ECONOMIC STRIKE
CALTEX [PHIL. ] INC., Petitioner, v. PHILIPPINE LABOR ORGANIZATIONS, CALTEX
CHAPTER, Respondent.
[G.R. No. L-4758. May 30, 1953.]
SYLLABUS
1. EMPLOYEE AND LABORERS; STRIKES; DECISION OF COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS DECLARING
STRIKE ILLEGAL; LABORERS NEW DEMANDS AND CONSEQUENT STRIKE NOT A VIOLATION OF DECISION.
— If after the decision of the Court of Industrial Relations declaring a strike illegal, new demands or
matters arise not connected with, or similar to, the demands in the former case, and the laborers struck
anew, the new strike cannot be held as a violation of the decision.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION MAKING NEW DAMAGES; LACK OF SERVICE. — Where
the new demands or matters were brought before the Court of Industrial Relations in a motion for
reconsideration, the court may entertain such motion as an application by an interested party for the
reopening of the question involved in the decision under section 17 of Commonwealth Act No. 103 as
amended, even if the motion for reconsideration was not served upon the company, or if served there
was no proof of service.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; REJECTION OF DEMANDS DOES NOT MAKE STRIKE ILLEGAL. — If the demands of the
laborers cannot be granted for being unjust and unreasonable, the only consequence should be
rejection of the demands, but not the illegality of the strike or the punishment of the workers who
presented them, for this would be in effect to outlaw altogether an effective means for securing better
working conditions.
DECISION
PARAS, C.J. :
In the course of the proceedings in Case No. 112-V of the Court of Industrial
Relations, involving an industrial dispute between the Philippine Labor Organizations,
Caltex Chapter, hereinafter referred to as the Union, and Caltex (Philippines), Inc.,
hereinafter referred to as the Company, that court issued an order on January 2,
1948
containing
the
following
directive:
jgc:chan roble s .com.ph
"The laborers involved in these cases, pending the final determination of same, are
enjoined not to stage strike or walk out from their employment without authority
from and without first submitting their grievances to the court. The respondent
companies are likewise enjoined not to lay off, dismiss, discharge or admit any
employees or laborers in their employments during the pendency of these cases
without beforehand notifying and obtaining the authority of the court. The
controversial points involved in the petitions will be heard separately by this court at
the
opportune
time."
cralaw
vi rt ua1aw
libra ry
On February 13 and 15, 1950, the Union presented certain demands on the Company
which became the subject of negotiations between the parties. On March 1, 1950, a
strike was declared by the Union, a matter which the Company submitted to the Court
of Industrial Relations in Case No. 112-V(10). After hearing, the Court of Industrial
Relations, thru Presiding Judge Arsenio C. Roldan, rendered a decision dated July 31,
1950,
holding
as
follows:
jgc:chan rob les.com. ph
"1. The prohibition from declaring a strike during the determination of the dispute,
issued in a pending case before the Court, refers to a strike over the same or similar
demands or dispute or matters directly connected with them in the pending case
only, and a strike thus declared while there is such order, is a violation of this
injunction
and,
therefore,
illegal;
"2. Prohibition not to declare strike during the determination of the dispute in a
pending case before the Court does not prohibit a strike for new demands;
"3. The strike declared by the members of the petitioning union, workers of the
respondent company, on March 1, 1950, was not a violation of the order given by
the
Court
of
Industrial
Relations
on
January
2,
1948;
"4. The strike declared by the members of the petitioning union, workers of the
respondent company, on March 1, 1950, was illegal, not only because the purpose
was trivial, unjust or unreasonable but because there was no good purpose at all.
"5. The company did not dismiss the laborers Concha, Silva, Algozo and Punzal as
they abandoned their work, and, therefore, the officials of the management can not
be
held
in
contempt
of
Court;
and
"6. As this strike was illegal, the Company is authorized to dismiss those responsible
therefor, and may rehire such of the striking employees and laborers and/or new
labor
force
as
in
its
discretion
it
may
see
fit."
cra law
vi rtua 1aw
lib rary
The Union filed a motion for reconsideration. Under date of January 31, 1951, the
Court of Industrial Relations in banc issued a resolution reversing the decision of
Judge Roldan insofar as it declared the strike illegal and insofar as it authorized the
Company to discharge the workers responsible for the strike. This resolution was by
a
three-to-two
vote.
On March 20, 1951, the Company filed an urgent petition, followed on the next day
by an urgent amended petition, praying that the motion for reconsideration filed
against the decision dated July 31, 1950 of Judge Roldan, be denied, because said
decision had become final and unappealable on August 17, 1950, in view of the fact
that, although the motion for reconsideration was filed by the Union on the last day
of the reglementary period, no copy thereof was served upon the adverse party and
no proof of service was shown. This amended urgent petition was denied by the Court
of Industrial Relations in banc in its unanimous order of April 20, 1951. The Company
has filed the present petition for review on certiorari, praying that judgment be
rendered:
jgc:chanrobles. com.ph
"(a) reversing and setting aside the resolution of the Court of Industrial Relations
modifying the decision of July 31, 1950, the latter having become final and
unappealable;
"(b) but should this court be of the opinion that the decision had not become final
and unappealable, petitioner prays that this Honorable Court render judgment
reversing and setting aside the resolution of the Court of Industrial Relations which
modified the decision of July 31, 1950, and affirming the said decision.
The contention of the Company that the decision of the Trial Judge of July 31, 1950
had become final and unappealable, is without merit. Assuming that copy of the
motion for reconsideration filed by the Union was not served upon the Company, or
if it was served no proof of service was presented, the Court of Industrial Relations
could entertain said motion for reconsideration as an application by an interested
party for the reopening of a question involved in the decision under section 17 of
Commonwealth Act No. 103, as amended. (Goseco v. Court of Industrial Relations,
68
Phil.
444.)
There is neither merit in the company’s contention that the strike staged by the Union
on March 1, 1950 was in violation of the directive of the Court of Industrial Relations
of January 2, 1948, hereinabove quoted. From the very decision of July 31, 1950, it
is clear that the strike was motivated by new demands or matters not connected with
or similar to the demands or disputes involved in the case in which the order of
January 2, 1948 were issued, and therefore could not have been, as correctly held
by
Judge
Roldan,
violative
of
the
directive
against
strikes.
The important question that arises is whether the strike held on March 1, 1950, was
illegal. On this we agree with the resolution of the Court of Industrial Relations in
banc. It is noteworthy that on February 13, 1950, the Union sent a letter to the
Company, containing fourteen demands referring to wage differentials, retirement
and insurance benefits, free medical treatment and hospitalization with pay,
Christmas bonus, bonus to drivers, vacation and sick leave, overtime pay,
reinstatement of certain employees, gratuity to pre-war employees and backpay
during the Japanese occupation. It appears also that in the second letter of February
15, 1950, the Union gave the manager of the Company forty-eight hours to decide
on the demands, with the admonition that the Union would declare a strike. The
resolution of the Court of Industrial Relations in banc of January 31, 1951 found that
"among the factors that motivated the declaration of the strike was the failure of the
respondent to meet the petitioner’s demands." These demands, if granted, would
certainly tend to improve the conditions of the laborers and employees affected, and
cannot be said to be trivial, much less illegal. But whether the same are unreasonable
or unjust is a matter to be decided after proper consideration. If said demands cannot
be granted for being unjust or unreasonable, the only consequence, in the
appropriate words of the Court of Industrial Relations in banc, should "be their
rejection and not the punishment of the workers who presented them." To make the
legality or illegality of strikes dependent solely on whether the demands of laborers
may or may not be granted, is in effect to outlaw altogether an effective means for
Securing
better
working
conditions.
Wherefore, the decision of the Court of Industrial Relations now under review is
hereby
affirmed,
with
costs
against
the
petitioner.
So
ordered.
Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Tuason, Jugo and Bautista Angelo, JJ., concur.
CENTRAL VEGETABLE OIL MANUFACTURING CO., INC., PetitionerAppellant, v. PHILIPPINE OIL INDUSTRY WORKERS UNION (CLO, C. V. C.
LOCAL), ET AL., Respondents-Appellees.
[G.R. No. L-4061. May 28, 1952.]
SYLLABUS
1. LABOR AND CAPITAL; STRIKE, WHEN NOT ILLEGAL. — The strike prompted by the
refusal of the company to discuss the 14-point petition of the union and to concede
at least two working days a week, was legitimate. The plea of the laborers for better
conditions and for more working days cannot be said to be trivial, unreasonable or
unjust, much less illegal, because it is not only the inherent right but the duty of all
free men to improve their living standard through honest work that pays a decent
wage. The demands that gave rise to the strike may not properly be granted but that
fact should not make the demands and the consequent strike illegal. The ability of
the company to grant the demands is one thing, and the right of the laborers to make
said demands is another thing. The latter should be kept inviolate.
DECISION
PARAS, C.J. :
In case No. 146-V of the Court of Industrial Relations between the Central Vegetable
Oil Manufacturing Company, Inc. and the Philippine Oil Industry Workers Union, the
parties entered on July 17, 1948, into an agreement worded as follows:
jgc:c hanro bles. com.ph
"1. That pending the re-opening of the factory in all the departments:
jgc:chanrob les.com. ph
"(a) Alfonso de los Reyes will work in place of Primitivo Tan at P6 per day and he and
Jose Deogracias (the latter at P6.30 per day) will be working regularly in the filling
department;
"(b) Primitivo Soriano will be working as a helper electrician at P3.30 per day;
"(c)
Apolinario
Roque
will
work
as
filterman
at
P6.12
per
day;
"2. That, if the new machinery has not been installed upon the re-opening of the
factory in all its departments, the Company shall admit all the former laborers of April
3, 1948; that, if the new machinery has then been installed upon the re-opening of
the factory in all its departments, the Company and a duly authorized representative
of the Union shall determine who among the former laborers shall be hired for each
kind of work it deemed capable to do the same and any disagreement thereon will
be submitted to the Court of Industrial Relations for arbitration and decision;
Provided, however, that during the negotiation and the pendency of the matter before
the Court of Industrial Relations, the laborers called by the Company and the Union
members shall work and continue working to the end that the re-opening of the
factory
shall
not
be
delayed;
"3. That, upon the re-opening of the factory in all its departments, the Company and
a duly authorized representative of the Union shall fix wages of the laborers at such
scales similar to those of the Philippine Refining Company, in as much as the same
machines now being used by the said Company are to be installed in the factory;
and, in case of any disagreement, the provisions in paragraph 2 of this agreement
will
apply;
"4. That all laborers of April 3, 1948, shall be given a loan of twenty (20) days wages,
except those who already received gratuity from the Company as per attached list
and those who will be working during the present period pending the re-opening of
the factory in all its departments, said loan being without interest and payable at the
rate of twenty (20%) per centum of each laborer’s weekly wage; except, however,
that those laborers who are forcibly laid off shall have the right to keep their loan
without
obligation
to
repay
the
same.
"The above-mentioned Union agrees to allow its affiliated laborers who were working
on June 10, 1948, to resume work immediately upon signing of this agreement."
c ralaw v irt ua1aw lib rary
This agreement, which was approved by the Court of Industrial Relations on July 23,
1948, was supplemented in the sense that, in determining the former laborers who
shall be hired for each kind of work, the Company and the duly constituted
representatives of the Union shall not consider the re-employment of those who have
already received gratuity before July 17, 1948, and severed their relations with the
Company.
The arrangement embodied in the agreement was conceived by the parties in
contemplation of the installation of new machineries of the Company which might
necessitate the reorganization of its personnel. Accordingly, there was a time when,
while machineries were being installed in the new oil mill, 24 laborers of the Union
were laid off. However, upon demand of said 24 laborers, the Company allowed them
to work one day each week; so that from June 27 to July 5, 1949, they continued to
work on shifts of four men a day, during which they were also granted a loan
equivalent to one day’s salary per week. From July 5 to August 6, 1949, when the
super duos were being tested, however, these 24 laborers were allowed to work on
full time basis. On or about August 6, 1949, a notice was posted on the bulletin board
of the Company by the plant superintendent to the effect that the oil mill would stop
operation at 7:00 a.m., Sunday, August 7, 1949, due to the readjustment of the
machineries until further notice, and that all shifts, mechanics and assistants should
report for work at 8:00 a.m., Monday, August 8, 1949. On this latter date, while the
three mechanics and three assistants reported for work, the 24 laborers did not.
This gave rise to a petition dated August 13, 1949, which the Central Vegetable Oil
Manufacturing Company, Inc. filed with the Court of Industrial Relations against the
Philippine Oil Industry Workers Union, praying that the laborers affiliated with the
respondent Union be discharged on the ground that they declared an illegal strike on
August 8, 1949. After hearing, the Court of Industrial Relations, thru Judge Arsenio
C. Roldan, rendered a decision on December 12, 1949, authorizing the Central
Vegetable Manufacturing Company, Inc. to dismiss the 24 laborers who failed to
report for work on August 8, 1949, and to replace them with new laborers, without
prejudice to other laborers of the Company who are members of the Union and who
had not gone on strike. Upon motion for reconsideration filed by the Union, the Court
of Industrial Relations ordered the reinstatement of the laborers and the payment of
their wages from the day work is resumed in the Company. Judges V. Jimenez Yanson
and Jose S. Bautista held that no strike was stage by the 24 laborers, on the ground
that, if they in fact stopped working on August 8, 1949, it was because there was no
work, as announced in the following notice posted in the bulletin board of the
Company: "Oil mill will stop operation, August 6, 1949, until further notice. All the
three mechanics and three assistant mechanics must report to their respective duty."
Judge Juan L. Lanting concurred in the reinstatement of the laborers, but held that,
even admitting that there was a strike, the same was not illegal. Judges Arsenio C.
Roldan and Modesto Castillo dissented, holding that there was an illegal strike
because it was in violation of the agreement of July 17, 1948, and that, at any rate,
said laborers had abandoned their work in violation of said agreement. The company
has
filed
the
present
petition
for
review
on certiorari.
In our view of the case, we will assume that there was a strike on August 8, 1949.
