G.R. No. L-45081
July 15, 1936
JOSE A. ANGARA, petitioner,
vs.
THE ELECTORAL COMMISSION, PEDRO YNSUA, MIGUEL CASTILLO, and DIONISIO C.
MAYOR, respondents.
Godofredo Reyes for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Hilado for respondent Electoral Commission.
Pedro Ynsua in his own behalf.
No appearance for other respondents.
LAUREL, J.:
This is an original action instituted in this court by the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, for the issuance of a writ of
prohibition to restrain and prohibit the Electoral Commission, one of the respondents, from taking further cognizance
of the protest filed by Pedro Ynsua, another respondent, against the election of said petitioner as member of the
National Assembly for the first assembly district of the Province of Tayabas.
The facts of this case as they appear in the petition and as admitted by the respondents are as follows:
(1) That in the elections of September 17, 1935, the petitioner, Jose A. Angara, and the respondents, Pedro
Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor, were candidates voted for the position of member of the National
Assembly for the first district of the Province of Tayabas;
(2) That on October 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers, proclaimed the petitioner as member-elect
of the National Assembly for the said district, for having received the most number of votes;
(3) That on November 15, 1935, the petitioner took his oath of office;
(4) That on December 3, 1935, the National Assembly in session assembled, passed the following
resolution:
[No. 8]
RESOLUCION CONFIRMANDO LAS ACTAS DE AQUELLOS DIPUTADOS CONTRA QUIENES
NO SE HA PRESENTADO PROTESTA.
Se resuelve: Que las actas de eleccion de los Diputados contra quienes no se hubiere presentado
debidamente una protesta antes de la adopcion de la presente resolucion sean, como por la
presente, son aprobadas y confirmadas.
Adoptada, 3 de diciembre, 1935.
(5) That on December 8, 1935, the herein respondent Pedro Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a
"Motion of Protest" against the election of the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, being the only protest filed
after the passage of Resolutions No. 8 aforequoted, and praying, among other-things, that said respondent
be declared elected member of the National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas, or that the election of
said position be nullified;
(6) That on December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted a resolution, paragraph 6 of which
provides:
6. La Comision no considerara ninguna protesta que no se haya presentado en o antes de este dia.
(7) That on December 20, 1935, the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, one of the respondents in the
aforesaid protest, filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion to Dismiss the Protest", alleging (a) that
Resolution No. 8 of Dismiss the Protest", alleging (a) that Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly was
adopted in the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative to prescribe the period during which
protests against the election of its members should be presented; (b) that the aforesaid resolution has for its
object, and is the accepted formula for, the limitation of said period; and (c) that the protest in question was
filed out of the prescribed period;
(8) That on December 27, 1935, the herein respondent, Pedro Ynsua, filed an "Answer to the Motion of
Dismissal" alleging that there is no legal or constitutional provision barring the presentation of a protest
against the election of a member of the National Assembly after confirmation;
(9) That on December 31, 1935, the herein petitioner, Jose A. Angara, filed a "Reply" to the aforesaid
"Answer to the Motion of Dismissal";
(10) That the case being submitted for decision, the Electoral Commission promulgated a resolution on
January 23, 1936, denying herein petitioner's "Motion to Dismiss the Protest."
The application of the petitioner sets forth the following grounds for the issuance of the writ prayed for:
(a) That the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the electoral Commission solely as regards the
merits of contested elections to the National Assembly;
(b) That the Constitution excludes from said jurisdiction the power to regulate the proceedings of said
election contests, which power has been reserved to the Legislative Department of the Government or the
National Assembly;
(c) That like the Supreme Court and other courts created in pursuance of the Constitution, whose exclusive
jurisdiction relates solely to deciding the merits of controversies submitted to them for decision and to
matters involving their internal organization, the Electoral Commission can regulate its proceedings only if
the National Assembly has not availed of its primary power to so regulate such proceedings;
(d) That Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly is, therefore, valid and should be respected and obeyed;
(e) That under paragraph 13 of section 1 of the ordinance appended to the Constitution and paragraph 6 of
article 7 of the Tydings-McDuffie Law (No. 127 of the 73rd Congress of the United States) as well as under
section 1 and 3 (should be sections 1 and 2) of article VIII of the Constitution, this Supreme Court has
jurisdiction to pass upon the fundamental question herein raised because it involves an interpretation of the
Constitution of the Philippines.
On February 25, 1936, the Solicitor-General appeared and filed an answer in behalf of the respondent Electoral
Commission interposing the following special defenses:
(a) That the Electoral Commission has been created by the Constitution as an instrumentality of the
Legislative Department invested with the jurisdiction to decide "all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly"; that in adopting its resolution of December 9,
1935, fixing this date as the last day for the presentation of protests against the election of any member of
the National Assembly, it acted within its jurisdiction and in the legitimate exercise of the implied powers
granted it by the Constitution to adopt the rules and regulations essential to carry out the power and
functions conferred upon the same by the fundamental law; that in adopting its resolution of January 23,
1936, overruling the motion of the petitioner to dismiss the election protest in question, and declaring itself
with jurisdiction to take cognizance of said protest, it acted in the legitimate exercise of its quasi-judicial
functions a an instrumentality of the Legislative Department of the Commonwealth Government, and hence
said act is beyond the judicial cognizance or control of the Supreme Court;
(b) That the resolution of the National Assembly of December 3, 1935, confirming the election of the
members of the National Assembly against whom no protest had thus far been filed, could not and did not
deprive the electoral Commission of its jurisdiction to take cognizance of election protests filed within the
time that might be set by its own rules:
(c) That the Electoral Commission is a body invested with quasi-judicial functions, created by the
Constitution as an instrumentality of the Legislative Department, and is not an "inferior tribunal, or
corporation, or board, or person" within the purview of section 226 and 516 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
against which prohibition would lie.
The respondent Pedro Ynsua, in his turn, appeared and filed an answer in his own behalf on March 2, 1936, setting
forth the following as his special defense:
(a) That at the time of the approval of the rules of the Electoral Commission on December 9, 1935, there
was no existing law fixing the period within which protests against the election of members of the National
Assembly should be filed; that in fixing December 9, 1935, as the last day for the filing of protests against
the election of members of the National Assembly, the Electoral Commission was exercising a power
impliedly conferred upon it by the Constitution, by reason of its quasi-judicial attributes;
(b) That said respondent presented his motion of protest before the Electoral Commission on December 9,
1935, the last day fixed by paragraph 6 of the rules of the said Electoral Commission;
(c) That therefore the Electoral Commission acquired jurisdiction over the protest filed by said respondent
and over the parties thereto, and the resolution of the Electoral Commission of January 23, 1936, denying
petitioner's motion to dismiss said protest was an act within the jurisdiction of the said commission, and is
not reviewable by means of a writ of prohibition;
(d) That neither the law nor the Constitution requires confirmation by the National Assembly of the election
of its members, and that such confirmation does not operate to limit the period within which protests should
be filed as to deprive the Electoral Commission of jurisdiction over protest filed subsequent thereto;
(e) That the Electoral Commission is an independent entity created by the Constitution, endowed with quasijudicial functions, whose decision are final and unappealable;
( f ) That the electoral Commission, as a constitutional creation, is not an inferior tribunal, corporation, board
or person, within the terms of sections 226 and 516 of the Code of Civil Procedure; and that neither under
the provisions of sections 1 and 2 of article II (should be article VIII) of the Constitution and paragraph 13 of
section 1 of the Ordinance appended thereto could it be subject in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions
to a writ of prohibition from the Supreme Court;
(g) That paragraph 6 of article 7 of the Tydings-McDuffie Law (No. 127 of the 73rd Congress of the united
States) has no application to the case at bar.
The case was argued before us on March 13, 1936. Before it was submitted for decision, the petitioner prayed for
the issuance of a preliminary writ of injunction against the respondent Electoral Commission which petition was
denied "without passing upon the merits of the case" by resolution of this court of March 21, 1936.
There was no appearance for the other respondents.
The issues to be decided in the case at bar may be reduced to the following two principal propositions:
1. Has the Supreme Court jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the
controversy upon the foregoing related facts, and in the affirmative,
2. Has the said Electoral Commission acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in assuming to the
cognizance of the protest filed the election of the herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation
of such election by resolution of the National Assembly?
We could perhaps dispose of this case by passing directly upon the merits of the controversy. However, the
question of jurisdiction having been presented, we do not feel justified in evading the issue. Being a case primæ
impressionis, it would hardly be consistent with our sense of duty to overlook the broader aspect of the question and
leave it undecided. Neither would we be doing justice to the industry and vehemence of counsel were we not to
pass upon the question of jurisdiction squarely presented to our consideration.
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It obtains not through express
provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of
matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact that the three
powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely unrestrained and
independent of each other. The Constitution has provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure
coordination in the workings of the various departments of the government. For example, the Chief Executive under
our Constitution is so far made a check on the legislative power that this assent is required in the enactment of laws.
This, however, is subject to the further check that a bill may become a law notwithstanding the refusal of the
President to approve it, by a vote of two-thirds or three-fourths, as the case may be, of the National Assembly. The
President has also the right to convene the Assembly in special session whenever he chooses. On the other hand,
the National Assembly operates as a check on the Executive in the sense that its consent through its Commission
on Appointments is necessary in the appointments of certain officers; and the concurrence of a majority of all its
members is essential to the conclusion of treaties. Furthermore, in its power to determine what courts other than the
Supreme Court shall be established, to define their jurisdiction and to appropriate funds for their support, the
National Assembly controls the judicial department to a certain extent. The Assembly also exercises the judicial
power of trying impeachments. And the judiciary in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively
checks the other departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and
legislative acts void if violative of the Constitution.
But in the main, the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the
executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the government. The overlapping and interlacing of
functions and duties between the several departments, however, sometimes makes it hard to say just where the one
leaves off and the other begins. In times of social disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks of the
Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department
is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the
several departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof.
As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking perfection and perfectibility, but as much as it was
within the power of our people, acting through their delegates to so provide, that instrument which is the expression
of their sovereignty however limited, has established a republican government intended to operate and function as a
harmonious whole, under a system of checks and balances, and subject to specific limitations and restrictions
provided in the said instrument. The Constitution sets forth in no uncertain language the restrictions and limitations
upon governmental powers and agencies. If these restrictions and limitations are transcended it would be
inconceivable if the Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by which to direct the course of government
along constitutional channels, for then the distribution of powers would be mere verbiage, the bill of rights mere
expressions of sentiment, and the principles of good government mere political apothegms. Certainly, the limitation
and restrictions embodied in our Constitution are real as they should be in any living constitution. In the United
States where no express constitutional grant is found in their constitution, the possession of this moderating power
of the courts, not to speak of its historical origin and development there, has been set at rest by popular
acquiescence for a period of more than one and a half centuries. In our case, this moderating power is granted, if
not expressly, by clear implication from section 2 of article VIII of our constitution.
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature, scope and extent of
such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And
when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over the other
departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and
sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution
and to establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to
them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial
review under the Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to
be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised
or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions
and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not
pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the presumption
of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the
Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the
wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative
departments of the governments of the government.
But much as we might postulate on the internal checks of power provided in our Constitution, it ought not the less to
be remembered that, in the language of James Madison, the system itself is not "the chief palladium of constitutional
liberty . . . the people who are authors of this blessing must also be its guardians . . . their eyes must be ever ready
to mark, their voice to pronounce . . . aggression on the authority of their constitution." In the Last and ultimate
analysis, then, must the success of our government in the unfolding years to come be tested in the crucible of
Filipino minds and hearts than in consultation rooms and court chambers.
In the case at bar, the national Assembly has by resolution (No. 8) of December 3, 1935, confirmed the election of
the herein petitioner to the said body. On the other hand, the Electoral Commission has by resolution adopted on
December 9, 1935, fixed said date as the last day for the filing of protests against the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, notwithstanding the previous confirmation made by the National
Assembly as aforesaid. If, as contended by the petitioner, the resolution of the National Assembly has the effect of
cutting off the power of the Electoral Commission to entertain protests against the election, returns and qualifications
of members of the National Assembly, submitted after December 3, 1935, then the resolution of the Electoral
Commission of December 9, 1935, is mere surplusage and had no effect. But, if, as contended by the respondents,
the Electoral Commission has the sole power of regulating its proceedings to the exclusion of the National
Assembly, then the resolution of December 9, 1935, by which the Electoral Commission fixed said date as the last
day for filing protests against the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, should
be upheld.
Here is then presented an actual controversy involving as it does a conflict of a grave constitutional nature between
the National Assembly on the one hand, and the Electoral Commission on the other. From the very nature of the
republican government established in our country in the light of American experience and of our own, upon the
judicial department is thrown the solemn and inescapable obligation of interpreting the Constitution and defining
constitutional boundaries. The Electoral Commission, as we shall have occasion to refer hereafter, is a constitutional
organ, created for a specific purpose, namely to determine all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly. Although the Electoral Commission may not be interfered
with, when and while acting within the limits of its authority, it does not follow that it is beyond the reach of the
constitutional mechanism adopted by the people and that it is not subject to constitutional restrictions. The Electoral
Commission is not a separate department of the government, and even if it were, conflicting claims of authority
under the fundamental law between department powers and agencies of the government are necessarily
determined by the judiciary in justifiable and appropriate cases. Discarding the English type and other European
types of constitutional government, the framers of our constitution adopted the American type where the written
constitution is interpreted and given effect by the judicial department. In some countries which have declined to
follow the American example, provisions have been inserted in their constitutions prohibiting the courts from
exercising the power to interpret the fundamental law. This is taken as a recognition of what otherwise would be the
rule that in the absence of direct prohibition courts are bound to assume what is logically their function. For instance,
the Constitution of Poland of 1921, expressly provides that courts shall have no power to examine the validity of
statutes (art. 81, chap. IV). The former Austrian Constitution contained a similar declaration. In countries whose
constitutions are silent in this respect, courts have assumed this power. This is true in Norway, Greece, Australia
and South Africa. Whereas, in Czechoslovakia (arts. 2 and 3, Preliminary Law to constitutional Charter of the
Czechoslovak Republic, February 29, 1920) and Spain (arts. 121-123, Title IX, Constitutional of the Republic of
1931) especial constitutional courts are established to pass upon the validity of ordinary laws. In our case, the
nature of the present controversy shows the necessity of a final constitutional arbiter to determine the conflict of
authority between two agencies created by the Constitution. Were we to decline to take cognizance of the
controversy, who will determine the conflict? And if the conflict were left undecided and undetermined, would not a
void be thus created in our constitutional system which may be in the long run prove destructive of the entire
framework? To ask these questions is to answer them. Natura vacuum abhorret, so must we avoid exhaustion in our
constitutional system. Upon principle, reason and authority, we are clearly of the opinion that upon the admitted
facts of the present case, this court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject mater of the
present controversy for the purpose of determining the character, scope and extent of the constitutional grant to the
Electoral Commission as "the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly."
Having disposed of the question of jurisdiction, we shall now proceed to pass upon the second proposition and
determine whether the Electoral Commission has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in adopting its
resolution of December 9, 1935, and in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed against the election of the
herein petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation thereof by the National Assembly on December 3, 1935.
As able counsel for the petitioner has pointed out, the issue hinges on the interpretation of section 4 of Article VI of
the Constitution which provides:
"SEC. 4. There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three Justice of the Supreme Court designated by
the Chief Justice, and of six Members chosen by the National Assembly, three of whom shall be nominated by the
party having the largest number of votes, and three by the party having the second largest number of votes therein.
The senior Justice in the Commission shall be its Chairman. The Electoral Commission shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly." It is
imperative, therefore, that we delve into the origin and history of this constitutional provision and inquire into the
intention of its framers and the people who adopted it so that we may properly appreciate its full meaning, import
and significance.
The original provision regarding this subject in the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902 (sec. 7, par. 5) laying down the
rule that "the assembly shall be the judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its members", was taken
from clause 1 of section 5, Article I of the Constitution of the United States providing that "Each House shall be the
Judge of the Elections, Returns, and Qualifications of its own Members, . . . ." The Act of Congress of August 29,
1916 (sec. 18, par. 1) modified this provision by the insertion of the word "sole" as follows: "That the Senate and
House of Representatives, respectively, shall be the sole judges of the elections, returns, and qualifications of their
elective members . . ." apparently in order to emphasize the exclusive the Legislative over the particular case s
therein specified. This court has had occasion to characterize this grant of power to the Philippine Senate and
House of Representatives, respectively, as "full, clear and complete" (Veloso vs. Boards of Canvassers of Leyte and
Samar [1919], 39 Phil., 886, 888.)
The first step towards the creation of an independent tribunal for the purpose of deciding contested elections to the
legislature was taken by the sub-committee of five appointed by the Committee on Constitutional Guarantees of the
Constitutional Convention, which sub-committee submitted a report on August 30, 1934, recommending the creation
of a Tribunal of Constitutional Security empowered to hear legislature but also against the election of executive
officers for whose election the vote of the whole nation is required, as well as to initiate impeachment proceedings
against specified executive and judicial officer. For the purpose of hearing legislative protests, the tribunal was to be
composed of three justices designated by the Supreme Court and six members of the house of the legislature to
which the contest corresponds, three members to be designed by the majority party and three by the minority, to be
presided over by the Senior Justice unless the Chief Justice is also a member in which case the latter shall preside.
The foregoing proposal was submitted by the Committee on Constitutional Guarantees to the Convention on
September 15, 1934, with slight modifications consisting in the reduction of the legislative representation to four
members, that is, two senators to be designated one each from the two major parties in the Senate and two
representatives to be designated one each from the two major parties in the House of Representatives, and in
awarding representation to the executive department in the persons of two representatives to be designated by the
President.
Meanwhile, the Committee on Legislative Power was also preparing its report. As submitted to the Convention on
September 24, 1934 subsection 5, section 5, of the proposed Article on the Legislative Department, reads as
follows:
The elections, returns and qualifications of the members of either house and all cases contesting the
election of any of their members shall be judged by an Electoral Commission, constituted, as to each House,
by three members elected by the members of the party having the largest number of votes therein, three
elected by the members of the party having the second largest number of votes, and as to its Chairman, one
Justice of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice.
The idea of creating a Tribunal of Constitutional Security with comprehensive jurisdiction as proposed by the
Committee on Constitutional Guarantees which was probably inspired by the Spanish plan (art. 121, Constitution of
the Spanish Republic of 1931), was soon abandoned in favor of the proposition of the Committee on Legislative
Power to create a similar body with reduced powers and with specific and limited jurisdiction, to be designated as a
Electoral Commission. The Sponsorship Committee modified the proposal of the Committee on Legislative Power
with respect to the composition of the Electoral Commission and made further changes in phraseology to suit the
project of adopting a unicameral instead of a bicameral legislature. The draft as finally submitted to the Convention
on October 26, 1934, reads as follows:
(6) The elections, returns and qualifications of the Members of the National Assembly and all cases
contesting the election of any of its Members shall be judged by an Electoral Commission, composed of
three members elected by the party having the largest number of votes in the National Assembly, three
elected by the members of the party having the second largest number of votes, and three justices of the
Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice, the Commission to be presided over by one of said justices.
During the discussion of the amendment introduced by Delegates Labrador, Abordo, and others, proposing to strike
out the whole subsection of the foregoing draft and inserting in lieu thereof the following: "The National Assembly
shall be the soled and exclusive judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of the Members", the following
illuminating remarks were made on the floor of the Convention in its session of December 4, 1934, as to the scope
of the said draft:
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Mr. VENTURA. Mr. President, we have a doubt here as to the scope of the meaning of the first four lines,
paragraph 6, page 11 of the draft, reading: "The elections, returns and qualifications of the Members of the
National Assembly and all cases contesting the election of any of its Members shall be judged by an
Electoral Commission, . . ." I should like to ask from the gentleman from Capiz whether the election and
qualification of the member whose elections is not contested shall also be judged by the Electoral
Commission.
Mr. ROXAS. If there is no question about the election of the members, there is nothing to be judged; that is
why the word "judge" is used to indicate a controversy. If there is no question about the election of a
member, there is nothing to be submitted to the Electoral Commission and there is nothing to be
determined.
Mr. VENTURA. But does that carry the idea also that the Electoral Commission shall confirm also the
election of those whose election is not contested?
Mr. ROXAS. There is no need of confirmation. As the gentleman knows, the action of the House of
Representatives confirming the election of its members is just a matter of the rules of the assembly. It is not
constitutional. It is not necessary. After a man files his credentials that he has been elected, that is sufficient,
unless his election is contested.
Mr. VENTURA. But I do not believe that that is sufficient, as we have observed that for purposes of the
auditor, in the matter of election of a member to a legislative body, because he will not authorize his pay.
Mr. ROXAS. Well, what is the case with regards to the municipal president who is elected? What happens
with regards to the councilors of a municipality? Does anybody confirm their election? The municipal council
does this: it makes a canvass and proclaims — in this case the municipal council proclaims who has been
elected, and it ends there, unless there is a contest. It is the same case; there is no need on the part of the
Electoral Commission unless there is a contest. The first clause refers to the case referred to by the
gentleman from Cavite where one person tries to be elected in place of another who was declared elected.
From example, in a case when the residence of the man who has been elected is in question, or in case the
citizenship of the man who has been elected is in question.
However, if the assembly desires to annul the power of the commission, it may do so by certain maneuvers
upon its first meeting when the returns are submitted to the assembly. The purpose is to give to the Electoral
Commission all the powers exercised by the assembly referring to the elections, returns and qualifications of
the members. When there is no contest, there is nothing to be judged.
Mr. VENTURA. Then it should be eliminated.
Mr. ROXAS. But that is a different matter, I think Mr. Delegate.
Mr. CINCO. Mr. President, I have a similar question as that propounded by the gentleman from Ilocos Norte
when I arose a while ago. However I want to ask more questions from the delegate from Capiz. This
paragraph 6 on page 11 of the draft cites cases contesting the election as separate from the first part of the
sections which refers to elections, returns and qualifications.
Mr. ROXAS. That is merely for the sake of clarity. In fact the cases of contested elections are already
included in the phrase "the elections, returns and qualifications." This phrase "and contested elections" was
inserted merely for the sake of clarity.
Mr. CINCO. Under this paragraph, may not the Electoral Commission, at its own instance, refuse to confirm
the elections of the members."
Mr. ROXAS. I do not think so, unless there is a protest.
Mr. LABRADOR. Mr. President, will the gentleman yield?
THE PRESIDENT. The gentleman may yield, if he so desires.
Mr. ROXAS. Willingly.
Mr. LABRADOR. Does not the gentleman from Capiz believe that unless this power is granted to the
assembly, the assembly on its own motion does not have the right to contest the election and qualification of
its members?
Mr. ROXAS. I have no doubt but that the gentleman is right. If this draft is retained as it is, even if two-thirds
of the assembly believe that a member has not the qualifications provided by law, they cannot remove him
for that reason.
Mr. LABRADOR. So that the right to remove shall only be retained by the Electoral Commission.
Mr. ROXAS. By the assembly for misconduct.
Mr. LABRADOR. I mean with respect to the qualifications of the members.
Mr. ROXAS. Yes, by the Electoral Commission.
Mr. LABRADOR. So that under this draft, no member of the assembly has the right to question the eligibility
of its members?
Mr. ROXAS. Before a member can question the eligibility, he must go to the Electoral Commission and
make the question before the Electoral Commission.
Mr. LABRADOR. So that the Electoral Commission shall decide whether the election is contested or not
contested.
Mr. ROXAS. Yes, sir: that is the purpose.
Mr. PELAYO. Mr. President, I would like to be informed if the Electoral Commission has power and authority
to pass upon the qualifications of the members of the National Assembly even though that question has not
been raised.
Mr. ROXAS. I have just said that they have no power, because they can only judge.
In the same session, the first clause of the aforesaid draft reading "The election, returns and qualifications of the
members of the National Assembly and" was eliminated by the Sponsorship Committee in response to an
amendment introduced by Delegates Francisco, Ventura, Vinzons, Rafols, Lim, Mumar and others. In explaining the
difference between the original draft and the draft as amended, Delegate Roxas speaking for the Sponsorship
Committee said:
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Sr. ROXAS. La diferencia, señor Presidente, consiste solamente en obviar la objecion apuntada por varios
Delegados al efecto de que la primera clausula del draft que dice: "The elections, returns and qualifications
of the members of the National Assembly" parece que da a la Comision Electoral la facultad de determinar
tambien la eleccion de los miembros que no ha sido protestados y para obviar esa dificultad, creemos que
la enmienda tien razon en ese sentido, si enmendamos el draft, de tal modo que se lea como sigue: "All
cases contesting the election", de modo que los jueces de la Comision Electoral se limitaran solamente a
los casos en que haya habido protesta contra las actas." Before the amendment of Delegate Labrador was
voted upon the following interpellation also took place:
El Sr. CONEJERO. Antes de votarse la enmienda, quisiera
El Sr. PRESIDENTE. ¿Que dice el Comite?
El Sr. ROXAS. Con mucho gusto.
El Sr. CONEJERO. Tal como esta el draft, dando tres miembros a la mayoria, y otros tres a la minoria y tres
a la Corte Suprema, ¿no cree Su Señoria que esto equivale practicamente a dejar el asunto a los miembros
del Tribunal Supremo?
El Sr. ROXAS. Si y no. Creemos que si el tribunal o la Commission esta constituido en esa forma, tanto los
miembros de la mayoria como los de la minoria asi como los miembros de la Corte Suprema consideraran
la cuestion sobre la base de sus meritos, sabiendo que el partidismo no es suficiente para dar el triunfo.
El Sr. CONEJERO. ¿Cree Su Señoria que en un caso como ese, podriamos hacer que tanto los de la
mayoria como los de la minoria prescindieran del partidismo?
El Sr. ROXAS. Creo que si, porque el partidismo no les daria el triunfo.
xxx
xxx
xxx
The amendment introduced by Delegates Labrador, Abordo and others seeking to restore the power to decide
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly to the National
Assembly itself, was defeated by a vote of ninety-eight (98) against fifty-six (56).
In the same session of December 4, 1934, Delegate Cruz (C.) sought to amend the draft by reducing the
representation of the minority party and the Supreme Court in the Electoral Commission to two members each, so
as to accord more representation to the majority party. The Convention rejected this amendment by a vote of
seventy-six (76) against forty-six (46), thus maintaining the non-partisan character of the commission.
As approved on January 31, 1935, the draft was made to read as follows:
(6) All cases contesting the elections, returns and qualifications of the Members of the National Assembly
shall be judged by an Electoral Commission, composed of three members elected by the party having the
largest number of votes in the National Assembly, three elected by the members of the party having the
second largest number of votes, and three justices of the Supreme Court designated by the Chief Justice,
the Commission to be presided over by one of said justices.
The Style Committee to which the draft was submitted revised it as follows:
SEC. 4. There shall be an Electoral Commission composed of three Justices of the Supreme Court
designated by the Chief Justice, and of six Members chosen by the National Assembly, three of whom shall
be nominated by the party having the largest number of votes, and three by the party having the second
largest number of votes therein. The senior Justice in the Commission shall be its chairman. The Electoral
Commission shall be the sole judge of the election, returns, and qualifications of the Members of the
National Assembly.
When the foregoing draft was submitted for approval on February 8, 1935, the Style Committee, through President
Recto, to effectuate the original intention of the Convention, agreed to insert the phrase "All contests relating to"
between the phrase "judge of" and the words "the elections", which was accordingly accepted by the Convention.
The transfer of the power of determining the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the legislature
long lodged in the legislative body, to an independent, impartial and non-partisan tribunal, is by no means a mere
experiment in the science of government.
Cushing, in his Law and Practice of Legislative Assemblies (ninth edition, chapter VI, pages 57, 58), gives a vivid
account of the "scandalously notorious" canvassing of votes by political parties in the disposition of contests by the
House of Commons in the following passages which are partly quoted by the petitioner in his printed memorandum
of March 14, 1936:
153. From the time when the commons established their right to be the exclusive judges of the elections,
returns, and qualifications of their members, until the year 1770, two modes of proceeding prevailed, in the
determination of controverted elections, and rights of membership. One of the standing committees
appointed at the commencement of each session, was denominated the committee of privileges and
elections, whose functions was to hear and investigate all questions of this description which might be
referred to them, and to report their proceedings, with their opinion thereupon, to the house, from time to
time. When an election petition was referred to this committee they heard the parties and their witnesses
and other evidence, and made a report of all the evidence, together with their opinion thereupon, in the form
of resolutions, which were considered and agreed or disagreed to by the house. The other mode of
proceeding was by a hearing at the bar of the house itself. When this court was adopted, the case was
heard and decided by the house, in substantially the same manner as by a committee. The committee of
privileges and elections although a select committee. The committee of privileges and elections although a
select committee was usually what is called an open one; that is to say, in order to constitute the committee,
a quorum of the members named was required to be present, but all the members of the house were at
liberty to attend the committee and vote if they pleased.
154. With the growth of political parties in parliament questions relating to the right of membership gradually
assumed a political character; so that for many years previous to the year 1770, controverted elections had
been tried and determined by the house of commons, as mere party questions, upon which the strength of
contending factions might be tested. Thus, for Example, in 1741, Sir Robert Walpole, after repeated attacks
upon his government, resigned his office in consequence of an adverse vote upon the Chippenham election.
Mr. Hatsell remarks, of the trial of election cases, as conducted under this system, that "Every principle of
decency and justice were notoriously and openly prostituted, from whence the younger part of the house
were insensibly, but too successfully, induced to adopt the same licentious conduct in more serious matters,
and in questions of higher importance to the public welfare." Mr. George Grenville, a distinguished member
of the house of commons, undertook to propose a remedy for the evil, and, on the 7th of March, 1770,
obtained the unanimous leave of the house to bring in a bill, "to regulate the trial of controverted elections, or
returns of members to serve in parliament." In his speech to explain his plan, on the motion for leave, Mr.
Grenville alluded to the existing practice in the following terms: "Instead of trusting to the merits of their
respective causes, the principal dependence of both parties is their private interest among us; and it is
scandalously notorious that we are as earnestly canvassed to attend in favor of the opposite sides, as if we
were wholly self-elective, and not bound to act by the principles of justice, but by the discretionary impulse of
our own inclinations; nay, it is well known, that in every contested election, many members of this house,
who are ultimately to judge in a kind of judicial capacity between the competitors, enlist themselves as
parties in the contention, and take upon themselves the partial management of the very business, upon
which they should determine with the strictest impartiality."
155. It was to put an end to the practices thus described, that Mr. Grenville brought in a bill which met with
the approbation of both houses, and received the royal assent on the 12th of April, 1770. This was the
celebrated law since known by the name of the Grenville Act; of which Mr. Hatsell declares, that it "was one
of the nobles works, for the honor of the house of commons, and the security of the constitution, that was
ever devised by any minister or statesman." It is probable, that the magnitude of the evil, or the apparent
success of the remedy, may have led many of the contemporaries of the measure to the information of a
judgement, which was not acquiesced in by some of the leading statesmen of the day, and has not been
entirely confirmed by subsequent experience. The bill was objected to by Lord North, Mr. De Grey,
afterwards chief justice of the common pleas, Mr. Ellis, Mr. Dyson, who had been clerk of the house, and Mr.
Charles James Fox, chiefly on the ground, that the introduction of the new system was an essential
alteration of the constitution of parliament, and a total abrogation of one of the most important rights and
jurisdictions of the house of commons.
As early as 1868, the House of Commons in England solved the problem of insuring the non-partisan settlement of
the controverted elections of its members by abdicating its prerogative to two judges of the King's Bench of the High
Court of Justice selected from a rota in accordance with rules of court made for the purpose. Having proved
successful, the practice has become imbedded in English jurisprudence (Parliamentary Elections Act, 1868 [31 & 32
Vict. c. 125] as amended by Parliamentary Elections and Corrupt Practices Act. 1879 [42 & 43 Vict. c. 75], s. 2;
Corrupt and Illegal Practices Preventions Act, 1883 [46 & 47 Vict. c. 51;, s. 70; Expiring Laws Continuance Act,
1911 [1 & 2 Geo. 5, c. 22]; Laws of England, vol. XII, p. 408, vol. XXI, p. 787). In the Dominion of Canada, election
contests which were originally heard by the Committee of the House of Commons, are since 1922 tried in the courts.
Likewise, in the Commonwealth of Australia, election contests which were originally determined by each house, are
since 1922 tried in the High Court. In Hungary, the organic law provides that all protests against the election of
members of the Upper House of the Diet are to be resolved by the Supreme Administrative Court (Law 22 of 1916,
chap. 2, art. 37, par. 6). The Constitution of Poland of March 17, 1921 (art. 19) and the Constitution of the Free City
of Danzig of May 13, 1922 (art. 10) vest the authority to decide contested elections to the Diet or National Assembly
in the Supreme Court. For the purpose of deciding legislative contests, the Constitution of the German Reich of July
1, 1919 (art. 31), the Constitution of the Czechoslovak Republic of February 29, 1920 (art. 19) and the Constitution
of the Grecian Republic of June 2, 1927 (art. 43), all provide for an Electoral Commission.
The creation of an Electoral Commission whose membership is recruited both from the legislature and the judiciary
is by no means unknown in the United States. In the presidential elections of 1876 there was a dispute as to the
number of electoral votes received by each of the two opposing candidates. As the Constitution made no adequate
provision for such a contingency, Congress passed a law on January 29, 1877 (United States Statutes at Large, vol.
19, chap. 37, pp. 227-229), creating a special Electoral Commission composed of five members elected by the
Senate, five members elected by the House of Representatives, and five justices of the Supreme Court, the fifth
justice to be selected by the four designated in the Act. The decision of the commission was to be binding unless
rejected by the two houses voting separately. Although there is not much of a moral lesson to be derived from the
experience of America in this regard, judging from the observations of Justice Field, who was a member of that body
on the part of the Supreme Court (Countryman, the Supreme Court of the United States and its Appellate Power
under the Constitution [Albany, 1913] — Relentless Partisanship of Electoral Commission, p. 25 et seq.), the
experiment has at least abiding historical interest.
The members of the Constitutional Convention who framed our fundamental law were in their majority men mature
in years and experience. To be sure, many of them were familiar with the history and political development of other
countries of the world. When , therefore, they deemed it wise to create an Electoral Commission as a constitutional
organ and invested it with the exclusive function of passing upon and determining the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly, they must have done so not only in the light of their own
experience but also having in view the experience of other enlightened peoples of the world. The creation of the
Electoral Commission was designed to remedy certain evils of which the framers of our Constitution were cognizant.
Notwithstanding the vigorous opposition of some members of the Convention to its creation, the plan, as
hereinabove stated, was approved by that body by a vote of 98 against 58. All that can be said now is that, upon the
approval of the constitutional the creation of the Electoral Commission is the expression of the wisdom and "ultimate
justice of the people". (Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address, March 4, 1861.)
From the deliberations of our Constitutional Convention it is evident that the purpose was to transfer in its totality all
the powers previously exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections of its members, to an
independent and impartial tribunal. It was not so much the knowledge and appreciation of contemporary
constitutional precedents, however, as the long-felt need of determining legislative contests devoid of partisan
considerations which prompted the people, acting through their delegates to the Convention, to provide for this body
known as the Electoral Commission. With this end in view, a composite body in which both the majority and minority
parties are equally represented to off-set partisan influence in its deliberations was created, and further endowed
with judicial temper by including in its membership three justices of the Supreme Court.
The Electoral Commission is a constitutional creation, invested with the necessary authority in the performance and
execution of the limited and specific function assigned to it by the Constitution. Although it is not a power in our
tripartite scheme of government, it is, to all intents and purposes, when acting within the limits of its authority, an
independent organ. It is, to be sure, closer to the legislative department than to any other. The location of the
provision (section 4) creating the Electoral Commission under Article VI entitled "Legislative Department" of our
Constitution is very indicative. Its compositions is also significant in that it is constituted by a majority of members of
the legislature. But it is a body separate from and independent of the legislature.
The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had
remained originally in the legislature. The express lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is an implied
denial of the exercise of that power by the National Assembly. And this is as effective a restriction upon the
legislative power as an express prohibition in the Constitution (Ex parte Lewis, 45 Tex. Crim. Rep., 1;
State vs. Whisman, 36 S.D., 260; L.R.A., 1917B, 1). If we concede the power claimed in behalf of the National
Assembly that said body may regulate the proceedings of the Electoral Commission and cut off the power of the
commission to lay down the period within which protests should be filed, the grant of power to the commission would
be ineffective. The Electoral Commission in such case would be invested with the power to determine contested
cases involving the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly but subject at all
times to the regulative power of the National Assembly. Not only would the purpose of the framers of our
Constitution of totally transferring this authority from the legislative body be frustrated, but a dual authority would be
created with the resultant inevitable clash of powers from time to time. A sad spectacle would then be presented of
the Electoral Commission retaining the bare authority of taking cognizance of cases referred to, but in reality without
the necessary means to render that authority effective whenever and whenever the National Assembly has chosen
to act, a situation worse than that intended to be remedied by the framers of our Constitution. The power to regulate
on the part of the National Assembly in procedural matters will inevitably lead to the ultimate control by the
Assembly of the entire proceedings of the Electoral Commission, and, by indirection, to the entire abrogation of the
constitutional grant. It is obvious that this result should not be permitted.
We are not insensible to the impassioned argument or the learned counsel for the petitioner regarding the
importance and necessity of respecting the dignity and independence of the national Assembly as a coordinate
department of the government and of according validity to its acts, to avoid what he characterized would be
practically an unlimited power of the commission in the admission of protests against members of the National
Assembly. But as we have pointed out hereinabove, the creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex
necesitate rei the power regulative in character to limit the time with which protests intrusted to its cognizance
should be filed. It is a settled rule of construction that where a general power is conferred or duty enjoined, every
particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also conferred (Cooley,
Constitutional Limitations, eight ed., vol. I, pp. 138, 139). In the absence of any further constitutional provision
relating to the procedure to be followed in filing protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental
power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by
necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.
