Should formerly colonized peoples receive reparations for colonial abuses?
Activity
Inquiry Question
Should formerly colonized peoples receive reparations for colonial abuses?
Evaluate the different arguments provided about whether or not formerly colonized peoples should receive
Slave market in Africa
reparations for earlier colonial abuses, and explain which argument is most persuasive and why.
Introduction
As many developing countries struggle with the legacy of colonialism, from some quarters there have been demands for reparations
for past abuses by former colonial powers. For example, court cases have been filed against the United Kingdom, Germany, and other
countries for the human rights violations that are alleged to have been committed during the colonial era. In 1999, a multinational
commission in Ghana determined that contemporary problems in Africa have their roots in the trans-Atlantic slave trade and
colonization of the continent by European powers—and that African countries should be paid $777 trillion in reparations.
However, these issues are contentious. While it is agreed that genocide, crimes against humanity, exterminations, ethnic cleansing,
disappearances, land expropriation, forced labor, the use of "comfort women," scientific and medical experimentation, and other gross
human rights violations were committed by colonial governments and multinational corporations, the question raised is whether these
states and corporations today are legally and morally responsible. It is argued that many abuses were not crimes or human rights
violations when they occurred, as international law at the time did not prohibit such conduct. In addition, neither those who committed
atrocities, nor those who suffered them, are still alive. It is also argued that former colonizers recognize their responsibilities and give
development aid to the countries they once occupied, and that this is just compensation for what occurred. Should inhabitants of
former colonized states, even if not directly affected by the events during those times, be able to receive reparations, in all of its various
forms, from the states who committed such abuses; or, if the state is no longer in existence, receive reparations from the states that
succeed them or from the multinational corporations that aided and abetted these violations at the time?
Background Information
Slavery
Until the mid-15th century, slavery had been practiced extensively in various cultures and settings, but it had
Slave market in Africa
never been affiliated with race or ethnicity. Enslavement was simply the custom that befell people who had
been defeated in conflict and were captives of war. In a theoretical sense, it was a humanitarian gesture that prevented the wholesale
execution of captives. However, that notion began to change as Europeans explored the coastline of West Africa and large-scale
human trafficking began to develop.
Slavery in Africa, 15th and 16th Centuries
Slavery had existed in Africa since antiquity, but the African variety of slavery was indeed different from that found in other settings.
Generally, African societies did not consider slaves to be personal property. Thus, slavery was seldom viewed as a permanent
condition. The rights of the slave were usually protected by local tribal law and custom, and generally a slave could purchase freedom
for himself or for his family members. Those practices and customs were challenged, however, as increasing numbers of European
expeditions reached the African coastline. After that, a harsher system of slavery was imposed on West Africans.
Portuguese navigators began a gradual process of exploring the West African coastline shortly after 1415. By the 1440s, sailors had
reached Cape Verde and were able to exchange trade goods for several Africans who were shipped back to Portugal and sold into
slavery. What began as a trickle soon became a torrent as Europeans realized there was an almost limitless supply of Africans. The
recognition that these Africans were either pagans or Muslims tended to legitimize their enslavement in the eyes of many European
Christians. The Roman Catholic Church justified slavery and later declared that the enslavement of the African was an act of Christian
expeditions reached the African coastline. After that, a harsher system of slavery was imposed on West Africans.
Portuguese navigators began a gradual process of exploring the West African coastline shortly after 1415. By the 1440s, sailors had
reached Cape Verde and were able to exchange trade goods for several Africans who were shipped back to Portugal and sold into
slavery. What began as a trickle soon became a torrent as Europeans realized there was an almost limitless supply of Africans. The
recognition that these Africans were either pagans or Muslims tended to legitimize their enslavement in the eyes of many European
Christians. The Roman Catholic Church justified slavery and later declared that the enslavement of the African was an act of Christian
benevolence aimed at the slave's moral uplift.
Initially, the Africans taken by the Portuguese were brought to Spain or Portugal, where some became household servants. Most,
however, were transported to islands in the Mediterranean or off the African coast, where they labored as agricultural slaves. Exposed
to new European diseases for which they lacked any immunity, many slaves died shortly after being captured. Once Christopher
Columbus reached the Americas and the full potential for exploiting the new territories there was realized, the need for African slaves
increased and the levels of the trade intensified.
As Europeans began to appreciate the need for African slaves on a larger scale, internal problems in West Africa destabilized the region
and contributed to the intensity of the slave trade. Civil strife between the various peoples created an atmosphere of instability that
only heightened the transatlantic slave trade. Further, the introduction of European weapons to Africa perpetuated the internal strife. A
near-constant state of warfare produced many captives of war, and Europeans were more than willing to exchange trade goods for
captured Africans.
Slavery in the Caribbean
Initially, Europeans followed the advice of conquerors like Hernando Cortés, who suggested that the Americas contained a sufficient
population of native peoples who might be enslaved to do the bidding of their European masters. However, intensive forced labor and
European diseases decimated the native populations. The Spanish soon realized that enslaving American Indians was impractical.
Therefore, Spain and other European powers with Caribbean colonies increased their reliance on enslaved African labor. The slave
trade would last for four centuries and would permanently influence the character and definition of slavery in the modern world.
The transition in the Spanish Caribbean from enslaving indigenous peoples to the enslavement of Africans was complicated by the
geopolitical realities of the early 16th century. In 1493, Pope Alexander VI issued a papal bull that fixed a line of demarcation dividing
the Atlantic world between Spanish and Portuguese interests. In 1494, that practice was made a part of the European diplomatic
arrangement through the Treaty of Tordesillas. It drew a line 370 leagues west of the Cape Verde Islands that divided all eastern
(Portuguese) regions from all western (Spanish) areas. If the Spanish wanted to maintain that arrangement, and thereby assure their
sole right to claim the Caribbean basin and much of South America, they would have to devise a system of importing slaves from
Africa. But that region fell entirely within the Portuguese sphere.
