Smith & Birkland: Institutional Dimensions
International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters
August 2012, Vol. 30, No. 2, pp. 147–170.
Building a Theory of Recovery: Institutional Dimensions
Gavin Smith
Department of City and Regional Planning
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Thomas Birkland
Department of Public Administration
North Carolina State University
Email: gavin_smith@unc.edu
This article discusses the institutional arrangements that influence pre-disaster planning
for recovery, and, more importantly, post-disaster recovery outcomes. The importance
and value of planning for disaster recovery is well known in the disaster literature,
although not often practiced as well as it could be. A theory of disaster recovery must
therefore account for the institutional environment referred to here as the disaster
recovery assistance framework. Describing the underlying dimensions of this network
will help to clarify the process of recovery, uncover ways to improve recovery outcomes,
and define the factors that influence the achievement of improved outcomes. Part of the
challenge will be in defining these improved outcomes, which could include increased
levels of disaster resilience or achieving a more sustainable disaster recovery.
Keywords: Disaster recovery, disaster recovery assistance network, planning
This article discusses the institutional arrangements that influence pre-disaster
planning for recovery, and, more importantly, post-disaster recovery outcomes. The
importance and value of planning for disaster recovery is well known in the disaster
literature, although not often practiced as well as it could be. A theory of disaster
recovery must therefore account for the institutional environment referred to here as the
disaster recovery assistance framework. Describing the underlying dimensions of this
network will help to clarify the process of recovery, uncover ways to improve recovery
outcomes, and define the factors that influence the achievement of improved outcomes.
Part of the challenge will be in defining these improved outcomes, which could include
increased levels of disaster resilience or achieving a more sustainable disaster recovery.
Berke, Kartez and Wenger note “Research is needed on how institutional arrangements
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act as incentives or barriers to adapting responses that meet local needs, capacities, and
opportunities during recovery” (Berke, Kartez, and Wenger 1993: 98). This observation
is still relevant today.
The underlying nature of the disaster recovery assistance framework is defined by the
actions of a fragmented network of different stakeholder groups who provide disaster
recovery assistance. Members of this network include public sector organizations (federal,
state, and local governments); quasi-governmental and nongovernmental organizations
(community development corporations, homeowners’ associations, special service
districts, regional planning organizations, professional associations, and colleges and
universities); nonprofit relief organizations (nonprofits, community-based organizations,
and foundations); private sector organizations (businesses and corporations, financial and
lending institutions, insurance, and media); international relief organizations and nations;
and emergent groups and individuals. These groups provide three types of resources:
financing, policies, and technical assistance.
In its simplest form, disaster recovery is often described as the pursuit, distribution,
and management of financial resources (Bates and Peacock 1987; Friesma 1979; Platt
1999). Indeed, financial assistance regularly exceeds hundreds of millions of dollars during
“routine” presidential disaster declarations and billions of dollars following larger events,
such as the Northridge Earthquake (1994), Hurricane Andrew (1992), the Midwest Floods
(1993), Hurricane Katrina (2005), and Hurricane Ike (2008). The intergovernmental
system of disaster relief and recovery assistance is designed to respond to these large
events and a number of smaller ones. Moreover, it is well known that the threshold for a
disaster declaration, and concomitant federal funding, has changed since the late 1980s.
Many “disasters” today would not have qualified for federal disaster assistance before the
1990s. Still, even with this broader set of federally declared disasters, most U.S. disasters
are small, localized events that do not meet federal disaster declaration criteria and
therefore do not receive federal financial assistance. The communities struck by these
disasters must therefore rely on a local assistance network.
Even as more events are categorized as federal disasters, in larger events we know
that financial assistance may not reach those communities that need it the most, where
need is defined as limited local capacity to respond to and recover from an event (Burby
1991). Moreover, those communities that receive financial assistance do not always
recover “better” or “faster” than those that do not (Roenigk 1993). This is because the
prescriptive nature of federal assistance, which tends to dominate the overall
distributional “shape” of the framework, often fails to meet local needs. The overreliance
on federal monetary assistance can impede attempts to implement important federal and
state-level policy changes, adopt new outreach and educational programs focused on
capacity building, or initiate pre-event programs at the community level, including
recovery planning that takes into account different scales of disaster. These problems are
elements of what risk analysts call “moral hazard,” which is when people tend not to
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avoid or mitigate risks when they believe that someone else will make them whole after a
disaster. At the same time, many hazard scholars have found that the pre- and postdisaster releases of federal assistance funds were most successful when agencies
developed partnerships with local community groups, nonprofits, and regional
organizations (Dyer 1999; Mileti 1999; Peacock, Morrow, and Gladwin 1997; Welsh and
Esnard 2009). In sum, recovery is more efficient and more effective when planning and
partnership development precedes a disaster, rather than following it.
Thus, a central premise of an improved disaster recovery assistance framework is an
increased emphasis on assisting communities to plan for disaster recovery. Evidence
shows that pre-event planning can create the impetus to effect policy change and
maximize various forms of financial assistance that lead to positive outcomes following a
disaster (Ohlsen and Rubin 1993; Schwab 1998; Skinner and Becker 1995). Theoretically,
major disasters should spark at least some greater attention to the problems of natural
disasters, with a high likelihood of policy change (Birkland 1997). Frederick Bates and
Walter Peacock have shown that major disasters can spark social and political change,
but only if the delivery, timing, and scope of pre- and post-event assistance are
considered (Bates and Peacock 1987).