It is, indeed, possible that, as suggested by counsel for the petitioner, the Electoral Commission may abuse its
regulative authority by admitting protests beyond any reasonable time, to the disturbance of the tranquillity and
peace of mind of the members of the National Assembly. But the possibility of abuse is not argument against the
concession of the power as there is no power that is not susceptible of abuse. In the second place, if any mistake
has been committed in the creation of an Electoral Commission and in investing it with exclusive jurisdiction in all
cases relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, the remedy is
political, not judicial, and must be sought through the ordinary processes of democracy. All the possible abuses of
the government are not intended to be corrected by the judiciary. We believe, however, that the people in creating
the Electoral Commission reposed as much confidence in this body in the exclusive determination of the specified
cases assigned to it, as they have given to the Supreme Court in the proper cases entrusted to it for decision. All the
agencies of the government were designed by the Constitution to achieve specific purposes, and each constitutional
organ working within its own particular sphere of discretionary action must be deemed to be animated with the same
zeal and honesty in accomplishing the great ends for which they were created by the sovereign will. That the
actuations of these constitutional agencies might leave much to be desired in given instances, is inherent in the
perfection of human institutions. In the third place, from the fact that the Electoral Commission may not be interfered
with in the exercise of its legitimate power, it does not follow that its acts, however illegal or unconstitutional, may
not be challenge in appropriate cases over which the courts may exercise jurisdiction.
But independently of the legal and constitutional aspects of the present case, there are considerations of equitable
character that should not be overlooked in the appreciation of the intrinsic merits of the controversy. The
Commonwealth Government was inaugurated on November 15, 1935, on which date the Constitution, except as to
the provisions mentioned in section 6 of Article XV thereof, went into effect. The new National Assembly convened
on November 25th of that year, and the resolution confirming the election of the petitioner, Jose A. Angara was
approved by that body on December 3, 1935. The protest by the herein respondent Pedro Ynsua against the
election of the petitioner was filed on December 9 of the same year. The pleadings do not show when the Electoral
Commission was formally organized but it does appear that on December 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission met for
the first time and approved a resolution fixing said date as the last day for the filing of election protest. When,
therefore, the National Assembly passed its resolution of December 3, 1935, confirming the election of the petitioner
to the National Assembly, the Electoral Commission had not yet met; neither does it appear that said body had
actually been organized. As a mater of fact, according to certified copies of official records on file in the archives
division of the National Assembly attached to the record of this case upon the petition of the petitioner, the three
justices of the Supreme Court the six members of the National Assembly constituting the Electoral Commission
were respectively designated only on December 4 and 6, 1935. If Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly
confirming non-protested elections of members of the National Assembly had the effect of limiting or tolling the time
for the presentation of protests, the result would be that the National Assembly — on the hypothesis that it still
retained the incidental power of regulation in such cases — had already barred the presentation of protests before
the Electoral Commission had had time to organize itself and deliberate on the mode and method to be followed in a
matter entrusted to its exclusive jurisdiction by the Constitution. This result was not and could not have been
contemplated, and should be avoided.
From another angle, Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly confirming the election of members against whom
no protests had been filed at the time of its passage on December 3, 1935, can not be construed as a limitation
upon the time for the initiation of election contests. While there might have been good reason for the legislative
practice of confirmation of the election of members of the legislature at the time when the power to decide election
contests was still lodged in the legislature, confirmation alone by the legislature cannot be construed as depriving
the Electoral Commission of the authority incidental to its constitutional power to be "the sole judge of all contest
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly", to fix the time for the
filing of said election protests. Confirmation by the National Assembly of the returns of its members against whose
election no protests have been filed is, to all legal purposes, unnecessary. As contended by the Electoral
Commission in its resolution of January 23, 1936, overruling the motion of the herein petitioner to dismiss the protest
filed by the respondent Pedro Ynsua, confirmation of the election of any member is not required by the Constitution
before he can discharge his duties as such member. As a matter of fact, certification by the proper provincial board
of canvassers is sufficient to entitle a member-elect to a seat in the national Assembly and to render him eligible to
any office in said body (No. 1, par. 1, Rules of the National Assembly, adopted December 6, 1935).
Under the practice prevailing both in the English House of Commons and in the Congress of the United States,
confirmation is neither necessary in order to entitle a member-elect to take his seat. The return of the proper election
officers is sufficient, and the member-elect presenting such return begins to enjoy the privileges of a member from
the time that he takes his oath of office (Laws of England, vol. 12, pp. 331. 332; vol. 21, pp. 694, 695; U. S. C. A.,
Title 2, secs. 21, 25, 26). Confirmation is in order only in cases of contested elections where the decision is adverse
to the claims of the protestant. In England, the judges' decision or report in controverted elections is certified to the
Speaker of the House of Commons, and the House, upon being informed of such certificate or report by the
Speaker, is required to enter the same upon the Journals, and to give such directions for confirming or altering the
return, or for the issue of a writ for a new election, or for carrying into execution the determination as circumstances
may require (31 & 32 Vict., c. 125, sec. 13). In the United States, it is believed, the order or decision of the particular
house itself is generally regarded as sufficient, without any actual alternation or amendment of the return (Cushing,
Law and Practice of Legislative Assemblies, 9th ed., sec. 166).
Under the practice prevailing when the Jones Law was still in force, each house of the Philippine Legislature fixed
the time when protests against the election of any of its members should be filed. This was expressly authorized by
section 18 of the Jones Law making each house the sole judge of the election, return and qualifications of its
members, as well as by a law (sec. 478, Act No. 3387) empowering each house to respectively prescribe by
resolution the time and manner of filing contest in the election of member of said bodies. As a matter of formality,
after the time fixed by its rules for the filing of protests had already expired, each house passed a resolution
confirming or approving the returns of such members against whose election no protests had been filed within the
prescribed time. This was interpreted as cutting off the filing of further protests against the election of those
members not theretofore contested (Amistad vs. Claravall [Isabela], Second Philippine Legislature, Record — First
Period, p. 89; Urguello vs. Rama [Third District, Cebu], Sixth Philippine Legislature; Fetalvero vs. Festin [Romblon],
Sixth Philippine Legislature, Record — First Period, pp. 637-640; Kintanar vs. Aldanese [Fourth District, Cebu], Sixth
Philippine Legislature, Record — First Period, pp. 1121, 1122; Aguilar vs. Corpus [Masbate], Eighth Philippine
Legislature, Record — First Period, vol. III, No. 56, pp. 892, 893). The Constitution has repealed section 18 of the
Jones Law. Act No. 3387, section 478, must be deemed to have been impliedly abrogated also, for the reason that
with the power to determine all contest relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the National
Assembly, is inseparably linked the authority to prescribe regulations for the exercise of that power. There was thus
no law nor constitutional provisions which authorized the National Assembly to fix, as it is alleged to have fixed on
December 3, 1935, the time for the filing of contests against the election of its members. And what the National
Assembly could not do directly, it could not do by indirection through the medium of confirmation.
Summarizing, we conclude:
(a) That the government established by the Constitution follows fundamentally the theory of separation of
power into the legislative, the executive and the judicial.
(b) That the system of checks and balances and the overlapping of functions and duties often makes difficult
the delimitation of the powers granted.
(c) That in cases of conflict between the several departments and among the agencies thereof, the judiciary,
with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, is the only constitutional mechanism devised finally to resolve
the conflict and allocate constitutional boundaries.
(d) That judicial supremacy is but the power of judicial review in actual and appropriate cases and
controversies, and is the power and duty to see that no one branch or agency of the government transcends
the Constitution, which is the source of all authority.
(e) That the Electoral Commission is an independent constitutional creation with specific powers and
functions to execute and perform, closer for purposes of classification to the legislative than to any of the
other two departments of the governments.
(f ) That the Electoral Commission is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly.
(g) That under the organic law prevailing before the present Constitution went into effect, each house of the
legislature was respectively the sole judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of their elective
members.
(h) That the present Constitution has transferred all the powers previously exercised by the legislature with
respect to contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of its members, to the Electoral
Commission.
(i) That such transfer of power from the legislature to the Electoral Commission was full, clear and complete,
and carried with it ex necesitate rei the implied power inter alia to prescribe the rules and regulations as to
the time and manner of filing protests.
( j) That the avowed purpose in creating the Electoral Commission was to have an independent
constitutional organ pass upon all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of
the National Assembly, devoid of partisan influence or consideration, which object would be frustrated if the
National Assembly were to retain the power to prescribe rules and regulations regarding the manner of
conducting said contests.
(k) That section 4 of article VI of the Constitution repealed not only section 18 of the Jones Law making each
house of the Philippine Legislature respectively the sole judge of the elections, returns and qualifications of
its elective members, but also section 478 of Act No. 3387 empowering each house to prescribe by
resolution the time and manner of filing contests against the election of its members, the time and manner of
notifying the adverse party, and bond or bonds, to be required, if any, and to fix the costs and expenses of
contest.
(l) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election is contested or not, is not essential before
such member-elect may discharge the duties and enjoy the privileges of a member of the National
Assembly.
(m) That confirmation by the National Assembly of the election of any member against whom no protest had
been filed prior to said confirmation, does not and cannot deprive the Electoral Commission of its incidental
power to prescribe the time within which protests against the election of any member of the National
Assembly should be filed.
We hold, therefore, that the Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional
prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Pedro Ynsua against the election
of the herein petitioner Jose A. Angara, and that the resolution of the National Assembly of December 3, 1935 can
not in any manner toll the time for filing protests against the elections, returns and qualifications of members of the
National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a protest within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission
might prescribe.
In view of the conclusion reached by us relative to the character of the Electoral Commission as a constitutional
creation and as to the scope and extent of its authority under the facts of the present controversy, we deem it
unnecessary to determine whether the Electoral Commission is an inferior tribunal, corporation, board or person
within the purview of sections 226 and 516 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The petition for a writ of prohibition against the Electoral Commission is hereby denied, with costs against the
petitioner. So ordered.
Avanceña, C. J., Diaz, Concepcion, and Horrilleno, JJ., concur.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 208566
November 19, 2013
GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA JOSE M. VILLEGAS JR. JOSE L. GONZALEZ REUBEN M. ABANTE
and QUINTIN PAREDES SAN DIEGO, Petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR. SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT FLORENCIO B. ABAD, NATIONAL TREASURER ROSALIA V. DE LEON SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES represented by FRANKLIN M. DRILON m his capacity as SENATE PRESIDENT and HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES represented by FELICIANO S. BELMONTE, JR. in his capacity as SPEAKER OF THE
HOUSE, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 208493
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) PRESIDENT SAMSON S. ALCANTARA, Petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE FRANKLIN M. DRILON in his capacity as SENATE PRESIDENT and HONORABLE FELICIANO
S. BELMONTE, JR., in his capacity as SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 209251
PEDRITO M. NEPOMUCENO, Former Mayor-Boac, Marinduque Former Provincial Board Member -Province
of Marinduque, Petitioner,
vs.
PRESIDENT BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III* and SECRETARY FLORENCIO BUTCH ABAD, DEPARTMENT
OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
"Experience is the oracle of truth."1
-James Madison
Before the Court are consolidated petitions2 taken under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, all of which assail the
constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System. Due to the complexity of the subject matter, the Court shall heretofore
discuss the system‘s conceptual underpinnings before detailing the particulars of the constitutional challenge.
The Facts
I. Pork Barrel: General Concept.
"Pork Barrel" is political parlance of American -English origin.3 Historically, its usage may be traced to the
degrading ritual of rolling out a barrel stuffed with pork to a multitude of black slaves who would cast their
famished bodies into the porcine feast to assuage their hunger with morsels coming from the generosity of
their well-fed master.4 This practice was later compared to the actions of American legislators in trying to
direct federal budgets in favor of their districts.5 While the advent of refrigeration has made the actual pork
barrel obsolete, it persists in reference to political bills that "bring home the bacon" to a legislator‘s district
and constituents.6 In a more technical sense, "Pork Barrel" refers to an appropriation of government
spending meant for localized projects and secured solely or primarily to bring money to a representative's
district.7 Some scholars on the subject further use it to refer to legislative control of local appropriations.8
In the Philippines, "Pork Barrel" has been commonly referred to as lump-sum, discretionary funds of
Members of the Legislature,9 although, as will be later discussed, its usage would evolve in reference to
certain funds of the Executive.
II. History of Congressional Pork Barrel in the Philippines.
A. Pre-Martial Law Era (1922-1972).
Act 3044,10 or the Public Works Act of 1922, is considered11 as the earliest form of "Congressional
Pork Barrel" in the Philippines since the utilization of the funds appropriated therein were subjected
to post-enactment legislator approval. Particularly, in the area of fund release, Section 312 provides
that the sums appropriated for certain public works projects13 "shall be distributed x x x subject to the
approval of a joint committee elected by the Senate and the House of Representatives. "The
committee from each House may also authorize one of its members to approve the distribution made
by the Secretary of Commerce and Communications."14 Also, in the area of fund realignment, the
same section provides that the said secretary, "with the approval of said joint committee, or of the
authorized members thereof, may, for the purposes of said distribution, transfer unexpended
portions of any item of appropriation under this Act to any other item hereunder."
In 1950, it has been documented15 that post-enactment legislator participation broadened from the
areas of fund release and realignment to the area of project identification. During that year, the
mechanics of the public works act was modified to the extent that the discretion of choosing projects
was transferred from the Secretary of Commerce and Communications to legislators. "For the first
time, the law carried a list of projects selected by Members of Congress, they ‘being the
representatives of the people, either on their own account or by consultation with local officials or
civil leaders.‘"16 During this period, the pork barrel process commenced with local government
councils, civil groups, and individuals appealing to Congressmen or Senators for projects. Petitions
that were accommodated formed part of a legislator‘s allocation, and the amount each legislator
would eventually get is determined in a caucus convened by the majority. The amount was then
integrated into the administration bill prepared by the Department of Public Works and
Communications. Thereafter, the Senate and the House of Representatives added their own
provisions to the bill until it was signed into law by the President – the Public Works Act.17 In the
1960‘s, however, pork barrel legislation reportedly ceased in view of the stalemate between the
House of Representatives and the Senate.18
B. Martial Law Era (1972-1986).
While the previous" Congressional Pork Barrel" was apparently discontinued in 1972 after Martial
Law was declared, an era when "one man controlled the legislature,"19 the reprieve was only
temporary. By 1982, the Batasang Pambansa had already introduced a new item in the General
Appropriations Act (GAA) called the" Support for Local Development Projects" (SLDP) under the
article on "National Aid to Local Government Units". Based on reports,20 it was under the SLDP that
the practice of giving lump-sum allocations to individual legislators began, with each assemblyman
receiving ₱500,000.00. Thereafter, assemblymen would communicate their project preferences to
the Ministry of Budget and Management for approval. Then, the said ministry would release the
allocation papers to the Ministry of Local Governments, which would, in turn, issue the checks to the
city or municipal treasurers in the assemblyman‘s locality. It has been further reported that
"Congressional Pork Barrel" projects under the SLDP also began to cover not only public works
projects, or so- called "hard projects", but also "soft projects",21 or non-public works projects such as
those which would fall under the categories of, among others, education, health and livelihood.22
C. Post-Martial Law Era:
Corazon Cojuangco Aquino Administration (1986-1992).
After the EDSA People Power Revolution in 1986 and the restoration of Philippine democracy,
"Congressional Pork Barrel" was revived in the form of the "Mindanao Development Fund" and the
"Visayas Development Fund" which were created with lump-sum appropriations of ₱480 Million and
₱240 Million, respectively, for the funding of development projects in the Mindanao and Visayas
areas in 1989. It has been documented23 that the clamor raised by the Senators and the Luzon
legislators for a similar funding, prompted the creation of the "Countrywide Development Fund"
(CDF) which was integrated into the 1990 GAA24 with an initial funding of ₱2.3 Billion to cover "small
local infrastructure and other priority community projects."
Under the GAAs for the years 1991 and 1992,25 CDF funds were, with the approval of the President,
to be released directly to the implementing agencies but "subject to the submission of the required
list of projects and activities."Although the GAAs from 1990 to 1992 were silent as to the amounts of
allocations of the individual legislators, as well as their participation in the identification of projects, it
has been reported26 that by 1992, Representatives were receiving ₱12.5 Million each in CDF funds,
while Senators were receiving ₱18 Million each, without any limitation or qualification, and that they
could identify any kind of project, from hard or infrastructure projects such as roads, bridges, and
buildings to "soft projects" such as textbooks, medicines, and scholarships.27
D. Fidel Valdez Ramos (Ramos) Administration (1992-1998).
The following year, or in 1993,28 the GAA explicitly stated that the release of CDF funds was to be
made upon the submission of the list of projects and activities identified by, among others, individual
legislators. For the first time, the 1993 CDF Article included an allocation for the Vice-President.29 As
such, Representatives were allocated ₱12.5 Million each in CDF funds, Senators, ₱18 Million each,
and the Vice-President, ₱20 Million.
In 1994,30 1995,31 and 1996,32 the GAAs contained the same provisions on project identification and
fund release as found in the 1993 CDF Article. In addition, however, the Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) was directed to submit reports to the Senate Committee on Finance and the
House Committee on Appropriations on the releases made from the funds.33
Under the 199734 CDF Article, Members of Congress and the Vice-President, in consultation with the
implementing agency concerned, were directed to submit to the DBM the list of 50% of projects to be
funded from their respective CDF allocations which shall be duly endorsed by (a) the Senate
President and the Chairman of the Committee on Finance, in the case of the Senate, and (b) the
Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Chairman of the Committee on Appropriations, in
the case of the House of Representatives; while the list for the remaining 50% was to be submitted
within six (6) months thereafter. The same article also stated that the project list, which would be
published by the DBM,35 "shall be the basis for the release of funds" and that "no funds appropriated
herein shall be disbursed for projects not included in the list herein required."
The following year, or in 1998,36 the foregoing provisions regarding the required lists and
endorsements were reproduced, except that the publication of the project list was no longer required
as the list itself sufficed for the release of CDF Funds.
The CDF was not, however, the lone form of "Congressional Pork Barrel" at that time. Other forms of
"Congressional Pork Barrel" were reportedly fashioned and inserted into the GAA (called
"Congressional Insertions" or "CIs") in order to perpetuate the ad ministration‘s political agenda.37 It
has been articulated that since CIs "formed part and parcel of the budgets of executive departments,
they were not easily identifiable and were thus harder to monitor." Nonetheless, the lawmakers
themselves as well as the finance and budget officials of the implementing agencies, as well as the
DBM, purportedly knew about the insertions.38 Examples of these CIs are the Department of
Education (DepEd) School Building Fund, the Congressional Initiative Allocations, the Public Works
Fund, the El Niño Fund, and the Poverty Alleviation Fund.39 The allocations for the School Building
Fund, particularly, ―shall be made upon prior consultation with the representative of the legislative
district concerned.”40 Similarly, the legislators had the power to direct how, where and when these
appropriations were to be spent.41
E. Joseph Ejercito Estrada (Estrada) Administration (1998-2001).
In 1999,42 the CDF was removed in the GAA and replaced by three (3) separate forms of CIs,
namely, the "Food Security Program Fund,"43 the "Lingap Para Sa Mahihirap Program Fund,"44 and
the "Rural/Urban Development Infrastructure Program Fund,"45 all of which contained a special
provision requiring "prior consultation" with the Member s of Congress for the release of the funds.
It was in the year 200046 that the "Priority Development Assistance Fund" (PDAF) appeared in the
GAA. The requirement of "prior consultation with the respective Representative of the District" before
PDAF funds were directly released to the implementing agency concerned was explicitly stated in
the 2000 PDAF Article. Moreover, realignment of funds to any expense category was expressly
allowed, with the sole condition that no amount shall be used to fund personal services and other
personnel benefits.47 The succeeding PDAF provisions remained the same in view of the reenactment48 of the 2000 GAA for the year 2001.
F. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (Arroyo) Administration (2001-2010).
The 200249 PDAF Article was brief and straightforward as it merely contained a single special
provision ordering the release of the funds directly to the implementing agency or local government
unit concerned, without further qualifications. The following year, 2003,50 the same single provision
was present, with simply an expansion of purpose and express authority to realign. Nevertheless,
the provisions in the 2003 budgets of the Department of Public Works and Highways51 (DPWH) and
the DepEd52 required prior consultation with Members of Congress on the aspects of implementation
delegation and project list submission, respectively. In 2004, the 2003 GAA was re-enacted.53
In 2005,54 the PDAF Article provided that the PDAF shall be used "to fund priority programs and
projects under the ten point agenda of the national government and shall be released directly to the
implementing agencies." It also introduced the program menu concept,55 which is essentially a list of
general programs and implementing agencies from which a particular PDAF project may be
subsequently chosen by the identifying authority. The 2005 GAA was re-enacted56 in 2006 and
hence, operated on the same bases. In similar regard, the program menu concept was consistently
integrated into the 2007,57 2008,58 2009,59 and 201060 GAAs.
Textually, the PDAF Articles from 2002 to 2010 were silent with respect to the specific amounts
allocated for the individual legislators, as well as their participation in the proposal and identification
of PDAF projects to be funded. In contrast to the PDAF Articles, however, the provisions under the
DepEd School Building Program and the DPWH budget, similar to its predecessors, explicitly
required prior consultation with the concerned Member of Congress61 anent certain aspects of project
implementation.
Significantly, it was during this era that provisions which allowed formal participation of nongovernmental organizations (NGO) in the implementation of government projects were introduced. In
the Supplemental Budget for 2006, with respect to the appropriation for school buildings, NGOs
were, by law, encouraged to participate. For such purpose, the law stated that "the amount of at
least ₱250 Million of the ₱500 Million allotted for the construction and completion of school buildings
shall be made available to NGOs including the Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chambers of
Commerce and Industry, Inc. for its "Operation Barrio School" program, with capability and proven
track records in the construction of public school buildings x x x."62 The same allocation was made
available to NGOs in the 2007 and 2009 GAAs under the DepEd Budget.63 Also, it was in 2007 that
the Government Procurement Policy Board64 (GPPB) issued Resolution No. 12-2007 dated June 29,
2007 (GPPB Resolution 12-2007), amending the implementing rules and regulations65 of RA
9184,66 the Government Procurement Reform Act, to include, as a form of negotiated
procurement,67 the procedure whereby the Procuring Entity68 (the implementing agency) may enter
into a memorandum of agreement with an NGO, provided that "an appropriation law or ordinance
earmarks an amount to be specifically contracted out to NGOs."69
G. Present Administration (2010-Present).
Differing from previous PDAF Articles but similar to the CDF Articles, the 201170 PDAF Article
included an express statement on lump-sum amounts allocated for individual legislators and the
Vice-President: Representatives were given ₱70 Million each, broken down into ₱40 Million for "hard
projects" and ₱30 Million for "soft projects"; while ₱200 Million was given to each Senator as well as
the Vice-President, with a ₱100 Million allocation each for "hard" and "soft projects." Likewise, a
provision on realignment of funds was included, but with the qualification that it may be allowed only
once. The same provision also allowed the Secretaries of Education, Health, Social Welfare and
Development, Interior and Local Government, Environment and Natural Resources, Energy, and
Public Works and Highways to realign PDAF Funds, with the further conditions that: (a) realignment
is within the same implementing unit and same project category as the original project, for
infrastructure projects; (b) allotment released has not yet been obligated for the original scope of
work, and (c) the request for realignment is with the concurrence of the legislator concerned.71
In the 201272 and 201373 PDAF Articles, it is stated that the "identification of projects and/or
designation of beneficiaries shall conform to the priority list, standard or design prepared by each
implementing agency (priority list requirement) x x x." However, as practiced, it would still be the
individual legislator who would choose and identify the project from the said priority list.74
Provisions on legislator allocations75 as well as fund realignment76 were included in the 2012 and
2013 PDAF Articles; but the allocation for the Vice-President, which was pegged at ₱200 Million in
the 2011 GAA, had been deleted. In addition, the 2013 PDAF Article now allowed LGUs to be
identified as implementing agencies if they have the technical capability to implement the
projects.77 Legislators were also allowed to identify programs/projects, except for assistance to
indigent patients and scholarships, outside of his legislative district provided that he secures the
written concurrence of the legislator of the intended outside-district, endorsed by the Speaker of the
House.78 Finally, any realignment of PDAF funds, modification and revision of project identification,
as well as requests for release of funds, were all required to be favorably endorsed by the House
Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance, as the case may be.79
III. History of Presidential Pork Barrel in the Philippines.
While the term "Pork Barrel" has been typically associated with lump-sum, discretionary funds of Members
of Congress, the present cases and the recent controversies on the matter have, however, shown that the
term‘s usage has expanded to include certain funds of the President such as the Malampaya Funds and the
Presidential Social Fund.
On the one hand, the Malampaya Funds was created as a special fund under Section 880 of Presidential
Decree No. (PD) 910,81 issued by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos (Marcos) on March 22, 1976. In
enacting the said law, Marcos recognized the need to set up a special fund to help intensify, strengthen, and
consolidate government efforts relating to the exploration, exploitation, and development of indigenous
energy resources vital to economic growth.82 Due to the energy-related activities of the government in the
Malampaya natural gas field in Palawan, or the "Malampaya Deep Water Gas-to-Power Project",83 the
special fund created under PD 910 has been currently labeled as Malampaya Funds.
On the other hand the Presidential Social Fund was created under Section 12, Title IV84 of PD 1869,85 or the
Charter of the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR). PD 1869 was similarly issued by
Marcos on July 11, 1983. More than two (2) years after, he amended PD 1869 and accordingly issued PD
1993 on October 31, 1985,86 amending Section 1287 of the former law. As it stands, the Presidential Social
Fund has been described as a special funding facility managed and administered by the Presidential
Management Staff through which the President provides direct assistance to priority programs and projects
not funded under the regular budget. It is sourced from the share of the government in the aggregate gross
earnings of PAGCOR.88
IV. Controversies in the Philippines.
Over the decades, "pork" funds in the Philippines have increased tremendously,89 owing in no small part to
previous Presidents who reportedly used the "Pork Barrel" in order to gain congressional support.90 It was in
1996 when the first controversy surrounding the "Pork Barrel" erupted. Former Marikina City Representative
Romeo Candazo (Candazo), then an anonymous source, "blew the lid on the huge sums of government
money that regularly went into the pockets of legislators in the form of kickbacks."91 He said that "the
kickbacks were ‘SOP‘ (standard operating procedure) among legislators and ranged from a low 19 percent
to a high 52 percent of the cost of each project, which could be anything from dredging, rip rapping,
sphalting, concreting, and construction of school buildings."92 "Other sources of kickbacks that Candazo
identified were public funds intended for medicines and textbooks. A few days later, the tale of the money
trail became the banner story of the Philippine Daily Inquirer issue of August 13, 1996, accompanied by an
illustration of a roasted pig."93 "The publication of the stories, including those about congressional initiative
allocations of certain lawmakers, including ₱3.6 Billion for a Congressman, sparked public outrage."94
Thereafter, or in 2004, several concerned citizens sought the nullification of the PDAF as enacted in the
2004 GAA for being unconstitutional. Unfortunately, for lack of "any pertinent evidentiary support that illegal
misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks has become a common exercise of unscrupulous Members of
Congress," the petition was dismissed.95
Recently, or in July of the present year, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) began its probe into
allegations that "the government has been defrauded of some ₱10 Billion over the past 10 years by a
syndicate using funds from the pork barrel of lawmakers and various government agencies for scores of
ghost projects."96 The investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six (6) whistle-blowers who declared
that JLN Corporation – "JLN" standing for Janet Lim Napoles (Napoles) – had swindled billions of pesos
from the public coffers for "ghost projects" using no fewer than 20 dummy NGOs for an entire decade. While
the NGOs were supposedly the ultimate recipients of PDAF funds, the whistle-blowers declared that the
money was diverted into Napoles‘ private accounts.97 Thus, after its investigation on the Napoles
controversy, criminal complaints were filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, charging five (5)
lawmakers for Plunder, and three (3) other lawmakers for Malversation, Direct Bribery, and Violation of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Also recommended to be charged in the complaints are some of the
lawmakers‘ chiefs -of-staff or representatives, the heads and other officials of three (3) implementing
agencies, and the several presidents of the NGOs set up by Napoles.98
On August 16, 2013, the Commission on Audit (CoA) released the results of a three-year audit
investigation99 covering the use of legislators' PDAF from 2007 to 2009, or during the last three (3) years of
the Arroyo administration. The purpose of the audit was to determine the propriety of releases of funds
under PDAF and the Various Infrastructures including Local Projects (VILP)100 by the DBM, the application of
these funds and the implementation of projects by the appropriate implementing agencies and several
government-owned-and-controlled corporations (GOCCs).101 The total releases covered by the audit
amounted to ₱8.374 Billion in PDAF and ₱32.664 Billion in VILP, representing 58% and 32%, respectively,
of the total PDAF and VILP releases that were found to have been made nationwide during the audit
period.102 Accordingly, the Co A‘s findings contained in its Report No. 2012-03 (CoA Report), entitled "Priority
Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) and Various Infrastructures including Local Projects (VILP)," were
made public, the highlights of which are as follows:103
● Amounts released for projects identified by a considerable number of legislators significantly
exceeded their respective allocations.
● Amounts were released for projects outside of legislative districts of sponsoring members of the
Lower House.
● Total VILP releases for the period exceeded the total amount appropriated under the 2007 to 2009
GAAs.
● Infrastructure projects were constructed on private lots without these having been turned over to
the government.
● Significant amounts were released to implementing agencies without the latter‘s endorsement and
without considering their mandated functions, administrative and technical capabilities to implement
projects.
● Implementation of most livelihood projects was not undertaken by the implementing agencies
themselves but by NGOs endorsed by the proponent legislators to which the Funds were
transferred.
● The funds were transferred to the NGOs in spite of the absence of any appropriation law or
ordinance.
● Selection of the NGOs were not compliant with law and regulations.
● Eighty-Two (82) NGOs entrusted with implementation of seven hundred seventy two (772) projects
amount to ₱6.156 Billion were either found questionable, or submitted questionable/spurious
documents, or failed to liquidate in whole or in part their utilization of the Funds.
● Procurement by the NGOs, as well as some implementing agencies, of goods and services
reportedly used in the projects were not compliant with law.
As for the "Presidential Pork Barrel", whistle-blowers alleged that" at least ₱900 Million from royalties in the
operation of the Malampaya gas project off Palawan province intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries has
gone into a dummy NGO."104 According to incumbent CoA Chairperson Maria Gracia Pulido Tan (CoA
Chairperson), the CoA is, as of this writing, in the process of preparing "one consolidated report" on the
Malampaya Funds.105
V. The Procedural Antecedents.
Spurred in large part by the findings contained in the CoA Report and the Napoles controversy, several
petitions were lodged before the Court similarly seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared
unconstitutional. To recount, the relevant procedural antecedents in these cases are as follows:
On August 28, 2013, petitioner Samson S. Alcantara (Alcantara), President of the Social Justice Society, filed a
Petition for Prohibition of even date under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Alcantara Petition), seeking that the "Pork
Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional, and a writ of prohibition be issued permanently restraining respondents
Franklin M. Drilon and Feliciano S. Belmonte, Jr., in their respective capacities as the incumbent Senate President
and Speaker of the House of Representatives, from further taking any steps to enact legislation appropriating funds
for the "Pork Barrel System," in whatever form and by whatever name it may be called, and from approving further
releases pursuant thereto.106 The Alcantara Petition was docketed as G.R. No. 208493.
On September 3, 2013, petitioners Greco Antonious Beda B. Belgica, Jose L. Gonzalez, Reuben M. Abante, Quintin
Paredes San Diego (Belgica, et al.), and Jose M. Villegas, Jr. (Villegas) filed an Urgent Petition For Certiorari and
Prohibition With Prayer For The Immediate Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction dated August 27, 2013 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Belgica Petition), seeking that the
annual "Pork Barrel System," presently embodied in the provisions of the GAA of 2013 which provided for the 2013
PDAF, and the Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary funds, such as the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential
Social Fund,107 be declared unconstitutional and null and void for being acts constituting grave abuse of discretion.
Also, they pray that the Court issue a TRO against respondents Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., Florencio B. Abad (Secretary
Abad) and Rosalia V. De Leon, in their respective capacities as the incumbent Executive Secretary, Secretary of the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM), and National Treasurer, or their agents, for them to immediately
cease any expenditure under the aforesaid funds. Further, they pray that the Court order the foregoing respondents
to release to the CoA and to the public: (a) "the complete schedule/list of legislators who have availed of their PDAF
and VILP from the years 2003 to 2013, specifying the use of the funds, the project or activity and the recipient
entities or individuals, and all pertinent data thereto"; and (b) "the use of the Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary
funds, including the proceeds from the x x x Malampaya Funds and remittances from the PAGCOR x x x from 2003
to 2013, specifying the x x x project or activity and the recipient entities or individuals, and all pertinent data
thereto."108 Also, they pray for the "inclusion in budgetary deliberations with the Congress of all presently off-budget,
lump-sum, discretionary funds including, but not limited to, proceeds from the Malampaya Funds and remittances
from the PAGCOR."109 The Belgica Petition was docketed as G.R. No. 208566.110
Lastly, on September 5, 2013, petitioner Pedrito M. Nepomuceno (Nepomuceno), filed a Petition dated August 23,
2012 (Nepomuceno Petition), seeking that the PDAF be declared unconstitutional, and a cease and desist order be
issued restraining President Benigno Simeon S. Aquino III (President Aquino) and Secretary Abad from releasing
such funds to Members of Congress and, instead, allow their release to fund priority projects identified and
approved by the Local Development Councils in consultation with the executive departments, such as the DPWH,
the Department of Tourism, the Department of Health, the Department of Transportation, and Communication and
the National Economic Development Authority.111 The Nepomuceno Petition was docketed as UDK-14951.112
On September 10, 2013, the Court issued a Resolution of even date (a) consolidating all cases; (b) requiring public
respondents to comment on the consolidated petitions; (c) issuing a TRO (September 10, 2013 TRO) enjoining the
DBM, National Treasurer, the Executive Secretary, or any of the persons acting under their authority from releasing
(1) the remaining PDAF allocated to Members of Congress under the GAA of 2013, and (2) Malampaya Funds
under the phrase "for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" pursuant to Section 8 of
PD 910 but not for the purpose of "financing energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects
of the government‖ under the same provision; and (d) setting the consolidated cases for Oral Arguments on October
8, 2013.
On September 23, 2013, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Consolidated Comment (Comment) of
even date before the Court, seeking the lifting, or in the alternative, the partial lifting with respect to educational and
medical assistance purposes, of the Court‘s September 10, 2013 TRO, and that the consolidated petitions be
dismissed for lack of merit.113
On September 24, 2013, the Court issued a Resolution of even date directing petitioners to reply to the Comment.
Petitioners, with the exception of Nepomuceno, filed their respective replies to the Comment: (a) on September 30,
2013, Villegas filed a separate Reply dated September 27, 2013 (Villegas Reply); (b) on October 1, 2013, Belgica,
et al. filed a Reply dated September 30, 2013 (Belgica Reply); and (c) on October 2, 2013, Alcantara filed a Reply
dated October 1, 2013.
On October 1, 2013, the Court issued an Advisory providing for the guidelines to be observed by the parties for the
Oral Arguments scheduled on October 8, 2013. In view of the technicality of the issues material to the present
cases, incumbent Solicitor General Francis H. Jardeleza (Solicitor General) was directed to bring with him during the
Oral Arguments representative/s from the DBM and Congress who would be able to competently and completely
answer questions related to, among others, the budgeting process and its implementation. Further, the CoA
Chairperson was appointed as amicus curiae and thereby requested to appear before the Court during the Oral
Arguments.
On October 8 and 10, 2013, the Oral Arguments were conducted. Thereafter, the Court directed the parties to
submit their respective memoranda within a period of seven (7) days, or until October 17, 2013, which the parties
subsequently did.
The Issues Before the Court
Based on the pleadings, and as refined during the Oral Arguments, the following are the main issues for the Court‘s
resolution:
I. Procedural Issues.
Whether or not (a) the issues raised in the consolidated petitions involve an actual and justiciable controversy; (b)
the issues raised in the consolidated petitions are matters of policy not subject to judicial review; (c) petitioners have
legal standing to sue; and (d) the Court‘s Decision dated August 19, 1994 in G.R. Nos. 113105, 113174, 113766,
and 113888, entitled "Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez"114 (Philconsa) and Decision dated April 24,
2012 in G.R. No. 164987, entitled "Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty v. Secretary of Budget and
Management"115 (LAMP) bar the re-litigatio n of the issue of constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System" under the
principles of res judicata and stare decisis.
II. Substantive Issues on the "Congressional Pork Barrel."
Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar thereto are
unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles of/constitutional provisions on (a) separation of powers;
(b) non-delegability of legislative power; (c) checks and balances; (d) accountability; (e) political dynasties; and (f)
local autonomy.
III. Substantive Issues on the "Presidential Pork Barrel."
Whether or not the phrases (a) "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" under
Section 8 of PD 910,116 relating to the Malampaya Funds, and (b) "to finance the priority infrastructure development
projects and to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and
authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines" under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993,
relating to the Presidential Social Fund, are unconstitutional insofar as they constitute undue delegations of
legislative power.
These main issues shall be resolved in the order that they have been stated. In addition, the Court shall also tackle
certain ancillary issues as prompted by the present cases.
The Court’s Ruling
The petitions are partly granted.
