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Cognitive‐Behavioural Theory: An Alternative Conception
Article in Australian Psychologist · February 2011
DOI: 10.1080/00050069308258894
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151
Cognitive-Behavioural Theory: An Alternative Conception
Jack E. James
La Trobe UniversiU
The present paper aims to show that mainstream cognitive and cognitive-behavioural theories are funda-
mentally flawed, and should be discarded in favour of a behavioural explanation of the relationship
behveen cognition and behaviour. The essence of this behavioural explanation of cognitive control is the
distinction between contingency-shaped and rule-govemed behaviour. The former occurs when consequences are experienced directly, whereas the latter influences perceived consequences. Cognitive
events, including thoughts, expectations, beliefs, and images, function as rules that encode relevant contingencies of reinforcement. In turn, rules serve as potent cognitive discriminative stimuli that profoundly
influence cunent and future behaviour.
The concerted effort to develop "cognitive" aliernatives to pre-
Specifically, the present aim is to show that cognitive-
viously established "behavioural" principles and practice has
undoubtedly been the most striking feature of psychotherapy
behavioural explanations of the relationship befween subjective
experience and overt behaviour are fundamentally flawed, and
should be discarded in favour of extant behavioural theory which
holds that cognitive events function as discriminative stimuli.
research over the past 2 decades. Evidence of these endeavours is
readily apparent in mainstream clinical journals such as Behavior
Therapy, Behaviour Research and Therapy, and the Journal of
Consulting and Clinical Psychology, where it can be seen that
"cognitive-behaviourai" has replaced "behavioural" as the
favoured treatment modality among psychotherapy investigators.
The ascendancy of cognitive-behaviour therapy is also evident in
the establishment of new institutjons (e.g., the journal Cognitive
Therapy and Research), and in changes to the formal structures
of existing institutions capable of influencing the future direction
of psychotherapy research. For example, on advice from the
COGNITION A]\'D HUIVIAN BEHAVIOUR
As the name implies, cognitive-behavioural theories have
attempted to extend the explanatory power of the behavioural
theory that preceded them. These attempts have found a responsive audience. Psychotherapists and consumers of psychotherapy
Iiterature seem to have embraced each new cognitive reformula-
tion of behavioural principles with unbridled enthusiasm.
Publications Committee, Behavior Therapy, which formerly published original research on "behavior therapy or behavior modifi-
According to one commentary, there now exist at least 20 distinct
varieties of cognitive therapy (Mahoney & Lyddon, 1988), and
the "cognitive revolution" in psychotherapy continues unabated.
While there are undoubtedly many reasons why a particular
cation", is now "devoted to the application of behavioral
and
approach to therapy wins favour over competitors.(e.g.,
cognitive sciences to clinical problems" (Craighead, 1990, p. i).
Proponents of cognitive-behavjour therapy assert that the
underlying theory has provided new insights into fundamental
relationships between mental processes and behaviour. If this
were true, we *'ould exp€ct, by now, to have witnessed new and
original therapies based on the puqported advances in understanding. However, early scepticism (e.g., kdwidge, i978; Miller &
Berman, 1983; Shapiro & Shapiro, 1982) as to whether the cognitive-behavioural approach has indeed produced original interventions, or even succeeded in enhancing the efficacy of existing
behavioural interventions, has persisted (e.g., Berman, Miller, &
Massman, 1985; Biglan, 1987; Eysenck, 1988; Rachlin, 1988).
This is not to question the efficacy of cognitive-behaviour thera-
l,edwidge, 1978), the success of the cognitive-behavioural movement is attributable in part to two popular misconceptions. The
first of these concerns the supposed limitations of behavioural
theory in explaining the role of cognitive events, while the second concerns the presumed adequacy of cognitive-behavioural
theory in explaining the role of cognitive processes in human
Association for the Advancement of Behavior Therapy
py per se. There is widespread agreement that cognitivebehaviour therapy is comparatively effective in the treatment of a
number of common psychological disorders (e.g., depression,
panic disorder).
