Psychological Reports: Sociocultural Issues in Psychology
2013, 113, 1, 107-117. © Psychological Reports 2013
RESPONDING TO MORAL DILEMMAS: THE ROLES OF EMPATHY
AND COLLECTIVIST VALUES AMONG THE CHINESE1
STEPHEN K. F. MANN
VIVIANA CHENG
Department of Rehabilitation and Social
Sciences
Tung Wah College
Hong Kong SAR, China
HKU Family Institute, The University of
Hong Kong
The Academy of Family Therapy
Hong Kong SAR, China
Summary.—The present study assessed how empathy and vertical collectivism
are related to moral competency in a sample of Hong Kong Chinese university students (N = 153; 70 men, 83 women). The Emotional Tendency Scale, IndividualismCollectivism Scale, and Moral Judgment Test were used to quantify empathy, vertical collectivism, and moral competency, respectively. Results showed that empathy
was not statistically significantly correlated with moral judgment. The interaction
of vertical collectivism and empathy predicted a theoretically important portion of
the variance in moral competency. The role of culture in moral development was
discussed.
In Western philosophical tradition, one of the most significant disputes is that between moral rationalists and moral sentimentalists (Gill,
2007). Moral rationalists believe that morality originated from reason
and that all creatures with sufficient rationality should arrive at roughly
the same moral conclusions, paving the way for the idea that objectively
true moral claims are irrespective of culture (Kohlberg, 1971). In contrast,
moral sentimentalists maintain that morality derives from extant emotions at a specific moment in time. Some philosophers consider this a view
on the nature of moral facts or moral beliefs while others regard it as a justification of moral beliefs.
Recent brain imaging (Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, &
Cohen, 2001) and social psychology (Bartels, 2008; Greene, Morelli,
Lowenberg, Nystrom, & Cohen, 2008) studies have consistently suggested that, when making moral judgments, people are in fact making a
culture-specific emotional appraisal (Kitayama & Markus, 1994; Shweder
& Haidt, 2002). This indicates that while emotional reaction is associated
with morality, it does not provide any information about antecedents. On
the other hand, emotional expression in itself is known to vary by culture.
Ekman and his colleagues (Ekman, Friesen, O'Sullivan, Chan, Diacoyanni-Tarlatzis, Heider, et al., 1987) studied 10 cultures and reported vast
differences in the intensity ratings of facial expressions of emotion. In their
Address correspondence to Dr. Stephen K. F. Mann, Department of Rehabilitation and Social
Sciences, Tung Wah College of Hong Kong, 31 Wylie Road, Ho Man Tin, Kowloon, HKSAR,
China or e-mail (stephenmann@twc.edu.hk).
1
DOI 10.2466/17.21.PR0.113x14z6
11-PR_Mann-130038.indd 107
ISSN 0033-2941
04/11/13 6:47 PM
108
S. K. F. MANN & V. CHENG
study, Asian participants gave lower intensity ratings of faces expressing happiness, surprise, and fear as compared to non-Asian participants.
The authors found that people act in relation to culturally learned rules
that confine how emotional expressions are to be perceived. Other studies have also found cultural values and practices to shape emotion-related
behavior more than temperamental factors such as neuroticism and extraversion (Tsai, Levenson, & McCoy, 2006).
Culture refers to values, norms, and beliefs that are socially shared
amongst a group of individuals in everyday practice (Kroeber & Kluckhohn, 1952). Cultures can be characterized as individualist or collectivist (Triandis, 1995). According to Hofstede (1980), individualistic societies
emphasize “I” consciousness and emphasize autonomy, emotional independence, right to privacy, pleasure seeking, financial security, and universalism (Hofstede, 1980). On the other hand, collectivistic societies
underscore the “we” consciousness, emphasizing collective identity, emotional dependence, sharing, duties and obligations, group decisions, and
particularism (Hofstede, 1991).