I. Procedural Issues.
The prevailing rule in constitutional litigation is that no question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or
governmental act may be heard and decided by the Court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for
judicial inquiry,117 namely: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power;
(b) the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; (c)
the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity ; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must
be the very lis mota of the case.118 Of these requisites, case law states that the first two are the most important119 and,
therefore, shall be discussed forthwith.
A. Existence of an Actual Case or Controversy.
By constitutional fiat, judicial power operates only when there is an actual case or controversy.120 This is embodied in
Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution which pertinently states that "judicial power includes the duty of the
courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable x x x."
Jurisprudence provides that an actual case or controversy is one which "involves a conflict of legal rights, an
assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract
difference or dispute.121 In other words, "there must be a contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and
enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence."122 Related to the requirement of an actual case or
controversy is the requirement of "ripeness," meaning that the questions raised for constitutional scrutiny are
already ripe for adjudication. "A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct
adverse effect on the individual challenging it. It is a prerequisite that something had then been accomplished or
performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of
an immediate or threatened injury to itself as a result of the challenged action."123 "Withal, courts will decline to pass
upon constitutional issues through advisory opinions, bereft as they are of authority to resolve hypothetical or moot
questions."124
Based on these principles, the Court finds that there exists an actual and justiciable controversy in these cases.
The requirement of contrariety of legal rights is clearly satisfied by the antagonistic positions of the parties on the
constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System." Also, the questions in these consolidated cases are ripe for
adjudication since the challenged funds and the provisions allowing for their utilization – such as the 2013 GAA for
the PDAF, PD 910 for the Malampaya Funds and PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, for the Presidential Social
Fund – are currently existing and operational; hence, there exists an immediate or threatened injury to petitioners as
a result of the unconstitutional use of these public funds.
As for the PDAF, the Court must dispel the notion that the issues related thereto had been rendered moot and
academic by the reforms undertaken by respondents. A case becomes moot when there is no more actual
controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits.125 Differing from this
description, the Court observes that respondents‘ proposed line-item budgeting scheme would not terminate the
controversy nor diminish the useful purpose for its resolution since said reform is geared towards the 2014 budget,
and not the 2013 PDAF Article which, being a distinct subject matter, remains legally effective and existing. Neither
will the President‘s declaration that he had already "abolished the PDAF" render the issues on PDAF moot precisely
because the Executive branch of government has no constitutional authority to nullify or annul its legal existence. By
constitutional design, the annulment or nullification of a law may be done either by Congress, through the passage
of a repealing law, or by the Court, through a declaration of unconstitutionality. Instructive on this point is the
following exchange between Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio (Justice Carpio) and the Solicitor General during
the Oral Arguments:126
Justice Carpio: The President has taken an oath to faithfully execute the law,127 correct? Solicitor General Jardeleza:
Yes, Your Honor.
Justice Carpio: And so the President cannot refuse to implement the General Appropriations Act, correct?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: Well, that is our answer, Your Honor. In the case, for example of the PDAF, the
President has a duty to execute the laws but in the face of the outrage over PDAF, the President was saying, "I am
not sure that I will continue the release of the soft projects," and that started, Your Honor. Now, whether or not that
… (interrupted)
Justice Carpio: Yeah. I will grant the President if there are anomalies in the project, he has the power to stop the
releases in the meantime, to investigate, and that is Section 38 of Chapter 5 of Book 6 of the Revised Administrative
Code128 x x x. So at most the President can suspend, now if the President believes that the PDAF is unconstitutional,
can he just refuse to implement it?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: No, Your Honor, as we were trying to say in the specific case of the PDAF because of
the CoA Report, because of the reported irregularities and this Court can take judicial notice, even outside, outside
of the COA Report, you have the report of the whistle-blowers, the President was just exercising precisely the duty
….
xxxx
Justice Carpio: Yes, and that is correct. You‘ve seen the CoA Report, there are anomalies, you stop and investigate,
and prosecute, he has done that. But, does that mean that PDAF has been repealed?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: No, Your Honor x x x.
xxxx
Justice Carpio: So that PDAF can be legally abolished only in two (2) cases. Congress passes a law to repeal it, or
this Court declares it unconstitutional, correct?
Solictor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor.
Justice Carpio: The President has no power to legally abolish PDAF. (Emphases supplied)
Even on the assumption of mootness, jurisprudence, nevertheless, dictates that "the moot and academic‘ principle
is not a magical formula that can automatically dissuade the Court in resolving a case." The Court will decide cases,
otherwise moot, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional character of the
situation and the paramount public interest is involved; third, when the constitutional issue raised requires
formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of
repetition yet evading review.129
The applicability of the first exception is clear from the fundamental posture of petitioners – they essentially allege
grave violations of the Constitution with respect to, inter alia, the principles of separation of powers, non-delegability
of legislative power, checks and balances, accountability and local autonomy.
The applicability of the second exception is also apparent from the nature of the interests involved
– the constitutionality of the very system within which significant amounts of public funds have been and continue to
be utilized and expended undoubtedly presents a situation of exceptional character as well as a matter of
paramount public interest. The present petitions, in fact, have been lodged at a time when the system‘s flaws have
never before been magnified. To the Court‘s mind, the coalescence of the CoA Report, the accounts of numerous
whistle-blowers, and the government‘s own recognition that reforms are needed "to address the reported abuses of
the PDAF"130 demonstrates a prima facie pattern of abuse which only underscores the importance of the matter. It is
also by this finding that the Court finds petitioners‘ claims as not merely theorized, speculative or hypothetical. Of
note is the weight accorded by the Court to the findings made by the CoA which is the constitutionally-mandated
audit arm of the government. In Delos Santos v. CoA,131 a recent case wherein the Court upheld the CoA‘s
disallowance of irregularly disbursed PDAF funds, it was emphasized that:
The COA is endowed with enough latitude to determine, prevent, and disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive,
extravagant or unconscionable expenditures of government funds. It is tasked to be vigilant and conscientious in
safeguarding the proper use of the government's, and ultimately the people's, property. The exercise of its general
audit power is among the constitutional mechanisms that gives life to the check and balance system inherent in our
form of government.
It is the general policy of the Court to sustain the decisions of administrative authorities, especially one which is
constitutionally-created, such as the CoA, not only on the basis of the doctrine of separation of powers but also for
their presumed expertise in the laws they are entrusted to enforce. Findings of administrative agencies are accorded
not only respect but also finality when the decision and order are not tainted with unfairness or arbitrariness that
would amount to grave abuse of discretion. It is only when the CoA has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, that this Court entertains a petition
questioning its rulings. x x x. (Emphases supplied)
Thus, if only for the purpose of validating the existence of an actual and justiciable controversy in these cases, the
Court deems the findings under the CoA Report to be sufficient.
The Court also finds the third exception to be applicable largely due to the practical need for a definitive ruling on the
system‘s constitutionality. As disclosed during the Oral Arguments, the CoA Chairperson estimates that thousands
of notices of disallowances will be issued by her office in connection with the findings made in the CoA Report. In
this relation, Associate Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen (Justice Leonen) pointed out that all of these would
eventually find their way to the courts.132 Accordingly, there is a compelling need to formulate controlling principles
relative to the issues raised herein in order to guide the bench, the bar, and the public, not just for the expeditious
resolution of the anticipated disallowance cases, but more importantly, so that the government may be guided on
how public funds should be utilized in accordance with constitutional principles.
Finally, the application of the fourth exception is called for by the recognition that the preparation and passage of the
national budget is, by constitutional imprimatur, an affair of annual occurrence.133 The relevance of the issues before
the Court does not cease with the passage of a "PDAF -free budget for 2014."134 The evolution of the "Pork Barrel
System," by its multifarious iterations throughout the course of history, lends a semblance of truth to petitioners‘
claim that "the same dog will just resurface wearing a different collar."135 In Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary,136 the
government had already backtracked on a previous course of action yet the Court used the "capable of repetition
but evading review" exception in order "to prevent similar questions from re- emerging."137 The situation similarly
holds true to these cases. Indeed, the myriad of issues underlying the manner in which certain public funds are
spent, if not resolved at this most opportune time, are capable of repetition and hence, must not evade judicial
review.
B. Matters of Policy: the Political Question Doctrine.
The "limitation on the power of judicial review to actual cases and controversies‖ carries the assurance that "the
courts will not intrude into areas committed to the other branches of government."138 Essentially, the foregoing
limitation is a restatement of the political question doctrine which, under the classic formulation of Baker v.
Carr,139 applies when there is found, among others, "a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue
to a coordinate political department," "a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it" or
"the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non- judicial discretion." Cast
against this light, respondents submit that the "the political branches are in the best position not only to perform
budget-related reforms but also to do them in response to the specific demands of their constituents" and, as such,
"urge the Court not to impose a solution at this stage."140
The Court must deny respondents‘ submission.
Suffice it to state that the issues raised before the Court do not present political but legal questions which are within
its province to resolve. A political question refers to "those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the
wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure."141 The intrinsic constitutionality of the "Pork Barrel System" is not an
issue dependent upon the wisdom of the political branches of government but rather a legal one which the
Constitution itself has commanded the Court to act upon. Scrutinizing the contours of the system along
constitutional lines is a task that the political branches of government are incapable of rendering precisely because it
is an exercise of judicial power. More importantly, the present Constitution has not only vested the Judiciary the right
to exercise judicial power but essentially makes it a duty to proceed therewith. Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution cannot be any clearer: "The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law. It includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the Government." In Estrada v. Desierto,142 the expanded concept of judicial power under the 1987 Constitution and
its effect on the political question doctrine was explained as follows:143
To a great degree, the 1987 Constitution has narrowed the reach of the political question doctrine when it expanded
the power of judicial review of this court not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of government. Heretofore,
the judiciary has focused on the "thou shalt not's" of the Constitution directed against the exercise of its jurisdiction.
With the new provision, however, courts are given a greater prerogative to determine what it can do to prevent grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
government. Clearly, the new provision did not just grant the Court power of doing nothing. x x x (Emphases
supplied)
It must also be borne in mind that ― when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not
assert any superiority over the other departments; does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature or
the executive, but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution."144 To a great
extent, the Court is laudably cognizant of the reforms undertaken by its co-equal branches of government. But it is
by constitutional force that the Court must faithfully perform its duty. Ultimately, it is the Court‘s avowed intention that
a resolution of these cases would not arrest or in any manner impede the endeavors of the two other branches but,
in fact, help ensure that the pillars of change are erected on firm constitutional grounds. After all, it is in the best
interest of the people that each great branch of government, within its own sphere, contributes its share towards
achieving a holistic and genuine solution to the problems of society. For all these reasons, the Court cannot heed
respondents‘ plea for judicial restraint.
C. Locus Standi.
"The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Unless a person is injuriously affected in any of his
constitutional rights by the operation of statute or ordinance, he has no standing."145
Petitioners have come before the Court in their respective capacities as citizen-taxpayers and accordingly, assert
that they "dutifully contribute to the coffers of the National Treasury."146 Clearly, as taxpayers, they possess the
requisite standing to question the validity of the existing "Pork Barrel System" under which the taxes they pay have
been and continue to be utilized. It is undeniable that petitioners, as taxpayers, are bound to suffer from the
unconstitutional usage of public funds, if the Court so rules. Invariably, taxpayers have been allowed to sue where
there is a claim that public funds are illegally disbursed or that public money is being deflected to any improper
purpose, or that public funds are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law,147 as in these
cases.
Moreover, as citizens, petitioners have equally fulfilled the standing requirement given that the issues they have
raised may be classified as matters "of transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of
paramount public interest."148 The CoA Chairperson‘s statement during the Oral Arguments that the present
controversy involves "not merely a systems failure" but a "complete breakdown of controls"149 amplifies, in addition to
the matters above-discussed, the seriousness of the issues involved herein. Indeed, of greater import than the
damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the fundamental law by
the enforcement of an invalid statute.150 All told, petitioners have sufficient locus standi to file the instant cases.
D. Res Judicata and Stare Decisis.
Res judicata (which means a "matter adjudged") and stare decisis non quieta et movere (or simply, stare decisis
which means "follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled") are general procedural law
principles which both deal with the effects of previous but factually similar dispositions to subsequent cases. For the
cases at bar, the Court examines the applicability of these principles in relation to its prior rulings in Philconsa and
LAMP.
The focal point of res judicata is the judgment. The principle states that a judgment on the merits in a previous case
rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction would bind a subsequent case if, between the first and second actions,
there exists an identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action.151 This required identity is not, however,
attendant hereto since Philconsa and LAMP, respectively involved constitutional challenges against the 1994 CDF
Article and 2004 PDAF Article, whereas the cases at bar call for a broader constitutional scrutiny of the entire "Pork
Barrel System." Also, the ruling in LAMP is essentially a dismissal based on a procedural technicality – and, thus,
hardly a judgment on the merits – in that petitioners therein failed to present any "convincing proof x x x showing
that, indeed, there were direct releases of funds to the Members of Congress, who actually spend them according to
their sole discretion" or "pertinent evidentiary support to demonstrate the illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of
kickbacks and has become a common exercise of unscrupulous Members of Congress." As such, the Court up held,
in view of the presumption of constitutionality accorded to every law, the 2004 PDAF Article, and saw "no need to
review or reverse the standing pronouncements in the said case." Hence, for the foregoing reasons, the res judicata
principle, insofar as the Philconsa and LAMP cases are concerned, cannot apply.
On the other hand, the focal point of stare decisis is the doctrine created. The principle, entrenched under Article
8152 of the Civil Code, evokes the general rule that, for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should
be doctrinally applied to those that follow if the facts are substantially the same, even though the parties may be
different. It proceeds from the first principle of justice that, absent any powerful countervailing considerations, like
cases ought to be decided alike. Thus, where the same questions relating to the same event have been put forward
by the parties similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by a competent court, the rule of stare
decisis is a bar to any attempt to re-litigate the same issue.153
Philconsa was the first case where a constitutional challenge against a Pork Barrel provision, i.e., the 1994 CDF
Article, was resolved by the Court. To properly understand its context, petitioners‘ posturing was that "the power
given to the Members of Congress to propose and identify projects and activities to be funded by the CDF is an
encroachment by the legislature on executive power, since said power in an appropriation act is in implementation
of the law" and that "the proposal and identification of the projects do not involve the making of laws or the repeal
and amendment thereof, the only function given to the Congress by the Constitution."154 In deference to the
foregoing submissions, the Court reached the following main conclusions: one, under the Constitution, the power of
appropriation, or the "power of the purse," belongs to Congress; two, the power of appropriation carries with it the
power to specify the project or activity to be funded under the appropriation law and it can be detailed and as broad
as Congress wants it to be; and, three, the proposals and identifications made by Members of Congress are merely
recommendatory. At once, it is apparent that the Philconsa resolution was a limited response to a separation of
powers problem, specifically on the propriety of conferring post-enactment identification authority to Members of
Congress. On the contrary, the present cases call for a more holistic examination of (a) the inter-relation between
the CDF and PDAF Articles with each other, formative as they are of the entire "Pork Barrel System" as well as (b)
the intra-relation of post-enactment measures contained within a particular CDF or PDAF Article, including not only
those related to the area of project identification but also to the areas of fund release and realignment. The
complexity of the issues and the broader legal analyses herein warranted may be, therefore, considered as a
powerful countervailing reason against a wholesale application of the stare decisis principle.
In addition, the Court observes that the Philconsa ruling was actually riddled with inherent constitutional
inconsistencies which similarly countervail against a full resort to stare decisis. As may be deduced from the main
conclusions of the case, Philconsa‘s fundamental premise in allowing Members of Congress to propose and identify
of projects would be that the said identification authority is but an aspect of the power of appropriation which has
been constitutionally lodged in Congress. From this premise, the contradictions may be easily seen. If the authority
to identify projects is an aspect of appropriation and the power of appropriation is a form of legislative power thereby
lodged in Congress, then it follows that: (a) it is Congress which should exercise such authority, and not its
individual Members; (b) such authority must be exercised within the prescribed procedure of law passage and,
hence, should not be exercised after the GAA has already been passed; and (c) such authority, as embodied in the
GAA, has the force of law and, hence, cannot be merely recommendatory. Justice Vitug‘s Concurring Opinion in the
same case sums up the Philconsa quandary in this wise: "Neither would it be objectionable for Congress, by law, to
appropriate funds for such specific projects as it may be minded; to give that authority, however, to the individual
members of Congress in whatever guise, I am afraid, would be constitutionally impermissible." As the Court now
largely benefits from hindsight and current findings on the matter, among others, the CoA Report, the Court must
partially abandon its previous ruling in Philconsa insofar as it validated the post-enactment identification authority of
Members of Congress on the guise that the same was merely recommendatory. This postulate raises serious
constitutional inconsistencies which cannot be simply excused on the ground that such mechanism is "imaginative
as it is innovative." Moreover, it must be pointed out that the recent case of Abakada Guro Party List v.
Purisima155 (Abakada) has effectively overturned Philconsa‘s allowance of post-enactment legislator participation in
view of the separation of powers principle. These constitutional inconsistencies and the Abakada rule will be
discussed in greater detail in the ensuing section of this Decision.
As for LAMP, suffice it to restate that the said case was dismissed on a procedural technicality and, hence, has not
set any controlling doctrine susceptible of current application to the substantive issues in these cases. In fine, stare
decisis would not apply.
II. Substantive Issues.
A. Definition of Terms.
Before the Court proceeds to resolve the substantive issues of these cases, it must first define the terms "Pork
Barrel System," "Congressional Pork Barrel," and "Presidential Pork Barrel" as they are essential to the ensuing
discourse.
Petitioners define the term "Pork Barrel System" as the "collusion between the Legislative and Executive branches
of government to accumulate lump-sum public funds in their offices with unchecked discretionary powers to
determine its distribution as political largesse."156 They assert that the following elements make up the Pork Barrel
System: (a) lump-sum funds are allocated through the appropriations process to an individual officer; (b) the officer
is given sole and broad discretion in determining how the funds will be used or expended; (c) the guidelines on how
to spend or use the funds in the appropriation are either vague, overbroad or inexistent; and (d) projects funded are
intended to benefit a definite constituency in a particular part of the country and to help the political careers of the
disbursing official by yielding rich patronage benefits.157 They further state that the Pork Barrel System is comprised
of two (2) kinds of discretionary public funds: first, the Congressional (or Legislative) Pork Barrel, currently known as
the PDAF;158 and, second, the Presidential (or Executive) Pork Barrel, specifically, the Malampaya Funds under PD
910 and the Presidential Social Fund under PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993.159
Considering petitioners‘ submission and in reference to its local concept and legal history, the Court defines the
Pork Barrel System as the collective body of rules and practices that govern the manner by which lump-sum,
discretionary funds, primarily intended for local projects, are utilized through the respective participations of the
Legislative and Executive branches of government, including its members. The Pork Barrel System involves two (2)
kinds of lump-sum discretionary funds:
First, there is the Congressional Pork Barrel which is herein defined as a kind of lump-sum, discretionary fund
wherein legislators, either individually or collectively organized into committees, are able to effectively control certain
aspects of the fund’s utilization through various post-enactment measures and/or practices. In particular, petitioners
consider the PDAF, as it appears under the 2013 GAA, as Congressional Pork Barrel since it is, inter alia, a postenactment measure that allows individual legislators to wield a collective power;160 and
Second, there is the Presidential Pork Barrel which is herein defined as a kind of lump-sum, discretionary fund
which allows the President to determine the manner of its utilization. For reasons earlier stated,161 the Court shall
delimit the use of such term to refer only to the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund.
With these definitions in mind, the Court shall now proceed to discuss the substantive issues of these cases.
B. Substantive Issues on the Congressional Pork Barrel.
1. Separation of Powers.
a. Statement of Principle.
The principle of separation of powers refers to the constitutional demarcation of the three fundamental powers of
government. In the celebrated words of Justice Laurel in Angara v. Electoral Commission,162 it means that the
"Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative
and the judicial departments of the government."163 To the legislative branch of government, through
Congress,164 belongs the power to make laws; to the executive branch of government, through the
President,165 belongs the power to enforce laws; and to the judicial branch of government, through the
Court,166 belongs the power to interpret laws. Because the three great powers have been, by constitutional design,
ordained in this respect, "each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its
jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere."167 Thus, "the legislature has no authority to execute or construe
the law, the executive has no authority to make or construe the law, and the judiciary has no power to make or
execute the law."168 The principle of separation of powers and its concepts of autonomy and independence stem
from the notion that the powers of government must be divided to avoid concentration of these powers in any one
branch; the division, it is hoped, would avoid any single branch from lording its power over the other branches or the
citizenry.169 To achieve this purpose, the divided power must be wielded by co-equal branches of government that
are equally capable of independent action in exercising their respective mandates. Lack of independence would
result in the inability of one branch of government to check the arbitrary or self-interest assertions of another or
others.170
Broadly speaking, there is a violation of the separation of powers principle when one branch of government unduly
encroaches on the domain of another. US Supreme Court decisions instruct that the principle of separation of
powers may be violated in two (2) ways: firstly, "one branch may interfere impermissibly with the other’s
performance of its constitutionally assigned function";171 and "alternatively, the doctrine may be violated when one
branch assumes a function that more properly is entrusted to another."172 In other words, there is a violation of the
principle when there is impermissible (a) interference with and/or (b) assumption of another department‘s functions.
The enforcement of the national budget, as primarily contained in the GAA, is indisputably a function both
constitutionally assigned and properly entrusted to the Executive branch of government. In Guingona, Jr. v. Hon.
Carague173 (Guingona, Jr.), the Court explained that the phase of budget execution "covers the various operational
aspects of budgeting" and accordingly includes "the evaluation of work and financial plans for individual activities,"
the "regulation and release of funds" as well as all "other related activities" that comprise the budget execution
cycle.174 This is rooted in the principle that the allocation of power in the three principal branches of government is a
grant of all powers inherent in them.175 Thus, unless the Constitution provides otherwise, the Executive department
should exclusively exercise all roles and prerogatives which go into the implementation of the national budget as
provided under the GAA as well as any other appropriation law.
In view of the foregoing, the Legislative branch of government, much more any of its members, should not cross
over the field of implementing the national budget since, as earlier stated, the same is properly the domain of the
Executive. Again, in Guingona, Jr., the Court stated that "Congress enters the picture when it deliberates or acts on
the budget proposals of the President. Thereafter, Congress, "in the exercise of its own judgment and wisdom,
formulates an appropriation act precisely following the process established by the Constitution, which specifies that
no money may be paid from the Treasury except in accordance with an appropriation made by law." Upon approval
and passage of the GAA, Congress‘ law -making role necessarily comes to an end and from there the Executive‘s
role of implementing the national budget begins. So as not to blur the constitutional boundaries between them,
Congress must "not concern it self with details for implementation by the Executive."176
The foregoing cardinal postulates were definitively enunciated in Abakada where the Court held that "from the
moment the law becomes effective, any provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to play any
role in the implementation or enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus
unconstitutional."177 It must be clarified, however, that since the restriction only pertains to "any role in the
implementation or enforcement of the law," Congress may still exercise its oversight function which is a mechanism
of checks and balances that the Constitution itself allows. But it must be made clear that Congress‘ role must be
confined to mere oversight. Any post-enactment-measure allowing legislator participation beyond oversight is bereft
of any constitutional basis and hence, tantamount to impermissible interference and/or assumption of executive
functions. As the Court ruled in Abakada:178
Any post-enactment congressional measure x x x should be limited to scrutiny and investigation. In particular,
congressional oversight must be confined to the following:
1âwphi1
(1) scrutiny based primarily on Congress‘ power of appropriation and the budget hearings conducted in
connection with it, its power to ask heads of departments to appear before and be heard by either of its
Houses on any matter pertaining to their departments and its power of confirmation; and
(2) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws pursuant to the power of Congress to conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation.
Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the Constitution. (Emphases
supplied)
b. Application.
In these cases, petitioners submit that the Congressional Pork Barrel – among others, the 2013 PDAF Article –
"wrecks the assignment of responsibilities between the political branches" as it is designed to allow individual
legislators to interfere "way past the time it should have ceased" or, particularly, "after the GAA is passed."179 They
state that the findings and recommendations in the CoA Report provide "an illustration of how absolute and
definitive the power of legislators wield over project implementation in complete violation of the constitutional
principle of separation of powers."180 Further, they point out that the Court in the Philconsa case only allowed the
CDF to exist on the condition that individual legislators limited their role to recommending projects and not if they
actually dictate their implementation.181
For their part, respondents counter that the separations of powers principle has not been violated since the
President maintains "ultimate authority to control the execution of the GAA‖ and that he "retains the final discretion
to reject" the legislators‘ proposals.182 They maintain that the Court, in Philconsa, "upheld the constitutionality of the
power of members of Congress to propose and identify projects so long as such proposal and identification are
recommendatory."183 As such, they claim that "everything in the Special Provisions [of the 2013 PDAF Article follows
the Philconsa framework, and hence, remains constitutional."184
The Court rules in favor of petitioners.
As may be observed from its legal history, the defining feature of all forms of Congressional Pork Barrel would be
the authority of legislators to participate in the post-enactment phases of project implementation.
At its core, legislators – may it be through project lists,185 prior consultations186 or program menus187 – have been
consistently accorded post-enactment authority to identify the projects they desire to be funded through various
Congressional Pork Barrel allocations. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the statutory authority of legislators to identify
projects post-GAA may be construed from the import of Special Provisions 1 to 3 as well as the second paragraph
of Special Provision 4. To elucidate, Special Provision 1 embodies the program menu feature which, as evinced
from past PDAF Articles, allows individual legislators to identify PDAF projects for as long as the identified project
falls under a general program listed in the said menu. Relatedly, Special Provision 2 provides that the implementing
agencies shall, within 90 days from the GAA is passed, submit to Congress a more detailed priority list, standard or
design prepared and submitted by implementing agencies from which the legislator may make his choice. The same
provision further authorizes legislators to identify PDAF projects outside his district for as long as the representative
of the district concerned concurs in writing. Meanwhile, Special Provision 3 clarifies that PDAF projects refer to
"projects to be identified by legislators"188 and thereunder provides the allocation limit for the total amount of projects
identified by each legislator. Finally, paragraph 2 of Special Provision 4 requires that any modification and revision
of the project identification "shall be submitted to the House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate
Committee on Finance for favorable endorsement to the DBM or the implementing agency, as the case may be."
From the foregoing special provisions, it cannot be seriously doubted that legislators have been accorded postenactment authority to identify PDAF projects.
Aside from the area of project identification, legislators have also been accorded post-enactment authority in the
areas of fund release and realignment. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the statutory authority of legislators to
participate in the area of fund release through congressional committees is contained in Special Provision 5 which
explicitly states that "all request for release of funds shall be supported by the documents prescribed under Special
Provision No. 1 and favorably endorsed by House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on
Finance, as the case may be"; while their statutory authority to participate in the area of fund realignment is
contained in: first , paragraph 2, Special Provision 4189 which explicitly state s, among others, that "any realignment
of funds shall be submitted to the House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance for
favorable endorsement to the DBM or the implementing agency, as the case may be‖ ; and, second , paragraph 1,
also of Special Provision 4 which authorizes the "Secretaries of Agriculture, Education, Energy, Interior and Local
Government, Labor and Employment, Public Works and Highways, Social Welfare and Development and Trade and
Industry190 x x x to approve realignment from one project/scope to another within the allotment received from this
Fund, subject to among others (iii) the request is with the concurrence of the legislator concerned."
Clearly, these post-enactment measures which govern the areas of project identification, fund release and fund
realignment are not related to functions of congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or
assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget execution. Indeed, by virtue of the foregoing, legislators
have been, in one form or another, authorized to participate in – as Guingona, Jr. puts it – "the various operational
aspects of budgeting," including "the evaluation of work and financial plans for individual activities" and the
"regulation and release of funds" in violation of the separation of powers principle. The fundamental rule, as
categorically articulated in Abakada, cannot be overstated – from the moment the law becomes effective, any
provision of law that empowers Congress or any of its members to play any role in the implementation or
enforcement of the law violates the principle of separation of powers and is thus unconstitutional.191 That the said
authority is treated as merely recommendatory in nature does not alter its unconstitutional tenor since the
prohibition, to repeat, covers any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law. Towards this end, the Court
must therefore abandon its ruling in Philconsa which sanctioned the conduct of legislator identification on the guise
that the same is merely recommendatory and, as such, respondents‘ reliance on the same falters altogether.
Besides, it must be pointed out that respondents have nonetheless failed to substantiate their position that the
identification authority of legislators is only of recommendatory import. Quite the contrary, respondents – through the
statements of the Solicitor General during the Oral Arguments – have admitted that the identification of the legislator
constitutes a mandatory requirement before his PDAF can be tapped as a funding source, thereby highlighting the
indispensability of the said act to the entire budget execution process:192
Justice Bernabe: Now, without the individual legislator’s identification of the project, can the PDAF of the legislator
be utilized?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: No, Your Honor.
Justice Bernabe: It cannot?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: It cannot… (interrupted)
Justice Bernabe: So meaning you should have the identification of the project by the individual legislator?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor.
xxxx
Justice Bernabe: In short, the act of identification is mandatory?
Solictor General Jardeleza: Yes, Your Honor. In the sense that if it is not done and then there is no identification.
xxxx
Justice Bernabe: Now, would you know of specific instances when a project was implemented without the
identification by the individual legislator?
Solicitor General Jardeleza: I do not know, Your Honor; I do not think so but I have no specific examples. I would
doubt very much, Your Honor, because to implement, there is a need for a SARO and the NCA. And the SARO and
the NCA are triggered by an identification from the legislator.
xxxx
Solictor General Jardeleza: What we mean by mandatory, Your Honor, is we were replying to a question, "How can
a legislator make sure that he is able to get PDAF Funds?" It is mandatory in the sense that he must identify, in that
sense, Your Honor. Otherwise, if he does not identify, he cannot avail of the PDAF Funds and his district would not
be able to have PDAF Funds, only in that sense, Your Honor. (Emphases supplied)
Thus, for all the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby declares the 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other provisions
of law which similarly allow legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in the implementation or
enforcement of the budget, unrelated to congressional oversight, as violative of the separation of powers principle
and thus unconstitutional. Corollary thereto, informal practices, through which legislators have effectively intruded
into the proper phases of budget execution, must be deemed as acts of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction and, hence, accorded the same unconstitutional treatment. That such informal practices do
exist and have, in fact, been constantly observed throughout the years has not been substantially disputed here. As
pointed out by Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno (Chief Justice Sereno) during the Oral Arguments of these
cases:193
Chief Justice Sereno:
Now, from the responses of the representative of both, the DBM and two (2) Houses of Congress, if we enforces the
initial thought that I have, after I had seen the extent of this research made by my staff, that neither the Executive
nor Congress frontally faced the question of constitutional compatibility of how they were engineering the budget
process. In fact, the words you have been using, as the three lawyers of the DBM, and both Houses of Congress
has also been using is surprise; surprised that all of these things are now surfacing. In fact, I thought that what the
2013 PDAF provisions did was to codify in one section all the past practice that had been done since 1991. In a
certain sense, we should be thankful that they are all now in the PDAF Special Provisions. x x x (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Ultimately, legislators cannot exercise powers which they do not have, whether through formal measures written into
the law or informal practices institutionalized in government agencies, else the Executive department be deprived of
what the Constitution has vested as its own.
2. Non-delegability of Legislative Power.
a. Statement of Principle.
As an adjunct to the separation of powers principle,194 legislative power shall be exclusively exercised by the body to
which the Constitution has conferred the same. In particular, Section 1, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution states that
such power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and referendum.195 Based
on this provision, it is clear that only Congress, acting as a bicameral body, and the people, through the process of
initiative and referendum, may constitutionally wield legislative power and no other. This premise embodies the
principle of non-delegability of legislative power, and the only recognized exceptions thereto would be: (a) delegated
legislative power to local governments which, by immemorial practice, are allowed to legislate on purely local
matters;196 and (b) constitutionally-grafted exceptions such as the authority of the President to, by law, exercise
powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy in times of war or other national
emergency,197 or fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as Congress may impose,
tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework
of the national development program of the Government.198
Notably, the principle of non-delegability should not be confused as a restriction to delegate rule-making authority to
implementing agencies for the limited purpose of either filling up the details of the law for its enforcement
(supplementary rule-making) or ascertaining facts to bring the law into actual operation (contingent rulemaking).199 The conceptual treatment and limitations of delegated rule-making were explained in the case of People
v. Maceren200 as follows:
The grant of the rule-making power to administrative agencies is a relaxation of the principle of separation of powers
and is an exception to the nondelegation of legislative powers. Administrative regulations or "subordinate legislation"
calculated to promote the public interest are necessary because of "the growing complexity of modern life, the
multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulations, and the increased difficulty of administering the law."
xxxx
Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that the rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode
or proceeding to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending or
expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the
statute cannot be sanctioned. (Emphases supplied)
b. Application.
In the cases at bar, the Court observes that the 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it confers post-enactment
identification authority to individual legislators, violates the principle of non-delegability since said legislators are
effectively allowed to individually exercise the power of appropriation, which – as settled in Philconsa – is lodged in
Congress.201 That the power to appropriate must be exercised only through legislation is clear from Section 29(1),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states that: "No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law." To understand what constitutes an act of appropriation, the Court, in
Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice and Insular Auditor202 (Bengzon), held that the power of appropriation involves (a)
the setting apart by law of a certain sum from the public revenue for (b) a specified purpose. Essentially, under the
2013 PDAF Article, individual legislators are given a personal lump-sum fund from which they are able to dictate (a)
how much from such fund would go to (b) a specific project or beneficiary that they themselves also determine. As
these two (2) acts comprise the exercise of the power of appropriation as described in Bengzon, and given that the
2013 PDAF Article authorizes individual legislators to perform the same, undoubtedly, said legislators have been
conferred the power to legislate which the Constitution does not, however, allow. Thus, keeping with the principle of
non-delegability of legislative power, the Court hereby declares the 2013 PDAF Article, as well as all other forms of
Congressional Pork Barrel which contain the similar legislative identification feature as herein discussed, as
unconstitutional.
3. Checks and Balances.
a. Statement of Principle; Item-Veto Power.
The fact that the three great powers of government are intended to be kept separate and distinct does not mean that
they are absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has also provided for an elaborate
system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the workings of the various departments of the
government.203
A prime example of a constitutional check and balance would be the President’s power to veto an item written into
an appropriation, revenue or tariff bill submitted to him by Congress for approval through a process known as "bill
presentment." The President‘s item-veto power is found in Section 27(2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which
reads as follows:
Sec. 27. x x x.
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(2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill,
but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object.
The presentment of appropriation, revenue or tariff bills to the President, wherein he may exercise his power of itemveto, forms part of the "single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, procedures" for law-passage as specified
under the Constitution.204 As stated in Abakada, the final step in the law-making process is the "submission of the bill
to the President for approval. Once approved, it takes effect as law after the required publication."205
Elaborating on the President‘s item-veto power and its relevance as a check on the legislature, the Court, in
Bengzon, explained that:206
The former Organic Act and the present Constitution of the Philippines make the Chief Executive an integral part of
the law-making power. His disapproval of a bill, commonly known as a veto, is essentially a legislative act. The
questions presented to the mind of the Chief Executive are precisely the same as those the legislature must
determine in passing a bill, except that his will be a broader point of view.
The Constitution is a limitation upon the power of the legislative department of the government, but in this respect it
is a grant of power to the executive department. The Legislature has the affirmative power to enact laws; the Chief
Executive has the negative power by the constitutional exercise of which he may defeat the will of the Legislature. It
follows that the Chief Executive must find his authority in the Constitution. But in exercising that authority he may not
be confined to rules of strict construction or hampered by the unwise interference of the judiciary. The courts will
indulge every intendment in favor of the constitutionality of a veto in the same manner as they will presume the
constitutionality of an act as originally passed by the Legislature. (Emphases supplied)
The justification for the President‘s item-veto power rests on a variety of policy goals such as to prevent log-rolling
legislation,207 impose fiscal restrictions on the legislature, as well as to fortify the executive branch‘s role in the
budgetary process.208 In Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, the US Supreme Court characterized the
President‘s item-power as "a salutary check upon the legislative body, calculated to guard the community against
the effects of factions, precipitancy, or of any impulse unfriendly to the public good, which may happen to influence a
majority of that body"; phrased differently, it is meant to "increase the chances in favor of the community against the
passing of bad laws, through haste, inadvertence, or design."209
For the President to exercise his item-veto power, it necessarily follows that there exists a proper "item" which may
be the object of the veto. An item, as defined in the field of appropriations, pertains to "the particulars, the details,
the distinct and severable parts of the appropriation or of the bill." In the case of Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice of
the Philippine Islands,210 the US Supreme Court characterized an item of appropriation as follows:
An item of an appropriation bill obviously means an item which, in itself, is a specific appropriation of money, not
some general provision of law which happens to be put into an appropriation bill. (Emphases supplied)
On this premise, it may be concluded that an appropriation bill, to ensure that the President may be able to exercise
his power of item veto, must contain "specific appropriations of money" and not only "general provisions" which
provide for parameters of appropriation.
Further, it is significant to point out that an item of appropriation must be an item characterized by singular
correspondence – meaning an allocation of a specified singular amount for a specified singular purpose, otherwise
known as a "line-item."211 This treatment not only allows the item to be consistent with its definition as a "specific
appropriation of money" but also ensures that the President may discernibly veto the same. Based on the foregoing
formulation, the existing Calamity Fund, Contingent Fund and the Intelligence Fund, being appropriations which
state a specified amount for a specific purpose, would then be considered as "line- item" appropriations which are
rightfully subject to item veto. Likewise, it must be observed that an appropriation may be validly apportioned into
component percentages or values; however, it is crucial that each percentage or value must be allocated for its own
corresponding purpose for such component to be considered as a proper line-item. Moreover, as Justice Carpio
correctly pointed out, a valid appropriation may even have several related purposes that are by accounting and
budgeting practice considered as one purpose, e.g., MOOE (maintenance and other operating expenses), in which
case the related purposes shall be deemed sufficiently specific for the exercise of the President‘s item veto power.