Thus, while issues such as innovation in therapy and the relative efficacy of alternative therapies are important, they are not
the subject of the present paper. Virtually all psychotherapies
possess a theoretical foundation upon
which the defining charac-
teristics of the approach are said to be based. Cognitive-
behavioural theory attempts to explain the relationship between
subjective experience (including cognition and affect) and overt
behaviour (whether disordered or "normal"). The present paper
questions mainstreamtognitive-behavioural theory, rather than
the practices that characterise cognitive-behaviour therapy.
behaviour,
B
e
havioural
T he
o
ry : Radical
B
e
haviouris m
Regarding the supposed limitations of behavioural theory, cog-
nitive-behaviourists erroneously believe that',traditionai'i
behavioural theory (especially radical behaviourism) either
denies the existence of cognition, or is incapable of accommodating it within an overall explanation of human action. In part,
these misconceptions may be due to confusion between the
behavioural principles espoused by J.B. Watson and those of B.F.
Skinner (Zettle & Hayes, 1982). In contrast to Watson and a
number of other prominent exponents of behaviourism, Skinner
was insistent about the necessity to explain the role of cognitive
processes in human behaviour. He wrote extensively on the subject. However, as he himself acknowledged (e .g., Skinner, 1972),
much of what he wrote about cognitive proc€sses appears not to
have been read, much less understood.
For example, about half of the text of Skinner's (1969) book,
Contingencies of reinforcement: A theoretical analysis, was concerned with subjective experience, and he lamented the fact that
this aspect of human behaviour has not received sufficient atten-
The present article is based on a paper delivered as part of the Division of Scientific Affairs Symposium, Burhus Frederic Skrnner, 1904-1990: Sone
reflections on his contribution to the disciptine of psychology (Convener; Professor Boris Crassini), Australian Psychological Society's Twenty.Sixth Annual
Conference, Adelaide, 29 Seotember - 4 October 1991.
Thanks to Drifa Hardardottir, Elizabeth Gregg, and Jay Birnbrauer for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
Requests for reprints should be sent to Professor Jack E. James, Department of Behavioural Health Sciences, La Trobe University, Bundoora ViC 3083
Australia.
Australian Psychologist Vol. 28, No.
3, 1993 pp. l5l-155
152
Jack E. James
tion from other behaviourists. He argued that whenever
behaviourists
of essentially unreplicated laboratory findings. Certainly,
Bandura's (7969, 1977a) treatment of observational learning is
excluded sensations, images, thought processes, and so on, from
Iargely speculative.
their deliberations ... the charge isjustified that they have neglected
the facts of consciousness. The strategy is, however, quite unwise. It
is particularly important that a science of behaviour face the prob-'
lem of privacy. (Skinner, 1969, pp.227-228)
Despite a dearth of relevant empirical evidence, Bandura's
(7969, 1977a) claims for the extent and potency of observational
leaming appear to have been widely accepted. In the absence of
empirical evidence, Bandura (1917a) has cited examples of complex, integrated human skills, including playing golf, writing
prose, and driving a car as illustrations of the potency of symbolic processes in general and observational learning in particular.
Yet these same examples can be used to demonstrate the exact
opposite
the limited potency of observational leaming.
- that is,
Of these various
examples, driving a car provides a good illustrative case in point. Bandura (1977a) has asserted explicitly that
By privacy, Skinner meant subjective experience in general,
including cognition and affect. While Skinner (1969) acknowledged the role of physiology when he wrote that an "adequate
science of behaviour must consider events taking place within the
skin of the organism" (p. 228), he gave particular attention to
subjective human experiences such as thoughts, sensations, and
images.
Furthermore, Skinner (1969) criticised what became the popu-
lar doctrine of so-called methodological behaviourism which
argued for the exclusion of private events from scientific psychology because such events cannot be observed directly.
