G l o bal izati o n an d th e
post- co l d war o rd e r
I A N C LA R K
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I ntrod uction
514
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A typology o f o rd e r
514
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The elem ents o f conte m po rary ord e r
516
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G lobal ization and the post-Westphal ian o rd e r
519
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G l o bal ization and l egiti macy
521
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An i nternational ord e r of global ized states?
523
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The global fi nancial crisis
524
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Concl u s i o n
525
Reader's G u ide
Th is chapter explores the natu re of the o rder that
has developed since the end of the cold war. It asks
whether that o rder is disti nctive. It also asks whether
global ization is its defi n i ng featu re. After d isti ngu i s h i ng
between various types of order-international, world,
and global-the chapter sketches the main i ngred ients
of the conte m porary o rder. These extend wel l beyond
the trad itional domain of i nternational m i l itary secu­
rity. The argu ment then add resses global ization as one
of the forces that hel ped to bring the cold war to an
end, and i nvestigates the associated trend towards a
post-Westphalian order. It also explores the ways i n
wh ich global ization now causes p roblems a n d ten ­
s i o n s i n t h e p resent o rder, especially with regard t o its
legiti macy, given p rofound i nequal ities. The chapter
ends by suggesting that global ization reflects changes
with i n states, not j ust between them: what is d isti nc­
tive about the present order is not the i m m i nent
dem ise of the states-system , but the conti n uation of
an i nternational order, the constituent u n its of which
are global ized states. Th is analysis is fu rther confi rmed
by the response to the fi nancial crisis si nce 2008.
I A N C LA R K
Introduction
This chapter is concerned with three key questions.
The first is whether there is now a distinctive pattern
of order in the post-cold war world (see Box 33.1) and,
if so, what are its principal elements. The second is
whether this order should be defined in terms of glo­
balization. The third asks what is now happening to
globalization, and what challenges it faces.
Study of the overall character of the post-cold war
order remains problematic. While there have been stud­
ies aplenty of individual aspects of this present order
(ethnicity, identity, religion, peacekeeping, humanitar­
ian intervention, globalization, regionalism, economic
transition, climate change, democratization, integra­
tion, financial instability, terrorism and the war on it,
weapons of mass destruction, regime change, etc.), we
still lack any grand synthesis of its essential nature.
In analysing the contemporary order, we need to be
mindful of how much greater are the demands upon,
and the expectations about, the i nternational order
today than previously. In earlier periods, the interest
in the international order was largely 'negative', and lay
in prevention of any threats that might emerge from
it. The interest is now 'positive' as well, as the inter­
national order is a much greater source than hitherto
of a range of social goods. It can deliver information,
economic resources, human rights, intervention,
access to global social movements and international
non-governmental organizations (INGOs), and an
abundance of cultural artefacts. Many of these 'goods'
may be regarded as unwelcome, but they remain highly
sought after by some governments and sectors of soci­
ety around the world.
•
•
•
The pri ncipal characteristics of the
contemporary order
that give it its d istinctive qual ity are difficult to discern.
Our understanding of, say, the inter-war period {1 91 9-39)
is i nformed by how it ended, but we do not yet know how
our present period wi l l 'end'.
The i nternational order now del ivers a range of
international 'goods', but also a wide range of ' bads'.
A typology of order
At the present moment, our ideas about order are
being pulled in a number of competing directions (see
Table 33.1). At the one end, they continue to be largely
state-centred and retain traditional concerns with the
structure of the balance of power, the possibly shifting
polarity of the international system, and the current
forms of collective security. At the other is a widen­
ing agenda that encompasses the relationship between
economic and political dimensions, new thinking
about human security (see Ch. 29), debates about the
Box 33.1 E l e m ents of d isconti n u ity and conti n u ity between cold war and post-cold
Cold war
Soviet power in Eastern Europe
B i polar com petition
Rival ideologies
G lobal secu rity integration
M i litary secu rity as h igh pol itics
Discontinuity
war
orders
Post-cold war
Dissol ution of the Soviet U n ion
U n i polar peacemaking
Supremacy of l i beral capitalism
G reater regional autonomy
N ational identity as high pol itics
Continuity
Some security structures, e.g. NATO
Economic global ization
H u man rights
Reaction against secular state
M u ltiple identities
Environmental agendas
Poverty in the South
Chapter 33 Globalization and the post-cold war order
Table 33 .1 Typologies of order
Units
Characteristics
Globalized
Global system
End of national pol ities, societies, and economies
I nternational
States
Concern with agenda of sovereignty and stabi l ity
World
H u man ity
Concern with agenda of rights, needs, and justice
Globalized international
G lobal ized states
Agenda of managi ng relations between states penetrated by global
system but sti l l d isti nguishable with i n it
distributive consequences of globalization, the role of
human rights, the impact of environmentalism, and
strategies for human emancipation. Clearly, a number
of differing, and potentially competing, conceptions of
order are at work.
These draw our attention to a number of important
distinctions. Are we to judge the effectiveness of order
solely as an aspect of the inter-state system, and thus
speak of international order? Or are we to widen the
discussion and consider order in terms of its impact on
individual human lives and aspirations, and thus talk
of a world o rder? Such a distinction is widely noted in
the literature, and is replicated in the similar distinc­
tion between international society and world society
(Clark 2007). However, how does the introduction of
the concept of globalization affect the analysis? Does
globalized order signify the same thing as world order
or something different? An attempt will be made to
answer that question towards the end of this chapter.
The search for the definitive elements of the con­
temporary order proceeds within quite separate
theoretical frameworks (see the Introduction to this
chapter). The first is the broadly realist (see Ch. 6).