Finally, special purpose funds and discretionary funds would equally square with the constitutional mechanism of
item-veto for as long as they follow the rule on singular correspondence as herein discussed. Anent special purpose
funds, it must be added that Section 25(4), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution requires that the "special
appropriations bill shall specify the purpose for which it is intended, and shall be supported by funds actually
available as certified by the National Treasurer, or t o be raised by a corresponding revenue proposal therein."
Meanwhile, with respect to discretionary funds, Section 2 5(6), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution requires that said
funds "shall be disbursed only for public purposes to be supported by appropriate vouchers and subject to such
guidelines as may be prescribed by law."
In contrast, what beckons constitutional infirmity are appropriations which merely provide for a singular lump-sum
amount to be tapped as a source of funding for multiple purposes. Since such appropriation type necessitates the
further determination of both the actual amount to be expended and the actual purpose of the appropriation which
must still be chosen from the multiple purposes stated in the law, it cannot be said that the appropriation law already
indicates a "specific appropriation of money‖ and hence, without a proper line-item which the President may veto.
As a practical result, the President would then be faced with the predicament of either vetoing the entire
appropriation if he finds some of its purposes wasteful or undesirable, or approving the entire appropriation so as
not to hinder some of its legitimate purposes. Finally, it may not be amiss to state that such arrangement also raises
non-delegability issues considering that the implementing authority would still have to determine, again, both the
actual amount to be expended and the actual purpose of the appropriation. Since the foregoing determinations
constitute the integral aspects of the power to appropriate, the implementing authority would, in effect, be exercising
legislative prerogatives in violation of the principle of non-delegability.
b. Application.
In these cases, petitioners claim that "in the current x x x system where the PDAF is a lump-sum appropriation, the
legislator‘s identification of the projects after the passage of the GAA denies the President the chance to veto that
item later on."212 Accordingly, they submit that the "item veto power of the President mandates that appropriations
bills adopt line-item budgeting" and that "Congress cannot choose a mode of budgeting which effectively renders
the constitutionally-given power of the President useless."213
On the other hand, respondents maintain that the text of the Constitution envisions a process which is intended to
meet the demands of a modernizing economy and, as such, lump-sum appropriations are essential to financially
address situations which are barely foreseen when a GAA is enacted. They argue that the decision of the Congress
to create some lump-sum appropriations is constitutionally allowed and textually-grounded.214
The Court agrees with petitioners.
Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of ₱24.79 Billion only appears as a collective allocation limit since the
said amount would be further divided among individual legislators who would then receive personal lump-sum
allocations and could, after the GAA is passed, effectively appropriate PDAF funds based on their own discretion.
As these intermediate appropriations are made by legislators only after the GAA is passed and hence, outside of the
law, it necessarily means that the actual items of PDAF appropriation would not have been written into the General
Appropriations Bill and thus effectuated without veto consideration. This kind of lump-sum/post-enactment legislative
identification budgeting system fosters the creation of a budget within a budget" which subverts the prescribed
procedure of presentment and consequently impairs the President‘s power of item veto. As petitioners aptly point
out, the above-described system forces the President to decide between (a) accepting the entire ₱24.79 Billion
PDAF allocation without knowing the specific projects of the legislators, which may or may not be consistent with his
national agenda and (b) rejecting the whole PDAF to the detriment of all other legislators with legitimate projects.215
Moreover, even without its post-enactment legislative identification feature, the 2013 PDAF Article would remain
constitutionally flawed since it would then operate as a prohibited form of lump-sum appropriation abovecharacterized. In particular, the lump-sum amount of ₱24.79 Billion would be treated as a mere funding source
allotted for multiple purposes of spending, i.e., scholarships, medical missions, assistance to indigents, preservation
of historical materials, construction of roads, flood control, etc. This setup connotes that the appropriation law leaves
the actual amounts and purposes of the appropriation for further determination and, therefore, does not readily
indicate a discernible item which may be subject to the President‘s power of item veto.
In fact, on the accountability side, the same lump-sum budgeting scheme has, as the CoA Chairperson relays,
"limited state auditors from obtaining relevant data and information that would aid in more stringently auditing the
utilization of said Funds."216 Accordingly, she recommends the adoption of a "line by line budget or amount per
proposed program, activity or project, and per implementing agency."217
Hence, in view of the reasons above-stated, the Court finds the 2013 PDAF Article, as well as all Congressional
Pork Barrel Laws of similar operation, to be unconstitutional. That such budgeting system provides for a greater
degree of flexibility to account for future contingencies cannot be an excuse to defeat what the Constitution requires.
Clearly, the first and essential truth of the matter is that unconstitutional means do not justify even commendable
ends.218
c. Accountability.
Petitioners further relate that the system under which various forms of Congressional Pork Barrel operate defies
public accountability as it renders Congress incapable of checking itself or its Members. In particular, they point out
that the Congressional Pork Barrel "gives each legislator a direct, financial interest in the smooth, speedy passing of
the yearly budget" which turns them "from fiscalizers" into "financially-interested partners."219 They also claim that the
system has an effect on re- election as "the PDAF excels in self-perpetuation of elective officials." Finally, they add
that the "PDAF impairs the power of impeachment" as such "funds are indeed quite useful, ‘to well, accelerate the
decisions of senators.‘"220
The Court agrees in part.
The aphorism forged under Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, which states that "public office is a public
trust," is an overarching reminder that every instrumentality of government should exercise their official functions
only in accordance with the principles of the Constitution which embodies the parameters of the people‘s trust. The
notion of a public trust connotes accountability,221 hence, the various mechanisms in the Constitution which are
designed to exact accountability from public officers.
Among others, an accountability mechanism with which the proper expenditure of public funds may be checked is
the power of congressional oversight. As mentioned in Abakada,222 congressional oversight may be performed either
through: (a) scrutiny based primarily on Congress‘ power of appropriation and the budget hearings conducted in
connection with it, its power to ask heads of departments to appear before and be heard by either of its Houses on
any matter pertaining to their departments and its power of confirmation;223 or (b) investigation and monitoring of the
implementation of laws pursuant to the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation.224
The Court agrees with petitioners that certain features embedded in some forms of Congressional Pork Barrel,
among others the 2013 PDAF Article, has an effect on congressional oversight. The fact that individual legislators
are given post-enactment roles in the implementation of the budget makes it difficult for them to become
disinterested "observers" when scrutinizing, investigating or monitoring the implementation of the appropriation law.
To a certain extent, the conduct of oversight would be tainted as said legislators, who are vested with postenactment authority, would, in effect, be checking on activities in which they themselves participate. Also, it must be
pointed out that this very same concept of post-enactment authorization runs afoul of Section 14, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution which provides that:
Sec. 14. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may personally appear as counsel before any
court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other administrative bodies. Neither shall he,
directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by
the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or
controlled corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of office. He shall not intervene in any matter before any
office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be called upon to act on account of his office.
(Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, allowing legislators to intervene in the various phases of project implementation – a matter before another
office of government – renders them susceptible to taking undue advantage of their own office.
The Court, however, cannot completely agree that the same post-enactment authority and/or the individual
legislator‘s control of his PDAF per se would allow him to perpetuate himself in office. Indeed, while the
Congressional Pork Barrel and a legislator‘s use thereof may be linked to this area of interest, the use of his PDAF
for re-election purposes is a matter which must be analyzed based on particular facts and on a case-to-case basis.
Finally, while the Court accounts for the possibility that the close operational proximity between legislators and the
Executive department, through the former‘s post-enactment participation, may affect the process of impeachment,
this matter largely borders on the domain of politics and does not strictly concern the Pork Barrel System‘s intrinsic
constitutionality. As such, it is an improper subject of judicial assessment.
In sum, insofar as its post-enactment features dilute congressional oversight and violate Section 14, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution, thus impairing public accountability, the 2013 PDAF Article and other forms of Congressional
Pork Barrel of similar nature are deemed as unconstitutional.
4. Political Dynasties.
One of the petitioners submits that the Pork Barrel System enables politicians who are members of political
dynasties to accumulate funds to perpetuate themselves in power, in contravention of Section 26, Article II of the
1987 Constitution225 which states that:
Sec. 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibit political dynasties
as may be defined by law. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
At the outset, suffice it to state that the foregoing provision is considered as not self-executing due to the qualifying
phrase "as may be defined by law." In this respect, said provision does not, by and of itself, provide a judicially
enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies guideline for legislative or executive action.226 Therefore, since
there appears to be no standing law which crystallizes the policy on political dynasties for enforcement, the Court
must defer from ruling on this issue.
In any event, the Court finds the above-stated argument on this score to be largely speculative since it has not been
properly demonstrated how the Pork Barrel System would be able to propagate political dynasties.
5. Local Autonomy.
The State‘s policy on local autonomy is principally stated in Section 25, Article II and Sections 2 and 3, Article X of
the 1987 Constitution which read as follows:
ARTICLE II
Sec. 25. The State shall ensure the autonomy of local governments.
ARTICLE X
Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.
Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and
accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of
recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local government units their powers, responsibilities,
and resources, and provide for the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and
functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local
units.
Pursuant thereto, Congress enacted RA 7160,227 otherwise known as the "Local Government Code of 1991" (LGC),
wherein the policy on local autonomy had been more specifically explicated as follows:
Sec. 2. Declaration of Policy. – (a) It is hereby declared the policy of the State that the territorial and political
subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest
development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the attainment of national goals.
Toward this end, the State shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure
instituted through a system of decentralization whereby local government units shall be given more powers,
authority, responsibilities, and resources. The process of decentralization shall proceed from the National
Government to the local government units.
xxxx
(c) It is likewise the policy of the State to require all national agencies and offices to conduct periodic consultations
with appropriate local government units, nongovernmental and people‘s organizations, and other concerned sectors
of the community before any project or program is implemented in their respective jurisdictions. (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)
The above-quoted provisions of the Constitution and the LGC reveal the policy of the State to empower local
government units (LGUs) to develop and ultimately, become self-sustaining and effective contributors to the national
economy. As explained by the Court in Philippine Gamefowl Commission v. Intermediate Appellate Court:228
This is as good an occasion as any to stress the commitment of the Constitution to the policy of local autonomy
which is intended to provide the needed impetus and encouragement to the development of our local political
subdivisions as "self - reliant communities." In the words of Jefferson, "Municipal corporations are the small
republics from which the great one derives its strength." The vitalization of local governments will enable their
inhabitants to fully exploit their resources and more important, imbue them with a deepened sense of involvement in
public affairs as members of the body politic. This objective could be blunted by undue interference by the national
government in purely local affairs which are best resolved by the officials and inhabitants of such political units. The
decision we reach today conforms not only to the letter of the pertinent laws but also to the spirit of the
Constitution.229 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
In the cases at bar, petitioners contend that the Congressional Pork Barrel goes against the constitutional principles
on local autonomy since it allows district representatives, who are national officers, to substitute their judgments in
utilizing public funds for local development.230 The Court agrees with petitioners.
Philconsa described the 1994 CDF as an attempt "to make equal the unequal" and that "it is also a recognition that
individual members of Congress, far more than the President and their congressional colleagues, are likely to be
knowledgeable about the needs of their respective constituents and the priority to be given each project."231 Drawing
strength from this pronouncement, previous legislators justified its existence by stating that "the relatively small
projects implemented under the Congressional Pork Barrel complement and link the national development goals to
the countryside and grassroots as well as to depressed areas which are overlooked by central agencies which are
preoccupied with mega-projects.232 Similarly, in his August 23, 2013 speech on the "abolition" of PDAF and
budgetary reforms, President Aquino mentioned that the Congressional Pork Barrel was originally established for a
worthy goal, which is to enable the representatives to identify projects for communities that the LGU concerned
cannot afford.233
Notwithstanding these declarations, the Court, however, finds an inherent defect in the system which actually belies
the avowed intention of "making equal the unequal." In particular, the Court observes that the gauge of PDAF and
CDF allocation/division is based solely on the fact of office, without taking into account the specific interests and
peculiarities of the district the legislator represents. In this regard, the allocation/division limits are clearly not based
on genuine parameters of equality, wherein economic or geographic indicators have been taken into consideration.
As a result, a district representative of a highly-urbanized metropolis gets the same amount of funding as a district
representative of a far-flung rural province which would be relatively "underdeveloped" compared to the former. To
add, what rouses graver scrutiny is that even Senators and Party-List Representatives – and in some years, even
the Vice-President – who do not represent any locality, receive funding from the Congressional Pork Barrel as well.
These certainly are anathema to the Congressional Pork Barrel‘s original intent which is "to make equal the
unequal." Ultimately, the PDAF and CDF had become personal funds under the effective control of each legislator
and given unto them on the sole account of their office.
The Court also observes that this concept of legislator control underlying the CDF and PDAF conflicts with the
functions of the various Local Development Councils (LDCs) which are already legally mandated to "assist the
corresponding sanggunian in setting the direction of economic and social development, and coordinating
development efforts within its territorial jurisdiction."234 Considering that LDCs are instrumentalities whose functions
are essentially geared towards managing local affairs,235 their programs, policies and resolutions should not be
overridden nor duplicated by individual legislators, who are national officers that have no law-making authority
except only when acting as a body. The undermining effect on local autonomy caused by the post-enactment
authority conferred to the latter was succinctly put by petitioners in the following wise:236
With PDAF, a Congressman can simply bypass the local development council and initiate projects on his own, and
even take sole credit for its execution. Indeed, this type of personality-driven project identification has not only
contributed little to the overall development of the district, but has even contributed to "further weakening
infrastructure planning and coordination efforts of the government."
Thus, insofar as individual legislators are authorized to intervene in purely local matters and thereby subvert
genuine local autonomy, the 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other similar forms of Congressional Pork Barrel is
deemed unconstitutional.
With this final issue on the Congressional Pork Barrel resolved, the Court now turns to the substantive issues
involving the Presidential Pork Barrel.
C. Substantive Issues on the Presidential Pork Barrel.
1. Validity of Appropriation.
Petitioners preliminarily assail Section 8 of PD 910 and Section 12 of PD1869 (now, amended by PD 1993), which
respectively provide for the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund, as invalid appropriations laws since
they do not have the "primary and specific" purpose of authorizing the release of public funds from the National
Treasury. Petitioners submit that Section 8 of PD 910 is not an appropriation law since the "primary and specific‖
purpose of PD 910 is the creation of an Energy Development Board and Section 8 thereof only created a Special
Fund incidental thereto.237 In similar regard, petitioners argue that Section 12 of PD 1869 is neither a valid
appropriations law since the allocation of the Presidential Social Fund is merely incidental to the "primary and
specific" purpose of PD 1869 which is the amendment of the Franchise and Powers of PAGCOR.238 In view of the
foregoing, petitioners suppose that such funds are being used without any valid law allowing for their proper
appropriation in violation of Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states that: "No money shall be
paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law."239
The Court disagrees.
"An appropriation made by law‖ under the contemplation of Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution exists
when a provision of law (a) sets apart a determinate or determinable240 amount of money and (b) allocates the same
for a particular public purpose. These two minimum designations of amount and purpose stem from the very
definition of the word "appropriation," which means "to allot, assign, set apart or apply to a particular use or
purpose," and hence, if written into the law, demonstrate that the legislative intent to appropriate exists. As the
Constitution "does not provide or prescribe any particular form of words or religious recitals in which an authorization
or appropriation by Congress shall be made, except that it be ‘made by law,‘" an appropriation law may – according
to Philconsa – be "detailed and as broad as Congress wants it to be" for as long as the intent to appropriate may be
gleaned from the same. As held in the case of Guingona, Jr.:241
There is no provision in our Constitution that provides or prescribes any particular form of words or religious recitals
in which an authorization or appropriation by Congress shall be made, except that it be "made by law," such as
precisely the authorization or appropriation under the questioned presidential decrees. In other words, in terms of
time horizons, an appropriation may be made impliedly (as by past but subsisting legislations) as well as expressly
for the current fiscal year (as by enactment of laws by the present Congress), just as said appropriation may be
made in general as well as in specific terms. The Congressional authorization may be embodied in annual laws,
such as a general appropriations act or in special provisions of laws of general or special application which
appropriate public funds for specific public purposes, such as the questioned decrees. An appropriation measure is
sufficient if the legislative intention clearly and certainly appears from the language employed (In re Continuing
Appropriations, 32 P. 272), whether in the past or in the present. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Likewise, as ruled by the US Supreme Court in State of Nevada v. La Grave:242
To constitute an appropriation there must be money placed in a fund applicable to the designated purpose. The
word appropriate means to allot, assign, set apart or apply to a particular use or purpose. An appropriation in the
sense of the constitution means the setting apart a portion of the public funds for a public purpose. No particular
form of words is necessary for the purpose, if the intention to appropriate is plainly manifested. (Emphases supplied)
Thus, based on the foregoing, the Court cannot sustain the argument that the appropriation must be the "primary
and specific" purpose of the law in order for a valid appropriation law to exist. To reiterate, if a legal provision
designates a determinate or determinable amount of money and allocates the same for a particular public purpose,
then the legislative intent to appropriate becomes apparent and, hence, already sufficient to satisfy the requirement
of an "appropriation made by law" under contemplation of the Constitution.
Section 8 of PD 910 pertinently provides:
Section 8. Appropriations. x x x
All fees, revenues and receipts of the Board from any and all sources including receipts from service contracts and
agreements such as application and processing fees, signature bonus, discovery bonus, production bonus; all
money collected from concessionaires, representing unspent work obligations, fines and penalties under the
Petroleum Act of 1949; as well as the government share representing royalties, rentals, production share on service
contracts and similar payments on the exploration, development and exploitation of energy resources, shall form
part of a Special Fund to be used to finance energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects
of the government and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President. (Emphases supplied)
Whereas Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, reads:
Sec. 12. Special Condition of Franchise. — After deducting five (5%) percent as Franchise Tax, the Fifty (50%)
percent share of the Government in the aggregate gross earnings of the Corporation from this Franchise, or 60% if
the aggregate gross earnings be less than ₱150,000,000.00 shall be set aside and shall accrue to the General Fund
to finance the priority infrastructure development projects and to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed
facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines.
(Emphases supplied)
Analyzing the legal text vis-à-vis the above-mentioned principles, it may then be concluded that (a) Section 8 of PD
910, which creates a Special Fund comprised of "all fees, revenues, and receipts of the Energy Development Board
from any and all sources" (a determinable amount) "to be used to finance energy resource development and
exploitation programs and projects of the government and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by
the President" (a specified public purpose), and (b) Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, which similarly
sets aside, "after deducting five (5%) percent as Franchise Tax, the Fifty (50%) percent share of the Government in
the aggregate gross earnings of PAGCOR, or 60%, if the aggregate gross earnings be less than ₱150,000,000.00"
(also a determinable amount) "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects and x x x the restoration of
damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the President
of the Philippines" (also a specified public purpose), are legal appropriations under Section 29(1), Article VI of the
1987 Constitution.
In this relation, it is apropos to note that the 2013 PDAF Article cannot be properly deemed as a legal appropriation
under the said constitutional provision precisely because, as earlier stated, it contains post-enactment measures
which effectively create a system of intermediate appropriations. These intermediate appropriations are the actual
appropriations meant for enforcement and since they are made by individual legislators after the GAA is passed,
they occur outside the law. As such, the Court observes that the real appropriation made under the 2013 PDAF
Article is not the ₱24.79 Billion allocated for the entire PDAF, but rather the post-enactment determinations made by
the individual legislators which are, to repeat, occurrences outside of the law. Irrefragably, the 2013 PDAF Article
does not constitute an "appropriation made by law" since it, in its truest sense, only authorizes individual legislators
to appropriate in violation of the non-delegability principle as afore-discussed.
2. Undue Delegation.
On a related matter, petitioners contend that Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative
power since the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" gives the
President "unbridled discretion to determine for what purpose the funds will be used."243 Respondents, on the other
hand, urged the Court to apply the principle of ejusdem generis to the same section and thus, construe the phrase
"and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" to refer only to other purposes related
"to energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government."244
The Court agrees with petitioners‘ submissions.
While the designation of a determinate or determinable amount for a particular public purpose is sufficient for a legal
appropriation to exist, the appropriation law must contain adequate legislative guidelines if the same law delegates
rule-making authority to the Executive245 either for the purpose of (a) filling up the details of the law for its
enforcement, known as supplementary rule-making, or (b) ascertaining facts to bring the law into actual operation,
referred to as contingent rule-making.246 There are two (2) fundamental tests to ensure that the legislative guidelines
for delegated rule-making are indeed adequate. The first test is called the "completeness test." Case law states that
a law is complete when it sets forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate.
On the other hand, the second test is called the "sufficient standard test." Jurisprudence holds that a law lays down
a sufficient standard when it provides adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the
delegate‘s authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.247 To be sufficient, the standard must specify the
limits of the delegate‘s authority, announce the legislative policy, and identify the conditions under which it is to be
implemented.248
In view of the foregoing, the Court agrees with petitioners that the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be
hereafter directed by the President" under Section 8 of PD 910 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power
insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the President‘s authority
with respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used. As it reads, the said phrase gives the
President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows him
to unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the purview of the law. That the subject phrase may be confined only
to "energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government" under the principle of
ejusdem generis, meaning that the general word or phrase is to be construed to include – or be restricted to – things
akin to, resembling, or of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned,249 is belied by three (3) reasons:
first, the phrase "energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government" states a
singular and general class and hence, cannot be treated as a statutory reference of specific things from which the
general phrase "for such other purposes" may be limited; second, the said phrase also exhausts the class it
represents, namely energy development programs of the government;250 and, third, the Executive department has, in
fact, used the Malampaya Funds for non-energy related purposes under the subject phrase, thereby contradicting
respondents‘ own position that it is limited only to "energy resource development and exploitation programs and
projects of the government."251 Thus, while Section 8 of PD 910 may have passed the completeness test since the
policy of energy development is clearly deducible from its text, the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be
hereafter directed by the President" under the same provision of law should nonetheless be stricken down as
unconstitutional as it lies independently unfettered by any sufficient standard of the delegating law. This
notwithstanding, it must be underscored that the rest of Section 8, insofar as it allows for the use of the Malampaya
Funds "to finance energy resource development and exploitation programs and projects of the government,"
remains legally effective and subsisting. Truth be told, the declared unconstitutionality of the aforementioned phrase
is but an assurance that the Malampaya Funds would be used – as it should be used – only in accordance with the
avowed purpose and intention of PD 910.
As for the Presidential Social Fund, the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that Section 12 of PD 1869 has already
been amended by PD 1993 which thus moots the parties‘ submissions on the same.252 Nevertheless, since the
amendatory provision may be readily examined under the current parameters of discussion, the Court proceeds to
resolve its constitutionality.
Primarily, Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, indicates that the Presidential Social Fund may be used
"to first, finance the priority infrastructure development projects and second, to finance the restoration of damaged
or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the
Philippines." The Court finds that while the second indicated purpose adequately curtails the authority of the
President to spend the Presidential Social Fund only for restoration purposes which arise from calamities, the first
indicated purpose, however, gives him carte blanche authority to use the same fund for any infrastructure project he
may so determine as a "priority". Verily, the law does not supply a definition of "priority in frastructure development
projects" and hence, leaves the President without any guideline to construe the same. To note, the delimitation of a
project as one of "infrastructure" is too broad of a classification since the said term could pertain to any kind of
facility. This may be deduced from its lexicographic definition as follows: "the underlying framework of a system,
especially public services and facilities (such as highways, schools, bridges, sewers, and water-systems) needed to
support commerce as well as economic and residential development."253 In fine, the phrase "to finance the priority
infrastructure development projects" must be stricken down as unconstitutional since – similar to the above-assailed
provision under Section 8 of PD 910 – it lies independently unfettered by any sufficient standard of the delegating
law. As they are severable, all other provisions of Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, remains legally
effective and subsisting.
D. Ancillary Prayers. 1.
Petitioners’ Prayer to be Furnished Lists and Detailed Reports.
Aside from seeking the Court to declare the Pork Barrel System unconstitutional – as the Court did so in the context
of its pronouncements made in this Decision – petitioners equally pray that the Executive Secretary and/or the DBM
be ordered to release to the CoA and to the public: (a) "the complete schedule/list of legislators who have availed of
their PDAF and VILP from the years 2003 to 2013, specifying the use of the funds, the project or activity and the
recipient entities or individuals, and all pertinent data thereto" (PDAF Use Schedule/List);254 and (b) "the use of the
Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary funds, including the proceeds from the x x x Malampaya Funds and remittances
from the PAGCOR x x x from 2003 to 2013, specifying the x x x project or activity and the recipient entities or
individuals, and all pertinent data thereto"255 (Presidential Pork Use Report). Petitioners‘ prayer is grounded on
Section 28, Article II and Section 7, Article III of the 1987 Constitution which read as follows:
ARTICLE II
Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public
disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.
ARTICLE III Sec. 7.
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records,
and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government
research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may
be provided by law.
The Court denies petitioners‘ submission.
Case law instructs that the proper remedy to invoke the right to information is to file a petition for mandamus. As
explained in the case of Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission:256
While the manner of examining public records may be subject to reasonable regulation by the government agency in
custody thereof, the duty to disclose the information of public concern, and to afford access to public records cannot
be discretionary on the part of said agencies. Certainly, its performance cannot be made contingent upon the
discretion of such agencies. Otherwise, the enjoyment of the constitutional right may be rendered nugatory by any
whimsical exercise of agency discretion. The constitutional duty, not being discretionary, its performance may be
compelled by a writ of mandamus in a proper case.
But what is a proper case for Mandamus to issue? In the case before Us, the public right to be enforced and the
concomitant duty of the State are unequivocably set forth in the Constitution.
The decisive question on the propriety of the issuance of the writ of mandamus in this case is, whether the
information sought by the petitioner is within the ambit of the constitutional guarantee. (Emphases supplied)
Corollarily, in the case of Valmonte v. Belmonte Jr.257 (Valmonte), it has been clarified that the right to information
does not include the right to compel the preparation of "lists, abstracts, summaries and the like." In the same case, it
was stressed that it is essential that the "applicant has a well -defined, clear and certain legal right to the thing
demanded and that it is the imperative duty of defendant to perform the act required." Hence, without the foregoing
substantiations, the Court cannot grant a particular request for information. The pertinent portions of Valmonte are
hereunder quoted:258
Although citizens are afforded the right to information and, pursuant thereto, are entitled to "access to official
records," the Constitution does not accord them a right to compel custodians of official records to prepare lists,
abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to acquire information on matters of public concern.
It must be stressed that it is essential for a writ of mandamus to issue that the applicant has a well-defined, clear
and certain legal right to the thing demanded and that it is the imperative duty of defendant to perform the act
required. The corresponding duty of the respondent to perform the required act must be clear and specific Lemi v.
Valencia, G.R. No. L-20768, November 29,1968,126 SCRA 203; Ocampo v. Subido, G.R. No. L-28344, August 27,
1976, 72 SCRA 443.
The request of the petitioners fails to meet this standard, there being no duty on the part of respondent to prepare
the list requested. (Emphases supplied)
In these cases, aside from the fact that none of the petitions are in the nature of mandamus actions, the Court finds
that petitioners have failed to establish a "a well-defined, clear and certain legal right" to be furnished by the
Executive Secretary and/or the DBM of their requested PDAF Use Schedule/List and Presidential Pork Use Report.
Neither did petitioners assert any law or administrative issuance which would form the bases of the latter‘s duty to
furnish them with the documents requested. While petitioners pray that said information be equally released to the
CoA, it must be pointed out that the CoA has not been impleaded as a party to these cases nor has it filed any
petition before the Court to be allowed access to or to compel the release of any official document relevant to the
conduct of its audit investigations. While the Court recognizes that the information requested is a matter of
significant public concern, however, if only to ensure that the parameters of disclosure are properly foisted and so as
not to unduly hamper the equally important interests of the government, it is constrained to deny petitioners‘ prayer
on this score, without prejudice to a proper mandamus case which they, or even the CoA, may choose to pursue
through a separate petition.
It bears clarification that the Court‘s denial herein should only cover petitioners‘ plea to be furnished with such
schedule/list and report and not in any way deny them, or the general public, access to official documents which are
already existing and of public record. Subject to reasonable regulation and absent any valid statutory prohibition,
access to these documents should not be proscribed. Thus, in Valmonte, while the Court denied the application for
mandamus towards the preparation of the list requested by petitioners therein, it nonetheless allowed access to the
documents sought for by the latter, subject, however, to the custodian‘s reasonable regulations,viz.:259
In fine, petitioners are entitled to access to the documents evidencing loans granted by the GSIS, subject to
reasonable regulations that the latter may promulgate relating to the manner and hours of examination, to the end
that damage to or loss of the records may be avoided, that undue interference with the duties of the custodian of the
records may be prevented and that the right of other persons entitled to inspect the records may be insured Legaspi
v. Civil Service Commission, supra at p. 538, quoting Subido v. Ozaeta, 80 Phil. 383, 387. The petition, as to the
second and third alternative acts sought to be done by petitioners, is meritorious.
However, the same cannot be said with regard to the first act sought by petitioners, i.e.,
"to furnish petitioners the list of the names of the Batasang Pambansa members belonging to the UNIDO and PDPLaban who were able to secure clean loans immediately before the February 7 election thru the
intercession/marginal note of the then First Lady Imelda Marcos."
The Court, therefore, applies the same treatment here.
2. Petitioners’ Prayer to Include Matters in Congressional Deliberations.
Petitioners further seek that the Court "order the inclusion in budgetary deliberations with the Congress of all
presently, off-budget, lump sum, discretionary funds including but not limited to, proceeds from the x x x Malampaya
Fund, remittances from the PAGCOR and the PCSO or the Executive‘s Social Funds."260
Suffice it to state that the above-stated relief sought by petitioners covers a matter which is generally left to the
prerogative of the political branches of government. Hence, lest the Court itself overreach, it must equally deny their
prayer on this score.
3. Respondents’ Prayer to Lift TRO; Consequential Effects of Decision.
The final issue to be resolved stems from the interpretation accorded by the DBM to the concept of released funds.
In response to the Court‘s September 10, 2013 TRO that enjoined the release of the remaining PDAF allocated for
the year 2013, the DBM issued Circular Letter No. 2013-8 dated September 27, 2013 (DBM Circular 2013-8) which
pertinently reads as follows:
3.0 Nonetheless, PDAF projects funded under the FY 2013 GAA, where a Special Allotment Release Order (SARO)
has been issued by the DBM and such SARO has been obligated by the implementing agencies prior to the
issuance of the TRO, may continually be implemented and disbursements thereto effected by the agencies
concerned.
Based on the text of the foregoing, the DBM authorized the continued implementation and disbursement of PDAF
funds as long as they are: first, covered by a SARO; and, second, that said SARO had been obligated by the
implementing agency concerned prior to the issuance of the Court‘s September 10, 2013 TRO.
Petitioners take issue with the foregoing circular, arguing that "the issuance of the SARO does not yet involve the
release of funds under the PDAF, as release is only triggered by the issuance of a Notice of Cash Allocation
[(NCA)]."261 As such, PDAF disbursements, even if covered by an obligated SARO, should remain enjoined.
For their part, respondents espouse that the subject TRO only covers "unreleased and unobligated allotments."
They explain that once a SARO has been issued and obligated by the implementing agency concerned, the PDAF
funds covered by the same are already "beyond the reach of the TRO because they cannot be considered as
‘remaining PDAF.‘" They conclude that this is a reasonable interpretation of the TRO by the DBM.262
The Court agrees with petitioners in part.
At the outset, it must be observed that the issue of whether or not the Court‘s September 10, 2013 TRO should be
lifted is a matter rendered moot by the present Decision. The unconstitutionality of the 2013 PDAF Article as
declared herein has the consequential effect of converting the temporary injunction into a permanent one. Hence,
from the promulgation of this Decision, the release of the remaining PDAF funds for 2013, among others, is now
permanently enjoined.
The propriety of the DBM‘s interpretation of the concept of "release" must, nevertheless, be resolved as it has a
practical impact on the execution of the current Decision. In particular, the Court must resolve the issue of whether
or not PDAF funds covered by obligated SAROs, at the time this Decision is promulgated, may still be disbursed
following the DBM‘s interpretation in DBM Circular 2013-8.
On this score, the Court agrees with petitioners‘ posturing for the fundamental reason that funds covered by an
obligated SARO are yet to be "released" under legal contemplation. A SARO, as defined by the DBM itself in its
website, is "aspecific authority issued to identified agencies to incur obligations not exceeding a given amount
during a specified period for the purpose indicated. It shall cover expenditures the release of which is subject to
compliance with specific laws or regulations, or is subject to separate approval or clearance by competent
authority."263
Based on this definition, it may be gleaned that a SARO only evinces the existence of an obligation and not the
directive to pay. Practically speaking, the SARO does not have the direct and immediate effect of placing public
funds beyond the control of the disbursing authority. In fact, a SARO may even be withdrawn under certain
circumstances which will prevent the actual release of funds. On the other hand, the actual release of funds is
brought about by the issuance of the NCA,264 which is subsequent to the issuance of a SARO. As may be
determined from the statements of the DBM representative during the Oral Arguments:265
Justice Bernabe: Is the notice of allocation issued simultaneously with the SARO?
xxxx
Atty. Ruiz: It comes after. The SARO, Your Honor, is only the go signal for the agencies to obligate or to enter into
commitments. The NCA, Your Honor, is already the go signal to the treasury for us to be able to pay or to liquidate
the amounts obligated in the SARO; so it comes after. x x x The NCA, Your Honor, is the go signal for the MDS for
the authorized government-disbursing banks to, therefore, pay the payees depending on the projects or projects
covered by the SARO and the NCA.
Justice Bernabe: Are there instances that SAROs are cancelled or revoked?
Atty. Ruiz: Your Honor, I would like to instead submit that there are instances that the SAROs issued are withdrawn
by the DBM.
Justice Bernabe: They are withdrawn?
Atty. Ruiz: Yes, Your Honor x x x. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Thus, unless an NCA has been issued, public funds should not be treated as funds which have been "released." In
this respect, therefore, the disbursement of 2013 PDAF funds which are only covered by obligated SAROs, and
without any corresponding NCAs issued, must, at the time of this Decision’s promulgation, be enjoined and
consequently reverted to the unappropriated surplus of the general fund. Verily, in view of the declared
unconstitutionality of the 2013 PDAF Article, the funds appropriated pursuant thereto cannot be disbursed even
though already obligated, else the Court sanctions the dealing of funds coming from an unconstitutional source.
This same pronouncement must be equally applied to (a) the Malampaya Funds which have been obligated but not
released – meaning, those merely covered by a SARO – under the phrase "and for such other purposes as may be
hereafter directed by the President" pursuant to Section 8 of PD 910; and (b) funds sourced from the Presidential
Social Fund under the phrase "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects" pursuant to Section 12 of
PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, which were altogether declared by the Court as unconstitutional. However,
these funds should not be reverted to the general fund as afore-stated but instead, respectively remain under the
Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund to be utilized for their corresponding special purposes not
otherwise declared as unconstitutional.
E. Consequential Effects of Decision.
As a final point, it must be stressed that the Court‘s pronouncement anent the unconstitutionality of (a) the 2013
PDAF Article and its Special Provisions, (b) all other Congressional Pork Barrel provisions similar thereto, and (c)
the phrases (1) "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President" under Section 8 of PD
910, and (2) "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects" under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended
by PD 1993, must only be treated as prospective in effect in view of the operative fact doctrine.
To explain, the operative fact doctrine exhorts the recognition that until the judiciary, in an appropriate case,
declares the invalidity of a certain legislative or executive act, such act is presumed constitutional and thus, entitled
to obedience and respect and should be properly enforced and complied with. As explained in the recent case of
Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San Roque Power Corporation,266 the doctrine merely "reflects awareness that
precisely because the judiciary is the governmental organ which has the final say on whether or not a legislative or
executive measure is valid, a period of time may have elapsed before it can exercise the power of judicial review
that may lead to a declaration of nullity. It would be to deprive the law of its quality of fairness and justice then, if
there be no recognition of what had transpired prior to such adjudication."267 "In the language of an American
Supreme Court decision: ‘The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination of unconstitutionality, is an
operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored.‘"268
For these reasons, this Decision should be heretofore applied prospectively.
Conclusion
The Court renders this Decision to rectify an error which has persisted in the chronicles of our history. In the final
analysis, the Court must strike down the Pork Barrel System as unconstitutional in view of the inherent defects in the
rules within which it operates. To recount, insofar as it has allowed legislators to wield, in varying gradations, nonoversight, post-enactment authority in vital areas of budget execution, the system has violated the principle of
separation of powers; insofar as it has conferred unto legislators the power of appropriation by giving them personal,
discretionary funds from which they are able to fund specific projects which they themselves determine, it has
similarly violated the principle of non-delegability of legislative power ; insofar as it has created a system of
budgeting wherein items are not textualized into the appropriations bill, it has flouted the prescribed procedure of
presentment and, in the process, denied the President the power to veto items ; insofar as it has diluted the
effectiveness of congressional oversight by giving legislators a stake in the affairs of budget execution, an aspect of
governance which they may be called to monitor and scrutinize, the system has equally impaired public
accountability ; insofar as it has authorized legislators, who are national officers, to intervene in affairs of purely local
nature, despite the existence of capable local institutions, it has likewise subverted genuine local autonomy ; and
again, insofar as it has conferred to the President the power to appropriate funds intended by law for energy-related
purposes only to other purposes he may deem fit as well as other public funds under the broad classification of
"priority infrastructure development projects," it has once more transgressed the principle of non-delegability.