In this connection, it may be stated that on July 14, 1949, the respondent Union
presented
to
the
Company
the
following
14-point
petition:
jgc:chan roble s.com.p h
"1. That, in case of reparation periods all laborers who are members of the Union
be given other jobs in the company;
"2. That, all night shift workers covered from 6:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. be given an
additional compensation of fifty per cent (50%);
"3. That, sick leave up to complete recovery with full pay be provided the laborers;
"4. That, free medicine, medical care, dental treatment and hospitalization be
provided all laborers;
"5. That, after one (1) month of service, any laborer be considered permanent;
"6. That, the closed-shop system in hiring new employees be established;
"7. That, in case of disability, death, incurable disease, dismissal and/or closing of
the business, any laborer be given a compensation of two (2) months pay for every
year of service rendered;
"8. That, the amount of six pesos (P6.00) as the minimum wage for the present be
given the laborers;
"9. That, the following laborers be given their former daily wages such as indicated
hereinbelow:
cha nrob 1es vi rtua l 1aw lib rary
‘a. Pricilo Sarmiento P12.00 a day;
b. Raymundo Dizon 9.60 a day; and
c. All foreman 9.00 a day.’
"10. That, the check-off system in the collection of dues and other monetary
obligation of the union members be established;
"11. That, one (1) man be given the sole responsibility in the supervision of all the
works and operation of the whole factory;
"12. That, due to the present conditions of speedy and heavy pressure of work in
which the present laborers can’t cope with due to their small number, an expeller,
two (2) copra bodega tendermen and one (1) copra meal tenderman be employed
in each shift;
"13. That, the regular mechanics be reinforced or employed additional mechanics,
and
"14. That, maternity leave of one (1) month before and one (1) month after
delivery with full pay be provided all the female laborers."
cralaw vi rt ua1aw lib rary
In addition, on August 8, 1949, the Union asked the Company to allow the 24 laborers
in question to work for more than one day, or a minimum of two days every week.
This was turned down by the Company which also refused to consider the 14-point
petition and insisted that the Union should appoint a representative who, with the
Company, could fix the wages of the laborers at scales similar to those of the
Philippine Refining Company, as required by the agreement of July 17, 1948.
In our opinion, the strike declared on August 8, 1949, undoubtedly prompted by the
refusal of the company to discuss the 14- point petition of the Union and to concede
at least two working days a week, was legitimate. The plea of the laborers for better
conditions and for more working days cannot be said to be trivial, unreasonable or
unjust, much less illegal, because it is not only the inherent right but the duty of all
free men to improve their living standards through honest work that pays a decent
wage. We cannot hope to have a strong and progressive nation, as long as the
laboring class (which constitutes the great majority) remains under constant
economic insecurity and leads a life of misery. The demand for two working days a
week, even regardless of those for sick leave, maternity leave, medical treatment
and hospitalization, is the most legitimate that can be presented by any laborer, for
it affects his very right to live. We need not stretch our imagination or power of
reasoning to realize that the laborer who has to feed and clothe himself and his family
for
seven
days
a
week,
cannot
survive
on
one
day’s
wage.
The demands that gave rise to the strike may not properly be granted under the
circumstances of this case, but that fact should not make said demands and the
consequent strike illegal. The ability of the Company to grant said demands is one
thing, and the right of the laborers to make said demands is another thing. The latter
should be kept inviolate. There are adequate instrumentalities which may be resorted
to in case of excesses. In this connection, it may be mentioned that there is nothing
in the agreement of July 17, 1948, that may be interpreted as prohibiting the Union
absolutely from seeking more working days or better conditions for the laborers. And
such
prohibition
will
be
patently
immoral
if
not
illegal.
The Union is charged with having violated its agreement of July 17, 1948, by refusing
to name a representative for the purpose of fixing the scales of salaries and wages
in accordance with those of the Philippine Refining Company, but, as Judge Lanting
properly observes, said violation may be negatived by the belief of the Union that the
Company first violated the agreement by employing extra laborers. The explanation
of the Company to the effect that extra laborers were hired, not to replace the regular
laborers but merely to do odd jobs, is not entirely plausible, because the 24 laborers
in question could have been as well employed to perform said odd jobs, especially
because as admitted by the appellant, "the twenty-four laborers worked on rotation
of four men a day so that each man worked one day a week. They worked — not in
their regular work which had to do with the operation of the duo expellers and which
duo expellers were not then operating — but by doing odd jobs and helping at the
installation of the new machineries." At any rate, we think that the fixing of wages
should be subordinated to the more urgent and important matter of threshing out
the
question
of
granting
two
working
days
to
the
laborers.
Wherefore, the appealed decision of the Court of Industrial Relations is affirmed, and
it
is
so
ordered
with
costs
against
the
petitioner.
Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Tuason and Labrador, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-38258 November 19, 1982
LAKAS NG MANGGAGAWANG MAKABAYAN (LAKAS), petitioner,
vs.
MARCELO ENTERPRISES and MARCELO TIRE & RUBBER CORP., MARCELO RUBBER AND
LATEX PRODUCTS, MARCELO STEEL, CORPORATION, MARCELO CHEMICAL & PIGMENT
CORP., POLARIS MARKETING CORPORATION and THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS, respondents,
G.R. No. L-38260 November 19, 1982
MARCELO TIRE & RUBBER CORPORATION, MARCELO RUBBER & LATEX PRODUCTS, INC.,
MARCELO STEEL CORPORATION, POLARIS MARKETING CORPORATION, MARCELO
CHEMICAL AND PIGMENT CORP., MARCELO ENTERPRISES, under which name or style they
are also known, petitioners,
vs.
LAKAS NG MANGGAGAWANG MAKABAYAN (LAKAS) AND THE HONORABLE COURT OF
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents.
GUERRERO, J.:
Separate appeals by certiorari from the Decision of the Court of Industrial Relations (Manila) dated
July 20, 1973, as well as the Resolution of the court en banc dated January 24, 1974 denying the
reconsideration thereof rendered in ULP Case No. 4951 entitled, "Lakas ng Manggagawang
Makabayan, Petitioner, versus Marcelo Enterprises and Marcelo Tire and Rubber Corporation,
Marcelo Rubber and Latex Products, Marcelo Steel Corporation, Polaris Marketing Corporation, and
Marcelo Chemical and Pigment Corporation, Respondents. "
The antecedent facts as found by the respondent Court of Industrial Relations embodied in the
appealed Decision are correct, supported as they are by the evidence on record. Nevertheless, We
find it necessary to make a re-statement of the facts that are integrated and inter-related, drawn from
the voluminuous records of these cases which are herein jointly decided, since it would only be from
a statement of all the relevant facts of the cases made in all fullness, collectively and
comprehensively, can the intricate issues posed in these appeals be completely and judiciously
resolved.
It appears that prior to May 23, 1967, the date which may be stated as the start of the labor dispute
between Lakas ng Manggagawang Makabayan (hereinafter referred to as complainant LAKAS) and
the management of the Marcelo Tire and Rubber Corporation, Marcelo Rubber and Latex Products,
Inc., Polaris Marketing Corporation, Marcelo Chemical and Pigment Corporation, and the Marcelo
Steel Corporation (Nail Plan) (hereinafter referred to as respondent Marcelo Companies) the
Marcelo Companies had existing collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) with the local unions then
existing within the appropriate bargaining units, viz: (1) the respondent Marcelo Tire and Rubber
Corporation, with the Marcelo Camelback Tire and Foam Union (MACATIFU); (2) the respondent
Marcelo Rubber and Latex Products, Inc., with the Marcelo Free Workers Union (MFWU); and (3)
the respondent Marcelo Steel Corporation with the United Nail Workers Union (UNWU). These
existing CBAs were entered into by and between the parties while the aforestated local unions were
then affiliated with a national federation, the Philippine Social Security Labor Union (PSSLU).
It is well to note from the records that when the aforestated CBAs of the said local unions were
nearing their respective expiration dates (March 15,1967) for MACATIFU and UNWU, and June 5,
1967 for MFWU), the general situation within the ranks of labor was far from united. The MACATIFU
in respondent Marcelo Tire and Rubber Corporation, then headed by Augusto Carreon, did not enjoy
the undivided support of all the workers of the respondent corporation, as there existed a rival union,
the Marcelo United Employees and Workers Association (MUEWA) whose president was then
Paulino Lazaro. As events would later develop, the members of the MACATIFU of Augusto Carreon
joined the MUEWA of Paulino Lazaro, after the latter filed a petition for direct certification which was
granted by the industrial court's Order of July 5, 1967 recognizing and certifying MUEWA as the sole
and exclusive bargaining representative of all the regular workers of the respondent corporation. The
union rivalry between MACATIFU and MUEWA did not, however, end with the Order of July 5. 1967,
but more than ever developed into a more pressing problem of union leadership because Augusto
Carreon also claimed to be the president of the MUEWA by virtue of the affiliation of his MACATIFU
members with MUEWA. The records also reveal that even the ranks of MFWU in respondent
Marcelo Rubber and Latex Products, Inc. was divided between those supporting Ceferino Ramos
and Cornelio Dizon who both claimed the presidency in said union. Only the UNWU in respondent
Marcelo Steel Corporation was then enjoying relative peace as Jose Roque was solely recognized
as the union's president. The events that followed are hereinafter stated in chronological order for a
clearer understanding of the present situation.
On March 14, 1967, the management of respondent Marcelo Steel Corporation received a letter
requesting the negotiation of a new CBA together with a draft thereof, from the PSSLU president,
Antonio Diaz, for and in behalf of UNWU whose CBA was to expire the following day. Similar letters
and proposals were, likewise, sent to the management of respondent Marcelo Tire and Rubber
Corporation for and in behalf of MACATIFU, and to respondent Marcelo Rubber and Latex Products
for and in behalf of MFWU, whose respective CBAs were both to expire on June 5, 1967.
However, on that very same day of March 14, 1967, the management of respondent Marcelo Tire
and Rubber Corporation received a letter from the UNWU president, Jose Roque, disauthorizing the
PSSLU from representing his union.
Then, on April 14, 1967, Paulino Lazaro of MUEWA requested negotiation of a new CBA with
respondent Marcelo Tire and Rubber Corporation, submitting therewith his union's own proposals.
Again, on May 3, 1967, the management of respondents Marcelo Tire and Rubber Corporation and
Marcelo Rubber and Latex Products, Inc., received another letter requesting negotiation of new
CBAs also for and in behalf of the MACATIFU and the MFWU from J.C. Espinas & Associates.
Finally, on May 23, 1967, the management of all the respondent Marcelo Companies received a
letter from Prudencio Jalandoni, the alleged president of the complainant LAKAS. In this letter of
May 23, 1967, the complainant LAKAS informed management of the affiliation of the Marcelo United
Labor Union (MULU) with it. Included therein was a 17-points demand for purposes of the requested
collective bargaining with management.
Confronted with a problem of whom to recognize as the bargaining representative of all its workers,
the management of all the respondent Marcelo Companies understandably dealt with the problem in
this wise, viz: (1) it asked proof of authority to represent the MFWU and the MACATIFU from J.C.
Espinas & Associates; and (2) in a letter dated May 25, 1967, it apprised PSSLU, Paulino Lazaro of
MUEWA and complainant LAKAS of the fact of the existing conflicting demands for recognition as
the bargaining representative in the appropriate units involved, consequently suggesting to all to
settle the question by filing a petition for certification election before the Court of Industrial Relations,
with an assurance that the management will abide by whatever orders the industrial court may issue
thereon.
PSSLU demurred to management's stand and informed them of its intention to file an unfair labor
practice case because of management's refusal to bargain with it, pointedly stating that it was with
the PSSLU that the existing CBAs were entered into. Again, as events later developed, on or about
the middle of August 1981, PSSLU filed a Notice of Strike which became the subject of conciliation
with the respondent companies. In the case of MUEWA, Paulino Lazaro threatened that his union
will declare a strike against respondent Marcelo Tire and Rubber Corporation. On the other hand,
complainant LAKAS for MULU filed on June 13, 1967 before the Bureau of Labor Relations a Notice
of Strike against all the respondent Marcelo Companies, alleging as reasons therefore harrassment
of union officers and members due to union affiliation and refusal to bargain. This aforestated Notice
of Strike was, however, withdrawn on July 14, 1967.
In the meantime, as stated earlier in this Decision, the MUEWA filed a petition for direct certification
before the industrial court. There being no other union or interested person appearing before the
court except the MUEWA, and finding that MUEWA represented more than the majority of the
workers in respondent Marcelo Tire and Rubber Corporation, the court granted the petition and by
Order of July 5, 1967, certified MUEWA of Paulino Lazaro as the sole and exclusive bargaining
representative of all the regular workers in said respondent.
On July 11, 1967, Augusto Carreon of MACATIFU wrote the management of respondent Marcelo
Tire and Rubber Corporation expressly stating that no one was yet authorized to submit proposals
for and in behalf of the union for the renewal of its CBA, adding that "(a)ny group representing our
Union is not authorized and should not be entertained."
On July 14, 1967, as earlier stated, the Notice of Strike filed by complainant LAKAS was withdrawn
pursuant to a Memorandum Agreement signed on the same day by management and LAKAS.
Thereafter, or on July 20, 1967, letters of proposal for collective bargaining were sent by Prudencio
Jalandoni of LAKAS to all the respondent Marcelo companies. In answer thereto, management
wrote two (2) letters, both dated July 24, 1967, addressed to Jalandoni, expressing their conformity
to sit down in conference on the points to be negotiated as soon as LAKAS can present evidence of
authority to represent the employees of respondent corporations in said conference. The records
disclose that it was in the atmosphere of constant reservation on the part of management as to the
question of representation recognition that complainant LAKAS and management sat down for CBA
negotiations.
The first conference was held on August 14, 1967, followed by one on August 16, 1967 whereby
management, in formal reply to union's economic demands, stated its willingness to give pay
adjustments and suggested renewal of other provisions of the old CBAs. A third conference was set
although no one from LAKAS or the local unions appeared. On August 29, 1967, the fourth
conference was held where, from a letter dated August 30, 1967 from Jose Delfin of Management to
Jose B. Roque of UNWU, can be inferred that in the conference of August 29, 1967, the
management with respect to respondent Marcelo Steel Corporation, agreed to give pay adjustments
from P0.15 to P0.25 to meritorious cases only, and to increase its contribution to the retirement fund
from 1-1/2% to 3% provided the employees' contribution will be increased from 1% to 2%.
Management likewise suggested the renewal of the other provisions of the existing CBA.
Management's offers were not accepted by complainant LAKAS who insisted on the grant of all its
economic demands and in all of the Marcelo Companies.
As it would later appear during the trial of the ULP case below, and as found as a fact by the
respondent court, only the economic proposals of complainant LAKAS were the matters taken up in
all these CBA conferences.