The solution was the Spanish Crown's practice of offering an asiento (contract) to Portugal, and later to other European powers, to
transport Africans as slaves for use in Spanish colonial possessions. Over the centuries, the asiento belonged to different nations, as it
became a valuable prize of war that occasionally fell into the hands of the victors during treaty negotiations. For those nations that
held the contract for significant periods—especially the Portuguese, Dutch, and English—slave trading became a systematic practice in
which efficiency and profitability overshadowed the inhumanity of the practice.
Mechanics of the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade
An elaborate system to capture, trade, and transport Africans across the Atlantic as slaves developed in the 16th century and continued
to function until the early 19th century. Estimates suggest that as many as 11 million slaves may have been transported across the
Atlantic over four centuries in what came to be called the Middle Passage. Although Africans were certainly victimized by this system,
many African kingdoms and states trafficked in slaves. They frequently assisted European and American slavers who plied the West
African coast searching for captured Africans. For much of the 17th and 18th centuries, a "triangle trade" existed between ports in New
England, West Africa, and the Caribbean. That commerce provided enslaved Africans to the labor-starved colonies of the Americas in
exchange for trade goods from the New World.
Many Africans transported across the Atlantic Ocean as slaves would later claim that the Middle Passage was the most horrible aspect
of their enslavement. Large numbers of Africans were tightly packed in an often ramshackle vessel and forced to endure an ocean
crossing that might range from three weeks to two months. During those crossings, the male slaves were generally kept in chains to
reduce the possibility of an uprising. Fresh water and food supplies were meager and disease and occasional epidemics were rampant.
Not surprisingly, large numbers of enslaved Africans died during the Atlantic crossing.
Those surviving Africans found themselves in the slave markets of the Caribbean basin. There they were purchased at auction and
introduced to the intensive labor of agricultural slavery. Africans who were unseasoned as slaves were not highly valued because the
mortality rate among that group was excessively high. The value of those slaves who survived acclimation and work rose, however, as
they were recognized as being seasoned and more likely to survive extended enslavement.
Page 2 of 11
Large-scale importation of Africans to the Caribbean coincided with the "sugar revolution" that occurred in the 17th century. As sugar
cultivation spread from Brazil to Suriname and such islands as Jamaica, Cuba, and Barbados, sugar's spectacular profitability created
an almost insatiable demand for slave laborers. The potential for immense profits created a cycle in which the destinies of sugar and
slavery became completely intertwined.
Not surprisingly, large numbers of enslaved Africans died during the Atlantic crossing.
Those surviving Africans found themselves in the slave markets of the Caribbean basin. There they were purchased at auction and
introduced to the intensive labor of agricultural slavery. Africans who were unseasoned as slaves were not highly valued because the
mortality rate among that group was excessively high. The value of those slaves who survived acclimation and work rose, however, as
they were recognized as being seasoned and more likely to survive extended enslavement.
Large-scale importation of Africans to the Caribbean coincided with the "sugar revolution" that occurred in the 17th century. As sugar
cultivation spread from Brazil to Suriname and such islands as Jamaica, Cuba, and Barbados, sugar's spectacular profitability created
an almost insatiable demand for slave laborers. The potential for immense profits created a cycle in which the destinies of sugar and
slavery became completely intertwined.
Slavery in North America
As sugar cultivation spread—and crops like tobacco, rice, indigo, and cotton expanded—slavery became entrenched in the Americas.
After a Dutch trading vessel introduced 20 Africans into Virginia in August 1619, within a generation slavery developed in England's
North American colonies.
Although the first Africans introduced into the Virginia colony were brought there as indentured servants, they and their descendants
were being held in perpetual bondage as early as the 1640s. By the late 17th century, slavery had been legally sanctioned throughout
nearly all of the English colonies. The perception of slavery as a matter of racial distinctiveness is one that developed more strongly in
the English colonies than in Iberian-influenced societies. Whereas the Spanish and the Portuguese had experienced Muslim domination
and had developed cultures in which domestic slavery was common, the English had no comparable experiences. Thus, their attitudes
toward race evolved differently. Certainly, the English attitude toward race was a factor in some areas, where a total dependence on
slave labor became the norm.
After the American Revolution, slavery continued in the southern states, where large agricultural plantations depended on forced labor.
Living conditions for American slaves were difficult, with long work hours and little material comfort. Few masters recognized the
sanctity of the slave family and sold off children from their parents, or vice versa, as they pleased. Slaves were subject to harsh
punishment for even minor offenses.
Historians have recently examined the dynamics of American slave communities and whether the majority of slaves accepted their
condition or worked to undermine their bondage. A series of slave rebellions and revolts throughout American history alarmed whites
and illustrated that not all slaves complacently accepted their status. Historians have been hypothesizing that a majority of slaves
most likely sought to undermine the system through a series of small, passive aggressive acts. These include working as slowly as
possible or secretly ruining crops. Some slaves, of course, chose to run away to Canada, the West, or the North. Yet the chance of
recapture was extremely high, and runaway slaves met with harsh punishments, sometimes even death.
Slavery in the Modern World
Sadly, slavery continues to exist in the modern world. Modern societies have managed to practice various forms of slavery. Today,
slavery can be seen in the Developing World. Certain forms of debt-peonage, contract labor, child labor, arranged marriages, and more
traditional forms of enslavement persist.