Among the many definitions of collectivistic values, vertical collectivistic orientation, defined as “perceiving the self as a part (or an aspect) of
a collective and accepting inequalities within the collective” (Singelis, Triandis, Bhawuk, & Gelfand, 1995), is an accurate picture of collectivism in
Chinese culture. The ‘Doctrine of the Mean’ (zhong yong) is one of the Chinese Confucian classics on teachings of ethics. According to this doctrine,
humans are considered a genuine part of a balanced universe, with an
instinctive moral sense to maintain harmony (Bond & Hwang, 2008; Sun,
2008). Cross-cultural studies have repeatedly demonstrated that Asians
are more likely to demonstrate a dialectical emotional style in comparison
to Americans. In support of this finding, the frequency of experiencing
pleasant and unpleasant emotions has been found to be more consistent among Asians than non-Asians (Schimmack, Oishi, & Diener, 2002).
Asians were often found to allow coexistence of positive and negative
emotions, such as being happy and sad, while Westerners attempted to
resolve such contradictions, and balances were seen as impossible (Peng
& Nisbett, 1999).
Duan, Wei, and Wang (2008) found that dispositional intellectual
empathy and empathic emotion were positively associated with collectivism. Unlike individualists, collectivists were found to be more likely
to use “other-focus” as their primary referent and to feel the emotions
of others (Kitayama & Markus, 1994). Collectivists may also display an
inclination to prioritize the needs of the collective over their own while
developing empathy. Thus, collectivistic values could be considered a cultural drive that facilitates empathy both intellectually and emotionally. If
11-PR_Mann-130038.indd 108
04/11/13 6:47 PM
MORALITY, EMPATHY, AND COLLECTIVISM
109
cultural conditions and rules governed the emotional engagement process, such rules and conditions may also exert an effect on moral judgment
(Hoffman, 2000). This is supported by qualitative research conducted in
Japan, where Japanese boys were found to regard the morality of care
in a vignette (Gilligan & Wiggins, 1987) as a societal norm (Shimizu,
2001). In this study, Japanese participants challenged Kohlberg's “Heinz's
dilemma”, which is a moral dilemma involving a poor husband stealing a
drug for his dying wife. The scenario depicted in the vignette was viewed
as negligence of the relational and collective basis of individual moral
decisions (Iwasa, 1989). The authors found that morality was considered
an extension beyond the boys' personal feelings and their care orientation was expressed as a communal responsibility. In a subsequent study
that evaluated cross-cultural differences in moral development according
to Kohlberg's theory, it was found that unlike their American matched
counterparts, Japanese adolescents were against the husband stealing the
drug for his dying wife. This initiated an interesting argument that highlights cultural differences in moral decision making (Iwasa, 1992). Based
on findings as such, a moral judgment could be regarded as a socially and
culturally agreed-upon norm of individual conduct, not solely as a personal decision.
Current research has shown that the disposition of emotional
responses is significantly affected by cultural conditions and rules; for
instance, there are significant differences in how Asians and Americans
view the valence of emotions. Empathy can lead to personal distress or
empathic concerns. When encountering moral dilemmas, this emotional
response prevails rational thinking, especially when an individual needs
to make ultimate decisions.
In view of the limited attempts made insofar to investigate how cultural values affect moral judgment, the purpose of this study was to evaluate the relationships among moral judgment, cultural values, and empathy
among a group of Hong Kong Chinese university students.
Hypothesis. Vertical collectivism, a value that is deeply ingrained
in the Chinese culture, will be correlated with empathy and
both variables will affect moral judgments.
METHOD
Participants
Participants (N = 150; 70 men, 83 women) with a mean age of 23.9 yr.
(SD = 5.6) were recruited from the campuses of two universities in Hong
Kong. More than 88% of the participants had achieved undergraduate or
higher education levels (Table 1), 37.9% reported religious affiliations and
the majority (86%) of them had been born in Hong Kong.
