does not require an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient evidence to secure a conviction.
Hence, the determination of probable cause can rest partially, or even entirely, on hearsay as long as the
person making the hearsay statement is credible and there is substantial basis for the same.
Hearsay evidence is admissible in determining probable cause in a preliminary investigation
because such is merely preliminary and does not finally adjudicate rights and obligations of the parties.
The ad hoc committee, as contained by the narration of facts in their reports, found that the loans
or accommodations extended by the DBP to Galleon were behest in nature. There was substantial basis
to credit the findings as such were based on official documents prepared by the DBP itself. It was
Ombudsman's error to discredit the findings in the executive summary for being hearsay and of little
probative value.
66
Purpose of Preliminary Investigation
Parulan
DE LIMA vs. REYES
G.R. No. 209330 January 11, 2016
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Preliminary Investigation; In a preliminary investigation, the
prosecutor does not determine the guilt or innocence of an accused.—In a preliminary investigation, the
prosecutor does not determine the guilt or innocence of an accused. The prosecutor only determines
“whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed
and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.” As such, the prosecutor does
not perform quasi-judicial functions.
Facts
This Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the of the Court of Appeals, which rendered null and void
Department of Justice Order No. 710 issued by the Secretary of Justice. The said DO created a second
panel of prosecutors to conduct a reinvestigation of a murder case in view of the first panel of
prosecutors’ failure to admit the complainant’s additional evidence.
Dr. Gerardo Ortega was shot dead in Puerto Princesa City, Palawan. After a brief chase with
police officers, Marlon B. Recamata was arrested. He made an extrajudicial confession admitting that he
shot Dr. Ortega. He executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay before the Counter Terrorism Division of the NBI
where he alleged that it was former Palawan Governor Mario Joel T. Reyes who ordered the killing of Dr.
Ortega.
Sec of Justice De Lima issued Department Order No. 091 creating a special panel of prosecutors
(First Panel) to conduct preliminary investigation.
The First Panel concluded its preliminary investigation and issued a resolution dismissing the
Affidavit-Complaint. Dr. Inocencio-Ortega filed a Motion to Re-Open Preliminary Investigation, which,
sought the admission of mobile phone communications between former Governor Reyes and Edrad.
While the Motion to Re-Open was still pending, Dr. Inocencio-Ortega filed a Motion for Partial
Reconsideration Ad Cautelam of the Resolution. Both Motions were denied by the First Panel.
The Secretary of Justice issued Department Order No. 710 creating a new panel of investigators
(Second Panel) to conduct a reinvestigation of the case to address the offer of additional evidence denied
by the First Panel.
The Second Panel issued a Subpoena requiring Reyes to appear before them and to submit his
counter-affidavit and supporting evidence. Former Governor Reyes filed before the Court of Appeals a
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary
Restraining Order assailing the creation of the Second Panel.
The Second Panel issued the Resolution finding probable cause and recommending the filing of
informations on all accused. Branch 52 of the Regional Trial Court of Palawan subsequently issued
warrants of arrest.
Reyes filed before the Secretary of Justice a Petition for Review Ad Cautelam assailing the
Second Panel’s Resolution. He also filed before the Court of Appeals a Supplemental Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or TRO impleading Regional
Trial Court of Palawan.
Reyes argued that the RTC could not enforce the Second Panel’s Resolution and proceed with
the prosecution of his case since this Resolution was void. The CA in a decision declared DO 710 as null
67
and void and reinstated the First Panel’s Resolutions. According to the CA, the Sec of Justice committed
grave abuse of discretion, that she should have modified or reversed the Resolutions of the First Panel
pursuant to the 2000 NPS Rule on Appeal instead creating the Second Panel.
The Secretary of Justice, the Second Panel, and Dr. Inocencio-Ortega filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the Decision of CA but, however, was denied. It stated that the Secretary of Justice
had not shown the alleged miscarriage of justice sought to be prevented by the creation of the Second
Panel since both parties were given full opportunity to present their evidence before the First Panel.
The Secretary of Justice and the Second Panel filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.
Petitioners argue that the Sec of that under Republic Act No. 10071 and the 2000 NPS Rule on
Appeal, the Secretary of Justice has the power to create a new panel of prosecutors to reinvestigate a
case to prevent a miscarriage of justice.