Less than a week after the fourth CBA conference, or on September 4, 1967, the complainant
LAKAS declared a strike against all the respondent Marcelo Companies. Acts of violence and
vandalism attended the picketing. Ingress and egress at the respondents' premises were
successfully blocked. One worker, Plaridel Tiangco, was manhandled by the strikers and was
hospitalized. Windows of the Chemical Plant were badly damaged. As a consequence, ten (10)
strikers were later charged before the Municipal Court of Malabon, Rizal, four of whom were
convicted while the others were at large.
On September 13, 1967, the respondent Marcelo Companies obtained a writ of preliminary
injunction from the Court of First Instance of Rizal enjoining the strikers from preventing the ingress
and egress at the respondents' premises. The following day, a "Return to Work Agreement" (Exhibit
"A") was executed by and among the management, represented by Jose P. Marcelo and Jose A.
Delfin, and the local unions, together with complainant LAKAS, represented by Prudencio Jalandoni
for LAKAS, Jose B. Roque for UNWU, Cornelio Dizon for MFWU and Augusto Carreon for MUEWA,
the representations of the latter two, however, being expressly subjected by management to nonrecognition. Aside from providing for the immediate lifting of the picket lines, the agreement, more
pertinently provides, to wit,
4. The management agrees to accept all employees who struck without
discrimination or harassment consistent with an orderly operation of its various
plants, provided it is understood that management has not waived and shall continue
to exercise freely its rights and prerogatives to punish, discipline and dismiss its
employees in accordance with law and existing rules and regulations that cases filed
in court will be allowed to take their normal course.
By virtue of this agreement, the respondent Marcelo Companies resumed operations and the strikers
went back to work. As found by the respondent court, all strikers were admitted back to work, except
four (4) namely, Wilfredo Jarquio, Leonardo Sakdalan, Jesus Lim and Arlington Glodeviza, who
chose not to report for work because of the criminal charges filed against them before the municipal
court of Malabon and because of the administrative investigation conducted by management in
connection with the acts of violence and vandalism committed during the September 4 strike.
Together with Jesus Lim, three other strikers who reported for work and were admitted, namely,
Jose Roque, Alfredo Cabel and Ramon Bataycan, were convicted in said criminal case.
After the resumption of normal business, the management of the respondent Marcelo Companies,
the complainant LAKAS together with the local unions resumed their bargaining negotiations subject
to the conditions earlier mentioned. On October 4, 1967, the parties met and discussed the
bargaining unit to be covered by the CBA in case one is entered into, union shop arrangement,
check-off, waiver of the employer of the notice requirement in case of employees' separation,
separation pay in cash equivalent to 12-days pay for every year of service, retirement plan, and one
or two years duration of the CBA. It was also agreed in that meeting not to negotiate with respect to
respondent Marcelo Tire and Rubber Corporation inasmuch as a CBA had already been entered into
by management with the MUEWA of Paulino Lazaro, the recently certified union in said respondent.
Finally, on October 13, 1967, the negotiations reached its final stage when the management of
respondents Marcelo Rubber and Latex Products, Inc. and Marcelo Steel Corporation gave the
complainant LAKAS a copy of management's drafts of the collective bargaining proposals for MFWU
and UNWU, respectively.
Unexpectedly and without filing a notice of strike, complainant LAKAS declared another strike
against the respondent Marcelo Companies on November 7, 1967, resulting in the complete
paralyzation of the business of said respondents. Because of this second strike, conciliation
conferences were again set by the Conciliation Service Division of the Department of Labor on
November 8, November 23, and December 4, 1967. On the last aforementioned date, however,
neither complainant LAKAS nor the local unions appeared.
Instead, on December 13, 1967, Prudencio Jalandoni of complainant LAKAS, in behalf of the striking
unions, coursed a letter (Exhibit "B") to Jose P. Marcelo of management advising that, "on Monday,
December 18, 1967, at 7:00 o'clock in the morning, all your striking workers and employees will
return to work under the same terms and conditions of employment before the strike." The letter was
attested to by Cornelio Dizon for MFWU, Jose Roque for UNWU and Augusto Carreon for MUEWA.
On December 15,1967, the Bureau of Labor Relations was informed by the complainant LAKAS who
requested for the Bureau's representative to witness the return of the strikers to their jobs.
The records reveal that in the meantime, prior to December 13, 1967, some of the strikers started
going back to work and were admitted; and that as early as December 4, 1967, the management
started posting notices at the gates of the respective premises of the respondents for strikers to
return back to work, Similar notices were also posted on December 18 and December 27, 1967.
Upon their return, the reporting strikers were requested to fill up a certain form (Exhibit "49") wherein
they were to indicate the date of their availability for work in order that they may be scheduled.
According to the respondent Marcelo Companies, this requirement was asked of the strikers for
legitimate business reasons within management prerogative. Several of the strikers filled up the
required form and were accordingly scheduled for work. The remaining others, led and supported by
complainant LAKAS, refused and insisted that they be all admitted back to work without complying
with the aforestated requirement, alleging that the same constituted a "screening" of the striking
workers. As matters stood, Management refused to forego the requirement; on the other hand, the
remaining strikers demanded to be readmitted without filing up the form for scheduling.
These then constitute the factual background when the complainant LAKAS, represented by its
counsel, Atty. Benjamin C. Pineda, on December 26, 1967 , filed before the respondent court a
charge for unfair labor practice against the respondent Marcelo Companies, alleging nonreadmission of the striking members of the three (3) affiliated local unions despite the unconditional
offer to return to work after the strike of November 7, 1967. Based on the allegations of the foregoing
charge and after a preliminary investigation conducted by the acting Prosecutor of said respondent
court, the acting Chief Prosecutor, Atty. Antonio Tria Tirona, filed on February 12, 1968 the instant
complaint under authority of Section 5(b) of Republic Act 875, otherwise known as the Industrial
Peace Act.
The Complaint below alleges, among others, to wit:
1. That complainant is a legitimate labor organization, with its affiliates, namely:
Marcelo Free Workers Union, United Nail Workers Union, and Marcelo United
Employees Unions, whose members listed in Annexes "A", "B", and "C" of this
complaint are considered employees of respondent within the meaning of the Act;
2. ...
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
3. That individual complaints listed in Annexes "A", "B", and "C" of this complaint are
members of the Marcelo United Employees and Workers Association, Marcelo Free
Workers Union, and United Nail Workers Union, respectively; that the members of
the Marcelo United Employees and Workers Union are workers of respondent
Marcelo Tire and Rubber Corporation; that the members of the Marcelo Free
Workers Union compose the workers of the Marcelo Rubber and Latex Products,
Polaris Marketing Corporation, and the members of the United Nail Workers Union
compose the workers of the Marcelo Steel Corporation (Nail Plant);
4. That each of the aforesaid local unions, before their affiliation with the complainant
union LAKAS, had a collective bargaining agreement with respondents; that after the
expiration of the collective bargaining agreement above-mentioned and after the
above-mentioned local unions affiliated with the complainant LAKAS, the said
federation sent to respondents' president, Jose P. Marcelo, on May 23, 1967, a letter,
requesting for a negotiation for collective bargaining, together with union proposals
thereof, but respondents refused;
5. That after respondents knew of the affiliation of the aforementioned local unions
with the LAKAS, the said respondents, thru their officers and agents began harassing
the union members, discriminated against them by transferring some of its officers
and members from one section to another in such a way that their work was reduced
to manual labor, and by suspending them without justifiable cause. in spite of long
years of service with said respondents;
6. That as a result of the abovementioned unfair labor practice of respondents, and
after complainant sent communication thereto, protesting against the acts of the
above-mentioned, complainant decided to stage a strike on September 4, 1967, after
filing a notice of strike with the Department of Labor;
7. That on September 14, 1967, however, Jose P. Marcelo, and Jose A. Delfin,
president and vice-president of the respondents, respectively, on one hand and the
presidents of the three local unions above-mentioned and the national president of
complainant union on the other, entered into a Return-to-Work Agreement. providing
among others, as follows:
4. The management agrees to accept all employees who struck
without discrimination or harassment consistent with an orderly
operation of its various plants provided it is understood that
management has not waived and shall continue to exercise freely its
rights and prerogatives to punish, discipline and dismiss its
employees in accordance with law and existing rules and regulations
and that cases filed in Court will be allowed to take their normal
course.
8. That, contrary to the above Return-to-Work agreement, and in violation thereof,
respondents refused to admit the members of the three striking local unions; that in
admitting union members back to work, they were screened in spite of their long
employment with respondent, but respondents gave preference to the casual
employees;
9. That, because of the refusal of the respondents to accept some union members, in
violation of the above-mentioned Return-to-Work agreement and refusal of
respondents to bargain in good faith with complainant, the latter, together with the
members of the three local unions above-mentioned, again staged a strike on
November 7, 1967;
10. That on December 13, 1967, complainant sent a letter to respondents that the
members of the striking unions abovementioned offered to return to work on
December 18, 1967 without any condition, but respondents likewise refused, and still
continue to refuse to reinstate them up to the present;
11. That here to attached are the list of names of the members of the three local
unions above-mentioned who were not admitted back to work by respondents,
marked as Annexes "A ", "B ", and "C and made as an integral part of this complaint;
12. That the union members listed in Annexes "A", "B", and "C" hereof were not able
to secure substantial employment in spite of diligent efforts exerted by them;
13. That the above unfair labor practice acts of respondents are in violation of
Section 4, subsections 1, 4 and 6 in relation to Sections 13, 14 and 15 of Republic
Act No. 875.
The complaint prayed "that after due hearing, judgment be rendered, declaring respondents guilty of
unfair labor practice, and
(a) Ordering respondents to cease and desist from further committing the acts
complained of;
(b) Ordering respondents to comply with the Return-to-Work agreement dated
September 14, 1967, and to admit back to work the workers listed in annexes "A", "B
" and "C" hereof, with back wages, without loss of seniority rights and privileges
thereof;
(c) Ordering respondents to bargain in good faith with complainant union; and
(d) Granting complainant and its complaining members thereof such other affirmative
reliefs and remedies equitable and proper, in order to effectuate the policies of the
Industrial Peace Act.
On March 16, 1968, after an Urgent Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer, the respondents
filed their Answer denying the material allegations of the Complaint and alleging as affirmative
defenses,
I. That the Collective Bargaining Agreement between respondent Marcelo Steel
Corporation and the United Nail Workers Union expired on March 15, 1967; The
Collective Bargaining Agreement between the United Rubber Workers Union (which
eventually became the Marcelo Free Workers Union) and the respondent Marcelo
Rubber and Latex Products, Inc., expired on June 5, 1967; the Collective Bargaining
Agreement between Marcelo Camelback Tire and Foam Union and the Marcelo Tire
and Rubber Corporation expired on June 5, 1967;
II. That on May 23, 1967, one Mr. Prudencio Jalandoni of complainant addressed a
communication to Mr. Jose P. Marcelo of respondents informing him of the alleged
affiliation of the Marcelo United Labor Union with complainant and submitting a set of
collective bargaining proposal to which counsel for respondents replied suggesting
that a petition for certification election be filed with the Court of Industrial Relations in
view of the several demands for representation recognition;
III. That the transfers of workers from one job to another were made in accordance
with needs of the service. Respondents afforded union officers and members
affected by the transfers the privilege to watch out for vacancies and select positions
they prefer to be in. No suspensions without justifiable cause were made as alleged
in the Complaint;
IV. That between May 23, 1967, the date of their first demand for negotiations, and
September 4, 1967, the start of the first strike, proposals and counter-proposals were
had. Respondents are not aware of whether or not a notice of strike was filed with
the Court of Industrial Relations;
V. That Mr. Jose P. Marcelo is the President of Marcelo Rubber and Latex Products,
Inc., Marcelo Tire and Rubber Corporation, and Marcelo Steel Corporation, while Mr.
Jose A. Delfin is the acting Personnel Manager of respondent Marcelo Rubber and
Latex Products, Inc., Marcelo Tire and Rubber Corporation, Marcelo Steel
Corporation and Marcelo Chemical and Pigment Corporation;
VI. That respondents did not refuse to admit members of the striking union. Only four
(4) workers who had criminal cases filed against them voluntarily failed to report to
the Personnel Department for administrative investigation;
VII. That after September 14, 1967, all workers of the different respondent
corporations returned to work except the four mentioned in the preceding paragraph
hereof who have pending criminal cases; between September 14, 1967, and
November 7, 1967 another strike was declared without justifiable cause;
VIII. That on November 28, 1967, respondent obtained an injunction from the Court
of First Instance of Rizal, Caloocan City Branch, against the illegal picketing of the
local unions; in the first week of December, 1967, the striking workers began
returning to work; on December 13, 1967, a letter was received from complainant
advising respondents that its striking workers were calling off, lifting the picket line
and returning to work, that from the first week of December, 1967, respondents
invited the striking workers desiring to return to work to fill out an information sheet
stating therein their readiness to work and the exact dates they were available so
that proper scheduling could be done; a number of workers showed no interest in
reporting to work; management posted in the Checkpoint, Bulletin Boards, and the
gates notices calling all workers to return to work but a number of workers obviously
were not interested in returning anymore;
IX. That respondents posted several times lists of names of workers who had not
returned to work with the invitation to return to work, but they did not return to work;
X. That a number of workers in the list Annexes "A", "B" and "C" have resigned after
they found more profitable employment elsewhere;
XI. That the local unions referred to in the Complaint if they ever had affiliated with
complainant union had subsequently disaffiliated therefrom;
XII. That the strikes called and declared by the striking unions were illegal;
XIII. That the local unions were bargaining in bad faith with respondents,
and praying for the dismissal of the Complaint as well as for the declaration of illegality of the two (2)
strikes called by the striking unions.
Thereafter, the trial commenced. Then on October 24, 1968, a development occurred which gave a
peculiar aspect to the case at bar. A Manifestation and Motion signed by the respective officers and
members of the MUEWA, headed by Paulino Lazaro, was filed by the said union, alleging, to wit,
l. That the above-entitled case purportedly shows that the Marcelo United Employees
and Workers Association is one of the Complainants being represented by the
Petitioner Lakas ng Manggagawang Makabayan (LMM);
2. That it likewise appears in the above-entitled case that the services of the herein
Petitioner was sought by a certain Augusto Carreon together with his cohorts who
are not members of the Marcelo United Employees and Workers Association much
less connected with the Marcelo Tire and Rubber Corporation wherein the Marcelo
United Employees and Workers Association has an existing Collective Bargaining
Agreement;
3. That to set the records of this Honorable Court straight, the undersigned officers
and members of the Marcelo United Employees and Workers Association
respectfully manliest that the aforesaid organization has no complaint whatsoever
against any of the Marcelo Enterprises;
4. ...