11-PR_Mann-130038.indd 109
04/11/13 6:47 PM
110
S. K. F. MANN & V. CHENG
TABLE 1
DEMOGRAPHIC DATA FOR PARTICIPANTS
Variable
Sex
Educational level
N
%
Women
Group
83
54.2
Men
70
45.8
Secondary
17
11.1
University
116
75.8
Graduate school
Place of birth
Hong Kong
Mainland China
Other
Religious affiliation
Mother language
Self-perceived ethnicity
Protestant
20
13.1
131
85.6
20
13.1
2
1.3
36
23.5
Catholic
7
4.6
Buddhist
15
9.8
No religious belief
95
62.1
Cantonese
151
98.7
Putonghua
2
1.3
10
6.5
103
67.3
39
25.5
Chinese (General)
Hong Kong
Chinese (Mainland)
Procedure
Ethical approval was granted by the Ethics Review Committee of a
university in Hong Kong. The tests were conducted individually in a quiet
room at a university. Since the Moral Judgment Test required participants
to make moral judgments of two scenarios, it was administered first at the
beginning of the session to avoid possible hypothesis guessing. Standard
instructions for the test were used at the beginning of the test administration. Participants were then administered the Emotional Empathic Tendency Scale (EETS) and the Individualism-Collectivism Scale (ICS). Data
analysis involved calculating the overall scores on the EETS, the Vertical
collectivism score from the ICS, and the C-index of the Moral Judgment
Test.
Measures
Emotional empathy.—The Emotional Empathic Tendency Scale developed by Mehrabian and Epstein (1972) was used to evaluate the emotional engagement and the self-perceived empathy of the participants
in this study. The EETS is a self-report measurement that defines emotional empathy as “the heightened responsiveness to another's emotional
experience.” It does not measure “cognitive empathy,” which refers to the
11-PR_Mann-130038.indd 110
04/11/13 6:47 PM
MORALITY, EMPATHY, AND COLLECTIVISM
111
TABLE 2
SAMPLE ITEMS OF EMOTIONAL EMPATHIC TENDENCY SCALE
Item No.
1.
Item Content
It makes me sad to see a lonely stranger in a group.
10.
The people around me have a great influence on my moods.
16.
Seeing people cry upsets me.
29.
It upsets me to see struggling older people.
31.
I become very involved when I watch a movie.
ability to intellectually simulate the perspective of another person (Chlopan, McCain, Carbonell, & Hagen, 1985). The EETS consists of 33 items
assessed on a 9-point response scale with anchors −4: Very strong disagreement and +4: Very strong agreement. The scale contains seven subscales, but only the total score is normally reported in the literature (Davis,
1996). Sample items of the EETS could be found in Table 2. High internal
consistency reliability (α = .87) (Mehrabian, 1996) and satisfactory psychometric properties (Hojat, 2007) of the EETS have been reported in previous
studies. The internal consistency reliability (Cronbach α) of the scale was
.81 in the present study.
TABLE 3
SAMPLE ITEMS OF INDIVIDUALISM-COLLECTIVISM SCALE
Item No.
2.
Item Content
I would do what pleases my family, even if I detested that activity.
3.
I usually sacrifice my self-interest for the benefit of my group.
7.
Children should feel honored if their parents receive a distinguished award.
12.
I would sacrifice an activity that I enjoy very much if my family did not
approve of it.
Collectivism.—A shortened version of the Individualism-Collectivism Scale (ICS) was employed to measure the vertical collectivism of the
participants (Singelis, et al., 1995). The 14-item scale evaluates four cultural orientations, one of which is Vertical collectivism. Respondents indicated their agreement on each of the 14 items on a five-point scale with
anchors 1: Strongly agree and 5: Strongly disagree. Significant correlations
between the subscales have been found in previous research (Singelis,
et al., 1995). Sample items are shown in Table 3. Items 2, 3, 7, and 12 comprise the Vertical collectivism scale (Singelis, et al., 1995). The total score
on these items was used in the present study. The internal consistency reliability (α) of these items was .60, indicating poor reliability. However, as
this is the only available scale measuring individualism and collectivism
in Chinese, it was used without modification in this preliminary study.