Petitioners’ position was that the First Panel “appear[ed] to have ignored the rules of preliminary
investigation” when it refused to receive additional evidence that would have been crucial for the
determination of the existence of probable cause
Petitioners argue that since the Information had been filed, the disposition of the case was already within
the discretion of the trial court Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Secretary of Justice had
no authority to order motu propio the reinvestigation of the case since Dr. Inocencio-Ortega was able to
submit her alleged new evidence to the First Panel when she filed her Motion for Partial Reconsideration.
Respondent argues that the Second Panel’s Resolution dated March 12, 2012 was void since the Panel
was created by a department order that was beyond the Secretary of Justice’s authority to issue. He
further argues that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case since the Information filed by
the Second Panel was void.
Issues
1. Whether or not Secretary of Justice is authorized to create motu propio another panel of
prosecutors in order to conduct a reinvestigation of the case
2. Whether or not his Petition for Certiorari has already been rendered moot by the filing of the
information in court
Held
1. YES. The 2000 NPS Rule on Appeal requires the filing of a petition for review before the
Secretary of Justice can reverse, affirm, or modify the appealed resolution of the provincial or city
prosecutor or chief state prosecutor. The Secretary of Justice may also order the conduct of a
reinvestigation in order to resolve the petition for review. Under Section 11: SECTION 11.
Reinvestigation.—If the Secretary of Justice finds it necessary to reinvestigate the case, the
reinvestigation shall be held by the investigating prosecutor, unless, for compelling reasons,
another prosecutor is designated to conduct the same. Under Rule 112, Section 4 of the Rules of
Court, however, the Secretary of Justice may motu propio reverse or modify resolutions of the
provincial or city prosecutor or the chief state prosecutor even without a pending petition for
review.
The Secretary of Justice exercises control and supervision over prosecutors and it is within her
authority to affirm, nullify, reverse, or modify the resolutions of her prosecutors.
2. YES. A preliminary investigation is “merely inquisitorial,” and is only conducted to aid the
prosecutor in preparing the information. It serves a twofold urpose: first, to protect the innocent
68
against wrongful prosecutions; and second, to pare the state from using its funds and resources
in useless prosecutions. In Salonga v. Cruz Paño:
The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to secure the innocent against hasty, malicious and
oppressive prosecution, and to protect him from an open and public accusation of crime, from the
trouble, expense and anxiety of a public trial, and also to protect the state from useless and
expensive trials.
Moreover, a preliminary investigation is merely preparatory to a trial. It is not a trial on the merits.
An accused’s right to a preliminary investigation is merely statutory; it is not a right guaranteed by
the Constitution. Hence, any alleged irregularity in an investigation’s conduct does not render the
information void nor impair its validity.
Once the information is filed in court, the court acquires jurisdiction of the case and any motion to
dismiss the case or to determine the accused’s guilt or innocence rests within the sound
discretion of the court.
Here, the trial court has already determined, independently of any finding or recommendation by
the First Panel or the Second Panel, that probable cause exists for the issuance of the warrant of
arrest against respondent. Probable cause has been judicially determined. Jurisdiction over the
case, therefore, has transferred to the trial court. A petition for certiorari questioning the validity of
the preliminary investigation in any other venue had been rendered moot by the issuance of the
warrant of arrest and the conduct of arraignment.
The Court of Appeals should have dismissed the Petition for Certiorari filed before them when the
trial court issued its warrant of arrest. Since the trial court has already acquired jurisdiction over
the case and the existence of probable cause has been judicially determined, a petition for
certiorari questioning the conduct of the preliminary investigation ceases to be the “plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy” provided by law. Since this Petition for Review is an appeal from a moot
Petition for Certiorari, it must also be rendered moot.
69
HEIRS OF NESTOR TRIA V. OBIAS, 635 SCRA 91
FACTS:
On May 22, 1998, at around 10:00 o’clock in the morning at the Pili Airport in Camarines Sur,
Engr. Nestor Tria, Regional Director of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH),
Region V and concurrently Officer-In-Charge of the 2nd Engineering District of Camarines Sur,
was shot by a gunman while waiting to board his flight to Manila. He was brought to a hospital but
died the following day from the lone gunshot wound on his nape. Subsequently, the incident was
investigated by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
During the preliminary investigation, respondent filed her Counter-Affidavit denying that she was in
anyway involved with the killing of Engr. Tria, and further asserted that from the totality of evidence
gathered by the NBI, it has not established prima facie the existence of conspiracy as to implicate
her in the death of Engr. Tria.
