1. Trenas v. People, 664 SCRA 355 RTC MAKATI HAS NO JURISDICTION FACTS: • • • • Margarita wanted to buy a house-and-lot. It was then mortgaged with Maybank. The bank manager recommended the appellant Hector to private complainant Elizabeth, who was an employee and niece of Margarita, for advice regarding the expenses for the transfer of the title in the latter’s name. Thereafter, Elizabeth gave P150,000 to Hector who issued a corresponding receipt and prepared a Deed of Sale with Assumption of Mortgage. Hector gave Elizabeth receipts however, when she consulted with the BIR, she was informed that the receipts were fake. o Hector admitted to her that the receipts were fake and that he used the P120,000.00 for his other transactions. To settle his accounts, appellant Hector issued in favor of Elizabeth a check but the same was dishonored for the reason that the account was closed. Petitioner asserts that the prosecution witness failed to allege that any of the acts material to the crime of estafa had occurred in Makati City. Thus, the trial court failed to acquire jurisdiction over the case. ISSUE: Whether or not the court has jurisdiction. NO RULING: • • • • • The overarching consideration in this case is the principle that, in criminal cases, venue is jurisdictional. A court cannot exercise jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense committed outside its limited territory. In a criminal case, the prosecution must not only prove that the offense was committed, it must also prove the identity of the accused and the fact that the offense was committed within the jurisdiction of the court. In this case, the prosecution failed to show that the offense of estafa under Section 1, paragraph (b) of Article 315 of the RPC was committed within the jurisdiction of the RTC of Makati City. There is nothing in the documentary evidence offered by the prosecution that points to where the offense, or any of its elements, was committed. Jurisdiction over the subject matter in a criminal case cannot be conferred upon the court by the accused, by express waiver or otherwise. That jurisdiction is conferred by the sovereign authority that organized the court and is given only by law in the manner and form prescribed by law. There being no showing that the offense was committed within Makati, the RTC of that city has no jurisdiction over the case. In case itanong: Under Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC, the elements of estafa are as follows: (1) that money, goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same; (2) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender, or denial on his part of such receipt; (3) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (4) there is demand by the offended party to the offender. PANFILO LACSON v. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY G.R. No. 128096; 20 January 1999 Facts: Eleven (11) persons believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng, an organized crime syndicate, were killed by the elements of Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG). Said group was composed of several police units including the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission Task Force Habagat (PACC-TFH) headed by herein petitioner. Consequently, a police from the Central Investigation Command (CIC), another unit belonging to ABRITG, stated that what transpired between the ABRITG and the gang members was a summary execution. This led to the investigation of the incident, finding that said encounter was a legitimate police operation. However, the review board modified the findings and recommended for the indictment for multiple murder against all of the respondents of the case, including herein petitioner. Information for murder were filed against the same before the Sandiganbayan. The Ombudsman then filed an amended information to the Sandiganbayan, charging herein petitioner only as an accessory. The petitioner then moved to question the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, contending that since the amended information only charged him as an accessory, his case would thereby fall within the Regional Trial Court’s jurisdiction. Petitioner asserted that the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is limited only to cases where one or more of the “principal” accused who are government officials with Salary Grade 27 or higher, or PNP officials with the rank of Chief Superintendent or higher. When the Sandiganbayan admitted the amended information, it ordered for the case to be transferred to the RTC of Quezon City. Consequently, while the case was pending to be resolved, a law was passed defining and expanding the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan (RA 8249), removing the word “principal” from “principal accused” in Section 2 of RA 7975 (Old Sandiganbayan Law). Aggrieved, petitioner challenged the constitutionality of the law and argued that it is prejudicial to his cause considering that the law shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which a trial has not begun. ISSUE: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction to try and decide the case. HELD: Yes. Sandiganbayan has the exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide the case. The jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan also covers the felonies committed by public officials and employees in relation to their office. Since herein petitioner was charged with murder, what determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is the official position or rank of the offender that is, whether he is one of those officers enumerated in the law. The provisions of RA 7975 (Old Sandiganbayan Law) do not make any preference to the criminal participation of the accused public officer as to whether he is charged as a principal, accomplice, or accessory. In effect, the Congress, in enacting RA 8249 (New Sandiganbayan Law), did not mention the criminal participation of the public officer as a requisite to determine jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. No. Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction. While the above-quoted information states that the above-named principal accused committed the crime of murder "in relation to thier public office, there is, however, no specific allegation of facts that the shooting of the victim by the said principal accused was intimately related to the discharge of their official duties as police officers. Likewise, the amended information does not indicate that the said accused arrested and investigated the victim and then killed the latter while in their custody. In the aforecited case of People vs. Montejo, it is noteworthy that the phrase committed in relation to public office " does not appear in the information, which only signifies that the said phrase is not what determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. What is controlling is the specific factual allegations in the information that would indicate the close intimacy between the discharge of the accused's official duties and the commission of the offense charged, in order to qualify the crime as having been committed in relation to public office. Consequently, for failure to show in the amended informations that the charge of murder was intimately connected with the discharge of official functions of the accused PNP officers, the offense charged in the subject criminal cases is plain murder and, therefore, within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court,73 not the Sandiganbayan. People v. Lagon, 185 SCRA 442 Facts: In July 1976, a CRIMINAL INFORMATION was filed with the City Court of Roxas City, charging private respondent Libertad Lagon with the crime of ESTAFA under paragraph 2 (d) of article 315 of the RPC which perpetrated in April 1975. The information charged that the accused had allegedly issued a check in the amount of 4,232.80 pesos as payment for goods or merchandise purchased, knowingly that she did not have sufficient funds to cover the check, which check therefore subsequently bounced. The city court dismissed the information upon the ground that the penalty prescribed by law for the offense charged was beyond the court’s authority to impose. The judge held that the authority of the court to try a criminal action is determined by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action, and not by the law in force at the time of the commission of the crime. At the time of the commission of the cime in April 1975, jurisdiction over the offense was vested by law in the city court. However, by the time the criminal information was filed, paragraph 2 (d) of art. 315 of the RPC had already been amended and the penalty imposable upon a person accused thereunder increased, which penalty was beyond the city court’s authority to impose. Accordingly, the court dismissed the information without prejudice to it being refiled in the proper court. Issue: 1.WON the city court of Roxas has jurisdiction over the case. 2. WON the application of the above-settled doctrine to the instant case would result in also applying Presidential Decree No. 818 to the present case, in disregard of the rules against retroactivity of penal laws. Ruling 1. Court jurisdiction is determined by the law at the time of the institution of the action. Therefore, the City Court has no jurisdiction over the case. Petition for review dismissed. Section 87 of the Judiciary Act of 1948: jurisdiction of municipal and city courts... offense… in which the penalty… does not exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for not more than six (6) years or fine not exceeding P6,000.00 or both . . . ." 2. RPC permits penal laws to have retroactive effect only "insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, . . . " Subject-matter jurisdiction is determined by the authority of the court to impose the penalty imposable under the applicable statute given the allegations of criminal information. In People v.Purisima and People v. Buissan: . . . The issue here is one of jurisdiction, of a court's legal competence to try a case ab origine. In criminal prosecutions, it is settled that the jurisdiction of the court is not determined by what may be meted out to the offender after trial, or even by the result of the evidence that would be presented at the trial, but by the extent of the penalty which the law imposes for the misdemeanor, crime or violation charged in the complaint…”. Should the information be refiled in the RTC, that court may only impose the penalty provided in the law at the time of the commission of the crime. Jocelyn Asistio y Consino was charged with violation of Section 46 of the Cooperative Code of the Philippines (Republic Act No. [RA] 6938). The prosecution sought to prove that the accused had entered into an exclusive dealership agreement with Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc., (Coca Cola) for the sale of softdrink products at the same school. The school principal then created an audit committee to look into the financial reports of the Cooperative. Based on the documents obtained from Coca-Cola, including the records of actual deliveries and sales, and the financial statements prepared by Asistio, the audit committee found that Asistio defrauded the Cooperative and its members for three (3) years. Despite requests for her to return to the Cooperative the amounts she had allegedly misappropriated, Asistio failed and refused to do so. Thus, the Cooperative issued a Board Resolution authorizing the filing of criminal charges against her. Trial ensued and after the presentation and offer of evidence by the prosecution, Asistio moved to dismiss the case by way of Demurrer to Evidence with prior leave of court. She argued, among other matters, that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, does not have jurisdiction over the case, as the crime charged (Violation of Section 46 of RA 6938) does not carry with it a sanction for which she can be held criminally liable. The RTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. 6938 would be punishable by imprisonment of not less than six (6) months nor more than one (1) year and a fine of not less than one thousand pesos (P1,000.00) Issue: Whether or not RTC’s dismissal would warrant double jeopardy? Held: No. The requisites that must be present for double jeopardy to attach are: (a) a valid complaint or information; (b) a court of competent jurisdiction; (c) the accused has pleaded to the charge; and (d) the accused has been convicted or acquitted or the case dismissed or terminated without the express consent of the accused. Definitely, there is no double jeopardy in this case as the dismissal was with the accused-appellee's consent, that is, by moving for the dismissal of the case through a demurrer to evidence. As correctly argued by the People, where the dismissal was ordered upon or with express assent of the accused, he is deemed to have waived his protection against doubly jeopardy. In this case at bar, the dismissal was granted upon motion of petitioners. Double jeopardy, thus, did not attach. JOCELYN ASISTIO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 200465, April 20, 2015 DECISION: DENIED / Affirmed with CA FACTS: Petitioner Jocelyn Asistio y Consino was charged with violation of Section 46 of the Cooperative Code of the Philippines (Republic Act No. [RA] 6938).[4] The accusatory portion of the Information filed against her reads: That on or about July 27, 1998, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, being then the Chairperson and Managing Director of A. Mabini Elementary School Teachers Multi-Purpose Cooperative, and as such, have a complete control and exclusively manage the... entire business of A. Mabini Elementary School Teachers Multi-Purpose Cooperative, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously acquires, in violation of her duty as such and the confidence reposed on her, personal interest or equity adverse to A. Mabini Elementary School Teachers Multi-Purpose Cooperative by then and there entering into a contract with Coca Cola Products at A. Mabini Elementary School Teachers Multi-Purpose Cooperative in her own personal capacity when in truth and in fact as the said accused fully well knew, the sale of Coca-Cola products at A. Mabini Elementary School Teachers Multi-Purpose Cooperative should have accrued to A. Mabini Elementary School Teachers Multi-Purpose Cooperative to the damage and prejudice of A. Mabini Elementary School Teachers Multi-Purpose Cooperative. After the presentation and offer of evidence by the prosecution, petitioner moved to dismiss the case by way of Demurrer to Evidence with prior leave of court. She argued, among other matters, that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 40, does not have jurisdiction over the case, as the crime charged (Violation of Section 46 of RA 6938) does not carry with it a sanction for which she can be held criminally liable. On October 14, 2008, the RTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, thus: Considering that the MeTCs, MTC, MCTCs have exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the... civil liability arising from such offense or predicated thereon, and considering that violation of [Sec] 46 of R.A. 6938 would be punishable by imprisonment of not less than six (6) months nor more than one (1) year and a fine of not less than one thousand pesos (P1,000.00), or both at the discretion of the Court, this Court (RTC) has no jurisdiction to hear and determine the instant case which properly pertains to the first level courts. On whether the dismissal of the charge against petitioner on demurrer to evidence amounts to an acquittal, hence, final and unappealable, the Court rules in the negative... the RTC granted the demurrer to evidence and dismissed the case not for insufficiency of evidence, but for lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged. On whether the remand of the criminal case to the RTC violated her right against double jeopardy due to its earlier dismissal on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, the Court rules in the negative and upholds the CA in ruling that the dismissal having been granted upon... petitioner's instance, double jeopardy did not attach, thus: The accused-appellee cannot also contend that she will be placed in double jeopardy upon this appeal. It must be stressed that the dismissal of the case against her was premised upon her filing of a demurrer to evidence, and the finding, albeit erroneous, of the... trial court that it is bereft of jurisdiction. ISSUE: Whether the offense charged in the information for Section 46 of RA 6938 necessarily includes or is necessarily included in a crime for falsification of private document under Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended (RPC). RULING: The test to determine whether an offense necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the other is provided under Section 5, Rule .120 of the Rules of Court: An offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved, when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those constituting the latter. After a careful examination of the Information filed against petitioner for falsification of private document in Criminal Case No. 370119-20-CR and for violation of Section 46, RA 6938 in Criminal Case No. 01-197750, the Court holds that the first offense for which petitioner was acquitted does not necessarily include and is not necessarily included in the second offense. The Information for falsification of private document, on the one hand, alleged that petitioner, being then the Chairperson and Managing Director of A. Mabini Elementary School Teachers Multi-Purpose Cooperative, as part of her duty to prepare financial reports, falsified such report for the School Year 1999-2000, in relation to the sales profits of Coca-Cola products in violation of Article 172 (2)35 of the RPC. The elements of falsification of private document under Article 172, paragraph 2 of the RPC are: (1) that the offender committed any of the acts of falsification, except those in paragraph 7, Article 171;36 (2) that the falsification was committed in any private document; and (3) that the falsification caused damage to a third party or at least the falsification was committed with intent to cause such damage. The Information for violation of Section 46 of RA 6938 alleged, on the other hand, that being then such officer and director of the Cooperative, petitioner willfully acquired personal interest or equity adverse to it, in violation of her duty and of the confidence reposed upon her, by entering into a contract with Coca-Cola in her own personal capacity, knowing fully well that the sales profits of such products should have accrued to the Cooperative. The essential elements of violation of Section 46 of RA 6938 are (1) that the offender is a director, officer or committee member; and (2) that the offender willfully and lcnowingly (a) votes for or assents to patently unlawful acts; (b) is guilty of gross negligence or bad faith in directing the affairs of the cooperative; or (c) acquires any personal or pecuniary interest in conflict with their duty as such directors, officers or committee member. Verily, there is nothing common or similar between the essential elements of the crimes of falsification of private document under Article 172 (2) of the RPC and that of violation of Section 46 of RA 6938, as alleged in the Informations filed against petitioner. As neither of the said crimes can be said to necessarily include or is necessarily included in the other, the third requisite for double jeopardy to attach�a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first�is, therefore, absent. Not only are their elements different, they also have a distinct nature, i.e., the former is malum in se, as what makes it a felony is criminal intent on the part of the offender, while the latter is malum prohibitum, as what makes it a crime is the special, law enacting it. Moreover, in People v. Doriguez,37 the Court held: It is a cardinal rule that the protection against double jeopardy may be invoked only for the same offense or identical offenses. A simple act may offend against two (or more) entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law, and if one provision requires proof of an additional fact or element which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction or a dismissal of the information under one does not bar prosecution under the other. Phrased elsewise, where two different laws (or articles of the same code) defines two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to a prosecution of the other, although both offenses arise from the same fact, if each crime involves some important act which is not an essential element of the other. Since the Informations filed against petitioner were for separate, and distinct offenses as discussed above�the first against' Article 172 (2) of the Revised Penal Code and the second against Section 46 of the Cooperative Code (RA 6938) one cannot be pleaded as a bar to the other under the rule on double jeopardy. Besides, it is basic in criminal procedure that an accused may be charged with as many crimes as defined in our penal laws even if these arose from one incident. Thus, where a single act is directed against one person but said act constitutes a violation of two or more entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law, or by a special law and the Revised Penal Code, as in this case, the prosecution against one is not an obstacle to the prosecution of the other. 5. Serana v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 162059 | 22 January 2008 Facts: Petitioner Hannah Eunice D. Serana was a senior student of the University of the Philippines-Cebu. She was appointed by then President Joseph Estrada as a student regent of UP, to serve a one-year term. Hannah Serana with her siblings and relatives, registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission the Office of the Student Regent Foundation, Inc. (OSRFI). One of the projects of the OSRFI was the renovation of the Vinzons Hall Annex. President Estrada gave Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00) to the OSRFI as financial assistance for the proposed renovation. The renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex failed to materialize. The succeeding student regent consequently filed a complaint for Malversation of Public Funds and Property with the Office of the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman, after due investigation, found probable cause to indict the petitioner and her brother Jade Ian D. Serana for estafa. Hannah Serana moved to quash the information and posited that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over her person. As a student regent, she was not a public officer since she merely represented her peers, in contrast to the other regents who held their positions in an ex officio capacity. She added that she was a simple student and did not receive any salary as a student regent. The OMB opposed the motion. According to the Ombudsman, petitioner, despite her protestations, iwas a public officer. As a member of the BOR, she has the general powers of administration and exercises the corporate powers of UP. The Sandiganbayan denied petitioner’s motion for lack of merit. Issues: Whether or not, Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over Serana as she contended that she was not a public officer. Ruling: It is P.D. No.1606, as amended, rather than R.A. No. 3019, as amended that determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan which is determined by Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019 (The Anti- Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended). Section 4 (B) of P.D. No. 1606 states that “Other offenses of felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection of this section in relation to their office.” The Sandiganbayan has a jurisdiction over other felonies committed by public officials in relation to their office and estafa is one of those felonies. The jurisdiction is subject to these requirements: The offense is committed by public officials and employees as stated in P.D. No. 1606. The offense is committed in relation to their office. In Geduspan v. People, the Court held that while the first part of Section 4(A) covers only officials with Salary Grade 27 and higher, its second part specifically includes other executive officials whose positions may not be of Salary Grade 27 and higher but who are by express provision of law placed under the jurisdiction of the said court. Hannah Serana falls under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as she is placed there by express provision of law. Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explicitly vested the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations. Petitioner falls under this category. As the Sandiganbayan pointed out, the BOR performs functions similar to those of a board of trustees of a non-stock corporation. By express mandate of law, Hannah Serana is, indeed, a public officer as contemplated by P.D. No. 1606. CLAIRE R. GAUFO 2315-0319 BRIG. GEN. (Ret.) JOSE S. RAMISCAL, JR., Petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (4th Division) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents G.R. Nos. 169727-28 August 18, 2006 FACTS: Petitioner Jose S. Ramiscal Jr. was a retired officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), with the rank of Brigadier General when he served as President of the AFP- Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS). The AFP-RSBS was established in December 1973 to established in a separate fund to guarantee continuous financial support to the AFP military retirement system as provided for in Republic Act No. 340. AFP-RSBS is a government-owned or controlled corporation (GOCC) and its funds are in the nature of public funds. In 1997, the Congresswoman Luwalhati Antonio filed a complaint-affidavit with the office of the ombudsman for Mindanao. Citing anomalous real state transactions involving the Magsaysay Park at General Santos City, she requested the Ombudsman to investigate the petitioner Retired Brig. Gen. Jose S. Ramiscal Jr., President of AFP-RSBS together with 27 other persons, for conspiracy in misappropriating AFP=RSBS funds and in defrauding the governmental millions of pesos in capital gains and documentary stamp taxes. After preliminary investigation, the Ombudsman found petitioner probably guilty of violation of Section 3 of RA 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and 12 information for falsification of public documents. All were similarly worded except for the names of other accused, the dates of the commission of the offense and the property involved. The Information alleged that Ramiscal, et. al. misappropriated and converted the amount of P250,318,200.00 for their personal use from the funds of AFP-RSBS. On February 2, 1999, the petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to Dismiss the Information and to Defer the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest, alleging want of jurisdiction. In a Resolution dated April 5, 1999, the Sandiganbayan denied the earlier motions filed by the petitioner for lack of merit. Consequently, a warrant of arrest against him was issued.19 He posted a cash bail bond for his provisional liberty. cralawred On April 6, 1999, the petitioner opposed the appearance of the law firm of Albano & Associates as private prosecutors, contending that the charges brought against him were purely public crimes which did not involve damage or injury to any private party; thus, no civil liability had arisen.21 He argued that under Section 16 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, an offended party may be allowed to intervene through a special prosecutor only in those cases where there is civil liability arising from the criminal offense charged. He maintained that if the prosecution were to be allowed to prove damages, the prosecution would thereby be proving another crime, in violation of his constitutional right to be informed of the nature of the charge against him. In its comment, the law firm contended that its clients, Commodore Aparri and Brig. Gen. Navarro, were members of the AGFOI and contributors of AFP-RSBS. It alleged that as such members- contributors, they have been disadvantaged or deprived of their lawful investments and residual interest at the AFP-RSBS through the criminal acts of the petitioner and his cohorts. It posited that its clients, not having waived the civil aspect of the cases involved, have all the right to intervene pursuant to Section 16, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, the law firm averred that its appearance was in collaboration with the Office of the Ombudsman, and that their intervention in any event, was subject to the direction and control of the Office of the Special Prosecutor. ISSUE: Whether or not that the resolution of the Sandiganbayan is interlocutory in nature and not final. RULING: The assailed resolution of Sandiganbayan is interlocutory in nature. The word interlocutory refers to something intervening between the commencement and the end of a suit which decides some point or matter but is not a final decision of the whole controversy. The Court distinguished a final order or resolution from an interlocutory one in Investments, Inc. v. Court of Appeals as follows:chanroblesvirtua1awlibrary A final judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more to be done by the Court in respect thereto, e.g., an adjudication on the merits which, on the basis of the evidence presented at the trial, declares categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties are and which party is in the right; or a judgment or order that dismisses an action on the ground, for instance, of res adjudicata or prescription. Once rendered, the task of the Court is ended, as far as deciding the controversy or determining the rights and liabilities of the litigants is concerned. Nothing more remains to be done by the Court except to await the parties next move (which, among others, may consist of the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration, or the taking of an appeal) and ultimately, of course, to cause the execution of the judgment once it becomes final or, to use the established and more distinctive term, final and executory. Conversely, an order that does not finally disposes of the case, and does not end the Courts task of adjudicating the parties contentions and determining their rights and liabilities as regards each other, but obviously indicates that other things remain to be done by the Court, is interlocutory, e.g., an order denying a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the Rules, or granting a motion for extension of time to file a pleading, or authorizing amendment thereof, or granting or denying applications for postponement, or production or inspection of documents or things, etc. Unlike a final judgment or order, which is appealable, as above pointed out, an interlocutory order may not be questioned on appeal except only as part of an appeal that may eventually be taken from the final judgment rendered in this case. The rule is founded on considerations of orderly procedure, to forestall useless appeals and avoid undue inconvenience to the appealing party by having to assail orders as they are promulgated by the court, when all such orders may be contested in a single appeal. Under Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only final judgments, orders or resolutions of the Court of Appeals or Sandiganbayan may be assailed therein. The remedy is a mode of appeal on questions of law only. ARNEL ESCOBAL VS GARCHITORINA GR NO. 124644 05 February 2004 FACTS: Petitioner is a graduate of PMA, member of AFP, Philippine Constabulary and Intelligence Group of PNP. While petitioner is conducting surveillance operations on drug trafficking in a restaurant located in Naga City he was involved in a shooting incident resulting to the death of one Rodney Rafael Nueca, an information was filed in Naga City for murder . The RTC issued a preventive suspension of service petitioner and a warrant of arrest he then filed for bail for his temporary liberty. During the pendency of the case, he requested for reinstatement citing RA No. 6975 his suspension should last for 90 only and having served the same he should now be reinstated. The PNP Chief wrote Judge David Naval requesting information whether he will issued an order lifting the suspension. The court did not answer that prompted petitioner to file motion but the RTC denied. He filed instead Motion to Dismiss citing the case of Philippines V. Asuncion since he committed the crime in the performance of his duty, the Sandigan Bayan has the exclusive jurisdiction over the case. ISSUE: 1. Whether Sandigan Bayan presiding judge erred in remanding the case to RTC 2. Whether the Sandigan Bayan or the RTC has jurisdiction over petitioner’s case RULING: 1. The respondent presiding judge acted in accordance with law and ruling of this Court when he ordered the remand of the case to the RTC, the court of origin. The jurisdiction of the court over criminal cases is determined by the allegations in the information of the complaint and the statue in effect at the time of the commencement of the action, unless such statues provides for a retroactive application thereof. The jurisdictional requirements must be alleged in the Information. Such jurisdiction of the court acquired at the inception of the case continues until the case is terminated. Under Section 4(a) of P.D. No. 1606 as amended by P.D No. 1861, the Sandigan had exclusive jurisdiction in cases involving1. Violations of RA No. 3019 known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt practices Act, RA No. 1379 and Chapter II, Sec. 2 Title VII of the RPC; 2. Other offenses committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office, including those employed by GOCCs, whether simple or complex with other crimes, when the penalty prescribed by law is higher that prison correccional or imprisonment for six (06) year or a fine of P6,000.00 Under the law, even if the offender committed the crime charged in relation to his office but occupies a position corresponding to a salary grade below "27," the proper Regional Trial Court or Municipal Trial Court, as the case may be, shall have exclusive jurisdiction over the case. In this case, the petitioner was a Police Senior Inspector, with salary grade "23." He was charged with homicide punishable by reclusion temporal. Hence, the RTC had exclusive jurisdiction over the crime charged conformably to Sections 20 and 32 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7691. The petitioner’s contention that R.A. No. 7975 should not be applied retroactively has no legal basis. It bears stressing that R.A. No. 7975 is a substantive procedural law which may be applied retroactively.23 Petition is dismissed. 