Technical assistance, such as training, education, and outreach initiatives, serves an
important coordinative function in the pre- and post-disaster environments, affecting
financial and policy-related outcomes. Most disaster recovery training and educational
programs are conducted on an ad hoc basis and are focused on the administration of
federal programs rather than on a collaboratively designed, locally tailored training
agenda that emphasizes a long-term commitment to capacity-building strategies across
the broader assistance network. The provision of assistance, including that which may
change the pre-event social, political, or economic milieu, benefits from an ongoing
dialogue across the provider network. Ideally, local stakeholders guide this dialogue.
Robert Kates, summarizing the work of his colleagues notes that advisory services
provided by outside technical experts rarely alter the pre-event growth patterns and postdisaster redevelopment strategies that are advocated by entrenched development interests
(Kates 1977). Their findings were consistent with the experience of several professional
associations that attempted to alter development patterns in New Orleans and coastal
Mississippi after Hurricane Katrina (Berke, Song, and Stevens 2009; Olshansky and
Chang 2009).
The principal goals of technical assistance should be to build capacity and selfreliance (Smith and Wenger 2006). While major disasters require outside assistance to
supplement local capabilities, pre-event outreach, education, and training strategies can
strengthen partnerships across the disaster assistance network while providing incentives
for the coordination and stretching of available resourcesfunding, policy, and technical
assistance. Unfortunately, the current disaster recovery assistance framework discourages
such an approach. Compounding this problem is the inability of federal, state, and local
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governments to clearly articulate responsibilities for the management of long-term
recovery and reconstruction activities.
The characteristics that define the disaster recovery assistance framework, provide a
basis for the construction of a theory of recovery, and clarify targeted pre-event planning
and post-event actions are: 1) the relationship between the rules governing assistance and
the ability of that assistance to meet local needs, 2) the timing of program delivery, and 3)
the level of horizontal and vertical integration within and across organizations that span
the disaster recovery assistance network.
Like much work in the social sciences, this chapter contains a number of embedded
“predictions,” or hypotheses. First, we predict that recovery outcomes are improved when
pre-disaster planning and coordination occurs. We ground this in the idea that planning
for all dimensions of emergencies, disasters, and catastrophes has been shown to improve
outcomes, and that communities that plan for disasters, before and after the events, fare
better than those who do not, other things being equal (Burby and Dalton 1994).
Second, we predict that financial assistance will not reach those communities that
need it most. The distributive aspects of risk and of relief are well documented in the
literature (Platt 1999) and Hurricane Katrina revealed important differences in the
distribution of relief and recovery resources. Fundamentally, this means that wealthier
people are likely to be less vulnerable to disaster, and more resilient in terms of their
ability to withstand disaster. In this case, “wealth” is material well-being and the
nonmonetary resources—networks, information, power, and the like—that can be more
easily harnessed by wealthier people in disaster recovery (Bates and Swan 2010; Phillips
2010).We can extrapolate this to communities: communities with greater wealth and
other resources will recover more quickly than those communities that lack these
resources. This raises questions of equity, particularly when we consider that
disadvantaged communities are often more vulnerable not just because of their inherent
lack of “wealth,” but because decisions were made about features of risk and
vulnerability in these communities’ without their input or consent. In the case of
Hurricane Katrina, the Greater New Orleans Community Data Center’s data bears this
out: the impoverished lower Ninth Ward was profoundly damaged, as was wealthier
Lakeview, but Lakeview recovered faster (although neither neighborhood has fully
recovered). Thus, as a matter of equity, less wealthy neighborhoods and communities
may require greater assistance: “Neighborhoods vary greatly as to their resources and
capacity for organizing, and it will be important for City Hall to provide neighborhoods
with the tools they need to participate in land use decisions going forward” (Plyer 2010:
1).
Third, we predict that better outcomes will arise if there are cooperative partnerships
among the actors involved in the disaster recovery network. Often, a recovery network
exists without it being called “recovery network” per se, but which can use existing
networks and “social capital,” such as Father Tran’s Vietnamese community in New
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Orleans East. Identifying these loci of strong social capital, even in putatively “low social
capital” cities, is important for beginning the collaborative, cooperative recovery
planning process that would learn from the last disaster and plan for the next. As we
show here, many communities do not engage in such a process, or are constrained from
doing so by disaster assistance policies that are designed from the top-down, are therefore
inflexible, and do not adapt well to local needs and conditions.
The Rules of Assistance and Understanding Local Needs
Among the most influential factors shaping recovery outcomes are the policies
established to guide the distribution of money and the provision of technical assistance.
Regrettably, the rules governing these policies tend to be most prescriptive among those
organizations with the least understanding of local needs (Laska et al. 2010). Moreover,
the rules often change, especially following disasters (Smith 2004). More generally,
students of the policy process have, for over thirty years, known that “top-down” policy
designs often fail to achieve their goals because they fail to take into account local needs,
conditions, and capacities (Goggin 1990).