5. ..., the Complaint filed by the Petitioner in the above-entitled case in behalf of the
Marcelo United Employees and Workers Association is without authority from the
latter and therefore the officers and/or representatives of the petitioning labor
organization should be cited for Contempt of Court;
6. ...., the Complaint filed by the Petitioner in the above-entitled case in behalf of the
Marcelo United and Employees and Workers Association should be considered as
withdrawn;
xxx xxx xxx
This was followed by another Manifestation and Motion flied on November 6, 1968 and signed by the
officers and members of the UNWU, headed by its President, Juan Balgos, alleging, to wit,
1. That the above-entitled case purportedly shows that the United Nail Workers
Union is being represented by the Petitioner Lakas ng Manggagawang Makabayan
for the alleged reason that the former is one of the affiliates of the latter;
2. That on January 15, 1968, all the Officers and members of the United Nail
Workers Union disaffiliated from the herein Petitioning labor organization for the
reason that Petitioning labor organization could not serve the best interest of the
Officers and members of the United Nail Workers Union and as such is a stumbling
block to a harmonious labor- management relations within all the Marcelo
enterprises; ...
3. That the filing of the above-entitled case by the herein Petitioning labor
organization was made over and above the objections of the officers and members of
the United Nail Workers Union;
4. That in view of all the foregoing, the Officers and members of the United Nail
Workers Union do hereby disauthorize the Petitioner of the above-entitled case (Re::
Lakas ng Manggagawang Makabayan) from further representing the United Nail
Workers Union in the above-entitled case;
5. That in view further of the fact that the filing of the above-entitled case was made
over and above the objections of the Officers and members of the United Nail
Workers Union, the latter therefore manifest their intention to cease and desist as
they hereby ceased and desisted from further prosecuting the above-entitled case in
the interest of a harmonius labor-management relation within the Marcelo
Enterprises;
xxx xxx xxx
Likewise, a Manifestation and Motion signed by the Officers and members of the MFWU, headed by
its president, Benjamin Mañaol, dated October 28, 1968 and filed November 6, 1968, stated the
same allegations as the Manifestation and Motion filed by the UNWU quoted above, except that the
disaffiliation of the MFWU from LAKAS was made effective January 25, 1968. The Resolutions of
Disaffiliation of both MFWU and UNWU were attached to these Manifestations.
On November 19, 1968, complainant LAKAS filed an Opposition to these Manifestations and
Motions, materially alleging that, to wit:
1. That complainants respectfully stated that when Charge No. 2265 was filed on
December 26, 1967 in this case, giving rise to the instant complaint, the alleged
officers of the union-movants were not yet officers on the filing of said Charge No.
2265,...
2. That the alleged officers and members who signed the three (3) Manifestations
and Motions are the very employees who were accepted back to work by the
respondents during the strike by the complainants on September 4, 1967 and
November 7, 1967, and the said alleged officers and members who signed the said
manifestations and motions are still working up to the present in the establishments
of the respondents.
3. That precisely because of the acceptance back to work of these alleged officers
and members of the union-movants, and the refusal of respondents to accept back to
work all the individual complainants in this case mentioned in Annexes "A", "B" and
"C" of the instant complaint, inspite of the offer to return to work by the complainants
herein made to the respondents without any conditions at the time of the strike, as
per complainants' letter of December 13, 1967 (Exh. "B", for the complainants),
which fact precisely gave rise to the filing of this case.
xxx xxx xxx
On January 31, 1969, after the submission of their respective Memoranda on the motions asking for
the dismissal and withdrawal of the complaint, the Court of Industrial Relations issued an Order
deferring the resolution of the Motions until after the trial on the merits. To this Order, two separate
Motions for Reconsideration were filed by the respondent companies and the movant-unions, which
motions were, however, denied by the court en banc by its Resolution dated March 5, 1969.
After the trial on the merits of the case, and after submission by the parties of their respective
memoranda, the respondent court rendered on July 20, 1973 the Decision subject of these petitions.
On the motions for dismissal or withdrawal of the complaint as prayed for by MUEWA, UNWU and
MFWU, the respondent court denied the same on the ground that the instant case was filed by the
Lakas ng Manggagawang Makabayan for and in behalf of the individual employees concerned and
not for the movants who were not authorized by said individual complainants to ask for the dismissal.
On the merits of the case, while the Decision contained opinions to the effect that the respondent
Marcelo Companies were not remiss in their obligation to bargain, and that the September 4, 1967
strike as well as the November 7, 1967 strike, were economic strikes, and were, therefore, illegal
because of lack of the required notices of strike before the strikes were declared in both instances,
the Decision, nevertheless, on the opinion that the "procedure of scheduling adopted by the
respondents was in effect a screening of those who were to be readmitted," declared respondent
Marcelo Companies guilty of unfair labor practice in discriminating against the employees named in
Annexes "A", "B", and "C" by refusing to admit them back to work other strikers were admitted back
to work after the strike of November 7, 1967. The dispositive portion of the appealed Decision states,
to wit,
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, respondents should be, as they are
hereby, declared guilty of unfair labor practice only for the discrimination on terms or
conditions of employment as hereinbefore discussed in connection with the return of
the strikers complainants back to work after the second strike, and, therefore,
ordered to pay the individual complainants appearing in Annexes "A", "B" and "C" of
the Complaint, except Arlington Glodeviza, Jesus Lim, Wilfredo Jarquio, Leonardo
Sakdalan, Jose Roque, Alfredo Cabel, and those still working, were dismissed for
cause, whose contracts expired or who had resigned as above indicated, their back
wages from December l8, 1967 but only up to June 29, 1970 when this case was
submitted for decision, without reinstatement, minus their earnings elsewhere for the
same period.
As to those who died without having been re-employed, the back wages shall be
from December 18, 1967 up to the date of their demise, as indicated in the body of
this Decision, but not beyond June 20, 1970, likewise less their earnings elsewhere.
The Chief Auditing Examiner of this Court, or his duly authorized representative, is
hereby directed to proceed to the premises of respondent companies to examine
their books, payrolls, vouchers and other pertinent papers or documents as may be
necessary to compute the back wages due the individual complainant in line with this
Decision, and to submit his Report thereon not later than twenty (20) days after
completion of such examination for further disposition of the Court.
SO ORDERED.
On August 9, 1973, counsel for respondent Marcelo Companies filed a Motion for Reconsideration of
the above Decision assigning as errors, to wit,
I. The trial court erred in not finding that complainant Lakas ng Manggagawang
Makabayan (Lakas) has no authority to file and/or to prosecute the Complaint against
respondents in representation of the local unions and/or individual complainants
and/or members of local unions in their individual capacities and in not dismissing the
complaint on that ground upon motions of the local unions concerned and/or their
members.
II. The trial court erred in finding that respondent discriminated against individual
complainants who were not readmitted to work after the November 7, 1967 strike
while others were able to return to their former employment and in holding that the
procedure adopted by respondents was in effect a screening of those who were
readmitted and in finding respondents guilty of unfair labor practice by reason
thereof. "
On August 14, 1973, the individual complainants who had earlier disauthorized the counsel of
record, Atty. Benjamin Pineda, from further representing them and from amicably settling their
claims, on their own behalf filed their arguments in support of their Motion for Reconsideration,
through a newly retained counsel, Atty. Pablo B. Castillon. Assigned as errors are, to wit,
I. The findings of the trial court excluding some of the employees from the
aforementioned Decision as well as from the benefits resulting therefrom is not in
accordance with law and the facts.
II. The findings of the trial court declaring the strikes of September 4 and November
7, 1967 as illegal for being an economic strike is not in accordance with law and the
facts adduced in this case.
III. The Honorable trial court in ordering the reduction of the back wages, without
reinstatement, appears to have departed from the substantial evidence rule and
established jurisprudence.
By Resolution of January 24, 1974, the Court en banc denied the two (2) Motions for
Reconsideration filed by both the respondent Marcelo Companies and the individual complainants.
On February 19, 1974 and on February 20, 1974, both parties filed their respective Notices of
Appeals. Hence, these petitions.
In L-38258, the petition filed by complainant Lakas ng Manggagawang Makabayan (LAKAS), the
following were assigned as reversible errors, to wit,
I. The respondent court erred in finding the strikes of September 4 and November 7,
1967 to be economic strikes and declaring the said strikes illegal for non-compliance
with the procedural requirement of Section 14(d) of Republic Act 875, although its
illegality was condoned or waived because of the Return-to-Work agreement on the
first strike, and the discriminatory rehiring of the striking employees after the second
strike.
II. The respondent court erred in denying reinstatement to the striking complainants
in Case No. 4951-ULP, and limiting the computation of their backwages from
December 18, 1967 to June 29, 1970 only, despite its findings of unfair labor practice
against private respondents herein as a consequence of the discriminatory rehiring of
the striking employees after the November 7, 1967 strike.
III. The respondent court erred in excluding the other individual complainants, except
those who are still working, those who resigned on or before December 18, 1967,
and those whose employment contract expired, and denying to these individual
complainants the benefits resulting therefrom.
On the other hand, in L-38260 which is the petition filed by respondents Marcelo Enterprises,
Marcelo Tire and Rubber Corporation, Marcelo Rubber & Latex Products, Marcelo Steel
Corporation, Marcelo Chemical & Pigment Corporation, and Polaris Marketing Corporation, the
following is the alleged assignment of errors, to wit,
I. Respondent court erred in not finding that respondent Lakas ng Manggagawang
Makabayan (LAKAS) had no authority to file and/or to prosecute the complaint
against the petitioners herein in representation of the local unions and/or individual
complainants and/or members of local unions in their individual capacities and in not
dismissing the complaint in Case No. 4951-ULP of respondent court on that ground
upon motions of the local unions concerned and/or their officers and members.
II. Respondent court erred in finding that petitioners herein discriminated against
individual complainants in Case No. 4951-ULP of respondent court who were not
readmitted to work after the November 7, 1967 strike, while others were able to
return to their former employment and in holding that the procedure adopted by
petitioners herein was in effect a screening of those who were readmitted and in
finding petitioners herein guilty of unfair labor practice by reasons thereof.
III. Respondent court erred in rendering judgment ordering petitioners herein to pay
individual complainants in Case No. 4951-ULP of respondent court backwages from
December 18, 1967, to June 29, 1970, minus their earnings elsewhere, except those
who have resigned, those who have been dismissed for cause, those whose
contracts have expired and those who are already working.
IV. Respondent court erred in holding that petitioners herein have waived their right
to declare the strikes of September 4, 1967 and November 7, 1967, illegal.
From the aforecited assignments of errors respectively made in both petitions before Us, We find
that there are only two basic issues posed for Our resolution, viz: (1) whether or not the complaint
filed by LAKAS against the Marcelo Companies can be sustained, in view of the alleged fact that its
authority to file and prosecute the same has been squarely raised in issue at the first instance before
the respondent court; and (2) whether or not the Marcelo Companies are guilty of unfair labor
practice, for which they should be made liable for backwages and be obliged to reinstate the
employees appearing in Annexes "A", "B", and "C " of the complaint, taking into consideration the
prayer of LAKAS anent the correct payment of said backwages and the non-exclusion of some
employees from the benefits arising from the appealed Decision.
The first issue poses a procedural question which We shall dwell on after a resolution of the second
issue, this latter issue being of greater significance to the correct determination of the rights- of all
parties concerned as it treats of the merits of the present petitions.
Hence, anent the second issue of whether or not the complaint for unfair labor practice can be
sustained, this Court rules in favor of the respondent Marcelo Companies and consequently, the
appealed Decision is reversed. This reversal is inevitable after this Court has pored through the
voluminuous records of the case as well as after applying the established jurisprudence and the law
on the matters raised. We are not unmindful of the plight of the employees in this case but We
consider it oppressive to grant their petition in G.R. No. L38258 for not only is there no evidence
which shows that the respondent Marcelo Companies were seeking for an opportunity to discharge
these employees for union activities, or to discriminate against them because of such activities, but
there is affirmative evidence to establish the contrary conclusion.
The present controversy is a three-sided conflict, although focus has been greatly placed upon an
alleged labor dispute between complainant LAKAS and the respondent Marcelo Companies. It would
bear emphasizing, however, that what had been patently disregarded by the respondent industrial
court and the parties alike, is the fact that LAKAS had never been the bargaining representative of
any and an of the local unions then existing in the respondent Marcelo Companies.
Contrary to the pretensions of complainant LAKAS, the respondent Marcelo Companies did not
ignore the demand for collective bargaining contained in its letter of June 20, 1967. Neither did the
companies refuse to bargain at all. What it did was to apprise LAKAS of the existing conflicting
demands for recognition as the bargaining representative in the appropriate units involved, and
suggested the settlement of the issue by means of the filing of a petition for certification election
before the Court of Industrial Relations. This was not only the legally approved procedure but was
dictated by the fact that there was indeed a legitimate representation issue. PSSLU, with whom the
existing CBAs were entered into, was demanding of respondent companies to collectively bargain
with it; so was Paulino Lazaro of MUEWA, J.C. Espinas & Associates for MACATIFU and the
MFWU, and the complainant LAKAS for MULU which we understand is the aggrupation of
MACATIFU, MFWU and UNWU. On top of all of these, Jose Roque of UNWU disauthorized the
PSSLU from representing his union; and similarly, Augusta Carreon of MACATIFU itself informed
management as late as July 11, 1967 or after the demand of LAKAS that no group representing his
Union "is not authorized and should not be entertained. "
Indeed, what We said in Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU) vs. The Bureau of
Labor Relations, 69 SCRA 132, applies as well to this case.
..., in a situation like this where the issue of legitimate representation in dispute is
viewed for not only by one legitimate labor organization but two or more, there is
every equitable ground warranting the holding of a certification election. In this way,
the issue as to who is really the true bargaining representative of all the employees
may be firmly settled by the simple expedient of an election.