Slavery still existed in parts of Asia and Africa at the start of the 20th century. In Korea, slavery survived until 1930. A vigorous
domestic trade in slaves continued in parts of Africa until the end of World War I. After the war, the League of Nations ended slavery in
those areas where the practice persisted.
During the years of World War II, barbarous new practices of slavery were applied in both major theaters of the conflict. In Europe, the
Nazis instituted a campaign in which Jews and other "undesirables" were assigned to forced-labor camps. Many were literally worked
to death. Millions died in the camps that were a part of Adolf Hitler's "Final Solution."
In the Pacific theater, another form of slavery appeared during World War II. The Japanese regularly recruited young women to serve as
comfort women, or sexual slaves, to satisfy the needs of Japanese servicemen stationed in Korea and China. Years after the war's end,
the issue of the comfort women remains a contentious issue between the Koreans and Japanese.
Since World War II, the United Nations (UN) has worked to abolish slavery. The UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, enacted in
1948, proclaimed both the immorality and the illegality of slavery in all its forms. The UN Working Group on Contemporary Forms of
Slavery still carefully monitors reports that surface about incidents of slavery. In addition, several private organizations monitor reports
concerning cases of contemporary slavery and publicize those events to draw the world's attention to what remains a perplexing issue.
Junius P. Rodriguez
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Entry ID: 1498018
concerning cases of contemporary slavery and publicize those events to draw the world's attention to what remains a perplexing issue.
Junius P. Rodriguez
Entry ID: 1498018
Commentary
Reparations to Africa for the Slave Trade: A Qualified "No"
In this essay I argue against paying financial compensation to Africans or the continent of Africa for the trans-Atlantic
slave trade. Other forms of reparation, however, should be offered.
Since the 1990s there has been a small social movement for reparations for the slave trade among Africans and
members of the African diaspora (people of African descent living outside Africa). Members of this social movement
share a common belief that the Western world owes reparations to Africa for the trans-Atlantic slave trade. This trade
began in the mid-15th century and continued until well into the 19th century; although it was officially abolished by
the United Kingdom in 1807 and the United States in 1808, illegal traders continued to operate until late in the 19th
century. Traders from several countries, including the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United States,
engaged legally in the slave trade at various times.
An estimated 11.3 million Africans were transported from Africa to Europe, to Atlantic islands off the coast of Africa, and to the
Caribbean region, North America, and South America between 1450 and 1900; perhaps 15% to 20% more died in transit, either in Africa
or during the Atlantic crossing. However, reparationists often claim erroneously that the number who crossed the Atlantic or died during
the crossing was much higher, even as high as 100 million. Reparationists also often disregard the fact that Muslim/Arab slave traders
took slaves from Africa to the Middle East, and that Africans sold slaves to Europeans and Arabs and also kept slaves within their own
societies. The demand for reparations for the slave trade refers to the trans-Atlantic trade and is directed to the wealthy Western
countries that appear to have benefited from the slave trade and slavery. Thus, the demand for reparations is directed at the United
States, but not at Brazil, where far more enslaved people were taken. Moreover, reparationists are extremely vague about how "Africa,"
either as a geographical unit or as a collection of people, could successfully sue for and receive financial reparations.
In 2005, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) passed a resolution on Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy
and Reparations for Victims Of Gross Violations Of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations Of International
Humanitarian Law. This Resolution affirmed that reparations consist of several different dimensions. The UNGA document referred to
recent victims of violations of human rights and their immediate heirs; it did not recommend reparations for crimes of the distant past.
However, we can use the content of the reparations document to discuss the kinds of reparations that might apply to the slave trade.
Two aspects of reparations in the UNGA Resolution are relevant to the slave trade. The principle of satisfaction contains several
different elements, including verification of the facts of a crime and "full and public disclosure of the truth" about the crime, a public
apology, "commemoration of and tributes to the victims," and an accurate account of the violations of international human rights and
humanitarian law in educational material. The principle of compensation refers to the obligation to compensate victims for
economically assessable damages of past crimes. I argue that certain aspects listed under satisfaction should be offered to Africa and
Africans for the slave trade. Western governments, corporations, and individuals whose ancestors were engaged in the slave trade
should acknowledge their ancestors' culpability and apologize for it. The culpability of others, such as Africans and Arabs, for the crime
of the slave trade does not absolve Westerners of their own responsibilities. However, I argue that financial compensation is impossible
because the damage cannot be economically assessed. I offer the principle of economic human rights as an alternative to the principle
of financial compensation, and maintain that Africans deserve financial assistance to achieve their economic human rights regardless
of what or who is responsible for their not enjoying those rights.
The claim for reparations for the slave trade raises difficult questions of transgenerational justice (justice offered by the current
generation of living human beings for crimes committed against human beings now dead). The first question concerns who owes
reparations, if, indeed, they are owed at all. States that are the legally continuous institutional descendants of states that permitted the
slave trade might owe reparations, such as the governments of the United States, Britain, and France. Corporations that are the legally
continuous descendants of corporations that profited from the slave trade might also owe reparations. Finally, perhaps individuals
Page 4
who have inherited wealth accumulated by ancestors who profited from the slave trade and slavery might owe reparations.
The second question about transgenerational justice is who would receive the reparations. Possible recipients would be direct
descendants of those who were enslaved, if they could be located; these recipients would not live in Africa but in the diaspora regions
of the Americas. Another possibility might be to give reparations to those Africans who currently live in areas from which slaves were
taken. African states that roughly correspond geographically to the regions from which people were enslaved might be recipients.
of 11
Entry ID: 1498018
Commentary
Reparations to Africa for the Slave Trade: A Qualified "No"
In this essay I argue against paying financial compensation to Africans or the continent of Africa for the trans-Atlantic
slave trade. Other forms of reparation, however, should be offered.
Since the 1990s there has been a small social movement for reparations for the slave trade among Africans and
members of the African diaspora (people of African descent living outside Africa). Members of this social movement
share a common belief that the Western world owes reparations to Africa for the trans-Atlantic slave trade. This trade
began in the mid-15th century and continued until well into the 19th century; although it was officially abolished by
the United Kingdom in 1807 and the United States in 1808, illegal traders continued to operate until late in the 19th
century. Traders from several countries, including the United Kingdom, France, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United States,
engaged legally in the slave trade at various times.
An estimated 11.3 million Africans were transported from Africa to Europe, to Atlantic islands off the coast of Africa, and to the
Caribbean region, North America, and South America between 1450 and 1900; perhaps 15% to 20% more died in transit, either in Africa
or during the Atlantic crossing. However, reparationists often claim erroneously that the number who crossed the Atlantic or died during
the crossing was much higher, even as high as 100 million. Reparationists also often disregard the fact that Muslim/Arab slave traders
took slaves from Africa to the Middle East, and that Africans sold slaves to Europeans and Arabs and also kept slaves within their own
societies. The demand for reparations for the slave trade refers to the trans-Atlantic trade and is directed to the wealthy Western
countries that appear to have benefited from the slave trade and slavery. Thus, the demand for reparations is directed at the United
States, but not at Brazil, where far more enslaved people were taken. Moreover, reparationists are extremely vague about how "Africa,"
either as a geographical unit or as a collection of people, could successfully sue for and receive financial reparations.
In 2005, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) passed a resolution on Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy
and Reparations for Victims Of Gross Violations Of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations Of International
Humanitarian Law. This Resolution affirmed that reparations consist of several different dimensions. The UNGA document referred to
recent victims of violations of human rights and their immediate heirs; it did not recommend reparations for crimes of the distant past.
However, we can use the content of the reparations document to discuss the kinds of reparations that might apply to the slave trade.
Two aspects of reparations in the UNGA Resolution are relevant to the slave trade. The principle of satisfaction contains several
different elements, including verification of the facts of a crime and "full and public disclosure of the truth" about the crime, a public
apology, "commemoration of and tributes to the victims," and an accurate account of the violations of international human rights and
humanitarian law in educational material. The principle of compensation refers to the obligation to compensate victims for
economically assessable damages of past crimes. I argue that certain aspects listed under satisfaction should be offered to Africa and
Africans for the slave trade. Western governments, corporations, and individuals whose ancestors were engaged in the slave trade
should acknowledge their ancestors' culpability and apologize for it. The culpability of others, such as Africans and Arabs, for the crime
of the slave trade does not absolve Westerners of their own responsibilities. However, I argue that financial compensation is impossible
because the damage cannot be economically assessed. I offer the principle of economic human rights as an alternative to the principle
of financial compensation, and maintain that Africans deserve financial assistance to achieve their economic human rights regardless
of what or who is responsible for their not enjoying those rights.
The claim for reparations for the slave trade raises difficult questions of transgenerational justice (justice offered by the current
generation of living human beings for crimes committed against human beings now dead). The first question concerns who owes
reparations, if, indeed, they are owed at all. States that are the legally continuous institutional descendants of states that permitted the
slave trade might owe reparations, such as the governments of the United States, Britain, and France. Corporations that are the legally
continuous descendants of corporations that profited from the slave trade might also owe reparations. Finally, perhaps individuals
who have inherited wealth accumulated by ancestors who profited from the slave trade and slavery might owe reparations.
The second question about transgenerational justice is who would receive the reparations. Possible recipients would be direct
descendants of those who were enslaved, if they could be located; these recipients would not live in Africa but in the diaspora regions
of the Americas. Another possibility might be to give reparations to those Africans who currently live in areas from which slaves were
taken. African states that roughly correspond geographically to the regions from which people were enslaved might be recipients.
Page 5 of
Perhaps the continent of Africa as a whole could be the recipient, even though some Africans in some parts of the continent are more
likely to be descended from those who captured and sold slaves than from those who were enslaved.
Whoever the donors and recipients of reparations might be, some aspects of the Basic Principle's aspect of satisfaction could be
offered to remedy the harms that the slave trade still causes. Victims of human rights violations or atrocities need to have them
acknowledged; such acknowledgment means the wider society takes responsibility for the harm. In the case of the slave trade, current
11
who have inherited wealth accumulated by ancestors who profited from the slave trade and slavery might owe reparations.
The second question about transgenerational justice is who would receive the reparations. Possible recipients would be direct
descendants of those who were enslaved, if they could be located; these recipients would not live in Africa but in the diaspora regions
of the Americas. Another possibility might be to give reparations to those Africans who currently live in areas from which slaves were
taken. African states that roughly correspond geographically to the regions from which people were enslaved might be recipients.
Perhaps the continent of Africa as a whole could be the recipient, even though some Africans in some parts of the continent are more
likely to be descended from those who captured and sold slaves than from those who were enslaved.
Whoever the donors and recipients of reparations might be, some aspects of the Basic Principle's aspect of satisfaction could be
offered to remedy the harms that the slave trade still causes. Victims of human rights violations or atrocities need to have them
acknowledged; such acknowledgment means the wider society takes responsibility for the harm. In the case of the slave trade, current
victims are those whose ancestors were enslaved, those whose societies were harmed by the slave trade, and the wider community of
people of African descent who suffer the stigma of being connected to enslaved ancestors. Thus, the institutional descendants of
those responsible for the slave trade, especially governments and corporations, should acknowledge the harm the trade caused. For
example, Tony Blair, then-prime minister of the United Kingdom, made a statement in 2006 expressing his deep sorrow that the slave
trade had occurred.
Reparationists, however, usually want more than acknowledgment and apologies. Their chief demand is for
financial compensation to Africa, without much thought about who exactly in Africa would receive such
compensation, nor how it would be administered and who would eventually benefit from it. This is an
unrealistic demand, especially when extremely large amounts are asked for, such as the demand for $777
trillion (approximately 62 times the 2005 U.S. Gross Domestic Product) in reparations by the "Truth
Commission Conference" on Reparations in Accra, Ghana in 1999. Demands for financial reparations are based on the assumption
that current African underdevelopment was caused by the slave trade and colonialism. But the chain of causality from the time of the
slave trade to the present is very complicated. Even if one includes the period of colonialism with the slave trade, it is difficult to
establish the extent of their responsibility for African problems today.
The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) was the first United Nations document to specify that every individual in the
world was entitled to human rights. The UDHR also introduced the concept of economic human rights, which supplemented civil and
political rights with the principle that individuals also had the right to live a decent life, in a material sense. Economic human rights
were further specified in the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and included rights to health care,
basic education, food, housing, and an adequate standard of living. Reference to international human rights obligations relieves us of
the difficulty of trying to figure out how much African poverty today, after about 50 years of independence, is a result of the continuing
effects of the slave trade.
Reparationists ground their claims in the principle of retrospective justice; that is, claims for justice to remedy past harms. I ground my
argument in the principle of distributive justice, the necessity for a fair distribution of access to economic goods in the present,
regardless of the past causes of unfair distribution. The principle of economic human rights requires us all to be responsible for
everyone's human rights in the present, regardless of the past. This approach is also more pragmatic than the demand for reparations
for past harms. Western publics are unlikely to agree to pay huge amounts for reparations for very distant wrongs, especially as they
will be aware that large sums of money transferred to reparations will face the same problems of corruption, lack of accountability, and
administrative disorganization as foreign aid encountered over the last 50 years. Nor are Western publics likely to agree that they are
responsible for the consequences of the slave trade, even if their governments are the institutional heirs of governments that
encouraged the trade centuries ago.
*This paper is drawn from Rhoda E. Howard-Hassmann (with Anthony P. Lombardo), Reparations to Africa, Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 2008.
Rhoda Howard-Hassmann
Commentary
Reparations Are Owed and Should Be Paid
My answer to the question is a definite yes. This is because reparations are owed and should be paid for
both moral and legal reasons which this essay discusses.
Page 6 of 11
There have been tremendous developments in recent years for victims of human rights abuse in their bid to
claim redress for the violations they have suffered. While it is clear that around the world many countries are
coming to terms with their past, the question of providing reparations for victims has not until recently been
high on the agenda. While a number of countries are dealing with these issues, very few states are addressing their past "external"
violations—that is, what their country did in, or to, another country or groups or individuals elsewhere. This is particularly so with regard
Rhoda Howard-Hassmann
Commentary
Reparations Are Owed and Should Be Paid
My answer to the question is a definite yes. This is because reparations are owed and should be paid for
both moral and legal reasons which this essay discusses.
There have been tremendous developments in recent years for victims of human rights abuse in their bid to
claim redress for the violations they have suffered. While it is clear that around the world many countries are
coming to terms with their past, the question of providing reparations for victims has not until recently been
high on the agenda. While a number of countries are dealing with these issues, very few states are addressing their past "external"
violations—that is, what their country did in, or to, another country or groups or individuals elsewhere. This is particularly so with regard
to historical or colonial human rights violations. It is this context that is important when dealing with reparations for actions that
occurred a long time ago, by states and others who are mostly no longer in the places where the atrocities were committed.
While there are some who argue that reparations are not due for violations that occurred during colonial times, there are various
positions on these questions. The position adopted is often dependent on where those who take a particular stance come from in the
world. Broadly speaking, those in the Global South, including Africa, Latin America, and Asia, support reparations. Again generally
speaking, those in the Global North—in other words but with some exceptions, people in Europe and North America—besides African
Americans, do not support such claims. Again divided by region, those in the Global South argue that this is an issue whose time has
arrived, while those in the North argue that this is still a weak issue that has not gained a great deal of traction.
There have been many developments during the 21st century that have seen the inhabitants of former colonized countries seeking, and
in some cases receiving, reparations from their former colonial masters. The matter of reparations for slavery and colonialism was a
major, and highly contested, agenda item at the World Conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related
Intolerance (WCAR), held in Durban, South Africa, from August 31 to September 8, 2001. The issue is also more relevant now because a
number of countries, including Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and South Africa have been finding ways of dealing with such issues
from the distant past. In some cases they have provided restitution for violations that were committed, as well as land expropriations
that were carried out in their countries, sometimes more than a century ago. Some have argued that the fact that many historical cases
such as Nazi war crimes are resolved, but colonial ones are not, shows racism at work.
In spite of this, a number of former colonial communities are attempting to sue various role players for the
atrocities committed during colonization. These groups include the Herero of Namibia, who have sued
various corporations, including the German Deutsche Bank in the United States. Another case led to 228
Samburu and Maasai farmers in Kenya receiving 4.5 million pounds in damages from the United Kingdom's
Ministry of Defence (MoD) after their family members were killed or maimed over the past 50 years by British
Army explosives left behind on military ranges in that country. Yet another case involves a challenge to a British court decision made in
1913 to force some 10,000 Maasai off their land in Laikipia, Kenya, and into a new area on the Tanzanian border, where they were
affected by malaria. The Nandi people of Uganda are to sue the United Kingdom for killing their prophet Koitalel arap Samoei in 1905
during a military campaign to suppress Nandi resistance. Another case relates to the massacres in German East Africa (now Tanzania)
between 1905 and 1907 in what was known as the Maji Maji Rebellion. It is believed that about 250,000 Ngoni, Matumbi, Waluguru,
Makua, Yao, and Makonde people were killed.
As can be seen from the above examples, there are many cases. This indicates the extent to which people in former colonial territories
want to have these matters dealt with, despite the massive difficulties that victims have in bringing such cases, and the lack of funding
at their disposal. There are many other groups that want to bring such cases. Other groups that have attempted to sue, and still want to
take legal action, include African Americans in the United States, seeking reparations for slavery; and former comfort women in various
Asian countries, who seek reparations from Japan for forced prostitution during World War II.
Some argue that apologies and acknowledgment are due for what occurred a long time ago, but that reparations are not owed to
groups for such claims. They argue that collective financial reparations to inhabitants of former colonial territories for legal, political,
and practical reasons is not a good strategy, and that any processes to deal with these ills ought to be by distributive, rather than
restorative, justice. The argument put forward is that wealth redistribution is what ought to occur, and that claims should not be dealt
with on the basis of rights. It is, however, argued by some that the "West" has a duty to assist Africa because of the past but Page
that 7 of
Africans do not have rights to such claims. These positions are somewhat contradictory. In any case, they ignore the direct effect that
the events of long ago still have on the people who live in these places today. The fact is that colonialism must bear at least some part
of the blame for the situation that many groups, countries, and continents like Africa as a whole find themselves in today.
While some base their opposition to reparations for colonial atrocities on the fact that financial reparations ought not to be paid partly
due to the cost involved, reparations do not have to be largely or solely monetary. It is certainly problematic to agree, though, that
11
Some argue that apologies and acknowledgment are due for what occurred a long time ago, but that reparations are not owed to
groups for such claims. They argue that collective financial reparations to inhabitants of former colonial territories for legal, political,
and practical reasons is not a good strategy, and that any processes to deal with these ills ought to be by distributive, rather than
restorative, justice. The argument put forward is that wealth redistribution is what ought to occur, and that claims should not be dealt
with on the basis of rights. It is, however, argued by some that the "West" has a duty to assist Africa because of the past but that
Africans do not have rights to such claims. These positions are somewhat contradictory. In any case, they ignore the direct effect that
the events of long ago still have on the people who live in these places today. The fact is that colonialism must bear at least some part
of the blame for the situation that many groups, countries, and continents like Africa as a whole find themselves in today.
While some base their opposition to reparations for colonial atrocities on the fact that financial reparations ought not to be paid partly
due to the cost involved, reparations do not have to be largely or solely monetary. It is certainly problematic to agree, though, that
reparations are owed, but that only certain types of reparations should be paid. Nevertheless, there are many different types of
reparations. Reparations can encompass a variety of concepts, including damages, redress, restitution, compensation, rehabilitation,
and satisfaction. Each of these concepts has a unique meaning, although they are often used as general terms to encompass all the
different types of remedies available to a victim. "Compensation" or "damages" typically signify an amount of money awarded by a
court or other body for harm suffered. "Restitution" signifies a return to the situation before the harm occurred; "rehabilitation" denotes
provision of medical or other types of treatment; and "satisfaction" indicates acknowledgments, apologies, and the like. Some
reparations, regardless of which type they constitute, ought to be given by the states that were responsible for what occurred. The
enduring legacy of what occurred during those times should not be underestimated. The lasting effects of population decimation, land
dispossession, and other effects continue to haunt many groups. They impede their economic, social, and political progress.
Some argue that reparations have not been something which individuals could claim until recently. They argue that it is only in the last
20 years or so that there was international law on reparations particularly for individuals. However, reparations were in fact a
longstanding norm of customary international law for many years. United States jurisprudence from as far back as 1796 indicates that
individuals were awarded compensation in domestic courts for rights violations during wartime. International law has recognized
individual rights to claim for human rights violations for at least 100 years.
On the issue of slavery, and reparations for the slave trade, some argue that slavery and the slave trade were not abolished
internationally until 1926. But there is no agreement on this. It is argued by those who favor reparations for slavery and the slave trade
that from early in the 19th century there was a movement to apply a prohibition to slavery and the slave trade. The fact that many
countries at the time outlawed it, even during the 18th century, is seen by some to indicate that international customary law prohibited
this type of conduct long before 1926, and thus claims could be lodged based on customary international law. It is argued that the
history of the time is crucial, as it indicates that many states abolished such practices well before 1926. Denmark declared in 1792 that
slavery would be illegal as of 1803. The United States and United Kingdom followed in 1807. Britain freed all slaves within its
jurisdiction in 1833. France declared slavery illegal in 1815. That same year, the Congress of Vienna annexed a Declaration of the Eight
Courts (Austria, France, Great Britain, Portugal, Prussia, Russia, Spain and Sweden) relative to the Universal Abolition of the Slave
Trade. The Declaration called slavery "repugnant to the principles of humanity and universal morality." All these developments seem to
reflect the position that already in the 19th century there was widespread support among states for the prohibition of the slave trade
and slavery, and this is reflective of customary international law.
Reparation is about restitution and other types of reparations including acknowledgment and the restoration of dignity. More ought to
be done to reconcile those who live in different parts of the world. The fact that there is so much anger and unhappiness directed by
the Global South at the Global North is to some degree because of the past. Finding ways of dealing with the past and repairing the
fractured relationships can only be beneficial to everyone in all regions.
Jeremy Sarkin
Commentary
The Case against Reparations for "Historical Injustices" of the Colonial Period
In 1999, a Truth Commission Conference in Accra, Ghana (attended by private representatives from nine African
countries, the United Kingdom, the United States and three Caribbean countries) concluded that "the root causes of
Africa's problems today are the enslavement and colonization of African people over a 400-year period," whereby
Africa was owed $777 trillion in compensation (plus annual interest). At the United Nations-sponsored World
Conference against Racism—held in Durban, South Africa, in September 2001—a collective of African political and
Page 8 of 11
intellectual leaders reiterated the demand for the payment of reparations to Africa for, among other things,
colonialism.
In international law, the redress—the remedy for the breach of a recognized obligation—is ordinarily characterized as reparations. As to
the form that the reparations should take, Article 34 of the International Law Commission's Draft Articles on State Responsibility
Jeremy Sarkin
Commentary
The Case against Reparations for "Historical Injustices" of the Colonial Period
In 1999, a Truth Commission Conference in Accra, Ghana (attended by private representatives from nine African
countries, the United Kingdom, the United States and three Caribbean countries) concluded that "the root causes of
Africa's problems today are the enslavement and colonization of African people over a 400-year period," whereby
Africa was owed $777 trillion in compensation (plus annual interest). At the United Nations-sponsored World
Conference against Racism—held in Durban, South Africa, in September 2001—a collective of African political and
intellectual leaders reiterated the demand for the payment of reparations to Africa for, among other things,
colonialism.
In international law, the redress—the remedy for the breach of a recognized obligation—is ordinarily characterized as reparations. As to
the form that the reparations should take, Article 34 of the International Law Commission's Draft Articles on State Responsibility
provides that they should be: "restitution, compensation and satisfaction, either singly or in combination." Restitution and
compensation ordinarily involve some form of monetary payment; satisfaction is non-monetary and might include an apology for, or
some acknowledgment of, the "historical injustice."
Although not universally agreed, a proffered definition of "historical injustice" suggests that all such incidents have four characteristics
in common: "(a) they were committed or sanctioned at least a generation ago; (b) they were committed or authorized by one or more
collective agents, such as a government or corporation; (c) they harmed many individuals; and (d) they involved violations of
fundamental human rights …" What is unique about the idea of an "historical injustice" is that a violation of the fundamental human
rights must have been committed or sanctioned against a large number of persons in the past. There's the rub.
The concept of the "past" is doubly problematic. In the case of "historical injustices" committed during the colonial period, while
specific instances have been identified, no commencement date for reparations claims has been agreed. Although it has been
suggested that in order to qualify as an "historical injustice," the injustice must have occurred at least one generation ago, how far back
do we go to establish our starting point? Two, three or four generations?
Perhaps more fundamental is that if we start demanding reparations for injustices that occurred in the "past," very soon we will be
challenged by a cardinal principle of the rule of law: nullum crimen sine lege; the violation must be in respect of a recognized, extant,
anterior rule (whether legislated or customary). Without such a rule, there is no crime. Thus, in the case of an "historical wrong"
committed during the colonial period, it would be necessary to prove that, at the time the "historical wrong" was committed, the relevant
act was indeed recognized as wrongful. Therefore, it is disingenuous to judge the past in the light of a contemporary morality.
The mere fact that we view the action today as an "historical injustice" does not entitle the descendants of indigenous victims to
reparations from the modern successors of those governments and corporations that originally perpetrated the "injustice." The principle
remains: absent the legal rule, absent the entitlement.
Some actions, it is conceded, were undoubtedly so heinous that even at the time they would have been recognized as contravening an
unwritten moral code. (Such as, for example, the punishment of severing hands meted out by rubber contractors in the Congo of King
Leopold of the Belgians.) However, even in respect of such actions, there are both moral and legal obstacles that bar any claims for
reparations.
Were one to base a claim for the payment of reparations in morality, three potential arguments might be advanced. Perhaps the
weakest are those moral claims that justify the payment of reparations on the grounds that such payment will, in the future, act as a
deterrent to the perpetration of similar injustices. A second potential moral claim for the payment of reparations aims at the promotion
of distributive justice. The distribution of goods in society, the argument runs, is, because of historical accident, inappropriate;
reparations would serve better to redistribute goods on the basis of more objective criteria—such as merit, need or equality. A final
moral argument is that of corrective justice: an injustice has been committed in the past, which injustice creates a moral obligation for
redress; reparations provide the redress through the restoration of the status quo ante.
Were one to base a claim on legal grounds, that claim would probably be grounded in tort law, otherwise known as the law of delict (a
body of law concerned with non-criminal and non-contractual civil wrongs). The claim would either be for damages suffered, or for
Page
9 of
unjust enrichment. In the case of the former, an identifiable plaintiff will have to prove that he (or someone for whom he holds
the right
to sue) has been injured, and that that injury was caused by an identifiable defendant (or his ancestor) in breach of a duty owed, and
that the resultant injury might be translated into quantifiable damages. In the case of unjustified enrichment, the plaintiff would have
to prove that the defendant (through his ancestor) has had conferred upon him benefits that are a direct consequence of the "historical
injustice" and to which he is not entitled—the defendant has, in other words, been "unjustly enriched."
11
moral argument is that of corrective justice: an injustice has been committed in the past, which injustice creates a moral obligation for
redress; reparations provide the redress through the restoration of the status quo ante.
Were one to base a claim on legal grounds, that claim would probably be grounded in tort law, otherwise known as the law of delict (a
body of law concerned with non-criminal and non-contractual civil wrongs). The claim would either be for damages suffered, or for
unjust enrichment. In the case of the former, an identifiable plaintiff will have to prove that he (or someone for whom he holds the right
to sue) has been injured, and that that injury was caused by an identifiable defendant (or his ancestor) in breach of a duty owed, and
that the resultant injury might be translated into quantifiable damages. In the case of unjustified enrichment, the plaintiff would have
to prove that the defendant (through his ancestor) has had conferred upon him benefits that are a direct consequence of the "historical
injustice" and to which he is not entitled—the defendant has, in other words, been "unjustly enriched."
What both moral claims and legal claims have in common, however, is that they potentially fail to recognize the crucial need for a link
between the victim and the wrongdoer. Thus, even if the injustice complained of is "historical," where both victim and wrongdoer are
still alive reparations are conceivable ("justice" must trump any arguments based on a statute of limitations); where either the victim or
the wrongdoer are no longer extant, the situation becomes more complicated; where both victim and wrongdoer are no longer extant—
as would be the case in respect of most reparations claim having their origins in the colonial period—the obstacles to a claim for
reparations are many.
It is necessary to establish a link between the victims and their living descendants—"descendants-as-victims"—through showing that
any depravation that the descendants might currently suffer is causally a consequence of the historical injustice perpetrated on the
original victims. Establishing such a link is not necessarily a simple task—with the waning of colonialism and increased circumstances
of opportunity many other factors might also have contributed to the perceived depravation of the living descendants.
It is further necessary to establish a link between the original perpetrators and their present descendants—again, not a simple task
where the "legal personality" of the original perpetrator (whether a government or a corporation) has changed dramatically. If the aim of
the reparations is restitutory, their quantification is a near insurmountable problem. In quantifying the monetary payment to be paid,
does one only consider the damage suffered by the original victim, or does one also consider the cumulative damage suffered by
succeeding generations? If the latter, it is well nigh impossible to determine what financial position the descendants would have been
in but for the historical injustice.
Even were it possible to agree to a reparations package, an associated problem is the determination of the individual allocations to be
made to descendants of the original victims. Are all descendants to be treated equally, or are some more deserving than are others?
Illustrative of the problem is the dispute prevailing in Namibia over potential German reparations for the genocide of the Herero by the
German army in 1904–1908: some arguing that the descendants of those Herero who survived the genocide are more deserving of any
payment Germany might make than are the Namibian people as a whole.)
Further, if the distribution is to be made on the basis of an equal individual allocation—"forty acres and a mule," for example—will the
allocation necessarily, in the long term, really redress the historical injustice? The individual payment might well be squandered within
a few short years, ultimately leaving the descendant, and those that follow, no better off than prior to the payment. In such
circumstances, can one really claim that the wrong has now been righted?
The payment of reparations to the descendants of those who suffered "historical injustice" during the colonial
period is not appropriate. There are other, more appropriate ways of redressing wrongs committed in the past.
Recognition of the wrong on the part of the descendants—of both victims and perpetrators—is an important first
step. Past suffering cannot—and should not—be redressed in financial terms. "It is absurd," said Abdoulaye Wade,
president of Senegal, "… that you can pay up a certain number of dollars and then [the injustice] ceases to exist, is
canceled out and there is the receipt to prove it."
It is not possible to construct a truly communitarian society—affirming of our humanity—based on the mantra of
"they owe us." Obviously, we must learn from the past; always, our aim should be to ensure that injustice is weeded out so that the
destiny of our common humanity is realized. The role of history is crucial in this process; it alerts us to past lapses and inspires us in
past triumphs; it provides us with the framework we need to understand the present and guide our journey into the future. But it is not
the role of history to dictate the course for that future.
Garth Abraham
MLA Citation
"Cape Verde Activity: Should Formerly Colonized Peoples Receive Reparations for Colonial Abuses?" ABC-CLIO Solutions, ABC-CLIO, 2022,
educatorsupport.abc-clio.com/Support/InvestigateActivity/2273246. Accessed 1 Feb. 2022.
Page 10 of 11
COPYRIGHT 2022 ABC-CLIO, LLC
https://educatorsupport.abc-clio.com/Content/StudentActivity/2273246
Garth Abraham
MLA Citation
"Cape Verde Activity: Should Formerly Colonized Peoples Receive Reparations for Colonial Abuses?" ABC-CLIO Solutions, ABC-CLIO, 2022,
educatorsupport.abc-clio.com/Support/InvestigateActivity/2273246. Accessed 1 Feb. 2022.
COPYRIGHT 2022 ABC-CLIO, LLC
https://educatorsupport.abc-clio.com/Content/StudentActivity/2273246
Page 11 of 11
Name
Name
Class
Class
Class
Was Aaron Burr a Traitor?
African Reparations
​Collect
andPerspective
Organize Information
​Identify
or Bias
Inquiry Question
Inquiry Question
Present your own argument claiming whether or not Aaron Burr was a traitor
Evaluate the different arguments provided about whether or not formerly
to the U.S.
colonized peoples should receive reparations for earlier colonial abuses and
explain which argument is most persuasive and why.
Type
2-col, 1 row table
Type
Table-3x1
Headings
Column Headings: Evidence:Sarkin
Guilty, Evidence: Innocent.
Howard-Hassman
Headings
Other Notes
Other Notes
©2019 ABC-CLIO, LLC
©2019 ABC-CLIO, LLC
Abraham
Column
Headings:Howard-Hassman,
Sarkin,
Abraham
there's too
much evidence on either side
for the
#7 layout to cover it all
Name
Name
Class
Class
Inquiry Question
Response
©2019 ABC-CLIO, LLC
Should formerly colonized peoples receive reparations for colonial abuses?