Skinner argued that distinctions involving internal-external and
public-private dimensions are arbitrary and artificial. His position
was that, nofwithstanding the.ir private nature, cognitive processes are an essential aspect of human behaviour, and must therefore
be accommodated within scientific psychology. The question,
then, is not whether, but how subjective experience is accommodated within the framework of operant psychology. Before considering this question, we should first examine the second
misconception alluded to above, rvhich concerns the supposed
adequacy with *'hich subjective experience is explained by cognitive-behavioural theory.
Role of Cognition: Social Learning Theory
Although the following remarks deal specifically with social
leaming theory (Bandura, 1969, 1977a), the same general arguments can be applied to cognitive and cognitive-behavioural theories broadly (e.g., Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, i979; Ellis &
Harper, 1975; Meichenbaum, 1977). Special attention is given to
social leaming theory, because it has been particularly influential
in determining the nature and development of cognitivebehavioural psychotherapy. According to one account of the his-
tory of cognitive therapy, social learning theory "offered
a
revolutionary conception of human change processes [suggesting] that learning can occur entirely as a function of cognitive
control" (Mahoney & Lyddon, 1988, p. 196, italics in original).
Moreover, social learning theory is, according to Bandura
(1,977a), "a unified theoretical framework for analyzing human
thought and behaviour" (p. vi). The pivotal concept in social
learning theory is "vicarious" learning, variously labelled symbolic learning, modelling, or obsertational learning. Empirical
studies of observational learning during the 1960s (Bandura,
Blanchard, & Ritter, 1969; Bandura, Grusec, & Menlove, 1967;
Bandura, Ross,
&
Ross, 1963) provided a major empirical impe-
tus to the development of social learning theory, to which
Bandura (1969,1977a) has continued to be the major contributor.
However, Bandura's representation of observalional learning is
fundamentally flawed. Consequently, his account of cognitive
processes is untenable.
Observational learning. Central to understanding the deficiencies in Bandura's (1969, 1,977a) theoretical account of observational learning is his insistence that it is the most potent form of
human learning. He has claimed that "most human behaviour is
learned observationally through modeling" (Bandura, 1.977a, p.
22), and that "modeling serves as the principal mode of transmitting new forms of behaviour" (Bandu ra, 1977a, p, 54), Moreover,
according to Baniura (1977a), "the capacity to iearn by observa-
tion enables people to acquire large, integrated patterns of
behaviour without having to form them gradually by tedious triai
and error" (p. 12).Unfortunately, these claims lack supportive
empirical evidence. Although observational learning has been
demonstrated empirically, studies have been few in number and
have mostly involved circumscribed events in the laboratory. To
the extent that social learning theorists have drawn on empirical
evidence, they have done so by way of elaborate generalisations
Australian Psychologist Vol. 28, No. 3, 1993 pp. 151-155
skilled driving is primarily acquired through observation.
However, while observation is surely involved in the process of
learning to drive, it can be shown that observation is not the key
element in the acquisition process.
Prior to actually learning to drive, virtually everyone will have
experienced many hundreds (possibly many thousands) of hours
observing other people drive. Why is it that when we sit behind
the wheel for the first time, we are far from capable of executing
a smooth take-off involving change of gears, accurate steering,
coordinated use of the foot pedals, to name just a few of the tasks
that constitute driving a car? The fact is that contrary to
Bandura's (1969, 1977a) assertion, the acquisition of driving
skills is very much dependent on direct rather than vicarious
experience. Observation actually plays a minor (often trivial) role
in the acquisition of skills. The first time any of us sat behind the
rvheel of a car, no doubt we were capable of orienting ourselves
in a manner that was essentially accurate. That is, we probably
sat facing towards the bonnet of the car, w.ith hands on the wheel,
feet near the foot pedals, and so on. If we had never seen anyone
drive a car before, it is unlikely that we would have known to do
this at the outset. So, observation has contributed somethins.
However, it is obvious that these initial orienting behaviours aie
actually very minor variants of behaviours that were already part
of our behavioural repertoire. That is, by the time most people
come to learn to drive a car, they have already learned how to sit,
to orient themselves in a forward position, and to position their
hands and feet.