For as long as this nation adheres to the rule of law, any of the multifarious unconstitutional methods and
mechanisms the Court has herein pointed out should never again be adopted in any system of governance, by any
name or form, by any semblance or similarity, by any influence or effect. Disconcerting as it is to think that a system
so constitutionally unsound has monumentally endured, the Court urges the people and its co-stewards in
government to look forward with the optimism of change and the awareness of the past. At a time of great civic
unrest and vociferous public debate, the Court fervently hopes that its Decision today, while it may not purge all the
wrongs of society nor bring back what has been lost, guides this nation to the path forged by the Constitution so that
no one may heretofore detract from its cause nor stray from its course. After all, this is the Court‘s bounden duty and
no other‘s.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. In view of the constitutional violations discussed in this
Decision, the Court hereby declares as UNCONSTITUTIONAL: (a) the entire 2013 PDAF Article; (b) all legal
provisions of past and present Congressional Pork Barrel Laws, such as the previous PDAF and CDF Articles and
the various Congressional Insertions, which authorize/d legislators – whether individually or collectively organized
into committees – to intervene, assume or participate in any of the various post-enactment stages of the budget
execution, such as but not limited to the areas of project identification, modification and revision of project
identification, fund release and/or fund realignment, unrelated to the power of congressional oversight; (c) all legal
provisions of past and present Congressional Pork Barrel Laws, such as the previous PDAF and CDF Articles and
the various Congressional Insertions, which confer/red personal, lump-sum allocations to legislators from which they
are able to fund specific projects which they themselves determine; (d) all informal practices of similar import and
effect, which the Court similarly deems to be acts of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction; and (e) the phrases (1) "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President"
under Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 910 and (2) "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects"
under Section 12 of Presidential Decree No. 1869, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1993, for both failing the
sufficient standard test in violation of the principle of non-delegability of legislative power.
Accordingly, the Court‘s temporary injunction dated September 10, 2013 is hereby declared to be PERMANENT.
Thus, the disbursement/release of the remaining PDAF funds allocated for the year 2013, as well as for all previous
years, and the funds sourced from (1) the Malampaya Funds under the phrase "and for such other purposes as may
be hereafter directed by the President" pursuant to Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 910, and (2) the
Presidential Social Fund under the phrase "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects" pursuant to
Section 12 of Presidential Decree No. 1869, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1993, which are, at the time
this Decision is promulgated, not covered by Notice of Cash Allocations (NCAs) but only by Special Allotment
Release Orders (SAROs), whether obligated or not, are hereby ENJOINED. The remaining PDAF funds covered by
this permanent injunction shall not be disbursed/released but instead reverted to the unappropriated surplus of the
general fund, while the funds under the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund shall remain therein to
be utilized for their respective special purposes not otherwise declared as unconstitutional.
On the other hand, due to improper recourse and lack of proper substantiation, the Court hereby DENIES
petitioners‘ prayer seeking that the Executive Secretary and/or the Department of Budget and Management be
ordered to provide the public and the Commission on Audit complete lists/schedules or detailed reports related to
the availments and utilization of the funds subject of these cases. Petitioners‘ access to official documents already
available and of public record which are related to these funds must, however, not be prohibited but merely
subjected to the custodian‘s reasonable regulations or any valid statutory prohibition on the same. This denial is
without prejudice to a proper mandamus case which they or the Commission on Audit may choose to pursue
through a separate petition.
The Court also DENIES petitioners prayer to order the inclusion of the funds subject of these cases in the budgetary
deliberations of Congress as the same is a matter left to the prerogative of the political branches of government.
Finally, the Court hereby DIRECTS all prosecutorial organs of the government to, within the bounds of reasonable
dispatch, investigate and accordingly prosecute all government officials and/or private individuals for possible
criminal offenses related to the irregular, improper and/or unlawful disbursement/utilization of all funds under the
Pork Barrel System.
This Decision is immediately executory but prospective in effect.
SO ORDERED.
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-38025 August 20, 1979
DANTE O. CASIBANG, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE NARCISO A. AQUINO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch XIV, and
REMEGIO P. YU, respondents.
Nicanor & Bautista and Agaton D. Yaranon for petitioner.
Bince, Sevilleja, Agsalud & Associates for respondents.
MAKASIAR, J.:
Respondent Remigio P. Yu was proclaimed on November 9, 1971 as the elected Mayor of Rosales, Pangasinan in
the 1971 local elections, by a plurality of 501 votes over his only rival, herein petitioner, who seasonably filed on
November 24, 1971 a protest against the election of the former with the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, on
the grounds of (1) anomalies and irregularities in the appreciation, counting and consideration of votes in specified
electoral precincts; (2) terrorism; (3) rampant vote buying; (4) open voting or balloting; and (5) excessive campaign
expenditures and other violations of the 1971 Election Code.
Respondent Yu filed on November 29, 1971 his answer and counter-protest which petitioner answered on
December 10, 1971. However, respondent Yu withdrew his counter-protest after waiving the opening and revision of
the ballot boxes specified therein.
Proceedings therein continued with respect to the election protest of petitioner before the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan, Branch XIV, presided by respondent Judge, who initially took cognizance of the same as it is
unquestionably a justiciable controversy.
In the meantime or on September 21, 1972, the incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines issued
Proclamation No. 1081, placing the entire country under Martial Law; and two months thereafter, more or less, or
specifically on November 29, 1972, the 1971 Constitutional Convention passed and approved a Constitution to
supplant the 1935 Constitution; and the same was thereafter overwhelmingly ratified by the sovereign people of the
Republic of the Philippines on January 17, 1973; and on March 31, 1973, this Court declared that "there is no further
judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect" (Javellana vs. Executive Secretary, 50
SCRA 30 [1973]).
Thereafter or on October 10, 1973, at which time petitioner had already completed presenting his evidence and in
fact had rested his case, respondent Yu moved to dismiss the election protest of petitioner on the ground that the
trial court had lost jurisdiction over the same in view of the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution by reason of which —
principally) Section 9 of Article XVII [Transitory Provisions] and Section 2 of Article XI — a political question has
intervened in the case. Respondent Yu contended that "... the provisions in the 1935 Constitution relative to all local
governments have been superseded by the 1973 Constitution. Therefore, all local government should adhere to our
parliamentary form of government. This is clear in the New Constitution under its Article XI." He further submitted
that local elective officials (including mayors) have no more four-year term of office. They are only in office at the
pleasure of the appointing power embodied in the New Constitution, and under Section 9 of Article XVII.
Petitioner vigorously opposed the motion to dismiss, and, relying mainly on Sections 7 and 8 of Article XVII
(Transitory Provisions) of the New Constitution and G.O. No. 3, contended that the New Constitution did not divest
the Court of First Instance of its jurisdiction to hear and decide election protests pending before them at the time of
its ratification and effectivity; that the ratification of the New Constitution and its effectivity did not automatically
abolish the office and position of municipal mayor nor has it automatically cut short the tenure of the office, so as to
render the issue as to who is the lawfully elected candidate to said office or position moot and academic; that
election protests involve public interest such that the same must be heard until terminated and may not be
dismissed on mere speculation that the office involved may have been abolished, modified or reorganized; and that
the motion to dismiss was filed manifestly for delay.
Respondent Yu replied pointing out, among others, that petitioner failed to refute the issue of political question; and
reiterated his stand, expanding his arguments on the political question, thus:
It is an undeniable fact that this case has its source from the 1971 elections for municipal mayoralty.
Unsatisfied with the counting of votes held by the Board of Canvassers, the herein protestant filed
this present case. And before the termination of the same and pending trial, the Filipino people in the
exercise of their free will and sovereign capacity approved a NEW CONSTITUTION, thus a NEW
FORM OF GOVERNMENT-PARLIAMENTARY IN FORM was enforced. We find this provision under
Article XI of the New Constitution, which provides:
SEC. 2. The National Assembly shall enact a local government code which may not
thereafter be amended except by a majority vote of all its members, defining a more
responsive and accountable local government structure with an effective system of
recall, allocating among the different local government units their powers,
responsibilities, and resources, and providing for the qualifications, election and
removal, term, salaries, powers, functions, and duties of local officials, and all other
matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units. However, any
change in the existing form of local government shall not take effect until ratified by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose.
It is respectfully submitted that the contention of the protestant to the effect that the New Constitution
"shows that the office of the Municipal Mayor has not been abolished ... ," is not ACCURATE.
Otherwise, the provisions of Section 9 of Article XVII, is meaningless.
All officials and employees in the existing Government of the Republic shall continue
in office until otherwise provided by law or decreed by the incumbent President of the
Philippines, ...
In the above-quoted provision is the protection of the officials and employees working in our
government, otherwise, by the force of the New Constitution they are all out of the government
offices. In fact, in the case above-cited (Javellana) we are all performing our duties in accordance
with the New Constitution.
Therefore, election cases of the 1935 Constitution being interwoven in the political complexion of our
new Constitution should be dismissed because only those incumbent official and employees existing
in the new government are protected by the transitional provisions of the New Fundamental Law of
the Land. The protestant, we respectfully submit, is not covered by the provisions of Section 9 Article
XVII of the Constitution. And in case he will win in this present case he has no right to hold the
position of mayor of the town of Rosales, Pangasinan, because he was not then an official of the
government at the time the New Constitution was approved by the Filipino People. His right if
proclaimed a winner is derived from the 1935 Constitution which is changed by the Filipino people.
On December 18, 1973, the trial court, presided by respondent Judge, sustained the political question theory of
respondent Yu and ordered the dismissal of the electoral protest. Thus:
There is no dispute that the Filipino people have accepted and submitted to a new Constitution to
replace the 1935 Constitution, and that we are now living under its aegis and protection. ...
xxx xxx xxx
Under Section 9, Article XVII, of the new Constitution, above-quoted, only those officials and
employees of the existing Government of the Republic of the Philippines like the protestee herein,
are given protection and are authorized to continue in office at the pleasure of the incumbent
President of the Philippines, while under Section 2 of Article XI of the new Constitution, also abovequoted, the intention of completely revamp the whole local government structure, providing for
different qualifications, election and removal, term, salaries, powers, functions, and duties, is very
clear. These present questions of policy, the necessity and expediency of which are outside the
range of judicial review. With respect to the fate of incumbent oficials and employees in the existing
Government of the Republic of the Philippines, as well as to the qualifications, election and removal,
term of office, salaries, and powers of all local officials under the parliamentary form of government
— these have been entrusted or delegated by the sovereign people or has reserved it to be settled
by the incumbent Chief Executive or by the National Assembly with full discretionary authority
therefor. As if to supplement these delegated powers, the people have also decreed in a referendum
the suspension of all elections. Thus, in the United States, questions relating to what persons or
organizations constituted the lawful government of a state of the Union (Luther vs. Borden, 7 How. 1,
12, L. Ed 58), and those relating to the political status of a state (Highland Farms Dairy vs. Agnew,
57 S. et 549, 300 U.S. 608, 81 L.ed 835), have been held to be political and for the judiciary to
determine.
To the mind of the Court, therefore, the ratification and effectivity of the new Constitution has tainted
this case with a political complexion above and beyond the power of judicial review. As fittingly
commented by Mr. Justice Antonio in a separate opinion in the Javellana, et al. cases, 69 0. G. No.
36, September 3, 1973, p. 8008:
The essentially political nature of the question is at once manifest by understanding
that in the final analysis, what is assailed is not merely the validity of Proclamation
No. 1102 of the President, which is merely declaratory of the fact of the approval or
ratification, but the legitimacy of the government. It is addressed more to the framework and political character of this government which now functions under the new
Charter. It seeks to nullify a Constitution that is already effective. In other words,
where a complete change in the fundamental law has been effected through political
action, the Court whose existence is affected by such a change is, in the words of
Mr. Meville Fuller Weston "precluded from passing upon the fact of change by a
logical difficulty which is not to be surmounted as the change relates to the existence
of a prior point in the Court's "chain of title" to its authority and "does not relate
merely to a question of the horizontal distribution of powers." It involves a matter
which 'the sovereign has entrusted to the so-called political departments or has
reserved to be settled by its own extra-governmental action." The present
Government functions under the new Constitution which has become effective
through political action. Judicial power presupposes an established government and
an effective constitution. If it decides at all as a court, it necessarily affirms the
existence and authority of the Government under which it is exercising judicial power.
The Court is not unaware of provisions of the new Constitution, particularly Sections 7 and 8, Article
XVII (Transitory Provisions) decreeing that all existing laws not inconsistent with the new
Constitution shall remain operative until amended, modified, or repealed by the National Assembly,
and that all courts existing at the time of the ratification of the said new Constitution shall continue
and exercise their jurisdiction until otherwise provided by law in accordance with the new
Constitution, and all cases pending in said courts shall be heard, tried and determined under the
laws then in force. Again, to the mind of the Court, these refer to matters raised in the enforcement
of existing laws or in the invocation of a court's jurisdiction which have not been "entrusted to the socalled political department or has reserved to be settled by its own extra governmental action.
Hence, this petition.
We reverse.
The thrust of the aforesaid political question theory of respondent Yu is that the 1973 Constitution, through Section 9
of Article XVII thereof, protected only those incumbents, like him, at the time of its ratification and effectivity and are
the only ones authorized to continue in office and their term of office as extended now depends on the pleasure of,
as the same has been entrusted or committed to, the incumbent President of the Philippines or the Legislative
Department; and that Section 2 of Article XI thereof entrusted to the National Assembly the revamp of the entire
local government structure by the enactment of a local government code, thus presenting a question of policy, the
necessity and expediency of which are outside the range of judicial review. In short, for the respondent Judge to still
continue assuming jurisdiction over the pending election protest of petitioner is for him to take cognizance of a
question or policy "in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislative or Executive
branch of the government."
I
There is an imperative need to re-state pronouncements of this Court on the new Constitution which are decisive in
the resolution of the political question theory of respondent Yu.
WE ruled:
1. That Section 9 of Article XVII of the 1973 Constitution did not render moot and academic pending election protest
cases (Santos vs. Castañeda, 65 SCRA 114 [1975]; Euipilag vs. Araula, 60 SCRA 211 [1974]; Nunez vs. Averia, 57
SCRA 726 [1974]; Parades vs. Abad, L-36927, Sunga vs. Mosueda, L-37715, Valley vs. Caro, L-38331, 56 SCRA
522, [1974]).
2. That "the constitutional grant of privilege to continue in office, made by the new Constitution for the benefit of
persons who were incumbent officials or employees of the Government when the new Constitution took effect,
cannot be fairly construed as indiscriminately encompassing every person who at the time happened to be
performing the duties of an elective office, albeit under protest or contest" and that "subject to the constraints
specifically mentioned in Section 9, Article XVII of the Transitory Provisions, it neither was, nor could have been the
intention of the framers of our new fundamental law to disregard and shunt aside the statutory right of a condidate
for elective position who, within the time-frame prescribed in the Election Code of 1971, commenced proceedings
beamed mainly at the proper determination in a judicial forum of a proclaimed candidate-elect's right to the
contested office."' (Santos vs. Castañeda, supra); and We rationalized that "the Constitutional Convention could not
have intended, as in fact it .did not intend, to shielf or protect those who had been unduly elected. To hold that the
right of the herein private respondents to the respective offices which they are now holding, may no longer be
subject to question, would be tantamount to giving a stamp of approval to what could have been an election victory
characterized by fraud, threats, intimidation, vote buying, or other forms of irregularities prohibited by the Election
Code to preserve inviolate the sanctity of the ballot." (Parades, Sunga and Valley cases, supra).
3. That "the right of the private respondents (protestees) to continue in office indefinitely arose not only by virtue of
Section 9 of Article XVII of the New Constitution but principally from their having been proclaimed elected to their
respective positions as a result of the November 8, 1971 elections. Therefore, if in fact and in law, they were not
duly elected to their respective positions and consequently, have no right to hold the same, perform their functions,
enjoy their privileges and emoluments, then certainly, they should not be allowed to enjoy the indefinite term of
office given to them by said constitutional provision" (Parades, Sunga and Valley cases, supra).
4. That "until a subsequent law or presidential decree provides otherwise, the right of respondent (protestee) to
continue as mayor rests on the legality of his election which has been protested by herein petitioner. Should the
court decide adversely against him the electoral protest, respondent (protestee) would cease to be mayor even
before a law or presidential decree terminates his tenure of office pursuant to said Section 9 of Article XVII of the
1973 Constitution" (Euipilag, supra).
5. That "there is a difference between the 'term' of office and the 'right' to hold an office. A 'term' of office is the
period during winch an elected officer or appointee is entitled to hold office, perform its functions and enjoy its
privileges and emoluments. A 'right' to hold a public office is the just and legal claim to hold and enjoy the powers
and responsibilities of the office. In other words, the 'term' refers to the period, duration of length of time during
which the occupant of an office is .entitled to stay therein whether such period be definite or indefinite. Hence,
although Section 9, Article XVII of the New Constitution made the term of the petitioners indefinite, it did not
foreclose any challenge by the herein petitioners, in an election protest, of the 'right' of the private respondents to
continue holding their respective office. What has been directly affected by said constitutional provision is the 'term'
to the office, although the 'right' of the incumbent to an office which he is legally holding is co-extensive with the
'term' thereof," and that "it is erroneous to conclude that under Section 9, Article XVII of the New Constitution, the
term of office of the private respondents expired, and that they are now holding their respective offices under a new
term. We are of the opinion that they hold their respective offices still under the term to which they have been
elected, although the same is now indefinite" (Parades, Sunga and Valley cases, supra).
6. That the New Constitution recognized the continuing jurisdiction of courts of first instance to hear, try and decide
election protests: "Section 7 of Article XVII of the New Constitution provides that 'all existing laws not inconsistent
with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, modified or repealed by the National Assembly. 'And
there has been no amendment, modification or repeal of Section 220 of the Election Code of 1971 which gave the
herein petitioners the right to file an election contest against those proclaimed elected," and "according to Section 8,
Article XVII of the New Constitution 'all courts existing at the time of the ratification of this Constitution shall continue
and exercise their jurisdiction until otherwise provided by law in accordance with this Constitution, and all cases
pending in said courts shall be heard, tried and determined under the laws then in force.' Consequently, the Courts
of First Instance presided over by the respondent-Judges should continue and exercise their jurisdiction to hear, try
and decide the election protests filed by herein petitioners" (Santos, Euipilag, Nunez, Parades, Sunga and Valley
cases, supra).
While under the New Constitution the Commission on Elections is now the sole judge of all contests relating to the
elections, returns, and qualifications of members of the National Assembly as well as elective provincial and city
officials (par. 2 of Sec. 2, Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution), such power does not extend to electoral contests
concerning municipal elective positions.
7. That General Order No. 3, issued by the President of the Philippines merely reiterated his powers under Section 9
of Article XVII of the New Constitution. The President did not intend thereby to modify the aforesaid constitutional
provision (Euipilag, supra).
General Order No. 3, as amended by General Order No. 3-A, does not expressly include electoral contests of
municipal elective positions as among those removed from the jurisdiction of the courts; for said General Order,
after affirming the jurisdiction of the Judiciary to decide in accordance with the existing laws on criminal and civil
cases, simply removes from the jurisdiction of the Civil Court certain crimes specified therein as well as the validity,
legality or constitutionality of any decree, order or acts issued by the President or his duly designated representative
or by public servants pursuant to his decrees and orders issued under Proclamation No. 1081.
8. That General Order No. 3 may not be invoked by the courts to avoid exercise of their jurisdiction because to do co
"is nothing short of unwarranted abdication of judicial', authority, which no judge duly imbued with the implications of
the paramount principle of independence of the judiciary should ever think of doing. It is unfortunate indeed that
respondent Judge is apparently unaware that it is a matter of highly significant historical fact that this Court has
always deemed General Order No. 3 including its amendment by General Order No. 3-A as practically inoperative
even in the light of Proclamation No. 1081 of September 21, 1972 and Proclamation No. 1104 of January 17, 1973,
placing the whole Philippines under martial law. While the members of the Court are not agreed on whether or not
particular instances of attack against the validity of certain Presidential decrees raise political questions which the
Judiciary would not interfere with, there is unanimity among Us in the view that it is for the Court rather than the
Executive to determine whether or not We may take cognizance of any given case involving the validity of acts of
the Executive Department purportedly under the authority of the martial law proclamations" (Lina vs. Purisima, 3
PHILAJUR 605, 610-611, 82 SCRA 344 [1978]).
II
1. In the light of the foregoing pronouncements, We hold that the electoral protest case herein involved has
remained a justiciable controversy. No political question has ever been interwoven into this case. Nor is there any
act of the incumbent President or the Legislative Department to be indirectly reviewed or interfered with if the
respondent Judge decides the election protest. The term "political question" connotes what it means in ordinary
parlance, namely, a question of policy. It refers to those questions which under the Constitution, are to be decided
by the people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not
legality, of a particular measure" (Tañada vs. Cuenco, L-1052, Feb. 28, 1957). A broader definition was advanced
by U.S. Supreme Court Justice Brennan in Baker vs. Carr (369 U.S. 186 [1962]): "Prominent on the surface of any
case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the
impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or the
impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of respect due coordinate
branches of the government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made;
or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question" (p.
217). And Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, then an Associate Justice, of this Court fixed the limits of the term,
thus: "The term has been made applicable to controversies clearly non-judicial and therefore beyond its jurisdiction
or to an issue involved in a case appropriately subject to its cognizance, as to which there has been a prior
legislative or executive determination to which deference must be paid (Cf. Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192 [1946];
Lopez vs. Roxas, L-25716, July 28, 1966, 17 SCRA 756; Gonzales vs. Commission on Elections, L-28196, Nov. 9,
1967, 21 SCRA 774). It 'has likewise been employed loosely to characterize a suit where the party proceeded
against is the President or Congress, or any branch thereof (Cf. Planas vs. Gil, 67 Phil. 62 [1937]; Vera vs. Avelino,
77 Phil. 192 [1946]). If to be delimited with accuracy; 'political questions' should refer to such as would under the
Constitution be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity or in regard to which full discretionary authority is
vested either in the President or Congress. It is thus beyond the competence of the judiciary to pass upon. ..."
(Lansang vs. Garcia, 42 SCRA 448, 504-505 [1971]).
2. The only issue in the electoral protest case dismissed by respondent Judge on the ground of political question is
who between protestant — herein petitioner — and protestee — herein respondent Yu — was the duly elected
mayor of Rosales, Pangasinan, and legally entitled to enjoy the rights, privileges and emoluments appurtenant
thereto and to discharge the functions, duties and obligations of the position. If the protestee's election is upheld by
the respondent Judge, then he continues in office; otherwise, it is the protestant, herein petitioner. That is the only
consequence of a resolution of the issue therein involved — a purely justiciable question or controversy as it implies
a given right, legally demandable and enforceable, an act or ommission violative of said right, and a remedy,
granted or sanctioned by law, for said breach of right (Tan vs. Republic, 107 Phil. 632-633 [1960]). Before and after
the ratification and effectivity of the New Constitution, the nature of the aforesaid issue as well as the consequences
of its resolution by the Court, remains the same as above-stated.
3. Any judgment to be made on that issue will not in any way collide or interfere with the mandate of Section 9 of
Article XVII of the New Constitution, as it will merely resolve who as between protestant and protestee is the duly
elected mayor of Rosales, Pangasinan; hence, entitled to enjoy the extended term as mandated by said provision of
the New Constitution. As construed by this Court, the elective officials referred to in Section 9 of Article XVII are
limited to those duly elected as the right to said extended term was not personal to whosoever was incumbent at the
time of the ratification and effectivity of the New Constitution. Nor would such judgment preempt, collide or interfere
with the power or discretion entrusted by the New Constitution to the incumbent President or the Legislative
Department, with respect to the extended term of the duly elected incumbents; because whoever between
protestant and protestee is declared the duly elected mayor will be subject always to whatever action the President
or the Legislative Department will take pursuant thereto.
4. Neither does Section 2 of Article XI stigmatize the issue in that electoral protest case with a political color. For
simply, that section allocated unto the National Assembly the power to enact a local government code "which may
not thereafter be amended except by a majority of all its Members, defining a more responsive and accountable
local government allocating among the different local government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources,
and providing for their qualifications, election and removal, term, salaries, powers, functions and duties of local
officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units" but "... any change in the
existing form of local government shall not take effect until ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite
called for the purpose." It is apparent at once that such power committed by the New Constitution to the National
Assembly will not be usurped or preempted by whatever ruling or judgment the respondent Judge will render in the
electoral protest case. Whoever will prevail in that contest will enjoy the indefinite term of the disputed office of
mayor of Rosales, Pangasinan in the existing set-up of local government in this country; subject always to whatever
change or modification the National Assembly will introduce when it will enact the local government code.
III
The construction made by respondent Judge of Sections 7 and 8 of Article XVII of the New Constitution "... that
these refer to matters raised in the enforcement of existing laws or in the invocation of a court's jurisdiction which
have not been 'entrusted to the so-called political department or reserved to be settled by its own extragovernmental action,"' strained as it is, cannot be sustained in view of the result herein reached on the issue of
political question as well as Our previous pronouncements as above restated on the same Sections 7 and 8 of the
New Constitution.
WHEREFORE, RESPONDENT COURT'S ORDER OF DISMISSAL IS HEREBY SET ASIDE AND THE
RESPONDENT COURT IS DIRECTED TO IMMEDIATELY PROCEED WITH THE TRIAL AND DETERMINATION
OF THE ELECTION PROTEST BEFORE IT ON THE MERITS. THIS DECISION SHALL BE IMMEDIATELY
EXECUTORY UPON PROMULGATION HEREOF. NO COSTS.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-10520
February 28, 1957
LORENZO M. TAÑADA and DIOSDADO MACAPAGAL, petitioners,
vs.
MARIANO JESUS CUENCO, FRANCISCO A. DELGADO, ALFREDO CRUZ, CATALINA CAYETANO, MANUEL
SERAPIO, PLACIDO REYES, and FERNANDO HIPOLITO in his capacity as cashier and disbursing
officer, respondents.
Tañada, Teehankee and Macapagal for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Troadio T. Quiazon, Jr. for respondents.
CONCEPCION, J.:
Petitioner Lorenzo M. Tañada is a member of the Senate of the Philippines, and President of the Citizens Party,
whereas petitioner Diosdado Macapagal, a member of the House of Representatives of the Philippines, was one of
the official candidates of the Liberal Party for the Senate, at the General elections held in November, 1955, in which
Pacita Madrigal Warns, Lorenzo Sumulong, Quintin Paredes, Francisco Rodrigo, Pedro Sabido, Claro M. Recto,
Domocao Alonto and Decoroso Rosales, were proclaimed elected. Subsequently, the elections of this Senatorselect-who eventually assumed their respective seats in the Senate-was contested by petitioner Macapagal, together
with Camilo Osias, Geronima Pecson, Macario Peralta, Enrique Magalona, Pio Pedrosa and William Chiongbianwho had, also, run for the Senate, in said election-in Senate Electoral Case No. 4, now pending before the Senate
Electoral Tribunal. .
The Senate, in its session of February 22, 1956, upon nomination of Senator Cipriano Primicias, on behalf of the
Nacionalista Party, chose Senators Jose P. Laurel, Fernando Lopez and Cipriano Primicias, as members of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal. Upon nomination of petitioner Senator Tañada, on behalf of the Citizens Party, said
petitioner was next chosen by the Senate as member of said Tribunal. Then, upon nomination of Senator Primicias
on behalf of the Committee on Rules of the Senate, and over the objections of Senators Tañada and Sumulong, the
Senate choose respondents Senators Mariano J. Cuenco and Francisco A. Delgado as members of the same
Electoral Tribunal. Subsequently, the Chairman of the latter appointed: (1) Alfredo Cruz and Catalina Cayetano, as
technical assistant and private secretary, respectively, to Senator Cuenco, as supposed member of the Senate
Electoral Tribunal, upon his recommendation of said respondent; and (2) Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes, as
technical assistant and private secretary, respectively to Senator Delgado, as supposed member of said Electoral
Tribunal, and upon his recommendation.
Soon, thereafter, Senator Lorenzo M. Tañada and Congressman Diosdado Macapagal instituted the case at bar
against Senators Cuenco and Delgado, and said Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido
Reyes, as well as Fernando Hipolito, in his capacity as Cashier and Disbursing Officer of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal. Petitioners allege that on February 22, 1956, as well as at present, the Senate consists of 23 Senators
who belong to the Nacionalista Party, and one (1) Senator-namely, petitioner, Lorenzo M. Tañada-belonging to the
Citizens Party; that the Committee on Rules for the Senate, in nominating Senators Cuenco and Delgado, and the
Senate, in choosing these respondents, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, had "acted absolutely without
power or color of authority and in clear violation .. of Article VI, Section 11 of the Constitution"; that "in assuming
membership in the Senate Electoral Tribunal, by taking the corresponding oath of office therefor", said respondents
had "acted absolutely without color of appointment or authority and are unlawfully, and in violation of the
Constitution, usurping, intruding into and exercising the powers of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal"; that,
consequently, the appointments of respondents, Cruz, Cayetano, Serapio and Reyes, as technical assistants and
private secretaries to Senators Cuenco and Delgado-who caused said appointments to be made-as members of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal, are unlawful and void; and that Senators Cuenco and Delgado "are threatening and are
about to take cognizance of Electoral Case No. 4 of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, as alleged members thereof, in
nullification of the rights of petitioner Lorenzo M. Tañada, both as a Senator belonging to the Citizens Party and as
representative of the Citizens Party in the Senate Electoral Tribunal, and in deprivation of the constitutional rights of
petitioner Diosdado Macapagal and his co-protestants to have their election protest tried and decided-by an
Electoral Tribunal composed of not more than three (3) senators chosen by the Senate upon nomination of the party
having the largest number of votes in the Senate and not more than the (3) Senators upon nomination of the Party
having the second largest number of votes therein, together, three (3) Justice of the Supreme Court to be
designated by the Chief Justice, instead of by an Electoral Tribunal packed with five members belonging to the
Nacionalista Party, which is the rival party of the Liberal Party, to which the Petitioner Diosdado Macapagal and his
co-protestants in Electoral Case No. 4 belong, the said five (5) Nacionalista Senators having been nominated and
chosen in the manner alleged.. hereinabove.".
Petitioners pray that:.
"1. Upon petitioners' filing of bond in such amount as may be determined by this Honorable Court, a writ of
preliminary injunction be immediately issued directed to respondents Mariano J. Cuenco, Francisco A. Delgado,
Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes, restraining them from continuing to usurp,
intrude into and/ or hold or exercise the said public offices respectively being occupied by them in the Senate
Electoral Tribunal, and to respondent Fernando Hipolito restraining him from paying the salaries of respondent
Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes, pending this action.
"2. After hearing, judgment be rendered ousting respondent Mariano J. Cuenco Francisco A. Delgado, Alfredo Cruz,
Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes from the aforementioned public offices in the Senate
Electoral Tribunal and that they be altogether excluded therefrom and making the Preliminary injunction permanent,
with costs against the respondents.".
Respondents have admitted the main allegations of fact in the petition, except insofar as it questions the legality,
and validity of the election of respondents Senators Cuenco and Delgado, as members of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal, and of the appointment of respondent Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido
Reyes as technical assistants and private secretaries to said respondents Senators. Respondents, likewise, allege,
by way of special and affirmative defenses, that: (a) this Court is without power, authority of jurisdiction to direct or
control the action of the Senate in choosing the members of the Electoral Tribunal; and (b) that the petition states no
cause of action, because "petitioner Tañada has exhausted his right to nominate after he nominated himself and
refused to nominate two (2) more Senators", because said petitioner is in estoppel, and because the present action
is not the proper remedy. .
I. Respondents assail our jurisdiction to entertain the petition, upon the ground that the power to choose six (6)
Senators as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal has been expressly conferred by the Constitution upon the
Senate, despite the fact that the draft submitted to the constitutional convention gave to the respective political
parties the right to elect their respective representatives in the Electoral Commission provided for in the original
Constitution of the Philippines, and that the only remedy available to petitioners herein "is not in the judicial forum",
but "to bring the matter to the bar of public opinion.".
We cannot agree with the conclusion drawn by respondents from the foregoing facts. To begin with, unlike the
cases of Alejandrino vs. Quezon (46 Phil., 83) and Vera vs. Avelino (77 Phil., 192)-relied upon by the respondents
this is not an action against the Senate, and it does not seek to compel the latter, either directly or indirectly, to allow
the petitioners to perform their duties as members of said House. Although the Constitution provides that the Senate
shall choose six (6) Senators to be members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, the latter is part neither of Congress
nor of the Senate. (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil., 139, Suanes vs. Chief Accountant, 81 Phil., 818; 46
Off. Gaz., 462.).
Secondly, although the Senate has, under the Constitution, the exclusive power to choose the Senators who shall
form part of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, the fundamental law has prescribed the manner in which the authority
shall be exercised. As the author of a very enlightening study on judicial self-limitation has aptly put it:.
"The courts are called upon to say, on the one hand, by whom certain powers shall be exercised, and on the other
hand, to determine whether the powers possessed have been validly exercised. In performing the latter function,
they do not encroach upon the powers of a coordinate branch of the, government, since the determination of the
validity of an act is not the same, thing as the performance of the act. In the one case we are seeking to ascertain
upon whom devolves the duty of the particular service. In the other case we are merely seeking to determine
whether the Constitution has been violated by anything done or attented by either an executive official or the
legislative." (Judicial Self-Limitation by Finkelstein, pp. 221, 224, 244, Harvard Law Review, Vol. 39; emphasis
supplied,).
The case of Suanes vs. Chief Accountant (supra) cited by respondent refutes their own pretense. This Court
exercised its jurisdiction over said case and decided the same on the merits thereof, despite the fact that it involved
an inquiry into the powers of the Senate and its President over the Senate Electoral Tribunal and the personnel
thereof. .
Again, under the Constitution, "the legislative power" is vested exclusively in the Congress of the Philippines. Yet,
this does not detract from the power of the courts to pass upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress 1 And, since
judicial power includes the authority to inquire into the legality of statutes enacted by the two Houses of Congress,
and approved by the Executive, there can be no reason why the validity of an act of one of said Houses, like that of
any other branch of the Government, may not be determined in the proper actions. Thus, in the exercise of the socalled "judicial supremacy", this Court declared that a resolution of the defunct National Assembly could not bar the
exercise of the powers of the former Electoral Commission under the original Constitution. 2 (Angara vs. Electoral
Commission, supra), and annulled certain acts of the Executive 3 as incompatible with the fundamental law.
In fact, whenever the conflicting claims of the parties to a litigation cannot properly be settled without inquiring into
the validity of an act of Congress or of either House thereof, the courts have, not only jurisdiction to pass upon said
issue, but, also, the duty to do so, which cannot be evaded without violating the fundamental law and paving the
way to its eventual destruction. 4.
Neither are the cases of Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito (78 Phil., 1) and Cabili vs. Francisco (88 Phil., 654), likewise,
invoked by respondents, in point. In the Mabanag case, it was held that the courts could not review the finding of the
Senate to the effect that the members thereof who had been suspended by said House should not be considered in
determining whether the votes cast therein, in favor of a resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution,
sufficed to satisfy the requirements of the latter, such question being a political one. The weight of this decision, as a
precedent, has been weakened, however, by our resolutions in Avelino vs. Cuenco (83 Phil., 17), in which this Court
proceeded to determine the number essential to constitute a quorum in the Senate. Besides, the case at bar does
not hinge on the number of votes needed for a particular act of said body. The issue before us is whether the
Senate-after acknowledging that the Citizens Party is the party, having the second largest number of votes in the
Senate, to which party the Constitution gives the right to nominate three (3) Senators for the Senate electoral
Tribunal-could validly choose therefor two (2) Nacionalista Senators, upon nomination by the floor leader of the
Nacionalista Party in the Senate, Senator Primicias claiming to act on behalf of the Committee on Rules for the
Senate.
The issue in the Cabili case was whether we could review a resolution of the Senate reorganizing its representation
in the Commission on Appointments. This was decided in the negative, upon the authority of Alejandrino vs. Quezon
(supra) and Vera vs. Avelino (supra), the main purpose of the petition being "to force upon the Senate the
reinstatement of Senator Magalona in the Commission on Appointments," one-half (1/2) of the members of which is
to be elected by each House on the basis of proportional representation of the political parties therein. Hence, the
issue depended mainly on the determination of the political alignment of the members of the Senate at the time of
said reorganization and of the necessity or advisability of effecting said reorganization, which is a political question.
We are not called upon, in the case at bar, to pass upon an identical or similar question, it being conceded,
impliedly, but clearly, that the Citizens Party is the party with the second largest number of votes in the Senate. The
issue, therefore, is whether a right vested by the Constitution in the Citizens Party may validly be exercised, either
by the Nacionalista Party, or by the Committee on Rules for the Senate, over the objection of said Citizens Party.
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The only ground upon which respondents' objection to the jurisdiction of this Court and their theory to the effect that
the proper remedy for petitioners herein is, not the present action, but an appeal to public opinion, could possibly be
entertained is, therefore, whether the case at bar raises merely a political question, not one justiciable in nature.
In this connection, respondents assert in their answer that "the remedy of petitioners is not in the judicial forum, but,
to use petitioner, Tañada's own words, to bring the matter to the bar of public opinion' (p. 81, Discussion on the
Creation of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, February 21, 1956)." This allegation may give the impression that said
petitioner had declared, on the floor of the Senate, that his only relief against the acts complained of in the petition is
to take up the issue before the people- which is not a fact. During the discussions in the Senate, in the course of the
organization of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, on February 21, 1956, Senator Tañada was asked what remedies he
would suggest if he nominated two (2) Nacionialista Senators and the latter declined the, nomination. Senator
Tañada replied:.