This concentrates on the structure of the post-cold
war system, especially on the number of great power
actors and the distribution of capabilities among them.
It defines order largely in terms of the security struc­
ture. It spawned a debate in the early 1990s about the
polarity of the post-cold war system, about the possi­
bility of a renewed conce rt, and about the worrisome
eventuality that a return to m u lti polarity could herald
the erosion of the stability generated by the cold war's
bipolarity. It gave rise to a debate about primacy and
hegemony (Clark 201 1).
The second is broadly liberal in derivation and
focuses on regimes and institutions, and their associ­
ated norms and values (see Ch. 7). Its central claim is
that patterns of integration and interdependence had
become so deeply embedded in the cold war period,
albeit for strategic and geopolitical reasons, that they
had by then created a self-sustaining momentum.
Since complex systems of global governance had been
spawned in the interim, these regimes would survive
the collapse of the 'realist' conditions that had given
rise to them in the first place.
A third line is the one that assesses order in terms
of its achievement of individual human emancipation.
The mere fact of stability among the major powers, or
the institutionalization of relations among the domi­
nant groups of states, tells us little about the quality
of life for most inhabitants of the globe. If it is true, as
writers like Ken Booth (1999) argue, that governments
are the main source of the abuse of human rights, we
need to do more than study the international human
rights agreements that these very governments enter
into, but look also at what is really happening to people
on the ground (see Ch. 30).
A fourth line of exploration is directly via the litera­
ture on globalization. This chapter asks simply whether
or not globalization may be thought tantamount to a
form of order. Must we speak of globalization as an on­
going process without any end-state, or can we instead
speak of a globalized order as a distinctive political
form (see Ch. I)? The latter view is clearly set forth in
the suggestion that the contemporary Western state
conglomerate, collectively, constitutes an 'emergent
global state' (Shaw 1997: 503-4; 2000). Globalization,
on this view, represents an incipient political order in
its own right.
Key Points
•
When we speak of order, we need to specify order for
whom-states, peoples, groups, or i n d ivid uals.
•
I nternational order focuses on stable and peaceful
relations between states, often related to the balance of
power. It is primarily about m i l itary security.
•
World o rd e r is concerned with other val ues, such
justice, development, rights, and emancipation.
•
A pattern of order may advance some values at the
expense of others.
as
I A N C LA R K
The elements of contem porary order
The 'social -state' system
Initially, there is the basic nature of the contemporary
state system itself. The state system is 'social', first, in the
sense that states over the past century have performed
a range of social functions that distinguish them from
earlier phases. The great revival in the political viabil­
ity of states, from the nadir of the Second World War,
is attributable to the largely successful undertaking of
this task. While not all states are equal in their ability
to deliver these functions, most would now list respon­
sibility for development and economic management,
health, welfare, and social planning as essential tasks
for the state.
It is 'social' also in the second sense that pressures
for emulation tend to reinforce common patterns of
behaviour and similar forms of state institutional
structure. Historically, states have emulated each
other in developing the social and economic infra­
structures of military power. Now this task has
broadened as states seek to adopt 'best practice' in
terms of economic competitiveness and efficiency.
They also face the social pressure to conform to cer­
tain standards of human rights, and this has permit­
ted a measure of dilution and delegation of the state's
exclusive jurisdiction over its own domestic affairs, as
reflected .in notions of responsibility to protect (RtoP)
(see Ch. 31). In consequence, some of the key rules of
the states-system (sovereignty, non-intervention) are
undergoing considerable adaptation, and this gives
the contemporary order many of its complex and
ambivalent qualities.
nationalism (see Ch. 25), and are subject to contested
assessments as to whether they represent a 'new' nation­
alism, or a reversion to a pre-existing primordialism .
The state is both challenged and reinforced by a wel­
ter of additional crises of identity-tendencies towards
apparently new forms of political community driven
by ethnic separatism, regional identities, new transna­
tional projects, new social movements, and the return
to culture/religion (see Ch. 26). The key question here is
the extent to which these are wholly new tendencies, or
whether they represent some kind of historical atavism.
The politics of identity at the beginning of the new mil­
lennium affects the social nature of the state, as it raises
explicit questions about citizenship-who is to count as
a citizen, and what is the nature of the contract between
state and citizen (see Ch. 32).
It must not, however, be imagined that all such
issues of identity have emerged only in the aftermath
of the cold war. For example, it could be said that there
has been a widespread reaction throughout much of
the developing world against what has been seen as the
imposition of a modernizing, Westernizing, and secu­
lar form of state. The revolution in Iran in 1979 is a case
in point, and cautions us not to assume that ' identity
politics' were invented simply with the end of the cold
war. This is particularly so with regard to the resur­
gence of religion as a factor in international relations.
While it may seem that religion has suddenly been
rediscovered, the more plausible account is that it had
never gone away, but had simply been less visible under
the alternative distractions of the cold war.
Polarity and the col lectivization of security
Identity and the nation-state
A second feature is the multiplicity of issues about
identity that have become prevalent since the 1990s.
Some of these revolve around contemporary forms of
Box 33.2 Elements of order
Structural elements
Purposive elements
Polarity
Multi lateral ism
R eg ional ism
Two worlds
Social-state
Identity
Economic order
Li beral rights
A key area of concern remains the traditional security
order. This addresses the present distribution of power,
and whether that distribution should be described as
u n ipolarity, or as bipolarity, m u ltipolarity, or some
kind of hybrid. This debate has shifted considerably
since the early 1990s. At that point, expectations of
a resumption of multipolarity were widespread, and
a US-centred unipolarity thought likely to last for a
'moment' at most. Thereafter, US predominance became
much more clearly established, so that analysts rou­
tinely referred to American hegemony, or some kind of
American empire (see Ch. 4). This trend resulted from
US economic successes during the 1990s, coupled with
Chapter 33 Globalization and the post-cold war order
the on-going difficulties of its other competitors. Japan's
economy stagnated over the same period. Russia became
embroiled in protracted and deep-seated domestic
political and economic transformation. The European
Union, although it has both widened and deepened,
continues to have difficulty in acting decisively on its
own in international crises. In consequence, a key deter­
minant of the present security order has been the role of
the USA, and its willingness to become involved in gen­
eral maintenance of order. This element has been highly
variable, with the prominent US role in Kosovo in 1999
and in Iraq in 2003 standing in marked contrast to its
unwillingness to become engaged in Rwanda in 1994 or
Sudan in 2005 -6. More recently, the prodigious growth
of the Chinese economy, and of other emerging powers,
has contributed to the sense of the end of the unique
phase of US primacy (see Ch. 5).
governance (regimes, international organizations,
and INGOs). These cover most aspects of life, includ­
ing developments in legal (human rights, war crimes,
the International Criminal Court), environmental
(UNFCCC and post-Kyoto agreements), and economic
regimes, as well as in the core peacekeeping activities
of universal organizations like the United Nations. To
what extent can we sensibly refer to globalization as
giving rise, in turn, to a system of global governance?
What is its potential for further development? Are cur­
rent international regimes dependent on the underlying
power structure of Western dominance and reflective
of Western liberal preferences, and how sustainable are
they given the cultural diversity of the present world?
These issues link the discussion directly to the next ele­
ment of order, since much of this regime infrastructure
is to be found at a regional level.
The organ ization of prod uction and
exchange
Regionalism
Another prominent dimension is the political economy
of the present order. Central to it is the degree of stability
in the international trading and financial systems. The
former remains beset by disputes between the world's
three great trading groups or triads, and their trading
relationship with the developing world; the latter shows
periodic signs of undergoing meltdown, as during the
financial turmoil that afflicted the East Asian econo­
mies towards the late 1990s, and the global economy
in 2008. This economic order is partially managed by
those elements of governance institutionalized in bod­
ies such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization
(WTO) (see Chs 16 and 27). The resulting economic
order penetrates deeply: such bodies do not determine
just the rules for international trade and borrowing,
nor shape exchange rates alone. The full effects of this
internationalization of production include its impact
on the many other things that determine the quality
of human lives: production of military equipment, the
condition of the environment, social welfare, access to
medicines, human (and specifically child) rights in the
area of labour, and gender inequalities in the economy
and in processes of development.
M u ltilateral
manage ment and governance
One remarkable aspect of the order is the extremely
dense network of contemporary forms of international
The development of contemporary regionalism (see
Ch. 26) is yet another key to understanding the
emerging order. This takes various forms, including
economic (trading regions), security (such as NATO),
and cultural activities. The intensification of region­
alism is occasionally viewed as a denial of globaliza­
tion, but is more plausibly regarded as one aspect of
it, rather than as evidence to the contrary. The fact
that a number of regions feel the need to develop
regional institutions is itself a manifestation of glo ­
balization, in the same way that the universal spread
of the nation-state, as the principal political form,
was an earlier product of globalization. Nonetheless,
there are interesting questions about the significance
of regionalism for the post- cold war order, such as the
seemingly greater degree of autonomy 'enjoyed' by
regions since the end of the cold war, and the role of
regions in constituting new forms of identity. There is
a paradox that, with the loss of cold war constraints,
regions appeared to have greater autonomy-while, at
the same time, levels of interpenetration and global­
ization continue to indicate diminished possibilities
for regional insulation.
The l i beral rights order
Arguably, this is the feature with the most striking
continuities to the cold war period. Human rights had
become a conspicuous feature of post-1 945 interna­
tional politics, largely in reaction to the catastrophic
I A N C LA R K
experiences of the period before 1945 (see Chs 30 and
31). This theme was a paramount aspect of the cold war
period itself and was again highlighted with the col­
lapse of the Soviet bloc, since that event was portrayed
as a major step forward in extending the liberal order.
In this respect, the focus on l i beral rights is another ele­
ment of continuity between the two periods. However,
the post-cold war order is paradoxically under pressure
precisely because of its seemingly greater promotion of
a type of universalism, thought to be evoking forms of
religious and cultural resistance.
This relates directly to wider questions about the
future of democratization. How this develops is of
momentous import for the future stability of the inter­
national order, and touches on a series of interrelated
issues: the status of democracy as a universal norm;
the current variable experience with democratization,
including in the aftermath of the Arab Spring; the pres­
sures on democracy arising from globalization (and
hence the appeals for cosmopolitan forms of democ­
racy); and the future of democracy as a source of inter­
state peace and stability (see Ch. 15).
Case Study 1
North-South and the two world orders
Any examination of the contemporary order must give
a high profile to the apparent gulf within it, separat­
ing the experience of the industrialized North from
the increasingly marginalized South. Some see the
tensions to which this gives rise as undermining the
prospects for longer-term stability (see Ch. 29). Are
North-South relations more stable now than in pre­
vious eras, or do they remain precariously rooted in
inequalities of power, massive gaps in quality of life,
and incompatibilities of cultural values? (see Case
Study 1). It is also a very moot point, and a key area
of disagreement, whether globalization is aggravating
these inequalities, or, as its supporters believe, whether
it remains the best available means of rectifying them
in the longer term. Otherwise expressed, are the prob­
lems of the South due to the processes of globaliza­
tion, or to the South's relative exclusion from them?
In any case, does this divide threaten the durability of
the post-cold war order, or must we simply recognize
it as a key component of that order, and for that reason
Developing state health and u neq ual global ization
© www. istockphoto.com/Alida Van n i
Of the global health burden of death by i nfectious d isease i n the
early 2000s, some 82 per cent occu rred i n Africa and Southeast
Asia, and less than 5 per cent in Europe and the Americas {WHO
figures). At the same time, the region of the Americas contained
some 1 0 per cent of the total burden of disease, yet 3 1 per cent
of the world's health workers. In com parison, Africa suffers 24
per cent of the global burden of disease, with only 3 per cent of
the health worke rs {WHO figures). Clearly, there is a sharp m is­
match between need and the availabil ity of resou rces to meet
it. This situation is compounded by movement of trai ned health
personnel towards h igh and middle i ncome countries. Wh i l e the
developed world vol ubly voices its concerns about the spread of
i nfectious disease, the developing world remains relatively pow­
erless to staunch the i nward flow of other diseases, such as those
associated with smoking and d iet. Those now encroach upon its
own populations. Estimates place the projected death burden
associated with smoking as fal ling between 70-80 per cent upon
developing cou ntries by 2030.
The developing world thus faces the prospect of a 'double
burden', simu lta n eously carryi ng a disproportionate share with
respect to both i nfectious and non-i nfectious disease. If this is
global ization, it is highly unequal, with the flow of harms in the
one d i rection far su rpassing the return traffic in the opposite.
The picture is equally stark when viewed from the perspective
of remedial action, particu larly with respect to medical research
and the avai labil ity of medici nes. In broad terms, we fi nd the
application of the crude, but suggestive, 1 0:90 ratio. A mere 1 0
per cent of research spending globally i s d evoted to add ress
those health problems that account for 90 per cent of the global
d isease burden. The situation is particu larly vexed as regards
research i nto medici nes, and the i r availabil ity (at an affordable
price). The 80 per cent of the world's popu lation i n the develop­
i ng world accou nts for only some 20 per cent of global sales of
pharmaceuticals. The reason is straightforward ly that the bulk of
research and production is geared to those i l l n esses that affl ict
the developed world in particular, because that is where the
effective economic demand for medication is to be found.
Chapter 33 Globalization and the post-cold war order
understand it as an element of structural continuity
with its predecessors?
As against this image of two monolithic blocs of
North and South, other analysts insist that this concep­
tion is now out of date. The impacts of globalization cut
across states and not just between them, yielding complex
patterns of stratification that defy easy classification into
North and South. There are enormous variations and
inequalities within states, and within regions, not just
between them. For this reason, it may be too artificial to
speak of two such orders, as there is much more diversity
than such crude dichotomies tend to imply.
Key Poi nts
•
•
Security is increasingly dealt with o n
a
multilateral basis, even
when th is does not conform to classical 'collective security'
models.
•
Europe, and East Asia) and is managed by a panoply of
Western-domi nated i nstitutions.
Order is shaped by the changed natu re of states and of the
tasks they perform.
The global economy is pri marily shaped by relations
between the th ree key groupings ( North America, Western
•
H u man rights have a much h igher profi le than in earl ier
h istorical periods.
•
Are there two separate orders i n the North and South, or a
more complex diversity of orders?
G lobalization and ttie post-Westphalian o rder
There is a tendency to regard the current high degree of
globalization as simply a consequence of the end of the
cold war. This view has become coupled to a more gen­
eral argument about the end of the Westphalian order
(see Box 33.3).
Not surprisingly, many commentators see the post­
cold war period as characterized by the intensification
of the processes of globalization, particularly with
regard to financial integration. The global financial
order is now virtually universal in its reach, as is the
influence of its principal institutions, such as the World
Bank and the International Monetary Fund.
On this reasoning, it is the ending of the cold war
that has allowed the further spread of globalization, and
we can therefore regard the scope of globalization as a
point of difference between the cold war and post-cold
war worlds. Unfortunately, there is a danger in such an
analysis. The problem is that to regard globalization as
Box 33.3 I nterpretations of global ization and the end of the cold war
'The end of the Cold War d ivision i nto com peti ng world orders
marks a crucial substantive and sym bol i c transition to si ngle­
world economic, cultural and pol itical orders.'
(Shaw 1 999: 194)
'A merica has ceased to be a superpower, because it has met its
match: global ization-a global ization wh ich, moreover, it helps
to promote despite not managi ng to master totally its meani ng.'
(Laidi 1 998: 1 70)
'Global ization is the most significant d evelopment and theme i n
contemporary l ife a n d social theory t o emerge since t h e col l apse
of Marxist systems.'
(A/brow 1 996: 89)
'G lobal ists continue to mai ntai n that there are big, fin-de-siecfe
transformations under way in the world at large, which can be
laid at the door of someth ing cal led global ization. Th is new era­
popu larized as "a world without borders" and sym bol ized by
the dismantl ing of the Berl i n Wal l-ostensibly came i nto its own
where the cold war left off.'
(Weiss 1 999: 59)
'To tal k of 1 989 as the begi n n i ng of globalisation is very m islead­
ing . . . [G]lobal isation . . . was happening d uring the Cold War and
has contin ued si nce. If the Cold War system dominated i nterna­
tional pol itics from 1 945 to 1 989, then its successor is American
hegemony, not global isation.'
(Leg rain 2002: 7 7)
I A N C LA R K
simply the consequence of the end of the cold war is to
neglect the extent to which globalization also served as
a cause of its end. In other words, globalization marks
a point of continuity, not simply discontinuity, between
the two periods.
In a wider sense, the danger with such a proce­
dure is that it neglects other dimensions of continuity,
such as in the construction of a liberal capitalist order
(Ikenberry 2001). What is the historical evidence for
this type of argument? Its principal element is the view
that globalization developed out of the core of Western
capitalist states that formed during the cold war. This
became such a powerful force that it finally both weak­
ened the other cold war protagonist, namely the Soviet
Union, and also made the point of the cold war increas­
ingly irrelevant. As regards the Soviet Union, what
damaged and eroded its capacity as a military power
was precisely the fact that it had not become integrated
into the financial and technological sinews of global
capitalism. As regards the logic of the cold war as a
whole, the existence of a hostile Soviet bloc was cru­
cial in the initial integration of the Western system. By
the 1980s, however, this system was effectively self-sus­
taining, and no longer required any external enemy to
provide its dynamic for growth. In this sense, the Soviet
Union had become redundant as far as the needs of the
dominant Western system were concerned.
If globalization was both an element of the pre­
existing cold war system and also stands out shar.ply
as an element of the contemporary order, it needs to be
seen as a point of continuity between the two periods.
This logic, in turn, requires us to concede that the pres­
ent order is not sui generis, as it contains within it ele­
ments that were already present during the cold war.
This suggests that the contemporary order should be
understood as not wholly distinct from that which pre­
ceded it. But if globalization is the element that binds
both together, can it be also the key to understanding
the present order?
The claim that globalization defines the essential
quality of the present order has been denied for a num­
ber of reasons. Most generally, if globalization is seen
as a long-term historical trend-with various waves­
then to interpret the present order in terms of global­
ization does not say enough about what is specific to the
current situation in particular.
Beyond this, globalization has been described as
the dystopic absence of order. The general claim is that
'no one seems now to be in control' (Bauman 1998:
58). It is for this reason that globalization has come
to be associated with a more general thesis about the
demise of the Westphalian order. This system had
typified the order since 1648, and its hallmarks were
clearly defined states, with hard borders, each enjoy­
ing full sovereignty and jurisdiction within its own
territory. The rules of the game dictated that states
would not intervene in the domestic affairs of each
other. Globalization, in contrast, is thought to ques­
tion the efficacy of borders. This is very much so in the
case of the global economy, where it is suggested that
borders no longer mean as much as they once did. It
also applies to other aspects of political life, such as
human rights and humanitarian intervention, where
the norms of the Westphalian order have come under
increasing pressure.
All these arguments suggest that globalization
may be inadequate as the exclusive conceptual basis
for understanding the contemporary order because of
what globalization does. It is too varied in its effects,
and so lacking in purpose and goals, so that we can­
not visualize a single order constructed on that basis
alone. Indeed, the main theme of these writings is just
how disorderly the process of globalization is. But a
different form of argument can be made on the basis
of what globalization is, not just what it does. We need
to be more precise about its nature, and not look only
at its effects. This will be set out in the final section,
after we have reviewed some of the political problems
that appear to be attached to globalization today. These
arise exactly from that sense of purposelessness and
lack of control.
•
Gl obalization i s often portrayed as an effect ofthe end of
the cold war because this led to its furthe r geographical
spread.
•
At the same time, globalization needs to be understood as
one of the factors that contributed to the end of the cold
war. It was the Soviet U n ion's margi nalization from
processes of global ization that revealed, and i ntensified, its
weaknesses.
•
Accord i ngly, global ization should be regarded as an
element of conti n u ity between the cold war and post-cold
war orders.
•
There is reason for scepticism that global ization is the
exclusive hal l mark of contemporary order.
•
G lobal ization e m bodies a range of often com peti ng val ues.
Chapter 33 Globalization and the post-cold war order
G lobalization and l egiti macy
On the face of it, globalization potentially creates sev­
eral problems for the political stability of the current
order. Not least is this so with regard to its legitimacy
(see Box 33.4). There is a widely shared view that the
emergence of a diffuse protest movement against glo­
balization is symptomatic of a new wave of resistance
to it. This creates tensions at several levels. The central
problem is understood to be one of the limited effec­
tiveness of democratic practice in present world condi­
tions. At a time when so much emphasis is placed on
the virtues of democracy, many question its viability
when organized on a purely national basis, given the
context of globalization. There are two facets to this
issue: representation and accountability. It is all very
well for citizens to be represented in national elec­
toral institutions, but what voice does this give them
in controlling those very economic, social, and cul­
tural forces that cut across national borders, if their
own governments do not have the capacity to deal with
these? Conversely, this creates an issue of account­
ability. There may be little point in holding national
and local politicians accountable through elections if
these politicians remain relatively powerless to exercise
influence over global corporations, global technology,
global environmental changes, or the global financial
system. These concerns apply specifically to just how
democratic are bodies such as the World Bank and
the International Monetary Fund, as well as interna­
tional organizations such as the United Nations. On a
regional level, there has been recurrent anxiety about
the so-called legitimacy deficits that afflict the institu­
tions of the European Union (see Ch. 26). The general
issue is the lack of congruence between the geographi­
cal organization of our various political systems, and
the 'deterritorialized' nature of our current economic,
social, and political activities.
In the face of these concerns, there has been much
debate about the role of an emerging global civil society
(Keane 2003). This embraces a variety of cross-national
social movements, including anti-globalization activ­
ists as well as a multitude of international non-govern­
mental organizations, such as Greenpeace and Amnesty
International. Their proponents see these movements
as the only feasible way of directly influencing global
policies on such matters as development, environment,
human rights, and international security, and hence
Box 33.4 The debate about global ization and legiti macy
'The process of global ization has had a m ixed i m pact on the legiti­
macy of i nternational organ izations. The demand for i nternational
co-ord i nation and common action has obviously i ncreased. But at
the same time, the effectiveness of IOs has d i m i n ished.'
(Junne 200 1 : 2 1 8- 1 9)
'Global structu res violate com m itments to the politics of consent:
there is a global democratic deficit that m ust be reduced ifworld ­
wide arrangements are to be legitimate.'
(Linklater 1 999: 477)
'It wi l l be argued that the rising need for e n larged and deepened
i nternational cooperation in the age of global ization led to the
establish ment of new i nternational i nstitutions with specific fea­
tu res. As a result, the i ntrusiveness of those new i nternational
i nstitutions i nto national societies has increased d ramatical ly.'
(Zurn 2004: 261 -2)
'The democratic project is to global ize democracy as we have
global ized the economy.'
(Barber 2002: 255)
'Some theorists have poi nted to the activity of social movements
working beyond state borders as a method of i ncreasing demo­
cratic practice. They see a contrad iction between the fact that the
structu res of power . . . are fi rmly rooted i n the global context,
but partici pation, representation and legitimacy are fixed at the
state level.'
(O' Brien et al. 2000: 2 1 -2)
'H owever much i n d ivid ual I N GOs and global social m ove­
ments may have contri buted to the extension of d e mocratic
pol itics across the world, they do not cu rrently possess the
req u isite degree of legiti macy and accou ntab i l ity to be con ­
sidered a s democrati c rep resentatives i n a global ized political
co m m u n ity.'
(Colas 2002: 1 63)
'Rather than reform, these critics i nsist that what is req u i red is an
alternative system of global governance, privi legi ng people over
profits, and the local over the global.'
(Held and McGrew 2002: 64)
I A N C LA R K
as the best way of democratizing global governance.
Others, however, remain sceptical. There is nothing
inherently democratic about global civil society as
such, as there is no legitimate basis of representation or
accountability to many of these movements (Van Rooy
2003). They may simply represent sectional interests,
and make policy hostage to those that are better orga­
nized, have greater resources, and are more vocal.
Indeed, from the perspective of many govern­
ments in the South, global civil society may aggravate
the inequalities between rich and poor. Civil society
is resented as an extension of the power of the North,
for the reason that such movements have a much
more solid basis in the developed world, and are more
likely to speak for its interests. This is illustrated, for
example, in the tension between the economic develop­
ment objectives of many governments in the South and
the preferred policies of many environmental move­
ments in the North. The possible objection is that this
Case Study 2
perpetuates the sense of two contrasting global orders,
one for the North (represented both by strong govern­
ments and strong civil society movements) and another
for the South (led by weak governments, and weakly
organized civil society). This may contribute to a per­
ceived crisis oflegitimacy for the state in the developing
world (see Case Study 2).
Key Poi nts
•
Trad itional democracy does not offer effective
representation in the global order.
•
National elections may not make politicians accountable if
they can not control wider global forces.
•
There is a heated debate about whether global civi l society
can help to democratize i nternational institutions.
•
Some governments i n the South remain suspicious of
social movements that may be better organized i n
developed countries.
The crisis of developing state legiti macy
© www.istockphoto.com/ad rian brockwel l
The idea of the two world orders-one applying to the rich and
stable North and the other to the poor and unstable South-re i n ­
forces t h e i m age o f a crisis o f state legiti macy i n t h e South. Many
of these have, si nce decolon ization, been depicted as q uasi ­
states (Jackson 1 990), n o t enjoying t h e fu l l capacities o f strong
states. The period since the end of the cold war has rei nforced
this tendency. It has become commonplace to refer to a n u m ber
of 'fai led states' (e.g. Lebanon, Cambod ia, Afghan istan, Somalia,
Rwanda, ZaYre, Zim babwe), indicating their inabil ity to mai ntai n
central order with i n the state, or to produce at least m i n i mal
conditions of social welfare and economic subsistence. In some
cases, law and order has broken down i nto civil war, creati ng fief­
doms organ ized by rival warlords.
The deployment by the i nternational com m u n ity of a n u m ­
b e r o f peacebu i l d i ng m issions has been i m p l icitly justified on the
grounds of the 'fai l u re' of these national authorities to mai ntai n
order on their own, especially i n the aftermath of i nternational
or civi l confl ict. Th is has been associated with the revival of doc­
trines of trusteeship i n the i nternational com m u nity, chargi ng the
strong with some responsi bil ity for protecting the welfare of the
weak.
However, there is considerable resentment agai nst this
notion of failed states, and it is often suggested that the fai l u res
are exactly the outcome of the structural conditions that the
Northern powers have themselves created by their economic
and pol itical actions. This resentment leads to charges that the
i nstruments of the i nternational com m u nity are being used to
erode the pol itical legiti macy of Southern governments, thereby
making Southern societies more vulnerable to i ntervention, and
more adaptable to the preferences of the rich states. Th is is fu r­
ther compounded when the most powerful states themselves
q uestion the legitimacy of some governments, by designati ng
them as rogue states, or sponsors of terrorism, and questioning
their ful l entitlement to be represented i n i nternational negotia­
tions, or to enjoy equal rights with other states. The objection
raised is that state fa i l u res, and the resulting d i m i n ished legiti­
macy of d eveloping states, are not 'objective' conditions but the
prod ucts of Northern pol i cies.
Chapter 33 Globalization and the post-cold war order
An i nternational o rder of globalized states?
The chapter now returns to the question of whether
globalization can be regarded as the defining element
in contemporary order. Globalization could be taken
to represent the mainstay of today's order only if it
superseded all traditional elements of the international
order. But if globalization is an addition to, not a sub­
stitute for, the existing international order, then it is not
wholly adequate to the task of providing us with the
single key to the post-cold war order.
If it can be convincingly held that globalization is
not some process over and above the activities of states,
but is instead an element within state transformation,
we can develop on this basis a conception of the global­
ized state. Globalization does not make the state disap­
pear, but is a way of thinking about its present form. By
extension, globalization does not make redundant the
notion of an international order, but instead requires
us to think about a globalized international order. In
short, what is required is a notion of international order
composed of globalized states.
Much of the confusion results from the tendency to
see globalization as exclusively pertaining to the envi­
ronment in which states find themselves: globaliza­
tion is a force wholly external to the individual states,
and demands an outside-in perspective on the result­
ing outcomes (see Fig. 33.1). On this view, globaliza­
tion is a claim about the degree of interconnectedness
between states, such that the significance of borders,
and the reality of separate national actors, is called
seriously into question. There is no denying that this
is part of what globalization signifies. But what such
a one-sided interpretation leaves out is the extent to
which globalization refers also to a ' domestic' process
Globalization
Figure 3 3 . 1
Outside- i n view of global ization
of change within states. Regarded in this alternative
way, globalization can be understood as an expression
of the profound transformations in the nature of the
state, and in state-society relations, that have devel­
oped in recent decades. This requires an inside-out
view of globalization as well (see Fig. 33.2). This leads
us to think not of the demise or retreat of the state, but
about its changing functionality: states still exist but
do different things-they do some things less well than
they used to, and also have taken on new responsibili­
ties in exchange.
Even in an age of globalization, there remain both
states and a states-system. We need to face the seeming
paradox that there can indeed be an international order
of globalized states.
State
Key Poi nts
•
Globalization is often thought of as an extreme form of
i nterdepend ence. This sees it excl usively as an outside-in
development.
•
The i m pl i cation of such analyses is that states are now
much weaker as actors. Consequently, they are i n retreat
or becoming obsolete.
•
But if global ization is considered as a transformation in the
nature of states themselves, this suggests that states are sti l l
central t o the d iscussion o f order: they are d ifferent but
not obsolete. This leads to the idea of a global ized state as
a state form, and i ntroduces an inside-out element.
•
In this case, there is no contrad iction between the norms
and rules of a state system operating alongside global ized
states.
Globalization
I A N C LA R K
State
Globalization
+
Globalization
+
Figure 33.2 I nside-out view of global ization
THe global financial crisis·
The on-going financial upheaval since 2007 lends fur­
ther support to the core argument of this chapter. On
the one hand, it certainly seemed to reaffirm the strong
version of the globalization thesis that the world is so
powerfully interconnected that no state can isolate
itself from harmful impacts. This was demonstrated in
the speed with which the sub-prime credit implosion in
the USA transmitted itself globally. As the squeeze on
international lending affected the real economy, pro­
duction and trade experienced sharp falls. Small states
such as Iceland and Ireland, and then Greece, seemed
'hollowed out' by this financial globalization. As part of
the associated crisis in the eurozone, even larger econo­
mies such as Spain and Italy have been placed at risk.
On the other hand, the response to the crisis gave
the lie to those accounts suggesting that the global
economy was no longer embedded in state and political
structures, and somehow was able to operate autono ­
mously. The most striking feature of the events of 2008
was the return of state action to underwrite the bank­
ing and financial sectors. Leading states, including the
USA, had to bail out the banks, either through loans, or
effectively through forms of nationalization. Even the
USA, the bastion of laissez-faire capitalism, undertook
unprecedented levels of governmental intervention in
the economy, including the automobile industry. As
governments introduced their various stimulus pack­
ages to try to push their economies out of recession,
there was even a barely concealed attempt to interfere
with the market by veiled forms of protectionism.
In short, if the discussion of globalization hitherto
had tended to proceed on the basis of a false opposi­
tion between globalization and state power-viewed as
in a zero-sum relationship where more globalization
further weakened the role of states-then the financial
crunch of 2008 made abundantly clear the extent to
which a global economy and global finance remained
critically dependent on structural supports from state
sources. Indeed, this age of globalization witnessed the
return to unusually high levels of state capitalism in
the so-called market economies.
The maj or challenge to a business-as-usual model
for the future global economy comes from climate
change. While responding to this challenge appears
particularly difficult during an economic recession,
with many competing demands on public finances,
the move towards a post-carbon economy is being
presented as an opportunity for, not an obstacle to,
economic recovery. How far, and how fast, this will
go depends on interlocking domestic and interna­
tional negotiations. Domestically, many governments
are trying to enact 'clean energy' legislation, or to
introduce carbon trading schemes, to curb emissions.
Internationally, much depends on whether an effective
post-Kyoto regime can be implemented, and whether
it will deliver an acceptable deal that involves all maj or
emitters, whether ' developing' or not (see Ch. 22). It is
no 19nger possible to talk about the future of globaliza­
tion without placing responses to climate change at the
centre of the discussion.