This example, then, illustrates a fundamental limitation of
observational experience. Observing others encourages the application of skills already learned through direct experience, but to
apply them in different circurnstances (e.g., sitting behind the
wheel of a car as distinct from say sitting at a table). Contrary to
Bandura's claims, observational processes contribute little to the
acquisition of complex patterns of behaviour (where, by definition, complex means substantially beyond the person's current
expertise). If a new behaviour is encouraged through observation,
it typically involves a slight modification of preexisting patterns
rather than the acquisition of "large, integrated" patterns, Thus,
the unique aspects of driving are learned, not tfuough observation, but through direct experience. Crunching gears is aversive
and gradually decreases in frequency, whereas smooth gear
changes are reinforced. The same is true of the other examples
cited by Bandura (1977a), such as playing golf and writing prose,
as it is for skilled behaviour in general.
In summary, skilled behaviour (and this includes most of
the
observable behaviour of normally functioning humans) develops
primarily out of direct experience. It is "contingency-shaped',,
whereby successively closer approximations are differentially
reinforced. The contribution of observation (modelling, vicarious
experience) to skill acquisition is that it may facilitate the performance of responses already acquired through direct experience.
Notwithstanding the limited role of modelling in the acquisition
of contingency-shaped behaviour, observational experience is a
key factor in the development of "rule-governed" behaviour
(described below). Moreover, acknowledgment of the facilitative
role of observation raises a question as to how its influence (how-
ever slight) should be e.xplained. For more than 20 years,
Bandura (1969,1977a) has argued that observational learning is
a
'
Cognitions as Discriminative
unique, all-embracing process. In fact, despite general acceptance
of the term observalional learning, modelling is not a learning
process per se. When present, observation functions as an adjunct
to leaming, and is easily accommodated by behavioural theory
without the embellishments invented by Bandura (1969, 1977a)
and other cognitive-behavioural theorists.
and its environment must always specify three things: (1) the occasion upon which a response occurs, (2) the response itselt and (3)
the reinforcing consequences. The interrelationships among them
are the 'contingencies of reinforcement'. (p. 7)
Thus, contingencies of reinforcement incorporate discriminative stimuli, responses, and reinforcing consequences. This tripartite conceptualisation has given rise to the so-called "ABCs" of
behaviour analysis to symbolise the component elements of
antecedents, behaviour, and consequences.
The component of the three-term contingency of particular
interest in the present context is that rvhich refers to antecedent
conditions. In Skinner's (1969) words, "Any stimulus present
when an operant is reinforced acquires control in the sense that
the rate will be higher when it is present" (p. 7). These predisposing aspects of the environment, these discriminative stimuli, are
said to "set the occasion" for behaviour.
The literature on operant conditioning has tended to emphasise
the role of consequences, sometimes to the neglect of the role of
discriminative stimuli. This is unfortunate. because it is often discriminative-stimulus control that best informs us about the more
subtle aspects of human behaviour. The role of discriminative stimuli in the learning process allows for the establishment of much
more complex relationships than would be possible if learning
merely included responses and their consequences. In many
(a)
e
d v ersus Rule - gov ern ed B e haviour
Behaviour that results in directly experienced (or acua[) consequences is refened to as contingency-shaped behaviour. On the
other hand, behaviour that is influenced throughperceived consequences, rathei than actual consequences, is said to be rule-governed (Sktnner, 1969). Some examples from everyday life should
help to clarify the distinction.
Airline passengers are inclined to keep their seat belts fastened
during flight, in order to reduce the risk of being injured in the
event of turbulence or some other in-flight mishap. Similarly, car
drivers are careful to apply the brakes in response to the illuminated rear brake lights of other vehicles, in order to avoid collisions. In general, inhabitants of Australia are careful when using
a naked flame outdoors during hot, dry weather, because of the
risk of inadvertently causing a bush fire. These are just a few of
countless possible examples of rules that govern our lives. An
important feature of rules is that awareness of them often has
profound effects on behaviour, even though the consequences
alluded to in a particular rule may never actually occur. With reference to the previous examples, it is not necessary to experience
an in-flight mishap, a traffic coilision, or a raging bush fire to be
profoundly affected by "knowledge" (i.e., thoughts, beliefs,
images, etc.) of these events.