"There are two remedies that occur to my mind right now, Mr. Senator; one is the remedy open to all of us that if we
feel aggrieved and there is no recourse in the court of justice, we can appeal to public opinion. Another remedy is an
action in the Supreme Court. Of course, as Senator Rodriguez, our President here, has said one day; "If you take
this matter to the Supreme Court, you will lose, because until now the Supreme Court has always ruled against any
action that would constitute interference in the business of anybody pertaining to the Senate. The theory of
separation of powers will be upheld by the Supreme Court." But that learned opinion of Senator Rodriguez, our
President, notwithstanding, I may take the case to the Supreme Court if my right herein is not respected. I may lose,
Mr. President, but who has not lost in the Supreme Court? I may lose because of the theory of the separation of
powers, but that does not mean, Mr. President, that what has been done here is pursuant to the provision of the
Constitution." (Congressional Record, Vol. III, p. 339; emphasis supplied.).
This statement did not refer to the nomination, by Senator Primicias, and the election, by the Senate, of Senators
Cuenco and Delgado as members of said Tribunal. Indeed, said nomination and election took place the day after
the aforementioned statement of Senator Tañada was made. At any rate, the latter announced that he might "take
the case to the Supreme Court if my right here is not respected.".
As already adverted to, the objection to our jurisdiction hinges on the question whether the issue before us is
political or not. In this connection, Willoughby lucidly states:.
"Elsewhere in this treatise the well-known and well-established principle is considered that it is not within the
province of the courts to pass judgment upon the policy of legislative or executive action. Where, therefore,
discretionary powers are granted by the Constitution or by statute, the manner in which those powers are exercised
is not subject to judicial review. The courts, therefore, concern themselves only with the question as to the existence
and extent of these discretionary powers.
"As distinguished from the judicial, the legislative and executive departments are spoken of as the political
departments of government because in very many cases their action is necessarily dictated by considerations of
public or political policy. These considerations of public or political policy of course will not permit the legislature to
violate constitutional provisions, or the executive to exercise authority not granted him by the Constitution or by,
statute, but, within these limits, they do permit the departments, separately or together, to recognize that a certain
set of facts exists or that a given status exists, and these determinations, together with the consequences that flow
therefrom, may not be traversed in the courts." (Willoughby on the Constitution of the United States, Vol. 3, p. 1326;
emphasis supplied.).
To the same effect is the language used in Corpus Juris Secundum, from which we quote:.
"It is well-settled doctrine that political questions are not within the province of the judiciary, except to the extent that
power to deal with such questions has been conferred upon the courts by express constitutional or statutory
provisions.
"It is not easy, however, to define the phrase `political question', nor to determine what matters, fall within its scope.
It is frequently used to designate all questions that lie outside the scope of the judicial questions, which under the
constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government." (16 C.J.S., 413; see, also
Geauga Lake Improvement Ass'n. vs. Lozier, 182 N. E. 491, 125 Ohio St. 565; Sevilla vs, Elizalde, 112 F. 2d 29, 72
App. D. C., 108; emphasis supplied.).
Thus, it has been repeatedly held that the question whether certain amendments to the Constitution are invalid for
non-compliance with the procedure therein prescribed, is not a political one and may be settled by the Courts. 5 .
In the case of In re McConaughy (119 N.W. 408), the nature of political question was considered carefully. The
Court said:.
"At the threshold of the case we are met with the assertion that the questions involved are political, and not judicial.
If this is correct, the court has no jurisdiction as the certificate of the state canvassing board would then be final,
regardless of the actual vote upon the amendment. The question thus raised is a fundamental one; but it has been
so often decided contrary to the view contended for by the Attorney General that it would seem to be finally settled.
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x x x.
" .. What is generally meant, when it is, said that a question is political, and not judicial, is that it is a matter which, is
to be exercised by the people in their primary political capacity, or that it has been specifically delegated to some
other department or particular officer of the government, with discretionary power to act. See State vs. Cunningham,
81 Wis. 497, 51 L. R. A. 561; In Re Gunn, 50 Kan. 155; 32 Pac. 470, 948, 19 L. R. A. 519; Green vs. Mills, 69 Fed.
852, 16, C. C. A. 516, 30 L. R. A. 90; Fletcher vs. Tuttle, 151 Ill. 41, 37 N. E. 683, 25 L. R. A. 143, 42 Am. St. Rep.
220. Thus the Legislature may in its discretion determine whether it will pass a law or submit a proposed
constitutional amendment to the people. The courts have no judicial control over such matters, not merely because
they involve political question, but because they are matters which the people have by the Constitution delegated to
the Legislature. The Governor may exercise the powers delegated to him, free from judicial control, so long as he
observes the laws and acts within the limits of the power conferred. His discretionary acts cannot be controllable,
not primarily because they are of a political nature, but because the Constitution and laws have placed the particular
matter under his control. But every officer under a constitutional government must act according to law and subject
him to the restraining and controlling power of the people, acting through the courts, as well as through the
executive or the Legislature. One department is just as representative as the other, and the judiciary is the
department which is charged with the special duty of determining the limitations which the law places upon all official
action. The recognition of this principle, unknown except in Great Britain and America, is necessary, to the end that
the government may be one of laws and not men'-words which Webster said were the greatest contained in any
written constitutional document." (pp. 411, 417; emphasis supplied.).
In short, the term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a
question of policy. In other words, in the language of Corpus Juris Secundum (supra), it refers to "those questions
which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or executive branch of the Government." It is
concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
Such is not the nature of the question for determination in the present case. Here, we are called upon to decide
whether the election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado, by the Senate, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal,
upon nomination by Senator Primicias-a member and spokesman of the party having the largest number of votes in
the Senate-on behalf of its Committee on Rules, contravenes the constitutional mandate that said members of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal shall be chosen "upon nomination .. of the party having the second largest number of
votes" in the Senate, and hence, is null and void. This is not a political question. The Senate is not clothed with "full
discretionary authority" in the choice of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. The exercise of its power thereon
is subject to constitutional limitations which are claimed to be mandatory in nature. It is clearly within the legitimate
prove of the judicial department to pass upon the validity the proceedings in connection therewith.
".. whether an election of public officers has been in accordance with law is for the judiciary. Moreover, where the
legislative department has by statute prescribed election procedure in a given situation, the judiciary may determine
whether a particular election has been in conformity with such statute, and, particularly, whether such statute has
been applied in a way to deny or transgress on the constitutional or statutory rights .." (16 C.J.S., 439; emphasis
supplied.).
It is, therefore, our opinion that we have, not only jurisdiction, but, also, the duty, to consider and determine the
principal issue raised by the parties herein.
II. Is the election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado, by the Senate, as members of the Electoral Tribunal, valid and
lawful?.
Section 11 of Article VI of the Constitution, reads:.
"The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge
of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral
Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be
designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or of the House of
Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen by each House, three upon nomination of the party
having the largest number of votes and three of the party having the second largest number of votes therein. The
Senior Justice in each Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman." (Emphasis supplied.).
It appears that on February 22, 1956, as well as at present, the Senate of the Philippines consists of twenty three
(23) members of the Nacionalista Party and one (1) member of the Citizens Party, namely, Senator Tañada, who is,
also, the president of said party. In the session of the Senate held on February 21, 1956, Senator Sabido moved
that Senator Tañada, "the President of the Citizens Party, be given the privilege to nominate .. three (3) members"
of the Senate Electoral Tribunal (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, pp. 328-329), referring to those who,
according to the provision above-quoted, should be nominated by "the party having the second largest number of
votes" in the Senate. Senator Tañada objected formally to this motion upon the-ground: (a) that the right to
nominate said members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal belongs, not to the Nacionalista Party of which Senator
Sabido and the other Senators are members-but to the Citizens Party, as the one having the second largest number
of votes in the Senate, so that, being devoid of authority to nominate the aforementioned members of said Tribunal,
the Nacionalista Party cannot give it to the Citizens Party, which, already, has such authority, pursuant to the
Constitution; and (b) that Senator Sabido's motion would compel Senator Tañada to nominate three (3) Senators to
said Tribunal, although as representative of the minority party in the Senate he has "the right to nominate one, two
or three to the Electoral Tribunal," in his discretion. Senator Tañada further stated that he reserved the right to
determine how many he would nominate, after hearing the reasons of Senator Sabido in support of his motion. After
some discussion, in which Senators Primicias, Cea, Lim, Sumulong, Zulueta, and Rodrigo took part, the Senate
adjourned until the next morning, February 22, 1956 (Do., do, pp. 329, 330, 332-333, 336, 338, 339, 343).
Then, said issues were debated upon more extensively, with Senator Sumulong, not only seconding the opposition
of Senator Tañada, but, also, maintaining that "Senator Tañada should nominate only one" member of the Senate,
namely, himself, he being the only Senator who belongs to the minority party in said House (Do., do., pp. 360-364,
369). Thus, a new issue was raised - whether or not one who does not belong to said party may be nominated by its
spokesman, Senator Tañada - on which Senators Paredes, Pelaez, Rosales and Laurel, as well as the other
Senators already mentioned, expressed their views (Do., do., pp. 345, 349, 350, 354, 358, 364, 375). Although the
deliberations of the Senate consumed the whole morning and afternoon of February 22, 1956, a satisfactory solution
of the question before the Senate appeared to be remote. So, at 7:40 p.m., the meeting was suspended, on motion
of Senator Laurel, with a view to seeking a compromise formula (Do., do., pp. 377). When session was resumed at
8:10 p.m., Senator Sabido withdrew his motion above referred to. Thereupon, Senator Primicias, on behalf of the
Nacionalista Party, nominated, and the Senate elected, Senators Laurel, Lopez and Primicias, as members of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal. Subsequently, Senator Tañada stated:.
"On behalf of the Citizens Party, the minority party in this Body, I nominate the only Citizens Party member in this
Body, and that is Senator Lorenzo M. Tañada.".
Without an objection, this nomination was approved by the House. Then, Senator Primicias stood up and said:.
"Now, Mr. President, in order to comply with the provision in the Constitution, the Committee on Rules of the
Senate-and I am now making this proposal not on behalf of the Nacionalista Party but on behalf of the Committee
on Rules of the Senate-I nominate two other members to complete the membership of the Tribunal: Senators
Delgado and Cuenco.".
What took place thereafter appears in the following quotations from the Congressional Record for the Senate.
"SENATOR TAÑADA. Mr. President.
"EL PRESIDENTE INTERINO. Caballero de Quezon.
"SENATOR TAÑADA. I would like to record my opposition to the nominations of the last two named gentlemen,
Senators Delgado and Cuenco, not because I don't believe that they do not deserve to be appointed to the tribunal
but because of my sincere and firm conviction that these additional nominations are not sanctioned by the
Constitution. The Constitution only permits the Nacionalista Party or the party having the largest number of votes to
nominate three.
"SENATOR SUMULONG. Mr. President.
"EL PRESIDENTE INTERINO. Caballero de Rizal.
"SENATOR SUMULONG. For the reasons that I have stated a few moments ago when I took the floor, I also wish to
record my objection to the last nominations, to the nomination of two additional NP's to the Electoral Tribunal.
"EL PRESIDENTE INTERINO. Esta dispuesto el Senado a votar? (Varios Senadores: Si.) Los que esten conformes
con la nominacion hecha por el Presidente del Comite de Reglamentos a favor de los Senadores Delgado y Cuenco
para ser miembros del Tribunal Electoral, digan, si. (Varios Senadores: Si.) Los que no lo esten digan, no (Silencio.)
Queda aprobada." (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, p. 377; emphasis supplied.).
Petitioners maintain that said nomination and election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado-who belong to the
Nacionalista Party-as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, are null and void and have been made without
power or color of authority, for, after the nomination by said party, and the election by the Senate, of Senators
Laurel, Lopez and Primicias, as members of said Tribunal, the other Senators, who shall be members thereof, must
necessarily be nominated by the party having the second largest number of votes in the Senate, and such party is,
admittedly, the Citizens Party, to which Senator Tañada belongs and which he represents.
Respondents allege, however, that the constitutional mandate to the effect that "each Electoral Tribunal shall be
compose of nine (9) members," six (6) of whom "shall be members of the Senate or of the House of
Representatives, as the case may be", is mandatory; that when-after the nomination of three (3) Senators by the
majority party, and their election by the Senate, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal-Senator Tañada
nominated himself only, on behalf of the minority party, he thereby "waived his right to no two more Senators;" that,
when Senator Primicias nominated Senators Cuenco and Delgado, and these respondents were chosen by the
Senate, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, Said Senator Primicias and the Senate merely complied with
the aforementioned provision of the fundamental law, relative to the number of members of the Senate Electoral
Tribunal; and, that, accordingly, Senators Cuenco and Delgado are de jure members of said body, and the
appointment of their co-respondents, Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes is valid
and lawful.
At the outset, it will be recalled that the proceedings the organization of the Senate Electoral Tribunal began with a
motion of Senator Sabido to the effect that "the distinguished gentleman from Quezon, the President of the Citizens
Party, be given the privilege to nominate the three Members" of said Tribunal. Senator Primicias inquired why the
movant had used the word "privilege". Senator Sabido explained that the present composition of the Senate had
created a condition or situation which was not anticipated by the framers of our Constitution; that although Senator
Tañada formed part of the Nacionalista Party before the end of 1955, he subsequently parted ways with" said party;
and that Senator Tañada "is the distinguished president of the Citizens Party," which "approximates the situation
desired by the framers of the Constitution" (Congressional Record for the Senate Vol. III, pp. 329-330). Then
Senator Lim intervened, stating:.
"At present Senator Tañada is considered as forming the only minority or the one that has the second largest
number of votes in the existing Senate, is not that right? And if this is so, he should be given this as a matter of right,
not as a matter of privilege. .. I don't believe that we should be allowed to grant this authority to Senator Tañada only
as a privilege but we must grant it as a matter of right." (Id., id., p. 32; emphasis supplied.).
Similarly, Senator Sumulong maintained that "Senator Tañada, as Citizens Party Senator, has the right and not a
mere privilege to nominate," adding that:.
".. the question is whether we have a party here having the second largest number of votes, and it is clear in my
mind that there is such a party, and that is the Citizens Party to which the gentleman from Quezon belongs. .. We
have to bear in mind, .. that when Senator Tañada was included in the Nacionalista Party ticket in 1953, it was by
virtue of a coalition or an alliance between the Citizens Party and the Nacionalista Party at that time, and I maintain
that when Senator Tañada as head of the Citizens Party entered into a coalition with the Nacionalista Party, he did
not thereby become a Nacionalista because that was a mere coalition, not a fusion. When the Citizens Party
entered into a mere coalition, that party did not lose its personality as a party separate and distinct from the,
Nacionalista Party. And we should also remember that the certificate of candidacy filed by Senator Tañada in the
1953 election was one to the effect that he belonged to the Citizens Party .." (Id., id., p. 360; emphasis supplied.).
The debate was closed by Senator Laurel, who remarked, referring to Senator Tañada:.
"..there is no doubt that he does not belong to the majority in the first place, and that, therefore, he belongs to the
minority. And whether we like it or not, that is the reality of the actual situation-that he is not a Nacionalista now, that
he is the head and the representative of the Citizens Party. I think that on equitable ground and from the point of
view of public opinion, his situation .. approximates or approaches what is within the spirit of that Constitution. .. and
from the point of view of the spirit of the Constitution it would be a good thing if we grant the opportunity to Senator
Tañada to help us in the organization of this Electoral Tribunal (Id., id., p. 376; emphasis supplied.).
The foregoing statements and the fact that, thereafter, Senator Sabido withdrew his motion to grant Senator Tañada
the "privilege" to nominate, and said petitioner actually nominated himself "on behalf of the Citizens Party, the
minority party in this Body"-not only without any, objection whatsoever, but, also, with the approval of the Senateleave no room for doubt that the Senate-leave no room for doubt that the Senate has regarded the Citizens Party,
represented by Senator Tañada, as the party having the second largest number of votes in said House.
Referring, now, to the contention of respondents herein, their main argument in support of the mandatory character
of the constitutional provision relative to the number of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal is that the word
"shall", therein used, is imperative in nature and that this is borne out by an opinion of the Secretary of Justice dated
February 1, 1939, pertinent parts of which are quoted at the footnote. 6.
Regardless of the respect due its author, as a distinguished citizen and public official, said opinion has little, if any,
weight in the solution of the question before this Court, for the practical construction of a Constitution is of little, if
any, unless it has been uniform .." 6a Again, "as a general rule, it is only in cases of substantial doubt and ambiguity
that the doctrine of contemporaneous or practical construction has any application". As a consequence, "where the
meaning of a constitutional provision is clear, a contemporaneous or practical executive interpretation thereof is
entitled to no weight, and will not be allowed to distort or in any way change its natural meaning." The reason is that
"the application of the doctrine of contemporaneous construction is more restricted as applied to the interpretation of
constitutional provisions than when applied to statutory provisions", and that, "except as to matters committed by the
Constitution, itself to the discretion of some other department, contemporary or practical construction is not
necessarily binding upon the courts, even in a doubtful case." Hence, "if in the judgment of the court, such
construction is erroneous and its further application is not made imperative by any paramount considerations of
public policy, it may he rejected." (16 C. J. S., 71-72; emphasis supplied.) 6b.
The aforemention opinion of the Secretary of Justice is not backed up by a, "uniform" application of the view therein
adopted, so essential to give thereto the weight accorded by the rules on contemporaneous constructions.
Moreover, said opinion tends to change the natural meaning of section 11 of Article VI of the Constitution, which is
clear. What is more, there is not the slightest doubt in our mind that the purpose and spirit of said provisions do not
warrant said change and that the rejection of the latter is demanded by paramount considerations of public policy. .
The flaw in the position taken in said opinion and by respondent herein is that, while, it relies upon the compulsory
nature of the word "shall", as regards the number of members of the Electoral Tribunals, it ignores the fact that the
same term is used with respect to the method prescribed for their election, and that both form part of a single
sentence and must be considered, therefore, as integral portions of one and the same thought. Indeed, respondents
have not even tried to show and we cannot conceive-why "shall" must be deemed mandatory insofar as the number
of members of each Electoral Tribunal, and should be considered directory as regards the procedure for their
selection. More important still, the history of section 11 of Article VI of the Constitution and the records of the
Convention, refute respondents' pretense, and back up the theory of petitioners herein.
Commenting on the frame of mind of the delegates to the Constitutional Convention, when they faced the task of
providing for the adjudication of contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the
Legislative Department, Dr. Jose M. Aruego, a member of said Convention, says:.
"The experience of the Filipino people under the provisions of the organic laws which left to the lawmaking body the
determination of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its members was not altogether satisfactory. There were
many complaints against the lack of political justice in this determination; for in a great number of cases, party
interests controlled and dictated the decisions. The undue delay in the dispatch of election contests for legislative
seats, the irregularities that characterized the proceedings in some of them, and the very apparent injection of
partisanship in the determination of a great number of the cases were decried by a great number of the people as
well as by the organs of public opinion.
"The faith of the people in the uprightness of the lawmaking body in the performance of this function assigned to it in
the organic laws was by no means great. In fact so blatant was the lack of political justice in the decisions that there
was, gradually built up a camp of thought in the Philippines inclined to leave to the courts the determination of
election contests, following the practice in some countries, like England and Canada.
"Such were the conditions of things at the time of the meeting of the convention." (The Framing of the Philippine
Constitution by Aruego, Vol. 1, pp. 257-258; emphasis supplied.).
This view is shared by distinguished members of the Senate. Thus, in its session of February 22, 1956, Senator
Sumulong declared:.
".. when you leave it to either House to decide election protests involving its own members, that is virtually placing
the majority party in a position to dictate the decision in those election cases, because each House will be
composed of a majority and a minority, and when you make each House the judge of every election protest
involving any member of that House, you place the majority in a position to dominate and dictate the decision in the
case and result was, there were so many abuses, there were so main injustices: committed by the majority at the
expense and to the prejudice of the minority protestants. Statements have been made here that justice was done
even under the old system, like that case involving Senator Mabanag, when he almost became a victim of the
majority when he had an election case, and it was only through the intervention of President Quezon that he was
saved from becoming the victim of majority injustices.
"It is true that justice had sometimes prevailed under the old system, but the record will show that those cases were
few and they were the rare exceptions. The overwhelming majority of election protests decided under the old system
was that the majority being then in a position to dictate the, decision in the election protest, was tempted to commit
as it did commit many abuses and injustices." (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. 111, p. 361; emphasis
supplied.).
Senator Paredes, a veteran legislator and former Speaker of the House of Representatives, said:.
".. what was intended in the creation of the electoral tribunal was to create a sort of collegiate court composed of
nine members: Three of them belonging to the party having the largest number of votes, and three from the party
having the second largest number votes so that these members may represent the party, and the members of said
party who will sit before the electoral tribunal as protestees. For when it comes to a party, Mr. President, there
ground to believe that decisions will be made along party lines." (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, p.
351; emphasis supplied.).
Senator Laurel, who played an important role in the framing of our Constitution, expressed himself as follows:.
"Now, with reference to the protests or contests, relating to the election, the returns and the qualifications of the
members of the legislative bodies, I heard it said here correctly that there was a time when that was given to the
corresponding chamber of the legislative department. So the election, returns and qualifications of the members, of
the Congress or legislative body was entrusted to that body itself as the exclusive body to determine the election,
returns and qualifications of its members. There was some doubt also expressed as to whether that should continue
or not, and the greatest argument in favor of the retention of that provision was the fact that was, among other
things, the system obtaining in the United States under the Federal Constitution of the United States, and there was
no reason why that power or that right vested in the legislative body should not be retained. But it was thought that
would make the determination of this contest, of this election protest, purely political as has been observed in the
past." (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, p. 376; emphasis supplied.).
It is interesting to note that not one of the members of the Senate contested the accuracy of the views thus
expressed.
Referring particularly to the philosophy underlying the constitutional provision quoted above, Dr. Aruego states:.
"The defense of the Electoral Commission was based primarily upon the hope and belief that the abolition of Party
line because of the equal representation in this body of the majority and the minority parties of the National
Assembly and the intervention of some members of the Supreme Court who, under the proposed constitutional
provision, would also be members of the same, would insure greater political justice in the determination of election
contests for seats in the National Assembly than there would be if the power had been lodged in the lawmaking
body itself. Delegate Francisco summarized the arguments for the creation of the Electoral Commission in the
following words:.
"I understand that from the time that this question is placed in the hands of members not only of the majority party
but also of the minority party, there is already a condition, a factor which would make protests decided in a nonpartisan manner. We know from experience that many times in the many protests tried in the House or in the
Senate, it was impossible to prevent the factor of party from getting in. From the moment that it is required that not
only the majority but also the minority should intervene in these questions, we have already enough guarantee that
there would be no tyranny on the part of the majority.
`But there is another more detail which is the one which satisfies me most, and that is the intervention of three
justices. So that with this intervention of three justices if there would be any question as to the justice applied by the
majority or the minority, if there would be any fundamental disagreement, or if there would be nothing but questions
purely of party in which the members of the majority as well as those of the minority should wish to take lightly a
protest because the protestant belongs to one of said parties, we have in this case, as a check upon the two parties,
the actuations of the three justices. In the last analysis, what is really applied in the determination of electoral cases
brought before the tribunals of justice or before the House of Representatives or the Senate? Well, it is nothing more
than the law and the doctrine of the Supreme Court. If that is the case, there will be greater skill in the application of
the laws and in the application of doctrines to electoral matters having as we shall have three justices who will act
impartially in these electoral questions.
`I wish to call the attention of my distinguished colleagues to the fact that in electoral protests it is impossible to set
aside party interests. Hence, the best guarantee, I repeat, for the administration of justice to the parties, for the fact
that the laws will not be applied rightfully or incorrectly as well as for the fact that the doctrines of the Supreme Court
will be applied rightfully, the best guarantee which we shall have, I repeat, is the intervention of the three justices.
And with the formation of the Electoral Commission, I say again, the protestants as well as the protestees could
remain tranquil in the certainty that they will receive the justice that they really deserve. If we eliminate from this
precept the intervention of the party of the minority and that of the three justices, then we shall be placing protests
exclusively in the hands of the party in power. And I understand, gentlemen, that in practice that has not given good
results. Many have criticized, many have complained against, the tyranny of the majority in electoral cases .. I
repeat that the best guarantee the fact that these questions will be judged not only by three members of the majority
but also by three members of the minority, with the additional guarantee of the impartial judgment of three justices of
the Supreme Court." (The Framing of the Philippine Constitution by Aruego, Vol. I, pp. 261-263; emphasis
supplied.).
The foregoing was corroborated by Senator Laurel. Speaking for this Court, in Angara vs. Electoral Commission (63
Phil., 139), he asserted:.
"The members of the Constitutional Convention who framed our fundamental law were in their majority-men mature
in years and experience. To be sure, many of them were familiar with the history and political development of other
countries of the world. When, therefore they deemed it wise to create an Electoral Commission as a constitutional
organ and invested with the exclusive function of passing upon and determining the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the National Assembly, they must have done so not only in the light of their own
experience but also having in view the experience of other enlightened peoples of the world. The creation of the
Electoral Commission was designed to remedy certain evils of which the framers of our Constitution were cognizant.
Notwithstanding the vigorous opposition of some members of the Convention to its creation, the plan, as
hereinabove stated, was approved by that body by a vote of 98 against 58. All that can be said now is that, upon the
approval of the Constitution, the creation of the Electoral Commission is the expression of the wisdom `ultimate
justice of the people'. (Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address, March 4, 1861.).
"From the deliberations of our Constitutional Convention it is evident that the purpose was to transfer in its totality all
the powers previously exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to contested elections of its members, to an
independent and impartial tribunal. It was not so much the knowledge and appreciation of contemporary
constitutional precedents, however, as the long felt need of determining legislative contests devoid of partisan
considerations which prompted the people acting through their delegates to the Convention, to provide for this body
known as the Electoral Commission. With this end in view, a composite body in which both the majority and minority
parties are equally represented to off-set partisan influence in its deliberations was created, and further endowed
with judicial temper by including in its membership three justices of the Supreme Court," (Pp. 174-175.) 7.
As a matter of fact, during the deliberations of the convention, Delegates Conejero and Roxas said:.
"El Sr. CONEJERO. Antes de votarse la enmienda, quisiera pedir informacion del Subcomite de Siete.
"El Sr. PRESIDENTE. Que dice el Comite?" El Sr. ROXAS. Con mucho gusto. "El Sr. CONEJERO. Tal como esta el
draft., dando tres miembrosala mayoria, y otros t?-es a la minyoryia y atros a la Corte Suprerma, no cree su Senoria
que este equivale pricticamente a dejar el asunto a los miembros del Tribunal Supremo?.
"El Sr. ROXAS. Si y no. Creemos que si el tribunal a la Comision esta cotistuido en esa forma, tanto los miembros
de la mayoria como los de la minoria asi como los miembros de la Corte Saprema consideration la cuestion sobre la
base de sus meritos, sabiendo que el partidismo no es suficiente para dar el triunbo.
"El Sr. CONEJERO. Cree Su Senoria que en un caso como ese, podriamos hacer que tanto los de la mayoria como
los de la minoria prescindieran del partidisrno?.
"El Sr. ROXAS. Creo que si, porque el partidismo no les daria el triunfo." (Angara vs. Electoral Commission, supra,
pp. 168-169; emphasis supplied.).
It is clear from the foregoing that the main objective of the framers of our Constitution in providing for the
establishment, first, of an Electoral Commission, 8 and then 9 of one Electoral Tribunal for each House of Congress,
was to insure the exercise of judicial impartiality in the disposition of election contests affecting members of the
lawmaking body. To achieve this purpose, two devices were resorted to, namely: (a) the party having the largest
number of votes, and the party having the second largest number of votes, in the National Assembly or in each
House of Congress, were given the same number of representatives in the Electoral Commission or Tribunal, so
that they may realize that partisan considerations could not control the adjudication of said cases, and thus be
induced to act with greater impartiality; and (b) the Supreme Court was given in said body the same number of
representatives as each one of said political parties, so that the influence of the former may be decisive and endow
said Commission or Tribunal with judicial temper.
This is obvious from the very language of the constitutional provision under consideration. In fact, Senator Sabidowho had moved to grant to Senator Tañada the privilege" to make the nominations on behalf of party having the
second largest number of votes in the Senate-agrees with it. As Senator Sumulong inquired:.
"..I suppose Your Honor will agree with me that the framers of the Constitution precisely thought of creating this
Electoral Tribunal so as to prevent the majority from ever having a preponderant majority in the Tribunal."
(Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, p. 330; emphasis supplied.).
Senator Sabido replied:.
"That is so, .." (Id., p. 330.).
Upon further interpretation, Senator Sabido said:.
".. the purpose of the creation of the Electoral Tribunal and of its composition is to maintain a balance between the
two parties and make the members of the Supreme Court the controlling power so to speak of the Electoral Tribunal
or hold the balance of power. That is the ideal situation." (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, p. 349;
emphasis supplied.).
Senator Sumulong opined along the same line. His words were: .
"..The intention is that when the three from the majority and the three from the minority become members of the
Tribunal it is hoped that they will become aware of their judicial functions, not to protect the protestants or the
protegees. It is hoped that they will act as judges because to decide election cases is a judicial function. But the
framers of, the Constitution besides being learned were men of experience. They knew that even Senators like us
are not angels, that we are human beings, that if we should be chosen to go to the Electoral Tribunal no one can
say that we will entirely be free from partisan influence to favor our party, so that in, case that hope that the three
from the majority and the three from the minority who will act as Judges should result in disappointment, in case
they do not act as judges but they go there and vote along party liner, still there is the guarantee that they will offset
each other and the result will be that the deciding vote will reside in the hands of the three Justices who have no
partisan motives to favor either the protestees or the protestants. In other words, the whole idea is to prevent the
majority from controlling and dictating the decisions of the Tribunal and to make sure that the decisive vote will be
wielded by the Congressmen or Senators who are members the Tribunal but will be wielded by the Justices who, by
virtue of their judicial offices, will have no partisan motives to serve, either protestants, or protestees. That is my
understanding of the intention of the framers of the Constitution when they decided to create the Electoral Tribunal.
xxx
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x x x.
"My idea is that the intention of the framers of the constitution in creating the Electoral Tribunal is to insure
impartially and independence in its decision, and that is sought to be done by never allowing the majority party to
control the Tribunal, and secondly by seeing to it that the decisive vote in the Tribunal will be left in the hands of
persons who have no partisan interest or motive to favor either protestant or protestee." (Congressional Record for
the Senate, Vol. III, pp. 362-363, 365-366; emphasis supplied.).
So important in the "balance of powers" between the two political parties in the Electoral Tribunals, that several
members of the Senate questioned the right of the party having the second largest number of votes in the Senate
and, hence, of Senator Tañada, as representative of the Citizens Party-to nominate for the Senate Electoral Tribunal
any Senator not belonging to said party. Senators Lim, Sabido, Cea and Paredes maintained that the spirit of the
Constitution would be violated if the nominees to the Electoral Tribunals did not belong to the parties respectively
making the nominations. 10.
It is not necessary, for the purpose of this decision, to determine whether the parties having the largest, and the
second largest, number of votes in each House may nominate, to the Electoral Tribunals, those members of
Congress who do not belong to the party nominating them. It is patent, however, that the most vital feature of the
Electoral Tribunals is the equal representation of said parties therein, and the resulting equilibrium to be maintained
by the Justices of the Supreme Court as members of said Tribunals. In the words of the members of the present
Senate, said feature reflects the "intent" "purpose", and "spirit of the Constitution", pursuant to which the Senate
Electoral Tribunal should be organized (Congressional Record for the Senate, pp. 330, 337, 348-9, 350, 351, 355,
358, 362-3, 364, 370, 376).
Now then, it is well settled that "the purpose of all rules or maxims as to the construction or interpretation of statutes
is to discover the true intention of the law" (82 C. J. S., 526) and that.
"As a general rule of statutory construction, the spirit or intention of a statute prevails over the letter thereof, and
whatever is within the spirit of statute is within the statute although it is not within the letter, while that which is within
the letter, but not within the spirit of a statute, is not within the statute; but, where the law is free and clear from
ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded on the pretext of pursuing its spirit." (82 C. J. S., 613.).
"There is no universal rule or absolute test by which directory provisions in a statute may in all circumstances be
distinguished from those which are mandatory. However, in the determination of this question, as of every other
question of statutory construction, the prime object is to ascertain the legislative intent. The legislative intent must be
obtained front all the surrounding circumstances, and the determination does not depend on the form of the statute.
Consideration must be given to the entire statute, its nature, its object, and the consequences which would result
from construing it one way or the other, and the statute must be construed in connection with other related statutes.
Words of permissive character may be given a mandatory significance in order to effect the legislative intent, and,
when the terms of a statute are such that they cannot be made effective to the extent of giving each and all of them
some reasonable operation, without construing the statute as mandatory, such construction should be given; .. On
the other hand, the language of a statute, however mandatory in form, may be deemed directory whenever
legislative purpose can best be carried out by such construction, and the legislative intent does not require a
mandatory construction; but the construction of mandatory words as directory should not be lightly adopted and
never where it would in fact make a new law instead of that passed by the legislature. .. Whether a statute is
mandatory or directory depends on whether the thing directed to be done is of the essence of the thing required, or
is a mere matter of form, and what is a matter of essence can often be determined only by judicial construction.
Accordingly, when a particular provision of a statute relates to some immaterial matter, as to which compliance with
the statute is a matter of convenience rather than substance, or where the directions of a statute are given merely
with a view to the proper, orderly, and prompt conduct of business, it is generally regarded as directory, unless
followed by words of absolute prohibition; and a statute is regarded as directory were no substantial rights depend
on it, no injury can result from ignoring it, and the purpose of the legislative can be accomplished in a manner other
than that prescribed, with substantially the same result. On the other hand, a provision relating to the essence of the
thing to be done, that is, to matters of substance, is mandatory, and when a fair interpretation of a statute, which
directs acts or proceedings to be done in a certain way shows that the legislature intended a compliance with such
provision to be essential to the validity of the act or proceeding, or when same antecedent and pre-requisite
conditions must exist prior to the exercise of power, or must be performed before certain other powers can be
exercise, the statute must be regarded as mandatory. (Id., pp. 869-874.) (See also, Words and Phrases, Vol. 26, pp.
463-467; emphasis supplied.).
What has been said above, relative to the conditions antecedent to, and concomitant with, the adoption of section
11 of Article VI of the Constitution, reveals clearly that its framers intended to prevent the majority party from
controlling the Electoral Tribunals, and that the structure thereof is founded upon the equilibrium between the
majority and the minority parties therein, with the Justices of the Supreme Court, who are members of said
Tribunals, holding the resulting balance of power. The procedure prescribed in said provision for the selection of
members of the Electoral Tribunals is vital to the role they are called upon to play. it constitutes the essence of said
Tribunals. Hence, compliance with said procedure is mandatory, and acts performed in violation thereof are null and
void. 11.
It is true that the application of the foregoing criterion would limit the membership of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, in
the case at bar, to seven (7), instead of nine (9), members; but, it is conceded that the present composition of the
Senate was not foreseen by the framers of our Constitution (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, pp. 329,
342, 349, 354, 359, 375). Furthermore, the spirit of the law prevails over its letter, and the solution herein adopted
maintains the spirit of the Constitution, for partisan considerations can not be decisive in a tribunal consisting of
three (3) Justices of the Supreme Court, three (3) members nominated by the majority party and either one (1) or
two (2) members nominated by the party having the second largest number of votes in the House concerned.
Upon the other hand, what would be the result of respondents' contention if upheld? Owing to the fact that the
Citizens Party 12 has only one member in the Upper House, Senator Tañada felt he should nominate, for the
Senate Electoral Tribunal, only said member of the Citizens Party. The same is, thus, numerically handicapped, visa-vis the majority party, in said Tribunal. Obviously, Senator Tañada did not nominate other two Senators, because,
otherwise, he would worsen the already disadvantageous position, therein, of the Citizens Party. Indeed, by the
aforementioned nomination and election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado, if the same were sanctioned, the
Nacionalista Party would have five (5) members in the Senate Electoral Tribunal, as against one (1) member of the
Citizens Party and three members of the Supreme Court. With the absolute majority thereby attained by the majority
party in said Tribunal, the philosophy underlying the same would be entirely upset. The equilibrium between the
political parties therein would be destroyed. What is worst, the decisive moderating role of the Justices of the
Supreme Court would be wiped out, and, in lieu thereof, the door would be thrown wide open for the predominance
of political considerations in the determination of election protests pending before said Tribunal, which is precisely
what the fathers of our Constitution earnestly strove to forestall. 13.
This does not imply that the honesty, integrity or impartiality of Senators Cuenco and Delgado are being questioned.
As a matter of fact, when Senator Tañada objected to their nomination, he explicitly made of record that his
opposition was based, not upon their character, but upon the principle involved. When the election of members of
Congress to the Electoral Tribunal is made dependent upon the nomination of the political parties above referred to,
the Constitution thereby indicates its reliance upon the method of selection thus established, regardless of the
individual qualities of those chosen therefor. Considering the wealth of experience of the delegatesto the
Convention, as lawyers of great note, as veteran politicians and as leaders in other fields of endeavor, they could
not, and did not, ignore the fact that the Constitution must limit itself to giving general patterns or norms of action. In
connection, particularly, with the composition of the Electoral Tribunals, they believed that, even the most well
meaning individuals often find it difficult to shake off the bias and prejudice created by political antagonisms and to
resist the demands of political exigencies, the pressure of which is bound to increase in proportion to the degree of
predominance of the party from which it comes. As above stated, this was confirmed by distinguished members of
the present Senate. (See pp. 25-28, 33, 34, supra.).