The extent to which assistance networks can navigate around and even amend disaster
recovery rules depends on a number of factors—including past disaster experience;
organizational culture; the ability of assistance recipients to communicate their needs
through their involvement in the collection, analysis, and display of pertinent information;
the presence of stakeholder advocates; access to political power and influence; and the
use of a procedural forum to identify problems, share ideas, and propose solutions (Smith
2010). The poor integration of the rules governing the distribution of assistance vis-a-vis
an understanding of local needs represents a key theme in the framework, as is evident in
Figure 1, a hypothetical representation of the configuration of most assistance networks.
The placement of stakeholder nodes along the diagonal line depicted in Figure 1
varies according to the makeup of the disaster assistance networks in different locations.
Networks contain members with varying levels of resources, experience, expertise, and
willingness to modify their programs. One network may contain an astute collection of
state officials willing to amend existing programs or develop new ones to address unmet
needs, whereas another may rely on a consortium of quasi-governmental organizations,
nonprofits, and community-based groups to coordinate recovery efforts. Changing
conditions may cause stakeholder nodes to shift over time within a network. Catalysts for
change may include access to additional resources, lessons noted or, in some cases,
learned following events, conversations with others who posit new perspectives, and
planning for disaster recovery.
The stakeholders at the upper and lower ends of the diagonal in Figure 1 most
accurately represent the central theme of the graphic: stakeholders with the most
prescriptive rules are the ones with the least understanding of local needs and vice versa.
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Those located in the middle are nominally cast in what we call a “zone of uncertainty,”
which means that practitioners and researchers generally know less about these groups,
including the roles they play in recovery, the policies that dictate their resource
distribution, and the best ways to integrate their resources into a collaborative recovery
effort that meets local needs.
Figure 1. Rules and Understanding of Local Needs
Further hindering coordination is the paternalisticand inaccurateassumption that
federal and state governments are the sources for most of the resources needed postdisaster. This belief is erroneous because the federal government, in particular, is in the
business of delivering relief and recovery resources while hewing closely to rules
intended to make such spending “accountable” in the bureaucratic sense. Furthermore,
the federal government and state governments generally do not provide all—or even
most—of the range of resources needed for pre-event planning. Furthermore, individuals,
nonprofits, small businesses, and groups that emerge after disasters, many of whom
possess critically important, locally-grounded resources, are often underutilized, illcoordinated with others, or ignored because of the failure of “higher” levels of the
assistance network to take these groups and their capacities into account. Also
overlooked in the network may be members of the private sector, which finance recovery
and reconstruction efforts and rebuild damaged communities. In fact, a growing body of
evidence suggests that nonprofit organizations (Paterson 1998), quasi-governmental
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organizations, and the private sector, including corporations, small businesses, and
consultants (Klein 2007; Sylves 2007), play a more important role in recovery than
originally thought (Shughart 2006). However, they are less discussed in the literature and
their contributions are underused in practice, in large part due to a bias on the part of
most policy makers to think of institutional actors as “official” organizations rather than
non-governmental or emergent organizations with much less formal organization. This
bias derives from the widespread belief that “policy” is primarily defined by statute and
regulation, rather than by their implementation in practice. The failure to account for
these and other contributions of the network is an unfortunate reality of disaster recovery
in the United States.
Particularly troubling is the routine exclusion of those individuals and families, local
governments, and other recipients of disaster assistance in decision-making procedures
that directly affect them. This problem, which has been more actively studied in the
international aid literature (Anderson and Woodrow 1989; Harrell-Bond 1986), is directly
relevant to any analysis of the U.S. approach to recovery. As shown in Figure 1,
individuals tend to have limited influence over the allocation of federal assistance or the
programmatic rules shaping eligibility, even though those who are directly affected by a
disaster tend to have a stronger understanding of local needs.
The failure to provide flexible programs capable of responding to local needs is partly
the result of a network in which members lack information about the assistance provided
by one another. Without this information, they are unable to consider ways to modify
their strategies to reduce duplication; find common ground in seemingly contradictory
objectives; or eliminate adverse pre-event conditions, such as social vulnerability and
inequitable decision-making practices, through post-event actions. On the other hand,
communities that develop such information-sharing venues as recovery committees or
other participatory forums are more likely to work to change the negative conditions that
existed before the event (Geipel 1991). Anthony Oliver-Smith found that in those
communities where proposed activities were clearly linked to local needs, the assistance
providers developed strategies more closely approximating existing capabilities (OliverSmith 1990). For Philip Berke and Timothy Beatley, an effective recovery planning
approach is one that emphasizes the importance of fostering a good fit between the needs of
those receiving assistance, the design of programs, and the capacity of organizations
responsible for the delivery of assistance (Berke and Beatley 1997).