DIS
CRII\IINATIVE STI}TULI AND
RULE-GOVERNED BEIIAVIOUR
Rules as Discriminative Stimuli
The importance of rule-governed behaviour is that it represents
a special case of behaviour that is under discriminative-stimulus
control. However, in this case, the discriminative stimulus is a
rule (i.e., involves cognition). Specifically, rules are cognitively
encoded contingencies of reinforcement (see Figure 1). By
informing us about prevailing contingencies, rules serve as cognitive discriminative stimuli that set the occasion for behavins in
sf/s'
5D
alient aspect of the
nvironment. Serves
as a discriminative
stimulus (SD).
153
resp€cts, it is the actions of discriminative stimuli that give human
behaviour the flexibility and complexity that *'e identify as human.
This is perhaps best exemplified in the distinction that may be
drawn between contingency-shaped and rule-govemed behaviour.
C o ntin ge ncy - shap
Contingencies of R e inforc e m e nt
Refurning.to the question of how subjective experience, including vicarious, symbolic, and cognitive processes in general, is
accommodated by operant theory, it is necessary to consider the
principles that govem the operation of contingencies of reinforce'
ment. The "thlee-term contingency" is the essence of all operant
learning. On this subject, we can do no better than to quote
Skinner (1969) himself:
An adequate formulation of the interaction between an organism
Stimuli
Cognitive event (Ru ) which
as a memory, thought, belief,
etc., serves as a rule. Rules are
cognitions that encode relevant
continsencies of reinforcement
Rule-governe!
behaviour (R).
Contingent consequences
which either reinforce (S+)
or punish (S-lenactment of
behaviour
a rule.
(R)
prompted
by
and po"ssess SD properties.
)
Hot, dry weather.
Lighting an open fire in hot
Careful use of fire.
ffi
and others, maintenance
weather may cause a bush fire.
of
property and forests.
c)
Shopping mall.
"I will probably
lose my way in
the mall and be overcome with
Avoid mall,
house bound.)
panic".
d)
In bed, unable to sleep.
"Nothing I do is
Diminished aversive feelings
of panic. (Person becomes
a success"
Refuse to go to work
Reduced instances of work-
on following and
subsequent days.
of depression.)
ace
e)
Social gathering with
unfamiliar people.
"I
must be thoroughly
approved of by everyone"
Avoidance of social
gatherings.
disappointment. (Beginnings
Alleviation of anticipatory
anxiety. (Maintenance of
social isolation.)
Figure 1 (a) Schematic general representation of cognitive responses serving as rules (encoding relevant contingencies of reinforcement), and functioning as discriminative stimuli. Examples are given to illustrate the influence of cognitive discriminative stim
uli {i.e., rules) in everyday life (b), and in the development of psychopathology such as.panic {c), avoidance/depression (d), and
anxiety (e). Dotted linds indicate cognitive processes, whereas continuous lines refer to observable relationships.
Australian Psychologist Vol. 28, No. 3, 1993 pp.
i51-155
154
Jack E. James
ways that tend to maximise reinforcement and minimise punish- immediate consequences would affect behaviour"
(Skinner,
ment..Figure 1(a) provid.es a schematic representation of the 1969, p.769).
ope ration- of rules as cognitive discriminative stimuli. By way of
trlojt people, for example, find it aversive to make regular payan, everyday illustration, Figure 1(b)_ shows the operation of what ments oi sutstantial
sumi of money to a bank. Nevertheless, the
might be called the "Fire-safety Rule". Specifically, hot.weather majority of income earners apparintly seek
out such financiat
oPerates as a discriminative stimulus that sets the occasion for a buiden!. The explanation f'oi this apparentty-seii-auusiue
particular cognition (a memory, thought, belief, hr:nch, image, behaviour is to be found in the discriminaiiu.-rtiriuiu,
properties
etc')' The cognition (or,.more^strictly, set of cognitions) i1 this of-a particular set of rules. These rules say
something to the
case is the formulation identified here as the Fire-safety Rule, effecf that "pain" and disadvantage now in the
form of mortgage
which-enco-des knowledge and beliefs about relevant contingen- repayments will be offset by the-benefits
of property ownerstrip
cies of reinforcement concerning bush fires.
in-the future,
In turn, the Fire-Safety Rule serves as a discriminative stimulus
which sets the occasion for a variety of behaviours subsumed by B e n eJiting from O th ers' E rp erie n c e
the pfuase, "careful use of fire". This behaviour has myriad conseAngther major function of rules is that they help people to avoid
-learning
quences. For example, it contributes to the preservation of forests
"the hard way". This is particulariy true of'behaviours
(a possible reinforcing outcome for the indivjdual), and helps to
that have aversive consequences, especially those that threaten life
avoid a host of aversive outcomes (e.g., property damage to self
and limb. By either hearing about, reading about, or seeing people
and others, lives Iost, legal sanctions). The host of consequences
behaving in ways that are variously advintageous or harmful-to
that serve to reinforce observance of the Fire-Safety Rule conthemselves or to others, people become informed about important
tribute to its salience, thereby enhancing its effectiveness as a disrelationships between different behaviours and attendant conse_
criminative stimulus. It is important to recognise, however, that it
quences. This information, in the form of rules, guides behaviour,
is not essential to have acnally experienced the honors of a bush
enabling us to benefit from the experience of others. It is curious
' fire to learn to be careful with fire. Knowing about the likely con- that
these are the very r_easons Bandura (1969,1977a) cites in sup
sequences, especially with regard to the aversive experiences of
port of iis advocacy of social learning theory. However, contrary
others who have behaved in particular ways (used fire) in specific
to Bandura's (1977a) claims, behavioural theory does not suggejt
circumstances (e.g., heat wave, dry "speli", strong winds), is suffithat we learn only by a process of ,,tedious trial and erior',.
cient to profoundly influence the cunent and future behaviour of
Survival depends on our benefiting from others' experience, and
persons confronted with similar circumstances.
frequently this occurs without any direct experienie of relevant
Ubiquity of rule-governed behav,iour. It is also important to
contingencies
less repeated trial and error. If humans
- much
recognise that when conceptualised as cognitive discriminative
leamed only through
direct experience of the universe of coniin_
stimuli, rules can be seen lo refer to virtually any reliable relagencies that influence behaviour, most would not survive childtionship befween behaviour and irs consequ.n..r. In this sense,
hood. The behavioura_l.concept of cognitions serving as
rules include laws and maxims (i.e., relationships involving reladiscriminative stimuli, which is the foundaiion of rule_sove;led
tively stable contingencies), commands (contingencies implying
behav.iour, provides a powerful and parsimonious explaiation of
a. compliance imperative) versus requests (absence of imperahow this essential learning occurs.
tive), warnings (suggestive of aversive consequences) virsus
advice and instructions (suggestive of reinforcing consequences),
RULE. GO VER].{ED BEIHVIOUR A}.{D
and statements of purpose (which typically allude to aniicipated
COGNITIVE THERAPY
consequences). Likewise, contracts, bribes, resolutions, and plans
Unfortunately, much of what is claimed to be distinctively cog_
.
all signify rules implying consequences of one kind or another,
nitive-behavioural theory is little more than a poor representation
and each influences behaviour more or less, depending in part on
of rules as discriminative stimuli. This can be seen by examining
the specific nature of the attendant consequences.
the justif.ication given for various intervention strategies derivel
As such, cognitive discriminative stimu'ii (i.e., rules) are ubiouifrom competing cognitive theories. The concepts of -,,self_effica_
tous in everyday life. Understanding the principles of rule-govemed
.1" Q..rl!_r.9, 1:977b), "negarive', (Beck et al.',1979), and ,,irra_
behaviour helps to elucidate the subtleties and shades of bJhaviour.
tional" (Ellis & Harper, 1975) thinking, and the intervention
both normal and abnormal. In all instances, the extent to which
strategies sug€ested by each, have been particularly jnfluential.
rules influence current behaviour, depends on the extent to whjch
Figure 1(c) shows how expectationi serve as cognitive dis_
past rule-following behaviour has been differentially reinforced.
criminative stimuli which function as rures describirig individuThus, the discriminative-stimulus properties of ruies will vary
als' beliefs about the relationships between aspec'is of their
between rules and behveen individuals, it least in subtle wai-s. as a
behaviour (in this instance, going to the mall) and anticipated
function of the complex afiav of consequences that will have been
consequences (becoming lost and overwhelmed with panic). As
experienced on countless previous occasions when rules of one
such, cognitions in the form of expectations can and Oo influence
kind or another were or were not followed by each individual.
behaviour because of their discriminative-stimulus properties, in
the same way that environmental discriminative stimuli influence
FUNCTIOT.iS OF RULES
behaviour. Similarly,_Figures 1(d) and 1(e) illustrare how negaConsidering the ubiquitous influence of rules as cognitive distive (Beck et al., 1979) 'and irrational (Ellis & Harper, 7915)
criminative stimuli, it is appropriate to describe some of the printhoughts, respectively, function as cognitive discriminitive stim'_
cipal ways in which rule-governed behaviour functions in uli which set the occasion for self-defeating
behaviour. The con_
everyday life.
tingencies of reinforcement that define ruG-governed behaviour
also. explain how therapeutic change occurs }ollowing cognitive
Delayed Reinforcement
(and behavioural) intervention.
An important function of rules is that they serve as coenitive
Frequently, in cognitive-behaviour therapy, patients are
mediators to help bridge the "gap" when reinforcem'ent is
encouraged to employ adaptive self-statements-and-internal dia_
delayed. It is characteristic for humans to expend effo( to effect
logues (e.g., Beck er a1.,7979; Ellis & Harper, 1975). The primaimportant consequences in the future. people are less likely to be
ry effect of these cognitive processes is to increase the lalience of
distracted by immediate, Iesser consequences, if they undirstand
relevant rules. lVhe.n a person engages in an internal dialogue,
the relationship befrveen current behaviour and likely future conthey increase the discriminative-stimulus properties of rutel in
sequ€nc€s (Rachlin, 1974). This knowledge is part of a cognitive
wa.ys that may be either adaptive or not. Accordingly, when ther_
mediation process in which rules have a central function. these,
apists challenge the self-defeating thoughts of pltients, they
in turn, function as discriminative stimuli that set the occasion for
encourage the replacement of unhelpful rules with more realistii
behaving in ways that produce delayed benefits despite possible
and adaptive ones. in other words, therapists' efforts help to
short-term costs. Skinner (1969) wrote, ,,Withouf rules, only
decrease the salience (i.e., discriminative-stirnulus potency) of
Australian Psychologist Vot. 28, No.
3, I 993 pp.
I
5l-l
55
Cognitions as Discriminative
Stimuli
155
and other cognitive events acquire discriminative-stimulus prop-
maladaptive cognitions while increasing the salience of adaptive
thoughts and beliefs.
Typically, patients are encouraged (usually by way of explicit
home assignments) to practice adaptive thoughts and behaviours.