The above-cited case gives the reason for the need of determining once and for all the true choice of
membership as to who should be their bargaining representative, which is that, "(E)xperience
teaches us, one of the root causes of labor or industrial disputes is the problem arising from a
questionable bargaining representative entering into CBA concerning terms and conditions of
employment. "
Respecting the issue of representation and the right of the employer to demand reasonable proof of
majority representation on the part of the supposed or putative bargaining agent, the commentaries
in Rothenberg on Labor Relations, pp. 42943 1, are forceful and persuasive, thus:
It is essential to the right of a putative bargaining agent to represent the employees
that it be the delegate of a majority of the employees and, conversely, an employer is
under duty to bargain collectively only when the bargaining agent is representative of
the majority of the employees. A natural consequence of these principles is that the
employer has the right to demand of the asserted bargaining agent proof of its
representation of its employees. Having the right to demonstration of this fact, it is
not an 'unfair labor practice' for an employer to refuse to negotiate until the asserted
bargaining agent has presented reasonable proof of majority representation. It is
necessary however, that such demand be made in good faith and not merely as a
pretext or device for delay or evasion. The employer's right is however to reasonable
proof. ...
... Although an employer has the undoubted right to bargain with a bargaining agent
whose authority has been established, without the requirement that the bargaining
agent be officially certified by the National Labor Relations Board as such, if the
informally presented evidence leaves a real doubt as to the issue, the employer has
a right to demand a certification and to refuse to negotiate until such official
certification is presented."
The clear facts of the case as hereinbefore restated indusputably show that a legitimate
representation issue confronted the respondent Marcelo Companies. In the face of these facts and
in conformity with the existing jurisprudence.
We hold that there existed no duty to bargain collectively with The complainant LAKAS on the part of
said companies. And proceeding from this basis, it follows that all acts instigated by complainant
LAKAS such as the filing of the Notice of strike on June 13, 1967 (although later withdrawn) and the
'two strikes of September 4, 1967 and November 7, 1967 were calculated , designed and intended to
compel the respondent Marcelo Companies to recognize or bargain with it notwithstanding that it
was an uncertified union, or in the case of respondent Marcelo Tire and Rubber Corporation, to
bargain with it despite the fact that the MUEWA of Paulino Lazaro vas already certified as the sole
bargaining agent in said respondent company. These concerted activities executed and carried into
effect at the instigation and motivation of LAKAS ire all illegal and violative of the employer's basic
right to bargain collectively only with the representative supported by the majority of its employees in
each of the bargaining units. This Court is not unaware of the present predicament of the employees
involved but much as We sympathize with those who have been misled and so lost their jobs
through hasty, ill-advised and precipitate moves, We rule that the facts neither substantiate nor
support the finding that the respondent Marcelo Companies are guilty of unfair labor practice.
There are also other facts which this Court cannot ignore. the complaint of LAKAS charge that after
their first strike of September 4, 1967, management and the striking employees entered into a
Return-to-Work Agreement but that it was violated by the respondent companies who "refused to
admit the members of the three striking local unions ... and gave reference to the casual
employees." (No. 8, Complaint). It is also alleged that the strike of November 7, 1967 was staged
"because of the refusal of the respondents to accept some union members ... and refusal of
respondents to bargain in good faith with complainant" (No. 9, Complaint). We find however, that in
making these charges, complainant LAKAS lacked candor, truth and fidelity towards the courts.
It is a fact found by the respondent court, and as revealed by he records of the case, that the
respondent Marcelo Companies did not violate the terms of the Return-to-Work Agreement
negotiated after the first strike. All of the strikers were admitted back to work except four (4) who
opted not to report for work because of the administrative investigation conducted in connection with
the acts of violence perpetrated during the said strike.
It is also evident from the records that the charge of bargaining in bad faith imputed to the
respondent companies, is hardly credible. In fact, such charge is valid as only against the
complainant LAKAS. The parties had a total of five (5) conferences for purposes of collective
bargaining. It is worth considering that the first strike of September 4, 1967 was staged less than a
week after the fourth CBA conference and without any benefit of any previous strike notice. In this
connection, it must be stated that the notice of strike filed on June 13, 1967 could not have been the
strike notice for the first strike because it was already withdrawn on July 14, 1967. Thus, from these
stated facts can be seen that the first strike was held while the parties were in the process of
negotiating. Nor can it be sustained that the respondent Marcelo Companies bargained in bad faith
since there were proposals offered by them, but the complainant LAKAS stood pat on its position
that all of their economic demands should be met and that all of these demands should be granted in
all of the respondent Marcelo Companies. The companies' refusal to accede to the demands of
LAKAS appears to be justified since there is no showing that these companies were in the same
state of financial and economic affairs. There is reason to believe that the first strike was staged only
for the purpose of compelling the respondent Marcelo Companies to accede to the inflexible
demands of the complainant LAKAS. The records further establish that after the resumption of
normal operations following the first strike and the consequent Return-to-Work Agreement, the
striking unions led by complainant LAKAS and the management of the respondent Marcelo
Companies resumed their bargaining negotiations. And that on October 13, 1967, complainant
LAKAS sent the final drafts of the collective bargaining proposals for MFWU and UNWU. The
second strike of November 7, 1967 was then staged immediately after which strike, as before, was
again lacking of a strike notice. All of these facts show that it was complainant LAKAS, and not the
respondent Marcelo Companies, which refused to negotiate in the pending collective bargaining
process. AR that the facts show is that the bargaining position of complainant LAKAS was inflexible
and that it was in line with this uncompromising attitude that the strikes were declared, significantly
after notice that management did not or could not meet all of their 17-points demand.
Respondent court, upholding the contention of petitioner LAKAS that after the second strike, the
respondent Marcelo Companies, despite the strikers' unconditional offer to return to work, refused to
readmit them without "screening" which LAKAS insists to be "discriminatory hiring of the striking
employees, " declared that although the two strikes were illegal, being economic strikes held in
violation of the strike notice requirement, nevertheless held the Marcelo Companies guilty of unfair
labor practice in discriminating against the complaining employees by refusing to readmit them while
other strikers were admitted back to work. We do not agree.
It is the settled jurisprudence that it is an unfair labor practice for an employer not to reinstate, or
refuse re-employment of members of union who abandon their strike and make unconditional offer to
return to work. 1 As indeed Exhibit "B" presents an unconditional offer of the striking employees to return
to work under the same terms and conditions of employment before the strike, the question then
confronting Us is whether or not on the part of the respondent companies, there was refusal to reinstate
or re-employ the strikers.
We find as a fact that the respondent Marcelo Companies did not refuse to reinstate or re-employ
the strikers, as a consequence of which We overrule the finding of unfair labor practice against said
companies based on the erroneous conclusion )f the respondent court. It is clear from the records
that even before the unconditional offer to return to work contained in , Exhibit "B" was made, the
respondent Marcelo Companies had already posted notices for the strikers to return back to work.
It is true that upon their return, the strikers were required to fill up a form (Exhibit "49") wherein they
were to indicate the date of their availability for work. But We are more impressed and are
persuaded to accept as true the contention of the respondent Marcelo Companies that the
aforestated requirement was only for purposes of proper scheduling of the start of work for each
returning striker. It must be noted that as a consequence of the two strikes which were both attended
by widespread acts of violence and vandalism, the businesses of the respondent companies were
completely paralyzed. It would hardly be justiciable to demand of the respondent companies to
readmit all the returning workers in one big force or as each demanded readmission. There were
machines that were not in operating condition because of long disuse during the strikes. Some of the
machines needed more than one worker to operate them so that in the absence of the needed team
of workers, the start of work by one without his teammates would necessarily be useless, and the
company would be paying for his time spent doing no work. Finally, We take judicial cognizance of
the fact that companies whose businesses were completely paralyzed by major strikes cannot
resume operations at once and in the same state or force as before the strikes.
But what strikes Us most in lending credence to respondents' allegation that Exhibit "49" was not
meant to screen the strikers, is the fact that an of the returning strikers who filled up the form were
scheduled for work and consequently started with their jobs. It is only those strikers who refused or
failed to fill-up the required form, like the herein complaining employees, who were not scheduled for
work and consequently have not been re- employed by the respondent Marcelo Companies. Even if
there was a sincere belief on their part that the requirement of Exhibit "49" was a ruse at "screening"
them, this fear would have been dispelled upon notice of the fact that each and all of their co-strikers
who rued up the required form were in fact scheduled for work and started to work. The stoppage of
their work was not, therefore, the direct consequence of the respondent companies' complained act,
Hence, their economic loss should not be shifted to the employer. 2
It was never the state policy nor Our judicial pronouncement that the employees' right to selforganization and to engage in concerted activities for mutual aid and protection, are absolute or be
upheld under an circumstances. Thus, in the case of Royal Interocean Lines, et al. vs. CIR, 3 We
cited these authorities giving adequate panoply to the rights of employer, to wit:
The protection of workers' right to self-organization in no way interfere with
employer's freedom to enforce such rules and orders as are necessary to proper
conduct of his businesses, so long as employer's supervision is not for the purpose
of intimidating or coercing his employees with respect to their self-organization and
representation. (National Relations Board vs. Hudson Motor Car Co., C.C.A., 1942,
123 F 2d. 528). "
It is the function of the court to see that the rights of self-organization and collective
bargaining guaranteed by the Act are amply secured to the employee, but in its effort
to prevent the prescribed unfair labor practice, the court must be mindful of the
welfare of the honest employer (Martel Mills Corp. vs. M.L.R.L., C.C.A., 1940,11471
F2d. 264)."
In Pagkakaisang Itinataguyod ng mga Manggagawa sa Ang Tibay (PIMA), Eliseo Samson, et al., vs.
Ang Tibay, Inc., et al., L-22273, May 16, 1967, 20 SCRA 45, We held that the exaction, by the
employer, from the strikers returning to work, of a promise not to destroy company property and not
to commit acts of reprisal against union members who did not participate in the strike, cannot be
considered an unfair labor practice because it was not intended to discourage union membership. It
was an act of a self- preservation designed to insure peace and order in the employer's premises. It
was also held therein that what the Industrial Peace Act regards as an unfair labor practice is the
discrimination committed by the employer in regard to tenure of employment for the purpose of
encouraging or discouraging union membership.
In the light of the above ruling and taking the facts and circumstances of the case before Us in
relation to the requirement by the respondent companies in the filling up of Exhibit "49", We hold and
rule that the requirement was an act of self-preservation, designed to effect cost-savings as well as
to insure peace and order within their premises. Accordingly, the petition in G. R. No. L-38258
should be dismissed, it having failed to prove, substantiate and justify the unfair labor practice
charges against the respondent Marcelo Companies.
Now to the procedural question posed in the first issue brought about by the respondent court's
denial of the motions to withdraw the complaint respectively filed by MUEWA, UNWU and MFWU. In
their petition (G.R. L-38260) the respondent Marcelo Companies maintain that the respondent court
erred in not dismissing the complaint even as it knew fully well that the very authority of LAKAS to
represent the labor unions who had precisely disaffiliated from the LAKAS, was open to serious
question and was being ventilated before it. On the other hand, the respondent court rationalized the
denial of the aforestated motions to withdraw by holding that the complaint was filed by LAKAS on
behalf of the individual employees whose names were attached to the complaint and hence, that the
local unions who were not so authorized by these individual employees, cannot withdraw the said
complaint. The lower court's opinion is erroneous.
Firstly, LAKAS cannot bring any action for and in behalf of the employees who were members of
MUEWA because, as intimated earlier in this Decision, the said local union was never an affiliate of
LAKAS. What appears clearly from the records is that it was Augusto Carreon and his followers who
joined LAKAS, but then Augusto Carreon was not the recognized president of MUEWA and neither
he nor his followers can claim any legitimate representation of MUEWA. Apparently, it is this split
faction of MUEWA, headed by Augusta Carreon, who is being sought to be represented by LAKAS.
However, it cannot do so because the members constituting this split faction of MUEWA were still
members of MUEWA which was on its own right a duly registered labor union. Hence, any suit to be
brought for and in behalf of them can be made only by MUEWA, and not LAKAS. It appearing then
that Augusta Carreon and his cohorts did not disaffiliate from MUEWA nor signed any individual
affiliation with LAKAS, LAKAS bears no legal interest in representing MUEWA or any of its
members.
Nor will the lower court's opinion be availing with respect to the complaining employees belonging to
UNWU and MFWU. Although it is true, as alleged by LAKAS, that when it filed the charge on
December 26, 1967, the officers of the movant unions were not yet then the officers thereof,
nevertheless, the moment MFWU and UNWU separated from and disaffiliated with 'LAKAS to again
exercise its rights as independent local unions, registered before as such, they are no longer
affiliates of LAKAS, as what transpired here. Naturally, there would no longer be any reason or
occasion for LAKAS to continue representing them. Notable is the fact that the members purportedly
represented by LAKAS constitute the mere minority of the movant unions, as may be inferred from
the allegations of the movant unions as well as the counter-allegations of LAKAS filed below. As
such, they cannot prevail or dictate upon the will of the greater majority of the unions to which they
still belong, it appearing that they never disaffiliated from their unions; or stated in another way, they
are bound by the action of the greater majority. 4
In NARIC Workers' Union vs. CIR, 5 We ruled that, "(a) labor union would go beyond the limits of its
legitimate purposes if it is given the unrestrained liberty to prosecute any case even for employees who
are not members of any union at all. A suit brought by another in representation of a real party in interest
is defective." Under the uncontroverted facts obtaining herein, the aforestated ruling is applicable, the
only difference being that, here, a labor federation seeks to represent members of a registered local union
never affiliated with it and members of registered local unions which, in the course of the proceedings
before the industrial court, disaffiliated from it.
This is not to say that the complaining employees were without any venue for redress. Under the
aforestated considerations, the respondent court should have directed the amendment of the
complaint by dropping LAKAS as the complainant and allowing the suit to be further prosecuted in
the individual names of those who had grievances. A class suit under Rule 3, Section 12 of the
Rules of Court is authorized and should suffice for the purpose.
In fairness to the complaining employees, however, We treated their Motion for Reconsideration of
the Decision subject of appeal as curing the defect of the complaint as the said motion expressly
manifested their collective desire to pursue the complaint for and in their own behalves and
disauthorizing LAKAS' counsel from further representing them. And We have also treated their
petition before Us in the same manner, disregarding the fact that LAKAS remained the petitioning
party, as it appears from the verification that the petition in L38258 was for and in behalf of the
complaining employees. The merits of their petition, however, fall short of substantiating the charge
of unfair labor practice against the respondent Marcelo Companies. On the other hand, the appeal of
the Marcelo Companies in L-38260 must be upheld and sustained.