Timing of Assistance
The post-disaster timing of programs, including grants-in-aid, training, information
exchange, and planning, can significantly influence the speed and quality of disaster
recovery outcomes (Olshansky 2008; Olshansky and Chang 2009; Rubin 1985). Disaster
recovery is characterized by tensions over how to strike a balance between the speed of
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recovery, the time required to develop and implement sound recovery policy informed by
ongoing deliberation (Nelson, Ehrenfeucht, and Laska 2007), and by the perceived need
to ensure accountability in the use of public resources. All too often, communities, states,
nations, and other members of the assistance network assume that time-consuming
activities like planning and other consensus-building techniques are primarily employed
after a disaster, and therefore slow the overall pace of recovery. In practice, many
stakeholders have resigned themselves to this reactive approach. But deliberation need
not excessively slow recovery, particularly if it is practiced pre-event. Pre-event planning
can limit the urge to rush to develop quick plans and processes that, while popular,
reproduce or increase vulnerability. Planning can also help stakeholders understand that
federal and state goals are not necessarily the same as community goals, and may actually
pose a number of problems during the recovery period as described throughout this
article.
To better understand the potential variations in the temporal trajectory of recovery,
both across networks and individual stakeholder groups, we must better understand how
and when assistance is provided. Each stakeholder in the network provides assistance at
some point or points over time that may include a combination of pre-event planning and
post-event actions. The failure to coordinate the timing of assistance after a disaster can
result in missed opportunities to meet pressing local needs. Perhaps most important is the
effect of limited pre-event expenditures on capacity-building techniques, including plan
making, public participation, and facilitated policy dialogue among members of the
assistance network. This can further degrade the effective use of recovery funding or the
creation of a coherent recovery strategy, both of which can affect the speed, quality, and
equitable distribution of recovery assistance following a disaster (Nelson, Ehrenfeucht,
and Laska 2007).
Figure 2 illustrates a hypothetical scenario of disaster assistance provided by two
members of the networkthe federal government and nonprofit organizationsacross
the disaster recovery continuum that further clarifies the institutional complexities of
recovery. Nonprofits often provide assistance before federal agencies have fully assessed
the situation and begun to deliver financial resources. The failure to effectively
coordinate the timing of assistance has several negative consequences. For example,
nonprofit organizations may assist others repair or rebuild their homes in high-hazard
areas to their pre-event condition before more rigorous building codes and ordinances can
be adopted or before federal grant programs can be identified and procured that can offset
some or all of the costs associated with these new standards. If the remaining members of
the assistance network and the different types of assistance they provide are added to this
scenario, it becomes evident just how complicated it is to coordinate the delivery of
assistance over time, particularly if a community has not developed a pre-disaster
recovery plan or attempts to do so in the aftermath of a disaster.
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Figure 2 also reflects how the pre-event distribution of resourcesdisaster recovery
planning; training, education, and outreach initiatives; and the funding needed to
implement themplays an important but often overlooked role in recovery. As part of
the pre-event recovery planning process, members of the assistance network should
develop a series of temporally coordinated pre- and post-disaster actions. In addition, preevent training in tasks associated with plan implementation, such as grants administration;
the assessment of hazard vulnerability, existing capabilities and local needs; and disaster
recovery exercises, are all best performed in advance of an event.
Figure 2. The Hypothetical Timing of Disaster Assistance: An Example of Federal
Government and Nonprofit Stakeholders
Robert Kates and David Pijawka describe the disaster recovery process as an orderly
series of post-disaster steps, each of which occurs sequentially over predictable periods of
time (Haas, Kates, and Bowden 1977; Kates and Pijawka 1977). Although a number of
hazard scholars have challenged this model as being overly simplistic (Berke, Kartez, and
Wenger 1993; Quarantelli 1989; Smith and Wenger 2006; Sullivan 2003; Vale and
Campanella 2005; Wilson 1991), it provides a broad conceptual understanding of the
post-disaster temporal aspects of recovery. When tested empirically with regard to the
1976 Friuli, Italy, earthquake, it was found to represent a “typical rhythm” (Geipel 1991).
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But while offering a helpful sketch of the general process of post-disaster recovery,
this model does not provide the details necessary to critically evaluate the effect of
different members of the network and the assistance they can provide. In reality,
assistance is not distributed uniformly over time by members of the disaster assistance
network, nor is it easily categorized as described by Robert Kates and David Pijawka.
The recovery process is more accurately described as a complex array of overlapping,
often uncoordinated activities, the product of a lack of pre-disaster planning, differential
access to pre- and post-disaster resources and power, prescriptive statutes and regulations,
pre- and post-disaster disputes, institutional deficiencies, and the reliance on adaptive
post-event actions (Alesch et al. 2001; Berke, Kartez, and Wenger 1993; Bolin and
Bolton 1983). This observation coincides with the more recent description of the disaster
recovery process as “a cascade of seemingly diffused events, many of which may be
interrelated” (Alesch, Arendt, and Holly 2009).
The actual recovery process varies with each disaster, both temporally and spatially.
For instance, Claire Rubin and colleagues found that reconstruction was occurring in
some locations while debris management was under way in others (Rubin, Saperstein,
and Barbee 1985). This reality, which has been corroborated in other studies of recovery
(Oliver-Smith 1990), reflects the unequal access to resources in the post-disaster
environment, which can significantly affect the speed of recovery among individuals,
groups, communities, and regions. In fact, recovery may take years or even decades to
achieve, if it happens at all; damaged infrastructure, homes, or public buildings may never
be repaired or replaced, and some segments of society may never fully recover
economically.