11-PR_Mann-130038.indd 111
04/11/13 6:47 PM
112
S. K. F. MANN & V. CHENG
Moral competence.—The Moral Judgment Test (MJT) was developed
by Lind (1998) to measure an individual's moral competence by assessing
how the respondent dealt with counter-arguments and arguments related
to his or her own judgments in each scenario. It also assesses the respondent's moral ideals, which correspond to each stage of moral reasoning
as defined by Kohlberg (1984). The resulting C-index is a measure of the
extent to which the respondent's judgments about these arguments is
based on moral standpoints or non-moral considerations. In other words,
the C-index reflects the ability to judge arguments in relation to their
moral quality (Lind, 1998). Ranging from 1 to 100, the C-index shows the
percentage of an individual's total response variation due to concern for
the moral quality of the given arguments or behavior.
Demographic questionnaire.—A research assistant collected the participants' basic demographic information, which included personal details
such as (a) sex, (b), age, (c) ethnicity, (d) educational level, and (e) religious
orientation.
Analysis
To check the assumptions of multiple regression analysis, the following preliminary analyses were conducted (de Vaus, 2002). In terms
of linearity, the actual standardized residual values of dependent variables were tested against their corresponding predicted residual values,
and the result indicated a linear relationship. Potential outliers (i.e., more
than three standard deviation units from the mean) were also identified
by inspecting the scatter plots and standardized residual plots. Skew and
kurtosis values were acceptable (i.e., less than two times the standard
error of measurement values for the various distributions) and no outliers were found.
To explore the basic characteristics of the data, differences in empathy,
collectivism, and moral competency by gender and educational background
of participants were compared. Initial analyses revealed small, statistically significant differences in the EETS scores between men and women
(t151 = –4.31, p < .001, r2 = .11) and in Vertical collectivism scores between people with and without religious affiliation (t151 = –2.21, p < .005, r2 = .03).
RESULTS
Correlations between age, gender, and measures of Vertical collectivism, Empathy, Vertical collectivism × Empathy, and Moral competency are
shown in Table 4. In order to rectify potential multicollinearity problems,
mean centering of the predictors was done before the regression analysis (the sample mean was subtracted from each observed value of the
predictors). In addition, as there was a significant difference in the Vertical collectivism between the participants with and without religious
11-PR_Mann-130038.indd 112
04/11/13 6:47 PM
113
MORALITY, EMPATHY, AND COLLECTIVISM
TABLE 4
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN MEASURES AGE, GENDER, VERTICAL COLLECTIVISM, EMPATHY, VERTICAL
COLLECTIVISM × EMPATHY, AND MORAL COMPETENCY
Measure
1.
Age
−.03
1. Gender
2.
3.
4.
Moral Competency
−.12
.04
.04
−.17
−.05
.35†
.35†
.05
2. Vertical collectivism
−.06
3. Empathy
.13
.03
.96†
−.04
4. Vertical collectivism × Empathy
†p < .01 (2-tailed).
−.05
affiliation, this was used as a weighting variable in the analysis. Weighted
least square (WLS) regression analysis was then conducted to see if sex of
participant or vertical collectivism or empathy scores and their interaction
terms predicted variance in Moral competency score (C-index). The combination of predictors explained about 9% of the variance in the C-index
(R2 = .09, F6,147 = 2.24, p < .05) as shown in Table 5. The beta coefficient of
the interaction Vertical collectivism × Empathy was statistically significant
(β = –0.24, p < .05).
TABLE 5
PARTIAL REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS OF GENDER, VERTICAL COLLECTIVISM, EMPATHY, GENDER BY
VERTICAL COLLECTIVISM, GENDER BY EMPATHY, AND VERTICAL COLLECTIVISM BY EMPATHY AND
MORAL COMPETENCY
Source
Constant
Moral Competency
B
SE
0.26
0.06
β
0.04
0.03
0.10
Vertical collectivism
−0.44
0.03
−0.52
Empathy
Gendera
−0.01
0.01
−0.47
Gender × Vertical
collectivism
0.03
0.02
0.59
Gender × Empathy
0.01
0.01
0.44
R2
F
.09
2.24*
Vertical collectivism ×
0.00
0.00
−0.24*
Empathy
a.
Coded 1 = male, 2 = female. β denotes the standardized beta coefficients. B denotes the
unstandardized beta coefficients. *p < .05.
DISCUSSION
The relations among cultural values, moral judgment, and empathy were investigated in a group of local Hong Kong Chinese university
11-PR_Mann-130038.indd 113
04/11/13 6:47 PM
114
S. K. F. MANN & V. CHENG
students. Contrary to previous research findings (Barnett, Howard,
King, & Dino, 1981; Eisenberg, 2000; Greene, et al., 2001), the correlation
between Moral competency and Empathy was found to be non-significant. This suggests that when an individual makes a moral judgment,
the role of empathy is likely to be included with other psychological
functions and empathy is not solely responsible for the individual's
moral decision. Yet, emotion may be involved in an individual's judgment and could be a motivator. While several studies have demonstrated that a strong emotional stimulus affects one's response to moral
scenarios, the precise point at which emotion affects one's moral judgment remains unknown. There is also insufficient neurological evidence
to demonstrate that emotion is necessary for making moral judgment
(Huebner, Dwyer, & Hauser, 2008).
Vertical collectivism was shown to interact with empathy in a way
that had a small influence on Moral Judgment Test scores. As mentioned
previously, vertical collectivism in Asia is based on Confucian teaching,
which is deeply ingrained in the culture of many Asian societies. Since it is
such a dominating cultural value among the Chinese, it inevitably affects
cognitive appraisals. Socialization under this traditional value would
lead to cultural-specific cognitive moral schemas (Shore, 1996), as well as
unique holistic and analytic reasoning patterns (Peng & Nisbett, 1999).
The cognitive schemas of an individual from a collectivistic culture may
play a role in emotional responses, which are hypothesized to affect that
individual's moral judgments.
A collectivistic orientation does not merely prepare the individual
to empathize with others; it also encourages socially conforming behaviors. These are crucial dispositions of emotional as well as cognitive empathy. The ability to empathize is an important part of an individual's social
and cognitive development. As one behaves in a certain way, it inevitably affects relationships with others. The interaction of vertical collectivism and empathy on moral competency found in the present study adds
new insight to the model of the processes underlying moral judgment
suggested by Greene (Greene, et al., 2001). It also hints at aspects of development in empathic understanding. While Western philosophy may consider certain emotions such as being happy or sad to be in conflict with
each other, a dialectical way of thinking sees them as compatible. This paradigm would most certainly influence one's conceptions and perception
of emotions. Although empathy is an emotional process, it also involves
social and cultural considerations and appraisals. The role empathy plays
in relation to emotion is expected to manifest differently in Asian compared to Western societies.
11-PR_Mann-130038.indd 114
04/11/13 6:47 PM
MORALITY, EMPATHY, AND COLLECTIVISM
115
Limitations
Two major limitations could be identified. Firstly, a self-rated measure of empathy was used to assess both the affective predispositions and
the social desirability responses of the participants in this study. As being
socially desirable is crucial for individuals from collectivistic cultures like
the Chinese, social desirability is often placed before one's personal feelings and perceptions. This may lead to biases in the results, as participants
may attempt to present themselves in a more favorable way. It is also common for individuals in collectivistic cultures to “fake good” to conform to
socially acceptable values and gain social endorsement, an argument supported by a study conducted by Huang and colleagues (Huang, Liao, &
Chang, 1998), which showed that social desirability response bias threatened the validity of a questionnaire.
Secondly, previous research has questioned whether or not emotional
arousal during real-life moral dilemmas could be fully engaged during
moral forecasting when using self-report measures of morality (Temper,
Inzlicht, & Page-Gould, 2011). In studies that compared moral judgment
using real-life situations and self-report questionnaires, contradictory
results have been reported. While Temper and colleagues (Temper, et al.,
2011) suggested that individuals may imagine themselves as being more
selfish than they really are in the absence of emotional arousal, such as
participating in a research study, Batson and Thompson (2001) held that
both moral hypocrisy and overpowered integrity are major factors that
make self-reported moral people behave immorally under real-life situations. This suggests that moral hypocrisy is especially strong among people who scored high on their self-report measure of moral responsibility,
and hence presents as another bias in the present study.
Conclusions
Results suggest that when making moral decisions, empathy is likely
to act together with other psychological functions. An individual's moral
decisions may be affected by socialization, supporting the hypothesis that
moral competency is indeed affected by culture.
REFERENCES
BARNETT, M. A., HOWARD, J. A., KING, L. M., & DINO, G. A. (1981) Helping behavior and
the transfer of empathy. The Journal of Social Psychology, 115, 125-132.
BARTELS, D. (2008) Principled moral sentiment and the flexibility of moral judgment and
decision making. Cognition, 108, 381-417.
BATSON, C. D., & THOMPSON, E. R. (2001) Why don't moral people act morally? Motivational considerations. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 10, 54-57.
BOND, M. H., & HWANG, K. (2008) The social psychology of Chinese people. In M. H.
Bond (Ed.), The psychology of the Chinese people. Hong Kong: Chinese Univer. Press.
11-PR_Mann-130038.indd 115
04/11/13 6:47 PM
116
S. K. F. MANN & V. CHENG
CHLOPAN, B. E., MCCAIN, M. L., CARBONELL, J. L., & HAGEN, R. L. (1985) Empathy: review
of available measures. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 48, 635-653.
DAVIS, M. H. (1996) Empathy: a social psychological approach. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
DE VAUS, D. (2002) Analyzing social science data. London: Sage.
DUAN, C., WEI, M., & WANG, L. (2008) The role of individualism-collectivism in empathy: an exploratory study. Asian Journal of Counselling, 15, 57-81.
EISENBERG, N. (2000) Emotion, regulation, and moral development. Annual Review of
Psychology, 51, 665-697.
EKMAN, P., FRIESEN, W. V., O'SULLIVAN, M., CHAN, A., DIACOYANNI-TARLATZIS, I., HEIDER, K.,
KRAUSE, R., LECOMPTE, W. A., PITCAIRN, T., RICCI-BITTI, P. E., SCHERER, K., TOMITA, M.,
& TZAVARAS, A. (1987) Universals and cultural differences in the judgments of facial
expressions of emotion. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 53, 712-717.
GILL, M. B. (2007) Moral rationalism vs. moral sentimentalism: is morality more like
math or beauty? Philosophy Compass, 2, 16-30.
GILLIGAN, C., & WIGGINS, G. (1987) The origins of morality in early childhood relationships. In J. Kagan & S. Lamb (Eds.), The emergence of morality in young children.
Chicago, IL: Univer. of Chicago Press. Pp. 277-305.
GREENE, J. D., MORELLI, S., LOWENBERG, K., NYSTROM, L. E., & COHEN, J. D. (2008) Cognitive
load selectively interferes with utilitarian moral judgment. Cognition, 107, 11441154.
GREENE, J. D., SOMMERVILLE, R. B., NYSTROM, L. E., DARLEY, J. M., & COHEN, J. D. (2001)
An fMRI investigation of emotional engagement in moral judgment. Science, 293,
2105-2108.
HOFFMAN, M. L. (2000) Empathy and moral development: implications for caring and justice.
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univer. Press.
HOFSTEDE, G. (1980) Culture's consequences: international differences in work-related values.
Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
HOFSTEDE, G. (1991) Cultures and organizations: software of the mind: intercultural cooperation and its importance for survival. Cambridge, UK: McGraw-Hill.
HOJAT, M. (2007) Empathy in patient care: antecedents, developments, measurement, and outcome. New York: Springer.
HUANG, C., LIAO, H., & CHANG, S. (1998) Social desirability and the clinical self-report
inventory: methodological reconsideration. Journal of Clinical Psychology, 54, 517528.
HUEBNER, B., DWYER, S., & HAUSER, M. (2008) The role of emotion in moral psychology.
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 13(1), 1-6.
IWASA, N. (1989) Situational considerations in moral judgment: a Japan-United States
comparison. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Harvard Univer.
IWASA, N. (1992) Postconventional reasoning and moral education in Japan. Journal of
Moral Education, 21, 3-16.
KITAYAMA, S., & MARKUS, H. R. (1994) Emotion and culture: empirical studies of mutual influence. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
KOHLBERG, L. (1971) From is to ought: how to commit the naturalistic fallacy and get
away with it in the study of moral development. In T. Mischel (Ed.), Cognitive
development and epistemology. New York: Academic Press. Pp. 151-235.
11-PR_Mann-130038.indd 116
04/11/13 6:47 PM
MORALITY, EMPATHY, AND COLLECTIVISM
117
KOHLBERG, L. (1984) Essays on moral development: the psychology of moral development.
(Vol. 2) San Francisco, CA: Harper & Row.
KROEBER, A. L., & KLUCKHOHN, C. (1952) Culture: a critical review of concepts and definitions.
Peabody Museum of Archaeology and Ethnology at Harvard Univer., Papers 47.
LIND, G. (1998) An introduction to the Moral Judgment Test (MJT). University of Konstanz,
Germany.
MEHRABIAN, A. (1996) Manual for the Balanced Emotional Empathy Scale (BEES). Monterey,
CA: Author.
MEHRABIAN, A., & EPSTEIN, N. (1972) A measure of emotional empathy. Journal of Personality, 40, 525-543.
MEHRABIAN, A., YOUNG, A. L., & SATO, S. (1988) Emotional empathy and associated individual differences. Current Psychology: Research and Reviews, 7, 221-240.
PENG, K., & NISBETT, R. E. (1999) Culture, dialectics, and reasoning about contradiction.
American Psychologist, 54, 741-754.
SCHIMMACK, U., OISHI, S., & DIENER, E. (2002) Cultural influences on the relation between
pleasant emotions and unpleasant emotions: Asian dialectic philosophies or individualism-collectivism? Cognition & Emotion, 16, 705-719.
SHIMIZU, H. (2001) Japanese adolescent boys' senses of empathy (Omoiyari) and Carol
Gilligan's perspectives on the morality of care: a phenomenological approach.
Culture and Psychology, 7, 453-474.
SHORE, B. (1996) Culture in mind: cognition, culture and the problem of meaning. New York:
Oxford Univer. Press.
SHWEDER, R. A., & HAIDT, J. (2002) The cultural psychology of the emotions: ancient and
new. In R. A. Sweder (Ed.), Why do men barbecue? Recipes for cultural psychology.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univer. Press. Pp. 51-63.
SINGELIS, T. M., TRIANDIS, D., BHAWUK, P. S., & GELFAND, M. J. (1995) Horizontal and vertical dimensions of individualism and collectivism: a theoretical and measurement
refinement. Cross-Cultural Research, 29, 240-275.
SUN, C. T. (2008) Themes in Chinese psychology. Singapore: Cengage Learning.
TEMPER, R., INZLICHT, M., & PAGE-GOULD, E. (2011) Are we more moral than we think?:
exploring the role of affect in moral behavior and moral forcasting. Psychological
Science, 22, 553-558.
TRIANDIS, H. C. (1995) Individualism and collectivism. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
TSAI, J. L., LEVENSON, R. W., & MCCOY, K. (2006) Cultural and temperamental variation in
emotional responses. Emotion, 6, 484-497.
Accepted July 10, 2013.
11-PR_Mann-130038.indd 117
04/11/13 6:47 PM
Copyright of Psychological Reports is the property of Ammons Scientific, Ltd. and its content
may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright
holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for
individual use.