The Prosecutor issued a resolution directing the filing of an information for murder against Aclan
and Ona but dismissed the case for insufficiency of evidence as against Obias. Petitioners
appealed to the DOJ, assailing the Prosecutor’s order to dismiss the charge against Obias. As
such, Justice Secretary Cuevas issued a Resolution directing the Prosecutor to include Obias in
the information. The DOJ was convinced that the sequence of events and respondent’s conduct
before, during and after the killing of Engr. Tria undeniably points to her complicity with Aclan and
Ona.further, Respondent filed a Notice of Appeal with the DOJ under the provisions of
Administrative Order No. 18, series of 1987. However this was denied.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the denial of her notice of appeal. However, the
DOJ denied respondent’s motion for reconsideration stating that the proper procedure is the filing
of an appeal or petition for review with the OP and not before the DOJ. Hence, the case was
considered closed and terminated.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion in affirming the OP’s dismissal of the murder
charge.
RULING:
No, the justice secretary is not precluded from exercising his power of review over the
investigating prosecutor even after the information has already been filed in court. However, the
justice secretary’s subsequent resolution withdrawing the information or dismissing the case does
not cause the court to lose jurisdiction over the case. In fact, the court is duty-bound to exercise
judicial discretion and its own independent judgment in assessing the merits of the resulting
motion to dismiss filed by the prosecution, to wit:
When confronted with a motion to withdraw an information on the ground of lack of probable cause
based on a resolution of the secretary of justice, the bounded duty of the trial court is to make an
independent assessment of the merits of such motion. Having acquired jurisdiction over the case,
the trial court is not bound by such resolution but is required to evaluate it before proceeding
further with the trial. While the secretary’s ruling is persuasive, it is not binding on courts. A trial
court, however, commits reversible error or even grave abuse of discretion if it refuses/neglects to
evaluate such recommendation and simply insists on proceeding with the trial on the mere pretext
of having already acquired jurisdiction over the criminal action.
Further, it is well within the court’s sound discretion to suspend arraignment to await the result of
the justice secretary’s review of the correctness of the filing of the criminal information.
George Antiquera y Codes vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 180661. December 11,
2013
Doctrine: If an arrest is proven to be illegal, the search and seizure that resulted from it was
likewise illegal. Consequently, the various drug paraphernalia that the police officers allegedly
found in the house and seized are inadmissible, having proceeded from an invalid search and
seizure. Since the confiscated drug paraphernalia is the very corpus delicti of the crime
charged, the Court has no choice but to acquit the accused.
Furthermore, the failure of the accused to object to the irregularity of his arrest by itself is not
enough to sustain his conviction. A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not carry with it
a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during the illegal warrantless arrest.
Facts:
George Codes Antiquera and Corazon Olivenza Cruz were charged with illegal
possession of paraphernalia for dangerous drug.
According to the prosecution, some policemen, and two civilian operatives on board a
patrol car and a tricycle were conducting a police visibility patrol, when they saw two unidentified
men rush out of house number 107-C and immediately boarded a jeep.
Suspecting that a crime had been committed, the police officers approached the house
from where the men came and peeked through the partially opened door. They saw accused
Antiquera holding an improvised tooter and a pink lighter. Beside him was his live-in partner,
Cruz, who was holding an aluminum foil and an improvised burner. They sat facing each other
at the living room. This prompted the police officers to enter the house, introduce themselves,
and arrest Antiquera and Cruz.
While inspecting the immediate surroundings, PO1 Cabutihan saw a wooden jewelry box
atop a table. It contained an improvised burner, wok, scissors, small transparent plastic sachets
with traces of white crystalline substance, improvised scoop, and seven unused strips of
aluminum foil. The police officers confiscated all these and brought Antiquera and Cruz to the
Drug Enforcement Unit of the Philippine National Police in Pasay City for further investigation
and testing
Issues:
1. Whether or not there was valid warrantless arrest?
2. Whether or not the accused had waived their right to question the irregularity of the arrest
since he voluntarily submitted himself to the court's jurisdiction by entering a plea of not guilty?
Ruling :
1. No. Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a "peace
officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the
person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense." This is an arrest in flagrante delicto.” The overt act constituting the crime MUST be
done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.
The circumstances in the present case do not make out a case of arrest made in in
flagrante delicto.