WHEREFORE, upon the foregoing considerations, the petition in L-38258 is dismissed and the
petition in L-38260 is granted. The decision of the Court of Industrial Relations is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new judgment is rendered holding that the respondent Marcelo
Companies are not guilty of unfair labor practice.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar (Chairman), Concepcion, Jr., Abad Santos, De Castro and Escolin, JJ., concur.
Aquino, J., concur in the result.
[G.R. No. 91915. September 11, 1992.]
DIVINE WORD UNIVERSITY OF TACLOBAN, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT and DIVINE WORD UNIVERSITY EMPLOYEES UNION-ALU,
Respondents. ROMERO, J.:
Facts:
Assailed in this petition for certiorari for being violative of the "constitutional right
of employees to self-organization which includes the right to form, join or assist
labor organizations of their own choosing for purposes of collective bargaining," 1
are the Orders issued by then Secretary of Labor and Employment Franklin H.
Drilon and Acting Secretary of Labor and Employment Dionisio D. de la Serna.
virtual lawlibrary
Med-Arbiter Bienvenido C. Elorcha certified the Divine Word University Employees
Union (DWUEU) as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the Divine Word
University (University for brevity). the University replied and requested a
preliminary conference. However, before the scheduled conference, DWUEU’s
resigned vice-president wrote a letter addressed to the University unilaterally
withdrawing the CBA proposals. Consequently, the preliminary conference
After almost three years, DWUEU, which had by then affiliated with the Associated
Labor Union, requested a conference with the University for the purpose of
continuing the collective bargaining negotiations. Despite the letter, the University
persisted in maintaining silence.
NCMB:
DWUEU-ALU filed with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board of the
Department of Labor and Employment a notice of strike on the grounds of
bargaining deadlock and unfair labor practice acts, However, it turned out that an
hour before the agreement was concluded, the University had filed a petition for
certification election with the Region VIII office of the Department of Labor and
Employment.
On the other hand, DWUEU-ALU, consonant with the agreement, submitted its
collective bargaining proposals. These were ignored by the University. Thereafter,
through the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) of Region VIII,
marathon conciliation conferences were conducted but to no avail. Hence, then
Secretary of Labor Franklin M. Drilon, exercising his powers under Art. 263(g) of
the Labor Code, issued an Order assuming jurisdiction over the labor dispute and
directing all striking workers to report back to work within twenty-four (24) hours
and the management to accept them back under the same terms and conditions
prevailing prior to the work stoppage. The Secretary also designated the NCMB to
hear the case and to submit its report thereon.
Secretary of Labor (DOLE)
the Sec of labor consolidated the petitions and ruled that
Undeniably, the Union and the DWU have not been able to conclude a CBA since
its certification by then Med-Arbiter Bienvenido Elorcha. But the non-conclusion of
a CBA within one year, as in this case, does not automatically authorize the holding
of a certification election when it appears that a bargaining deadlock issue has
been submitted to conciliation by the certified bargaining agent.
Clearly, a bargaining deadlock exists and as a matter of fact this is being conciliated
by the National Conciliation and Mediation Board at the time the University filed
its Petition for Certification Election. In fact the deadlock remained unresolved and
was in fact mutually agreed upon to be conciliated further by the NCMB as per
items 1 and 5 of the ‘Agreement’ (Exhibit ‘L’).
The aforequoted rule clearly barred the Med-Arbiter from further entertaining the
petition for certification election. Furthermore, the various communications sent
to the University by the Union prior to the filing of the notice of strike was enough
opportunity for the former to raise the issue of representation if it really casts
doubt to the majority status of the Union.
The Acting Secretary then concluded that for reneging on the agreement and for
its "reluctance and subscription to legal delay," the University should be "declared
in default."
Hence, the University had recourse to instant petition.
issue: WON Respondent Secretary committed grave and patent abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing his order finally denying petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration in the face of the order and subsequent acts of DOLE
official subsuming the second notice of strike with the first notice of strike.
Ruling:
The SC agreed with the Acting Secretary of Labor’s observation that the action for
intervention had in effect been denied by the dismissal of the petition for
certification election. The sub silencio treatment of the motion for intervention in
said Order does not mean that the motion was overlooked. It only means, as
shown by the findings of facts in the same Order, that there was no necessity for
the holding of a certification election wherein the DWU-IFEU could participate. But
once an employer has filed said petition, as the petitioner did in this case, its active
role ceases and it becomes a mere bystander. Any uncalled-for concern on the part
of the employer may give rise to the suspicion that it is batting for a company
union.
In this case, resolution of the motion for reconsideration at the earliest possible
time was urgently needed to set at rest the issues regarding the first notice of
strike, the certification election and the unfair labor practice cases filed by the
University and the DWUEU-ALU. The nature of the business of the University
demanded immediate and effective action on the part of the respondent public
officials. Otherwise, not only the contending parties in the dispute would be
adversely affected but more importantly, the studentry and their parents.
On the issue of whether or not a certification election should have been ordered
by the Secretary of Labor, pertinent are the following respective provisions of the
Labor Code and Rule V, Book V of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the
same Code:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"ART. 258. When an employer may file petition. — When requested to bargain
collectively, an employer may petition the Bureau for an election. If there is no
existing certified collective bargaining agreement in the unit, the Bureau shall,
after hearing, order a certification election.
All certification cases shall be decided within twenty (20) working days.
The Bureau shall conduct a certification election within twenty (20) days in
accordance with the rules and regulations prescribed by the Secretary of Labor.
Sec. 3. When to file. — In the absence of a collective bargaining agreement duly
registered in accordance with Article 231 of the Code, a petition for certification
election may be filed at any time. However, no certification election may be held
within one year from the date of issuance of a final certification election result.
Neither may a representation question be entertained if, before the filing of a
petition for certification election, a bargaining deadlock to which an incumbent or
certified bargaining agent is a party had been submitted to conciliation or
arbitration or had become the subject of valid notice of strike or lockout.
(Emphasis supplied)
If a collective bargaining agreement has been duly registered in accordance with
Article 231 of the Code, a petition for certification election or a motion for
intervention can only be entertained within sixty (60) days prior to the expiry date
of such agreement."cralaw virtua1aw library
These provisions make it plain that in the absence of a collective bargaining
agreement, an employer who is requested to bargain collectively may file a
petition for certification election any time except upon a clear showing that one of
these two instances exists: (a) the petition is filed within one year from the date of
issuance of a final certification election result or (b) when a bargaining deadlock
had been submitted to conciliation or arbitration or had become the subject of a
valid notice of strike or lockout.
While there is no question that the petition for certification election was filed by
the herein petitioner after almost four years from the time of the certification
election and, therefore, there is no question as to the timeliness of the petition,
the problem appears to lie in the fact that the Secretary of Labor had found that a
bargaining deadlock exists.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad
A "deadlock" is defined as the "counteraction of things producing entire stoppage:
a state of inaction or of neutralization caused by the opposition of persons or of
factions (as in government or a voting body): standstill." 21 There is a deadlock
when there is a "complete blocking or stoppage resulting from the action of equal
and opposed forces; as, the deadlock of a jury or legislature." 22 The word is
synonymous with the word impasse 23 which, within the meaning of the American
federal labor laws, "presupposes reasonable effort at good faith bargaining which,
despite noble intentions, does not conclude in agreement between the parties." 24
A thorough study of the records reveals that there was no "reasonable effort at
good faith bargaining" specially on the part of the University. Its indifferent
attitude towards collective bargaining inevitably resulted in the failure of the
parties to arrive at an agreement. "ART. 250. Procedure in collective bargaining. —
The following procedures shall be observed in collective bargaining:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
(a) When a party desires to negotiate an agreement, it shall serve a written notice
upon the other party with a statement of its proposals. The other party shall make
a reply thereto not later than ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such notice.
(b) Should differences arise on the basis of such notice and reply, either party may
request for a conference which shall begin not later than ten (10) calendar days
from the date of request.
(c) If the dispute is not settled, the Board shall intervene upon request of either or
both parties or at its own initiative and immediately call the parties to conciliation
meetings. The Board shall have the power to issue subpoenas requiring the
attendance of the parties to such meetings. It shall be the duty of the parties to
participate fully and promptly in the conciliation meetings the Board may call;
(d) During the conciliation proceedings in the Board, the parties are prohibited
from doing any act which may disrupt or impede the early settlement of the
disputes; andchanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library
(e) The Board shall exert all efforts to settle disputes amicably and encourage the
parties to submit their case to a voluntary arbitrator."cralaw virtua1aw library
Considering the procedure outlined above, the Court cannot help but notice that
the DWUEU was not entirely blameless in the matter of the delay in the bargaining
process. While it is true that as early as March 7, 1985, said union had submitted
its collective bargaining proposals and that, its subsequent withdrawal by the
DWUEU Vice-President being unauthorized and therefore ineffective, the same
proposals could be considered as subsisting, the fact remains that said union
remained passive for three years. The records do not show that during this threeyear period, it exerted any effort to pursue collective bargaining as a means of
attaining better terms of employment.
Be that as it may, the Court is not inclined to rule that there has been a deadlock or
an impasse in the collective bargaining process. As the Court earlier observed,
there has not been a "reasonable effort at good faith bargaining" on the part of the
University. While DWUEU-ALU was opening all possible avenues for the conclusion
of an agreement, the record is replete with evidence on the University’s reluctance
and thinly disguised refusal to bargain with the duly certified bargaining agent,
such that the inescapable conclusion is that the University evidently had no
intention of bargaining with it. Thus, while the Court recognizes that technically,
the University has the right to file the petition for certification election as there
was no bargaining deadlock to speak of, to grant its prayer that the herein assailed
Orders be annulled would put an unjustified premium on bad faith bargaining.
Bad faith on the part of the University is further exemplified by the fact that an
hour before the start of the May 10, 1988 conference, it surreptitiously filed the
petition for certification election. And yet during said conference, it committed
itself to "sit down" with the Union. Obviously, the University tried to preempt the
conference which would have legally foreclosed its right to file the petition for
certification election. In so doing, the University failed to act in accordance with
Art. 252 of the Labor Code which defines the meaning of the duty to bargain
collectively as "the performance of a mutual obligation to meet and convene
promptly and expeditiously in good faith." Moreover, by filing the petition for
certification election while agreeing to confer with the DWUEU-ALU, the University
violated the mandate of Art. 19 of the Civil Code that" (e)very person must, in the
exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith."cralaw virtua1aw library
dispotive:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. This decision is immediately executory.
Costs against the petitioner.
the SC denied the petition.
[G.R. Nos. L-7594 & L-7596. September 8, 1954.]
INSUREFCO PAPER PULP & PROJECT WORKER’S UNION, PETITIONER, v.
SUGAR REFINING CORPORATION, Respondent.
INSULAR SUGAR REFINING CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. HONORABLE
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and INSUREFCO & PAPER PULP
PROJECT WORKER’S UNION, Respondents.
Cid, Villaluz & Associates, for petitioner Insurefco Paper Pulp & Project
Workers’ Union.
Jose P. Bengzon, Guido Advincular and Potenciano Villegas, Jr., for
respondent Insular Sugar Refining Corporation.
SYLLABUS
1. STRIKES; WHEN STRIKE IS ILLEGAL. — A strike declared without giving to the
general manager, or the board of directors of the company, reasonable time within
which to consider and act on the demands submitted by the union is illegal.
Likewise, a strike is illegal when it is declared in violation of a collective bargaining
agreement especially when it provides for conclusive arbitration clauses. These
agreements must be strictly adhered to and respected if their ends have to be
achieved." (Liberal Labor Union v. Philippine Can Company 91 Phil., 72)
2. ID.; ID.; ORDER READMITTING STRIKERS DOES NOT MAKE THE QUESTION OF
LEGALITY OF STRIKE MOOT. — An order issued by the Court of Industrial Relations
authorizing the partial resumption of the operation of the sugar company
readmitting to the service all those who took part in the strike, to enable merely the
refinery to carry out its commitment to refine a huge quantity of centrifugal sugar,
cannot have the effect of declaring moot the question of the legality of the strike
where such order was issued subject to the express condition that the question
whether the strikers should be allowed to return permanently to work or not should
be made subject to the outcome of the case filed by the company to declare the
strike unjustified and illegal.
3. PETITION FOR REVIEW; WHAT QUESTIONS ONLY CAN BE ENTERTAINED. — A
question of fact cannot be taken up in a petition for review. It is a well-settled rule
in this jurisdiction that as long as there some evidence to support a decision of the
Court of Industrial Relations, the Supreme Court should not entertain, nor modify
or reverse it, Just because it is not based on overwhelming or preponderant
evidence. Its only province is to resolve or pass upon questions of law.
DECISION
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
These two cases concern two petitions for review of the decision rendered by the
Court of Industrial Relations on December 8, 1953 declaring the strike staged by
the members of the Insurefco Papers Pulp & Project Workers’ Union hereinafter
referred to as Union, on June 14, 1952 unreasonable and illegal and leaving to the
discretion of the management of the Insular Sugar Refining Corporation, hereinafter
referred to as Company, the dismissal of those responsible therefor as listed in
Exhibit "T" appearing on page 554-558 of the record of Case No. 283-V of said
court.
The Union interposed the present petition upon the plea that the court committed
serious errors in declaring the strike illegal and in authorizing the management of
the Company to dismiss the alleged leaders of the Union at its discretion, whereas
the Company has likewise appealed because the authority did not include other
persons who allegedly had had a direct part in the strike or are deemed also leaders
of the movement.
On June 12, 1952, petitioning Union through its leaders submitted to the Company
two sets of economic demands, one for increase in wages, elimination of the
rotation system, and enforcement of check- off, and the other containing proposals
with respect to profit - sharing, union representation in the management of the
Company, and an option to purchase the refinery. In the morning of June 14, 1952,
a third demand was submitted by the Union in which it requested for the immediate
cessation of the threats, intimidation, and violence being committed by certain
thugs, goons, and gangsters inside the refinery and asking at the same time that
gratuities be granted to the laborers incident to the purchase of the refinery. .
When said demands were submitted to the Chief of the Finance and Legal Division
of the Company, the union delegation was advised that the Acting General Manager
of the Company was then absent from Manila and for that reason no action could be
taken on these demands until after his return.