Horizontal and Vertical Integration
The third defining characteristic of the disaster assistance framework is the level of
coordination within and across organizations. The typology of horizontal and vertical
integration provides a tested means to explain these relationships (Berke, Kartez, and
Wenger 1993; May and Williams 1986) as well as to demonstrate how improved
interorganizational coordination can lead to a better understanding of local needs, the
crafting of less prescriptive policies and funding mechanisms, and the improved timing of
assistance.
Horizontal integration is measured by the strength of local relationships. It is defined
by the involvement of local groups and individuals in the decision-making process that is
prevalent, strong, and sustained over time. Participants may include local government
officials, quasi-governmental organizations, business owners, local financial institutions,
the media, community and emergent groups, and community residents. Inclusive
planning and policy-making strategies at the community level can strengthen horizontal
relationships. For instance, when community members are actively engaged in
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formulating a disaster recovery strategy that includes a description of how resources
(funding, policies and technical assistance) will be used to achieve community goals and
local needs, they are empowered to act rather than play the role of passive “disaster
victims” on whom assistance is imposed.
The current disaster recovery assistance framework, which is dominated by the
delivery of post-disaster financial assistance, often with a set of terms, conditions, and
processes to promote “accountability,” does not respect local capacities, needs, and the
value of pre-event investments in building stronger institutions. The larger assistance
network’s unwillingness to invest the time neededideally, before an event occursto
assess local needs and capabilities and to couple that understanding with external
assistance strategies that reflect a community’s unique conditions effectively discounts
the importance of locally grounded resources and the varied levels of horizontal
integration found in communities.
A community with poor horizontal integration lacks the stakeholder involvement
needed to develop a collective vision of recovery. Failing to include relevant local
stakeholders who possess key resources, including a deep local knowledge base and
trusted relationships, can limit the search for creative solutions and the development of
enduring agreements and plans, and can lead to further fragmentation and conflict among
those who have not been engaged in the decision-making process. Conflict can be
particularly acute after a disaster when local government officials and other communitybased members of the assistance network have not taken the time beforehand to develop
resource-allocation strategies or describe available resources to those directly impacted
by a disaster. The development of strong pre-event relationships and the sharing of
informationthrough both formal institutional vehicles such as a disaster recovery
committee and informal information dissemination channels such as nonprofits,
community groups, and faith-based organizationscan help position communities to
better confront the substantial challenges of disaster recovery. However, without an equal
commitment to building strong vertically integrated networks, communities are unable to
mine external resources or effectively argue for changes in policies that are overly
prescriptive or fail to meet local needs.
Vertical integration is defined by strong connections between members of a
community and organizations and networks that provide external assistance. Positive
linkages to state and national organizations, for instance, can result in an enhanced power
base and influence the ability to more effectively bridge the divide between overly
prescriptive programs and local needs. Strong vertical ties also apply to other members of
the assistance network, including national foundations, corporations, national lending
institutions, and insurance companies. Maintaining these vertical ties provides a way to
effectively communicate local needs and secure needed resources.
Communities with weak vertical integration have little ability to influence the
allocation of resources from outside the community. Nor do they possess a good
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understanding of the array of program rules across the network, which exacerbates the
problem of external assistance providers dictating how assistance will be provided.
Without a strong local advocate that is recognized by those providing externally based
assistance, communities are left to struggle with the administration of narrowly defined,
sometimes conflicting programs rather than being able to determine what is in their best
interest. Compounding this problem is the inability to coordinate the timing of program
delivery, which can also hinder the larger aims of a community.
Berke, Kartez, and Wenger (1993) use a horizontal and vertical integration typology
to describe the level of interorganizational coordination present during the disaster
recovery process (Figure 3). Communities that maintain strong horizontal and vertical
integration are referred to as Type 1 communities. These communities are likely to
recover more quickly than the other three types and to do so in a way that addresses
unique local needs. Type 2 communities have strong horizontal but weak vertical
integrationfor example, small, tight-knit rural communities that have not maintained
relationships with state and federal agencies or other members of the assistance network
located outside the community. Because of a limited understanding of recovery programs
and policies, including their rules and timing of delivery, Type 2 communities depend on
state emergency management agencies, private sector consultants, regional planning
organizations, professional associations, or others to provide guidance. Type 3
communities are those with weak horizontal and strong vertical integration. These
communities have a good understanding of the state and federal organizations responsible
for providing assistance, but they lack a community vision derived from meaningful
public participation and the identification of local needs, so recovery efforts tend to be
driven by federal programs that are highly prescriptive and often ill-timed relative to the
assistance delivered by other members of the network. Finally, Type 4 communities are
characterized by weak horizontal and vertical integration and are thus the least equipped
to face the challenges associated with disaster recovery. These communities can neither
effectively seek outside assistance nor coordinate the internal actions necessary to
implement recovery programs.