In connection with the argument of the former Secretary of Justice to the effect that when "there is no minority party
represented in the Assembly, the necessity for such a check by the minority disappears", the following observations
of the petitioners herein are worthy of notice:.
" Under the interpretation espoused by the respondents, the very frauds or terrorism committed by a party would
establish the legal basis for the final destruction of minority parties in the Congress at least. Let us suppose, for
example, that in the Senate, the 15 or 16 senators with unexpired terms belong to the party A. In the senatorial
elections to fill the remaining 8 seats, all the 8 candidates of party A are proclaimed elected through alleged fraud
and/or terrorism. (The ouster of not less than 3 senators-elect in the elections held since liberation attests to the
reality of election frauds and terrorism in our country.) There being no senator or only one senator belonging to the
minority, who would sit in judgment on the election candidates of the minority parties? According to the contention of
the respondents, it would be a Senate Electoral Tribunal made up of three Supreme Court Justices and 5 or 6
members of the same party A accused of fraud and terrorism. Most respectfully, we pray this Honorable Court to
reject an interpretation that would make of a democratic constitution the very instrument by which a corrupt and
ruthless party could entrench itself in power the legislature and thus destroy democracy in the Philippines.
xxx
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x x x.
".. When there are no electoral protests filed by the Minority party, or when the only electoral protests filed are by
candidates of the majority against members-elect of the same majority party, there might be no objection to the
statement. But if electoral protests are filed by candidates of the minority party, it is at this point that a need for a
check on the majority party is greatest, and contrary to the observation made in the above-quoted opinion, such a
cheek is a function that cannot be successfully exercised by the 3 Justices of the Supreme Court, for the obvious
and simple reason that they could easily be outvoted by the 6 members of the majority party in the Tribunal.
xxx
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x x x.
"In the case of the cited opinion of Secretary Abad Santos rendered in 1939, it, did not appear that there were
minority party candidates who were adversely affected by the ruling of the Secretary of Justice and who could have
brought a test case to court." (Emphasis supplied.).
The defenses of waiver and estoppel set up against petitioner Tañada are untenable. Although "an individual may
waive constitutional provisions intended for his benefit", particularly those meant for the protection of his property,
and, sometimes, even those tending "to secure his personal liberty", the power to waive does not exist when "public
policy or public morals" are involved. (11 Am. Jur. 765; I Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, pp. 368-371). The
procedure outlined in the Constitution for the organization, of the Electoral Tribunals was adopted in response to the
demands of the common weal, and it has been held that where a statute is founded on public policy, those to whom
it applies should not be permitted to waive its provisions" (82 C. J. S., 874). Besides, there can be no waiver without
an intent to such effect, which Senator Tañada did not have. Again, the alleged waiver or exhaustion of his rights
does not justify the exercise thereof by a person or party, other than that to which it is vested exclusively by the
Constitution.
The rule estoppel is that "whenever a party has, by his declaration, act or omissions, intentionally and deliberately
led another to believe a particular thing true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in a litigation arising out of such
declaration, act or omission, be permitted to falsify it" (Rule 69, sec. 68 [a], Rules of Court). In the case at bar,
petitioner Senator Tañada did not lead the Senate to believe that Senator Primicias could nominate Senators
Cuenco and Delgado. On the contrary, said petitioner repeatedly asserted that his was the exclusive right to make
the nomination. He, likewise, specifically contested said nomination of Senators Cuenco and Delgado. Again, the
rule on estoppel applies to questions of fact, not of law, about the truth of which the other party is ignorant (see
Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3, pp. 490, 495). Such is not the nature of the situation that
confronted Senator Tañada and the other members of the Senate. Lastly, the case of Zandueta vs. De la Costa (66
Phil., 615), cited by respondents, is not in point. Judge Zandueta assumed office by virtue of an appointment, the
legality of which he later on assailed. In the case at bar, the nomination and election of Senator Tañada as member
of the Senate Electoral Tribunal was separate, distinct and independent from the nomination and election of
Senators Cuenco and Delgado.
In view of the foregoing, we hold that the Senate may not elect, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, those
Senators who have not been nominated by the political parties specified in the Constitution; that the party having the
largest number of votes in the Senate may nominate not more than three (3) members thereof to said Electoral
Tribunal; that the party having the second largest number of votes in the Senate has the exclusive right to nominate
the other three (3) Senators who shall sit as members in the Electoral Tribunal; that neither these three (3)
Senators, nor any of them, may be nominated by a person or party other than the one having the second largest
number of votes in the Senate or its representative therein; that the Committee on Rules for the Senate has no
standing to validly make such nomination and that the nomination of Senators Cuenco and Delgado by Senator
Primicias, and the election of said respondents by the Senate, as members of said Tribunal, are null and void ab
initio.
As regards respondents Alfredo Cruz, Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes, we are not prepared
to hold, however, that their appointments were null and void. Although recommended by Senators Cuenco and
Delgado, who are not lawful members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, they were appointed by its Chairman,
presumably, with the consent of the majority of the de jure members of said body 14 or, pursuant to the Rules
thereof. At any rate, as held in Suanes vs. Chief Accountant (supra), the election of its personnel is an internal
matter falling within the jurisdiction and control of said body, and there is every reason to believe that it will,
hereafter take appropriate measures, in relation to the four (4) respondents abovementioned, conformably with the
spirit of the Constitution and of, the decision in the case at bar.
Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that, respondents Senators Mariano Jesus Cuenco and
Francisco A. Delgado have not been duly elected as Members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, that they are not
entitled to act as such and that they should be, as they are hereby, enjoined from exercising the powers and duties
of Members of said Electoral Tribunal and from acting in such capacity in connection with Senate Electoral Case No.
4 thereof. With the qualification stated above, the petition is dismissed, as regards respondents Alfredo Cruz,
Catalina Cayetano, Manuel Serapio and Placido Reyes. Without special pronouncement as to costs. It is so
ordered.
Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J.B.L., and Felix, JJ., concur.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-44640 October 12, 1976
PABLO C. SANIDAD and PABLITO V. SANIDAD, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and HONORABLE NATIONAL TREASURER, respondents.
G.R. No. L-44684. October 12,1976
VICENTE M. GUZMAN, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ELECTIONS, respondent.
G.R. No. L-44714. October 12,1976
RAUL M. GONZALES, RAUL T. GONZALES, JR., and ALFREDO SALAPANTAN, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE COMMISSION ON SELECTIONS and HONORABLE NATIONAL TREASURER, respondents.
MARTIN, J,:
The capital question raised in these prohibition suits with preliminary injunction relates to the power of the incumbent
President of the Philippines to propose amendments to the present Constitution in the absence of the interim
National Assembly which has not been convened.
On September 2, 1976, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 991 calling for a national
referendum on October 16, 1976 for the Citizens Assemblies ("barangays") to resolve, among other things, the
issues of martial law, the I . assembly, its replacement, the powers of such replacement, the period of its existence,
the length of the period for tile exercise by the President of his present powers.1
Twenty days after or on September 22, 1976, the President issued another related decree, Presidential Decree No.
1031, amending the previous Presidential Decree No. 991, by declaring the provisions of presidential Decree No.
229 providing for the manner of voting and canvass of votes in "barangays" (Citizens Assemblies) applicable to the
national referendum-plebiscite of October 16, 1976. Quite relevantly, Presidential Decree No. 1031 repealed Section
4, of Presidential Decree No. 991, the full text of which (Section 4) is quoted in the footnote below.2
On the same date of September 22, 1976, the President issued Presidential Decree No. 1033, stating the questions
to be submitted to the people in the referendum-plebiscite on October 16, 1976. The Decree recites in its "whereas"
clauses that the people's continued opposition to the convening of the National Assembly evinces their desire to
have such body abolished and replaced thru a constitutional amendment, providing for a legislative body, which will
be submitted directly to the people in the referendum-plebiscite of October 16.
The questions ask, to wit:
(1) Do you want martial law to be continued?
(2) Whether or not you want martial law to be continued, do you approve the following amendments to the
Constitution? For the purpose of the second question, the referendum shall have the effect of a plebiscite within the
contemplation of Section 2 of Article XVI of the Constitution.
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS:
1. There shall be, in lieu of the interim National Assembly, an interim Batasang Pambansa. Members of the interim
Batasang Pambansa which shall not be more than 120, unless otherwise provided by law, shall include the
incumbent President of the Philippines, representatives elected from the different regions of the nation, those who
shall not be less than eighteen years of age elected by their respective sectors, and those chosen by the incumbent
President from the members of the Cabinet. Regional representatives shall be apportioned among the regions in
accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio while
the sectors shall be determined by law. The number of representatives from each region or sector and the, manner
of their election shall be prescribed and regulated by law.
2. The interim Batasang Pambansa shall have the same powers and its members shall have the same functions,
responsibilities, rights, privileges, and disqualifications as the interim National Assembly and the regular National
Assembly and the members thereof. However, it shall not exercise the power provided in Article VIII, Section 14(l) of
the Constitution.
3. The incumbent President of the Philippines shall, within 30 days from the election and selection of the members,
convene the interim Batasang Pambansa and preside over its sessions until the Speaker shall have been elected.
The incumbent President of the Philippines shall be the Prime Minister and he shall continue to exercise all his
powers even after the interim Batasang Pambansa is organized and ready to discharge its functions and likewise he
shall continue to exercise his powers and prerogatives under the nineteen hundred and thirty five. Constitution and
the powers vested in the President and the Prime Minister under this Constitution.
4. The President (Prime Minister) and his Cabinet shall exercise all the powers and functions, and discharge the
responsibilities of the regular President (Prime Minister) and his Cabinet, and shall be subject only to such
disqualifications as the President (Prime Minister) may prescribe. The President (Prime Minister) if he so desires
may appoint a Deputy Prime Minister or as many Deputy Prime Ministers as he may deem necessary.
5. The incumbent President shall continue to exercise legislative powers until martial law shall have been lifted.
6. Whenever in the judgment of the President (Prime Minister), there exists a grave emergency or a threat or
imminence thereof, or whenever the interim Batasang Pambansa or the regular National Assembly fails or is unable
to act adequately on any matter for any reason that in his judgment requires immediate action, he may, in order to
meet the exigency, issue the necessary decrees, orders or letters of instructions, which shall form part of the law of
the land.
7. The barangays and sanggunians shall continue as presently constituted but their functions, powers, and
composition may be altered by law.
Referenda conducted thru the barangays and under the Supervision of the Commission on Elections may be called
at any time the government deems it necessary to ascertain the will of the people regarding any important matter
whether of national or local interest.
8. All provisions of this Constitution not inconsistent with any of these amendments shall continue in full force and
effect.
9. These amendments shall take effect after the incumbent President shall have proclaimed that they have been
ratified by I majority of the votes cast in the referendum-plebiscite."
The Commission on Elections was vested with the exclusive supervision and control of the October 1976 National
Referendum-Plebiscite.
On September 27, 1976, PABLO C. SANIDAD and PABLITO V. SANIDAD, father and son, commenced L-44640 for
Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction seeking to enjoin the Commission on Elections from holding and conducting
the Referendum Plebiscite on October 16; to declare without force and effect Presidential Decree Nos. 991 and
1033, insofar as they propose amendments to the Constitution, as well as Presidential Decree No. 1031, insofar as
it directs the Commission on Elections to supervise, control, hold, and conduct the Referendum-Plebiscite
scheduled on October 16, 1976.
Petitioners contend that under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no grant to the incumbent President to
exercise the constituent power to propose amendments to the new Constitution. As a consequence, the
Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16 has no constitutional or legal basis.
On October 5, 1976, the Solicitor General filed the comment for respondent Commission on Elections, The Solicitor
General principally maintains that petitioners have no standing to sue; the issue raised is political in nature, beyond
judicial cognizance of this Court; at this state of the transition period, only the incumbent President has the authority
to exercise constituent power; the referendum-plebiscite is a step towards normalization.
On September 30, 1976, another action for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction, docketed as L-44684, was
instituted by VICENTE M. GUZMAN, a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention, asserting that the power to
propose amendments to, or revision of the Constitution during the transition period is expressly conferred on the
interim National Assembly under Section 16, Article XVII of the Constitution.3
Still another petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction was filed on October 5, 1976 by RAUL M.
GONZALES, his son RAUL, JR., and ALFREDO SALAPANTAN, docketed as L- 44714, to restrain the
implementation of Presidential Decrees relative to the forthcoming Referendum-Plebiscite of October 16.
These last petitioners argue that even granting him legislative powers under Martial Law, the incumbent President
cannot act as a constituent assembly to propose amendments to the Constitution; a referendum-plebiscite is
untenable under the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973; the submission of the proposed amendments in such a short
period of time for deliberation renders the plebiscite a nullity; to lift Martial Law, the President need not consult the
people via referendum; and allowing 15-.year olds to vote would amount to an amendment of the Constitution, which
confines the right of suffrage to those citizens of the Philippines 18 years of age and above.
We find the petitions in the three entitled cases to be devoid of merit.
I
Justiciability of question raised.
1. As a preliminary resolution, We rule that the petitioners in L-44640 (Pablo C. Sanidad and Pablito V. Sanidad)
possess locus standi to challenge the constitutional premise of Presidential Decree Nos. 991, 1031, and 1033. It is
now an ancient rule that the valid source of a stature Presidential Decrees are of such nature-may be contested by
one who will sustain a direct injuries as a in result of its enforcement. At the instance of taxpayers, laws providing for
the disbursement of public funds may be enjoined, upon the theory that the expenditure of public funds by an officer
of the State for the purpose of executing an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds. 4 The
breadth of Presidential Decree No. 991 carries all appropriation of Five Million Pesos for the effective
implementation of its purposes. 5 Presidential Decree No. 1031 appropriates the sum of Eight Million Pesos to carry
out its provisions. 6 The interest of the aforenamed petitioners as taxpayers in the lawful expenditure of these
amounts of public money sufficiently clothes them with that personality to litigate the validity of the Decrees
appropriating said funds. Moreover, as regards taxpayer's suits, this Court enjoys that open discretion to entertain
the same or not. 7 For the present case, We deem it sound to exercise that discretion affirmatively so that the
authority upon which the disputed Decrees are predicated may be inquired into.
2. The Solicitor General would consider the question at bar as a pure political one, lying outside the domain of
judicial review. We disagree. The amending process both as to proposal and ratification, raises a judicial question.
8 This is especially true in cases where the power of the Presidency to initiate the of normally exercised by the legislature, is seriously doubted. Under the terms of
the 1973 Constitution, the power to propose amendments o the constitution resides in the interim National Assembly in the period of transition (See. 15, Transitory
provisions). After that period, and the regular National Assembly in its active session, the power to propose amendments becomes ipso facto the prerogative of the
regular National Assembly (Sec. 1, pars. 1 and 2 of Art. XVI, 1973 constitution). The normal course has not been followed. Rather than calling the National
Assembly to constitute itself into a constituent assembly the incumbent President undertook the proposal of amendments and submitted the proposed
amendments thru Presidential Decree 1033 to the people in a Referendum-Plebiscite on October 16. Unavoidably, the regularity regularity of the procedure for
amendments, written in lambent words in the very Constitution sought to be amended, raises a contestable issue. The implementing Presidential Decree Nos. 991,
1031, and 1033, which commonly purport to have the force and effect of legislation are assailed as invalid, thus the issue of the validity of said Decrees is plainly a
justiciable one, within the competence of this Court to pass upon. Section 2 (2), Article X of the new Constitution provides: "All cases involving the constitutionality
of a treaty, executive agreement, or law may shall be heard and decided by the Supreme Court en banc and no treaty, executive agreement, or law may be
declared unconstitutional without the concurrence of at least ten Members. ..." The Supreme Court has the last word in the construction not only of treaties and
statutes, but also of the Constitution itself The amending, like all other powers organized in the Constitution, is in form a delegated and hence a limited power, so
that the Supreme Court is vested with that authorities to determine whether that power has been discharged within its limits.
Political questions are neatly associated with the wisdom, of the legality of a particular act. Where the vortex of the
controversy refers to the legality or validity of the contested act, that matter is definitely justiciable or non-political.
What is in the heels of the Court is not the wisdom of the act of the incumbent President in proposing amendments
to the Constitution, but his constitutional authority to perform such act or to assume the power of a constituent
assembly. Whether the amending process confers on the President that power to propose amendments is therefore
a downright justiciable question. Should the contrary be found, the actuation of the President would merely be
a brutum fulmen. If the Constitution provides how it may be amended, the judiciary as the interpreter of that
Constitution, can declare whether the procedure followed or the authority assumed was valid or not.10
We cannot accept the view of the Solicitor General, in pursuing his theory of non-justiciability, that the question of
the President's authority to propose amendments and the regularity of the procedure adopted for submission of the
proposal to the people ultimately lie in the judgment of the A clear Descartes fallacy of vicious circle. Is it not that the
people themselves, by their sovereign act, provided for the authority and procedure for the amending process when
they ratified the present Constitution in 1973? Whether, therefore, the constitutional provision has been followed or
not is the proper subject of inquiry, not by the people themselves of course who exercise no power of judicial but by
the Supreme Court in whom the people themselves vested that power, a power which includes the competence to
determine whether the constitutional norms for amendments have been observed or not. And, this inquiry must be
done a prior not a posterior i.e., before the submission to and ratification by the people.
Indeed, the precedents evolved by the Court or, prior constitutional cases underline the preference of the Court's
majority to treat such issue of Presidential role in the amending process as one of non-political impression. In the
Plebiscite Cases, 11 the contention of the Solicitor General that the issue on the legality of Presidential Decree No.
73 "submitting to the Pilipino people (on January 15, 1973) for ratification or rejection the Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention and appropriating fund s therefore "is a
political one, was rejected and the Court unanimously considered the issue as justiciable in nature. Subsequently in
the Ratification Cases12 involving the issue of whether or not the validity of Presidential Proclamation No. 1102.
announcing the Ratification by the Filipino people of the constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional
Convention," partakes of the nature of a political question, the affirmative stand of' the Solicitor General was
dismissed, the Court ruled that the question raised is justiciable. Chief Justice Concepcion, expressing the majority
view, said, Thus, in the aforementioned plebiscite cases, We rejected the theory of the respondents therein that the
question whether Presidential Decree No. 73 calling a plebiscite to be held on January 15, 1973, for the ratification
or rejection of the proposed new Constitution, was valid or not, was not a proper subject of judicial inquiry because,
they claimed, it partook of a political nature, and We unanimously declared that the issue was a justiciable one. With
Identical unanimity. We overruled the respondent's contention in the 1971 habeas corpus cases, questioning Our
authority to determine the constitutional sufficiency of the factual bases of the Presidential proclamation suspending
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus on August 21, 1971, despite the opposite view taken by this Court in
Barcelon vs. Baker and Montenegro vs. Castaneda, insofar as it adhered to the former case, which view We,
accordingly, abandoned and refused to apply. For the same reason, We did not apply and expressly modified, in
Gonzales vs. Commission on Elections, the political-question theory adopted in Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito." 13 The
return to Barcelon vs. Baker and Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, urged by the Solicitor General, was decisively refused by
the Court. Chief Justice Concepcion continued: "The reasons adduced in support thereof are, however, substantially
the same as those given in support on the political question theory advanced in said habeas corpus and plebiscite
cases, which were carefully considered by this Court and found by it to be legally unsound and constitutionally
untenable. As a consequence. Our decisions in the aforementioned habeas corpus cases partakes of the nature
and effect of a stare decisis which gained added weight by its virtual reiteration."
II
The amending process as laid out
in the new Constitution.
1. Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution on Amendments ordains:
SECTION 1. (1) Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by the
National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members, or by a constitutional convention.
(2) The National Assembly may, by a vote of two-thirds of all its Members, call a constitutional
convention or, by a majority vote of all its Members, submit the question of calling such a convention
to the electorate in an election.
SECTION 2. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution shall be valid when ratified by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not later than three months after the
approval of such amendment or revision.
In the present period of transition, the interim National Assembly instituted in the Transitory Provisions is conferred
with that amending power. Section 15 of the Transitory Provisions reads:
SECTION 15. The interim National Assembly, upon special call by the interim Prime Minister, may,
by a majority vote of all its Members, propose amendments to this Constitution. Such amendments
shall take effect when ratified in accordance with Article Sixteen hereof.
There are, therefore, two periods contemplated in the constitutional life of the nation, i.e., period of normalcy and
period of transition. In times of normally, the amending process may be initiated by the proposals of the (1) regular
National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or (2) by a Constitutional Convention called by a
vote of two-thirds of all the Members of the National Assembly. However the calling of a Constitutional Convention
may be submitted to the electorate in an election voted upon by a majority vote of all the members of the National
Assembly. In times of transition, amendments may be proposed by a majority vote of all the Members of the
National Assembly upon special call by the interim Prime Minister,.
2. This Court in Aquino v. COMELEC," had already settled that the incumbent President is vested with that
prerogative of discretion as to when he shall initially convene the interim National Assembly. Speaking for the
majority opinion in that case, Justice Makasiar said: "The Constitutional Convention intended to leave to the
President the determination of the time when he shall initially convene the interim National Assembly, consistent
with the prevailing conditions of peace and order in the country." Concurring, Justice Fernandez, himself a member
of that Constitutional Convention, revealed: "(W)hen the Delegates to the Constitutional Convention voted on the
Transitory Provisions, they were aware of the fact that under the same, the incumbent President was given the
discretion as to when he could convene the interim National Assembly; it was so stated plainly by the sponsor,
Delegate Yaneza; as a matter of fact, the proposal that it be convened 'immediately', made by Delegate Pimentel
(V) was rejected. The President's decision to defer the convening of the interim National Assembly soon found
support from the people themselves. In the plebiscite of January 10-15, 1973, at which the ratification of the 1973
Constitution was submitted, the people voted against the convening of the interim National Assembly. In the
referendum of July 24, 1973, the Citizens Assemblies ("bagangays") reiterated their sovereign will to withhold the
convening of the interim National Assembly. Again, in the referendum of February 27, 1975, the proposed question
of whether the interim National Assembly shall be initially convened was eliminated, because some of the members
of Congress and delegates of the Constitutional Convention, who were deemed automatically members of the I
interim National Assembly, were against its inclusion since in that referendum of January, 1973, the people had
already resolved against it.
3. In sensu strictiore, when the legislative arm of the state undertakes the proposals of amendment to a Constitution,
that body is not in the usual function of lawmaking. lt is not legislating when engaged in the amending process.16
Rather, it is exercising a peculiar power bestowed upon it by the fundamental charter itself. In the Philippines, that
power is provided for in Article XVI of the 1973 Constitution (for the regular National Assembly) or in Section 15 of
the Transitory Provisions (for the National Assembly). While ordinarily it is the business of the legislating body to
legislate for the nation by virtue of constitutional conferment amending of the Constitution is not legislative in
character. In political science a distinction is made between constitutional content of an organic character and that of
a legislative character'. The distinction, however, is one of policy, not of law.17 Such being the case, approval of the
President of any proposed amendment is a misnomer 18 The prerogative of the President to approve or disapprove
applies only to the ordinary cases of legislation. The President has nothing to do with proposition or adoption of
amendments to the Constitution. 19
III
Concentration of Powers
in the President during
crisis government.
1. In general, the governmental powers in crisis government the Philippines is a crisis government today are more or
less concentrated in the President. 20 According to Rossiter, "(t)he concentration of government power in a
democracy faced by an emergency is a corrective to the crisis inefficiencies inherent in the doctrine of the
separation of powers. In most free states it has generally been regarded as imperative that the total power of the
government be parceled out among three mutually independent branches executive, legislature, and judiciary. It is
believed to be destructive of constitutionalism if any one branch should exercise any two or more types of power,
and certainly a total disregard of the separation of powers is, as Madison wrote in the Federalist, No. 47, 'the very
definition of tyranny.' In normal times the separation of powers forms a distinct obstruction to arbitrary governmental
action. By this same token, in abnormal times it may form an insurmountable barrier to a decisive emergency action
in behalf of the state and its independent existence. There are moments in the life of any government when all
powers must work together in unanimity of purpose and action, even if this means the temporary union of executive,
legislative, and judicial power in the hands of one man. The more complete the separation of powers in a
constitutional system, the more difficult and yet the more necessary will be their fusion in time of crisis. This is
evident in a comparison of the crisis potentialities of the cabinet and presidential systems of government. In the
former the all-important harmony of legislature and executive is taken for granted; in the latter it is neither
guaranteed nor to be to confidently expected. As a result, cabinet is more easily established and more trustworthy
than presidential dictatorship. The power of the state in crisis must not only be concentrated and expanded; it must
also be freed from the normal system of constitutional and legal limitations. 21 John Locke, on the other hand, claims
for the executive in its own right a broad discretion capable even of setting aside the ordinary laws in the meeting of
special exigencies for which the legislative power had not provided. 22 The rationale behind such broad emergency
powers of the Executive is the release of the government from "the paralysis of constitutional restrains" so that the
crisis may be ended and normal times restored.
2. The presidential exercise of legislative powers in time of martial law is now a conceded valid at. That sun clear
authority of the President is saddled on Section 3 (pars. 1 and 2) of the Transitory Provisions, thus:23
The incumbent President of the Philippines shall initially convene the interim National Assembly and
shall preside over its sessions until the interim Speaker shall have been elected. He shall continue to
exercise his powers and prerogatives under the nineteen hundred and thirty-five Constitution and the
powers vested in the President and the Prime Minister under this Constitution until the calls upon the
interim National Assembly to elect the interim President and the interim Prime Minister, who shall
then exercise their respective powers vested by this Constitution.
All proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, and acts promulgated, issued, or done by the
incumbent President shall be part of the law of the land, and shall remain valid, binding, and
effective even after lifting of martial law or the ratification of this Constitution, unless modified,
revoked, or superseded by subsequent proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, or other acts of
the incumbent President, or unless expressly and explicitly modified or repealed by the regular
National Assembly.
"It is unthinkable," said Justice Fernandez, a 1971 Constitutional Convention delegate, "that the Constitutional
Convention, while giving to the President the discretion when to call the interim National Assembly to session, and
knowing that it may not be convened soon, would create a vacuum in the exercise of legislative powers. Otherwise,
with no one to exercise the lawmaking powers, there would be paralyzation of the entire governmental
machinery." 24 Paraphrasing Rossiter, this is an extremely important factor in any constitutional dictatorship which
extends over a period of time. The separation of executive and legislature ordained in the Constitution presents a
distinct obstruction to efficient crisis government. The steady increase in executive power is not too much a cause
for as the steady increase in the magnitude and complexity of the problems the President has been called upon by
the Filipino people to solve in their behalf, which involve rebellion, subversion, secession, recession, inflation, and
economic crisis-a crisis greater than war. In short, while conventional constitutional law just confines the President's
power as Commander-in-Chief to the direction of the operation of the national forces, yet the facts of our political,
social, and economic disturbances had convincingly shown that in meeting the same, indefinite power should be
attributed to tile President to take emergency measures 25
IV
Authority of the incumbent
President t to propose
amendments to the Constitution.
1. As earlier pointed out, the power to legislate is constitutionally consigned to the interim National Assembly during
the transition period. However, the initial convening of that Assembly is a matter fully addressed to the judgment of
the incumbent President. And, in the exercise of that judgment, the President opted to defer convening of that body
in utter recognition of the people's preference. Likewise, in the period of transition, the power to propose
amendments to the Constitution lies in the interim National Assembly upon special call by the President (See. 15 of
the Transitory Provisions). Again, harking to the dictates of the sovereign will, the President decided not to call the
interim National Assembly. Would it then be within the bounds of the Constitution and of law for the President to
assume that constituent power of the interim Assembly vis-a-vis his assumption of that body's legislative functions?
The answer is yes. If the President has been legitimately discharging the legislative functions of the interim
Assembly, there is no reason why he cannot validly discharge the function of that Assembly to propose
amendments to the Constitution, which is but adjunct, although peculiar, to its gross legislative power. This, of
course, is not to say that the President has converted his office into a constituent assembly of that nature normally
constituted by the legislature. Rather, with the interim National Assembly not convened and only the Presidency and
the Supreme Court in operation, the urges of absolute necessity render it imperative upon the President to act as
agent for and in behalf of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution. Parenthetically, by its very
constitution, the Supreme Court possesses no capacity to propose amendments without constitutional infractions.
For the President to shy away from that actuality and decline to undertake the amending process would leave the
governmental machineries at a stalemate or create in the powers of the State a destructive vacuum, thereby
impeding the objective of a crisis government "to end the crisis and restore normal times." In these parlous times,
that Presidential initiative to reduce into concrete forms the constant voices of the people reigns supreme. After all,
constituent assemblies or constitutional conventions, like the President now, are mere agents of the people .26
2. The President's action is not a unilateral move. As early as the referendums of January 1973 and February 1975,
the people had already rejected the calling of the interim National Assembly. The Lupong Tagapagpaganap of the
Katipunan ng mga Sanggunian, the Pambansang Katipunan ng mga Barangay, and the Pambansang Katipunan ng
mga Barangay, representing 42,000 barangays, about the same number of Kabataang Barangay organizations,
Sanggunians in 1,458 municipalities, 72 provinces, 3 sub-provinces, and 60 cities had informed the President that
the prevailing sentiment of the people is for the abolition of the interim National Assembly. Other issues concerned
the lifting of martial law and amendments to the Constitution .27 The national organizations of Sangguniang Bayan presently proposed to
settle the issues of martial law, the interim Assembly, its replacement, the period of its existence, the length of the period for the exercise by the President of its
present powers in a referendum to be held on October 16 .28 The Batasang Bayan (legislative council) created under Presidential Decree 995 of September 10,
1976, composed of 19 cabinet members, 9 officials with cabinet rank, 91 members of the Lupong Tagapagpaganap (executive committee) of the Katipunan ng
mga Sangguniang Bayan voted in session to submit directly to the people in a plebiscite on October 16, the previously quoted proposed amendments to the
Constitution, including the issue of martial law .29 Similarly, the "barangays" and the "sanggunians" endorsed to the President the submission of the proposed
amendments to the people on October 16. All the foregoing led the President to initiate the proposal of amendments to the Constitution and the subsequent
issuance of Presidential Decree No, 1033 on September 22, 1976 submitting the questions (proposed amendments) to the people in the National ReferendumPlebiscite on October 16.
V
The People is Sovereign
1. Unlike in a federal state, the location of sovereignty in a unitary state is easily seen. In the Philippines, a
republican and unitary state, sovereignty "resides in the people and all government authority emanates from
them .30 In its fourth meaning, Savigny would treat people as "that particular organized assembly of individuals in which, according to the Constitution, the
highest power exists." 31 This is the concept of popular sovereignty. It means that the constitutional legislator, namely the people, is sovereign 32 In consequence,
the people may thus write into the Constitution their convictions on any subject they choose in the absence of express constitutional prohibition. 33 This is because,
as Holmes said, the Constitution "is an experiment, as all life is all experiment."34 "The necessities of orderly government," wrote Rottschaefer, "do not require that
one generation should be permitted to permanently fetter all future generations." A constitution is based, therefore, upon a self-limiting decision of the people when
they adopt it. 35
2. The October 16 referendum-plebiscite is a resounding call to the people to exercise their sovereign power as
constitutional legislator. The proposed amendments, as earlier discussed, proceed not from the thinking of a single
man. Rather, they are the collated thoughts of the sovereign will reduced only into enabling forms by the authority
who can presently exercise the powers of the government. In equal vein, the submission of those proposed
amendments and the question of martial law in a referendum-plebiscite expresses but the option of the people
themselves implemented only by the authority of the President. Indeed, it may well be said that the amending
process is a sovereign act, although the authority to initiate the same and the procedure to be followed reside
somehow in a particular body.
VI
Referendum-Plebiscite not
rendered nugatory by the
participation of the 15-year olds.
1. October 16 is in parts a referendum and a plebiscite. The question - (1) Do you want martial law to be continued?
- is a referendum question, wherein the 15-year olds may participate. This was prompted by the desire of the
Government to reach the larger mas of the people so that their true pulse may be felt to guide the President in
pursuing his program for a New Order. For the succeeding question on the proposed amendments, only those of
voting age of 18 years may participate. This is the plebiscite aspect, as contemplated in Section 2, Article XVI of the
new Constitution. 36 On this second question, it would only be the votes of those 18 years old and above which will
have valid bearing on the results. The fact that the voting populace are simultaneously asked to answer the
referendum question and the plebiscite question does not infirm the referendum-plebiscite. There is nothing
objectionable in consulting the people on a given issue, which is of current one and submitting to them for ratification
of proposed constitutional amendments. The fear of commingled votes (15-year olds and 18-year olds above) is
readily dispelled by the provision of two ballot boxes for every barangay center, one containing the ballots of voters
fifteen years of age and under eighteen, and another containing the ballots of voters eighteen years of age and
above. 37 The ballots in the ballot box for voters fifteen years of age and under eighteen shall be counted ahead of
the ballots of voters eighteen years and above contained in another ballot box. And, the results of the referendumplebiscite shall be separately prepared for the age groupings, i.e., ballots contained in each of the two boxes.38
2. It is apt to distinguish here between a "referendum" and a "plebiscite." A "referendum" is merely consultative in
character. It is simply a means of assessing public reaction to the given issues submitted to the people foe their
consideration, the calling of which is derived from or within the totality of the executive power of the President.39 It is
participated in by all citizens from the age of fifteen, regardless of whether or not they are illiterates, feeble-minded,
or ex- convicts .40 A "plebiscite," on the other hand, involves the constituent act of those "citizens of the Philippines
not otherwise disqualified by law, who are eighteen years of age or over, and who shall have resided in the
Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they propose to vote for at least six months preceding the
election Literacy, property or any other substantive requirement is not imposed. It is generally associated with the
amending process of the Constitution, more particularly, the ratification aspect.
VII
1. There appeals to be no valid basis for the claim that the regime of martial law stultifies in main the freedom to
dissent. That speaks of a bygone fear. The martial law regime which, in the observation of Justice Fernando, 41 is
impressed with a mild character recorded no State imposition for a muffled voice. To be sure, there are restraints of
the individual liberty, but on certain grounds no total suppression of that liberty is aimed at. The for the referendumplebiscite on October 16 recognizes all the embracing freedoms of expression and assembly The President himself
had announced that he would not countenance any suppression of dissenting views on the issues, as he is not
interested in winning a "yes" or "no" vote, but on the genuine sentiment of the people on the issues at hand. 42 Thus,
the dissenters soon found their way to the public forums, voicing out loud and clear their adverse views on the
proposed amendments and even (in the valid ratification of the 1973 Constitution, which is already a settled
matter.43 Even government employees have been held by the Civil Service Commission free to participate in public
discussion and even campaign for their stand on the referendum-plebiscite issues.44
VIII
Time for deliberation
is not short.
1. The period from September 21 to October 16 or a period of 3 weeks is not too short for free debates or
discussions on the referendum-plebiscite issues. The questions are not new. They are the issues of the day. The
people have been living with them since the proclamation of martial law four years ago. The referendums of 1973
and 1975 carried the same issue of martial law. That notwithstanding, the contested brief period for discussion is not
without counterparts in previous plebiscites for constitutional amendments. Justice Makasiar, in the Referendum
Case, recalls: "Under the old Society, 15 days were allotted for the publication in three consecutive issues of the
Official Gazette of the women's suffrage amendment to the Constitution before the scheduled plebiscite on April 30,
1937 (Com. Act No. 34). The constitutional amendment to append as ordinance the complicated TydingsKocialskowski was published in only three consecutive issues of the Official Gazette for 10 days prior to the
scheduled plebiscite (Com. Act 492). For the 1940 Constitutional amendments providing for the bicameral
Congress, the reelection of the President and Vice President, and the creation of the Commission on Elections, 20
days of publication in three consecutive issues of the Official Gazette was fixed (Com Act No. 517). And the Parity
Amendment, an involved constitutional amendment affecting the economy as well as the independence of the
Republic was publicized in three consecutive issues of the Official Gazette for 20 days prior to the plebiscite (Rep.
Act No. 73)."45
2. It is worthy to note that Article XVI of the Constitution makes no provision as to the specific date when the
plebiscite shall be held, but simply states that it "shall be held not later than three months after the approval of such
amendment or revision." In Coleman v. Miller, 46 the United States Supreme court held that this matter of submission
involves "an appraisal of a great variety of relevant conditions, political, social and economic," which "are essentially
political and not justiciable." The constituent body or in the instant cases, the President, may fix the time within
which the people may act. This is because proposal and ratification are not treated as unrelated acts, but as
succeeding steps in a single endeavor, the natural inference being that they are not to be widely separated in time;
second, it is only when there is deemed to be a necessity therefor that amendments are to be proposed, the
reasonable implication being that when proposed, they are to be considered and disposed of presently, and third,
ratification is but the expression of the approbation of the people, hence, it must be done contemporaneously. 47 In
the words of Jameson, "(a)n alteration of the Constitution proposed today has relation to the sentiment and the felt
needs of today, and that, if not ratified early while that sentiment may fairly be supposed to exist. it ought to be
regarded as waived, and not again to be voted upon, unless a second time proposed by proper body
IN RESUME
The three issues are
1. Is the question of the constitutionality of Presidential Decrees Nos. 991, 1031 and 1033 political or justiciable?
2. During the present stage of the transition period, and under, the environmental circumstances now obtaining,
does the President possess power to propose amendments to the Constitution as well as set up the required
machinery and prescribe the procedure for the ratification of his proposals by the people?
3. Is the submission to the people of the proposed amendments within the time frame allowed therefor a sufficient
and proper submission?