Practice provides conditioning opportunities, and these further
strengthen the discriminative-stimulus properties of relevant cognitions (i.e., thoughts beliefs, self-statements, etc.) initiated and
socially reinforced by the therapist. In tum, there is a good chance
that the discriminative-stimulus potency of newly acquired adap
tive self-statements and internal dialogues will be strengthened
over time, as adaptive behaviours are reinforced by enhanced success in the natural environment. As such, most of what passes for
cognitive theory and practice can be more clearly explained in
terms of the principles that describe the role and functions of rulegoverned behaviour. Moreover, this analysis is consistent with a
large volume of empirical data on the successful treatment of anxiety disorders, which suggests that processes involved in anxiety
reduction are essentially both cognitive and enactive (i.e., involve
symbolic and direct experience) (James, 1985, 1986).
Bandura, A. (1969). Principles of behavior modification. New York: Holt,
RineharL & Winston.
Bandura, A. (1977a). Social learning rheory. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: PrenticeHall.
Bandura, A (1977b). Self-efficacy: Toward a unifying theory of behavioral
change. Psychological Review, 84, 191-2L5.
Bandura, A. (i986). Socia!foundations of thought and action: A social cognitive theory. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
CONCLUSION
Bandura, A., Blanchard, E.G., & Ritter, B. (1969). The relative efficacy of
desensitization and modeling approaches for inducing behavioural, affec-
Behavioural theory is acknowledged as having its roots firmly
grounded in experimental psychology. This may be contrasted
with the embellishments that distinguish cognitive-behavioural
theory, which have occurred independently of developments in
experimental cognitive psychology (Kendall & Bacon, 1988). It
is interesting to note that social learning theory has for many
years derived much scientific prestige by claiming direct linage
with empirically derived leaming theory. While such claims have
probably been exaggerated, even this route to scientific
respectability appears now to have been abandoned. In his most
recent major work, Bandura (1986) has deleted the term "learning" from "social learning theory", preferring instead to refer to
his model as "social cognitive theory" (Bandura, 1986). Since the
"cognitive" elements of social cognitive theory have little in
common with experimental cognitive psychology, social cognitive theory has become little more than a speculative edifice
devoid of empirical foundation.
Notwithstanding the enthusiasm that cognitive-behavioural
speculation continues to enjoy, theory devoid of empirical foundation cannot survive as serious science. On the other hand, it
may be possible to develop a genuine cognitive-behavioural science by treating cognitive events as discriminative stimuli within
a framework of principles that define rule-governed behaviour.
Zettle and Hayes (1982), for example, have used Skinner's
(1957) analysis of verbal behaviour to outline a model of psychopathology and behaviourally oriented therapy in which rules
function as cognitive discriminative stimuli. Such developments
would seem to suggest a crucial role for experimental cognitive
psychology in helping to elucidate the mechanisms underlying
the formation and acquisition of rules, and the processes by
which rules function to influence behaviour.
It should be evident from the above that the present paper is
wholly accepting of the notion that cognitions may mediate
behaviour. Specifically, it has been argued throughout that cognitions exercise a mediating influence on behaviour by way of their
function as discriminative stimuli. In this sense, the principles
espoused in the present paper are explicitly cognitive-behavioural
in nature while being very different fiom extant theories generally characterised as "cognitive-behavioural". Unfortunately, the
cognitive and cognitive-behavioural theories currently in vogue
have failed to advance scientific understandins of the relationship
between cognition and human behaviour. T'he combination of
elaborate speculation and disregard for empirical evidence that
characterises mainstream cognitive theories, such as that proffered by Bandura (1977a, i986), obfuscate rather than clarify the
role and function of cognition. Classical behavioural theory, such
as that espoused by Skinner (e.g., 1969), holds that cognition is a
key aspect of human behaviour.
Nofrvithstanding the important role of cognitions, they are not
exclusive causal agents. Thoughts, expectations, beliefs, images,
erties against a background of environment-behaviour interac-
tion, eventually serving as rules that encode contingencies of
reinforcement. In this way, "internal" events (thoughts, beliefs,
emotions, perceived physiological activity, images, and cognitive
representations of all kinds) function in a dynamic process of
reciprocal influence, action, and interaction with the environment
and behaviour. There remains much work to be done within the
combined fields of experimental cognitive psychology and
behaviour analysis to elucidate these interactive processes.
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