44. People v. Henry T. Go G.R. No. 168539 (March 25, 2014) Re: Jurisdiction of Courts Facts: The Information filed against respondent is an offshoot of this Court's Decision in Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. Subsequent to the above Decision, Pesayco filed a complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman against several individuals for alleged violation of R.A. 3019 aka ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT. Among those charged was herein respondent Henry Go, who was then the Chairman and President of PIATCO, for having supposedly conspired with then DOTC Secretary Arturo Enrile (Secretary Enrile) in entering into a contract which is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government. On September 16, 2004, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found probable cause to indict them for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019. Thus, in an Information dated January 13, 2005, respondent was charged before the SB in conspiracy of late Arturo Enrile, Sec of Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC). The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 28090. Prosecution: a. SB has already acquired jurisdiction over the person of respondent by reason of his voluntary appearance, when he filed a motion for consolidation and when he posted bail. b. SB has exclusive jurisdiction over respondent's case, even if he is a private person, because he was alleged to have conspired with a public officer. Respondent: a. filed a Motion to Quash the Information filed against him on the ground that the operative facts adduced therein do not constitute an offense under Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019. b. citing the show cause order of the SB, also contended that, independently of the deceased Secretary Enrile, the public officer with whom he was alleged to have conspired, respondent, who is not a public officer nor was capacitated by any official authority as a government agent, may not be prosecuted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019. SB resolution: a. grants respondent’s Motion to Quash. b. appearing that Henry T. Go, the lone accused in this case is a private person and his alleged coconspirator-public official was already deceased long before this case was filed in court, for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused, the Court grants the Motion to Quash and the Information filed in this case is hereby ordered quashed and dismissed. Hence, the instant petition. Issue: 1. Whether the ruling of the Sandiganbayan granting the motion to quash be applied in the present case Ruling: 1. No. The Court does not agree. Respondent should be reminded that prior to this Court's ruling, he already posted bail for his provisional liberty. In fact, he even filed a Motion for Consolidation. The Court agrees with petitioner's contention that private respondent's act of posting bail and filing his Motion for Consolidation vests the SB with jurisdiction over his person. The rule is well settled that the act of an accused in posting bail or in filing motions seeking affirmative relief is tantamount to submission of his person to the jurisdiction of the court. Thus, it has been held that: When a defendant in a criminal case is brought before a competent court by virtue of a warrant of arrest or otherwise, in order to avoid the submission of his body to the jurisdiction of the court he must raise the question of the court’s jurisdiction over his person at the very earliest opportunity. If he gives bail, demurs to the complaint or files any dilatory plea or pleads to the merits, he thereby gives the court jurisdiction over his person. (State ex rel. John Brown vs. Fitzgerald, 51 Minn., 534) As ruled in La Naval Drug vs. CA [236 SCRA 78, 86]: "[L]ack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant may be waived either expressly or impliedly. When a defendant voluntarily appears, he is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. If he so wishes not to waive this defense, he must do so seasonably by motion for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court; otherwise, he shall be deemed to have submitted himself to that jurisdiction." Moreover, "[w]here the appearance is by motion for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person, it must be for the sole and separate purpose of objecting to said jurisdiction. If the appearance is for any other purpose, the defendant is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. Such an appearance gives the court jurisdiction over the person." As a recapitulation, it would not be amiss to point out that the instant case involves a contract entered into by public officers representing the government. More importantly, the SB is a special criminal court which has exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving violations of R.A. 3019 committed by certain public officers, as enumerated in P.D. 1606 as amended by R.A. 8249. This includes private individuals who are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the said public officers. In the instant case, respondent is being charged for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019, in conspiracy with then Secretary Enrile. Ideally, under the law, both respondent and Secretary Enrile should have been charged before and tried jointly by the Sandiganbayan. However, by reason of the death of the latter, this can no longer be done. Nonetheless, for reasons already discussed, it does not follow that the SB is already divested of its jurisdiction over the person of and the case involving herein respondent. To rule otherwise would mean that the power of a court to decide a case would no longer be based on the law defining its jurisdiction but on other factors, such as the death of one of the alleged offenders. Facts: In this case, the Office of the Ombudsman initiated two forfeiture proceedings against former Maj. Gen. Carlos Garcia, his wife Clarita, and their two children to recover allegedly ill-gotten properties and funds. Initial Forfeiture Case (Forfeiture Case 1): The Ombudsman filed a petition to forfeit properties valued at Php 143,052,015.29, which were purportedly acquired by Maj. Gen. Carlos Garcia, Clarita Garcia, and their two children. This case was assigned to the 4th Division of the Sandiganbayan. Subsequent Forfeiture Case (Forfeiture Case 2): After the initiation of Forfeiture Case 1 but prior to the filing of Forfeiture Case 2, the Ombudsman charged the Garcias and three others with violating Republic Act (RA) 7080, known as plunder. This criminal charge alleged that the property and funds amassed by the Garcias amounted to Php 303,272,005.99. Crim. Case No. 28107 was assigned to the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan. Service of Summons for Forfeiture Case 1: The Sheriff's office issued summons related to Forfeiture Case 1, which were all personally served on Maj. Gen. Carlos Garcia while he was detained. Subsequently, the Sandiganbayan issued a writ of attachment in favor of the Republic. The Garcias responded by filing a motion to dismiss, arguing that the Sandiganbayan lacked jurisdiction over separate civil actions for forfeiture. However, the Sandiganbayan denied the motion to dismiss and declared the Garcias in default. Despite this default order, the Garcias sought the consolidation of Forfeiture Case 1 with the plunder case, claiming that it was mandatory under RA 8249. The Sandiganbayan denied this motion for consolidation. Service of Summons for Forfeiture Case 2: The Sheriff's office of the Sandiganbayan served summons for Forfeiture Case 2. The sheriff handed the summons to the OIC/Custodian of the PNP Detention Center, who subsequently gave them to Gen. Garcia. While Gen. Garcia acknowledged receiving the summons, he added a note indicating that he received the copies for Clarita, Ian, Carl, Juan Paolo, and Timothy but couldn't guarantee their service to the other respondents. ISSUES: 1. Whether the Sandiganbayan possesses jurisdiction over the forfeiture case despite the commencement of the plunder case. 2. Whether the Sandiganbayan maintains jurisdiction over Garcia’s case due to improper service of summons. RULING: 1. Yes. The 4th Division of the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the civil case because the forfeiture cases represent the corresponding civil actions for recovering civil liability ex delicto. The civil liability in forfeiture cases does not originate from the commission of a criminal offense; instead, it is based on a statute that safeguards the state's right to reclaim unlawfully acquired assets. Furthermore, a forfeiture case under RA 1379 stems from a distinct cause of action separate from a plunder case. This undermines the idea that the criminal charges of plunder absorb the forfeiture cases. In a prosecution for plunder, the objective is to prove the commission of criminal acts to obtain ill-gotten wealth. In contrast, RA 1379 merely requires demonstrating a disproportion between the respondent's properties and their legitimate income, without the need to establish how these properties were acquired. 2. No. Fundamental to this issue is the principle that a court must establish jurisdiction over a party for its decisions or orders to be binding. Valid service of summons, in accordance with the appropriate Rules, is the method by which a court obtains jurisdiction over an individual. The summonses for the forfeiture cases should have been personally served on Maj. Gen. Carlos Flores Garcia, who was detained at the PNP Detention Center, and he should have acknowledged receipt by signing. However, it is evident that substituted service of summons was attempted for both Forfeiture cases on the petitioner and their children through Maj. Gen. Garcia at the PNP Detention Center. Nevertheless, these substituted service attempts were considered invalid due to their irregular and defective nature. To be valid, substituted service of summons must meet specific requirements, including impossibility of prompt personal service, providing specific details in the return, and serving a person of suitable age and discretion residing at the defendant's house or residence, or a competent person in charge of the defendant's office or regular place of business. None of these criteria were met, rendering the substituted service invalid. Additionally, Clarita Garcia's act of questioning the court's jurisdiction through a special appearance does not equate to a voluntary appearance. Therefore, filing a motion to dismiss that challenges the court's jurisdiction, along with other grounds, does not constitute a voluntary appearance before the court. Notes: Key Issues: Jurisdiction Over Petitioner Despite Improper Service of Summons: The first issue centers on whether the Sandiganbayan (SB) has jurisdiction over the petitioner, despite alleged irregularities in the service of summons. Jurisdiction Over the Forfeiture Case Despite the Plunder Case: The second issue questions whether the SB has jurisdiction over the forfeiture cases, considering the simultaneous existence of the plunder case. Court's Rulings: Jurisdiction Over Petitioner Despite Improper Service of Summons: The court ruled that the SB did not have jurisdiction over the petitioner due to improper service of summons. It emphasized that valid service of summons is crucial for a court to have jurisdiction over a party. Summons for both Forfeiture Cases 1 and 2 were served personally on Maj. Gen. Carlos Garcia, who was detained at the PNP Detention Center. While he acknowledged receipt, substituted service was also attempted on the petitioner and her children through Maj. Gen. Garcia, which was found to be irregular and defective. The court outlined three requirements for valid substituted service, which were not met in this case. Additionally, the petitioner's special appearance to challenge the court's jurisdiction was deemed not a voluntary appearance. Jurisdiction Over the Forfeiture Case Despite the Plunder Case: The court ruled that the SB had jurisdiction over the forfeiture cases despite the concurrent existence of the plunder case. It clarified that civil liability in forfeiture cases does not arise from the commission of a criminal offense but is based on a statute aimed at recovering unlawfully acquired properties. Furthermore, a forfeiture case under RA 1379 is separate and distinct from a plunder case. In a plunder case, the focus is on proving the commission of criminal acts to acquire ill-gotten wealth, while RA 1379 simply requires demonstrating the disproportion of the respondent's properties to their legitimate income without the need to prove how those properties were acquired. In summary, the court held that the SB did not have jurisdiction over the petitioner due to improper service of summons. However, it maintained jurisdiction over the forfeiture cases, finding them to be separate from the plunder case and governed by different legal principles. People v. Benipayo, 586 SCRA April 24, 2009 Two consolidated cases: G.R. No. 154473 and 155573 Facts: In the first case, Alfredo L. Benipayo, then Chairman of the COMELEC, delivered a speech in the "Forum on Electoral Problems: Roots and Responses in the Philippines" held at the Balay Kalinaw, UP-Diliman Campus, Quezon City. The speech was subsequently published in the issues of the Manila Bulletin. Petitioner corporation, believing that it was the one alluded to by the respondent when he stated in his speech that: “Now, they are at it again, trying to hoodwink us into contract that is so grossly disadvantageous to the government that it offends common sense to say that it would be worth the 6.5 billion-peso price tag.” filed, through its authorized representative, an Affidavit-Complaint for libel. Arguing that he was an impeachable officer, respondent questioned the jurisdiction of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City. Despite the challenge, the City Prosecutor filed an Information for libel against the respondent with the RTC of Quezon City. Petitioner later filed a Motion for Inhibition and Consolidation, contending that Judge Salazar could not impartially preside over the case because his appointment to the judiciary was made possible through the recommendation of respondent's father-in-law. Petitioner further moved that the case be ordered consolidated with the other libel case pending with another RTC Branch. While the said motion remained unresolved, respondent, for his part, moved for the dismissal of the case on the assertion that the trial court had no jurisdiction over his person for he was an impeachable officer and thus, could not be criminally prosecuted before any court during his incumbency; and that, assuming he can be criminally prosecuted, it was the Office of the Ombudsman that should investigate him and the case should be filed with the Sandiganbayan. RTC issued the challenged Order dismissing the criminal case and considering as moot and academic petitioner's motion to inhibit. While the RTC found that respondent was no longer an impeachable officer because his appointment was not confirmed by Congress, it ruled that the case had to be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction considering that the alleged libel was committed by respondent in relation to his office — he delivered the speech in his official capacity as COMELEC Chair. Accordingly, it was the Sandiganbayan that had jurisdiction over the case to the exclusion of all other courts. On motion for reconsideration, RTC adhered to its ruling that it was not vested with jurisdiction to hear the libel case. In the second case, the Respondent, as COMELEC Chair, and COMELEC Commissioner Tangcangco were guests of the talk show "Point Blank", hosted by Ces Drilon and televised nationwide on the ANC-23 channel. The television show's episode that day was entitled "COMELEC Wars". In that episode, respondent alleged that that Photokina funds are being used for a "PR" campaign against him. Petitioner considered respondent's statement as defamatory, and, through its authorized representative, filed a Complaint-Affidavit for libel. Respondent similarly questioned the jurisdiction of the OCP-QC. The City Prosecutor, however, consequently filed the corresponding Information with the RTC. Respondent also moved for the dismissal of the information raising similar arguments. RTC issued the assailed Order also dismissing the criminal case for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the respondent. The RTC, in the further assailed Order, denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. Hence, this petition. Issue: If the trial court erred in ruling that it had no jurisdiction over the case. Ruling: YES. Jurisdiction of the court to hear and decide a case is conferred by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action, unless a latter statute provides for a retroactive application thereof. Article 360 of the RPC, as amended by RA4363, is explicit on which court has jurisdiction to try cases of written defamations, thus: “The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations as provided for in this chapter, shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the court of first instance [now, the RTC] of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense…” Although RA7691 was enacted to decongest the clogged dockets of the RTC by expanding the jurisdiction of first level courts, said law is of a general character. Even if it is a later enactment, it does not alter the provision of Article 360 of the RPC, a law of a special nature. "Laws vesting jurisdiction exclusively with a particular court, are special in character, and should prevail over the Judiciary Act defining the jurisdiction of other courts (such as the Court of First Instance) which is a general law." A later enactment like RA7691 does not automatically override an existing law, because it is a well-settled principle of construction that, in case of conflict between a general law and a special law, the latter must prevail regardless of the dates of their enactment. Jurisdiction conferred by a special law on the RTC must therefore prevail over that granted by a general law on the MTC. Moreover, from the provisions of RA7691, there seems to be no manifest intent to repeal or alter the jurisdiction in libel cases. If there was such intent, then the amending law should have clearly so indicated because implied repeals are not favored. Absent an express repeal, a subsequent law cannot be construed as repealing a prior one unless an irreconcilable inconsistency or repugnancy exists in the terms of the new and old laws. Lastly, in AO 104-96, this Court delineated the proper jurisdiction over libel cases, hence settled the matter with finality: "LIBEL CASES SHALL BE TRIED BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS HAVING JURISDICTION OVER THEM TO THE EXCLUSION OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS IN CITIES, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS." 12. SANCHEZ V. DEMETRIOU, G.R. No. Nos. 111771-77 November 9, 1993 | CRUZ, J.: DOCTRINE: “The crime of rape with homicide imputed to the petitioner was not connected with the discharge of his functions as municipal mayor nor that there is an "intimate connection" between the offense and his office. It follows that the said crime, being an ordinary offense, is triable by the regular courts and not the Sandiganbayan.” Facts: On July 28, 1993, the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission requested the filing of appropriate charges against several persons, including the petitioner, in connection with the rape-slay of Mary Eileen Sarmenta and the killing of Allan Gomez. Acting on this request, the Panel of State Prosecutors of the Department of Justice conducted a preliminary investigation on Petitioner Sanchez was not present but was represented by his counsel, Atty. Marciano Brion, Jr. An “invitation” issued by PNP Commander Rex Piad was also served on Sanchez and he was immediately taken to Camp Vicente Lim. Sanchez was placed on “arrest status” upon the positive identification by Centeno and SPO3 Malabanan that Sanchez was the principal in the rape-slay case. The respondent prosecutors conducted an inquest upon Sanchez’ arrival, with Atty. Panelo as his counsel. After the hearing, a warrant of arrest was served on Sanchez in connection with a criminal case for violation of RA 6713. The Informations for Rape with Homicide were filed in RTC Laguna and warrants of arrest were issued against all of the accused. The venue of the case was then transferred to Pasig, Metro Manila upon the expressed apprehension of the Secretary of Justice. Sanchez filed a Motion to Quash on the following grounds: 1) he was denied the right to present evidence at the preliminary investigation; 2) only the Ombudsman had the competence to conduct the investigation; 3) his warrantless arrest is illegal and the court has therefore not acquired jurisdiction over him, 4) he is being charged with seven homicides arising from the death of only two persons; 5) the informations are discriminatory because they do not include Teofilo Alqueza and Edgardo Lavadia; and 6) as a public officer, he can be tried for the offense only by the Sandiganbayan. The Motion to Quash was denied. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether or not Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case. Ruling: The crime of rape with homicide with which the petitioner stands charged obviously does not fall under paragraph (1), which deals with graft and corruption cases. Neither is it covered by paragraph (2) because it is not an offense committed in relation to the office of the petitioner. There is no direct relation between the commission of the crime of rape with homicide and the petitioner's office as municipal mayor because public office is not an essential element of the crime charged. The offense can stand independently of the office. Moreover, it is not even alleged in the information that the commission of the crime charged was intimately connected with the performance of the petitioner's official functions to make it fall under the exception laid down in People v. Montejo. In that case, a city mayor and several detectives were charged with murder for the death of a suspect as a result of a "third degree" investigation held at a police substation. The appearance of a senator as their counsel was questioned by the prosecution on the ground that he was inhibited by the Constitution from representing them because they were accused of an offense committed in relation to their office. The Court agreed. It held that even if their position was not an essential ingredient of the offense, there was nevertheless an intimate connection between the office and the offense, as alleged in the information, that brought it within the definition of an offense "committed in relation to the public office." In the case at bar, the crime of rape with homicide imputed to the petitioner was not connected with the discharge of his functions as municipal mayor nor that there is an "intimate connection" between the offense and his office. It follows that the said crime, being an ordinary offense, is triable by the regular courts and not the Sandiganbayan.” Disposition: WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The respondent judge is DIRECTED to continue with the trial of Criminal Cases Nos. 101141, 101142, 101143, 101144, 101145, 101146 and 101147 and to decide them with deliberate dispatch. *Assailed jurisdiction of the RTC re: De lima Drug case 13. DE LIMA VS. GUERRERO, G.R. No. 229781, (OCTOBER 10, 2017) FACTS: That within the period from November 2012 to March 2013, Leila M. De Lima, accused Rafael Marcos Z. Ragos, by taking advantage of their public office, conspiring and confederating with accused Ronnie P. Dayan, being then the employee of the Department of Justice detailed to De Lima, all of them having moral ascendancy or influence over inmates in the New Bilibid Prison, did then and there commit illegal drug trading. De Lima and Ragos, with the use of their power, position, and authority demand, solicit and extort money from the high profile inmates in the New Bilibid Prison to support the Senatorial bid of De Lima in the May 2016 election; by reason of which, the inmates, not being lawfully authorized by law and through the use of mobile phones and other electronic devices, did then and there willfully and unlawfully trade and traffic dangerous drugs, and thereafter give and deliver to De Lima, through Ragos and Dayan, the proceeds of illegal drug trading amounting to millions of pesos. Soon, charges were filed against the Senator as a result of the allegations against her. ISSUES: Whether the Regional Trial Court or the Sandiganbayan has the jurisdiction over the violation of Republic Act No. 9165 averred in the assailed Information. RULING: *THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT HAS JURISDICTION Petitioner argues that, based on the allegations of the Information, the Sandiganbayan has the jurisdiction to try and hear the case against her. She posits that the Information charges her not with violation of RA 9165 but with Direct Bribery-a felony within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan given her rank as the former Secretary of Justice with Salary Grade 31. For the petitioner, even assuming that the crime described in the Information is a violation of RA 9165, the Sandiganbayan still has the exclusive jurisdiction to try the case considering that the acts described in the Information were intimately related to her position as the Secretary of Justice. Some justices of this Court would even adopt the petitioner's view, declaring that the Information charged against the petitioner is Direct Bribery. The respondents, on the other hand, maintain that the RTC has exclusive jurisdiction to try violations of RA 9165, including the acts described in the Information against the petitioner. The Sandiganbayan, so the respondents contend, was specifically created as an anti-graft court. It was never conferred with the power to try drug-related cases even those committed by public officials. In fact, respondents point out that the history of the laws enabling and governing the Sandiganbayan will reveal that its jurisdiction was streamlined to address specific cases of graft and corruption, plunder, and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth. From the very designation of the crime in the Information itself, it should be plain that the crime with which the petitioner is charged is a violation of RA 9165. As this Court clarified in Quimvel v. People, the designation of the offense in the Information is a critical element required under Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court in apprising the accused of the offense being charged. It is basic that jurisdiction over the subject matter in a criminal case is given only by law in the manner and form prescribed by law. It is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action. Indeed, Congress has the plenary power to define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of various courts. It follows then that Congress may also, by law, provide that a certain class of cases should be exclusively heard and determined by one court. Such would be a special law that is construed as an exception to the general law on jurisdiction of courts.92 The pertinent special law governing drug-related cases is RA 9165, which updated the rules provided in RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. A plain reading of RA 9165, as of RA 6425, will reveal that jurisdiction over drug-related cases is exclusively vested with the Regional Trial Court and no other. The designation of the RTC as the court with the exclusive jurisdiction over drug-related cases is apparent in the following provisions where it was expressly mentioned and recognized as the only court with the authority to hear drugrelated cases. Notably, no other trial court was mentioned in RA 9165 as having the authority to take cognizance of drug-related cases. Thus, in Morales v. Court of Appeals, this Court categorically named the RTC as the court with jurisdiction over drug related-cases. For those in the dissent, the failure to reproduce the phrase "exclusive original jurisdiction" is a clear indication that no court, least of all the RTC, has been vested with such "exclusive original jurisdiction" so that even the Sandiganbayan can take cognizance and resolve a criminal prosecution for violation of RA 9165. As thoroughly discussed by Justice Peralta in his Concurring Opinion, such deduction is unwarranted given the clear intent of the legislature not only to retain the "exclusive original jurisdiction" of the RTCs over violations of the drugs law but to segregate from among the several RTCs of each judicial region some RTCs that will "exclusively try and hear cases involving violations of [RA 9165)." If at all, the change introduced by the new phraseology of Section 90, RA 9165 is not the deprivation of the RTCs' "exclusive original jurisdiction" but the further restriction of this "exclusive original jurisdiction" to select RTCs of each judicial region. The exclusive original jurisdiction over violations of RA 9165 is not transferred to the Sandiganbayan whenever the accused occupies a position classified as Grade 27 or higher, regardless of whether the violation is alleged as committed in relation to office. The power of the Sandiganbayan to sit in judgment of high-ranking government officials is not omnipotent. The Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction is circumscribed by law and its limits are currently defined and prescribed by RA 10660, which amended Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1606. Duncano V. Sandigan 72 SCRA 2015 Facts: Petitioner Danilo A. Duncano is, at the time material to the case, the Regional Director of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) with Salary Grade 26 as classified under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6758. On March 24, 2009, the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), Office of the Ombudsman, filed a criminal case against him for violation of Section 8, in relation to Section 11 of R.A. No. 6713, allegedly committed as follows: That on or about April 15, 2003, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused DANILO DUNCANO y ACIDO, a high ranking public officer, being the Regional Director of Revenue Region No. 7, of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, Quezon City, and as such is under an obligation to accomplish and submit declarations under oath of his assets, liabilities and net worth and financial and business interests, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally fail to disclose in his Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities and Networth (SALN) for the year 2002, his financial and business interests/connection in Documail Provides Corporation and Don Plus Trading of which he and his family are the registered owners thereof, and the 1993 Nissan Patrol motor vehicle registered in the name of his son VINCENT LOUIS P. DUNCANO which are part of his assets, to the damage and prejudice of public interest. Issue: Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the petitioner. Held: No. The Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over violations of Section 3(a) and (e), Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, unless committed by public officials and employees occupying positions of regional director and higher with Salary Grade “27” or higher, under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758) in relation to their office. The creation of the Sandiganbayan was mandated by Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution. By virtue of the powers vested in him by the Constitution and pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081, dated September 21, 1972, former President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued P.D. No. 1486. The decree was later amended by P.D. No. 1606, Section 20 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, P.D. No. 1860, and P.D. No. 1861. With the advent of the 1987 Constitution, the special court was retained as provided for in Section 4, Article XI thereof. Aside from Executive Order Nos. 14 and 14-a, and R.A. 7080, which expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, P.D. No. 1606 was further modified by R.A. No. 7975, R.A. No. 8249, and just this year, R.A. No. 10660. For the purpose of this case, the relevant provision is Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, which states: SEC. 4. Section 4 of the same decree is hereby further amended to read as follows: “SEC. 4. Jurisdiction.– The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving: “A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense: “(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including: “ (a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads; “(b) City mayor, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads; “(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher; “(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank; “(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of provincial director and those holding the rank of senior superintendent or higher; “(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor; “(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations. “(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade 27 and up under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989; “(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; “(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commission, without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; and “(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade 27 and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989. “B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their office. “C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986. Yet, those that are classified as Salary Grade 26 and below may still fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, provided that they hold the positions enumerated by the law. In this category, it is the position held, not the salary grade, which determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The specific inclusion constitutes an exception to the general qualification relating to “officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.”38 As ruled in Inding: Following this disquisition, the paragraph of Section 4 which provides that if the accused is occupying a position lower than SG 27, the proper trial court has jurisdiction, can only be properly interpreted as applying to those cases where the principal accused is occupying a position lower than SG 27 and not among those specifically included in the enumeration in Section 4 a. (1) (a) to (g). Stated otherwise, except for those officials specifically included in Section 4 a. (1) (a) to (g), regardless of their salary grades, over whom the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction, all other public officials below SG 27 shall be under the jurisdiction of the proper trial courts “where none of the principal accused are occupying positions corresponding to SG 27 or higher.” By this construction, the entire Section 4 is given effect. The cardinal rule, after all, in statutory construction is that the particular words, clauses and phrases should not be studied as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part of the statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce a harmonious whole. And courts should adopt a construction that will give effect to every part of a statute, if at all possible. Ut magis valeat quam pereat or that construction is to be sought which gives effect to the whole of the statute – its every word. Inocentes v, People PROMULGATION July 16 2016 G.R. No. 205963-64 Doctrine 1. Jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired upon (1) his arrest or apprehension, with or without a warrant, or (2) his voluntary appearance or submission to the jurisdiction of the court. 2. Violations of R.A. No. 3019 committed by presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or -controlled corporations, and state universities shall be within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. 3. The Sandiganbayan maintains its jurisdiction over those officials specifically enumerated in (a) to (g) of Section 4(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, regardless of their salary grades. It is the position held, not the salary grade, which determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan FACTS • Inocentes, and 4 others, was charged with violating Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). • The crime was committed in Tarlac City, PH. • The accused are all public officers who conspired with a certain De Guzman. • They processed and approved the housing loans of 491 borrowers of De Guzman’s housing project under the GSIS Bahay Ko Program, with a total amount of loans amounting to PhP241,053,600, even though they were not qualified and were not under the territorial jurisdiction of the Tarlac Field Office. • The Sandiganbayan issued a minute resolution finding probable cause and ordered the issuance of a warrant of arrest against all the accused. • Inocentes immediately posted bail. • Inocentes filed an omnibus motion for judicial determination of probable cause, to quash information, among others. He argued that the information filed did not allege the specific acts done by him which would constitute the offense, and that he argued that his position with a salary grade of 26 does not make him fall under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. He likewise claimed that his position as department manager cannot be equated to those enumerated under RA 3019. • The Sandiganbayan argued that it already determined the existence of probable cause when it issued the warrant of arrest against the accused, and that PD 1606 includes managers of GOCCs, whose position may not fall under SG 27. • Inocentes questions before the SC the finding of the Sandiganbayan of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, and the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over his person. ISSUE 1. W/N a judicial redetermination of probable cause is proper when the accused voluntary surrenders to the jurisdiction of the court. NO. Judicial redetermination of probable cause is not proper. It is well-settled that Jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired upon (1) his arrest or apprehension, with or without a warrant, or (2) his voluntary appearance or submission to the jurisdiction of the court. In our jurisdiction, posting bail is tantamount to voluntary surrender. In this case, the petitioner posted bail. This gives the court the jurisdiction over his person. The question whether the findings of probable cause was tainted with grave abuse of discretion does not matter anymore, the Sandiganbayan acquired jurisdiction over the person of Inocentes. The outcome would have been different if Inocentes have brought the matter before he had posted bail or without voluntarily surrendering himself. NO. Judicial redetermination of probable cause is not proper. 2. W/N the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over Inocentes, a department manager (of GSIS) with the salary grade of 26. Yes. SG has jurisdiction over Inocentes, a department manager (of GSIS) with the salary grade of 26. Violations of R.A. No. 3019 committed by presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or -controlled corporations, and state universities shall be within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan maintains its jurisdiction over those officials specifically enumerated in (a) to (g) of Section 4(1) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, regardless of their salary grades. It is the position held, not the salary grade, which determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Simply put, those that are classified as Salary Grade 26 and below may still fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, provided they hold the positions enumerated by the law. In this category, it is the position held, not the salary grade, which determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Furthermore, as the Sandiganbayan correctly held, even low-level management positions fall under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. We settled this point in Lazarte v. Sandiganbayan and Geduspan v. People. In this case, the petitioner is the branch manager of Tarlac branch. SG has jurisdiction over Inocentes, a department manager (of GSIS) with the salary grade of 26. 3. WN the case must be dismissed because his right to speedy disposition of the case is violated. Yes. The case must be dismissed because his right to speedy disposition of the case is violated. A person’s right to a speedy disposition of his case is guaranteed under Section 16, Article III of the Constitution: All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies. This constitutional right is not limited to the accused in criminal proceedings but extends to all parties in all cases, be it civil or administrative in nature, as well as in all proceedings, either judicial or quasi-judicial.30 In this accord, any party to a case may demand expeditious action of all officials who are tasked with the administration of justice.31 In Tatad v. Sandiganbayan,32 we held that the long delay of close to three (3) years in the termination of the preliminary investigation conducted by the Tanodbayan constituted a violation not only of the constitutional right of the accused under the broad umbrella of the due process clause, but also of the constitutional guarantee to "speedy disposition" of cases as embodied in Section 16 of the Bill of Rights Applying in the instant case, the delay of at least seven (7) years before the informations were filed skews the fairness which the right to speedy disposition of cases seeks to maintain. Undoubtedly, the delay in the resolution of this case prejudiced Inocentes since the defense witnesses he would present would be unable to recall accurately the events of the distant past. Considering the clear violation of Inocentes’ right to the speedy disposition of his case, we find that the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in not acting on the case within a reasonable time after it had acquired jurisdiction over it. Therefore, the case must be dismissed because his right to speedy disposition of the case is violated. STA. ROMANA, DONABEL EDGAR CRISOSTOMO, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, respondent. G.R. No. 152398. April 14, 2005 FACTS: Petitioner, a member of the Philippine National Police and a jail guard at the Solano Municipal Jail was charged with the murder of Renato Suba, a detention prisoner at the Solano Municipal Jail. The Information alleged that Crisostomo conspired with his co-accused, Dominador C. dela Cruz, Efren M. Perez, Raki T. Anggo, Randy A. Lumabo, Rolando M. Norberte and Mario Calingayan, all inmates at the Solano Municipal Jail, in murdering Renato. Deceased, Renato Suba, was brought to the police station on the night of February 13, 1989 for investigation for allegedly hitting the head of a certain Diosdado Lacangan, thereafter, he was brought to the detention cell. At 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon the following day, the deceased was visited by his brother, Rizalino Suba and asked to bring him a blanket, toothbrush, clothes and foods. Rizalino Suba left the municipal jail on February 14, 1989, at almost 5:20 p.m., while his other brother, Rolando, brought the things to the deceased in jail who came back at 6:00 pm. Deceased was in good health, in good condition, and not complaining anything about his body as he was then 26 years old, single, had finished advance ROTC, and worked in a logging concession. Accused Mario Calingayan saw the deceased still alive lying down after 6:00 p.m. when he was about to take a bath; thereafter he went to his cell and played cards with his cellmates. At around 9:00 p.m. of the same day, upon the information of Mr. Baldovino, a barangay councilman, per request of the policemen, Rizalino Suba, David Suba and Manuel Rollo, a barangay councilman, arrived at the municipal building and saw the dead body of the deceased lying on the cement floor outside the cell. Calingayan was detained with five (5) others at the second cell among four (4) cells in the jail. The four (4) cells, although having their own separate doors, made of iron grills and equipped each with a padlock, were always open. It was up to them whether to close the doors, and any detention prisoner could go to any cell inside the prison. Petitioner Edgar Crisostomo was the only one on duty at the time of the death of the victim. The Sandiganbayan found accused Edgar Crisostomo and Mario Calingayan guilty of the crime of murder. ISSUE: Whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the crime of murder charged against Crisostomo who is a Senior Police Officer 1 at the time of the filing of the Information? RULING: Yes. The Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction to try the case. Since the crime was committed on 14 February 1989, the applicable provision of law is Section 4 of PD 1606, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1861 ("PD 1861"), which took effect on 23 March 1983. The amended provision reads: Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise: (a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving: xxx (2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, whether simple or complexed with other crimes, where the penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00: PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that offenses or felonies mentioned in this paragraph where the penalty prescribed by law does not exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years or a fine of P6,000.00 shall be tried by the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court. Crisostomo was charged with murder, the penalty for which is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, a penalty within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Indeed, murder and homicide will never be the main function of any public office. No public office will ever be a constituent element of murder. When then would murder or homicide, committed by a public officer, fall within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan? People v. Montejo7 provides the answer. The Court explained that a public officer commits an offense in relation to his office if he perpetrates the offense while performing, though in an improper or irregular manner, his official functions and he cannot commit the offense without holding his public office. In such a case, there is an intimate connection between the offense and the office of the accused. If the information alleges the close connection between the offense charged and the office of the accused, the case falls within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Thus, the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over this case will stand or fall on this test: Does the Information allege a close or intimate connection between the offense charged and Crisostomo's public office?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary The Information passes the test. The Information alleged that Crisostomo "a public officer, being then a member of the Philippine National Police stationed at Solano Police Station and a jailer thereat, taking advantage of his public position and thus committing the offense in relation to his office" conspired, confederated and connived with his co-accused who are inmates of the Solano Municipal Jail to kill Renato, "a detention prisoner." If the victim were not a prisoner, the Information would have to state particularly the intimate relationship between the offense charged and the accused public officer's office to vest jurisdiction on the Sandiganbayan. This is not the case here. The law restrains the liberty of a prisoner and puts him under the custody and watchful eyes of his jail guard. Again, the two-fold duties of a jail guard are to insure the safe custody and proper confinement of persons detained in the jail. The law restricts access to a prisoner. However, because of the very nature of the work of a jail guard, he has access to the prisoner. Crisostomo, as the jail guard, could not have conspired with the inmates to murder the detention prisoner in his cell if Crisostomo were not a "jailer." The Information accused Crisostomo of murdering a detention prisoner, a crime that collides directly with Crisostomo's office as a jail guard who has the duty to insure the safe custody of the prisoner. Crisostomo's purported act of killing a detention prisoner, while irregular and contrary to Crisostomo's duties, was committed while he was performing his official functions. The Information sufficiently apprised Crisostomo that he stood accused of committing the crime in relation to his office, a case that is cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, not the Regional Trial Court. There was no prejudice to Crisostomo's substantive rights. Assuming that the Information failed to allege that Crisostomo committed the crime in relation to his office, the Sandiganbayan still had jurisdiction to try the case. The Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan on 19 October 1993. Deloso v. Domingo,8 promulgated on 21 November 1990, did not require that the information should allege that the accused public officer committed the offense in relation to his office before the Sandiganbayan could assume jurisdiction over the case. In the present case, the Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan upon the recommendation of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman in a Resolution dated 30 June 1993. That Crisostomo committed the crime in relation to his office can be gleaned from the Deputy Ombudsman's resolution as it stated that: (1) Crisostomo was the jail guard on duty at the time that Renato was killed; (2) from the time that Crisostomo assumed his duty up to the discovery of Renato's body, no one had entered the jail and no one could enter the jail, as it was always locked, without the permission of the jail guard; (3) the key is always with the jail guard; (4) Renato sustained severe and multiple injuries inflicted by two or more persons indicating conspiracy; and (5) the relative position of the jail guard to the cell is in such a way that any activity inside the cell could be heard if not seen by the jail guard. Based on the foregoing findings, as well as on the Deloso v. Domingo ruling and the Court's instructions in Republic v. Asuncion, the Sandiganbayan had every reason to assume jurisdiction over this case. Crisostomo waited until the very last stage of this case, the rendition of the verdict, before he questioned the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction. Crisostomo is already estopped from questioning the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction. CASE NO. 12 ESTEBAN v. SANDIGANBAYAN TOPIC: JURISDICTION OF SANDIGANBAYAN PARTIES: THE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Ana May V. Simbajon, VERSUS Judge Rogelio M. Esteban, COMPLAINANT: Judge Rogelio M. Esteban FILED a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, assailing the Resolution dated December 18, 2000 of the Sandiganbayan (1st Division) and Order dated January 11, 2000 in Criminal Cases Nos. 24703-04. DEFENDANT: THE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES FACTS: In her complaint, Ana May alleged that she was a casual employee of the City Government of Cabanatuan City. Sometime in February 1997, she was detailed with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 1, Cabanatuan City, upon incessant request of Presiding Judge Reogelio Esteban, herein petitioner. After her detail with Branch 1, the item of bookbinder became vacant. Thus, she applied for the position but petitioner did not take any action on her application. On July 25, 1997, when she approached petitioner in his chambers to follow up her application, he told her, "Ano naman ang magiging kapalit ng pagpirma ko rito? Mula ngayon, girlfriend na kita. Araw-araw papasok ka dito sa opisina ko, at araw-araw, isang halik." Ana May refused to accede to his proposal as she considered him like her own father. Petitioner nonetheless recommended her for appointment. Thereafter, he suddenly kissed her on her left cheek. She was shocked and left the chambers, swearing never to return or talk to petitioner. On August 5, 1997, at around 9:30 in the morning, Virginia S. Medina, court interpreter, informed Ana May that petitioner wanted to see her in his chambers regarding the payroll. As a subordinate, she complied. Once inside, petitioner asked her if she has been receiving her salary as a bookbinder. When she answered in the affirmative, he said, "Matagal na pala eh, bakit hindi ka pumapasok dito sa kuwarto ko? Di ba sabi ko say iyo, girlfriend na kita?" Again, Ana May protested to his proposal, saying he is like a father to her and that he is a married man with two sons. Petitioner suddenly rose from his seat, grabbed her and said, "Hindi pwede yan, mahal kita." He embraced her, kissing her all over her face and touching her right breast. Ana May freed herself and dashed out of the chambers crying. She threw the payroll on the table of her co-employee, Elizabeth Q. Manubay. The latter sensed something was wrong and accompanied Ana May to the restroom. There she told Elizabeth what happened. ANA MAY: On March 9 and July 1, 1998, two Informations for violation of R.A. 7877 (Anti-Sexual Harassment Law of 1995) were filed against petitioner with the Sandiganbayan, docketed therein as Criminal Cases Nos. 24490 and 24702. On July 1, 1998, two Informations for acts of lasciviousness were filed with the same court, docketed as Criminal Cases. 24703-04. JUDGE ESTEBAN: On September 18, 1998, petitioner filed a motion to quash the Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 24703-04 for acts of lasciviousness on the ground that he has been placed four (4) times in jeopardy for the same offense. SANDIGANBAYAN: The Sandiganbayan denied the motion to quash but directed the prosecution to determine if the offenses charged in Criminal Cases Nos. 24703-04 were committed in relation to petitioner’s functions as a judge. PROSECUTION: The prosecution filed Amended Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 24703 and 24704 quoted as follows: Criminal Case No. 24703: That on or about the 5th day of August 1997 in Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija... within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court... JUDGE ROGELIO M. ESTEBAN, a public officer, being then the Presiding Judge of Branch 1 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cabanatuan City, who after having been rejected by the private complainant, Ana May V. Simbajon, of his sexual demands or solicitations to be his girlfriend and to enter his room daily for a kiss as a condition for the signing of complainant’s permanent appointment as a bookbinder in his Court, thus in relation to his office or position as such, with lewd design and malicious desire, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously planted a kiss on her left cheek against her will and consent, to her damage and detriment. Criminal Case No. 24704 That on or about the 25th day of June 1997 in Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija ... and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court... JUDGE ROGELIO M. ESTEBAN, a public officer, being then the Presiding Judge of Branch 1 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cabanatuan City, who after having been rejected by the private complainant, Ana May V. Simbajon, of his sexual demands or solicitations to be his girlfriend and to enter his room daily for a kiss as a condition for the signing of complainant’s permanent appointment as a bookbinder in his Court, thus in relation to his office or position as such, with lewd design and malicious desire, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously planted a kiss on her left cheek against her will and consent, to her damage and detriment. JUDGE ESTEBAN: On September 29, 1999, HE filed a motion to quash the Amended Informations on the ground that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the crimes charged considering that they were not committed in relation to his office as a judge. SANDIGANBAYAN: On November 22, 1999, before the Sandiganbayan could resolve the motion to quash, the prosecution filed the following Re-Amended Information in Criminal Case No. 24703 which was admitted by the Sandiganbayan. "That on or about the 5th day of August 1997 in Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, JUDGE ROGELIO M. ESTEBAN, a public officer, being then the Presiding Judge of Branch 1 of the Municipal Trial Court in Cabanatuan City, who after having been rejected by the private complainant, Ana May V. Simbajon, of his sexual demands or solicitations to be his girlfriend and to enter his room daily for a kiss as a condition for the signing of complainant’s permanent appointment as a bookbinder in his Court, thus in relation to his office or position as such, with lewd design and malicious desire, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously grab private complainant, kiss her all over her face and touch her right breast against her will and consent, to her damage and detriment. Sandiganbayan denied petitioner’s motion to quash the Amended Informations, holding that "the act of approving or indorsing the permanent appointment of complaining witness was certainly a function of the office of the accused so that his acts are, therefore, committed in relation to his office." JUDGE ESTEBAN: He moved for a reconsideration, but was denied. Hence, the instant petition for certiorari. ISSUE/S: Whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over Criminal Cases Nos. 24703-04 for acts of lasciviousness filed against petitioner. PETTIONER’S ARGUMENT/S: He contends that the alleged acts of lasciviousness were not committed in relation to his office as a judge; and the fact that he is a public official is not an essential element of the crimes charged. DEFENDANT’S ARGUMENT/S: The Ombudsman, represented by the Office of the Special Prosecutor, maintains that the allegations in the 2 Amended Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 24703-04 indicate a close relationship between petitioner’s official functions as a judge and the commission of acts of lasciviousness. RULING/SC’S DISCUSSION/LAWS MENTIONED: YES, SANDIGANBAYAN HAS JURISDICTION. Sandiganbayan did not gravely abuse its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting the Amended Information for acts of lasciviousness Petition is DISMISSED. Assailed Resolution and Order of the Sandiganbayan are AFFIRMED. “An offense is said to have been committed in relation to the office if the offense is "intimately connected" with the office of the offender” Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended by Republic Act No. 8249: SEC. 4. Jurisdiction. – The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving: xxx b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crime committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their office. People v. Montejo: an offense is said to have been committed in relation to the office if the offense is "intimately connected" with the office of the offender and perpetrated while he was in the performance of his official functions. This intimate relation between the offense charged and the discharge of official duties must be alleged in the Information. This is in accordance with the rule that the factor that characterizes the charge is the actual recital of the facts in the complaint or information. Hence, where the information is wanting in specific factual averments to show the intimate relationship/connection between the offense charged and the discharge of official functions, the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the case. Under Supreme Court Circular No. 7 dated April 27, 1987, petitioner, as presiding judge of MTCC, Branch 1, Cabanatuan City, is vested with the power to recommend the appointment of Ana May Simbajon as bookbinder. As alleged in the Amended Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 24703-04, she was constrained to approach petitioner on June 25, 1997 as she needed his recommendation. But he imposed a condition before extending such recommendation she should be his girlfriend and must report daily to his office for a kiss. There can be no doubt, therefore, that petitioner used his official position in committing the acts complained of. While it is true, as petitioner argues, that public office is not an element of the crime of acts of lasciviousness, defined and penalized under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, nonetheless, he could not have committed the crimes charged were it not for the fact that as the Presiding Judge of the MTCC, Branch I, Cabanatuan City, he has the authority to recommend the appointment of Ana May as bookbinder. In other words, the crimes allegedly committed are intimately connected with his office. The jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information.The Amended Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 24703-04 contain allegations showing that the acts of lasciviousness were committed by petitioner in relation to his official function. LAWS MENTIONED: REPUBLIC ACT No. 8249: AN ACT FURTHER DEFINING THE JURISDICTION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1606, AS AMENDED, PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES Section 4. Section 4 of the same decree is hereby further amended to read as follows: "A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense: "(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade '27' and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including: "(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers and other provincial department heads; "(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors engineers and other city department heads; "(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher; "(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank; "(e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of provincial director and those holding the rank of senior superintendent or higher; "(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor; "(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or -controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations; "(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade'27'and up under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989; "(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; "(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; and "(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade'27'and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989. "B. Other offenses orfelonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their office. "C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986. "In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary grade '27' or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military or PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court and municipal circuit trial court ' as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdiction as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended. "The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or orders or regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction orof their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided. "The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for the issuance of the writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction and over petitions of similar nature, including quo warranto, arising or that may arise in cases filed or which may be filed under Executive Order Nos. 1,2,14 and 14-A, issued in 1986: Provided, That the jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be exclusive of the Supreme Court. The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the implementing rules that the Supreme Court has promulgated and may hereafter promulgate, relative to appeals/petitions for review to the Court of Appeals, shall apply to appeals and petitions for review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of the Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor, shall represent the People of the Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986. "In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public officers or employees, including those employed in govemment-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them. "Any provisions of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the criminal action and the corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability shall at all times be simultaneously instituted with, and jointly determined in, the same proceeding by the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts, the filing of the criminal action being deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil action, and no right to reserve the filing of such civil action separately from the criminal action shall be recognized: Provided, however, That where the civil action had therefore been filed separately but judgment therein has not yet been rendered, and the criminal case is hereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, said civil action shall be transferred to the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, as the case may be, for consolidation and joint determination with the criminal action, otherwise the separate civil action shall be deemed abandoned." Bonifacio v. RTC of Makati, Br. 149 FACTS: Petitioners Bonifacio et al were charged with the crime of libel. Gimenez, on behalf of Yuchengco family and Malayan Insurance Co., filed a criminal complaint for libel under Article 355 in relation to Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code. The complaint alleged that petitioners publicly and maliciously with intention of attacking the honesty, virtue, honor and integrity, character and reputation of Malayan Insurance Co. Inc., and Yuchengco family for exposing them to public hatred and contempt, and published in the said website http://www.pepcoalition.com a defamatory article persuading the public to remove their investments and policies from the said company after the petitioners filed to seek their redress for their pecuniary loss under the policies they obtained from the company. Petitioners filed before the respondent RTC of Makati a Motion to Quash on the grounds that it failed to vest jurisdiction on the Makati RTC. Petitioners maintained that the Information failed to allege a particular place within the trial courts jurisdiction where the subject article was printed and first published or that the offended parties resided in Makati at the time the alleged defamatory material was printed and first published, and the prosecution erroneously laid the venue of the case in the place where the offended party accessed the internet-published article. ISSUE: Whether the RTC Makati erred in admitting an amended information? RULING: Yes, Venue is jurisdictional in criminal actions such that the place where the crime was committed determines not only the venue of the action but constitutes an essential element of jurisdiction. The venue of libel cases where the complainant is a private individual is limited to only either of two places such as the place where the complainant actually resides at the time of the commission of the offense and the place the alleged defamatory article was printed and first published. Further, RA 4363 amended Art 360 of the RPC which sets the venue for the filing of an information for a libel case. The old rule allows the filing of an action for libel in any jurisdiction where the libelous article was published or circulated. Disini v. Secretary of Justice G.R. No. 203335 February 2014 Facts: The consolidated petitions seek to declare several provisions of R.A. 10175, the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012, unconstitutional and void. The cybercrime law aims to regulate access to and use of the cyberspace. The cyberspace is a boon to the need of the current generation for greater information and facility of communication. However, all is not well with the system since it could not flter out a number of persons of ill will who would want to use cyberspace technology for mischiefs and crimes. The government certainly has the duty and the right to prevent these tomfooleries from happening and punish their perpetrators, hence the Cybercrime Prevention Act. Meanwhile, petitioners claim that the means adopted by the cybercrime law for regulating undesirable cyberspace activities violate certain of their constitutional rights. The government of course asserts that the law merely seeks to reasonably put order into cyberspace activities, punish wrongdoings, and prevent hurtful attacks on the system. Pending hearing and adjudication of the issues presented in these cases, on February 5, 2013 the Court extended the original 120-day temporary restraining order (TRO) that it earlier issued on October 9, 2012, enjoining respondent government agencies from implementing the cybercrime law until further orders. Issues: Whether or not the following provisions of the cybercrime law that regard certain acts as crimes and impose penalties for their commission as well as the provisions that would enable the government to track down and penalize violators are constitutional: a. Section 4 (a) (1) on Illegal Access; b. Section 4 (a) (3) on Data Interference; c. Section 4 (a) (6) on Cyber-squatting; d. Section 4 (b) (3) on Identity Theft; e. Section 4 (c) (1) on Cybersex; f. Section 4 (c) (2) on Child Pornography; g. Section 4 (c) (3) on Unsolicited Commercial Communications; h. Section 4 (c) (4) on Libel; i. Section 5 on Aiding or Abetting and Attempt in the Commission of Cybercrimes; j. Section 6 on the Penalty of One Degree Higher; k. Section 7 on the Prosecution under both the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and R.A. 10175; l. Section 8 on Penalties; m. Section 12 on Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data; n. Section 13 on Preservation of Computer Data; o. Section 14 on Disclosure of Computer Data; p. Section 15 on Search, Seizure and Examination of Computer Data; q. Section 17 on Destruction of Computer Data; r. Section 19 on Restricting or Blocking Access to Computer Data; s. Section 20 on Obstruction of Justice; t. Section 24 on Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC); and u. Section 26 (a) on CICC's Powers and Functions. Whether or not Articles 353,354, 361, and 362 of the Revised Penal Code on the crime of libel is constitutional Ruling: a. b. c. d. e. f. g. h. Section 4(a)(1) is valid and constitutional. The strict scrutiny standard is not applicable since freedom of speech is not what is punished but only the access of a computer system without right. Besides, the ethical hacker does his job with prior permission from the client according to their agreement. Section 4(a)(3) is valid and constitutional. It does not encroach on any freedom under the overbreadth doctrine. It simply punishes a form of vandalism on computer data, electronic document or electronic data message. There is no freedom to destroy other people’s computer systems and private documents. Section 4(a)(6) is valid and constitutional. The law is reasonable in penalizing the offender for acquiring the domain name in bad faith to proft, mislead, destroy reputation, or deprive others who are not illmotivated of the rightful opportunity of registering the same. Section 4(b)(3) is valid and constitutional. The press has nothing to fear since a special circumstance is present to negate intent to gain which is required in this section. Section 4(c)(1) is valid and constitutional. Engaging in sexual acts privately through internet connection, perceived by some as a right, has to be balanced with the mandate of the State to eradicate white slavery and the exploitation of women. Section 4(c)(2) is valid and constitutional. The intensity or duration of penalty is a legislative prerogative. There is also a rational basis for such higher penalty. The potential for uncontrolled proliferation of a particular piece of child pornography when uploaded in the cyberspace is incalculable. Section 4(c)(3) is void and unconstitutional. To prohibit the transmission of unsolicited ads would deny a person the right to read his emails, even unsolicited commercial ads addressed to him. Unsolicited advertisements are legitimate forms of expression. Section 4(c)(4) on online libel is valid and constitutional with respect to the original author of the post but void and unconstitutional with respect to others who simply receive the post and react to it. The internet encourages a freewheeling, anything-goes writing style. They are a world apart in terms of quickness of the readers’ reaction to defamatory statements posted in cyberspace, facilitated by one-click reply options offered by the networking site as well as by the speed with which such reactions are disseminated down the line to other internet users. i. j. k. l. m. n. o. p. q. Section 5 that penalizes aiding or abetting and attempt in the commission of cybercrimes is valid and constitutional only in relation to Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access, Section 4(a)(2) on Illegal Interception, Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference, Section 4(a)(4) on System Interference, Section 4(a)(5) on Misuse of Devices, Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting, Section 4(b)(1) on Computer-related Forgery, Section 4(b) (2) on Computer-related Fraud, Section 4(b)(3) on Computer-related Identity Theft, and Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex; but void and unconstitutional with respect to Sections 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography, 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial Communications, and 4(c) (4) on online Libel. Penal laws should provide reasonably clear guidelines for law enforcement officials and triers of facts to prevent arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Section 6 is valid and constitutional. It merely makes commission of existing crimes through the internet a qualifying circumstance. In using technology, the offender often evades identifcation and is able to reach far more victims or cause greater harm. This creates a basis for higher penalties for cybercrimes. Section 7 is void and unconstitutional only in respect to (1) Online libel charged under both Section 4(c)(4) of R. A. 10175 and Article 353 of the RPC, and (2) Online child pornography charged under both Section 4(c) (2) of R.A. 10175 and R.A. 9775 or the Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009 because of double jeopardy. The Court resolves to leave the determination of the correct application of Section 7 to actual cases. Section 8 is valid and constitutional. It is the prerogative of the lawmaking body to prescribe a measure of severe penalties for what it regards as deleterious cybercrimes. Section 12 is void and unconstitutional. The supposed limitation is no limitation at all since it is the law enforcement agencies that would specify the target communications. The power is virtually limitless, enabling law enforcement authorities to engage in “fshing expedition,” choosing whatever specifed communication they want. This threatens the right of individuals to privacy. Section 13 is valid and constitutional. The data that service providers preserve on orders of law enforcement authorities are not made inaccessible to users by reason of the issuance of such orders. The process of preserving data will not unduly hamper the normal transmission or use of the same. Section 14 is valid and constitutional. It envisions only the enforcement of a duly issued court warrant. The prescribed procedure for disclosure would not constitute an unlawful search or seizure nor would it violate the privacy of communications and correspondence. Disclosure can be made only after judicial intervention. Section 15 is valid and constitutional. It does not supersede existing search and seizure rules but merely supplements them. It does not pose any threat on the rights of the person from whom they were taken. Section 17 is valid and constitutional. It does not deprive the user’s right against deprivation of property without due process of law because it is unclear that the user has a demandable right to require the service provider to have a copy of the data saved indefnitely for him in its storage r. s. t. u. system. If he wanted them preserved, he should have saved them in his computer. He could also request the service provider for a copy before it is deleted. Section 19 is void and unconstitutional which authorizes the DOJ to restrict or block access to suspected Computer Data. It is in violation of the constitutional guarantees to freedom of expression and against unreasonable searches and seizures. Section 20 is valid and constitutional in so far as it applies to the provisions of Chapter IV which are not struck down by Court. There must be judicial determination of guilt, during which defense and justifcations for non-compliance done knowingly or wilfully may be raised. Section 24 is valid and constitutional. The formulation of the cybersecurity plan is consistent with the policy of law to prevent and combat cyber offenses by facilitating their detection, investigation, and prosecution at both the domestic and international levels, and by providing arrangements for fast and reliable international cooperation. Section 26(a) is valid and constitutional. For the same reason in the preceding number, the policy adopted is in the interest of law and order, which has been considered as sufficient standard. Articles 353, 354, 361, and 362 of the Revised Penal Code that penalizes libel are valid and constitutional. Case Digest DISINI V. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE G.R. No. 203335 February 18, 2014 Jimenez v. Sorongon, 687 SCRA 151 G.R. No. 178607 BRlON, J. Petitioners: DANTE LA. JlMENEZ, in his capacity as president and representative of UNLAD SHlPPlNG & MANAGEMENT CORpORATlON, December 5, 2012 JM Tolentino Respondents: HON. EDWlN SORONGON (in his capacity as presiding Judge of Branch 214 of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City), SOCRATES ANTZOULATOS, CARMEN ALAMlL, MARCELl GAZA and MARKOS AVGOUSTlS TOPIC: RULE 110 - PROCECUTION OF OFFENSES Facts: Petitioner is the president of Unlad Shipping & Management Corporation, a local manning agency. Private respondents are some of the listed incorporators of Tsakos Maritime Services, lnc. (TMSl), another local manning agency Unlad Shpping filed a complaint-affidavit against the TMSI for syndicated and large scale illegal recruitment. Petitioner alleged that the respondents falsely represented their stockholdings in TMSl’s articles of incorporation to secure a license to operate as a recruitment agency from the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA) City prosecutor filed the corresponding criminal information with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaluyong City RTC ordered the issuance of warrants of arrest against the respondents upon finding the existence of probable cause to hold respondents for trial Respondent Alamil filed a motion for judicial determination of probable cause with a request to defer enforcement of the warrants of arrest Petitioner filed his opposition with motion to expunge, contending that respondent AIamiI, being a fugitive from justice, had no standing to seek any reIief and that the RTC already found probable cause to hold the respondents for trial The RTC granted respondent Alamil’s motion for reconsideration. It treated respondent Alamil’s motion for judicial determination as a motion to dismiss for lack of probable cause. It found: (1) no evidence on record to indicate that the respondents gave any false information to secure a license to operate as a recruitment agency from the POEA; and (2) that respondent Alamil voluntarily submitted to the RTC’s jurisdiction through the filing of pleadings seeking affirmative relief. Thus, the RTC dismissed the case, and set aside the earlier issued warrants of arrest. On October 18, 2006, the petitioner elevated his case to the CA via a Rule 65 petition for certiorari assailing the RTC’s March 8, 2006, May 10, 2006, and August 7, 2006 orders. In its November 23, 2006 resolution, the CA dismissed outright the petitioner’s Rule 65 petition for lack of legal personality to file the petition on behalf of the People of the Philippines. Issue/s and Ratio: Whether the CA committed a reversible error in dismissing outright the petitioner’s Rule 65 petition for certiorari for lack of legal personality to file the petition on behalf of the P e o p l e o f t h e P h i l i p p i n e s ? NO The petitioner has no legal personality to assail the dismissal of the criminal case It is well-settled that "every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest[,]" "who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or by the party entitled to the avails of the suit." Interest means material interest or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved. By real interest is meant a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy, or a future, contingent, subordinate or consequential interest. When the plaintiff or the defendant is not a real party in interest, the suit is dismissible. Procedural law basically mandates that "[a]ll criminal actions commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of a public prosecutor." In appeals of criminal cases before the CA and before this Court, the OSG is the appellate counsel of the People, pursuant to Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code. This section explicitly provides: SEC. 35. Powers and Functions. — The Office of the Solicitor General shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers. . . . It shall have the following specific powers and functions: (1) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings; represent the Government and its officers in the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in which the Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is a party. (emphasis added) The People is the real party in interest in a criminal case and only the OSG can represent the People in criminal proceedings pending in the CA or in this Court. This ruling has been repeatedly stressed in several cases and continues to be the controlling doctrine. While there may be rare occasions when the offended party may be allowed to pursue the criminal action on his own behalf (as when there is a denial of due process), this exceptional circumstance does not apply in the present case. In this case, the petitioner has no legal personality to assail the dismissal of the criminal case since the main issue raised by the petitioner involved the criminal aspect of the case, i.e., the existence of probable cause. The petitioner did not appeal to protect his alleged pecuniary interest as an offended party of the crime, but to cause the reinstatement of the criminal action against the respondents. This involves the right to prosecute which pertains exclusively to the People, as represented by the OSG. Whether or not respondent Alamil has no legal standing to seek any relief from the RTC since she is a fugitive from justice? Alamil can seek relief from the RTC Respondent Alamil voluntarily submitted to the RTC’s jurisdiction As a rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. Filing pleadings seeking affirmative relief constitutes voluntary appearance, and the consequent jurisdiction of one's person to the jurisdiction of the court. Thus, by filing several motions before the RTC seeking the dismissal of the criminal case, respondent Alamil voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the RTC. Custody of the law is not required for the adjudication of reliefs other than an application for bail. Ruling: WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the appeal. The twin resolutions of the CoUJt of Appeals dated November 23, 2006 and June 28, 2007 in CAG. R. SP No. 96584 are AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner. People vs. Valdez it is unavoidable for the Court to pronounce PO2 Valdez guilty of three homicides, instead of three murders, on account of the informations not sufficiently alleging the attendance of treachery. 663 SCRA 272 . January 18, 2012 Ponente: BERSAMIN, ItJ.cannot be otherwise, for, indeed, the real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the information, or from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, which are mere conclusions of law, but FACTS: by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or information The Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City charged the two accused, Eduardo Valdez and Edwin Valdez, in the RTC with three counts of murder for the killing of Ferdinand Sayson, Moises Sayson, Jr., and Joselito Sayson. The RTC convicted the two accused of three counts of murder and sentenced them to suffer reclusion perpetua for each count of murder and ordered to pay to the heirs of each victim P93,000.00 as actual damages, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, and P50,000.00 as moral damages. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) upheld the RTC on July 18, 2006, subject to the modification that each accused pay to the heirs of each victim P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, P25,000.00 as temperate damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, plus costs of suit. The accused came to the Court to seek acquittal. On May 9, 2007, however, accused Edwin Valdez filed a motion to withdraw appeal, which the Court granted on October 10, 2007, thereby deeming Edwin’s appeal closed and terminated. Hence, the Court hereby resolves only the appeal of PO2 Eduardo Valdez. ISSUE: Whether the information is sufficient considering the failure to mention the aggravating circumstance of the crime. HELD: NO. Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Information; Pleadings and Practice; The real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the information, or from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, which are mere conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of the facts in the complaint or information.—The real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the information, or from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, which are mere conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of the facts in the complaint or information. In People v. Dimaano, 469 SCRA 647 (2005), the Court elaborated: For complaint or information to be sufficient, it must state the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was committed. What is controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the designation of the offense charged or the particular law or part thereof allegedly violated, these being mere conclusions of law made by the prosecutor, but the description of the crime charged and the particular facts therein recited. The acts or omissions complained of must be alleged in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment. No information for a crime will be sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly allege the elements of the crime charged. FERNANDO Q. MIGUEL v. SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. No. 172035, July 4, 2012 (SECOND DIVISION) BRION, J. FACTS: A letter-complaint was filed with the Ombudsman charging Miguel with violation of RA 3019. The Ombudsman directed Miguel to submit his counter-affidavit. The Ombudsman found probable cause against Miguel and some private individuals for violation of RA 3019 and against Miguel alone for Falsification of Public Document [Art. 171(4), RPC]. Subsequently, the Ombudsman filed Informations with the Sandiganbayan. Miguel moved for a reinvestigation, which the Sandiganbayan granted. Despite the extension period asked and given multiple times, Miguel failed to file his counter-affidavit, prompting Prosec. Ruiz to declare that Miguel had waived his right to submit countervailing evidence. After several extensions sought and granted, Miguel filed a Motion to Quash and/or Reinvestigation for the criminal cases against him. The Sandiganbayan denied his motion because of the pending OSP reinvestigation. Miguel was arraigned and pleaded not guilty in both criminal cases. The OSP filed a Motion to Suspend Miguel Pendente Lite. Miguel filed his Opposition based on the “obvious and fatal defect of the information” in failing to allege that the giving of unwarranted benefits and advantages was done through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. A resolution was promulgated, suspending Miguel from his position as City Mayor for 90 days. Miguel moved for reconsideration of his suspension order and demanded for a pre-suspension hearing. The Sandiganbayan denied his motion, prompting him to file this petition to challenge the validity of his suspension order. ISSUE: Whether the information charging Miguel with violation of Sec. 3(e) of RA 3019 is valid. HELD: YES. In deference to the constitutional right of an accused to be informed of the nature and the cause of the accusation against him, Sec. 6, Rule 110 requires that the information shall state the designation of the offense given by the statute and the acts or omissions imputed which constitute the offense charged. Additionally, the Rules require that these acts or omissions and its attendant circumstances "must be stated in ordinary and concise language" and "in terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is being charged and for the court to pronounce judgment." A reading of the information clearly reveals that the phrase "acting with evident bad faith and manifest partiality" was merely a continuation of the prior allegation of the acts of Miguel, and that he ultimately acted with evident bad faith and manifest partiality in giving unwarranted benefits and advantages to his co-accused private individuals. Given the supposed ambiguity of the subject being qualified by the phrase "acting with evident bad faith and manifest partiality," the remedy of Miguel, if at all, is merely to move for a bill of particulars and not for the quashal of an information which sufficiently alleges the elements of the offense charged. PEOPLE vs SORIA G.R. No. 179031, November 14, 2012 Facts: “AAA”after eating, went to the bedroom to rest. Thereafter, appellant entered the room and positioned himself on top of “AAA”, took off her clothes and inserted his penis into her vagina. “AAA” felt intense pain from her breast down to her vagina and thus told her father that it was painful. At that point, the appellant apologized to his daughter, stood up, and left the room. This whole incident was witnessed by “AAA’s” brother, “BBB”. The trial court rendered its judgment finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape against “AAA”, his daughter of minor age, as charged in the Information. While the appellate court was convinced that appellant raped “AAA”, it nevertheless noted the prosecution’s failure to present her birth certificate as competent proof of her minority. Thus, the CA concluded that the crime committed by appellant against his daughter was only simple rape and accordingly modified the penalty imposed by the trial court from death to reclusion perpetua. Still insisting on his innocence, appellant comes to this Court through this appeal. Issue: Whether the information against the accused for the crime of Rape is sufficient Held: Yes, The Information stated that appellant inserted his penis into the genital of “AAA,” which constituted rape by sexual intercourse under the first paragraph of Article 266-A. At the same time, the Information alleged that appellant used force and intimidation to commit an act of sexual assault. While these allegations cause ambiguity, they only pertain to the mode or manner of how the rape was committed and the same do not invalidate the Information or result in the automatic dismissal of the case. “[W]here an offense may be committed in any of the different modes and the offense is alleged to have been committed in two or more modes specified, the indictment is sufficient, notwithstanding the fact that the different means of committing the same offense are prohibited by separate sections of the statute. The allegation in the information of the various ways of committing the offense should be regarded as a description of only one offense and the information is not thereby rendered defective on the ground of multifariousness.”17 Any objection from the appellant with respect to the Information is held to have been waived failing any effort to oppose the same before trial.18 He therefore can be convicted of rape through sexual intercourse or rape by sexual assault, depending on the evidence adduced during trial. UNION BANK VS PEOPLE (Perjury) G.R. No. 192565, February 28, 2012 En Banc Brion, J Nature of the Case: Petition for the reversal of RTC Decision & Petition to Quash the Information for Perjury against Tomas Brief: This is an appeal of the decision rendered by the Lower Court on the constitutionality of Ordinance No. 84, series of 1975 of the Municipality of Bocaue, Bulacan. FACTS: Certification against Forum Shopping was made integral parts of two complaints for sum of money with prayer for a writ of replevin against the respondent spouses Eddie Tamondong and Eliza B. Tamondong, Spouses filed a complaint-affidavit against Tomas for violation of Article 183 of the RPC, for making a false narration in a Certificate against Forum Shopping. OSG shared the petitioner’s view and issued Manifestation and Motion in lieu of Comment relying also in Ilusorio case and the crime of perjury is the deliberate or intentional giving of false evidence in the court where the evidence is material. The case was referred to En Banc because of the conflicting rulings in the case of Ilusorio (basis of the petition) and the Sy Tiong case that was the basis of the assailed RTC-Makati City ruling ISSUE: WON perjury is committed? ACTIONS OF THE COURT: MTC of Makati: Denied the Petition to Quash on the ff. ground: a) It has jurisdiction since the Certificate against Forum Shopping was notarized in Makati City; and b) Information sufficiently charged Tomas with perjury Dismissed the Motion for Reconsideration filed by Petitioner RTC-Makati- Dismissed the Petition for Certiorari on the ground of abuse of discretion. Basis of the ruling is quoted as follows “the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or territory where the offense was committed, or where any of its essential ingredients occurred.” RTC-Makati City also observed that the facts in Ilusorio [the case used by the petitioner] are different from the facts of the present case MTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion since since the order denying the Motion to Quash was based on jurisprudence later than Ilusorio. Supreme Court: Dismissed the petition. Rationale: The constitutive act of the offense is the making of an affidavit; thus, the criminal act is consummated when the statement containing a falsity is subscribed and sworn before a duly authorized person. The following are the elements of Perjury vis-à-vis the applicability in the herein case: ELEMENT APPLICABILITY 1. That the accused made a The petitioner executed statement under oath or Certificate Against Forum executed an affidavit upon a Shopping, duly notarized in material matter Makati City 2. That the statement or The petitioner executed affidavit was made before a Certificate Against Forum competent officer, authorized to Shopping, duly notarized in receive and administer oath. Makati City. 3. That in the statement or Deliberate falsehood was also affidavit, the accused made a sufficiently alleged to have willful and deliberate assertion been committed in Makati of a falsehood. City, not Pasay City. The Information indicates that the Petitioner has not commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same issues in another tribunal or agency, accused knowing well that said material statement was false 4. That the sworn statement or Certificate Against Forum affidavit containing the falsity Shopping is required by law. is required by law or made for a legal purpose. As to the venue (criminal proceedings), when the crime is committed through false testimony under oath in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil, venue is at the place where the testimony under oath is given. If in lieu of or as supplement to the actual testimony made in a proceeding that is neither criminal nor civil, a written sworn statement is submitted, venue may either be at the place where the sworn statement is submitted or where the oath was taken as the taking of the oath and the submission are both material ingredients of the crime committed. In all cases, determination of venue shall be based on the acts alleged in the Information to be constitutive of the crime committed. NOTE: In my opinion, other topics discussed in the case are more applicable to the proper venue of action which is covered in Criminal Proceeding subject. As to the Criminal Law subject, the essence of the case is only to determine whether Perjury is committed. 25.Solidum v. People, 718 SCRA 263 Facts: Gerald Albert Gercayo (Gerald) was born on June 2, 1992 with an imperforate anus. Two days after his birth, Gerald underwent colostomy, a surgical procedure to bring one end of the large intestine out through the abdominal wall, enabling him to excrete through a colostomy bag attached to the side of his body. On May 17, 1995, Gerald, then three years old, was admitted at the Ospital ng Maynila for a pull-through operation. Dr. Leandro Resurreccion headed the surgical team, and was assisted by Dr. Joselito Luceño, Dr. Donatella Valeña and Dr. Joseph Tibio. The anesthesiologists included Dr. Marichu Abella, Dr. Arnel Razon and petitioner Dr. Fernando Solidum (Dr. Solidum). During the operation, Gerald experienced bradycardia, and went into a coma. His coma lasted for two weeks, but he regained consciousness only after a month. He could no longer see, hear or move. Agitated by her son’s helpless and unexpected condition, Ma. Luz Gercayo (Luz) lodged a complaint for reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries with the City Prosecutor’s Office of Manila against the attending physicians. The RTC found Dr. Solidum guilty beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries. Solidum failed to monitor and to properly regulate the level of anesthetic agent administered on Gerald. CA affirmed and applied the doctrine of res ipsa liquitor. Issues: (1) Whether or not the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor applies to this case. (2) Whether or not CA correctly affirmed the conviction of Dr. Solidum for liable for criminal negligence. Ruling: 1. The Court held that the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor in the case at bar is inappropriate. Res Ipsa Loquitor is literally translated as “the thing or the transaction speaks for itself.” It means that “where the thing which causes injury is shown to be under the management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management use proper case, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of case.” It is applied in conjunction with the doctrine of common knowledge. However, the doctrine is not a rule of substantive law, but merely a mode of proof or a mere procedural convenience. The doctrine, when applicable to the facts and circumstances of a given case, is not meant to and does not dispense with the requirement of proof of culpable negligence against the party charged. It merely determines or regulates what shall be prima facie evidence thereof, and help the plaintiff in proving a breach of duty. It can be invoked on when, under the circumstances involved, direct evidence is absent and not readily available. Essential requisites: a) The accident was of a kind that does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; b) The instrumentality or agency that caused the injury under the exclusive control of the person charged; and c) The injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution of the person injured. Elements 2 and 3 were present in this case. However, the first element was undeniably wanting. 2. No, the prosecution failed to prove the existence of the elements of reckless imprudence beyond reasonable doubt. Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the interest of another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance that the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. Reckless imprudence, on the other hand, consists of voluntarily doing or failing to do, without malice, an act from which material damage results by reason of an inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act. The prosecution did not prove the elements of reckless imprudence BRD because the circumstances cited by the CA were insufficient to establish that Dr. Solidum had been guilty of inexcusable lack of precaution in monitoring the administration of the anesthetic agent of Gerald. An action upon medical negligence – whether criminal, civil or administrative – calls for the plaintiff to prove by competent evidence each of the following 4 elements, namely; a) The duty owned by the physician to the patient, as created by the physician-patient relationship, to act in accordance with the specific norms or standards established by his profession; b) The breach of the duty by the physician’s failing to act in accordance with the applicable standard of care; c) The causation, i.e., there must be a reasonably close and causal connection between the negligent act or omission and the resulting injury; and d) The damages suffered by the patient. The standard of care is an objective standard by which the conduct of a physician sued for negligence or malpractice may be measured, and it does not depend, therefore, on any individual physician's own knowledge either. In attempting to fix a standard by which a court may determine whether the physician has properly performed the requisite duty toward the patient, expert medical testimony from both plaintiff and defense experts is required. The judge, as the trier of fact, ultimately determines the standard of care, after listening to the testimony of all medical experts The testimonies the prosecution presented did not prove beyond reasonable doubt that Dr. Solidum had been recklessly imprudent in administering the anesthetic agent to Gerald. Dr. Solidum was criminally charged for “failing to monitor and regulate properly the levels of anesthesia administered to said Gerla and using 100% halothan and other anesthetic medications.” However, the findings of Dr. Vertido, one of the anesthesiologists, was revealingly concluded that “although the anesthesiologists followed the normal routine and precautionary procedures, still hyproxia3 and its corresponding side effects did occur.” Hence, 100% halothan is not what should be administered, it should be 100% oxygen. G.R. No. 192123 March 10, 2014 DR. FERNANDO P. SOLIDUM, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. FACTS: This appeal is taken by a physician-anesthesiologist who has been pronounced guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and the Court of Appeals (CA). He had been part of the team of anesthesiologists during the surgical pull-through operation conducted on a threeyear old patient born with an imperforate anus. Gerald Albert Gercayo (Gerald) was born on June 2, 1992 with an imperforate anus. Two days after his birth, Gerald underwent colostomy, a surgical procedure to bring one end of the large intestine out through the abdominal wall, enabling him to excrete through a colostomy bag attached to the side of his body. On May 17, 1995, Gerald, then three years old, was admitted at the Ospital ng Maynila for a pull-through operation. The petitioner Dr. Fernando Solidum (Dr. Solidum) was the anesthesioligist. During the operation, Gerald experienced bradycardia, and went into a coma. He regained consciousness only after a month. He could no longer see, hear or move. Agitated by her son’s helpless and unexpected condition, Ma. Luz Gercayo (Luz) lodged a complaint for reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries with the City Prosecutor’s Office of Manila against the attending physicians. Upon a finding of probable cause, the City Prosecutor’s Office filed an information solely against Dr. Solidum. The case was initially filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, but was transferred to the RTC pursuant to Section 5 of Republic Act No. 8369 (The Family Courts Act of 1997). On July 19, 2004, the RTC rendered its judgment finding Dr. Solidum guilty beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence resulting to serious physical injuries. On January 20, 2010, the CA affirmed the conviction of Dr. Solidum. ISSUE(S): 1) whether or not Dr. Solidum was liable for criminal negligence. 2) Wether or not Dr. Solidum was civilly liable HELD: 1) No 2) No RATIO: Issue 1: Dr. Solidum was criminally charged for "failing to monitor and regulate properly the levels of anesthesia administered to said Gerald Albert Gercayo and using 100% halothane and other anesthetic medications." However, the foregoing circumstances, taken together, did not prove beyond reasonable doubt that Dr. Solidum had been recklessly imprudent in administering the anesthetic agent to Gerald. Indeed, Dr. Vertido’s findings did not preclude the probability that other factors related to Gerald’s major operation, which could or could not necessarily be attributed to the administration of the anesthesia, had caused the hypoxia and had then led Gerald to experience bradycardia. Dr. Vertido revealingly concluded in his report, instead, that "although the anesthesiologist followed the normal routine and precautionary procedures, still hypoxia and its corresponding side effects did occur." The existence of the probability about other factors causing the hypoxia has engendered in the mind of the Court a reasonable doubt as to Dr. Solidum’s guilt, and moves us to acquit him of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to serious physical injuries. " Issue #2 We have to clarify that the acquittal of Dr. Solidum would not immediately exempt him from civil liability. But we cannot now find and declare him civilly liable because the circumstances that have been established here do not present the factual and legal bases for validly doing so. His acquittal did not derive only from reasonable doubt. There was really no firm and competent showing how the injury to Gerard had been caused. That meant that the manner of administration of the anesthesia by Dr. Solidum was not necessarily the cause of the hypoxia that caused the bradycardia experienced by Gerard. Consequently, to adjudge Dr. Solidum civilly liable would be to speculate on the cause of the hypoxia. We are not allowed to do so, for civil liability must not rest on speculation but on competent evidence. CASTILLO VS SALVADOR G.R. NO. 191240, JULY 30, 2014 FACTS: Respondent Phillip R. Salvador was charged with estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code. The Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals acquitted him of the same but the civil aspect of the case remained. Respondent Salvador then filed a petition for review on Certiorari to the Supreme Court. Petitioner Cristina B. Castillo is a businesswoman engaged in real estate business, educational institution, boutique, and trading business. She was then enticed by Salvador and his brother, Ramon Salvador to engage in freight and remittance business. As petitioner had deeply fallen in love with respondent Salvador and since she trusted him very much as he even acted as a father to her children when her annulment was ongoing, she agreed to embark on the remittance business. She agreed with respondent and Ramon that any profit derived from the business would be equally divided among them and that respondent would be in charge of promotion and marketing in Hong Kong, while Ramon would take charge of the operations of business in the Philippines and she would be financing the business. The business has not operated yet as petitioner was still raising the amount of US$100,000.00 as capital for the actual operation. When petitioner already had the money, she handed the same to respondent Salvador which was witnessed by her disabled half-brother Enrico B. Tan. However, the proposed business never operated as respondent only stayed in Hong Kong for three days. When she asked respondent about the money and the business, the latter told her that the money was deposited in a bank. However, upon further query, respondent confessed that he used the money to pay for his other obligations. Since then, the US$100,000.00 was not returned at all. ISSUE: WON award of damages may be retained despite acquittal of the criminal case. HELD: The award of damages must be removed. Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability of the accused. First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of the actor omission complained of. This instance closes the door to civil liability, for a person who has been found to be not the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can never be held liable for such act or omission. There being no delict, civil liability ex delictois out of the question, and the civil action, if any, which may be instituted must be based on grounds other than the delict complained of. This is the situation contemplated in Rule III of the Rules of Court. The second instance is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. This is the situation contemplated in Article 29 of the Civil Code, where the civil action for damages is "for the same act or omission. A reading of the CA decision would show that respondent was acquitted because the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Said the CA: The evidence for the prosecution being insufficient to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the crime as charged had been committed by appellant, the general presumption, "that a person is innocent of the crime or wrong, stands in his favor. The prosecution failed to prove that all the elements of estafa are present in this case as would overcome the presumption of innocence in favor of appellant. For in fact, the prosecution's primary witness herself could not even establish clearly and precisely how appellant committed the alleged fraud. She failed to convince us that she was deceived through misrepresentations and/or insidious actions, in venturing into a remittance business. Quite the contrary, the obtaining circumstance in this case indicate the weakness of her submissions. Thus, since the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt, respondent is not exempt from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. In Encinas v. National Bookstore, Inc., the higher court explained the concept of preponderance of evidence as follows: x x x Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term "greater weight of the evidence" or "greater weight of the credible evidence." Preponderance of evidence is a phrase which, in the last analysis, means probability of the truth. It is evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto. However, in this case, no such civil liability is proved even by preponderance of evidence. In discrediting petitioner’s allegation that she gave respondent US$100,000.00 in May 2002, the CA found that: (1) petitioner failed to show how she was able to raise the money in such a short period of time and even gave conflicting versions on the source of the same; (2) petitioner failed to require respondent to sign a receipt so she could have a record of the transaction and offered no plausible reason why the money was allegedly hand-carried to Hong Kong; (3) petitioner’s claim of trust as reason for not requiring respondent to sign a receipt was inconsistent with the way she conducted her previous transactions with him; and (4) petitioner’s behavior after the alleged fraud perpetrated against her was inconsistent with the actuation of someone who had been swindled. The petition for the award of damages is denied. DY VS. PEOPLE GR NO. 189081, August 10, 2016, Jardeleza SUMMARY: Petitioner Dy was a former General Manager of MCCI, was charged with estafa by the company through its president Willian Mandy. Petitioner assisted MCCI in its business and one business pertained to the construction of a warehouses over Numancia Property that MCCi leased from Philippine National Bank. He proposed to Willian Dy the purchase of a property owned by Pantranco. Since it involves a large amount of money, Mandy agreed to obtain a loan from International China Bank of Commerce (ICBC) the amount of 20M. As a security, MCCI issued a chattel mortgage where he entrusted to petitioner the obligation to manage the payment of the loan thru cheks, where it was evidently defaulted. Petitioner claimed that he encashed the checks and returned the cash to Mandy. ICBC eventually foreclosed the mortgaged property. Mandy filed a case of Estafa to petitioner before the RTC Manila who rendered the decision acquitting the petitioner having failed to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The accused is however civilly liable to the complainant for the amount of P21,706,281.00. He filed an appeal with CA but denied affirming the RTC’s decision. ISSUE/S: The propriety of making a finding of civil liability in a criminal case for estafa when the accused is acquitted for failure of the prosecution to prove all the elements of the crime charged. RULING OF THE COURT: The lower courts erred when they ordered petitioner to pay her civil obligation arising from a contract of loan in the same criminal case where she was acquitted on the ground that there was no crime. Any contractual obligation she may have must be litigated in a separate civil action involving the contract of loan. In case where the accused is acquitted on the ground that there is no crime, the civil action deemed instituted with the criminal case cannot prosper precisely because there is no delict from which any civil obligation may be sourced. The peculiarity of this case is the finding that petitioner, in fact, has an obligation arising from a contract. This civil action arising from contract is not necessarily extinguished. It can be instituted in the proper court through the power of civil action. DECISION: The petition granted, the decision of the CA is reversed, without prejudice to any civil action which may be filed to claim civil liability arising from the contract. G.R. No. 145391 August 26, 2002 AVELINO CASUPANAN and ROBERTO CAPITULO, petitioners, vs. MA RIO LLAVORE LA ROYA, respondent. CARPIO, J.: FACTS: An accident occurred involving two vehicles, one driven by respondent Laroya and the other owned by petitioner Capitulo and driven by petitioner Casupanan. Subsequently, two cases were filed in the MCTC of Capas Tarlac: first, a criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property filed by the respondent against Casapunan; and second, a civil case arising from a quasi-delict filed by the petitioners against the respondent. The civil case was initiated while the criminal case was still undergoing preliminary investigation. The respondent, who was the defendant in the civil case, filed a motion to dismiss, citing forum shopping due to the pendency of the criminal case. The MCTC granted the motion for dismissal on the grounds of forum shopping. The petitioners then filed a Motion for Reconsideration, arguing that a separate civil action can be independently instituted from the criminal case. The MCTC denied the motion. Subsequently, the petitioners filed a petition for Certiorari before Capas RTC to challenge the MCTC’s Order, but the RTC dismissed it for lack of merit. Hence, a petition for Review on Certiorari was brought before the Court. ISSUE: Whether an accused in a pending criminal case for reckless imprudence can validly file a separate civil action for quasi-delict against the private complainant in the criminal case, simultaneously and independently. RULING: Yes. The right of the accused to initiate a separate civil action for quasi-delict is similar to the right of the offended party to file an independent civil action, as provided in Section 1 of Rule 111. Under this rule, the independent civil action based on Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code is not considered initiated with the criminal action but can be filed separately by the offended party without any reservation. The initiation of the criminal action does not suspend the prosecution of the independent civil action as per these articles of the Civil Code. The suspension mentioned in Section 2 of the current Rule 111 pertains only to the civil action arising from the crime, provided that such civil action is either reserved or filed before the commencement of the criminal action. Consequently, the offended party can initiate two separate lawsuits for the same act or omission: first, a criminal case where the civil action to recover civil liability ex-delicto is considered initiated, and second, a civil case for quasi-delict, all without violating the prohibition against forum shopping. These two cases can proceed simultaneously and independently. The only limitation is that the offended party cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission by the defendant. Similarly, the accused can initiate a civil action for quasi-delict based on the same act or omission for which they are accused in the criminal case. This is explicitly permitted in paragraph 6, Section 1 of the current Rule 111, which states that the accused's counterclaim may be litigated in a separate civil action. This approach is fair for two reasons. First, the accused is barred from raising any counterclaim in the civil aspect that is regarded as initiated in the criminal case. Consequently, the accused must litigate separately to assert their counterclaim against the offended party. If the accused does not file a separate civil action for quasi-delict, the prescriptive period may lapse because the period continues to run until the civil action for quasi-delict is initiated. Second, the presumed innocent accused has the right to invoke Article 2177 of the Civil Code, just as the offended party can utilize this remedy, which is independent of the criminal action. Denying the accused the option to file a separate civil action for quasi-delict while refusing to recognize their counterclaim in the criminal case would violate their due process rights, access to the courts, and equal protection under the law. Consequently, the separate civil action filed by the petitioners based on quasi-delict is appropriate. NOTES: Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, the independent civil action in Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code is not deemed instituted with the criminal action but may be filed separately by the offended party even without reservation. The commencement of the criminal action does not suspend the prosecution of the independent civil action under these articles of the Civil Code. The suspension in Section 2 of the present Rule 111 refers only to the civil action arising from the crime if such civil action is reserved or filed before the commencement of the criminal action. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Samson, 808 SCRA 90 November 9, 2016 Facts: On July 26, 2000, upon application of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 56, in Makati City issued Search Warrants Nos. 00-022 to 00-032, inclusive, all for unfair competition,9 to search the establishments owned, controlled and operated by Samson. The implementation of the search warrants on July 27, 2000 led to the seizure of various products bearing Caterpillar's Core Marks. Caterpillar filed against Samson several criminal complaints for unfair competition in the Department of Justice (DOJ), docketed as LS. Nos. 2000-13 54 to 2000-13 64, inclusive. Additionally, on July 31, 2000, Caterpillar commenced a civil action against Samson and his business entities, with the IPO as a nominal party10 - for Unfair Competition, Damages and Cancellation of Trademark with Application for Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction - docketed as Civil Case No. Q-00-41446 of the RTC in Quezon City. In said civil action, the RTC denied Caterpillar's application for the issuance of the TRO on August 17, 2000. The DOJ, through Senior State Prosecutor Jude R. Romano, issued a joint resolution dated November 15, 200111 recommending that Samson be criminally charged with unfair competition under Section 168.3 (a),12 in relation to Section 123.l(e),13 Section 131.114 and Section 170,15 all of Republic Act No. 8293, or the Intellectual Property Code of the Philippines (IP Code). However, because Samson and his affiliate companies allegedly continued to sell and distribute products clothed with the general appearance of its own products, Caterpillar again applied for another set of search warrants against Samson and his businesses. The RTC, Branch 172, in Valenzuela City issued Search Warrants Nos. 12-V-00,16 13-V-00,17 20-V-0018 and 29-V-0019 upon application of the NBI, by virtue of the implementation of which several goods were seized and confiscated by the NBI agents. As a consequence, Caterpillar filed 26 criminal complaints for unfair competition on January 31, 2001, docketed as LS. Nos. 2001-42 to 2001-67, against Samson and/or the occupants of his affiliate entities before the DOJ.20 In due course, the DOJ, through State Prosecutor Zenaida M. Lim, issued a joint resolution dated September 28, 200121 recommending the filing of criminal complaints for unfair competition under Section 168.3(a), in relation to Section 123 .1, Section 131.1 and Section 170 of the IP Code. Accordingly, six criminal complaints were filed in the RTC, Branch 256, in Muntinlupa City, presided by Judge Alberto L. Lerma, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 02-238 to 02-243. Issue: If there is a prejudicial question between the civil action in the IPO for unfair competition and the criminal cases filed in the RTC. Ruling: No. Regarding the second issue, petitioner failed to substantiate his claim that there was a prejudicial question. In his petition, he prayed for the reversal of the March 26, 2003 order which sustained the denial of his motion to suspend arraignment and other proceedings in Criminal Case Nos. Q-02-10804344. For unknown reasons, however, he made no discussion in support of said prayer in his petition and reply to comment. Neither did he attach a copy of the complaint in Civil Case No. Q-00-41446 nor quote the pertinent portion thereof to prove the existence of a prejudicial question. At any rate, there is no prejudicial question if the civil and the criminal action can, according to law, proceed independently of each other. Under Rule 111, Section 3 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, in the cases provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the independent civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In the case at bar, the common element in the acts constituting unfair competition under Section 168 of R.A. No. 8293 is fraud. Pursuant to Article 33 of the Civil Code, in cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Hence, Civil Case No. Q- 00-41446, which as admitted by private respondent also relate to unfair competition, is an independent civil action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. As such, it will not operate as a prejudicial question that will justify the suspension of the criminal cases at bar. (31) People vs. Romero, G.R. No. 112985, April 21, 1999 [Pardo, J.] Issue: Whether the death of the accused extinguishes his/her civil liability. Facts: Ernesto A. Ruiz was a radio commentator of Radio DXRB, Butuan City. In August, 1989, he came to know the business of Surigao San Andres Industrial Development Corporation (SAIDECOR), when he interviewed Martin Romero, president and general manager, and Ernesto Rodriguez, operations manager, regarding the corporation’s investment operations in Butuan City and Agusan del Norte. SAIDECOR started its operation on August 24, 1989 as a marketing business. Later, it engaged in soliciting funds and investments from the public. The corporation guaranteed an 800% return on investment within fifteen (15) or twenty one (21) days. Investors were given coupons containing the capital and the return on the capital collectible on the date agreed upon. It stopped operations in September 1989. Ruiz made an investment in SAIDECOR, after paying P150,000 to Rodriguez, he received a postdated Butuan City Rural Bank check instead of the usual redeemable coupon. The check indicated P1,000,200.00 as the amount in words, but the amount in figures was for P1,200,000.00, as the return on the investment. Ruiz did not notice the discrepancy. When the check was presented to the bank for payment on October 5, 1989, it was dishonored for insufficiency of funds, as evidenced by the check return slip issued by the bank. On October 25, 1989, Butuan City acting fiscal Ernesto M. Brocoy filed with the Regional Trial Court, Butuan City, an Information against the two (2) accused for estafa and another Information for violation of BP Blg 22, arising from the issuance of the same check. During the pendency of the appeal, on November 12, 1997, Ernesto died. Ruling: Yes, the death of the accused, prior to final judgment or pending appeal, extinguishes his/her civil liability. Pursuant to the doctrine established in People vs. Bayotas, the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability ex delicto. The criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused, the civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal case. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of the accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Thus, the outcome of this appeal pertains only to the remaining accused-appellant, Martin L. Romero. 32. Magistrado V. People, G.R. No. 148072 July 10, 2007 | Chico-Nazario, J.: Facts: Private respondent Elena M. Librojo filed a criminal complaint for perjury against petitioner with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City. After the filing of petitioners counter-affidavit and the appended pleadings, the Office of the City Prosecutor recommended the filing of an information for perjury against petitioner. Thus, Assistant City Prosecutor Josephine Z. Fernandez filed an information for perjury against petitioner with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City. Petitioner filed a motion for suspension of proceedings based on a prejudicial question of the civil case pending which was filed by the Private Respondent. Petitioner alleged that the civil case must be resolved first before Criminal Case No. 90721 may proceed since the issues in the said civil cases are similar or intimately related to the issues raised in the criminal action. MeTC denied Motion for Lack of Merit. Respondent appealed to the RTC and CA whom denied the motion respectively. Hence this case. Issue/s: Whether there was a Prejudicial Question to suspend the hearing of the Criminal case of the Petitioner. Ruling: A prejudicial question is defined as that which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. The prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before the court but the jurisdiction to try and resolve the question must be lodged in another court or tribunal. It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. For a prejudicial question in a civil case to suspend criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. Thus, for a civil action to be considered prejudicial to a criminal case as to cause the suspension of the criminal proceedings until the final resolution of the civil case, the following requisites must be present: (1) the civil case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based; (2) in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined; and (3) jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in another tribunal. It is evident that the civil cases and the criminal case can proceed independently of each other. Regardless of the outcome of the two civil cases, it will not establish the innocence or guilt of the petitioner in the criminal case for perjury. The purchase by petitioner of the land or his execution of a real estate mortgage will have no bearing whatsoever on whether petitioner knowingly and fraudulently executed a false affidavit of loss of TCT No. N-173163. Disposition: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Resolutions dated 5 March 2001 and 3 May 2001of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 63293 are hereby AFFIRMED and the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 43, is hereby directed to proceed with the hearing and trial on the merits of Criminal Case No. 90721, and to expedite proceedings therein, without prejudice to the right of the accused to due process. Costs against petitioner. 33. PIMENTEL VS. PIMENTEL, G.R. No 172060 (SEPTEMBER 2010) FACTS: Maria Chrysantine Pimentel filed an action for frustrated parricide against Joselito R. Pimentel before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Petitioner received summons to appear before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 72 (RTC Antipolo) for the pre-trial and trial of Civil Case No. 04-7392 (Maria Chrysantine Lorenza L. Pimentel v. Joselito Pimentel) for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Section 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity. On 11 February 2005, petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the proceedings before the RTC Quezon City on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question. Petitioner asserted that since the relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in parricide, the outcome of Civil Case No. 04-7392 would have a bearing in the criminal case filed against him before the RTC Quezon City. The RTC Quezon City issued an Order dated 13 May 2005 holding that the pendency of the case before the RTC Antipolo is not a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case before it. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. The Court of Appeals ruled that in the criminal case for frustrated parricide, the issue is whether the offender commenced the commission of the crime of parricide directly by overt acts and did not perform all the acts of execution by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. ISSUES: The only issue in this case is whether the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case for frustrated parricide against petitioner. RULING: The petition has no merit. Clearly, the civil case for annulment was filed after the filing of the criminal case for frustrated parricide. As such, the requirement of Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure was not met since the civil action was filed subsequent to the filing of the criminal action. The resolution of the civil action is not a prejudicial question that would warrant the suspension of the criminal action. There is a prejudicial question when a civil action and a criminal action are both pending, and there exists in the civil action an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. The subsequent dissolution of their marriage will have no effect on the alleged crime that was committed at the time of the subsistence of the marriage. In short, even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent is annulled, petitioner could still be held criminally liable since at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, he was still married to respondent. Even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent is declared null and void, petitioner could still be held liable since at the time of the alleged commission of the crime, he was still married to respondent. A declaration of nullity of the marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is of no moment insofar as the State’s penal laws are concerned. JM Dominguez Agronomic Company vs. Liclican G.R. No. 208587, July 29, 2015 Facts: During the annual stockholders meeting of petitioner JM Dominguez Agronomic Company, Inc. (JMD) held on December 29, 2007 at the Baguio City Country Club, the election for its new set of directors was conducted. This event was presided by then company president, and herein respondent, Cecilia Liclican, and attended by her co-respondents Norma Isip and Purita Rodriguez, and by petitioners Helen Dagdagan, Patrick Pacis, Kenneth Pacis, and Shirley Dominguez as well. Conflict ensued when petitioners Patrick and Kenneth Pacis were allegedly not allowed to vote on the ground that they are not registered stockholders of JMD. As pointed out, it was their mother and grandmother, both deceased, who are the stockholders in JMD, and that there is still no settlement of their respective estates to effectively transfer their shares in the company to Patrick and Kenneth Pacis. Tensions rose and respondents, allegedly, walked out of the meeting. But since the remaining stockholders with outstanding shares constituted a quorum, the election of officers still proceeded. Subsequently, JMD, represented by petitioners Dagdagan and Patrick Pacis, executed an Affidavit-Complaint dated December 15, 2008 charging respondents Liclican and Isip with qualified theft. Petitioners alleged in the complaint, docketed as I.S. No. 3011 with the Office of the City Prosecutor in Baguio City, that on January 2, 2008, Liclican and Isip, without any authority whatsoever, conspired to withdraw the amount of P852,024.19 from the corporation’s savings account with the Equitable-PCI Bank; and that the following day, they issued Check No. C00024899018in the amount of P200,000, payable to cash, and to be drawn against JMD’s account with Robinson’s Savings Bank. In a separate complaint,docketed as I.S. No. 3118, the corporation claimed that respondents Liclican and Isip likewise issued Equitable-PCI Bank Check No. 32095311 payable to one Atty. Francisco Lava, Jr. for P200,000 to be debited from the corporation’s account. Issue: Whether there exists a prejudicial question that could affect the criminal proceedings for qualified theft against respondents. No. The resolution of the prejudicial question did not, in context, cure the grave abuse of discretion already committed. The fact remains that when the RTC, Branch 7 issued its challenged Orders on March 10, 2009, the Judgment in favor of petitioners was not yet rendered. Consequently, there was still, at that time, a real dispute as to who the rightful set of officers were. Plainly, Judge Tiongson-Tabora should not have issued the challenged Orders and should have, instead, suspended the proceedings until Civil Case No. 6623-R was resolved with finality. To grant the instant petition and rule that the procedural infirmity has subsequently been cured either by the Judgment or by Judge Tiongson-Tabora’s inhibition would mean condoning the continuation of the criminal proceedings despite, at that time, the existence of a prejudicial question. Such condonation would create a precedent that renders inutile the doctrine on prejudicial question, such that the court trying the criminal case will be permitted to proceed with the trial in the aberrant assumption that the resolution of the prior instituted civil case would benefit the private complainant in the criminal proceedings. Criminal Case Nos. 29175-R and 29176-R may already proceed, and ought to be re-raffled to re-determine the existence of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest against respondents. ROSA H. FENEQUITO, ET. AL, VS. BERNARDO VERGARA, JR. G.R. No. 172829, July 18, 2012 Facts: 1. An information for falsification of public documents was filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila by the Assistant City Prosecutor of Manila against herein petitioners. 2. petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss the Case Based on Absence of Probable Cause.3 3. The MeTC dismissed the criminal case filed by respondent Bernardo Vergara, Jr. for falsification of public documents against petitioners Rosa H. Fenequito, et. al., upon motion of the petitioners based on lack of probable cause. 4. With the express conformity of the public prosecutor, the respondents appealed the dismissal to the RTC. 5. The RTC set aside the order of dismissal and remanded the case to the MeTC for trial. 6. Petitioners questioned the order of the RTC by Petition for Review before the CA which was dismissed for being improper because the order of the RTC is interlocutory in nature and therefore not appealable. 7. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the CA denied it in its Resolution, hence, the instant petition. Issue: Whether the decision of the RTC, being interlocutory, is final that can be appealed on petition for review on certiorari under rule 45 before the CA. Held: No. The decision of the RTC, being interlocutory, is not final and this cannot be appealed on petition for review on certiorari under rule 45 before the CA. A final order is one that which disposes of the whole subject matter or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing to be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined. Upon the other hand, an order is interlocutory if it does not dispose of a case completely, but leaves something more to be done upon its merits. Section 1, Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure contemplates of an appeal from a final decision or order of the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. In the present case, the assailed Decision of the RTC set aside the Order of the MeTC and directed the court a quo to proceed to trial by allowing the prosecution to present its evidence. Hence, it is clear that the RTC Decision is interlocutory as it did not dispose of the case completely, but left something more to be done on its merits., And since it is not a final decision, the CA cannot exercise its appellate jurisdiction over the matter. Tested against the above criterion, the RTC Decision is beyond cavil interlocutory in nature. It is essentially a denial of petitioners' motion to quash because it leaves something more to be done which is the continuation of the criminal proceedings until the guilt or innocence of the accused is determined. Therefore, the decision of the RTC, being interlocutory, is not final and this cannot be appealed on petition for review on certiorari under rule 45 before the CA. Issue: Whether respondent can appeal the dismissal made by the MeTC to the RTC. Held: Yes. The respondent can appeal the dismissal made by the METC to the RTC. Petitioners' reliance on Presidential Decree No. 911 is misplaced, as the cited provision refers only to cases where the assistant fiscal or state prosecutor's power to file information or dismiss a case is predicated or conditioned upon the prior authority or approval of the Provincial or city fiscal or the Chief State Prosecutor. There is nothing in the said law, which provides that in cases of appeal, an Assistant City Prosecutor or a State Prosecutor may file the same only upon prior authority or approval of the City Prosecutor or the Chief State Prosecutor. In other words, unless otherwise ordered, an Assistant City Prosecutor or a State Prosecutor may file an appeal with the RTC, questioning the dismissal by the MeTC of a case for lack of probable cause, even without prior authority or approval of the City Prosecutor or the Chief State Prosecutor. Presidential Decree No. 911 refers only to cases where the assistant fiscal or state prosecutor's power to file information or dismiss a case is predicated or conditioned upon the prior authority or approval of the Provincial or city fiscal or the Chief State Prosecutor. There is nothing in the said law, which provides that in cases of appeal, an Assistant City Prosecutor or a State Prosecutor may file the same only upon prior authority or approval of the City Prosecutor or the Chief State Prosecutor. In other words, unless otherwise ordered, an Assistant City Prosecutor or a State Prosecutor may file an appeal with the RTC, questioning the dismissal by the MeTC of a case for lack of probable cause, even without prior authority or approval of the City Prosecutor or the Chief State Prosecutor. Since the appeal, in the instant case was made with the RTC of Manila, it is clear that the City Prosecutor or his assistant (in this case, the Assistant City Prosecutor) had authority to file the same. Suffice it to say that the appeal filed with the RTC was made with the express conformity of the public prosecutor who handles the case. It is wrong for petitioners to argue that it is the OSG which has authority to file an appeal with the RTC. The Administrative Code of 1987 mandates the OSG to represent “the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings.” On the other hand, Section 11 of Presidential Decree No. 1275, entitled “Reorganizing the Prosecution Staff of the Department of Justice and the Offices of the Provincial and City Fiscals, Regionalizing the Prosecution Service, and Creating the National Prosecution Service,” which was the law in force at the time the appeal was filed, provides that the provincial or the city fiscal (now referred to as prosecutor) “shall have charge of the prosecution of all crimes, misdemeanors and violations of city or municipal ordinances in the courts of such province or city and shall therein discharge all the duties incident to the institution of criminal prosecutions.” In consonance with the above-quoted provision, it has been held by this Court that the fiscal represents the People of the Philippines in the prosecution of offenses before the trial courts at the metropolitan trial courts, municipal trial courts, municipal circuit trial courts and the regional trial courts. Remember: 1. The Administrative Code of 1987 mandates the OSG to represent “the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings.” 2. The fiscal represents the People of the Philippines in the prosecution of offenses before the trial courts at the metropolitan trial courts, municipal trial courts, municipal circuit trial courts and the regional trial courts. RULE 112 – PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION A. Definition/Description - when a matter of right - distinguish from Preliminary Examination Read: Fenequito vs. Vergara, Jr., 677 SCRA 113 Burgundy Realty Corporation vs. Reyes, 687 SCRA 524 B. Who may conduct P. I. Read: Abanado vs. Bayona, 677 SCRA 595 Heirs of Nestor Tria vs. Obias, 635 SCRA 91 C. Procedure in Metro Manila vs. Outside Metro Manila Read: Uy vs. Javellana, 680 SCRA 13 D. Inquest, what is - when applied - waiver of Art. 125 of RPC Read: People vs. Valencia E. Quantum of Evidence - probable cause vs. prima facie A. Definition/Description Josue FENEQUITO vs. VERGARA, JR. G.R. No. 172829 July 18, 2012 Criminal Procedure; Office of the Solicitor General; Prosecutors; Administrative Code of 1987, mandates the Office of the Solicitor General to represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings, whereas, Section 11 of Presidential Decree no. 1275 provides that the provincial and city prosecutor shall have charge of the prosecution of all crimes, misdemeanours and violations of city or municipal ordinances in courts of such province or city and shall therein discharge all the duties incident to the institution of criminal prosecutions. – It is wrong for petitioners to argue that it is the OSG which has the authority to file an appeal with the RTC. Section 35 (1), Chapter 12, Title III of Book IV of Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, mandates the OSG to represent the “Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings.” On the other hand, Section 11 of Presidential Decree No. 1275, entitled “reorganizing the Prosecution Staff of the Department of Justice and the Offices of the Provincial and City Fiscals, Regionalizing the Prosecution Service, and Creating the National Prosecution Service,” which was the law in force at the time the appeal was files, provides that the provincial or the city fiscal (now referred to as prosecutor) “shall have charge of the prosecution of all crimes. Misdemeanours and violations of city of municipal ordinances in the courts of such province or city and shall therein discharge all the duties incident to the institution of criminal prosecution.” 54 Same; prosecutors; unless otherwise ordered, an Assistant City Prosecutor or a State Prosecutor may file an appeal with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), questioning the dismissal by the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of a case for lack of probable cause, even without prior authority or approval of the City Prosecutor or the Chief State Prosecutor. – Petitioners’ reliance on the Presidential Decree No. 911 is misplaced, as the cited provision refers only to cases where the assistant fiscal or state prosecutor’s power to file an information or dismiss a case is predicated or conditioned upon the prior authority or approval of the provincial or city fiscal or the Chief State Prosecutor. There is nothing in the said law which provides that in cases of appeal an Assistant City Prosecutor or a State Prosecutor may file the same only upon prior authority or approval of the City Prosecutor or the Chief State Prosecutor. Stated differently, unless otherwise ordered, an Assistant City Prosecutor or a State Prosecutor may file an appeal with the RTC, questioning the dismissal by the MeTC of a case for lack of probable cause, even without prior authority or approval of the City Prosecutor or the Chief State Prosecutor. Facts On February 11, 2004, an information for falsification of public documents was filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila by the Assistant City Prosecutor of Manila (representing Bernardo Vergara Jr.) against Rosa Fenequito, Corazon E. Hernandez, and Lauro H. Rodriquez. On April 23, 2004, Fenequito, et al. filed a Motion to Dismiss the Case Based on Absence of Probable Cause. The MeTC issued an order granting the said motion. Upon appeal by the public prosecutor, however, the RTC set aside the MeTC’s order and directed the latter to trial. Fenequito, et al, filed an appeal before the CA, which subsequent ruled that the RTC’s assailed decision was interlocutory in nature and was therefore not appealable. Hence, the instant petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Issue Whether or not RTC’s decision was interlocutory and can be appealed. Held RTC’s decision was interlocutory in nature. As such, it cannot be appealed. One of the grounds for the CA’s outright dismissal of Fenequito et al.’s petition for review was because of the latter’s failure to submit copies of pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent to the petition filed, as required under Section 2, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. It is settled rule that the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process; it is merely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. An appeal being a purely statutory right, an appealing party must strictly comply with the requisites laid down in the Rules of Court. The rationale for this strict attitude is not difficult to appreciate as the Rules are designed to facilities the orderly disposition of appealed cases. But even if the Court bends its Rules to allow the present petition, the Court still finds no cogent reason to depart from the assailed ruling of the CA. This is because Fenequito et al. erroneously assumed that the RTC Decision is final and appealable, when in fact it is interlocutory. An order is interlocutory if it does not dispose of a case completely, but leaves something more to be done upon its merits. In contrast, a final order is one that which dispose of the whole subject matter or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing to be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined. Granted, the assailed Decision of the RTC set aside the Order of the MeTC and directed the court a quo to proceed to trial by allowing the prosecution to present its evidence. Hence, it is clear that the RTC Decision is interlocutory as it did not dispose of the case completely, but left something more to be done on its merits. 55 Note: The doctrine promulgated in the case does not particularly relate to the topic indicated in the outline, i.e., preliminary investigation distinguished from preliminary examination. Probable Cause Quiniquini Burgundy Realty Corporation v. Josefa “Jing” C. Reyes and SEC Raul Gonzalez of the DOJ GR no: 181021 December 10, 2012 Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Appeals; Decisions or resolutions of prosecutors are subject to appeal to the Secretary of Justice who, under the Revised Administrative Code,exercise the power of direct control and supervision over said prosecutors; and who may thus affirm, nullify, reverse or modify their rulings. – It is not disputed that decisions or resolutions of prosecutors are subject to appeal to the Secretary of Justice who, under the Revised Administrative Code, exercise the power of direct control and supervision over said prosecutors; and who may thus affirm, nullify reverse or modify their rulings. Review as an act of supervision and control by the justice secretary over the fiscals and prosecutors find basis in the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies which holds that mistakes, abuses or negligence committed in the initial steps of an administrative activity or by an administrative agency should be corrected by higher administrative authorities, and not directly by courts. Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Preliminary Investigation; A preliminary investigation constitutes a realistic judicial appraisal of the merits of a case. – It must be remembered that the finding of probable cause was made after conducting a preliminary investigation. A preliminary investigation constitutes a realistic judicial appraisal of the merits of a case. Its purpose is to determine whether (a) a crime has been committed; and (b) whether there is a probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. Same; same; same; In a preliminary investigation, the public prosecutor merely determines whether there is probable cause or sufficient ground to engender a well founded belief that a crime has been committed, and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial; A preliminary investigation does not require a full and exhaustive presentation of the parties’ evidence. – This Court need not overemphasize that in a preliminary investigation, the public prosecutor merely determines whether there is probable cause or sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. It does not call for the application of rules and standards of proof that a judgment of conviction requires after trial on the merits. The complainant need not present at this stage proof beyond reasonable doubt. A preliminary investigation does not require a full and exhaustive presentation of the parties’ evidence. Precisely, there is a trial to allow the reception of evidence for both parties to substantiate their respective claims. Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Probable cause; Words and Phrases; Probable cause has been defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted; A finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. – Probable cause has been defined as the existence of such facts and circumstance as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted. Probable cause is a reasonable ground of presumption that a matter is or may be, well founded on such state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to believe, or entertain an honest or strong suspicion, that a thing is so. The term does not mean “actual or positive cause” nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on 56 opinion and reasonable belief. Thus, a finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charge. Facts Private respondent offered her services to petitioner as the latter’s real estate agent in buying parcels of land in Laguna. She informed petitioner that more or less ten lot owners are her clients who were willing to sell their properties. Convinced of her representations, petitioner released the amount of P 23,432,327.50 in her favor to buy those parcels of land. Instead, Reyes misappropriated the money given by the petitioner to her personal use and benefit. Petitioner then sent formal demand to Reyes to return the amount given. Reyes denied the fact that she had received such amount of money and misappropriated it. A Preliminary investigation was conducted against Reyes in Makati City. Thereafter, an Information for the crime of Estafa was filed against Reyes in RTC Br.149 Makati City. Undeterred, Reyes filed a petition for review before the DOJ but it was dismissed by the Secretary of Justice (SOJ) through the State Prosecutor. Aggrieved, Reyes filed a motion for reconsideration and the said motion was granted. SOJ issued a resolution granting the petition of Reyes and ordering the City Prosec of Makati to cause the withdrawal of the information for estafa. Hence the petition. Issue Whether there is a probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. Held Yes. Preliminary investigation constitutes a realistic judicial appraisal of the merits of the case. In a preliminary investigation, the public prosecutor merely determines whether there is a probable cause or sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, and that the respondent is probably guilty and should be held for trial. In the case at bar, the investigating prosecutor was correct in finding the existence of all the elements of the crime of estafa. Reyes did not dispute that she received in trust the amount of P23,423,327.50 from petitioners as proven by the checks and vouchers to be used in purchasing the parcels of land. Thus, the mere presumption of misappropriation or conversion is enough to conclude that a probable cause exists for the indictment of Reyes for estafa. Finding probabe cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act of omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. Therefore, the court ordered to proceed with the arraignment of Josefa “Jing” C. Reyes. Lozada CITY PROSECUTOR ARMANDO P ABANADO VS JUDGE ABRAHAM A BAYONA 677 SCRA 595 Criminal Procedure; Preliminary Investigation; The conduct of a preliminary investigation is primarily an executive function. – The conduct of a preliminary investigation is primarily an executive function. Thus, the courts must consider the rules of procedure of the Department of Justice in conducting 57 preliminary investigations whenever the actions of a public prosecutor is put in question. An examination of 2008 Revised Manual for Prosecutors of the Department of Justice- National Prosecution Service (DOJ-NPS Manual), therefore, is necessary. Same; Same; The Department of Justice-National Prosecution Service(DOJ-NPS) Manual states that the resolution of the investigating prosecutor should be attached to the information only “as far as practicable.” Thus, such attachment is not mandatory or required under the rules. ―We find that there is nothing in the DOJNPS Manual requiring the removal of are solution by an investigating prosecutor recommending the dismissal of a criminal complaint af t er it was r e ver s ed b y th e pr o v inc i al , c i t y or c h i ef state prosecutor. Nonetheless, we also note that attaching such a resolution to aninformation filed in court is optional under the aforementioned manual. The DOJ-NPS Manual states that the resolution of the investigating prosecutor should be attached to the information only “as far as practicable.” Thus, such attachment is not mandatory or required under the rules. Administrative Law; Judges; Gross Ignorance of the Law; Not every judicial error is tantamount t o ignorance of the law and if it was committed in good faith, the judge need not be subjected to administrative sanction. ―Not every judicial error is tantamount to ignorance of the law and if it was committed in good faith, the judge need not be subjected to administrative sanction. While complainant admitted thathe erred in insisting on the production of the Jarder Resolution despite the provisions of the DOJNPS Manual, such error cannot be categorized asgross ignorance of the law as he did not appear to be motivated by bad faith. Indeed, the rules of procedure in the prosecution office were not clear as to whether or not an investigating prosecutor’s resolution of dismissal that had been reversed by the city prosecutor should still form part of the records. Same; Same; Gross Misconduct; Gross misconduct presupposes evidence of grave irregularity in the performance of duty. ―Neither did respondent’s action amount to gross misconduct. Gross misconduct presupposes evidence of grave irregularity in the performance of duty. In the case at bar, respondent’s act of requiring complainant to explain why he should not be cited in contempt for his failure to submit the Jarder Resolution in court was in accordance with established rules of procedure. Furthermore, complainant did not abuse his contempt power as he did not pursue the proceedings in view of the May 29, 2009 and June 15, 2009Gellada orders. Lastly, as previously discussed, respondent issued those orders in good faith as he honestly believed that they were necessary in the fair and just issuance of the warrant of arrest in Criminal Case No. 0903-16474. Facts This administrative complaint stemmed from Criminal Case entitled People of the Philippines vs Cresencio Palo, Sr. which Information was filed by complainant before the Metropolitan Trial Court in Cities of Bacolod City and was eventually raffled to Branch 7 presided by respondent judge. In connection with the issuance of the warrant of arrest as regards the criminal complaint, respondent judge issued an Order (April 13, 2009) ordering complainant to submit, among other records, a Memorandum of the transfer of the case from designated Investigating Prosecutor to the City Prosecutor. Complainant, however, explained on a letter that there was no Memorandum of transfer as complainant disapproved the recommendation of dismissal by Assistant City Prosecutor Dennis S. Jarder, the investigating officer for the Palo case, pursuant to Sec 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. Unsatisfied, respondent issued another Order (May 5, 2009) requiring complainant to submit the Jarder resolution but was answered by a letter from complainant that such Memorandum was no longer part of the records. Moreover, attached to the letter was an explanation by Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito Zuno that 58 resolutions disapproved by City/Provincial Prosecutors were not released to the parties and/or to their counsels. Respondent judge insisted that such resolution was necessary for evaluation of the issuance of warrant of arrest and issued an Order (May 14, 2009) requiring complainant to explain why he should not be cited for contempt. Complainant filed for an Inhibition and subsequently a petition for certiorari with a prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order for respondent to restrain from proceeding with the contempt hearing. The petition was granted and complainant moved to file administrative complaint against respondent judge for gross ignorance of the law procedure, gross misconduct, and violation of Court Circular No. 12 dated June 30, 1987. Issue Whether or not complainant erred in not submitting the Jarder resolution. Held The Court held on the negative. As held by Judge Gelleda, “when a city or provincial prosecutor reverses the investigating assisting city or provincial prosecutor, the resolution finding probable cause replaces the recommendation of the investigating prosecutor recommending the dismissal of the case. The result would be that the resolution of dismissal no longer forms an integral part of the records of the case. It is no longer required that the complaint or entire records of the case during the preliminary investigation be submitted to and be examined by the judge. The rationale behind this practice is that the rules do not intend to unduly burden trial judges by requiring them to go over the complete records of the cases all the time for the purpose of determining probable cause for the sole purpose of issuing a warrant of arrest against the accused. "What is required, rather, is that the judge must have sufficient supporting documents (such as the complaint, affidavits, counteraffidavits, sworn statements of witnesses or transcripts of stenographic notes, if any) upon which to make his independent judgment or, at the very least, upon which to verify the findings of the prosecutor as to the existence of probable cause.” Summary Procedure Montilla UY VS. JAVELLANA 680 SCRA 13 , September 05, 2012 Arrests; The court shall not order the arrest of the accused except for failure to appear whenever required.―Judge Javellana’s issuance of a Warrant of Arrest for the accused in People v. Cornelio, is in violation of Section 16 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, categorically stating that “[t]he court shall not order the arrest of the accused except for failure to appear whenever required.” Judge Javellana never claimed that the accused failed to appear at any hearing. His justification that the accused was wanted for the crime of attempted homicide, being tried in another case, Crim. Case No. 04-096, is totally unacceptable and further indicative of his ignorance of law. People v. Cornelio, pending before Judge Javellana’s court as Crim. Case No. 04-097, is for malicious mischief, and is distinct and separate from Crim. Case No. 04-096, which is for attempted homicide, although both cases involved the same accused. Proceedings in one case, such as the issuance of a warrant of arrest, should not be extended or made applicable to the other. Same; Preliminary Investigation; Revised Rule on Summary Procedure; The Revised Rule on Summary Procedure does not provide for a preliminary investigation prior to the filing of a criminal case under said Rule.―The Revised Rule on Summary Procedure does not provide for a preliminary investigation prior to the filing of a criminal case under said Rule. A criminal case within the scope of the Rule shall be commenced in the following manner: SEC. 11. How commenced.―The filing of criminal cases falling 59 within the scope of this Rule shall be either by complaint or by information; Provided, however, That in Metropolitan Manila and in Chartered Cities, such cases shall be commenced only by information, except when the offense cannot be prosecuted de oficio. The complaint or information shall be accompanied by the affidavits of the complainant and of his witnesses in such number of copies as there are accused plus two (2) copies for the court’s files. If this requirement is not complied with within five (5) days from date of filing, the case may be dismissed. Same; Same; Section 1, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure only requires that a preliminary investigation be conducted before the filing of a complaint or information for an offense where the penalty prescribed by law is at least four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day without regard to the fine.―Section 1, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure only requires that a preliminary investigation be conducted before the filing of a complaint or information for an offense where the penalty prescribed by law is at least four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day without regard to the fine. As has been previously established herein, the maximum penalty imposable for malicious mischief in People v. Lopez, et al. is just six (6) months. Same; Revised Rule on Summary Procedure; The Revised Rule on Summary Procedure was precisely adopted to promote a more expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases, and to enforce the constitutional rights of litigants to the speedy disposition of cases.―Judge Javellana did not provide any reason as to why he needed to conduct a preliminary investigation in People v. Lopez, et al. We stress that the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure was precisely adopted to promote a more expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases, and to enforce the constitutional rights of litigants to the speedy disposition of cases. Judge Javellana cannot be allowed to arbitrarily conduct proceedings beyond those specifically laid down by the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, thereby lengthening or delaying the resolution of the case, and defeating the express purpose of said Rule. FACTS This administrative case arose from a verified complaint for "gross ignorance of the law and procedures, gross incompetence, neglect of duty, conduct improper and unbecoming of a judge, grave misconduct and others," filed by Public Attorneys Uy and Bascug of PAO against Presiding Judge Javellana of the Municipal Trial Court, La Castellana, Negros Occidental. Public Attorneys Uy and Bascug alleged the following in their complaint: Judge Javellana was grossly ignorant of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. Public Attorneys Uy and Bascug cited several occasions as examples: Judge Javellana issued a warrant of arrest after the filing of said case despite Section 16 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure; did not grant the motion to dismiss for noncompliance with the Lupon requirement under Sections 18 and 19(a) of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, insisting that said motion was a prohibited pleading; refused to dismiss outright the complaint even when the same was patently without basis or merit, as the affidavits of therein complainant and her witnesses were all hearsay evidence; and did not apply the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure and, instead, conducted a preliminary examination and preliminary investigation in accordance with the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, then set the case for arraignment and pre-trial, despite confirming that therein complainant and her witnesses had no personal knowledge of the material facts alleged in their affidavits, which should have been a ground for dismissal of said case. Judge Javellana violated Section 6(b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and issued warrants of arrest without propounding searching questions to the complainants and their witnesses to determine the necessity of placing the accused under immediate custody. As a result, Judge 60 Javellana issued warrants of arrest even when the accused had already voluntarily surrendered or when a warrantless arrest had been effected. Judge Javellana failed to observe the constitutional rights of the accused as stated in Section 12(1), Article III of the Constitution. Judge Javellana set Crim. Case No. 03-097, entitled People v. Bautista, for preliminary investigation even when the accused had no counsel, and proceeded with said investigation without informing the accused of his rights to remain silent and to have a counsel Judge Javellana stressed that the charges against him were baseless and malicious; and the acts being complained of involved judicial discretion and, thus, judicial in nature and not the proper subject of an administrative complaint. Consequently, Judge Javellana sought the dismissal of the instant complaint against him. The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), in its report, found Judge Javellana liable for gross ignorance of the law or procedure when he did not apply the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure in cases appropriately covered by said Rule. ISSUE Whether or not the conduct of preliminary investigation by Judge Javellana is not valid for not following the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure. HELD YES. The Revised Rule on Summary Procedure does not provide for a preliminary investigation prior to the filing of a criminal case under said Rule. A criminal case within the scope of the Rule shall be commenced in the following manner: SEC. 11. How commenced.―The filing of criminal cases falling within the scope of this Rule shall be either by complaint or by information; Provided, however, That in Metropolitan Manila and in Chartered Cities, such cases shall be commenced only by information, except when the offense cannot be prosecuted de oficio. The complaint or information shall be accompanied by the affidavits of the complainant and of his witnesses in such number of copies as there are accused plus two (2) copies for the court’s files. If this requirement is not complied with within five (5) days from date of filing, the case may be dismissed. Also, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure only requires that a preliminary investigation be conducted before the filing of a complaint or information for an offense where the penalty prescribed by law is at least four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day without regard to the fine. The Revised Rule on Summary Procedure was precisely adopted to promote a more expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases, and to enforce the constitutional rights of litigants to the speedy disposition of cases. Judge Javellana cannot be allowed to arbitrarily conduct proceedings beyond those specifically laid down by the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, thereby lengthening or delaying the resolution of the case, and defeating the express purpose of said Rule. Preliminary Investigation; Warrantless Arrest Romero PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALEJANDRO C. VALENCIA G.R. Nos. 94511-13 Information; can be filed without a preliminary investigation against an accused arrested without warrant. We held under this case that a person who is lawfully arrested without a warrant pursuant to paragraph 1(b), section 5, rule 113, rules of court should be delivered to the nearest police station and proceeded against in accordance with rule 112, section 7. Under said section 7, rule 112, the prosecuting 61 officer can file the information in court without a preliminary investigation, which was done in the accusedappellant’s case. Preliminary investigation; deemed waived when not invoked. Since the records do not show whether the accused-appellant asked for a preliminary investigation after the case had been filed in court, as in fact, the accused-appellant signified his readiness to be arraigned, the court can only conclude that he waived his right to have a preliminary investigation, when he did, in fact, pleaded "Not Guilty" upon his arraignment. Facts The antecedent events based on the summary given by the Solicitor General are as follows; Arlyn Barredo-Jimenez, her two children, Annabelle and Samuel, Jr., aged five and three, respectively, and her mother, are residents of 2008 F. Muñoz St., Paco, Manila. At about 9:00 p.m. of March 19, 1989, as she was about to eat supper, she noticed appellant standing five steps away from the open door of her house and holding a sumpak, a homemade shotgun. Seized with fear, she closed the door. After a few moments, she heard a burst of gunfire. This was followed by cries of pain from her children inside the house. Seeing her children bloodied, she immediately went outside and shouted for help. As she did so, she saw appellant running away, carrying the sumpak. Two neighbors assisted Jimenez in bringing the injured children to the Philippine General Hospital. Patrolman Renato Marquez, a homicide investigator, interviewed Jimenez at the hospital about the shooting incident. Since she was still experiencing shock over the incident Jimenez forgot to mention the name of appellant as the one who shot her children Acting on the report of a barangay tanod, Patrolmen Roberto Cajiles, Romeo de la Peña and Carlos Castañeda, assigned at the Ong Detachment, Police Station No. 5, conducted an investigation of the shooting incident in the house of Jimenez. At the time, Jimenez and her injured children were already in the hospital. Nevertheless, Pat. Cajiles was able to interview the mother of Jimenez, the barangay captain, a certain Josie, and appellant’s brother, Rolando, who all mentioned appellant as the gunwielder. Moreover, the policemen discovered the presence of six pellet holes and one big hole with the size of the circumference of a shotgun bullet on the door of the house of Jimenez. Three pellets were also found at the crime scene. Early next morning, the three policemen were led by Rolando Valencia to the residence of Sonia Castillo, his aunt, where he believed appellant was sleeping. The police apprehended appellant there and took him to the Ong Detachment for initial investigation . He was indorsed to the police headquarters for further investigation in the evening of March 22, 1989. When arraigned, the accused-appellant pleaded "Not Guilty." Trial then proceeded resulting in accused-appellant’s conviction as above stated. On appeal, Accused-appellant raised as one of the errors of the trial court: B. In finding that the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of the defendant-appellant beyond reasonable doubt in spite of the fact that there was allegedly no preliminary investigation, and that no sufficient evidence exists proving his guilt. Issues 1. Whether or not a prosecuting officer may immediately file an information in court when an accused was lawfully arrested without a warrant, even in the absence of a preliminary investigation. 2. Whether or not the accused-apellant, Alejandro Valencia, who did not invoked a preliminary investigation after the case had been filed in court, may be deemed waiving his right to a preliminary investigation, and thus be tried and validly convicted even in the absence of such. 62 Held 1. The court rules in the Affirmative. In the case at bar, what happened was that the accused was lawfully arrested, without a warrant pursuant to paragraph 1(b), Section 5, Rule 113, Rules of Court 23 should be delivered to the nearest police station and proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7. Under said Section 7, Rule 112, the prosecuting officer can file the Information in court without a preliminary investigation. 2. The court rules in the Affirmative Since the records do not show whether the accused-appellant asked for a preliminary investigation after the case had been filed in court, as in fact, the accused-appellant signified his readiness to be arraigned, the Court can only conclude that he waived his right to have a preliminary investigation, when he did, in fact, pleaded "Not Guilty" upon his arraignment. Ponga was convicted because all the circumstances pointed to no other person but him — Ponga — as the sumpak-wielder Arlyn Barredo-Jimenez testified that while they were taking their supper that night of March 19, 1989, she happened to glance through the open door of their hut and she saw the accused, outside, standing a few meters away, holding a homemade shotgun (sumpak). Lest she may get embroiled in any untoward incident, she hurriedly went to close the door. She recognized that person standing outside due to the light in front of their house and the fluorescent lamp at the back of their neighbor’s house, thus illuminating the place where the person was standing. Soon after she closed the door, there was a gun blast and then she heard the moanings and cries of pain of her two children, Annabelle and Samuel, Jr. When she looked at them, she saw them bloodied and writhing in pain. Immediately, she opened the door of their hovel to ask for help. Once she opened the door, she saw the accused, Alejandro Valencia, running away and carrying with his right hand the homemade shotgun. In addition, the telltale bullet marks of the door proved without doubt that they were produced by a shotgun bullet and pellets thereof. Pat. Renato Marquez testified that he saw those bullet and pellet holes at the door when he went to investigate the place after he received a report of the incident from Pat. Ramon Cajiles of the Ong Detachment. From his investigation, only one suspect has been consistently mentioned and that is accused Alejandro Valencia who is identified by those he investigated as Ponga. All these circumstances are found by the Court to be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused, Alejandro Valencia, is guilty thereof, and at the same time inconsistent with any other hypothesis except that of his guilt. They constitute an unbroken chain which leads to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the defendant, Alejandro Valencia, to the exclusion of all others, as the author or the two crimes, a chain of natural and rational circumstances corroborating each other and they certainly cannot be overcome by the very inconcrete and doubtful evidence submitted by him (Erlanger and Galinger, Inc. v. Exconde, L-4792 and L-4795, September 20, 1953) as will be pointed out later. Then, too, the facts that no less than the accused’s brother, Ramon Valencia, brought the policeman to their aunt’s house to arrest the herein accused is another circumstance to show that, indeed, herein accused is guilty thereof. The decision of the trial court is AFFIRMED 63 Probable Cause Naca PCGG v. NAVARRO-GUTIERREZ GR No. 194159 21 October 2015 Same; Same; Probable Cause; It must be emphasized that in determining the elements of the crime charged for purposes of arriving at a finding of probable cause, only facts sufficient to support a prima facie case against the respondents are required, not absolute certainty. In this regard, it must be emphasized that in determining the elements of the crime charged for purposes of arriving at a finding of probable cause, only facts sufficient to support a prima facie case against the respondents are required, not absolute certainty. Probable cause implies mere probability of guilt, i.e., a finding based on more than bare suspicion, but less than evidence that would justify a conviction. To reiterate, the validity of the merits of a party’s defense or accusations and the admissibility of testimonies and evidences are better ventilated during the trial stage than in the preliminary stage. In sum, the Court is convinced that there is probable cause to indict individual respondents of violating Sections 3(e) and (g) of RA 3019. Hence, the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing the criminal complaint against them. Ombudsman; Doctrine of Non-Interference; The Supreme Court (SC) has consistently refrained from interfering with the discretion of the Ombudsman to determine the existence of probable cause and to decide — whether or not an Information should be filed. Nonetheless, the Court is not precluded from reviewing the Ombudsman’s action when there is a charge of grave abuse of discretion. At the outset, it must be stressed that the Court has consistently refrained from interfering with the discretion of the Ombudsman to determine the existence of probable cause and to decide whether or not an Information should be filed. Nonetheless, the Court is not precluded from reviewing the Ombudsman’s action when there is a charge of grave abuse of discretion. Grave abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. The Ombudsman’s exercise of power must have been done in an arbitrary or despotic manner which must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Preliminary Investigation; Probable Cause; The conduct of preliminary investigation proceedings whether by the Ombudsman or by a public prosecutor — is geared only to determine whether or not probable cause exists to hold an accused-respondent for trial for the supposed crime that he committed. In this regard, it is worthy to note that the conduct of preliminary investigation proceedings — whether by the Ombudsman or by a public prosecutor — is geared only to determine whether or not probable cause exists to hold an accused-respondent for trial for the supposed crime that he committed. In Fenequito v. Vergara, Jr., 677 SCRA 113 (2012), the Court defined probable cause and the parameters in finding the existence thereof in the following manner, to wit: Probable cause, for the purpose of filing a criminal information, has been defined as such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that respondent is probably guilty thereof. The term does not mean “actual or positive cause” nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Probable cause does not require an inquiry whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a 64 crime has been committed by the suspects. It need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, not on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and definitely not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. In determining probable cause, the average man weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of the rules of evidence of which he has no technical knowledge. He relies on common sense. What is determined is whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. It does not require an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient evidence to secure a conviction. Same; Same; Same; Preliminary investigation is merely an inquisitorial mode of discovering whether or not there is reasonable basis to believe that a crime has been committed and that the person charged should be held responsible for it. Being merely based on opinion and belief, a finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient evidence to secure a conviction. Verily, Preliminary investigation is merely an inquisitorial mode of discovering whether or not there is reasonable basis to believe that a crime has been committed and that the person charged should be held responsible for it. Being merely based on opinion and belief, a finding of probable cause does not require an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient evidence to secure a conviction. “[A preliminary investigation] is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of [the prosecution’s] evidence. The presence and absence of the elements of the crime is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense that may be passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits.” Hence, “the validity and merits of a party’s defense or accusation, as well as the admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are better ventilated during trial proper than at the preliminary investigation level.” Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Preliminary Investigation; Hearsay Evidence Rule; In the recent case of Estrada v. Ombudsman, 748 SCRA 1 (2005), the Supreme Court (SC) declared that hearsay evidence is admissible in determining probable cause in preliminary investigations because such investigation is merely preliminary, and does not finally adjudicate rights and obligations of parties. It was error for the Ombudsman to simply discredit the TWG’s findings contained in the Executive Summary which were adopted by the Ad Hoc Committee for being hearsay, self-serving, and of little probative value. It is noteworthy to point out that owing to the initiatory nature of preliminary investigations, the technical rules of evidence should not be applied in the course of its proceedings. In the recent case of Estrada v. Ombudsman, 748 SCRA 1 (2015), the Court declared that hearsay evidence is admissible in determining probable cause in preliminary investigations because such investigation is merely preliminary, and does not finally adjudicate rights and obligations of parties. Citing a case decided by the Supreme Court of the United States, it was held that probable cause can be established with hearsay evidence, as long as there is substantial basis for crediting the hearsay. Facts On 8 October 1993, then President Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 14 creating the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-finding Committee on Behest Loans. The same was created to identify the behest loans entered into by the past administrations. Subsequently, Memorandum No. 619 was issued. It laid down the criteria to aid the said ad hoc committee in the determination of whether or not a loan is behest in character. 65 The ad hoc committee and the technical working group then examined documents evidencing loans granted to different institutions during the administration of former President Marcos. Among those was a series of loans granted by the Developmental Bank of the Philippines (DBP) to the National Galleon Shipping Corporation. In total, the value of Galleon's obligations to DBP amounted to Php 2,039,284,390.85 while the value of its collaterals was merely Php 539,000,000. The ad hoc committee concluded that the loans obtained by Galleon from DBP possessed positive characteristics of behest loans, considering that: (a) Galleon was undercapitalized; (b) the loan was undercollateralized; (c) the major stockholders of Galleon were known to be Marcos cronies; and (d) certain documents pertaining to the loans were found to bear marginal notes of the former President Marcos. The PCGG then filed a criminal complaint before the Ombudsman against the individual respondents. The respondents contended that the action was already barred by prescription for more than 20 years has passed. Moreover, Roque also averred that he was not a crony of the President Marcos. The Ombudsman dismissed the criminal complaint filed by the PCGG. It held that the complaint lacked probable cause as the executive summaries and technical reports were consisted mostly of hearsay and of little probative value. Issue Whether or not the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in finding that there was no probable cause for the complaint filed by the PCGG against the respondents. Held Yes. Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion. The petition of PCGG has merit. The conduct of preliminary investigation proceedings is geared to determine whether or not probable cause exists to hold an accused-respondent for trial for the supposed crime that he committed. In this light, probable cause is defined as such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that respondent is probably guilty of the same. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. It does not import absolute certainty. A finding of probably cause needs only to rest on evidence that a crime has been committed by the suspects. It does not need to be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. It does not require an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient evidence to secure a conviction. Hence, the determination of probable cause can rest partially, or even entirely, on hearsay as long as the person making the hearsay statement is credible and there is substantial basis for the same. Hearsay evidence is admissible in determining probable cause in a preliminary investigation because such is merely preliminary and does not finally adjudicate rights and obligations of the parties. The ad hoc committee, as contained by the narration of facts in their reports, found that the loans or accommodations extended by the DBP to Galleon were behest in nature. There was substantial basis to credit the findings as such were based on official documents prepared by the DBP itself. It was Ombudsman's error to discredit the findings in the executive summary for being hearsay and of little probative value. 66 Purpose of Preliminary Investigation Parulan DE LIMA vs. REYES G.R. No. 209330 January 11, 2016 Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Preliminary Investigation; In a preliminary investigation, the prosecutor does not determine the guilt or innocence of an accused.—In a preliminary investigation, the prosecutor does not determine the guilt or innocence of an accused. The prosecutor only determines “whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.” As such, the prosecutor does not perform quasi-judicial functions. Facts This Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the of the Court of Appeals, which rendered null and void Department of Justice Order No. 710 issued by the Secretary of Justice. The said DO created a second panel of prosecutors to conduct a reinvestigation of a murder case in view of the first panel of prosecutors’ failure to admit the complainant’s additional evidence. Dr. Gerardo Ortega was shot dead in Puerto Princesa City, Palawan. After a brief chase with police officers, Marlon B. Recamata was arrested. He made an extrajudicial confession admitting that he shot Dr. Ortega. He executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay before the Counter Terrorism Division of the NBI where he alleged that it was former Palawan Governor Mario Joel T. Reyes who ordered the killing of Dr. Ortega. Sec of Justice De Lima issued Department Order No. 091 creating a special panel of prosecutors (First Panel) to conduct preliminary investigation. The First Panel concluded its preliminary investigation and issued a resolution dismissing the Affidavit-Complaint. Dr. Inocencio-Ortega filed a Motion to Re-Open Preliminary Investigation, which, sought the admission of mobile phone communications between former Governor Reyes and Edrad. While the Motion to Re-Open was still pending, Dr. Inocencio-Ortega filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration Ad Cautelam of the Resolution. Both Motions were denied by the First Panel. The Secretary of Justice issued Department Order No. 710 creating a new panel of investigators (Second Panel) to conduct a reinvestigation of the case to address the offer of additional evidence denied by the First Panel. The Second Panel issued a Subpoena requiring Reyes to appear before them and to submit his counter-affidavit and supporting evidence. Former Governor Reyes filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order assailing the creation of the Second Panel. The Second Panel issued the Resolution finding probable cause and recommending the filing of informations on all accused. Branch 52 of the Regional Trial Court of Palawan subsequently issued warrants of arrest. Reyes filed before the Secretary of Justice a Petition for Review Ad Cautelam assailing the Second Panel’s Resolution. He also filed before the Court of Appeals a Supplemental Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or TRO impleading Regional Trial Court of Palawan. Reyes argued that the RTC could not enforce the Second Panel’s Resolution and proceed with the prosecution of his case since this Resolution was void. The CA in a decision declared DO 710 as null 67 and void and reinstated the First Panel’s Resolutions. According to the CA, the Sec of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion, that she should have modified or reversed the Resolutions of the First Panel pursuant to the 2000 NPS Rule on Appeal instead creating the Second Panel. The Secretary of Justice, the Second Panel, and Dr. Inocencio-Ortega filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision of CA but, however, was denied. It stated that the Secretary of Justice had not shown the alleged miscarriage of justice sought to be prevented by the creation of the Second Panel since both parties were given full opportunity to present their evidence before the First Panel. The Secretary of Justice and the Second Panel filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari. Petitioners argue that the Sec of that under Republic Act No. 10071 and the 2000 NPS Rule on Appeal, the Secretary of Justice has the power to create a new panel of prosecutors to reinvestigate a case to prevent a miscarriage of justice. Petitioners’ position was that the First Panel “appear[ed] to have ignored the rules of preliminary investigation” when it refused to receive additional evidence that would have been crucial for the determination of the existence of probable cause Petitioners argue that since the Information had been filed, the disposition of the case was already within the discretion of the trial court Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Secretary of Justice had no authority to order motu propio the reinvestigation of the case since Dr. Inocencio-Ortega was able to submit her alleged new evidence to the First Panel when she filed her Motion for Partial Reconsideration. Respondent argues that the Second Panel’s Resolution dated March 12, 2012 was void since the Panel was created by a department order that was beyond the Secretary of Justice’s authority to issue. He further argues that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case since the Information filed by the Second Panel was void. Issues 1. Whether or not Secretary of Justice is authorized to create motu propio another panel of prosecutors in order to conduct a reinvestigation of the case 2. Whether or not his Petition for Certiorari has already been rendered moot by the filing of the information in court Held 1. YES. The 2000 NPS Rule on Appeal requires the filing of a petition for review before the Secretary of Justice can reverse, affirm, or modify the appealed resolution of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor. The Secretary of Justice may also order the conduct of a reinvestigation in order to resolve the petition for review. Under Section 11: SECTION 11. Reinvestigation.—If the Secretary of Justice finds it necessary to reinvestigate the case, the reinvestigation shall be held by the investigating prosecutor, unless, for compelling reasons, another prosecutor is designated to conduct the same. Under Rule 112, Section 4 of the Rules of Court, however, the Secretary of Justice may motu propio reverse or modify resolutions of the provincial or city prosecutor or the chief state prosecutor even without a pending petition for review. The Secretary of Justice exercises control and supervision over prosecutors and it is within her authority to affirm, nullify, reverse, or modify the resolutions of her prosecutors. 2. YES. A preliminary investigation is “merely inquisitorial,” and is only conducted to aid the prosecutor in preparing the information. It serves a twofold urpose: first, to protect the innocent 68 against wrongful prosecutions; and second, to pare the state from using its funds and resources in useless prosecutions. In Salonga v. Cruz Paño: The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to secure the innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution, and to protect him from an open and public accusation of crime, from the trouble, expense and anxiety of a public trial, and also to protect the state from useless and expensive trials. Moreover, a preliminary investigation is merely preparatory to a trial. It is not a trial on the merits. An accused’s right to a preliminary investigation is merely statutory; it is not a right guaranteed by the Constitution. Hence, any alleged irregularity in an investigation’s conduct does not render the information void nor impair its validity. Once the information is filed in court, the court acquires jurisdiction of the case and any motion to dismiss the case or to determine the accused’s guilt or innocence rests within the sound discretion of the court. Here, the trial court has already determined, independently of any finding or recommendation by the First Panel or the Second Panel, that probable cause exists for the issuance of the warrant of arrest against respondent. Probable cause has been judicially determined. Jurisdiction over the case, therefore, has transferred to the trial court. A petition for certiorari questioning the validity of the preliminary investigation in any other venue had been rendered moot by the issuance of the warrant of arrest and the conduct of arraignment. The Court of Appeals should have dismissed the Petition for Certiorari filed before them when the trial court issued its warrant of arrest. Since the trial court has already acquired jurisdiction over the case and the existence of probable cause has been judicially determined, a petition for certiorari questioning the conduct of the preliminary investigation ceases to be the “plain, speedy, and adequate remedy” provided by law. Since this Petition for Review is an appeal from a moot Petition for Certiorari, it must also be rendered moot. 69 HEIRS OF NESTOR TRIA V. OBIAS, 635 SCRA 91 FACTS: On May 22, 1998, at around 10:00 o’clock in the morning at the Pili Airport in Camarines Sur, Engr. Nestor Tria, Regional Director of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), Region V and concurrently Officer-In-Charge of the 2nd Engineering District of Camarines Sur, was shot by a gunman while waiting to board his flight to Manila. He was brought to a hospital but died the following day from the lone gunshot wound on his nape. Subsequently, the incident was investigated by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). During the preliminary investigation, respondent filed her Counter-Affidavit denying that she was in anyway involved with the killing of Engr. Tria, and further asserted that from the totality of evidence gathered by the NBI, it has not established prima facie the existence of conspiracy as to implicate her in the death of Engr. Tria. The Prosecutor issued a resolution directing the filing of an information for murder against Aclan and Ona but dismissed the case for insufficiency of evidence as against Obias. Petitioners appealed to the DOJ, assailing the Prosecutor’s order to dismiss the charge against Obias. As such, Justice Secretary Cuevas issued a Resolution directing the Prosecutor to include Obias in the information. The DOJ was convinced that the sequence of events and respondent’s conduct before, during and after the killing of Engr. Tria undeniably points to her complicity with Aclan and Ona.further, Respondent filed a Notice of Appeal with the DOJ under the provisions of Administrative Order No. 18, series of 1987. However this was denied. Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the denial of her notice of appeal. However, the DOJ denied respondent’s motion for reconsideration stating that the proper procedure is the filing of an appeal or petition for review with the OP and not before the DOJ. Hence, the case was considered closed and terminated. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion in affirming the OP’s dismissal of the murder charge. RULING: No, the justice secretary is not precluded from exercising his power of review over the investigating prosecutor even after the information has already been filed in court. However, the justice secretary’s subsequent resolution withdrawing the information or dismissing the case does not cause the court to lose jurisdiction over the case. In fact, the court is duty-bound to exercise judicial discretion and its own independent judgment in assessing the merits of the resulting motion to dismiss filed by the prosecution, to wit: When confronted with a motion to withdraw an information on the ground of lack of probable cause based on a resolution of the secretary of justice, the bounded duty of the trial court is to make an independent assessment of the merits of such motion. Having acquired jurisdiction over the case, the trial court is not bound by such resolution but is required to evaluate it before proceeding further with the trial. While the secretary’s ruling is persuasive, it is not binding on courts. A trial court, however, commits reversible error or even grave abuse of discretion if it refuses/neglects to evaluate such recommendation and simply insists on proceeding with the trial on the mere pretext of having already acquired jurisdiction over the criminal action. Further, it is well within the court’s sound discretion to suspend arraignment to await the result of the justice secretary’s review of the correctness of the filing of the criminal information. George Antiquera y Codes vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 180661. December 11, 2013 Doctrine: If an arrest is proven to be illegal, the search and seizure that resulted from it was likewise illegal. Consequently, the various drug paraphernalia that the police officers allegedly found in the house and seized are inadmissible, having proceeded from an invalid search and seizure. Since the confiscated drug paraphernalia is the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, the Court has no choice but to acquit the accused. Furthermore, the failure of the accused to object to the irregularity of his arrest by itself is not enough to sustain his conviction. A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during the illegal warrantless arrest. Facts: George Codes Antiquera and Corazon Olivenza Cruz were charged with illegal possession of paraphernalia for dangerous drug. According to the prosecution, some policemen, and two civilian operatives on board a patrol car and a tricycle were conducting a police visibility patrol, when they saw two unidentified men rush out of house number 107-C and immediately boarded a jeep. Suspecting that a crime had been committed, the police officers approached the house from where the men came and peeked through the partially opened door. They saw accused Antiquera holding an improvised tooter and a pink lighter. Beside him was his live-in partner, Cruz, who was holding an aluminum foil and an improvised burner. They sat facing each other at the living room. This prompted the police officers to enter the house, introduce themselves, and arrest Antiquera and Cruz. While inspecting the immediate surroundings, PO1 Cabutihan saw a wooden jewelry box atop a table. It contained an improvised burner, wok, scissors, small transparent plastic sachets with traces of white crystalline substance, improvised scoop, and seven unused strips of aluminum foil. The police officers confiscated all these and brought Antiquera and Cruz to the Drug Enforcement Unit of the Philippine National Police in Pasay City for further investigation and testing Issues: 1. Whether or not there was valid warrantless arrest? 2. Whether or not the accused had waived their right to question the irregularity of the arrest since he voluntarily submitted himself to the court's jurisdiction by entering a plea of not guilty? Ruling : 1. No. Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a "peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense." This is an arrest in flagrante delicto.” The overt act constituting the crime MUST be done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. The circumstances in the present case do not make out a case of arrest made in in flagrante delicto. FIRST, the police officers claim that they were alerted when they saw two unidentified men suddenly rush out of 107 David Street, Pasay City. Since they suspected that a crime had been committed, the natural thing for them to do was to give chase to the jeep that the two fleeing men boarded, given that the officers were in a patrol car and a tricycle. Running after the fleeing suspects was the more urgent task but the officers instead gave priority to the house even when they heard no cry for help from it. SECOND, admittedly, the police officers did not notice anything amiss going on in the house from the street where they stood. Indeed, even as they peeked through its partially opened door, they saw no activity that warranted their entering it. One of the police officers testified that the door was only opened about 4-6 inches and they still have to push the door wide open to actually see its interior and peep through its opening because they did not know what was happening inside. Clearly, no crime was plainly exposed to the view of the arresting officers that authorized the arrest of accused Antiquera without warrant under the above- mentioned rule. Considering that his arrest was illegal, the search and seizure that resulted from it was likewise illegal. Consequently, the various drug paraphernalia that the police officers allegedly found in the house and seized are inadmissible, having proceeded from an invalid search and seizure. Since the confiscated drug paraphernalia is the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, the Court has no choice but to acquit the accused. 2. NO. The failure of the accused to object to the irregularity of his arrest by itself is not enough to sustain his conviction. A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during the illegal warrantless arrest. Sanchez v. Demetriou, 227 SCRA G.R. No. Nos. 111771-77 November 9, 1993 Doctrine: “The rule is that if the accused objects to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, he may move to quash the information, but only on that ground. If, as in this case, the accused raises other grounds in the motion to quash, he is deemed to have waived that objection and to have submitted his person to the jurisdiction of that court.” FACTS: Seven Informations of Rape with Homicide were filed against Mayor Antonio L. Sanchez of Calauan Laguna and six other persons in connection with the rape-slay of Mary Eileen Sarmenta and the killing of Allan Gomez. Acting on the request of the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission, the panel of State Prosecutors of the Department of Justice conducted a preliminary investigation. Sanchez was not present but he was represented by Atty. Brion. An “invitation” issued by PNP Commander Rex Piad was also served on Sanchez and he was immediately taken to Camp Vicente Lim. Sanchez was placed on “arrest status” upon the positive identification by Centeno and SPO3 Malabanan that Sanchez was the principal in the rape-slay case. The respondent prosecutors conducted an inquest upon Sanchez’ arrival, with Atty. Panelo as his counsel. After the hearing, a warrant of arrest was served on Sanchez in connection with a criminal case for violation of RA 6713. The Information for Rape with Homicide were filed in RTC Laguna and warrants of arrest were issued against all of the accused. The venue of the case was then transferred to Pasig, Metro Manila upon the expressed apprehension of the Secretary of Justice. Sanchez filed a Motion to Quash on the following grounds: 1) he was denied the right to present evidence at the preliminary investigation; 2) only the Ombudsman had the competence to conduct the investigation; 3) his warrantless arrest is illegal and the court has therefore not acquired jurisdiction over him, 4) he is being charged with seven homicides arising from the death of only two persons; 5) the informations are discriminatory because they do not include Teofilo Alqueza and Edgardo Lavadia; and 6) as a public officer, he can be tried for the offense only by the Sandiganbayan. The Motion to Quash was denied. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: If the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case. HELD: NO. The crime of rape with homicide does not fall under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as it obviously does not fall under paragraph (1), which deals with graft and corruption cases. Neither is it covered by paragraph (2) because it is not an offense committed in relation to the office of the petitioner. There is no direct relation between the commission of the crime of rape with homicide and the petitioner's office as municipal mayor because public office is not an essential element of the crime charged. The offense can stand independently of the office. Moreover, it is not even alleged in the information that the commission of the crime charged was intimately connected with the performance of the petitioner's official functions to make it fall under the exception laid down in People v. Montejo. In that case, a city mayor and several detectives were charged with murder for the death of a suspect as a result of a "third degree" investigation held at a police substation.The Court held that, although public office is not an element of the crime of murder in abstract, the offense therein charged is intimately connected with their respective offices and was perpetrated while they were in the performance, though improper or irregular, of their official functions. Indeed they had no personal motive to commit the crime and they would not have committed it had they not held their aforesaid offices.