Upon the first issue, Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro and Associate Justices Enrique M. Fernando, Claudio
Teehankee, Antonio P. Barredo, Cecilia Munoz Palma, Hermogenes Concepcion Jr. and Ruperto G. Martin are of
the view that the question posed is justiciable, while Associate Justices Felix V. Makasiar, Felix Q. Antonio and
Ramon C. Aquino hold the view that the question is political.
Upon the second issue, Chief Justice Castro and Associate Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Aquino,
Concepcion Jr. and Martin voted in the affirmative, while Associate Justices Teehankee and Munoz Palma voted in
the negative. Associate Justice Fernando, conformably to his concurring and dissenting opinion in Aquino vs. Enrile
(59 SCRA 183), specifically dissents from the proposition that there is concentration of powers in the Executive
during periods of crisis, thus raising serious doubts as to the power of the President to propose amendments.
Upon the third issue, Chief Justice Castro and Associate Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Aquino, Concepcion Jr. and
Martin are of the view that there is a sufficient and proper submission of the proposed amendments for ratification by
the people. Associate Justices Barredo and Makasiar expressed the hope, however that the period of time may be
extended. Associate Justices Fernando, Makasiar and Antonio are of the view that the question is political and
therefore beyond the competence and cognizance of this Court, Associate Justice Fernando adheres to his
concurrence in the opinion of Chief Justice Concepcion in Gonzales vs. COMELEC (21 SCRA 774).Associate
Justices Teehankee and MUNOZ Palma hold that prescinding from the President's lack of authority to exercise the
constituent power to propose the amendments, etc., as above stated, there is no fair and proper submission with
sufficient information and time to assure intelligent consent or rejection under the standards set by this Court in the
controlling cases of Gonzales, supra, and Tolentino vs. COMELEC (41 SCRA 702).
Chief Justice Castro and Associate Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Aquino, Concepcion Jr. and Martin voted
to dismiss the three petitions at bar. For reasons as expressed in his separate opinion, Associate Justice Fernando
concurs in the result. Associate Justices Teehankee and Munoz Palma voted to grant the petitions.
ACCORDINGLY, the vote being 8 to 2 to dismiss, the said petitions are hereby dismissed. This decision is
immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 86344. December 21, 1989.]
REP. RAUL A. DAZA, Petitioner, v. REP. LUIS C. SINGSON and HON. RAOUL V. VICTORINO IN THE LATTER’S
CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, Respondent.
DECISION
CRUZ, J.:
After the congressional elections of May 11, 1987, the House of Representatives proportionally apportioned its twelve
seats in the Commission on Appointments among the several political parties represented in that chamber, including
the Lakas ng Bansa, the PDP-Laban, the NP-Unido, the Liberal Party, and the KBL, in accordance with Article VI,
Section 18, of the Constitution. Petitioner Raul A. Daza was among those chosen and was listed as a representative of
the Liberal Party. 1
On September 16, 1988, the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino was reorganized, resulting in a political realignment in
the House of Representatives. Twenty four members of the Liberal Party formally resigned from that party and joined
the LDP, thereby swelling its number to 159 and correspondingly reducing their former party to only 17 members. 2
On the basis of this development, the House of Representatives revised its representation in the Commission on
Appointments by withdrawing the seat occupied by the petitioner and giving this to the newly-formed LDP. On
December 5, 1988, the chamber elected a new set of representatives consisting of the original members except the
petitioner and including therein respondent Luis C. Singson as the additional member from the LDP. 3
The petitioner came to this Court on January 13, 1989, to challenge his removal from the Commission on
Appointments and the assumption of his seat by the Respondent. Acting initially on his petition for prohibition and
injunction with preliminary injunction, we issued a temporary restraining order that same day to prevent both the
petitioner and the respondent from serving in the Commission on Appointments. 4
Briefly stated, the contention of the petitioner is that he cannot be removed from the Commission on Appointments
because his election thereto is permanent under the doctrine announced in Cunanan v. Tan. 5 His claim is that the
reorganization of the House representation in the said body is not based on a permanent political realignment because
the LDP is not a duly registered political party and has not yet attained political stability.
For his part, the respondent argues that the question raised by the petitioner is political in nature and so beyond the
jurisdiction of this Court. He also maintains that he has been improperly impleaded, the real party respondent being
the House of Representatives which changed its representation in the Commission on Appointments and removed the
petitioner. Finally, he stresses that nowhere in the Constitution is it required that the political party be registered to be
entitled to proportional representation in the Commission on Appointments.
chanroble svirtualawl ibra ry
In addition to the pleadings filed by the parties, a Comment was submitted by the Solicitor General as amicus curiae
in compliance with an order from the Court.
At the core of this controversy is Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution providing as follows:
chanrob1e s virtual 1aw lib rary
Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the Senate, as ex officio
Chairman, twelve Senators and twelve Members of the House of Representatives, elected by each House on the basis
of proportional representation from the political parties and parties or organizations registered under the party-list
system represented therein. The Chairman of the Commission shall not vote, except in case of a tie. The Commission
shall act on all appointments submitted to it within thirty session days of the Congress from their submission. The
Commission shall rule by a majority vote of all the Members.
Ruling first on the jurisdictional issue, we hold that, contrary to the respondent’s assertion, the Court has the
competence to act on the matter at bar. Our finding is that what is before us is not a discretionary act of the House of
Representatives that may not be reviewed by us because it is political in nature. What is involved here is the legality,
not the wisdom, of the act of that chamber in removing the petitioner from the Commission on Appointments. That is
not a political question because, as Chief Justice Concepcion explained in Tañada v. Cuenco: 6
. . . the term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question
of policy. In other words, . . . it refers "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
Legislature or executive branch of the Government." It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not
legality, of a particular measure.
In the aforementioned case, the Court was asked by the petitioners therein to annul the election of two members of
the Senate Electoral Tribunal of that chamber, on the ground that they had not been validly nominated. The Senate
then consisted of 23 members from the Nacionalista Party and the petitioner as the lone member of the Citizens
Party. Senator Lorenzo M. Tañada nominated only himself as the minority representative in the Tribunal, whereupon
the majority elected Senators Mariano J. Cuenco and Francisco Delgado, from its own ranks, to complete the nineman composition of the Tribunal as provided for in the 1935 Constitution. The petitioner came to this Court,
contending that under Article VI, Section 11, of that Charter, the six legislative members of the Tribunal were to be
chosen by the Senate, "three upon nomination of the party having the largest number of votes and three of the party
having the second largest number of votes therein." As the majority party in the Senate, the Nacionalista Party could
nominate only three members and could not also fill the other two seats pertaining to the minority.
chanroble s.com:c ralaw:re d
By way of special and affirmative defenses, the respondents contended inter alia that the subject of the petition was
an internal matter that only the Senate could resolve. The Court rejected this argument, holding that what was
involved was not the wisdom of the Senate in choosing the respondents but the legality of the choice in light of the
requirement of the Constitution. The petitioners were questioning the manner of filling the Tribunal, not the discretion
of the Senate in doing so. The Court held that this was a justiciable and not a political question, thus:
chan rob1e s virtual 1aw l ibra ry
Such is not the nature of the question for determination in the present case. Here, we are called upon to decide
whether the election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado by the Senate, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal,
upon nomination by Senator Primicias — a member and spokesman of the party having the largest number of votes in
the Senate — on behalf of its Committee on Rules, contravenes the constitutional mandate that said members of the
Senate Electoral Tribunal shall be chosen "upon nomination . . . of the party having the second largest number of
votes" in the Senate and hence, is null and void. The Senate is not clothed with "full discretionary authority" in the
choice of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. The exercise of its power thereon is subject to constitutional
limitations which are claimed to be mandatory in nature. It is clearly within the legitimate province of the judicial
department to pass upon the validity of the proceeding in connection therewith.
‘. . . whether an election of public officers has been in accordance with law is for the judiciary. Moreover, where the
legislative department has by statute prescribed election procedure in a given situation, the judiciary may determine
whether a particular election has been in conformity with such statute, and particularly, whether such statute has
been applied in a way to deny or transgress on constitutional or statutory rights . . . .’ (16 C.J.S., 439; Emphasis
supplied).
It is, therefore, our opinion that we have, not only jurisdiction but also the duty, to consider and determine the
principal issue raised by the parties herein."
cralaw virtua1aw l ibra ry
Although not specifically discussed, the same disposition was made in Cunanan v. Tan as it likewise involved the
manner or legality of the organization of the Commission on Appointments, not the wisdom or discretion of the House
in the choice of its representatives.
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and decisive. The reason is that,
even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we would still not be precluded
from resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even the
political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution clearly provides:
chanrob1es vi rt ual 1aw li bra ry
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by
law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
The respondent’s contention that he has been improperly impleaded is even less persuasive. While he may be
technically correct in arguing that it is not he who caused the petitioner’s removal, we feel that this objection is also
not an insuperable obstacle to the resolution of this controversy. We may, for one thing, treat this proceeding as a
petition for quo warranto as the petitioner is actually questioning the respondent’s right to sit as a member of the
Commission on Appointments. For another, we have held as early as in the Emergency Powers Cases 7 that where
serious constitutional questions are involved, "the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands
that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure." The same policy
has since then been consistently followed by the Court, as in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, 8 where we held
through Chief Justice Fernando:
cralawnad
In the course of the deliberations, a serious procedural objection was raised by five members of the Court. It is their
view that respondent Commission on Elections not being sought to be restrained from performing any specific act, this
suit cannot be characterized as other than a mere request for an advisory opinion. Such a view, from the remedial law
standpoint, has much to recommend it. Nonetheless, a majority would affirm the original stand that under the
circumstances, it could still rightfully be treated as a petition for prohibition.
The language of Justice Laurel fits the case: "All await the decision of this Court on the constitutional question.
Considering, therefore, the importance which the instant case has assumed and to prevent multiplicity of suits, strong
reasons of public policy demand that [its] constitutionality . . . be now resolved." It may likewise be added that the
exceptional character of the situation that confronts us, the paramount public interest, and the undeniable necessity
for ruling, the national elections being barely six months away, reinforce our stand.
It would appear undeniable, therefore, that before us is an appropriate invocation of our jurisdiction to prevent the
enforcement of an alleged unconstitutional statute. We are left with no choice then; we must act on the matter.
Coming now to the more crucial question, the Court notes that both the petitioner and the respondent are invoking
the case of Cunanan v. Tan to support their respective positions. It is best, therefore, to make a quick review of that
case for a proper disposition of this one.
In the election for the House of Representatives held in 1961, 72 seats were won by the Nacionalista Party, 29 by the
Liberal Party and 1 by an independent. Accordingly, the representation of the chamber in the Commission on
Appointments was apportioned to 8 members from the Nacionalista Party and 4 from the Liberal Party. Subsequently,
25 members of the Nacionalista Party, professing discontent over the House leadership, made common cause with the
Liberal Party and formed what was called the Allied Majority to install a new Speaker and reorganize the chamber.
Included in this reorganization was the House representation in the Commission on Appointments where three of the
Nacionalista congressmen originally chosen were displaced by three of their party colleagues who had joined the Allied
Majority.
chanroble s.com : vi rtua l law lib rary
Petitioner Carlos Cunanan’s ad interim appointment as Deputy Administrator of the Reforestration Administration was
rejected by the Commission on Appointments as thus reorganized and respondent Jorge Tan, Jr. was thereafter
designated in his place. Cunanan then came to this Court, contending that the rejection of his appointment was null
and void because the Commission itself was invalidly constituted.
The Court agreed. It noted that the Allied Majority was a merely temporary combination as the Nacionalista defectors
had not disaffiliated from their party and permanently joined the new political group. Officially, they were still
members of the Nacionalista Party. The reorganization of the Commission on Appointments was invalid because it was
not based on the proportional representation of the political parties in the House of Representatives as required by the
Constitution. The Court held:
chanrob 1es vi rtua l 1aw lib ra ry
. . . In other words, a shifting of votes at a given time, even if due to arrangements of a more or less temporary
nature, like the one that has led to the formation of the so-called "Allied Majority," does not suffice to authorize are
organization of the membership of the Commission for said House. Otherwise the Commission on Appointments may
have to be reorganized as often as votes shift from one side to another in the House. The framers of our Constitution
could not have intended to thus place a constitutional organ, like the Commission on Appointments, at the mercy of
each House of Congress.
The petitioner vigorously argues that the LDP is not the permanent political party contemplated in the Constitution
because it has not been registered in accordance with Article IX-B, Section 2(5), in relation to the other provisions of
the Constitution. He stresses that the so-called party has not yet achieved stability and suggests it might be no
different from several other political groups that have died "a-bornin’," like the UNA, or have subsequently floundered,
like the UNIDO.
The respondent also cites Cunanan but from a different viewpoint. According to him, that case expressly allows
reorganization at any time to reflect changes in the political alignments in Congress, provided only that such changes
are permanent. The creation of the LDP constituting the bulk of the former PDP Laban and to which no less than 24
Liberal congressmen had transferred was a permanent change. That change fully justified his designation to the
Commission on Appointments after the reduction of the LP representation therein. Thus, the Court held:
chan rob1e s virtual 1a w libra ry
Upon the other hand, the constitutional provision to the effect that "there shall be a Commission on Appointments
consisting of twelve (12) Senators and twelve (12) members of the House of Representatives elected by each House,
respectively, on the basis of proportional REPRESENTATION OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES THEREIN," necessarily
connotes the authority of each House of Congress to see to it that this requirement is duly complied with. As a
consequence, it may take appropriate measures, not only upon the initial organization of the Commission, but also,
subsequently thereto. If by reason of successful election protests against members of a House, or of their expulsion
from the political party to which they belonged and/or of their affiliation with another political party, the ratio in the
representation of the political parties in the House is materially changed, the House is clothed with authority to
declare vacant the necessary number of seats in the Commission on Appointments held by members of said House
belonging to the political party adversely affected by the change and then fill said vacancies in conformity with the
Constitution.
In the course of the spirited debate on this matter between the petitioner and the respondent (who was supported by
the Solicitor General) an important development has supervened to considerable simplify the present controversy.
The petitioner, to repeat, bases his argument heavily on the non-registration of the LDP which, he claims has not
provided the permanent political realignment to justify the questioned reorganization. As he insists:
chanro b1es vi rt ual 1aw li bra ry
(c) Assuming that the so-called new coalesced majority is actually the LDP itself, then the proposed reorganization is
likewise illegal and ineffectual, because the LDP, not being a duly registered political party, is not entitled to the
"rights and privileges granted by law to political parties" (Sec. 160, BP No. 881), and therefore cannot legally claim
the right to be considered in determining the required proportional representation of political parties in the House of
Representatives. 9
x
x
x
. . . the clear constitutional intent behind Section 18, Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution, is to give the right of
representation in the Commission on Appointment only to political parties who are duly registered with the Comelec.
10
On November 23, 1989, however, that argument boomeranged against the petitioner. On that date, the Commission
on Elections in an en banc resolution affirmed the resolution of its First Division dated August 28, 1989, granting the
petition of the LDP for registration as a political party. 11 This has taken the wind out of the sails of the petitioner, so
to speak, and he must now limp to shore as best he can.
chan roble s law lib rary : red
The petitioner’s contention that, even if registered, the party must still pass the test of time to prove its permanence
is not acceptable. Under this theory, a registered party obtaining the majority of the seats in the House of
Representatives (or the Senate) would still not be entitled to representation in the Commission on Appointments as
long as it was organized only recently and has not yet "aged." The Liberal Party itself would fall in such a category.
That party was created in December 1945 by a faction of the Nacionalista Party that seceded therefrom to support
Manuel A. Roxas’s bid for the Presidency of the Philippines in the election held on April 23, 1946 12 The Liberal Party
won. At that time it was only four months old. Yet no question was raised as to its right to be represented in the
Commission on Appointments and in the Electoral Tribunals by virtue of its status as the majority party in both
chambers of the Congress.
The LDP has been in existence for more than one year now. It now has 157 members in the House of Representatives
and 6 members in the Senate. Its titular head is no less than the President of the Philippines and its President is
Senator Neptali A. Gonzales, who took over recently from Speaker Ramon V. Mitra. It is true that there have been,
and there still are, some internal disagreements among its members, but these are to be expected in any political
organization, especially if it is democratic in structure. In fact, even the monolithic Communist Party in a number of
socialist states has undergone similar dissension, and even upheavals. But it surely cannot be considered still
temporary because of such discord.
If the petitioner’s argument were to be pursued, the 157 members of the LDP in the House of Representatives would
have to be denied representation in the Commission on Appointments and, for that matter, also the Electoral Tribunal.
By the same token, the KBL, which the petitioner says is now "history only," should also be written off. The
independents also cannot be represented because they belong to no political party. That would virtually leave the
Liberal Party only-with all of its seventeen members — to claim all the twelve seats of the House of Representatives in
the Commission on Appointments and the six legislative seats in the House Electoral Tribunal.
It is noteworthy that when with 41 members the Liberal Party was alloted two of the seats in the Commission on
Appointments, it did not express any objection. 13 Inconsistently, the petitioner is now opposed to the withdrawal
from it of one seat although its original number has been cut by more than half.
As for the other condition suggested by the petitioner, to wit, that the party must survive in a general congressional
election, the LDP has doubtless also passed that test, if only vicariously. It may even be said that as it now commands
the biggest following in the House of Representatives, the party has not only survived but in fact prevailed. At any
rate, that test was never laid down in Cunanan.
chan roble s virtual lawl ibra ry
To summarize, then, we hold, in view of the foregoing considerations, that the issue presented to us is justiciable
rather political, involving as it does the legality and not the wisdom of the act complained of, or the manner of filling
the Commission on Appointments as prescribed by the Constitution. Even if the question were political in nature, it
would still come within our powers of review under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us by Article VIII,
Section 1, of the Constitution, which includes the authority to determine whether grave abuse of discretion amounting
to excess or lack of jurisdiction has been committed by any branch or instrumentality of the government. As for the
alleged technical flaw in the designation of the party respondent, assuming the existence of such a defect, the same
may be brushed aside, conformably to existing doctrine, so that the important constitutional issue raised may be
addressed. Lastly, we resolve that issue in favor of the authority of the House of Representatives to change its
representation in the Commission on Appointments to reflect at any time the changes that may transpire in the
political alignments of its membership. It is understood that such changes must be permanent and do not include the
temporary alliances or factional divisions not involving severance of political loyalties or formal disaffiliation and
permanent shifts of allegiance from one political party to another.
chan roble s lawlib rary : rednad
The Court would have preferred not to intervene in this matter, leaving it to be settled by the House of
Representatives or the Commission on Appointments as the bodies directly involved. But as our jurisdiction has been
invoked and, more importantly, because a constitutional stalemate had to be resolved, there was no alternative for us
except to act, and to act decisively. In doing so, of course, we are not imposing our will upon the said agencies, or
substituting our discretion for theirs, but merely discharging our sworn responsibility to interpret and apply the
Constitution. That is a duty we do not evade, lest we ourselves betray our oath.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order dated January 13, 1989, is LIFTED. The
Court holds that the respondent has been validly elected as a member of the Commission on Appointments and is
entitled to assume his seat in that body pursuant to Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution. No pronouncement as
to costs.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. 207264
October 22, 2013
REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSEPH SOCORRO B. TAN, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
PEREZ, J.:
This is a Motion for Reconsideration of the En Bane Resolution of 25 June 2013 which stated that: IN VIEW OF THE
FOREGOING, the instant petition is DISMISSED, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Commission on Elections. The 14 May 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc affirming the 27 March 2013
Resolution of the COMELEC First Division is upheld."
In her Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner summarizes her submission, thus:
"81. Stated differently, the Petitioner x x x is not asking the Honorable Court to make a determination as regards her
qualifications, she is merely asking the Honorable Court to affirm the jurisdiction of the HRET to solely and
exclusively pass upon such qualifications and to set aside the COMELEC Resolutions for having denied Petitioner
her right to due process and for unconstitutionally adding a qualification not otherwise required by the
constitution."1 (as originally underscored)
The first part of the summary refers to the issue raised in the petition, which is:
"31. Whether or not Respondent Comelec is without jurisdiction over Petitioner who is duly proclaimed winner and
who has already taken her oath of office for the position of Member of the House of Representatives for the lone
congressional district of Marinduque."2
Tied up and neatened the propositions on the COMELEC-or-HRET jurisdiction go thus: petitioner is a duly
proclaimed winner and having taken her oath of office as member of the House of Representatives, all questions
regarding her qualifications are outside the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and are within the HRET exclusive
jurisdiction.
The averred proclamation is the critical pointer to the correctness of petitioner's submission. The crucial question is
whether or not petitioner could be proclaimed on 18 May 2013. Differently stated, was there basis for the
proclamation of petitioner on 18 May 2013?
Dates and events indicate that there was no basis for the proclamation of petitioner on 18 May 2013. Without the
proclamation, the petitioner's oath of office is likewise baseless, and without a precedent oath of office, there can be
no valid and effective assumption of office.
We have clearly stated in our Resolution of 5 June 2013 that:
"More importantly, we cannot disregard a fact basic in this controversy – that before the proclamation of petitioner
on 18 May 2013, the COMELEC En Banc had already finally disposed of the issue of petitioner's lack of Filipino
citizenship and residency via its Resolution dated 14 May 2013. After 14 May 2013, there was, before the
COMELEC, no longer any pending case on petitioner's qualifications to run for the position of Member of the House
of Representatives. x x x As the point has obviously been missed by the petitioner who continues to argue on the
basis of her due proclamation, the instant motion gives us the opportunity to highlight the undeniable fact we here
repeat that the proclamation which petitioner secured on 18 May 2013 was WITHOUT ANY BASIS.
1. Four (4) days BEFORE the 18 May 2013 proclamation, or on 14 May 2013, the COMELEC En Banc has
already denied for lack o merit the petitioner's motion to reconsider the decision o the COMELEC First
Division that CANCELLED petitioner's certificate of candidacy.
2. On 18 May 2013, there was already a standing and unquestioned cancellation of petitioner's certificate o
candidacy which cancellation is a definite bar to her proclamation. On 18 May 2003, that bar has not been
removed, there was not even any attempt to remove it.
3. The COMELEC Rules indicate the manner by which the impediment to proclamation may be removed.
Rule 18, Section 13 (b) provides:
"(b) In Special Actions and Special Cases a decision or resolution of the Commission En Bane shall become
final and executory after five (5) days from its promulgation unless restrained by the Supreme Court."
Within that five (5 days, petitioner had the opportunity to go to the Supreme Court for a restraining order that
will remove the immediate effect of the En Banc cancellation of her certificate of candidacy. Within the five
(5) days the Supreme Court may remove the barrier to, and thus allow, the proclamation of petitioner. That
did not happen. Petitioner did not move to have it happen.
It is error to argue that the five days should pass before the petitioner is barred from being proclaimed.
Petitioner lost in the COMELEC as of respondent. Her certificate of candidacy has been ordered cancelled.
She could not be proclaimed because there was a final finding against her by the COMELEC.3 She needed
a restraining order from the Supreme Court to avoid the final finding. After the five days when the decision
adverse to her became executory, the need for Supreme Court intervention became even more imperative.
She would have to base her recourse on the position that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion in cancelling her certificate of candidacy and that a restraining order, which would allow her
proclamation, will have to be based on irreparable injury and demonstrated possibility of grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the COMELEC. In this case, before and after the 18 May 2013 proclamation, there
was not even an attempt at the legal remedy, clearly available to her, to permit her proclamation. What
petitioner did was to "take the law into her hands" and secure a proclamation in complete disregard of the
COMELEC En Bane decision that was final on 14 May 2013 and final and executory five days thereafter.
4. There is a reason why no mention about notice was made in Section 13(b) of Rule 18 in the provision that
the COMELEC En Bane or decision "SHALL become FINAL AND EXECUTORY after five days from its
promulgation unless restrained by the Supreme Court." On its own the COMELEC En Bane decision,
unrestrained, moves from promulgation into becoming final and executory. This is so because in Section 5
of Rule 18 it is stated:
Section 5. Promulgation. -The promulgation of a decision or resolutions of the Commission or a division shall be
made on a date previously fixed, of which notice shall be served in advance upon the parties or their attorneys
personally or by registered mail or by telegram.
5. Apart from the presumed notice of the COMELEC En Bane decision on the very date of its promulgation
on 14 May 2013, petitioner admitted in her petition before us that she in fact received a copy of the decision
on 16 May 20 13.4 On that date, she had absolutely no reason why she would disregard the available legal
way to remove the restraint on her proclamation, and, more than that, to in fact secure a proclamation two
days thereafter. The utter disregard of a final COMELEC En Bane decision and of the Rule stating that her
proclamation at that point MUST be on permission by the Supreme Court is even indicative of bad faith on
the part of the petitioner.
6. The indicant is magnified by the fact that petitioner would use her tainted proclamation as the very reason
to support her argument that she could no longer be reached by the jurisdiction of the COMELEC; and that it
is the HRET that has exclusive jurisdiction over the issue of her qualifications for office.
7. The suggestions of bad faith aside, petitioner is in error in the conclusion at which she directs, as well as
in her objective quite obvious from such conclusion. It is with her procured proclamation that petitioner
nullifies the COMELEC's decision, by Division and then En Banc and pre-empts any Supreme Court action
on the COMELEC decision. In other words, petitioner repudiates by her proclamation all administrative and
judicial actions thereon, past and present. And by her proclamation, she claims as acquired the
congressional seat that she sought to be a candidate for. As already shown, the reasons that lead to the
impermissibility of the objective are clear. She cannot sit as Member of the House of Representatives by
virtue of a baseless proclamation knowingly taken, with knowledge of the existing legal impediment.
8. Petitioner, therefore, is in error when she posits that at present it is the HRET which has exclusive
jurisdiction over her qualifications as a Member of the House of Representatives. That the HRET is the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the Members of the House of
Representatives is a written constitutional provision. It is, however unavailable to petitioner because she is
NOT a Member of the House at present. The COMELEC never ordered her proclamation as the rightful
winner in the election for such membership.5 Indeed, the action for cancellation of petitioner's certificate of
candidacy, the decision in which is the indispensable determinant of the right of petitioner to proclamation,
was correctly lodged in the COMELEC, was completely and fully litigated in the COMELEC and was finally
decided by the COMELEC. On and after 14 May 2013, there was nothing left for the COMELEC to do to
decide the case. The decision sealed the proceedings in the COMELEC regarding petitioner's ineligibility as
a candidate for Representative of Marinduque. The decision erected the bar to petitioner's proclamation. The
bar remained when no restraining order was obtained by petitioner from the Supreme Court within five days
from 14 May 2013.
9. When petitioner finally went to the Supreme Court on 10 June 2013 questioning the COMELEC First
Division ruling and the 14 May 2013 COMELEC En Bane decision, her baseless proclamation on 18 May
2013 did not by that fact of promulgation alone become valid and legal. A decision favorable to her by the
Supreme Court regarding the decision of the COMELEC En Bane on her certificate of candidacy was
indispensably needed, not to legalize her proclamation on 18 May 2013 but to authorize a proclamation with
the Supreme Court decision as basis.
10. The recourse taken on 25 June 2013 in the form of an original and special civil action for a writ of
Certiorari through Rule 64 of the Rules of Court is circumscribed by set rules and principles.
a) The special action before the COMELEC which was a Petition to Cancel Certificate of Candidacy
was a SUMMARY PROCEEDING or one heard summarily. The nature of the proceedings is best
indicated by the COMELEC Rule on Special Actions, Rule 23, Section 4 of which states that the
Commission may designate any of its officials who are members of the Philippine Bar to hear the
case and to receive evidence. COMELEC Rule 17 further provides in Section 3 that when the
proceedings are authorized to be summary, in lieu of oral testimonies, the parties may, after due
notice, be required to submit their position paper together with affidavits, counter-affidavits and other
documentary evidence; x x x and that this provision shall likewise apply to cases where the hearing
and reception of evidence are delegated by the Commission or the Division to any of its officials x x
x.
b) The special and civil action of Certiorari is defined in the Rules of Court thus:
When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its
or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no
appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may
file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law
and justice may require.
The accepted definition of grave abuse of discretion is: a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment so patent
and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, as
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner because of passion or hostility.6
It is the category of the special action below providing the procedural leeway in the exercise of the COMELEC
summary jurisdiction over the case, in conjunction with the limits of the Supreme Court's authority over the FINAL
COMELEC ruling that is brought before it, that defines the way petitioner's submission before the Court should be
adjudicated. Thus further explained, the disposition of 25 June 2013 is here repeated for affirmation:
Petitioner alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it took cognizance of "newly-discovered
evidence" without the same having been testified on and offered and admitted in evidence. She assails the
admission of the blog article of Eli Obligacion as hearsay and the photocopy of the Certification from the Bureau of
Immigration. She likewise contends that there was a violation of her right to due process of law because she was
not given the opportunity to question and present controverting evidence.
Her contentions are incorrect.
It must be emphasized that the COMELEC is not bound to strictly adhere to the technical rules of procedure in the
presentation of evidence. Under Section 2 of Rule I the COMELEC Rules of Procedure shall be liberally construed
in order x x x to achieve just, expeditious and inexpensive determination and disposition of every action and
proceeding brought before the Commission. In view of the fact that the proceedings in a petition to deny due course
or to cancel certificate of candidacy are summary in nature, then the newly discovered evidence was properly
admitted by respondent COMELEC.
Furthermore, there was no denial of due process in the case at bar as petitioner was given every opportunity to
argue her case before the COMELEC. From 10 October 2012 when Tan's petition was filed up to 27 March 2013
when the First Division rendered its resolution, petitioner had a period of five (5) months to adduce evidence.
Unfortunately, she did not avail herself of the opportunity given her.
Also, in administrative proceedings, procedural due process only requires that the party be given the opportunity or
right to be heard. As held in the case of Sahali v. COMELEC:
The petitioners should be reminded that due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing, but simply an
opportunity or right to be heard. One may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation but also, and perhaps many
times more creditably and predictable than oral argument, through pleadings. In administrative proceedings
moreover, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied; administrative process cannot be fully
equated with due process in its strict judicial sense. Indeed, deprivation of due process cannot be successfully
invoked where a party was given the chance to be he rd on his motion for reconsideration. (Emphasis supplied)
As to the ruling that petitioner s ineligible to run for office on the ground of citizenship, the COMELEC First Division,
discoursed as follows:
"x x x for respondent to reacquire her Filipino citizenship and become eligible for public office the law requires that
she must have accomplished the following acts: (1) take the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
before the Consul-General of the Philippine Consulate in the USA; and (2) make a personal and sworn renunciation
of her American citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.
In the case at bar, there s no showing that respondent complied with the aforesaid requirements. Early on in the
proceeding, respondent hammered on petitioner's lack of proof regarding her American citizenship, contending that
it is petitioner's burden to present a case. She, however, specifically denied that she has become either a
permanent resident or naturalized citizen of the USA.
Due to petitioner's submission of newly-discovered evidence thru a Manifestation dated February 7, 2013, however,
establishing the fact that respondent is a holder of an American passport which she continues to use until June 30
2012 petitioner was able to substantiate his allegations. The burden now shifts to respondent to present substantial
evidence to prove otherwise. This, the respondent utterly failed to do, leading to the conclusion inevitable that
respondent falsely misrepresented in her COC that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen. Unless and until she can
establish that she had availed of the privileges of RA 9225 by becoming a dual Filipino-American citizen, and
thereafter, made a valid sworn renunciation of her American citizenship, she remains to be an American citizen and
is, therefore, ineligible to run for and hold any elective public office in the Philippines." (Emphasis in the original.)
Let us look into the events that led to this petition: In moving for the cancellation of petitioner's COC, respondent
submitted records of the Bureau of Immigration showing that petitioner is a holder of a US passport, and that her
status is that of a balikbayan. At this point, the burden of proof shifted to petitioner, imposing upon her the duty to
prove that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen and has not lost the same, or that she has re-acquired such status in
accordance with the provisions of R.A. No. 9225. Aside from the bare allegation that she is a natural-born citizen,
however, petitioner submitted no proof to support such contention. Neither did she submit any proof as to the
inapplicability of R.A. No. 9225 to her.
Notably, in her Motion for Reconsideration before the COMELEC En Bane, petitioner admitted that she is a holder of
a US passport, but she averred that she is only a dual Filipino-American citizen, thus the requirements of R.A. No.
9225 do not apply to her. Still, attached to the said motion is an Affidavit of Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship
dated 24 September 2012. Petitioner explains that she attached said Affidavit if only to show her desire and zeal to
serve the people and to comply with rules, even as a superfluity. We cannot, however, subscribe to petitioner's
explanation. If petitioner executed said Affidavit if only to comply with the rules, then it is an admission that R.A. No.
9225 applies to her. Petitioner cannot claim that she executed it to address the observations by the COMELEC as
the assailed Resolutions were promulgated only in 2013, while the Affidavit was executed in September 2012.
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Moreover, in the present petition, petitioner added a footnote to her oath of office as Provincial Administrator, to this
effect: This does not mean that Petitioner did not, prior to her taking her oath of office as Provincial Administrator,
take her oath of allegiance for purposes of re-acquisition of natural-born Filipino status, which she reserves to
present in the proper proceeding. The reference to the taking of oath of office is in order to make reference to what
is already part of the records and evidence in the present case and to avoid injecting into the records evidence on
matters of fact that was not previously passed upon by Respondent COMELEC. This statement raises a lot of
questions -Did petitioner execute an oath of allegiance for re-acquisition of natural-born Filipino status? If she did,
why did she not present it at the earliest opportunity before the COMELEC? And is this an admission that she has
indeed lost her natural-born Filipino status?
To cover-up her apparent lack of an oath of allegiance as required by R.A. No. 9225, petitioner contends that, since
she took her oath of allegiance in connection with her appointment as Provincial Administrator of Marinduque, she is
deemed to have reacquired her status as a natural-born Filipino citizen.
This contention is misplaced. For one, this issue is being presented for the first time before this Court, as it was
never raised before the COMELEC. For another, said oath of allegiance cannot be considered compliance with Sec.
3 of R.A. No. 9225 as certain requirements have to be met as prescribed by Memorandum Circular No. AFF-04-01,
otherwise known as the Rules Governing Philippine Citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 and Memorandum Circular No.
AFF-05-002 (Revised Rules) and Administrative Order No. 91, Series of 2004 issued by the Bureau of Immigration.
Thus, petitioner s oath of office as Provincial Administrator cannot be considered as the oath of allegiance in
compliance with R.A. No. 9225.
These circumstances, taken together, show that a doubt was clearly cast on petitioner s citizenship. Petitioner,
however, failed to clear such doubt.7
11. It may need pointing out that there is no conflict between the COMELEC and the HRET insofar as the
petitioner s being a Representative of Marinduque is concerned. The COMELEC covers the matter of
petitioner s certificate of candidacy, and its due course or its cancellation, which are the pivotal conclusions
that determines who can be legally proclaimed. The matter can go to the Supreme Court but not as a
continuation of the proceedings in the COMELEC, which has in fact ended, but on an original action before
the Court grounded on more than mere error of judgment but on error of jurisdiction for grave abuse of
discretion. At and after the COMELEC En Bane decision, there is no longer any certificate cancellation
matter than can go to the HRET. In that sense, the HRET s constitutional authority opens, over the
qualification of its MEMBER, who becomes so only upon a duly and legally based proclamation, the first and
unavoidable step towards such membership. The HRET jurisdiction over the qualification of the Member of
the House of Representatives is original and exclusive, and as such, proceeds de novo unhampered by the
proceedings in the COMELEC which, as just stated has been terminated. The HRET proceedings is a
regular, not summary, proceeding. It will determine who should be the Member of the House. It must be
made clear though, at the risk of repetitiveness, that no hiatus occurs in the representation of Marinduque in
the House because there is such a representative who shall sit as the HRET proceedings are had till
termination. Such representative is the duly proclaimed winner resulting from the terminated case of
cancellation of certificate of candidacy of petitioner. The petitioner is not, cannot, be that representative. And
this, all in all, is the crux of the dispute between the parties: who shall sit in the House in representation of
Marinduque, while there is yet no HRET decision on the qualifications of the Member.
12. As finale, and as explained in the discussion just done, no unwarranted haste can be attributed, as the
dissent does so, to the resolution of this petition promulgated on 25 June 2013. It was not done to prevent
the exercise by the HRET of its constitutional duty. Quite the contrary, the speedy resolution of the petition
was done to pave the way for the unimpeded performance by the HRET of its constitutional role. The
petitioner can very well invoke the authority of the HRET, but not as a sitting member of the House of
Representatives.8
The inhibition of this ponente was moved for. The reason for the denial of the motion was contained in a letter to the
members of the Court on the understanding that the matter was internal to the Court. The ponente now seeks the
Courts approval to have the explanation published as it is now appended to this Resolution.
The motion to withdraw petition filed AFTER the Court has acted thereon, is noted. It may well be in order to remind
petitioner that jurisdiction, once acquired, is not lost upon the instance of the parties, but continues until the case is
terminated.9 When petitioner filed her Petition for Certiorari jurisdiction vested in the Court and, in fact, the Court
exercised such jurisdiction when it acted on the petition. Such jurisdiction cannot be lost by the unilateral withdrawal
of the petition by petitioner.
More importantly, the Resolution dated 25 June 2013, being a valid court issuance, undoubtedly has legal
consequences. Petitioner cannot, by the mere expediency of withdrawing the petition, negative and nullify the
Court's Resolution and its legal effects. At this point, we counsel petitioner against trifling with court processes.
Having sought the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, petitioner cannot withdraw her petition to erase the ruling
adverse to her interests. Obviously, she cannot, as she designed below, subject to her predilections the supremacy
of the law.
WHEREFORE, The Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED. The dismissal of the petition is affirmed. Entry of
Judgment is ordered.
SO ORDERED.