On June 14, 1952, at about 11:30 p.m., the members of the Union, without notice
or warning, struck causing the stoppage and paralization of the operations of the
refinery, said members going even to the extent of picketing the approaches of its
compound. Because of this walkout, the Company filed on June 18, 1952 an urgent
petition in the Court of Industrial Relations praying that the strike thus staged be
declared unjustified and illegal and that the Company be authorized to dismiss
those responsible for the strike, which petition was docketed as Case No. 707-V.
The Union having failed to file its answer as required by the regulation, the trial of
the case proceeded and the Company was allowed to present its evidence in
support of the petition. When the time of the Union came to present its rebuttal
evidence, its counsel asked that it be allowed to set up and prove certain special
defenses, which request was granted. These defenses are: (1) the maulings and
acts of violence committed on members of the Union inside the refinery; (2) the
threats, intimidation and violence committed on members of the Union by persons
supported, encouraged, and abetted by company officials; and (3) the existence of
a company union in the refinery.
After due trial, and the parties had submitted their memoranda, the Court of
Industrial Relations rendered decision declaring the strike unjustified and illegal and
giving discretion to the management of the Company to dismiss from the service
the leaders responsible therefor whose names are listed in Exhibit "T" appearing on
pages 554- 558 of the record of Case No. 283-V. Both parties, being dissatisfied
with the decision, interposed the present petition for review.
Inasmuch as the cases before us concern two petitions for review of a decision of
the Court of Industrial Relations which, by their very nature, merely involve
questions of law, the facts of this case as found in the decision are deemed
undisputed and, for the purposes of the issues herein raised, resort to said facts is
sufficient. We would, therefore, quote hereunder the pertinent portion of the
decision wherein said facts are outlined:
jgc:cha nro bles.c om.ph
"It is clear that Mr. Andres B. Callanta and several others presented exhibits ’B’ and
’C’, the alleged set of demands, to Mr. Manuel B. Villano, the secretary and
treasurer and chief of the Finance and Legal Department of the PHILSUGIN between
3:00 and 4:00 in the afternoon of June 12, 1952 at the office of the PHILSUGIN at
306 Samanillo Building. Mr. Callanta after asking him when the Acting General
Manager of the PHILSUGIN could be contacted was told that said Acting General
Manager together with the chairman of the Board, (the Board being composed of
five members) and two others, were at the time in Bacolod, Negros Occidental,
attending a convention of sugar men Mr. Callanta was advised that the Acting
General Manager was expected to arrive before June 17 because the usual
meetings of the board was every Wednesday and the following Wednesday would
be June 18. Mr. Callanta was advised that Exhibits ’B’ and ’C’, would be submitted
to Mr. Oliveros, the Acting General Manager, the moment he arrived from Bacolod.
Mr. Villano noticed upon receipt of exhibits ’B’ and ’C’ that the same were dated
March 31, 1952. On Monday morning June 15, 1952, Mr. Villano received from Mr.
Santiago, the cashier of the PHILSUGIN, another paper signed by one Mr. Lampiño
and marked as exhibits ’S’ or exhibit ’5’ and was submitted to Mr. Santiago about
11:00 or 12:00 o’clock, Saturday morning, June 14, 1952. This exhibit prayed for
the stopping of the alleged mauling, requested the payment of gratuities to the
workers and the information about petty thefts committed by "extras." It can
readily be seen that there was no possibility for the General Manager nor the board
of directors to consider the so-called demands between the time they were
presented and the declaration of the strike — the strike having been declared about
11:30 p.m. on June 14, 1952. The first official knowledge of the would be strike on
that day was when Messrs. Lampiño, Robles, Carrera and De Jesus, officers of the
union went to the house of one of the key officials of the company, Mr. Dominador
Salvador, about 10:30 p.m. urging the latter not to report during his shift that night
because there was going to be a strike.
"Exhibit ’S’ of petitioner or ’5’ for respondent which was received as mentioned by
the cashier of the company between 11:00 or 12:00 o’clock Saturday on the
morning of June 14, 1952, the day that the strike was declared and which
respondent considered the same as an ultimatum, mentioned no time or warning of
the declaration of strike. The strike was particularly the act of the heads of the
barangays whose names appear in exhibit ’T’ in Case No. 283-V.
"There was no time to consider the alleged demands because the General Manager,
the chairman of the Board, and two others were in Bacolod, and even when the
manager was advised by the Superintendent of the corporation at 5:03 a.m. thru a
telegram on June 15 of the declaration of the strike, efforts to locate the General
Manager in Bacolod proved futile, perhaps it was because it was Sunday, (Exhibit
’U’). Mr. Callanta, the virtual head of the union, being the president of the U.I.O.
mother union of the respondent union, and the person who advised the emissary of
the union to serve an ultimatum, knew very well that when he for the very first
time on June 12, 1952, presented demands contained in exhibits ’B’ and ’C’ the
company officials were not in Manila but elsewhere and would be in Manila on June
17, and that the board would meet on June 18. There was, therefore, no time for
the company thru its duly constituted authority to consider the alleged demands
whether to grant or not the contents of the three sets of demands presented. Mr.
Callanta the man who presented exhibits ’B’ and ’C’, a very intelligent young man,
know that petitioner is a corporation and its activities are supervised and/or
controlled by its board. And while it is true that during the progress of the hearing
in court propositions and counter propositions were presented to settle the case
amicably in and out of court, and while it is equally true that the corporation
eventually turned down every effort of amicable settlement, the same could not be
taken as the yard stick to conclude, as respondent claimed, that even if the
demands presented were studied and scrutinized by the management within a
reasonable time still the same would be rejected, as in fact they were. Certainly, it
is different when a strike is declared before the demands are studied and presented
to the authority that has the final say on the matter, from a strike called after the
demands have been denied upon their consideration. As in this case, the strike has
already been declared, and the case presented in court. The corporation has every
right to stand by on its prayer that the strike be declared illegal. For these reasons,
the court considers the strike unreasonable."
cra law virt ua1aw li bra ry
The question now to be determined is: Has the Court of Industrial Relations gravely
abused its discretion, as claimed, in declaring the strike staged by the members of
the Union unreasonable, unjustified, and illegal?
It appears that the Union, through its leaders and officials submitted to the
management of the Company a set of demands urging immediate action. These
demands were handed over to the Secretary-Treasurer and Chief of the Finance
and Legal Division of the Company on June 12, 1952. At that time the Acting
General Manager, together with the Chairman and two members of the Board of
Directors, were absent, having gone to Bacolod City, Negros Occidental, to attend a
conference of sugar men. The leaders of the Union were advised of this fact and
were informed that they would probably be back on June 17, because the usual
meeting of the Board was held every Wednesday and the following Wednesday
would be June 18. And in the morning of June 14, 1952, the Union, also through its
leaders, submitted another demand regarding certain maulings and acts of violence
being committed inside the refinery and requesting that they be stopped. And as no
immediate action was taken thereon, — but despite the advice given to them that
their demands would be submitted to the Acting General Manager immediately
upon his arrival from Bacolod City, — the leaders of the Union caused its members
to declare a strike at about midnight of June 14, 1952 thereby causing the
stoppage and paralization of the operations of the refinery.
It can readily be seen that the walkout was premature as it was declared without
giving to the General Manager, or the Board of Directors of the Company,
reasonable time within which to consider and act on the demands submitted by the
Union. The nature of the demands was such that no possible action could be taken
thereon by the officials to whom they were submitted. They could have only been
acted upon by the General Manager, or by the Board of Directors. The former was
then in Bacolod, and the latter could not be convened because the chairman and
two of its members were also absent. And this fact was well known to the leaders of
the Union. In the circumstances, the only conclusion that can be drawn is that, as
found by the lower court, the strike staged by the Union was unfortunate, as it is illconsidered, considering the great damage caused to the business of the refinery
resulting from the complete paralization of its operations. The Court of Industrial
Relations, therefore, acted rightly in declaring said strike unjustified and illegal.
One circumstance that should be noted is the fact that a portion of the demands
herein involved is but a reaffirmation of the demands that had been submitted by
the Union and which were the subject of a previous case between the same parties
(Case No. 283-V). This case also gave rise to a similar strike which was resolved by
a partial agreement concluded by the parties and wherein, among other things,
they included a form of settlement of their labor disputes of the following tenor:
jgc:chan roble s.com. ph
"VI. That all labor-management disputes shall be taken up in a Grievance
Committee consisting of 6 members, 3 from the Insurefco and Paper Pulp Project
Workers’ Union and 3 from the management. This committee shall take charge of
investigating any dispute arising between labor and management, after which it
shall make its recommendation to the management which shall have the final say
on the matter under consideration. Any matter submitted to the Grievance
Committee shall be decided within four days and the management to take action
within three days from the receipt of the recommendation of the Grievance
Committee except when the matter necessitates the action of the Board, in which
case the management should decide the matter within one week from the receipt of
the recommendation of the Grievance Committee." (Exhibits ’D ’D-1’, and ’E’).
Note that the above form of settlement covers all disputes that might arise between
labor and management and was adopted precisely to pave the way for their
amicable solution and avert a possible strike on the part of the Union. This
agreement received the sanction of the court. But, far from abiding by this form of
arbitration, the Union declared the instant strike as already pointed out. This
infringement constitutes a further justification for the decision reached by the court
a quo. As this court has aptly said: "Strikes held in violation of the terms contained
in a collective bargaining agreement are illegal especially when they provide for
conclusive arbitration clauses. These agreements must be strictly adhered to and
respected if their ends have to be achieved." (Liberal Labor Union v. Philippine Can
Company, 92 Phil., 72.)
It is true that the Union submitted a third demand complaining about certain
mauling, threats, or intimidation being committed by certain malefactors inside the
refinery, and apparently action on this matter could be taken with out awaiting the
return of the General Manager or the convening to a session of the Board of
Directors, but it should be noted that said demand was submitted at noon of June
14, 1952 and at about midnight of the same day the Union struck. Even granting
that such mauling or intimidation really existed, still we believe that the action
taken by the Union was unjustified it appearing that it has been so sudden that it
did not give time to the management to make an investigation of the complaint.
But the truth is, as found by the Court of Industrial Relations, "there is no proof
that the company had any hand in any of the treats, intimidations or mauling
incidents as pictured before this court. . . . They ensued out of petty jealousies
existing between the two unions in the company — jealousies which were aimed
solely at one objective, control by one union." These incidents even reached the
local courts and at the time the claim was being considered, they were still pending
determination. The court found that this claim is without merit.
The same thing may be said with regard to the claim that the declaration of the
strike has become moot in view of the order of the Court of Industrial Relations
issued on March 27, 1953 authorizing the partial resumption of the operation of the
refinery readmitting to the service all those who took part in the strike, for the
simple reason that said order was issued to enable merely the refinery to carry out
its commitment to refine a huge quantity of centrifugal sugar. It appears that the
order was issued subject to one express condition, that is, that the question of
whether the strikers should be allowed to return permanently to work or not should
be made subject to the outcome of that case. It is obvious that that order of March
27, 1953 cannot have the effect of declaring moot the question of the legality of the
strike which took place on June 14, 1952.
As regards the contention of the Company that the Court of Industrial Relations has
failed to include among the leaders whose dismissal was left to the discretion of the
management other persons who, as contended, likewise had a direct part in the
declaration of the strike, we don’t believe necessary to pass upon it it appearing
that it involves a question of fact which cannot be taken up in a petition for review.
It is a well-settled rule in this jurisdiction that "as long as there is some evidence to
support a decision of the Court of Industrial Relations, this court should not
interfere, nor modify or reverse it, just because it is not based on overwhelming or
preponderant evidence. Its only province is to resolve or pass upon questions of
law.’ [Philippine Newspaper Guild v. Evening News, Inc. G.R. No. L-2604, April 29,
1950, 47 Off. Gaz., 86 Phil. 303 Bardwill Bros. v. Philippine Labor Union and Court
of Industrial Relations (1940), 70 Phil., 672; Antamok Goldfields Mining v. Court of
Industrial Relations and National Labor Union, Inc. (1940) 70 Phil., 340.]
The petitions are dismissed, without pronouncement as to costs.
Paras, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Jugo, Concepcion and
Reyes, J.B.L., JJ., concur.
G.R. Nos. 95494-97 September 7, 1995
LAPANDAY WORKERS UNION, ARQUILAO BACOLOD, JOSE ERAD, FERNANDO
HERNANDO, EDDIE ESTRELLA, CIRILO DAYAG, EDUARDO POQUITA, CARLITO PEPITO,
RENE ARAO, JUANITO GAHUM, EMILIANO MAGNO, PERLITO LISONDRA, GREGORIO
ALBARAN, ABRAHAM BAYLON, DIONESIO TRUCIO, TOMAS BASCO AND ROSARIO
SINDAY, pertitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION & DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 95494-97 September 7, 1995
LAPANDAY WORKERS UNION, ARQUILAO BACOLOD, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND CADECO ARGO DEVELOPMENT PHILS.,
INC. respondents.
G.R. Nos. 95494-97 September 7, 1995
LAPANDAY WORKERS UNION, ARQUILAO BACOLOD, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND LAPANDAY AGRICULTURAL &
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.
G.R. Nos. 95494-97 September 7, 1995
LAPANDAY WORKERS UNION, TOMAS N. BASCO, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND LAPANDAY AGRICULTURAL &
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.
PUNO, J.:
Petitioner Lapanday Agricultural Workers' Union (Union for brevity) and petitioners-workers of
Lapanday Agricultural and Development Corporation and CADECO Agro Development Philippines,
Inc., seek to reverse the consolidated Decision dated August 29, 1990, 1rendered by public
respondent National Labor Relations Commision, declaring their strike illegal and ordering the dismissal
of their leaders.
The background of the case:
Private respondents are sister companies engaged in the production of bananas. Their agricultural
establishments are located in Davao City.
On the other hand, petitioner Lapanday Workers' Union (Union) is the duly certified bargaining agent
of the rank and file employees of private respondents. The Union is affiliated with the KMU-ANGLO.
The other petitioners are all members of the Union.
The records show that petitioner Union has a collective bargaining agreement with private
respondents, covering the period from December 5, 1985 to November 30, 1988. A few months
before the expiration of their CBA, private respondents initiated certain management policies which
disrupted the relationship of the parties.
First, on August 1, 1988, private respondents contracted Philippine Eagle Protectors and Security
Agency, Inc., to provide security services for their business premises located in Lapanday, Bandug,
Callawa, Davao City, and Guising, Davao Del Sur. Their contract also called for the protection of the
lives and limbs of private respondents' officers, employees and guests within company premises.