The disaster recovery assistance framework is beset by conflicts between program
rules and local needs; the uncoordinated timing of assistance; and often low levels of
horizontal and vertical integration. Upon further examination, however, they also indicate
strategic actionsgrounded in research findings and practicethat can be taken to
effectively confront those problems and transform the framework over time.
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Figure 3. Community Types by Degree of Horizontal and Vertical Integration
Source: Berke, Kartez, and Wenger 1993: 102.
Transforming the Disaster Recovery Assistance Framework
As has been noted, planning has the potential to positively influence the defining
characteristics of the recovery framework over timeamending overly prescriptive
policies, improving the link between pre- and post-event resources and local needs,
coordinating the timing of disaster assistance, and increasing the level of horizontal and
vertical integration (Smith and Wenger 2006). Unfortunately, most members of the
assistance network do not actively engage in pre-event planning for post-disaster
recovery. Therefore, how can we assume that planning can affect change across a
network of stakeholders that has historically relied on a post-disaster, loosely defined
adaptive strategy?
The disaster recovery assistance framework and the process of its transformation are
shown in Figure 4. The top graphic in the framework, Panels 1a1c, shows how the
various stakeholders in any local network can, through collaborative planning over time
(depicted by the time series T1, T2, and T3), gain a greater understanding of local needs,
as reflected in the shift of the diagonal line of stakeholders to a vertical position (i.e.,
T1T2). This enhanced understanding, described as part of a recovery plan’s procedural
nature and codified in its fact base (i.e. description of local demographic conditions,
settlement patterns, vulnerability to hazards, and the array of programs and policies
available to confront the challenges associated with disaster recovery), can be used to
undergird the plan’s proposed actions as they are operationalized in multiparty
agreements and policies that reflect the unique needs of the local community. Ideally,
these actions are undertaken in both the pre- and post-disaster period. Further, the plan,
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Figure 4. Transforming the Disaster Recovery Assistance Framework
Panels 1a-c
Panels 2a-c
Panels 3a-b
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including associated agreements and policies, can and should emphasize the importance
of acting collectively over time (i.e., T3) and thereby optimizing the use of the scarce
resources (funding, technical assistance, and policy) that the network can provide.
A planning-based framework is used to explore the conditions in which the disaster
recovery assistance process can function as an interconnected system guided by an
operational plan (Smith and Wenger 2006). Planning-based consensus-building
approaches provide the means to change the procedural characteristics of the disaster
recovery assistance framework while institutionalizing a community’s operational and
spatial orientation relative to hazards through the development of disaster recovery plans.
Plan making can be used to build an administrative, regulatory, and participatory tool that
guides the selection of policies reflecting local needs and conditions as well as the
identification of funding sources and technical assistance required to implement the plan.
A number of contextual factors create powerful disincentives to plan for recovery,
and they merit serious attention. The current disaster recovery assistance delivery system
is shaped by access to power and conflicts associated with the distribution of assistance
(Bates and Peacock 1987; Berke and Wenger 1991; Oliver-Smith 1990; Rubin and
Barbee 1985). Politically powerful stakeholders often seek to maintain the status quo or
benefit financially from reconstruction strategies that advance their own interests.
Astute communities can alter traditional assistance delivery mechanisms, forcing the
federal government to provide additional resources or to change the rules that govern
assistance delivery (Stehr 2001).This is particularly true, for instance, where states have
access to good pre- and post-disaster data as well as to political power (Smith 2004).
Other advantageous factors include organizations that strive to distribute assistance
equitably, state officials who develop policy and program alternatives in response to
narrowly defined federal assistance strategies, and community-based groups that emerge to
coordinate the many resources that are available after a disaster.
While planning has been shown to play an important role in hazard management,
including disaster recovery, much of what we know is derived from case study research,
not a quantitatively driven comprehensive analysis of state and local plans and their
effects on recovery outcomes. Furthermore, existing policies and programs do not
provide adequate support for disaster recovery planning. In fact, they create powerful
disincentives to develop pre-event recovery plans. The current emphasis on the delivery
of post-disaster grant programs and the nonexistent commitment to build the collective
capacity of the network to plan for recovery has effectively marginalized the role of
planning and the practicing land use planner. Viewing the recovery process as simply the
post-disaster quest for financial assistance has resulted in skewed metrics of success and
recovery outcomes that are shaped by largely prescriptive grant programs that do not
meet local needs, are inappropriately timed, and do not foster horizontal or vertical
integration.
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The issue of whether to invest in pre-event recovery plans in anticipation of a disaster
that may or may not occur or to retain the emphasis on post-disaster assistance delivery
reflects the importance of critically analyzing the timing of that assistance across the
resource-based dimensions of the framework. The second time series graphics (Panels 2a
and 2b) noted in Figure 4 represents both the traditional approach taken by a hypothetical
collection of two members of the assistance network (initially displayed as Figure 2) and
a modified approach emphasizing a greater commitment to funding for pre-event
recovery plans, hazard mitigation measures, and other identified needs; technical
assistance in the form of capacity-building initiatives, including training, education, and
outreach; and the formulation of policy that reflects the outcomes of a deliberative
planning process that strives to better address local needs while taking advantage of the
collective capacity of the larger network.
Panels 3a and 3b depict changes in the level of vertical and horizontal integration
over time. The movement from a Type 4 community to a Type 1 community, as
expressed in Figure 4, represents a linear progression that in reality may or may not
follow this simplified expression of transforming the level of vertical and horizontal
integration. In some instances, communities may remain at a given level of integration
with little change over time. Elsewhere, the movement from one type of community to
another may not occur in a sequential manner; rather, a disaster may serve as a
precipitating event that causes a multitype transformation. Communities may also regress,
transforming from a Type 1 community to a Type 4 community as part of a breakdown in
planning or the consolidation of power and post-disaster resources in the hands of a few
organizations that do not embrace collaboration across the network. Thus, the ability of
planning to function effectively must account for the realities of the current disaster
recovery assistance framework, including the limitations noted in this chapter.
Federal Policy as an Impediment to Improved Recovery
An important aspect of the assistance network that should be taken into account as we
move to a more proactive and collaborative model of preparedness and recovery is the
fundamental principle of federal disaster assistance. The federal role in disaster relief
began in earnest in about 1950, and its involvement grew rapidly in the 1990s, as FEMA
under President Clinton and James Lee Witt sought to involve the government more in
preparedness and mitigation of natural disasters, instead of civil defense planning.
But the underlying theory of government that shapes federal involvement in disasters
has hardly changed since the founding: that federal assistance should supplement local
and state responses to disasters, not supplant them. Regardless of this theory, the federal
government is often seen as by state and local governments as the funder of first resort
for all manner of activities related to disasters. FEMA and the federal government have
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also come to be broadly seen as the overall manager and funder of first resort, across all
phases of the disaster cycle.
But the Stafford Act, and various authorities related to that act, are not disaster
recovery programs. They are intended to routinize the federal government’s approach to
providing support, so as to achieve administrative efficiency, not out of a sense of charity
or compassion. The federal government’s statutory role in supporting disaster recovery,
enacted in the 1974 act and codified at 42 USC 5121(b) (7) stated that it was the intent of
Congress to “[provide] a long-range economic recovery program for major disaster areas.”
The Stafford Act removed this provision, signaling that, as a matter of law, Congress
does not view long-term recovery as a key goal in what has come to be seen as the
nation’s most important disaster management law. Emergency Support Function (ESF)
14 in the National Response Framework (NRF, formerly the National Response Plan, or
NRP) might provide policy guidance, but it simply cannot be seen as a clear statement of
legislative intent.
This is not, of course, to say that clear legislative intent will improve horizontal
integration within any one level of government, or even within any agency, not to
mention vertical integration with other stakeholders. But the very vagueness of ESF 14
and the extreme difficulty in its implementation suggests that federal thinking on support
for recovery is deficient, as was shown in Katrina’s aftermath. The degree to which this
changes with the passage of the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act and
the advent of the new National Disaster Recovery Framework, merits close attention and
could form the basis for greater clarity regarding federal roles in disaster recovery
assuming these roles and responsibilities across the assistance network are clearly
operationalized (Smith 2011).
Theories of these policy failures include the lax preparedness planning in state and
local governments, the failure of the federal government to support such planning, the
incompetence of FEMA officials in the wake of its absorption into the terrorism-obsessed
DHS, or fundamental flaws in existing laws and regulations. In most of these
explanations, we often hear about the problematic nature of federalism (or vertical
integration), which in normal times provides for a division of labor in government, but
which, during crises, often impede effective action.
Other features of federal law and national philosophy toward disaster relief suggest
that federal efforts in recovery are unlikely to be successful as long as federal laws are
more concerned with “accountability” than with outcomes achieved through
collaboration. This extreme commitment to formalism, coupled with low FEMA capacity
in the wake of its absorption into DHS, and with the latter agency’s obsession with
terrorism, has created a “perfect storm” of unclear legal authority, diminished capacity,
and broad mistrust between state and federal officials. This reality is reflected in two of
the key features that Smith (2011) writes about as important to the disaster recovery
framework: the significant problems with vertical integration, and the failure of federal
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officials to account for local conditions that may require a less rigorous application of
rules.
Federal relief policy also works against both mitigation and recovery by promoting
vulnerability and wasting scarce recovery dollars. In Hurricane Katrina, for example, the
Public Assistance (PA) program hindered the ability of communities to rebuild public
facilities to a “better” state, from a disaster resilience or mitigation perspective; rather,
such policies emphasize the replacement of facilities in a way that reproduces the status
quo ante. The ability to incorporate post-disaster mitigation measures into reconstruction
activities (through what is known as the “PA 406 program”) is more complex and takes
more time to implement than replacing damaged infrastructure to its pre-event condition.
The failure to plan for this eventuality often results in a debate about the speed versus
quality of recovery-of which the former often is often the chosen path. Thus, as Smith
(2011) notes, capacity-building measures can certainly help communities plan for
recovery, but we also need to consider building capacity for managing the existing
federal-state-local relationship; the letter of the law notwithstanding, this process is
neither simple nor automatic.
With this in mind, moving from hierarchical, rule-bound systems of disaster recovery
to networked, cooperative, non-hierarchical systems could, if adopted, significantly
improve recovery processes and outcomes after major or “catastrophic” disasters. More
broadly, the very idea of cooperative networked planning and governance across all
phases of the disaster cycle could yield significant improvements in disaster policy more
broadly. A move to this model would have to overcome current habits of bureaucratic
routine, intergovernmental mistrust, and occasional ignorance of who the stakeholders are
and what roles they can play in recovery. But the stakes are high enough—in property
damage, coincident economic losses, and in the loss of functioning communities, lives,
and livelihoods—that it is worthwhile to move toward cooperative systems for planning
for disasters and disaster recovery.
By better understanding disaster recovery, including predicted outcomes, and
generating new as well as modified policies that reflect a more detailed and nuanced
description of this complex process can be advanced by the development and testing of a
theory of disaster recovery. This article has described three key principles, or drivers, of
recovery outcomes, based on the recognition that disaster recovery is shaped by a loosely
coupled network of resource providers. Future areas of research are described next in
order to further expand upon and operationalize these key principles.
Future Research
Based on the issues presented in this article, we suggest that the following research
questions should be explored in order to advance recovery theory:
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Operationalize and test the effect of the three drivers of recovery outcomes. The need
to more clearly operationalize variables tied to a proposed theory of disaster recovery was
suggested by Smith and Wenger in 2006 and still merits attention. In this case key
variables or drivers of recovery include: 1) the disconnect between available resources
(funding, policy and technical assistance) provided by members of the disaster assistance
network and the degree to which they reflect local needs, 2) the timing of disaster
assistance, and 3) the level of horizontal and vertical integration found across differing
disaster assistance networks.
Assess the degree to which planning can transform the characteristics of the disaster
recovery assistance framework. This article suggests that planning has the potential to
change the nature of, and underlying variables associated with, recovery including a
greater understanding of local needs, the better timing of assistance, and a move to
greater horizontal and vertical integration. Yet the degree to which planning has been
studied as part of transformational element in any theory of recovery remains limited.
Planning should be incorporated into the theory. Specific planning elements should
include the power of engaging in a process commonly referred to as collaborative
planning (including the effect of dispute resolution) as well as the analysis of plans using
the emerging field of plan quality analysis (Berke and Godschalk 2009; Berke and Smith
2008).
Conduct longitudinal multi-method studies of the recovery process. The early work of
Haas, Kates and Bowden explored the process of disaster recovery. Their approach
suggests a one-dimensional construct that does not incorporate much of what we know to
be true, including the differential nature of recovery across groups (associated with social
vulnerability, access to power, and the role of planning, among other variables) and the
transformational role of planning. Furthermore, much of the research that addresses
disaster recovery relies on the use of case studies that, while important, do not allow for
the testing of causal relationships across a larger sample of communities (or assistance
networks for that matter) needed to make statistically significant inferences about the
relationships across identified variables.
The disaster recovery process unfolds over a long time. In the case of major disasters,
recovery can last decades, during which time groups emerge, become formalized, or
disappear; collaborative partnerships form, and organizations learn (or fail to learn).
Since most studies of recovery are of limited duration, or represent a point or points in
time across what is better understood as a disaster recovery continuum, key procedural
dimensions of recovery are lost. Nor do most studies provide a fine-grained analysis of
issues that are uncovered over a lengthy period.
To accomplish this aim, we suggest the following approach: 1) the accumulation of
pre-event conditions (across environmental, social, economic, physical, and institutional
dimensions), 2) an evaluation of post-disaster impacts (across environmental, social,
economic, physical, and institutional dimensions), and 3) a series (of sufficient size to
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conduct quantitative analyses) of multi-decadal studies of long-term recovery in
communities exhibiting varied pre-event conditions and post-event impacts.
Explore integrative, multi-method approaches to meta-theory generation and testing
that combine the three dimensions of recovery presented here with the dimensions
identified in Smith (2011). The proposed longitudinal study of disaster recovery in the US
(and other communities across the world) described in the previous recommendation
would benefit from the integration of other theoretical constructs and variables. The
recommitted effort to study disaster recovery following Hurricane Katrina, includes a
growing interest in the development of a theory of recovery as well as an increased
commitment to develop quantitative measures of this complex and still misunderstood
process (Smith and Wenger 2006; Smith 2011).
The advent of the Resiliency and Vulnerability Observation Network—a proposed
consortium of research observatories intended to improve the ability of social and
physical scientists to collect, analyze, and archive longitudinal datasets—represents the
type of organizational platform needed to support the construction and testing of a theory
of recovery. Over time, past event-based datasets could be reconstructed (using existing
information gleaned from various members of assistance networks) while specific data
collection protocols could be developed and applied to collect standardized datasets
following new disasters. Not only does this approach allow for the collection of rich,
longitudinal datasets needed to better understand the process of recovery, it also
represents an opportunity to collectively improve the collaboration between researchers
and practitioners. In the end, two key objectives should be achieved, including advancing
the generation of knowledge and informing policy and practice associated with disaster
recovery.
Note
This paper draws on Chapter 2 of Smith (2011).
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