Chapter 33 Globalization and the post-cold war order
What all this suggests is that we are not witnessing
the end of globalization. More realistically, the financial
crisis points towards the beginning of the end of one
version of it. That particular model of Anglo-American
financial deregulation, which has reigned supreme since
the 1980s, does, indeed, now face major challenges
(Gamble 2009). It certainly faces an almost universal
crisis of legitimacy, both at the governmental and at
the civil society levels. By itself, however, this does not
indicate the end of globalization. Levels of interdepen­
dence remain very high. While there is, at the moment,
a strong desire to insulate national economies from the
worst excesses of deregulation, this is unlikely to go as
far as policies aimed actively at cutting national econ­
omies adrift from the global. Virtually all states retain
high stakes in this economy. While there is much talk of
a burgeoning Chinese economy coming to take the place
of the USA as the most powerful influence, there is noth­
ing to suggest that China is about to lead the attack on the
international economy, given its own high dependence
on access to it. Had China wished to destroy the liberal
project, 2008 presented its best opportunity for doing so.
Instead, China played its part in helping to bail out the
stricken US economy. We do not yet face the end of glo­
balization, because there is no major state interested in
acting as the champion of de-globalization. Nonetheless,
critical to the future evolution of the global economy, as
with many other aspects of the international order, will
be what kind of relationship, or accommodation, proves
possible between the US and China, as they still repre­
sent distinctively different types of globalized states.
Key Poi nts
•
Toxi c debts rapid ly infected the global fi nancial system.
•
State i ntervention was needed to support the system.
•
We
•
Responses to cli mate change are now a key d river of the
futu re shape of the global economy.
•
De-global ization has no political champion.
are seeing the end ofone versio n of globalization,
rather than the end of globalization.
Conclusion
In short, we now face a hybrid situation in which states
share a host of responsibilities with both intergovern­
mental organizations and a multiplicity of non-govern­
mental and transnational actors. This does not, however,
mean that the international order has become redun­
dant. It means simply that it needs to be redesigned
to take account of the new division of labour between
states, global networks, and the rudimentary forms of
global governance. As long as states persist as impor­
tant sources of political agency, they will construct a
states-system with its own rules and norms. It is this
that we regard as the essential basis of the international
order. Currently, the identity of states is undergoing
considerable change, to the extent that we can describe
them as globalized states. But these globalized states still
coexist within an international order, albeit one that now
differs from its recent historical forms. This order is cur­
rently seeking to develop a set of principles to reflect that
transformation. The quest for a post-cold war order is the
expression of this uneasy search. There is no reason to
assume that recent trends are irreversible, as the revival
of the security state after 9/1 1 would seem to indicate.
Likewise, the return to forms of state capitalism during
2008 was almost wholly unexpected. The globalized state
of the late twentieth century is evidently not the only
model of likely state development in the future.
Questions
Is the post-cold war o rder sti l l an i nternational o rder?
2 How i m po rtant an element i n the contem porary o rder is the condition of global izatio n ?
3 H ow wou l d you d i sti ngu ish between an i nternational and a world o rder, and wh ich is the
more i mportant framewo rk for assessi ng the contemporary situation?
4 I n which respects are the 'identities' of states undergoi ng change?
I A N C LA R K
5 How wou l d you defi ne the polarity of the contem porary i nternational system ?
6 Is regi.o nalism a contrad iction of global ization?
7 Is the p romi nence of democracy and l i beral rights convi ncing evidence of the i m pact of
global ization? If so, why is global ization so p roblematic for democracy?
8 I n which ways is globalization creating p roblems of pol itical legitimacy?
9 Does the 2008 fi nancial crisis point to the end of global ization?
1 0 I s the idea of an i nternational order of global ized states contradictory?
Further Read ing
International order
Bull, H . (1 977), The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (London: Macm i l lan),
especially Part 1 . Provides the standard i ntrod uction to this issue from an i nternational
society perspective.
New world orders and the post-cold war world
Clark, I. (2001 ), The Post-Cold War Order: The Spoils of Peace (Oxford: Oxford U n iversity Press).
Presents a gu ide to the debates about the post-cold war period, viewi ng the order as the
equ ivalent of a h i storical peace settlement.
I kenberry, G.J. (2001 ), After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order
after Major Wars (Pri nceton, Nj : Pri nceton U n iversity Press). Also sets post-cold war
developments in the i r historical context and argues for the emergence of an i ncreasi ngly
'constitutional' i nternational order after 1 945.
Globalization in the present order
Clark, I . (1 997), Globalization and Fragmentation: International Relations in the Twentieth
Century (Oxford: Oxford U n iversity Press). Places the contem porary d ebates about
global ization in historical perspective.
-- (1 999), Globalization and International Relations Theory (Oxford : Oxford U n iversity Press).
Develops a theoretical account of global ization i n terms of state transformatio n .
Cohen , j . L. (20 1 2), Globalization a n d Sovereignty: Rethinking Legality. Legitimacy and
Constitutionalism (Cambridge: Cam bridge U n iversity Press). Traces legal and h u man rights
i m p l i cations.
Friedman, T. L. (2006), The World is Flat: The Globalized World in the Twenty-First Century
(London: Pengu i n). A detai led j o u rnalistic account of the i m pacts of global ization.
Holden, R.J. (201 1 ), Globalization and the Nation State, 2nd edn (Hou n d m i l ls: Palgrave). Good
sum mary of the relationsh i p between global ization and the state.
International legitimacy
Clark, I. (2005), Legitimacy in International Society (Oxford : Oxford U n iversity Press). Explores
the natu re of legiti macy with i n the states-system .
-- (200 7), International Legitimacy a n d World Society (Oxford: Oxford U n iversity Press). Tries to
explain how world society norms are adopted by i nternational society.
-- (201 1 ), Hegemony in International Society (Oxford : Oxford U n iversity Press). Discusses a
con d ition of primacy with legiti macy.
The global financial crisis
Gamble, A. (2009), The Spectre at the Feast: Capitalist Crisis and the Politics of Recession
(Basingstoke: Palgrave M acm i l lan). An overview of the economic d rama of 2007-9.