FIRST, the police officers claim that they were alerted when they saw two unidentified
men suddenly rush out of 107 David Street, Pasay City. Since they suspected that a crime had
been committed, the natural thing for them to do was to give chase to the jeep that the two
fleeing men boarded, given that the officers were in a patrol car and a tricycle. Running after the
fleeing suspects was the more urgent task but the officers instead gave priority to the house
even when they heard no cry for help from it.
SECOND, admittedly, the police officers did not notice anything amiss going on in the
house from the street where they stood. Indeed, even as they peeked through its partially
opened door, they saw no activity that warranted their entering it. One of the police officers
testified that the door was only opened about 4-6 inches and they still have to push the door
wide open to actually see its interior and peep through its opening because they did not know
what was happening inside.
Clearly, no crime was plainly exposed to the view of the arresting officers that authorized
the arrest of accused Antiquera without warrant under the above- mentioned rule. Considering
that his arrest was illegal, the search and seizure that resulted from it was likewise illegal.
Consequently, the various drug paraphernalia that the police officers allegedly found in
the house and seized are inadmissible, having proceeded from an invalid search and seizure.
Since the confiscated drug paraphernalia is the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, the
Court has no choice but to acquit the accused.
2. NO. The failure of the accused to object to the irregularity of his arrest by itself is not
enough to sustain his conviction. A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not carry with it a
waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during the illegal warrantless arrest.
Sanchez v. Demetriou, 227 SCRA
G.R. No. Nos. 111771-77 November 9, 1993
Doctrine: “The rule is that if the accused objects to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, he
may move to quash the information, but only on that ground. If, as in this case, the accused raises
other grounds in the motion to quash, he is deemed to have waived that objection and to have
submitted his person to the jurisdiction of that court.”
FACTS: Seven Informations of Rape with Homicide were filed against Mayor Antonio L. Sanchez of
Calauan Laguna and six other persons in connection with the rape-slay of Mary Eileen Sarmenta
and the killing of Allan Gomez.
Acting on the request of the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission, the panel of State Prosecutors of
the Department of Justice conducted a preliminary investigation. Sanchez was not present but he
was represented by Atty. Brion. An “invitation” issued by PNP Commander Rex Piad was also served
on Sanchez and he was immediately taken to Camp Vicente Lim. Sanchez was placed on “arrest
status” upon the positive identification by Centeno and SPO3 Malabanan that Sanchez was the
principal in the rape-slay case. The respondent prosecutors conducted an inquest upon Sanchez’
arrival, with Atty. Panelo as his counsel. After the hearing, a warrant of arrest was served on Sanchez
in connection with a criminal case for violation of RA 6713. The Information for Rape with Homicide
were filed in RTC Laguna and warrants of arrest were issued against all of the accused. The venue
of the case was then transferred to Pasig, Metro Manila upon the expressed apprehension of the
Secretary of Justice.
Sanchez filed a Motion to Quash on the following grounds: 1) he was denied the right to present
evidence at the preliminary investigation; 2) only the Ombudsman had the competence to conduct
the investigation; 3) his warrantless arrest is illegal and the court has therefore not acquired
jurisdiction over him, 4) he is being charged with seven homicides arising from the death of only two
persons; 5) the informations are discriminatory because they do not include Teofilo Alqueza and
Edgardo Lavadia; and 6) as a public officer, he can be tried for the offense only by the
Sandiganbayan.
The Motion to Quash was denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: If the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case.
HELD: NO. The crime of rape with homicide does not fall under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
as it obviously does not fall under paragraph (1), which deals with graft and corruption cases. Neither
is it covered by paragraph (2) because it is not an offense committed in relation to the office of the
petitioner. There is no direct relation between the commission of the crime of rape with homicide and
the petitioner's office as municipal mayor because public office is not an essential element of the
crime charged. The offense can stand independently of the office. Moreover, it is not even alleged
in the information that the commission of the crime charged was intimately connected with the
performance of the petitioner's official functions to make it fall under the exception laid down in
People v. Montejo. In that case, a city mayor and several detectives were charged with murder for
the death of a suspect as a result of a "third degree" investigation held at a police substation.The
Court held that, although public office is not an element of the crime of murder in abstract, the offense
therein charged is intimately connected with their respective offices and was perpetrated while they
were in the performance, though improper or irregular, of their official functions. Indeed they had no
personal motive to commit the crime and they would not have committed it had they not held their
aforesaid offices.