The Union branded the security guards posted within the company premises as private respondents'
"goons" and "special forces." It also accused the guards of intimidating and harassing their
members.
Second, private respondents conducted seminars on Human Development and Industrial Relations
(HDIR) for their managerial and supervisory employees and, later, the rank-and-filers, to promote
their social education and economic growth. Among the topics discussed in the seminar were the
mission statement of the company, corporate values, and the Philippine political spectrum. The
Union claimed that the module on the Philippine political spectrum lumped the ANGLO (Alliance of
Nationalist and Genuine Labor Organization), with other outlawed labor organizations such as the
National Democratic Front or other leftist groups.
These issues were discussed during a labor-management meeting held on August 2, 1988. The
labor group was represented by the Union, through its President, petitioner Arquilao Bacolod, and its
legal counsel. After private respondents explained the issues, the Union agreed to allow its members
to attend the HDIR seminar for the rank-and-filers. Nevertheless, on August 19 and 20, the Union
directed its members not to attend the seminars scheduled on said dates. Earlier on, or on August 6,
1988, the Union, led by petitioners Arquilao Bacolod and Rene Arao, picketed the premises of the
Philippine Eagle Protectors to show their displeasure on the hiring of the guards.
Worse still, the Union filed on August 25, 1988, a Notice of Strike with the National Conciliation and
Mediation Board (NCMB). It accused the company of unfair labor practices consisting of coercion of
employees, intimidation of union members and union-busting.2 These were the same issues raised
by the Union during the August 2, 1988 labor-management meeting.
On August 29, 1988, the NCMB called a conciliation conference. The conference yielded the
following agreement:
(1) Union officers, including the officials of KMU-ANGLO, and the Executive Director of the NCMB
would attend the HDIR seminar on September 5, 1988; and
(2) A committee shall convene on September 10, 1989, to establish guidelines governing the guards.
The Union officials did attend the September 5, 1988 seminar. While they no longer objected to the
continuation of the seminar, they reiterated their demand for the deletion of the discussion pertaining
to the KMU-ANGLO.
With the apparent settlement of their differences, private respondents notified the NCMB that there
were no more bases for the notice of strike.
An unfortunate event brake the peace of the parties. On September 8, 1988, Danilo Martinez, a
member of the Board of Directors of the Union, was gunned down in his house in the presence of his
wife and children. The gunman was later identified as Eledio Samson, an alleged member of the
new security forces of private respondents.
On September 9, 1988, the day after the killing, most of the members of the Union refused to report
for work. They returned to work the following day but they did not comply with the "quota system"
adopted by the management to bolster production output. Allegedly, the Union instructed the
workers to reduce their production to thirty per cent (30%). Private respondents charged the Union
with economic sabotage through slowdown.
On September 14, 1988, Private respondents filed separate charges against the Union and its
members for illegal strike, unfair labor practice and damages, with prayer for injunction. These cases
were docketed as Case Nos. RAB-11-09-00612-888 and RAB No. 11-09-00613-88 before Labor
Arbiter Antonio Villanueva.
On September 17, 1988, petitioners skipped work to pay their last respect to the slain Danilo
Martinez who was laid to rest. Again, on September 23, 1988, petitioners did not report for work.
Instead, they proceeded to private respondents' office at Lanang, carrying placards and posters
which called for the removal of the security guards, the ouster of certain management officials, and
the approval of their mass leave application. Their mass action did not succeed.
In a last ditch effort to settle the deteriorating dispute between the parties, City Mayor Rodrigo
Duterte intervened. Dialogues were held on September 27 and 29, 1988 at the City Mayor's Office.
Again, the dialogues proved fruitless as private respondents refused to withdraw the cases they
earlier filed with public respondent.
On October 3, 1988, a strike vote was canducted among the members of the Union and those in
favor of the strike won overwhelming support from the workers. The result of the strike vote was then
submitted to the NCMB on October 10, 1988. Two days later, or on Ootober 12, 1988, the Union
struck.
On the bases of the foregoing facts, Labor Arbiter Antonio Villanueva ruled that the Onion staged an
illegal strike. The dispositlve portion of the Decision, dated December 12, 1988, states:
COMFORMABLY WITH ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered:
a) Declaring the strike staged by respondents (petitioners) to be illegal;
b) Declaring the employees listed as respondents in the complaint and those
mentioned in page 21 to have lost their employment status with complainants
Lapanday Agricultural and Development Corporation and Cadeco Agro Development
Philippines, Inc.; and
c) Ordering respondents (petitioners in this case) to desist from further committing an
illegal strike.
Petitioners appealed the Villanueva decision to public respondent NLRC.
It also appears that on December 6, 1988, or before the promulgation of the decision of Arbiter
Villanueva, the Union, together with Tomas Basco and 25 other workers, filed a complaint for unfair
labor practice and illegal suspension against LADECO. The case was docketed as Case No. RAB11-12-00780-88. On even date, another complaint for unfair labor practice and illegal dismissal was
filed by the Union, together with Arquilao Bacolod and 58 other complainants. This was docketed as
Case No. RAB-11-12-00779-88. These two (2) cases were heard by Labor Arbiter Newton Sancho.
Before the NLRC could resolve the appeal taken on the Villanueva decision in Case Nos. RAB-1109-00612-88 and RAB-11-09-00613-88, Labor Arbiter Sancho rendered a decision in the two (2)
cases filed by the Union against private respondents LADECO and CADECO (Case Nos. RAB-1112-00779-88 and RAB-11-12-00780-88). The Sancho decision, dated October 18, 1989,
declared LADECO and CADECO guilty of unfair labor practices and illegal dismissal and ordered the
reinstatement of the dismissed employees of private reapondents, with backwages and other
benefits. Significantly, the Sancho decision considered the refusal of the workers to report for work
on September 9, 1988, justified by the circumstance then prevailing, the killing of Danilo Martinez on
September 8,1988.
Private respondents appealed the Sancho decision, claiming, among others, that labor arbiter
Sancho erred in passing upon the legality of the strike staged by petitioners since said issue had
already been passed upon by the Regional Arbitration Branch and was still on appeal before the
NLRC.
Considering that the four (4) cases before it arose from the same set of facts and involved
substantially the same issues, the NLRC rendered a consolidated decision, promulgated August 29,
1990, upholding the Villanueva decision in Case Nos. RAB-11-09-00612-88 and RAB-11-09-0061388. The dispositive portion of the assailed NLRC decision states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, a new judgment is entered in the four
consolidated and above-captioned cases as follows:
1. The strike staged by the Lapanday Agricultural Workers Union is hereby declared
to be (sic) illegal;
2. As a consequence thereof, the following employees-union officers are declared to
have lost their employment status with Lapanday Agricultural Development
Corporation and CADECO Agro Development Philippines, to wit: Arguilao Bacolod,
Jose Erad, Fernando Hernando, Eldie Estrella, Cerelo Dayag, Lucino Magadan,
Rene Arao, Eduardo Poquita, Juanito Gahum, Emilio Magno, Perlito Lisondra,
Gregorio Albaron, Abraham Baylon, Dionosio Trocio, Tomas Basco and Rosario
Sinday;
3. However, the individual respondents (union members), being merely rank-and-file
employees and who merely joined the strike declared as illegal, are ordered
reinstated but without backwages, the period they were out of work is deemed the
penalty for the illegal strike they staged;
4. Ordering Lapanday Workers' Union, its leaders and members, to desist from
further committing an illegal strike; and
5. Dismissing the complaint for unfair labor practice, illegal suspension and illegal
dismissal filed by the Lapanday Workers Union (LWU)-ANGLO and its members, for
lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioners fileds motion for reconsideration. It did not prosper. Hence, the petition.
Petitioners now claim that public respondent NLRC gravely abused its discretion in: a) declaring that
their activities, from September 9, 1988 to October 12, 1988, were strike activities; and b) declaring
that the strike staged on October 12, 1988 was illegal.
The critical issue is the legality of the strike held on October 12, 1988. The applicable laws are
Articles 263 and 264 of the Labor Code, as amended by E.O. No. 111, dated December 24, 1986.3
Paragraphs (c) and (f) of Article 263 of the Labor Code, as amended by E.O. 111, provides:
(c) In cases of bargaining deadlocks, the duly certified or recognized bargaining
agent may file a notice of strike or the employer may file, notice of lockout with the
Ministry at least 30 days before the intended date thereof. In cases of unfair labor
practice, the notice shall be 15 days and in the absence of a duly certified or
recognized bargaining agent, the notice of strike may be filed by any legitimate labor
organization in behalf of its members. However, in case of dismissal from
employment of union officers duly elected in accordance with the union constitution
and by-laws, which may constitute union busting where the existence of the union is
threatened, the 15-daycooling-off period shall not apply and the union may take
action immediately.
xxx xxx xxx
(f) A decision to declare a strike must be approved by a majority of the total union
membership in the bargaining unit concerned, obtained by secret ballot in meetings
or referenda called for that purpose. A decision to declare a lockout must be
approved by a majority of the board of directors of the corporation or association or
of the partners in a partnership, obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for that
purpose. The decision shall be valid for the duration of the dispute based on
substantially the same grounds considered when the strike or lockout vote was
taken. The Ministry may, at its own initiative or upon the request of any affected
party, supervise the conduct of secret balloting. In every case, the union or the
employer shall furnish the Ministry the results of the voting at least seven (7) days
before the intended strike or lockout subject to the cooling-off period herein provided.
Article 264 of the same Code reads:
Art. 264. Prohibited activities. — (a) No labor organization or employer shall declare
a strike or lockout without first having bargained collectively in accordance with Title
VII of this Book or without first having filed the notice required in the preceding Article
or without the necessary strike or lockout vote first having been obtained and
reported to the Ministry.
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. . . . Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker
or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a
strike may be declared to have lost his employment status: Provided that mere
participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient ground for
termination of his employment, even if a replacement had been hired by the
employer during such lawful strike. (emphasis ours).
A strike is "any temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of employees as a result of an
industrial or labor dispute."4 It is the most preeminent of the economic weapons of workers which
they unsheathe to force management to agree to an equitable sharing of the joint product of labor
and capital. Undeniably, strikes exert some disquieting effects not only on the relationship between
labor and management but also on the general peace and progress of society. Our laws thus
regulate their exercise within reasons by balancing the interests of labor and management together
with the overarching public interest.
Some of the limitations on the exercise of the right of strike are provided for in paragraphs (c) and (f)
of Article 263 of the Labor Code, as amended, supra. They Provide for the procedural steps to be
followed before staging a strike — filing of notice of strike, taking of strike vote, and reporting of the
strike vote result to the Department of Labor and Employment. In National Federation of Sugar
Workers (NFSW) vs. Overseas, et al., 5 we ruled that these steps are mandatory in character, thus:
If only the filing of the strike notice and the strike-vote report would be deemed
mandatory, but not the waiting periods so specifically and emphatically prescribed by
law, the purposes (hereafter discussed) far which the filing of the strike notice and
strike-vote report is required cannot be achieved. . . .
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So too, the 7-day strike-vote report is not without a purpose. As pointed out by the
Solicitor General —
. . . The submission of the report gives assurance that a strike vote has been taken
and that, if the report concerning it is false, the majority of the members can take
appropriate remedy before it is too late.
The seven (7) day waiting period is intended to give the Department of Labor and
Employment an opportunity to verify whether the projected strike really carries the imprimatur
of the majority of the union members. The need for assurance that majority of the union
members support the strike cannot be gainsaid. Strike is usually the last weapon of labor to
compel capital to concede to its bargaining demands or to defend itself against unfair labor
practices of management. It is a weapon that can either breathe life to or destroy the union
and its members in their struggle with management for a more equitable due of their labors.
The decision to wield the weapon of strike must, therefore, rest on a rational basis, free from
emotionalism, unswayed by the tempers and tantrums of a few hotheads, and firmly focused
on the legitimate interest of the union which should not, however, be antithetical to the public
welfare. Thus, our laws require the decision to strike to be the consensus of the majority for
while the majority is not infallible, still, it is the best hedge against haste and error. In
addition, a majority vote assures the union it will go to war against management with the
strength derived from unity and hence, with better chance to succeed. In Batangas Laguna
Tayabas Bus Company vs. NLRC,6 we held:
xxx xxx xxx
The right to strike is one of the rights recognized and guaranteed by the Constitution
as an instrument of labor for its protection against exploitation by management. By
virtue of this right, the workers are able to press their demands for better terms of
employment with more energy and persuasiveness, poising the threat to strike as
their reaction to employer's intransigence. The strike is indeed a powerful weapon of
the working class. But precisely because of this, it must be handled carefully, like a
sensitive explosive, lest it blow up in the workers' own hands. Thus, it must be
declared only after the most thoughtful consultation among them, conducted in the
only way allowed, that is, peacefully, and in every case conformably to reasonable
regulation. Any violation of the legal requirements and strictures, . . . will render the
strike illegal, to the detriment of the very workers it is supposed to protect.
Every war must be lawfully waged. A labor dispute demands no less observance of
the rules, for the benefit of all concerned.
Applying the law to the case at bar, we rule that strike conducted by the union on October 12, 1988
is plainly illegal as it was held within th seven (7) day waiting period provided for by paragraph (f),
Article 263 of the Labor Code, as amended. The haste in holding the strike prevented the
Department of Labor and Employment from verifying whether it carried the approval of the majority
of the union members. It set to naught an important policy consideration of our law on strike.
Considering this finding, we need not exhaustively rule on the legality of the work stoppage
conducted by the union and some of their members on September 9 and 23, 1988. Suffice to state,
that the ruling of the public respondent on the matter is supported by substantial evidence.
We affirm the decision of the public respondent limiting the penalty of dismissal only to the leaders of
the illegal strike. especially the officers of the union who served as its major players. They cannot
claim good faith to exculpate themselves. They admitted knowledge of the law on strike, including its
procedure. They cannot violate the law which ironically was cast to promote their interest.
We, likewise, agree with the public respondent that the union members who were merely instigated
to participate in the illegal strike should be treated differently from their leaders. Part of our benign
consideration for labor is the policy of reinstating rank-and-file workers who were merely misled in
supporting illegal strikes. Nonetheless, these reinstated workers shall not be entitled to backwages
as they should not be compensated for services skipped during the illegal strike.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is dismissed for failure to show grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the public respondent. Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur.