Psychological Criminology should be essential reading for psychologists and all others who
are interested in understanding the causes of offending. It is a very impressive, comprehensive
and empirically-based review of psychological, biological, situational and other major
explanations of crime.
David P. Farrington, Professor of Psychological Criminology, University of Cambridge, UK
Psychological Criminology addresses the question: what is it about individuals and their
experiences that causes them to commit crime and/or to become criminal?
This book provides a comprehensive coverage of psychological theories of crime and
criminality, exploring theories focusing on factors present at birth (human nature, heredity);
theories that focus on factors that influence the offender over the lifespan (learning,
development); and theories focusing on factors present at the crime scene. It emphasises the
connections among the different approaches, and demonstrates how, taken together rather
than as rival explanations, they provide a more complete picture of crime and criminality than
each provides individually.
Theories are arranged throughout the book in a temporal sequence, from distal to proximal
causes of crime. The analysis spans 100,000 years, from the evolutionary roots of criminal
behaviour in the ancestral environments of early humans on the African savanna, to the
decision to engage in a specific criminal act.
Key features of the book include:
Psychological Criminology highlights the contributions that psychological theory can make to
the broader field of criminology; it will be of interest to students, academics, researchers and
practitioners in both criminology and forensic psychology.
Richard Wortley began his career as a prison psychologist and has subsequently taught in
criminology schools for many years. He is currently a Professor at University College London,
where he is Director of the Jill Dando Institute for Security and Crime Science.
Crime Science Series
Series editor: Professor Richard Wortley (Director, UCL Jill Dando Institute of Crime Science)
Criminology/Psychology
Cover image: © Corbis
RICHArD WOrTLEY
• a focus on theory – ‘explaining’ crime and criminality;
• an integrative approach;
• accessibility to readers who do not have a background in psychology.
Psychological Criminology
Richard Wortley’s book is scholarly and lucid, wide-ranging in content, and undogmatic in
tone. Most of all, it is timely. The need to bring together in an accessible form crime and
criminality-relevant developments across the biological and psychological sciences had
become urgent. The need is satisfied by this book.
Professor Ken Pease, Loughborough University, UK
Psychological
Criminology
An integrative approach
RICHArD WOrTLEY
www.routledge.com
Crime Science Series
Psychological Criminology
Psychological criminology addresses the question: what is it about individuals
and their experiences that causes them to commit crime and/or to become
criminal?
This book provides a comprehensive coverage of psychological theories of
crime and criminality, exploring theories focusing on factors present at birth
(human nature, heredity); theories that focus on factors that influence the offender
over the lifespan (learning, development); and theories focusing on factors present
at the crime scene. It emphasises the connections among the different approaches,
and demonstrates how, taken together rather than as rival explanations, they
provide a more complete picture of crime and criminality than each provides individually.
Theories are arranged throughout the book in a temporal sequence, from distal
to proximal causes of crime. The analysis spans 100,000 years, from the evolutionary roots of criminal behaviour in the ancestral environments of early humans
on the African savanna, to the decision to engage in a specific criminal act.
Key features of the book include:
•
•
•
a focus on theory – ‘explaining’ crime and criminality;
an integrative approach;
accessibility to readers who do not have a background in psychology.
Psychological Criminology highlights the contributions that psychological theory
can make to the broader field of criminology; it will be of interest to students,
academics, researchers and practitioners in both criminology and forensic
psychology.
Richard Wortley began his career as a prison psychologist and has subsequently
taught in criminology schools for many years. He is currently a Professor at
University College London, where he is Director of the Jill Dando Institute for
Security and Crime Science.
Crime Science Series
Edited by Richard Wortley, UCL
Crime science is a new way of thinking about and responding to the problem of
crime in society. The distinctive nature of crime science is captured in the name.
First, crime science is about crime. Instead of the usual focus in criminology on
the characteristics of the criminal offender, crime science is concerned with the
characteristics of the criminal event. The analysis shifts from the distant causes of
criminality – biological makeup, upbringing, social disadvantage and the like – to
the near causes of crime. Crime scientists are interested in why, where, when and
how particular crimes occur. They examine trends and patterns in crime in order
to devise immediate and practical strategies to disrupt these patterns.
Second, crime science is about science. Many traditional responses to crime
control are unsystematic, reactive and populist, too often based on untested
assumptions about what works. In contrast crime science advocates an evidencebased, problem-solving approach to crime control. Adopting the scientific method,
crime scientists collect data on crime, generate hypotheses about observed crime
trends, devise interventions to respond to crime problems, and test the adequacy
of those interventions.
Crime science is utilitarian in its orientation and multidisciplinary in its foundations. Crime scientists actively engage with front-line criminal justice practitioners to reduce crime by making it more difficult for individuals to offend, and
making it more likely that they will be detected if they do offend. To achieve these
objectives, crime science draws on disciplines from both the social and physical
sciences, including criminology, sociology, psychology, geography, economics,
architecture, industrial design, epidemiology, computer science, mathematics,
engineering and biology.
1. Superhighway Robbery
Graeme R. Newman and Ronald V. Clarke
2. Crime Reduction and Problem-oriented Policing
Edited by Karen Bullock and Nick Tilley
3. Crime Science
New approaches to preventing and detecting crime
Edited by Melissa J. Smith and Nick Tilley
4. Problem-oriented Policing and Partnerships
Implementing an evidence-based approach to crime reduction
Karen Bullock, Rosie Erol and Nick Tilley
5. Preventing Child Sexual Abuse
Stephen Smallbone, William L. Marshall and Richard Wortley
6. Environmental Criminology and Crime Analysis
Edited by Richard Wortley and Lorraine Mazerolle
7. Raising the Bar
Preventing aggression in and around bars, pubs and clubs
Kathryn Graham and Ross Homel
8. Situational Prevention of Organised Crimes
Edited by Karen Bullock, Ronald V. Clarke and Nick Tilley
9. Psychological Criminology
An integrative approach
Richard Wortley
Psychological Criminology
An integrative approach
Richard Wortley
First published 2011
by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN
Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada
by Routledge
711 Third Avenue, New York NY 10017
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business
© 2011 Richard Wortley
The right of Richard Wortley to be identified as author of this work has
been asserted by him in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and
Patent Act 1988.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or
utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now
known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in
any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing
from the publishers.
Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or
registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation
without intent to infringe.
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Wortley, Richard (Richard K.)
Psychological criminology : an integrative approach / Richard Wortley.
p. cm.
1. Criminal psychology. I. Title.
HV6080.W67 2011
364.3—dc22
2010041203
ISBN: 978–1–84392–806–5 (hbk)
ISBN: 978–1–84392–805–8 (pbk)
ISBN: 978–0–203–80609–8 (ebk)
Typeset in Times New Roman by
RefineCatch Limited, Bungay, Suffolk
Contents
List of illustrations
Acknowledgements
1 Introduction
x
xii
1
What is psychological criminology? 1
Defining crime and criminals 3
Debates about the nature of crime and criminality 7
Psychological theories of crime and criminality:
an integrated model 15
2 Human nature
20
The principles of evolution 20
Evolution and behaviour 24
Crime-focused evolutionary approaches 30
Offender-focused evolutionary approaches 35
Conclusion and evaluation 40
3 Heredity
42
A primer in behavioural genetics 42
Heritability of criminality 49
Variations in the heritability of criminality 57
Beyond behavioural genetics: molecular genetics 61
Conclusion and evaluation 62
4 The brain
Basic brain structures and functions 65
Psychophysiology and crime 73
Biochemistry and crime 74
65
viii Contents
Neuroanatomy and crime 77
Neuro-environmental factors and crime 81
Putting it together: neuropsychological theories of crime 85
Conclusion and evaluation 88
5 Personality
90
Trait approaches to personality 90
The single-trait approach and crime 96
The super-trait approach: Eysenck’s three-factor theory
of crime 100
Antisocial personality disorder (APD) 106
Conclusion and evaluation 113
6 Development
115
The biological and environmental foundations of human
development 115
Developmental risk and protective factors for crime 121
Psychosocial development and crime 126
Criminal careers 132
Conclusion and evaluation 137
7 Learning
139
The science of behaviour 139
Classical conditioning 145
Operant conditioning 151
Social learning 155
Conclusion and evaluation 160
8 Cognition
162
The cognitive revolution 162
Social cognitive theory 166
Offender decision-making 174
Schemas and scripts 180
Conclusion and evaluation 184
9 Situations
What is a situation? 186
Social psychology 191
Environmental psychology 195
185
Contents ix
Opportunity theories 199
The person–situation interaction (again) 205
Conclusion and evaluation 206
10 Conclusion
208
The argument in a nutshell 208
The strengths and limits of integration 210
Implications for practice 212
Bibliography
Index
216
261
Illustrations
Figures
1.1
1.2
3.1
3.2
4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
5.1
5.2
6.1
7.1
7.2
7.3
7.4
8.1
9.1
9.2
The age–crime curve for a hypothetical data-set
An integrative model of criminal behaviour
A section of the DNA molecule showing the double helix
structure
Ratios for the transmission of dominant purple (P) and recessive
white (w) genes for different combinations of parental genotypes
A neuron
Flow diagram of the nervous system
Cross-section of the brain showing hindbrain, midbrain and
forebrain
Side view of the lobes of the cerebral cortex
The hierarchical structure of Eysenck’s three super-traits
The relationship between neuroticism and extraversion
Age distribution for criminal offenders for a hypothetical data-set
separating life-course persistent and adolescent-limited offenders
Bandura’s principle of reciprocal determinism
Classical conditioning of the salivation response to the sound
of a bell
Classical conditioning of the fear response to sight of a white rat
Operant conditioning of (a) the pecking response in pigeons
and (b) the avoidance response in rats
Protoscript for burglary
The relationship between precipitators and facilitators of crime
The hypothetical interaction between offenders and situations
7
16
44
45
66
67
70
71
101
103
133
142
146
147
152
183
190
205
Tables
3.1 Key terms in genetics
3.2 Twin studies showing concordance rates (%) for MZ and DZ
twins based on criminal conviction data
3.3 Percentage of adoptees with criminal convictions as a function
of congenital and post-natal predispositions to criminality
43
51
55
List of illustrations xi
4.1
5.1
5.2
Neurotransmitters and their associated effects
The Big Five personality factors
Comparisons of DSM-IV-TR (American Psychiatric Association,
2000) criteria for APD, and Cleckley (1941) and Hare (1991)
criteria for psychopathy
5.3 Expert ratings of APD and psychopathy in terms of the
five-factor model
6.1 Major periods of life
6.2 Kohlberg’s stages of moral reasoning
8.1 Comparison of Sykes and Matza (1957) and Bandura (1976,
1977)
69
95
107
112
120
128
173
Acknowledgements
Most of the research and writing for this book was done while I was on sabbatical
from the School of Criminology and Criminal Justice, Griffith University, Australia.
Without this opportunity to have a consolidated period of time to devote to the
project, the book would not have been written. I am grateful to Peter Cassematis
who helped with the literature searches and to Sandra Hart to helped with the mindnumbing task of organising the references. Anna Stewart, John Rynne and Aiden
Sidebottom provided helpful feedback on one or more chapters. The excellent
drawings of the DNA molecule (Figure 3.1), the neuron (Figure 4.1), and the brain
(Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4) were done by Alisa Wortley. Finally, as ever, I am
indebted to my wife Chris, and my two children Tom and Sally, for putting up with
me as this book increasingly became something of an obsession.
1
Introduction
What is psychological criminology?
Psychology is the scientific study of behaviour and mental processes; criminology
is the scientific study of crime and criminals. Thus, psychological criminology
may be succinctly defined as the scientific study of the behaviour and mental
processes that contribute to an understanding of crime and criminals.
Beyond this bald definition, the fact that this book is about psychological
criminology requires elaboration. It is often said that criminology is not so much
a discipline as it is a collection of disciplines, each of which brings a different set
of assumptions and explanations to a common concern with crime and criminals.
Overwhelmingly, however, sociology has traditionally been the dominant discipline in criminology and most criminological theories are sociological in nature.
In the absence of further qualification, criminology is generally interpreted to
mean sociological criminology.
Sociological criminology examines the question: what is it about society that influences the incidence of crime and the distribution of criminality? Sociological theories
are largely concerned with groups or classes of people in society. Sociologists might
be interested in how fundamental structures in society contribute to crime, or why it
is that society chooses to label certain behaviours as criminal (and not label others).
For example, the relationship between social class and crime is largely a sociological
issue. So too is the question of why cigarette smoking is legal while marijuana
smoking is not.
In contrast, psychological criminology addresses the question: what is it about
individuals and their experiences that causes them to commit crime and/or to
become criminal? Psychologists are concerned with how an individual’s biological make-up, personality, upbringing, thought processes, current circumstances,
and so on produce criminal behaviour. Some psychological analyses examine the
relationship between crime and normative factors that are common to everyone’s
experience. For example, everybody from time to time conforms to peer pressure,
and this can sometimes lead an individual to commit crime. Other psychological
analyses focus on ways that criminals differ from non-criminals. For example,
research might examine whether criminals have distinctive personality profiles
that contribute to their criminal behaviours.
2
Introduction
To illustrate the difference between society-level and individual-level explanations, consider the case of rape. A sociological analysis of rape is likely to focus on
factors such as cultural norms with respect to male–female relationships, the power
differential between men and women in society, and so on. Further, it might be
discovered that rape is particularly prevalent among certain social groups – for
example, in a particular delinquent sub-culture. On the other hand, a psychological
analysis would typically examine the special characteristics or circumstances of
individuals who commit rape. Do rape offenders possess hostile attitudes towards
women? Have they experienced childhood traumas? Is there evidence of psychological disorder or sexual dysfunction? Were there factors at the time of the rape
(e.g., alcohol consumption) that contributed to their behaviour?
This does not mean that psychological criminology ignores the social contexts
of crime or, for that matter, that sociological criminology ignores the personal
characteristics of offenders. Just because psychological criminology focuses on
the individual does not mean that it is assumed all of the causes of crime originate
from within the individual. Using the rape example above, psychologists might
well be interested in how an offender’s attitudes towards women are shaped by
his social interactions and sub-cultural experiences. Likewise, sociologists might
be concerned with how the organisation of society reinforces male attitudes
towards women that support rape. There are overlaps, then, between psychological and sociological perspectives, especially regarding the role of social influences on attitudes and behaviour. Nevertheless, even here, sociological analyses
will usually remain at the collective level (e.g., the attitudes of a group), while
psychological analyses will usually return to the individual (e.g., the attitudes of
individuals within a group).
Traditionally, sociologists have been very critical of psychological approaches
to explaining crime and criminality. In particular, they argue that in focusing on
individuals, psychologists ignore factors such as social disadvantage and economic
inequality that are the ‘root causes’ of crime, and instead further stigmatise the
vulnerable and powerless in the community. For their part, psychologists often
believe that sociological theories ignore important individual variations in criminal
conduct and are unduly influenced by an ideological agenda rather than scientific
evidence.
It is not the purpose here to debate the relative merits of sociological and psychological criminology. Rather than seeing sociological and psychological theories as
competing explanations of crime, it is more productive to see them as complementary approaches. The analogy can be drawn with a microscope. A microscope has
a control that allows the viewer to alter the magnification with which a specimen
might be examined. Sometimes it is useful to take a close-up or micro view to
examine in detail particular parts of the specimen; other times it is useful to take a
broad or macro view to get an overall picture of how the various parts of the specimen interconnect. So too, psychological and sociological theories are explanations
of crime and criminals that are set at different levels of resolution.
Because of their different foci, sociological and psychological criminology serve
different purposes. The goal of sociological criminology is generally ‘big-picture’
Introduction 3
structural reform of the social systems that are seen ultimately to be responsible
for producing crime and criminals. The goal of psychological criminology, on
the other hand, is to intervene directly with offenders and potential offenders.
Psychological interventions have two main goals. First, psychological criminology
may be used to predict criminal behaviour. For example, a prison psychologist
might be required to make an assessment of the likelihood that a given prisoner will
represent a danger when returned to the community. Second, psychological criminology informs efforts to prevent criminal behaviour. This might involve attempting
to stop criminal behaviour before it occurs – for example, reducing the childhood
risk factors that are related to the development of criminal dispositions, or making
changes to particular locations that seem to encourage the performance of criminal
behaviour – or treating known offenders in order to stop them from reoffending.
This book examines the theories of crime and criminality that comprise psychological criminology and that inform the tasks of prediction and prevention of criminal behaviour. The order of the words in the title – Psychological Criminology and
not Criminological Psychology – was a considered choice. While the difference
may be subtle, the selected title reflects a mission to highlight the contribution that
psychology can make to the multidisciplinary enterprise that is criminology. The
sub-title of the book is An Integrative Approach. The integration is not between
psychological and sociological theories (although there is no intention to diminish
the contribution of sociological approaches) but among psychological theories.
Rather than present the various psychological perspectives as a series of discrete
and rival explanations, the aim of the book is to emphasise the connections among
approaches, and to show how, taken together, they provide a more complete picture
of crime and criminality than each can provide individually. This introductory
chapter sets out the rationale for this approach. First, the problem of defining crime
and criminals is addressed. Next some of the major debates about the nature of
crime and criminality are examined. There follows an overview of the psychological approaches covered in this book, and a presentation of a framework for
understanding the relationship among approaches and the contributions each makes
to the overall task of explaining crime and criminality. A central argument to be
developed in this chapter is that crime and criminality are diverse and complex
phenomena, and that the causes of offending may vary for different types of
offenders. An integrative approach to psychological theory better accounts for this
variability among offenders.
Defining crime and criminals
In order to examine explanations of crime and criminality, it is first necessary to
define these terms and to specify what will be included in and excluded from the
analyses. The task is surprisingly difficult. It is easy to slip into the habit of talking
about crime as a static and unitary phenomenon, and about criminals as if they are
a separate sub-species of human being bound by a common set of deviant characteristics. In fact, crime is a slippery concept encompassing diverse behaviours,
and criminals do not form a clearly distinguished or homogeneous subgroup.
4
Introduction
The shifting definitions of crime
The first thing to note is the obvious but crucial point that crime is legally defined.
A behaviour only becomes a crime when a particular law proscribing it is enacted.
There are numerous examples of definitions of crime varying over time and from
society to society. For example, in Britain today, any man having sexual relations
with a girl under the age of 16 years is guilty of sexual assault; however, in Victorian times, it was legal to have sex with a girl as young as 10 years of age. Worldwide, the age of consent for girls currently varies from 12 to 21, and there are even
variations within multi-jurisdictional countries such as Australia and the USA.
Thus, whether someone commits rape can depend upon where and when that
person lives.
One implication of this is that any crime could immediately be eliminated by the
simple expedient of decriminalising it. We have seen this happen in a number of
areas. Abortion, homosexual acts and prostitution are examples of behaviours that
have been partially or fully decriminalised in many places in recent years. On the
other hand, we can also see the process working in the other direction. Sexual abuse
of children is an example (as noted above), as is the increasing criminalisation of
drug use over the twentieth century. One perspective in sociological criminology –
conflict theory – is particularly concerned with how society makes decisions about
which behaviours to declare criminal, arguing that crime is invariably defined in a
way that serves the interests of the powerful.
The shifting definitions of crime pose difficulties for those psychological theories
that focus on differences between criminals and non-criminals. Psychological
profiles of criminals cannot be tied to an arbitrary legal construct. If someone can be
a criminal today but not tomorrow for the same behaviour, then how can anything
meaningful be said about their criminal nature? Recognising this problem, some
researchers have pointed out that there are limits to which definitions of crime vary
among cultures and over time. For example, Ellis and Walsh (2000) argue that,
despite some variability at the edges, there is a ‘stable core of universally condemned
offences’ (p. 7). These are behaviours that involve purposeful victimisation of other
community members, and include acts such as murder, theft, rape, vandalism, and
so on. Every society has individuals who engage in these sorts of behaviours and
who are liable to community sanctions. By focusing on these core offences and the
concept of purposeful victimisation, it is argued that ‘crime’ and ‘criminal’ become
stable and meaningful entities for psychological analysis.
Some researchers have gone further and dispensed with legal definitions altogether. Instead of crime, they focus on the concept of antisocial behaviour. Antisocial behaviour is a clinical construct, and refers to acts that violate societal
norms or infringe on the rights of others. Individuals who persistently behave
antisocially may be assessed as having an antisocial personality disorder (APD).
According to the current version of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders (DSM-IV-TR) (American Psychiatric Association, 2000),
specific symptoms of APD include deceitfulness, impulsivity, irresponsibility,
lack of remorse, reckless disregard for the welfare of others, and repeated failure
Introduction 5
to conform to social norms that may include violating the law. Note that some
antisocial individuals may also be referred to by the older term of psychopath,
although APD and psychopathy are not fully equivalent and there is much debate
about the relationship between the two (Hare, 1993). Nevertheless, because antisocial behaviour, APD and psychopathy are psychologically defined, they are
readily analysed using psychological theory. However, while antisocial behaviour
and crime overlap, they are not necessarily the same. Not everyone who has
committed crime has performed antisocial behaviour or has APD. A person
arrested for an act of political dissent, for example, might even argue that they
were behaving prosocially. Likewise, not all antisocial behaviour is illegal and not
all individuals with APD are criminals. Some people go through their life callously
using and abusing other people in ways that do not actually break the law.
Criminality as a continuum
Even if we agree on a set of behaviours that qualify as crimes, the dividing line
between criminals and non-criminals is not clear-cut. Like many personal
attributes – intelligence, anxiety, self-confidence, and so on – criminality is best
conceptualised as a continuum. Also, like other attributes, criminality is normally
distributed. That is, most people tend to cluster around the middle of the continuum,
while relatively few are at either extreme (very law-abiding or very criminal).
Thus, almost everybody at some time or other breaks the law (or commits antisocial acts). They might cheat on their tax, inflate their travel expenses, take
stationery home from work, knowingly accept too much change from a shopkeeper, keep found goods, run red lights, and so on. Obviously, many of these
offences are trivial and may be performed by an individual only occasionally.
Under these circumstances we would not regard the individual as being a ‘real’
criminal. As the offences committed by an individual become more serious and
more frequent, then their level of criminality is presumed to increase. However,
there is no clear point at which the individual qualifies as a criminal, and inevitably researchers and clinicians need to make pragmatic decisions on where to
draw the line.
Types of criminals
Finally, in the event that we are able to agree on who the ‘real’ criminals are, we
might still question the assumption that they form a single homogeneous group.
The label criminal can be applied to a wide diversity of individuals and this has
prompted some researcher to develop typologies that group different kinds of
criminals into various categories.
Most obviously, criminals commit different sorts of crimes. A person who has
committed murder and a person who has committed tax evasion may be both
defined as criminal but otherwise they may have little in common. It is sometimes
useful, therefore, to examine criminals separately in terms of the specific crimes
they have committed, or at least in terms of broader crime categories (e.g., violent
6
Introduction
offenders versus property offenders). However, this approach often breaks down.
The evidence increasingly shows that many criminals do not specialise in one type
of offence, but rather are criminally versatile. For example, Smallbone and
Wortley (2004a) found that among a sample of 362 prisoners convicted of child
sexual abuse – a group for which a high level of offence specialisation might be
assumed – offenders were four times more likely to have previous convictions
for non-sex offences than for sex offences. All 16 of the Australian Bureau
of Statistics offences categories were represented in the criminal histories,
including theft (30 per cent), traffic offences (24 per cent), personal injury offences
(19 per cent), burglary (14 per cent) and drug offences (13 per cent). Sex offences
(22 per cent) were not even the most common prior offence. Clearly categorising
versatile offenders in terms of their crimes is problematic.
Apart from offence type, criminals also vary markedly in the frequency and
persistence of their criminality. It has been recognised for some time that a small
group of chronic offenders is responsible for a disproportionately large amount of
crime (e.g., Wolfgang et al., 1972). Criminologists sometimes talk about this as
the 80/20 rule – 80 per cent of crimes are committed by 20 per cent of offenders.
(These percentages are not necessarily precise; it is the general concept, that also
applies to other phenomena such as victimisation rates, which is important.) This
observation has led to an important distinction by some criminologists between
life-course persistent (LCP) and adolescent-limited (AL) offenders (Moffitt,
1993). Life-course persistent offenders commit frequent offences over an extended
period. Signs of antisocial behaviour in these offenders are evident in early childhood, and many may be clinically assessed as having psychological disorders,
especially antisocial personality disorder. In contrast, for adolescent-limited
offenders, involvement in crime may be a transitory phenomenon, often linked to
specific stages of development or particular life events. In particular, it has been
noted that the aggregate offending rate peaks around 17 years of age, after
which it rapidly declines, a phenomenon referred to as the age–crime curve (see
Figure 1.1). The age–crime curve is one of the most robust and important findings
in criminology. It suggests that a great deal of crime is associated with developmental changes and social experiences specific to adolescence. In fact, some
studies have shown that the majority of young males have some formal contact
with the law, and that not engaging in some form of delinquency is the exception
(e.g., Farrington et al., 1986). The overwhelming majority of these individuals,
however, do not have a fixed propensity to commit crime, and they desist from
offending as they mature and/or their life circumstances change.
An individual’s offending pattern over time is referred to as his/her criminal
career. The idea that criminals have careers that parallel conventional careers has
provided a useful analogy for criminologists. Careers have a beginning and an end,
and individuals can move in and out of particular occupations as circumstances
change. Accordingly, criminal-career researchers are interested in when and how
criminals are initiated into crime, the type of crime they commit and their shifts from
one crime-type to another, the frequency of their offending, and their desistance
from criminal activity. The two-path career model described above (i.e., life-course
Introduction
7
Figure 1.1 The age–crime curve for a hypothetical data-set.
persistent versus adolescent-limited) is just one of a number of proposed offender
typologies based on offending pathways. Other researchers have suggested that
there are three or more distinct offender pathways (DiLalla and Gottesman, 1989;
D’Unger et al., 1998; Nagin and Land, 1993; Tracy et al., 1990). Whatever the
number, for our purposes, looking at criminals from a careers perspective provides
a more nuanced picture than the crude dichotomy of criminal/non-criminal. It
serves to remind us that criminals are a heterogeneous group and that criminality is
a dynamic attribute that may change significantly over an individual’s life-time.
When thinking about the causes of crime and criminality, this variability needs to be
accounted for, and different explanations may be required for different types of
offenders.
Debates about the nature of crime and criminality
There are many psychological theories relevant to crime and criminality and these
theories vary on the fundamental assumptions made about how human beings
operate. Before we consider how various psychological theories might be combined
into an integrated model, we need first to understand – and seek to accommodate –
the ways in which they differ. Five underlying debates about the nature of crime and
criminality are examined here. These are: (1) do offenders freely choose to commit
crime, or are their actions determined by factors outside of their control?; (2) Do the
causes of crime reside in the biological make-up of individuals, or in the way that
8
Introduction
individuals are raised?; (3) Are offenders normal or do they display pathologies that
distinguish them from other people?; (4) Do offenders need to acquire the criminal
motivations that drive them to commit crimes, or do they fail to control the criminal
impulses that are naturally present in all of us? And (5) is crime determined by
the characteristics of offenders, or does crime occur because of opportunities and
pressures in the immediate environment?
Free will versus determinism
Most people intuitively adhere to a philosophy of free will, believing that they are
able to make unconstrained choices about their behaviour and to guide their own
destiny. Explanations of crime, too, have traditionally portrayed criminals as freely
choosing their deviant ways. Originally free will was viewed within a religious
framework, with crime equated with sin and moral failing. Later, the early criminologists of the late eighteenth century – members of the so-called classical school
such as Cesare Beccaria and Jeremy Bentham – presented free will as a process by
which individuals weigh up the perceived costs and benefits of behaviour, and
choose the path that they judge to be most advantageous.
Most modern psychological theories, however, are based on the assumption of
determinism. These theories assume that all behaviour is ultimately caused by
factors outside the individual’s personal control. Theorists who adhere to determinism try to apply the same scientific principles and laws used in the ‘hard’
sciences to the issue of human behaviour. A seismologist would never say that an
avalanche occurred because a rock chose to fall down a hill: likewise a psychologist ought not to say that behaviour occurred simply because the person chose to
perform it. According to the deterministic logic, every action a person performs
can be traced to some prior biological or environmental factor. Thus, when a
person ‘chooses’ to perform an act, we need to ask why they chose to do it (and
what caused that to occur, and so on). Free will is thought to be just an illusion.
While we have the subjective experience of making choices, it is argued that our
conscious thoughts are just after-the-fact commentaries to ourselves on what we
have already subconsciously decided. As some have put it, how can we know
what we have thought until we have thought it?
The usual reaction of people when presented with the concept of determinism
is to reject the prospect out of hand. To be the subject of deterministic forces
outside of our control is an unappealing and rather unsettling thought, and moreover, it does not seem to accord with our subjective experience of making choices.
And the fact is, we can happily get by in life continuing to believe that we possess
free will, whether or not it is true. However, at a theoretical level, it is the adherence to determinism that drives researchers to uncover the causes of crime and to
build theories. After all, if offenders simply committed crime as a random expression of free will, then there would be nothing left to explain. This does not mean,
however, that psychologists ignore the thought processes and decision-making
strategies of offenders. Many deterministic psychologists believe that cognition
plays an important mediating role in the causes of behaviour. Some cognitive
Introduction 9
psychologists have gone further and have proposed the concept of ‘soft determinism’. Soft determinists argue that because human beings are capable of
conceptual thought, they therefore have some limited capacity to make choices
and to exercise some control over their own behaviour.
In fact, despite the profound philosophical gap between free will and determinism, often both positions will lead to similar conclusions. Most adherents to
free will would accept that people will invariably ‘choose’ the behaviour which
seems to offer them the most benefits, an interpretation which is not very far from
saying that a person’s behaviour is ‘determined’ by the perceived outcomes of that
behaviour. Moreover, in practice, when dealing with real-life problems, psychologists often operate ‘as if’ there is free will. For example, telling clients that they
have no control over their life events is not seen as a particularly useful therapeutic strategy!
Likewise, our laws and courts remain rooted in classical school notions of free
will and individual culpability. It is sometimes suggested that if behaviour is
determined by factors outside of the control of offenders, then punishing them for
their crimes cannot be morally justified. However, identifying reasons for criminal behaviour is not the same as excusing it. All behaviour has consequences and
it is wholly consistent with our everyday experience that criminal behaviour
should attract legal sanctions. Indeed, it would be unnatural if this were not the
case. Determinism is also sometimes confused with the idea that behaviour is predestined and fixed in a fatalistic fashion. In fact, determinism suggests that behaviour is dynamic and ever-sensitive to changes in causative influences. Determinism
is not just about an individual’s biological make-up; environmental factors can be
equally deterministic in their effects on behaviour. Thus, one desired outcome of
punishing offenders is to cause them to change their criminal behaviour.
Nature versus nurture
To the extent that behaviour is determined, the nature/nurture debate refers to whether
the determinants of behaviour are biological (nature) or environmental (nurture).
Biological explanations explore the role in criminal behaviour of genetics, psychophysiology, biochemical processes, neurological factors and physical traumas.
Environmental explanations look to the formative role in behaviour of child-rearing
practices, family dynamics, school experiences, peer group influences, and so forth.
Historically, nature and nurture explanations of behaviour have gone in and out
of fashion over the years. In the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century,
biological factors, albeit often crudely conceptualised, were a major component of
theories of behaviour. Indeed, criminology as a scientific discipline began with
Cesare Lombroso’s pseudo-Darwinian theories of the ‘born criminal’. In their own
ways, the development of Freudian psychodynamic theory and Pavlovian conditioning theory in the first half of the twentieth century provided the theoretical
bases for a shift towards environmental explanations. Psychodynamic theory
emphasised the role of childhood experiences and trauma in psychological disorder,
while conditioning theorists argued that all learning was the result of an individual’s
10
Introduction
environmental experience. The Second World War helped cement the dominance of
the environmental perspective, as people reacted against Nazi doctrines of racial
superiority that underpinned practices of genocide and forced sterilisation. It became
politically incorrect to even contemplate the biological bases of crime. Towards the
end of the twentieth century, however, biological explanations started to make a
come-back, spurred particularly by advances in gene technology.
Nevertheless, biological explanations of crime remain unpopular in the wider
discipline of criminology. For example, Ellis and Hoffman (1990) reported that
only 20 per cent of criminologists agreed that genes may play a significant role in
criminal behaviour. However, most contemporary psychological theories accept
that behaviour is a combination of both biological and environmental factors. This
is referred to as the biosocial perspective. These days, no reputable scientists
would argue that there are ‘born criminals’. Rather, they talk about biological
factors as predispositions that, given the right environmental influences, increase
the chances of criminal behaviours occurring but do not guarantee that they will
occur. Thus, for most psychologists the nature/nurture debate is no longer about
whether the causes of crime are biological or environmental, but about the nature
of the interplay between these two factors. One issue is how the respective roles
played by biological and environmental factors might vary from offender to
offender. For example, it is argued that life-course persistent offenders are more
likely than adolescent-limited offenders to display antisocial traits from an early
age that can be linked to biological processes. Adolescent-limited offenders, on
the other hand, are more likely to be influenced by environmental factors such as
peer pressure. Another issue concerns the way that biological and environmental
factors might interact with one another. A nature/nurture interaction occurs when
different individuals react to the same environment in different ways. This raises
the prospect, for example, that some individuals may be biologically more vulnerable to criminogenic environmental influences than are others.
Note that from a biosocial perspective, a common way that the nature/nurture
debate has been framed – which factor is more important in explaining an
individual’s criminal behaviour? – makes no sense since no behaviour can exist
without both conditions. This approach to the debate has been likened to asking
whether length or breadth is more important in determining the area of a rectangle
(Cosmides and Tooby, 1997).
Normal versus pathological
A related (though distinct) debate is whether criminals are normal or pathological.
This is often referred to as the mad/bad debate. There are a number of theoretical
explanations of crime that assume that criminals are revealing some form of
biological, psychological and/or behavioural dysfunction that separates them
from non-criminals. This approach is known as the medical model: criminal
behaviour is seen to result from a ‘sickness’ that must be ‘cured’ in order to restore
good health. On the other hand, other psychological approaches take the view that
crime and criminals are normal. This is not to say that that these theorists hold that
Introduction 11
most people rape and rob banks, or that raping and robbing banks are acceptable
or harmless behaviours in our society. Rather, they mean that we do not need
special psychological explanations for these behaviours. Criminal behaviour is
seen to be learned in the same way, and motivated by the same basic needs, as any
other behaviour. For example, a thief has learned to steal to get money just as
other people have learned to work to get money. Further, the thief’s desire for
money is perfectly rational and depends upon no hidden or perverse motives. The
thief’s behaviour is a normal response to his/her particular life experiences. It may
be bad but it is not mad.
The mad/bad debate overlaps the nature/nurture debate inasmuch that biological differences between criminals and non-criminals can be used as one argument
that criminals are pathological. However, it should be noted that not all biological theories of crime assume pathology. For example, some biological theorists
propose that the genes that predispose individuals to commit crime have evolved
as normal – indeed, adaptive – human characteristics. On the other hand, some
models of pathology do not rely on biological explanations. The psychodynamic
theories of Sigmund Freud and his followers are probably the best-known
examples of this. According to these theorists, crime arises from unconscious
psychological conflicts deep within the individual, and offenders are rarely aware
of the true reasons for their offending. Criminals are seen as psychologically
rather than biologically sick.
It is clear from the foregoing discussion that pathological means more than simply
unusual, socially unacceptable, or even maladaptive. Criminality may be each of
these things, but no one condition is sufficient to justify the label of pathology. People
with red hair, or with high IQs, are statistically infrequent but they are not pathological. Likewise, burping at the table may violate social norms but is not a sign
of pathology, while homosexuality was once considered both socially deviant and
pathological and is now no longer considered so. And people who smoke potentially
cause physical damage to themselves and others, while shyness can be a debilitating
condition that most people experience at some time or other; yet neither qualifies
as pathology. In DSM-IV-TR, the American Psychiatric Association (2000) attempts
to overcome the deficiencies of single definitions of pathology by stipulating a
combination of conditions that must be satisfied in order for an individual to attract a
diagnosis of mental disorder. It defines mental disorder as:
[A] clinically significant behavioral or psychological syndrome or pattern that
occurs in an individual and that is associated with present distress (e.g., a painful
symptom) or disability (i.e., impairment in one or more areas of functioning)
or with a significantly increased risk of suffering death, pain, disability, or an
important loss of freedom. In addition this syndrome or pattern must not be
merely an expectable and culturally sanctioned response to a particular event,
for example, the death of a loved one. Whatever its original cause, it must
currently be considered a manifestation of a behavioural, psychological or
biological dysfunction in the individual. Neither deviant behavior (e.g., political,
religious, or sexual) nor conflicts that are primarily between the individual and
12
Introduction
society are mental disorders unless the deviance or conflict is a symptom of a
dysfunction in the individual, as described above.
(ibid., p. xxxi)
According to the DSM definition, performance of criminal behaviour is not of
itself sufficient evidence of pathology. However, the definition allows that some
portion of offenders may commit crime as a result of a pathological condition. For
many researchers, then, the normal/pathological debate involves determining
which particular offenders are pathological and which specific mental disorders
they possess. Based on our discussion so far, those offenders diagnosed with antisocial personality disorders and/or as being life-course persistent offenders are the
most likely candidates to qualify as pathological. Nevertheless, pathology is an
elusive construct and debate remains about the validity and usefulness of the label
(Maddux et al., 2005). At what precise point, for example, does normal behaviour
become pathological?
The view of offenders as pathological is a powerful image that can shape the way
that clinicians, criminal justice practitioners, policy-makers, and the public react to
the problem of crime. At the same time, there is a sense in which the normal/pathological debate is more about terminology than substance. The nature/nurture debate
describes real differences of opinion about the causes of behaviour. In contrast, it is
possible for two researchers to agree on the causes of crime, say, a particular set of
developmental experiences, or even the presence of some distinctive biological
feature, but to disagree on whether those causes have produced a condition that ought
to be labelled pathological. Arguably, the decision about whether an offender is
normal or pathological is as much a value judgement as it is a scientific judgement,
and either way the decision need not interfere with the search for the causes of crime
and criminality.
Driving forces versus restraining forces
Most psychological theories of crime seek to answer the question: how does an
individual become criminal? These theories begin with the assumption that human
beings are born criminally neutral and must therefore acquire the motivations and
behaviours that drive them to commit crime. However, some theorists have turned
the question around and asked: what stops an individual from becoming criminal?
These theorists examine the personal, social and physical constraints that control
criminal impulses (Gottfredson and Hirschi, 1990; Hirschi, 1969; Matza, 1964).
The so-called control perspective assumes that the acquisition of criminal motivations does not need to be explained. Human beings naturally act on the basis of
self-interest and the desire to maximise their pleasure. Criminal behaviour, in turn,
is intrinsically rewarding and requires little in the way of specialised skill. It is
therefore taken for granted that people will commit crime if there are no constraints
on them to do so. Control theorists ask you to imagine the extreme case of a child
who has grown up without any restrictions being placed on his/her behaviour. The
outcome in such a scenario would be a selfish, impulsive individual who satisfies
Introduction 13
his/her urges indiscriminately. According to the control perspective, criminals do
not learn to commit crimes, but rather, they fail to learn not to commit them.
This distinction might at first sound like mere semantics, but in fact the implications are quite profound. According to the control perspective, the potential to
commit crime is universal. For example, everybody has at some time had sexual
fantasies about people they have met or observed. Most people, however, realise
that these fantasies cannot be instantly acted upon. Their sexual impulses are kept in
check by their moral standards, their fear of legal and social consequences, and the
logistic difficulty of carrying out the behaviour. The difference between someone
who commits rape and someone who doesn’t lies not so much in the nature of their
sexual motivations, but in the level of control that exists over their sexual motivations. Criminals are defined as individuals who routinely exercise poor self-control
over their criminal impulses. Sometimes, too, the usual controls over behaviour can
break down, and normally law-abiding individuals can commit crimes they would
otherwise not commit. Thus, rape often occurs in the turmoil and anonymity of a
war zone, committed by soldiers who in other circumstances would never carry out
such behaviour.
Generally speaking, theories that emphasise the acquisition of criminal behaviours suggest that offenders will at least to some extent specialise in their offending,
since the motivations and skills needed for each type of crime must be acquired
independently. On the other hand, control perspectives on crime suggest that
many offenders will be generalists; i.e., that the same lack of control that causes
them to steal will also cause them to break traffic rules, take drugs, commit rape,
and so on, as the opportunities arise. An implication of offending versatility is that
fewer separate theories are required to explain different types of crime.
Person versus situation
As the above example of rape in war illustrates, whether or not an individual commits
a crime can depend upon the particular circumstances at the time. The immediate
environment can be one source of control over behaviour. This leads to our final
debate, which concerns the extent to which the causes of criminal behaviour reside
within the individual, or in the situations in which the behaviour occurs. This is also
referred to as the cross-situational consistency debate. A great deal of psychological
theory and research is devoted to the study of internal constructs: personality, attitudes, beliefs. Once acquired, a person’s psychological attributes are viewed as being
more or less fixed. Everybody can be described in terms of their characteristic personality profile and on this basis their behaviour in new situations can be reliably
predicted. It is the person’s psychological make-up that determines how they behave.
However, this view has not gone unchallenged. Mischel (1968) argued against stable
trait models of behaviour that portrayed personality as a consistent predisposition.
Instead, he argued that behaviour is highly situationally-specific, and that an individual’s behaviour may vary considerably from one situation to the next. We may
identify variability across situations in our own behaviour. For example, we might
consider ourselves as generally confident but also recognise that there are times when
14
Introduction
we are not confident. Similarly, we can sometimes be surprised to see changes in the
behaviour of others when we encounter them in new environments (for example,
when visiting the home of a friend or work colleague for the first time).
Note that the person/situation debate is conceptually distinct from the nature/
nurture debate. While both debates are about the role of environments, the nature/
nurture debate focuses on distal causes (i.e., long-term factors that helped shape
the person’s personality or behavioural repertoire) whereas in the person/situation
debate, the focus is on proximal causes (i.e., factors occurring at the time the
behaviour is performed).
Following the person-centred bias of psychology more generally, most psychological theories of crime seek to explain criminal behaviour largely in terms of the
characteristics of offenders and pay little attention to the circumstances in which the
crime occurs. However, according to the situational perspective, the crime scene is
more than a passive backdrop against which criminal action is played out. Instead it
plays a fundamental role in initiating and shaping that action. A great deal of crime is
impulsive, opportunistic or a reaction to situational stresses. Individuals may become
violent in the heat of the moment, succumb to temptations to steal, commit crimes
under the effects of alcohol, or feel pressured to go along with delinquent friends.
Moreover, even the most prolific, predatory criminals do not offend randomly. On
the contrary, their offending is relatively infrequent and is responsive to the nature of
the immediate environment. For example, professional burglars do not burgle every
house that they see, but rather, they carefully select targets that will maximise their
gains and minimise their risks. Knowledge of the precise circumstances in which
crime occurs is crucial for a complete understanding of criminal behaviour, and traditional theories that are devoted to explaining the development of criminality only as
a fixed attribute are missing a key ingredient.
Summary: some guiding principles
The aim of this book is to develop an integrated model that draws together a range
of psychological theories of crime. The more the contributing theories differ in
terms of their fundamental premises, the more difficult this task becomes.
However, while the five debates discussed in this section have been proposed in
terms of polar opposites, there is common ground between the poles and it is not
necessary or even sensible to adhere to extreme positions. It is not so much a case
of deciding which side is correct as it is deciding how much emphasis should be
placed on one side or the other. Below are propositions with respect to the five
debates that will guide the selection of theories for this book and development of
an integrated model that links these theories together.
1
It is most productive to think about criminal behaviour as being the product
of causes, rather than as the expression of evil or of capricious whims. At the
same time, this does not preclude the examination of the thought patterns and
decision-making processes of offenders, nor does it suggest that offenders
ought not to be held accountable for their actions.
Introduction 15
2
3
4
5
Crime, like all behaviour, is the product of a biosocial process, that is, a
combination of biological predispositions and environmental experiences.
However, the relative roles of specific biology and environment factors, and
the nature of their interplay, vary among offenders.
Some – but by no means all – offenders have distinct biological, psychological
and/or behavioural features, and satisfy diagnostic criteria for mental disorders
such as antisocial personality disorder. However, whether or not such offenders
are labelled pathological involves a qualitative judgement that does not materially affect the scientific search for the causes of their behaviour.
Criminal behaviour is the result of acquired deviant motivations and behaviours, and a failure to inhibit natural criminal impulses. The inherent tendency
for human beings to act out of self-interest helps account for the latent propensity for criminal conduct in the general population, and the criminal versatility
of many offenders.
All criminal behaviour results from the combination of dispositional and situational factors. The probability of crime therefore varies according to both
the criminal characteristics of the individual and the criminogenic nature of
the immediate crime setting.
Psychological theories of crime and criminality: an
integrated model
We now turn to consider the psychological theories that will go into the integrative
model. In sociological criminology, theories are typically developed specifically for
the purpose of explaining crime and criminality. In contrast, there are very few
distinctly criminological theories in psychology. Instead, criminal behaviour is treated
as just another human response that obeys more general psychological rules, and that
can therefore be explained by mainstream psychological theory. Individual psychological theories, in turn, often have a narrow focus, emphasising the role of some
particular psychological factor or process. Eight areas of theory are covered in this
book, each of which is the subject of a chapter. These eight areas can be arranged in
a temporal sequence, from a focus on distal to proximal causal factors, suggested
by the nature/nurture and the person/situation debates. Some theories focus on factors
that are present at birth; other theories focus on factors that influence the offender over
the lifespan; and other theories focus on factors that are present at the crime scene. The
analysis spans 100,000 years, from the ancestral environments of early humans to
the decision to engage in a specific criminal act. The relationship among the eight
theoretical areas is shown in Figure 1.2 and each area is briefly described below.
Human nature
Human nature refers to a set of psychological features and behavioural tendencies
assumed to be characteristic of the human species. Human nature is explained
by evolutionary theory, which in recent years has been invigorated by advances in
the field of genetics and the development of the sub-discipline of evolutionary
16
Introduction
Figure 1.2 An integrative model of criminal behaviour.
psychology. The premise of evolutionary psychology is that, just as humans have
evolved adaptive physical characteristics – carried by genes – in response to natural
selection, so too they have evolved adaptive behavioural patterns – also carried by
genes – that have likewise maximised reproductive success. However, some evolved
behavioural tendencies can in certain circumstances increase the likelihood of criminal behaviour. For example, the evolutionary pressure to pass on genes underpins
sexual attraction and courtship behaviours, but also supplies the basic motivation for
rape. Evolutionary psychology sets out the broad parameters of human behaviour
and the origins of the biosocial foundations for criminal impulses.
Heredity
Whereas evolutionary theory examines the distribution of genes throughout the
human population, heredity is concerned more specifically with the transmission
of genes from one generation to the next. It has been an age-old observation that
crime often runs in families. However, on this observation alone it is not possible
to disentangle the contributions of genes and environmental influences within the
family. The results of research on twins and adoptees, however, strongly point to
a genetic basis to intergenerational criminality. Note that while both human nature
and heredity are shown in Figure 1.2 as present at birth, it is not suggested that
genes predetermine behaviour. Genes are responsible for behavioural potentials
but do not programme precise behavioural repertoires. Whether an individual
becomes criminal will depend upon lifespan and situational factors.
Introduction 17
The brain
Genes create behavioural predispositions by directing the construction of neuronal
networks in the brain. It might at first be thought odd that in Figure 1.2 the brain
is not depicted in the first category of factors that are present at birth. In fact, the
crucial point about the brain is its essential plasticity. Onto the hard-wired structures constructed by genes, new neuronal networks are laid down as the individual
interacts with his/her environment. The very physical structure of the brain is a
product of biosocial forces. Neurological processes include autonomic functions
to do with arousal (e.g., heart rate), biochemical processes (e.g., the secretion of
hormones), and neurological functioning (e.g., brain wave patterns). Research is
increasingly showing links between brain structures and functions and attributes
associated with criminal behaviour.
Personality
Brain structures and functions provide the foundations for the development
of personality, and these predispositions are shaped by an individual’s unique
developmental experiences. Personality is the relatively stable set of psychological characteristics that define an individual. It comprises ways of thinking,
patterns of behaviour and emotional responses that are assumed to be consistent
over time and from one situation to the next. Personality is typically summarised
as a collection of traits – aggression, shyness, confidence, and so forth – that can
be used to profile an individual and to distinguish one person from another. In
criminology, researchers are interested in individual differences between offenders
and non-offenders in order to identify personality traits that are predictive of criminal conduct.
Development
Psychologists who study social development are interested in the way that
human beings’ social behaviour matures and changes over time. They study the
importance of the bonds between children and their parents or primary caregivers,
how children learn the rules and expectations of society, and how they learn to
behave as autonomous individuals. The depiction in Figure 1.2 of social development occurring as a lifespan process is not meant to imply that genes do not
play an important role in social development, or that social development is not
closely linked to critical, biologically-determined periods of life. However, the
focus here is on the effect of developmental experiences – including parenting
and disciplinary strategies, childhood neglect and abuse, family dynamics, peer
relations and educational experiences – on social development. In terms of
crime and criminality, social development research informs in particular the
criminal careers perspective, which examines changes in criminal involvement
over time.
18
Introduction
Learning
The learning perspective is concerned with enduring changes in behaviour
that result from environmental experiences. There are three principal models of
learning: classical conditioning, operant conditioning and social learning. The first
two models (classical and operant conditioning) exclude from their analysis unseen
internal psychological processes (thoughts, attitudes, personality, etc.) and focus
only on the observable relationships between behaviour and tangible reinforcement
(rewards and punishments). The third model (social learning) presents a less
extreme view. According to social learning theory, a great deal of human behaviour is learned through social interactions (e.g., observation and imitation) and
does not require tangible rewards or punishments. In the application of learning
approaches to criminology, most attention has been given to the way patterns of
criminal behaviour are acquired over time, through childhood experiences and the
like. However, learning theory also holds that for learned behaviour to be produced
on any given occasion, it needs to be evoked by an appropriate environmental
stimulus. Thus, as shown in Figure 1.2, learning approaches explicitly incorporate
a role for situational factors.
Cognition
Cognition refers to the thought processes involved in covert functions such
as perception, information-processing, memory, reasoning, problem-solving and
decision-making. In traditional behaviourism, cognition is treated as an unnecessary and unverifiable construct. However, social learning theory introduced the
role of mental processes into the learning perspective and was subsequently
renamed social cognitive theory. Social cognitive theory is based on the premise
that the external environment does not act on us in an objective way, but is
mediated – perceived and interpreted – by our cognitive processes. Through
cognition – our ‘self-talk’ and imagination – we can generate an internal representation of the world that has the power to reinforce, punish and stimulate us in ways
similar to actual experience. However, this does not imply a return to unfettered
free will. The analogy is sometimes drawn between cognition and computers.
Computers are efficient information-processors but they still require external
inputs. With respect to criminal behaviour, the cognitive perspective focuses on
the way that offenders perceive criminal opportunities and make decisions about
whether or not to become involved in criminal conduct.
Situations
Learning and cognitive approaches each take into account how the offender deals
with environmental information at the time of the crime. To these approaches can
be added a range of other situational approaches that examine in detail what it is
about the crime scene that encourages crime. There are two broad approaches to
this task. Some theorists view situations in terms of criminal opportunities that
Introduction 19
offenders exploit. According to this view, offenders enter the crime scene motivated to offend and proceed with the crime if it is easy to carry out, the promised
rewards are high, and the chances of detection are low. Other theorists emphasise
the role of immediate environments in generating the motivation to commit
crime. According to this approach, some situational factors – peer pressure,
authority figures, environmental stress, provocation, and so forth – can actively
induce individuals to commit crime that they might not have otherwise contemplated at that time. Of course, situational theorists do not propose that all offenders
are hapless victims of circumstance. It is understood that crime occurs as a person–
situation interaction, and that some people are more susceptible to situational
temptations and pressures than are others.
Summary
Whether an individual commits a crime and the form that criminal behaviour
takes are complex products of biological, developmental and situational forces. It
is unrealistic to expect any one theory to adequately cover the scope of factors that
may contribute to the diverse phenomena of crime and criminality. The model
outlined in this section and elaborated upon in the chapters that follow is designed
to provide a general and flexible framework for understanding the relationship
among theories, and for accounting for variations in crime and criminals.
2
Human nature
Human nature is a term that is widely used and understood in everyday conversation. Most people have a common-sense belief that there are some universal characteristics and predictable ways of behaving that make humans human. However,
throughout much of the twentieth century, the idea of human nature was strongly
resisted in psychology and the social sciences more generally. Other animals
might have instincts that cause dogs to act like dogs and cats to act like cats, but
humans were assumed to be above such base influences. Instead, we were seen to
acquire all of our psychological characteristics during our individual lifetimes via
social, cultural and other environmental factors. In the past few decades, however,
some psychologists have begun exploring the behavioural implications of evolutionary theory to create the sub-discipline of evolutionary psychology, and to
provide a scientific foundation to the concept of human nature.
In this chapter, those universal human characteristics that provide the foundation
for criminal behaviour are examined. According to evolutionary psychologists,
humans have evolved not only physical characteristics that have been adaptive for
survival, but also adaptive behavioural patterns. Modern-day criminal behaviours
are the echoes of strategies employed by our distant ancestors to solve the everyday
problems they faced as nomadic hunter–gatherers. We now live in a very different
world, but these ancient behavioural responses remain hard-wired in our psychological make-up. The behaviour of humans today cannot be fully appreciated unless
these evolutionary origins are understood. However, before examining evolutionary
psychology’s explanations of criminal behaviour in detail, the basic principles of
evolutionary theory are outlined, and the theoretical assumptions of evolutionary
psychology, and its theoretical predecessor sociobiology, are discussed.
The principles of evolution
It is difficult to overstate the profound effect that Charles Darwin’s theory of
evolution had on the way that human beings view themselves. Prior to the publication of his On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection in 1859, scientific thinking about life on Earth was dominated by creationism – the belief that
God had created different species as they appear today and that each species was
immutable and unconnected to other species. Human beings were viewed as the
Human nature
21
peak of creation, fundamentally different in kind from ‘brute’ animals. Darwin’s
evolutionary theory, in contrast, outlined a process of gradual change over time by
which species arise and become extinct. All life falls on a continuum from simple
to complex, and the development of each species can be traced back through
earlier forms. Human beings are just another animal, different from other species
only by degrees, and connected to every other living thing through common
ancestry.
Natural selection
Driving evolution is natural selection. Darwin argued that within any species, individuals differ in attributes – adaptations – that contribute to their ability to survive
and reproduce in the face of environmental pressures. Some features of the environment, perhaps the arrival of a new predator or a change in climate, pose challenges
for a species. Variants, such as longer beaks or thicker fur, permit some members of
the population to better exploit the new environmental conditions. Individuals who
possess these favourable attributes will produce more offspring than other members
of the species, and, to the extent that these variations are inheritable, their offspring
will also carry this competitive advantage. Through this process of natural selection,
and over many generations, these adaptations will spread throughout the population
and eventually the species itself will undergo change. Put another way, any characteristic exhibited by a species is likely to have come about because it has conferred
some reproductive advantage on the ancestors of the species.
It is important to realise that natural selection is neither random, on the one
hand, nor purposeful, on the other. In the first case, it is often mistakenly asserted
that evolution occurs by chance. Critics of evolution have seized on this misconception in an attempt to support the concept of intelligent design. For example,
they have likened the evolution of complex life to the improbability of a jetliner
being assembled by a cyclone blowing through a junkyard, or the works of Shakespeare being produced by monkeys tapping on a typewriter (see Dawkins, 2006a).
But evolution is far from a random process. As the term natural ‘selection’ clearly
indicates, the characteristics of a species are actively shaped in precise ways by
the environments to which that species has been exposed. It is no happy coincidence that polar bears appear to have white fur that provides an effective camouflage against the snow; polar bears appear to have white fur because it is an
effective camouflage.
Equally erroneous is the view of evolution as a progressive process that pushes
species inexorably towards ever-increasing levels of complexity and refinement.
We are particularly prone to this error when we think about the evolution of our
own species, which we are inclined to regard as the pinnacle of evolution. As we
look back on our evolutionary journey, through the various ‘primitive’ forms of
hominid and on to modern humans, it seems as if we are the culmination of a
predetermined developmental trajectory. But this view is what Dawkins (2004,
p. 1) calls the ‘conceit of hindsight’. Evolution follows no master design, and at
no point in our evolution were we destined to take the form that we currently have.
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Human nature
Nor are we ‘more-evolved’ than are other species. Like all species, humans have
been designed by natural selection to meet the environmental challenges and
exploit the environmental niches that happen to have come their way.
Darwin made a few speculative comments about evolution and crime. In his
Descent of Man (1871, p. 173), he suggested that some of man’s ‘worst dispositions’ were reversions to earlier primitive states ‘from which we are not removed
by many generations’. However, it was left to Cesare Lombroso five years later
to publish the first concerted attempt to explain crime in terms of evolution
(Lombroso, 1876).
Homo delinquens: an evolutionary dead end
Lombroso took the idea of crime as regressive – or atavistic – behaviour and proposed
that criminals were evolutionary throwbacks, a brutish subspecies of humans whom
he labelled homo delinquens. In effect, criminals were conceived of as living
‘cavemen’ who had failed to fully develop the civilised and gracile characteristics of
homo sapiens. In addition to their primitive behaviour they could be identified by
their primitive physical features: large noses and ears, prominent jaw and cheekbones, asymmetrical facial features, protruding lips and so on. Lombroso wrapped
these ideas in a crude interpretation of Darwinism. For example, he endorsed the
view of evolution as a progression, with European adult males the highest form of
evolved life. Other races were assumed to have evolved before Europeans and
so were lower on the evolutionary scale, while women, because they resembled
beardless youths, were thought to be stuck in a childlike stage of development.
Just like species, theories also evolve, and new branches that prove themselves ill-equipped to adapt to changing conditions become extinct. So it is with
Lombroso’s concept of homo delinquens. To his credit, Lombroso actually set
about empirically testing his theory by taking skull measurements of prisoners
and comparing them with measurements taken from non-criminal soldiers. While
Lombroso claimed to have found more physical abnormalities among the prisoners, a later, more rigorous study by Charles Goring (1913) failed to replicate
this finding and his theory quickly fell into disrepute. For our purposes here,
Lombroso’s theory is a mere historical oddity, and it is disappointing to see
so many criminology texts still present it as if it represents current thinking on
evolution and crime. Evolutionary theories of crime have come a long way since
Lombroso, and crucial to that development has been the discovery of genes.
Gene-based evolutionary theory
When he formulated his evolutionary theory, Darwin knew nothing of genetics.
While the basic principles by which traits were inherited were demonstrated by
his contemporary, Gregor Mendel, in 1865, the significance of Mendel’s discoveries was not appreciated until the early twentieth century. It is a testament to
Darwin’s genius that subsequent genetic research has broadly affirmed his original insights while at the same time refining and enriching evolutionary theory.
Human nature
23
What are genes?
Genes are basic units of heredity that contain information relating to some aspect
of an organism’s construction, and are responsible for the transmission of characteristics from one generation to the next. People have known since antiquity that
offspring inherit characteristics from their parents, but the process by which this
occurred was not established until Mendel’s famous research on peas in the midnineteenth century (Mendel, 1865). Mendel discovered that each inherited characteristic involves a pair of hereditary units – what are now called genes – with one
unit taken randomly from each parent. Most importantly, Mendel showed that
heredity was not a blending process as was commonly thought, but that genes
made replicas of themselves in their offspring. In this way, genes are shuffled and
passed down intact through the generations, potentially indefinitely. Species,
then, carry their evolutionary histories in their genetic make-up. Genetics can be
used to examine the relationship among species in order to help untangle their
shared evolutionary ancestries. For example, humans have around 98 per cent of
their genes in common with chimpanzees, confirming them as our closest living
relatives. Genetics is examined in more detail in Chapter 3.
Genetic mutations
Only characteristics that have a genetic basis can evolve. However, if genes
continued to make perfect replicas of themselves each time an organism had
offspring, there would be severe limits on the degree to which a species could
change. At most, certain existing traits might spread or shrink in subpopulations
in response to local conditions (e.g., the variation in skin colour among racial
groups of humans). Evolution depends upon the introduction of new genes into
the gene pool, and these are created through genetic mutation. From time to time
there is a random error in the replication process during reproduction and a gene
makes a flawed copy of itself in an offspring. Most of the time, these genetic
mutations will be inconsequential or even harmful to the receiving organism and
will die out. However, a few mutations will produce beneficial adaptations.
Following Darwin’s principle of natural selection, if organisms that possess beneficial mutant genes are even fractionally more successful in reproducing than are
organisms without the mutant gene, then over time more and more members of the
species will possess that gene. Note that while mutations are random, whether the
mutation survives and spreads is not.
Selfish genes
All genes have one thing in common and that is the ruthless imperative to replicate. Dawkins (2006b) coined the term ‘selfish gene’ to convey the idea that
evolution must be understood from the perspective of what is ‘good’ for genes.
For Dawkins, organisms exist to aid the replication of genes (rather than the
reverse), and organisms have therefore evolved to act selfishly in the interests of
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Human nature
their genes. The bodies of organisms are merely disposable ‘survival machines’
for genes. The individuals who host genes will inevitably die, but their genes, if
they are successful in their quest to replicate, live on, passed from generation to
generation. Of course, Dawkins was not suggesting that genes possess conscious
intentions or strategies to maximise their chances of replication, but genes that are
good at replicating will be favoured by natural selection precisely because they
are good at replicating.
This view of evolution, known as gene selection, overturns the traditional
theory of group selection. Group selection is the idea that it is the survival of the
species that drives evolution, and that individual organisms will therefore act for
the good of the species even when it threatens their own well-being. As Dawkins
points out, group selection contains a fundamental contradiction. The tendency to
act for the good of the species would need to be genetically encoded in order to be
inherited. Further, the more strongly an organism possesses this trait, the more
likely that organism is to sacrifice its own life so that other members of the species
will live. Because of their reckless indifference to their own welfare, they will
therefore be less likely themselves to reproduce. Any genes for group selection,
therefore, should eventually become extinct through natural selection.
The fossil and genetic evidence for the physical evolution of species through
natural selection is overwhelming and few reputable scientists dispute the essential mechanics of the process. However, as Darwin recognised, and the concept of
the selfish gene reinforces, organisms evolve not only adaptive physical characteristics, but also to behave in ways that maximise the intergenerational transmission of genes. This proposition – that behaviour also has an evolutionary and
therefore a genetic basis – has proven more contentious, especially when it is
applied to humans.
Evolution and behaviour
Systematic efforts to apply evolutionary principles to understanding human
behaviour began in earnest in the 1960s with an interdisciplinary group of scientists known as sociobiologists, comprising psychologists, sociologists, biologists,
anthropologists and zoologists. More recently, an explicitly psychological explanation of human nature – evolutionary psychology – has emerged as an alternative
approach to understanding the behavioural implications of evolution.
Sociobiology
According to sociobiologists, the causes of all social behaviour can be ultimately
traced back to an organism’s struggle for ‘fitness’ (Alexander, 1979; Hamilton,
1964; Trivers, 1971, 1972; Wilson, 1975). Derived from the evolutionary concept
of ‘survival of the fittest’, fitness is the capacity of an organism to maximise its share
of genes in the gene pool of the next generation. The fittest organisms are by definition those that are the most successful in passing on their genes. Sociobiologists see
basic consistencies between the social behaviours of humans and other species.
Human nature
25
Human social networks, power hierarchies, family bonds, courting rituals, mating
patterns and sexual taboos all have parallels in the animal kingdom and all serve
the same purpose for us – increasing fitness – as they do for other animals. Two
adaptive, cross-species patterns of behaviour that are especially important for
understanding criminal behaviour are altruism and parental investment.
Altruism
On the face of it, the concept of the selfish gene paints a bleak picture of human
nature. It seems to portray a dog-eat-dog world where people look out only for
themselves. Yet clearly this image conflicts with many of our everyday experiences. Humans are social animals and have built cohesive societies where people
work cooperatively together for the common good. When disasters and tragedies
occur, we see people responding with selfless acts of heroism and generosity
towards complete strangers in need. On a smaller scale, we are all providers and
recipients of acts of kindness, friendship and cooperation routinely in our daily
lives. If evolutionary theory does indeed shape human behaviour, then it must be
able to explain self-sacrificing behaviour, that is, altruism, of this sort. In the past,
altruism was taken as evidence of group selection, where individual organisms
were designed to put the interests of the species ahead of their own. As outlined
earlier, this argument is genetically unsustainable. However, paradoxically,
altruism can be accounted for by the concept of selfish genes. Two selfish-gene
explanations have been proposed, kin selection and reciprocal altruism, covering
two different conditions under which altruism occurs.
Kin selection is the tendency for an organism to act altruistically in the interests
of genetic relatives (Hamilton, 1964). Kin selection is most obviously observed in
the self-sacrificing behaviour that parents perform for their offspring, but it may
extend to other relatives as well. We experience the effects of kin selection in the
close family ties that we feel. Sociobiologists view kin selection in terms of
‘inclusive fitness’. In other words, when ‘considering’ the prospects of passing on
its genes, an organism will take into account (include) the genes that it shares with
relatives. In some cases it makes strategic sense from a gene’s-eye view of the
world for an organism to assist the reproductive chances of a relative even if
this jeopardises its own reproductive success. Generally speaking, the closer the
genetic relationship, the greater the level of altruism an organism is prepared to
show. Of course, organisms do not really ‘consider’ kin selection. Kin selection
exists because organisms that practised it were as a result more successful in
passing on their genes, including their genes for kin selection, than organisms that
did not.
Organisms can also act altruistically towards other organisms to which they are
not genetically related, and sometimes even towards organisms from a different
species. From the perspective of the selfish gene, such a strategy will pay off if it
is likely that the assistance will be reciprocated in the future, a case of ‘you scratch
my back and I’ll scratch yours’ (Trivers, 1971). How genes for reciprocal altruism
may have evolved over time based on self-interest has been demonstrated using
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Human nature
game theory (Axelrod, 1984; Dawkins, 2006a, 2006b). Game theory involves
examining the strategic choices made by people when presented with certain
scenarios. One game is the prisoners’ dilemma, in which two players take the
roles of suspects arrested by police. Police separate the suspects and secretly
propose to each the following deal: if one suspect testifies against the other, and
the other suspect remains silent, the one testifying will go free and the other will
be sentenced to ten years; if they both remain silent they both receive six months;
and if they both testify they both receive five years. If the game is played once,
then the best self-serving strategy for each player is to testify – they will receive a
reduced sentence no matter what their opponent does. However, if each player
could be sure that their opponent would cooperate, then both benefit most by
remaining silent. If the game is played on successive occasions using the same
players (the iterated version), then each player has the opportunity to examine the
strategy of their opponent. In computer simulations of tournaments involving the
iterated game, the most effective playing strategy was ‘tit-for-tat’: remaining
silent on the first iteration and thereafter copying the behaviour of the opponent.
Thus, if the opponent reciprocated the initial play of silence, then both players
became locked into a pattern of cooperation; if the opponent did not reciprocate,
the first player punished him/her in the next round by testifying. In the long
run, tit-for-tat players won out over uncooperative players and eliminated them
from the tournament. Players who always cooperated irrespective of what the
opponent did were also eliminated because they left themselves open to exploitation by uncooperative players. In the same way, genes for a tit-for-tat behavioural
strategy – reciprocal altruism – can come to dominate a gene pool.
It is altruism that makes human society possible. We have evolved to ‘understand’ that if everyone did as they pleased whenever they wanted, then in the long
run we would be personally worse off. However, as will be discussed in more
detail later, people do not always act altruistically. The existence of criminal
behaviour is clear evidence of this.
Parental investment
In order to pass on genes, an organism must reproduce, so effective reproductive strategies are a central concern for all organisms. The approach to reproduction adopted by organisms has been conceived to fall along a continuum
(MacArthur and Wilson, 1967). At one end of the continuum are organisms that
reproduce prolifically and provide little or no care to their offspring. Many of
these offspring may die, but through weight of numbers enough survive to perpetuate the species. Organisms that reproduce rapidly in this way are referred to as
r-strategists (or quantitative reproducers). At the other end of the continuum are
organisms that have few offspring and devote considerable effort to raising them
(an example of kin selection). Though there are fewer offspring, parental care
increases the chances of each individual surviving. These organisms are referred
to K-strategists (or qualitative reproducers). Humans, of course, are extreme
K-strategists.
Human nature
27
To the extent that an organism invests in its offspring, typically that investment
will not be shared equally by both parents. In most species the female is required to
make the greatest sacrifice, even if this just involves gestating the unborn offspring.
According to Trivers’ (1972) parental investment and sexual selection theory, the
parent who invests more in the offspring will be more choosy in the selection of a
mate, while the parent who invests less in the offspring will be more competitive
with rivals for sexual access to mates. In humans, for example, females have a
biologically-limited number of offspring that they can produce in their lifetimes,
and not only do they have to carry each child for nine months, they then must
devote many years to raising the child to independence. Females will therefore
look for a partner who can provide her with necessary resources and who can be
relied upon to make a long-term commitment to assisting with child-rearing. Males,
on the other hand, can produce many children and at a minimum need only
contribute one copulative act to the enterprise. Males are more indiscriminate in
their sexual selections than are females, and are more likely to seek multiple partners. However, because females are choosy, males must compete with other males
to demonstrate their claim to be selected for mating rights. As will become more
apparent later in this chapter, this division in parental responsibilities in humans is
viewed as the root cause of the basic psychological differences between men and
women, including differences in their respective propensities to commit crime.
Evolutionary psychology
Sociobiology has generated heated debate in the social sciences. Critics have
objected to the portrayal of human behaviour as a direct consequence of the pressure on individuals to spread their genes, and the associated assumption that there
are direct parallels between human and animal social behaviours. Partly in
response to the criticisms of sociobiology, evolutionary psychology developed as
an alternative way of conceptualising the implications of evolutionary theory for
human behaviour. Evolutionary psychology shares many theoretical concepts
with sociobiology, but also departs from it in a number of ways.
The most important difference between sociobiology and evolutionary psychology
is the role attributed to fitness. Evolutionary psychologists reject the sociobiological
view of human beings as mindlessly driven by the need to maximise the representation of their genes in the gene pool. As Buss (1995, p. 10) noted, ‘If men had as a goal
the maximization of fitness, then why aren’t they all lined up to give donations to
sperm banks?’ Sociobiologists go from genes straight to social behaviour. Evolutionary psychologists argue that this overlooks a crucial middle link in the chain, and
that is the psychological dimension of behaviour. Genes do not generate behaviour,
but they are responsible for the construction of the brain that does. It is the way that
evolution has determined the wiring and functioning of the human brain that is the
focus of evolutionary psychology.
Evolutionary psychologists are concerned with evolved psychological mechanisms that are particular to humans and that help shape behavioural responses in
given contexts (Buss, 1995; Cosmides and Tooby, 1997; Nicholson, 1997; Tooby
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Human nature
and Cosmides, 2005). Psychological mechanisms are specific cognitive programs
that have their origins in the more general patterns of adaptive behaviour. The
broad behavioural strategies identified by sociobiologists are starting points (not
ends in themselves) for evolutionary psychologists. For example, Trivers’ (1972)
theory of parental investment and sexual selection can be extended to explain a
range of associated behaviours, such as why humans consistently judge certain
physical characteristics to be sexually desirable. By way of illustration, males in
all cultures prefer female hips to be wider than the waist, with an average preferred
hip-to-waist ratio of .7 (Singh, 1993). Evolutionary psychologists argue that this
preference originated because wide hips in women correlated with good health
and fertility. Men who preferred wide-hipped women therefore tended to produce
more children than did other men and so genes for this preference came to dominate the gene pool. Through selection, the wide-hipped preference has become
hard-wired and still affects present-day judgements by males of female attractiveness. There are many similar evolved psychological mechanisms that underpin
universal human attributes, such as human preferences for certain foods, common
fears of particular situations or objects, curiosity and attraction to novelty, the
tendency to become aggressive in predictable situations, proneness to sexual
jealousy, and so on (Buss, 1995; Cosmides and Tooby, 1997). Collectively, these
psychological mechanisms comprise human nature.
The existence of such psychological mechanisms implies a brain architecture that
is domain-specific. In other words, evolutionary psychologists argue that the brain is
not a general-purpose, problem-solving machine. Rather, it comprises a collection of
specialised neuronal circuits – modules – to deal with specialised adaptive problems.
For example, the problem of deciding what food to eat from the limitless options
available – grass, dung, stones, animal flesh – cannot be solved by any general
reasoning process. Instead evolved mechanisms guide us to prefer high-calorie, nonpoisonous food that can be processed in our stomachs. In this view, the brain is
likened to a Swiss army knife. Like the famous knife, the brain contains a set of
specialised tools, each with a specific function, waiting to be deployed when required.
There are several important points to clarify about evolutionary psychology.
First, the original adaptive purpose of evolved psychological mechanisms need not
still be valid. Central to evolutionary psychology is the proposition that the behaviours of humans today have their origins in ancestral environments. Modern humans
are thought to have evolved by 100,000 years ago and physiologically to have
changed little since that time. Humans were designed for life as hunter–gatherers on
the African savanna, or, as Cosmides and Tooby put it, ‘our modern skulls house a
stone age mind’ (1997, p. 11). For most of our existence as a species, humans have
lived in small, nomadic groups and the skills that were needed centred on finding
food, negotiating immediate social relationships within the group, and defending the
group from attack and other dangers. It is remarkable just how successfully our
original construction has equipped us to deal with modern-day problems that would
have been unimaginable to our ancient forebears. At the same time, there are behavioural patterns, including many behaviours we now label as criminal, that once were
functional but are no longer so. All psychological mechanisms developed because
Human nature
29
they were at some point adaptive for survival, but they may not now confer any
reproductive advantage and may even be detrimental in the modern world. Our
liking for fatty food, for example, once ensured that humans took full advantage of
scarce high-calorie food sources when they were available, but now it is responsible
for widespread obesity and heart disease. In the case of hip-to-waist ratio, it doesn’t
matter whether or not it is still a good predictor of fertility, it continues to shape
judgements of attractiveness nevertheless.
Second, evolved psychological mechanisms do not operate at a conscious level
(ibid.). The brain is an information-processing machine like a computer, and all
human behaviour – every thought and every blink of the eye – can be traced to
chemical reactions within it. As with a computer, the complex computations that
are performed by the brain occur deep in the circuitry, and what human beings
experience as awareness is a tiny fraction of the neuronal activity that has occurred.
Our consciousness has tricked us into believing that behaviour is simple and that
we have a great deal of rational control over our actions. However, even ‘simple’
tasks, such as catching a ball, require complicated analyses and calculations that
occur automatically below our level of awareness. It follows that we are never
truly aware of the reasons for much of our behaviour. Human beings do not go
about their daily business calculating the most effective ways to pass on their
genes, even if they may often behave in ways that are consistent with this general
objective. It is not suggested, for example, that men prefer women with wide
hips because they knowingly judge them to be healthy and fertile; they just prefer
wide hips.
Third, evolved psychological mechanisms do not furnish humans with a repertoire of behavioural responses that are fixed at birth and that set individuals along
a predestined pathway. Rather, psychological mechanisms are flexible cognitive
programs that are responsive to individual circumstances and environmental
inputs. The types of adaptive problems faced by people may differ depending
upon whether the person in question is male or female, young or old, or rich or
poor. Consequently, adaptive solutions also vary among people. Moreover, evolutionary psychology is a biosocial model of behaviour that depends fundamentally
upon the role of developmental experiences, social contexts and situational
contingencies. Psychological mechanisms define the broad outlines of human
nature, but it is recognised that there will still be wide variations in our expressed
behaviour. Returning to the hip-to-waist ratio, there are individual differences in
the precise preferred coefficient, as well as variations across cultures and changing
fashions over time within cultures.
While some evolutionary psychologists have explicitly distanced themselves
from sociobiologists (e.g, Buss, 1995; Cosmides and Tooby, 1997), there are clear
overlaps between sociobiology and evolutionary psychology and in practice it is
often difficult to neatly distinguish between the two approaches. The remainder of
this chapter draws on both perspectives to examine criminal behaviour, but for
convenience the newer term of evolutionary psychology will be used as a collective label. Evolutionary psychologists have come at the task of explaining criminal
behaviour from two different directions. One approach is to explain why certain
30
Human nature
crimes occur; the other approach is to explain why certain people are more likely
to commit crime.
Crime-focused evolutionary approaches
The essential argument of evolutionary psychologists is that criminal behaviours
are responses that were adaptive at some point in our evolutionary history by
conferring reproductive advantage on those who performed them. Even though
these responses are now illegal and are considered maladaptive in modern society,
the evolutionary origins remain encoded in the human psychological make-up. To
examine this argument, the specific cases of violent offending, property crime and
sexual offending will be examined.
Violent offending
To emphasise the need to think objectively about human nature, Wilson suggested
that the task be approached as if by ‘zoologists from another planet completing a
catalogue of social species on earth’ (1975, p. 547). Surely if such a catalogue was
actually compiled, one of the first things that the alien zoologists would record
about humans is their extraordinary capacity to inflict death and injury upon
fellow members of their species. While within-species violence and even killing
is far from unique to humans, we are very good at it. There is fossil evidence that
our ancestors attacked and killed one another. Even a cursory examination of
recorded human history reveals a dismal inventory of wars between communities
and homicides and assaults within communities. Cross-cultural studies further
reveal that violence is common in all contemporary societies, and that rates in
traditional tribal groups are sometimes higher than those for industrialised countries. As Buss and Shackelford (1997) point out, the ubiquity of human violence
across time and across societies cannot be explained solely by the usual criminological explanations that invoke the influence of modern-day factors such as the
strains of urbanisation, depictions of violence in the mass media and the decline
in Western values. There can be little doubt that the potential for violence is part
of human nature.
That human beings have a natural propensity for violence is not of itself
evidence for the role of evolution. Evolutionary psychology does not propose
human violence as a generalised aggressive impulse that is expressed indiscriminately; the issue is whether the circumstances in which human violence occurs
today indicate that the violence had its roots as an adaptive strategy that increased
reproductive success. To answer this question evolutionary psychologists have
examined human violence from a number of perspectives.
Power and status
The evolutionary bases of violence lie in the sexual-selection strategies of humans,
which promote female choosiness and cast males as sexual rivals. Most assaults
Human nature
31
and homicides involve both male perpetrators and victims. It does not take much
imagination to see how in ancestral populations of small, hierarchical social groups,
violence and intimidation might have originated by giving the perpetrator a
competitive advantage over other males. Aggressive individuals could take from
weaker ones important resources such as food and territory; they could more
successfully defend themselves from attack; and through their increased power and
status they could attract and keep more sexual partners (Buss and Shackelford,
1997). Male violence today is often associated with asserting status and demonstrating toughness within the peer group, or with restoring honour and reputation
following some perceived insult or challenge (Buss and Shackelford, 1997; Daly
and Wilson, 1997). From seemingly trivial incidents, male posturing of this sort
can lead to serious injury and death.
Campbell (2009) has pointed out that females, too, can commit status-related
violence. She argues that in monogamous societies, competition for mates is a
two-way street. If males are to commit to one partner, then they will also be selective. Usually competition between females is conducted in non-violent ways, for
example, through the use of cosmetics and other beauty aids to increase sexual
attractiveness. However, competition among females for mates may be particularly fierce in economically deprived communities where there is a shortage of
males (for example, through high death and imprisonment rates), or where
economic resources are concentrated in the hand of a few powerful males. Under
these circumstances, competitive behaviour may begin with attacks on a rival’s
appearance or reputation, and escalate to physical violence (Burbank, 1987;
Mullens et al., 2004).
Sexual proprietariness
Where males already have a sexual partner, a major cause of violence involves
efforts to keep her and to ensure that she does not mate with anyone else. According
to evolutionary psychology, males have evolved to be proprietorial when it comes
to their mates. Unlike females, males cannot be certain that they have parented the
offspring that are attributed to them and thus they have the most to lose genetically from infidelity. Males risk becoming victims of cuckoldry, that is, unwittingly raising the offspring of another male, an exercise which in evolutionary
terms is wasted effort. Males, therefore, are the main perpetrators of jealous
violence, a pattern that has been observed cross-culturally and in other species
(Wilson and Daly, 1993).
Consistent with the predictions of evolutionary psychology, the most common
causes of wife-killing (uxoricide) and spousal assault are suspicion by the husband
that the victim has been unfaithful or that she has decided to leave the marriage
(ibid.). The most common reason that wives kill husbands, on the other hand, is in
retaliation against male violence (Campbell, 2009; Daly and Wilson, 1988). Thus,
male jealousy is a key factor in both male and female spousal violence. Further,
male violence towards spouses is negatively correlated with the age of the victim –
that is, it is most likely to occur when the woman is young and fertile – reinforcing
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Human nature
the view that proprietariness is linked to attempts to control reproduction (Daly and
Wilson, 1988; Wilson et al., 1993).
For spousal assault to have evolved as an adaptive strategy, at some point it must
have been effective in increasing the reproductive success of perpetrators. Some
researchers have suggested that traumatic bonding – the tendency for many battered
wives to remain with their abusive husbands – is evidence of the payoff to perpetrators of spousal assault (Dutton, 1995; Ellis and Walsh, 1997). It has also been
hypothesised, based on animal studies, that women who are victims of domestic
violence may, as a result of the harassment, suffer reduced fertility and higher rates
of miscarriage. If this pattern holds for humans, it suggests that spousal assault may
in part have evolved as a strategy to counteract possible cuckoldry (Ellis and
Walsh, 1997).
Genetic relatedness
One of the predictions of evolutionary psychology is that individuals will act in ways
that increase the replication of the genes of kin. It would be counterproductive, then,
for people to kill or seriously injure close genetic relatives. Daly and Wilson (1997)
have pointed out that many criminological studies emphasise the relatedness of
victims and perpetrators of violence. However, because most researchers are not
coming from an evolutionary perspective in which genetic relatedness is of crucial
significance, studies examining victim–offender relationships generally do not differentiate between genetic relatives and non-genetic relatives (e.g., spouses, stepchildren, in-laws). Examining the available data more closely, Daly and Wilson found
that intrafamilial homicide was eleven-times more likely to involve non-genetic relatives than genetic relatives. The most common form of family violence is between
spouses, and as discussed in the previous section, much of this violence can be
explained by male proprietariness.
Examination of child abuse and infanticide data reveals a similar picture.
Research has consistently shown that adopted children and stepchildren are more
frequently victims of child abuse and neglect than are children raised by their
biological parents (Daly and Wilson, 1985; 1988, 1997; Lightcap et al., 1982).
For example, Daly and Wilson (1985) found that preschool children living with
families in which one of the parents was a step-parent were 40 times more like to
suffer child abuse than children living with two biological parents. From an evolutionary perspective, there is nothing to gain by raising offspring with whom there
is no genetic relationship and so there is an evolutionary pressure for less parental
investment. Related behaviour occurs in other species. For example, it is not
uncommon among mammals for a new male taking over a group of breeding
females to kill any existing offspring that he has not sired (Ebensperger, 1998).
At the same time, maltreatment of non-genetically-related offspring is not
inevitable. Psychological mechanisms may generalise in scope beyond their
narrow evolutionary origins. In some animal species females will adopt orphans
in a ‘misfiring’ of the kin selection rule (Dawkins, 2006b, p. 101). Likewise, in
humans, adults often have parental feelings towards unrelated children, while
Human nature
33
rates of maltreatment of stepchildren may be significantly affected by cultural
factors (Temrin et al., 2000).
Property crime
The evolutionary explanation for male property crime is an extension of the
proposed role of power and status in violent offending. Stealing is viewed as a
strategy designed to enable the perpetrator to accumulate resources in order to be
more competitive with other males for selection as a sexual partner. A key factor
in female choosiness is her estimation that the prospective mate can provide materially for her and her offspring. Shackelford et al. (2005) examined preferences in
mate attributes from nearly 10,000 participants across 37 cultures. In assessing a
prospective mate, women around the world valued status and resources more
highly, and valued good looks and health less highly, than did males. Similarly,
other studies have found that wealthier males have more sexual partners than do
poorer males (Kanazawa, 2003).
Of course, females also steal, but they take smaller amounts, less frequently,
and for different reasons than do males. According to Kanazawa (2009, p. 96)
‘Women steal what they need, men steal partly to show off.’ Nevertheless, there
has been a steady increase in the number of women arrested for property crimes
over recent years. While this increase is often attributed to women’s increased
criminal opportunities due to greater participation in the workforce (the by-product
of liberation), in fact the majority of these crimes are committed by unemployed
women and involve welfare fraud, credit card fraud, shoplifting, and the like
(Campbell, 1999, 2009). A more likely explanation is that the increase in female
property crime is the rise in the proportion of female-headed households due to
higher divorce rates and more unmarried mothers. Campbell argued that female
theft is usually motivated by economic hardship and is often related to the parental
investment obligation of providing for a family.
Sexual offending
At the heart of evolutionary psychology is the assumption that behaviours that once
increased reproductive success will be favoured by natural selection. The behaviour
that is most directly related to reproduction, of course, is sexual behaviour. Unsurprisingly then, present-day human sexual behaviour, including sexual offending, is
argued to be heavily influenced by evolved psychological mechanisms. This proposition is examined for rape, child sexual abuse and incest.
Rape
Rape is a behaviour that is almost exclusively carried out by males and occurs in
many animal species in addition to humans (McKibben et al., 2008; Thornhill and
Thornhill, 1992). Evolutionary psychology suggests that sexual aggression is a
male reproductive strategy that was successfully employed by our ancestors and
34
Human nature
continues to exert an influence on human sexual behaviour to the present day.
According to Trivers’ (1972) parental investment theory, sexual aggression is
most advantageous for the sex that makes less parental investment in offspring.
Because males do not gestate offspring, they are free to have multiple sexual partners and it is in their genetic interests that they impregnate as many females as
possible. On the other hand, because females make a heavy investment in
offspring, they will strongly resist any attempts to become impregnated by
someone not of their choosing. Males who were able to overcome female resistance, including through the use of aggression, had more offspring than did other
males, and their ‘pushy’ genes spread in the gene pool.
If increased procreation was the original basis for rape, it would be expected
that selection would favour sexual aggression towards victims of reproductive
age. Statistics consistently show this to be the case in all societies (Thornhill and
Thornhill, 1987). Nevertheless, it is important to keep in mind that psychological
mechanisms are not conscious strategies and nor do they necessarily fulfil their
original purpose of maximising fitness. As with the case of parental care, behavioural patterns may become more generalised. It is for this reason, for example,
that couples continue to have consensual sex beyond the age that they are capable
of producing children. The evolved psychological mechanism is a desire for sex,
not a calculating need to pass on genes.
Child sexual abuse
It follows from the foregoing discussion that females are most likely to be at risk of
sexual victimisation from the time they reach puberty. Because legal definitions
of child are based on prescribed age, in most jurisdictions there is period during
which females are defined as children but are biologically capable of reproduction.
Evolutionary theory predicts that most child sexual abuse should occur during
this window. In fact, Simon and Zgoba (2006) found that the 12–17-year-old age
bracket accounted for the greatest proportion of all (child and adult) female sexcrime victims, with 43 per cent of the total compared to the 31 per cent of victims
who were over 17 years of age.
This still leaves around a quarter of female sex-crime victims who were under the
age of 12 years and presumably pre-pubescent. Again, it is important to remember
that psychological mechanisms need not be perfectly selective in their targeting.
Mechanisms predisposing males to a preference for youthful sexual partners may
combine with other factors to push the age of the victim below puberty. One argument recently advanced is that child sexual abuse may be a by-product of human
nurturing (caregiving) and attachment (care-seeking) behaviours (Smallbone et al.,
2008). Nurturing and attachment are evolved psychological mechanisms crucial for
establishing the parent–child bond (Bowlby, 1969). However, both mechanisms are
also important in adult sexual behaviour, with which they share common biochemistry and neuronal structures. Romantic sexual attraction in adults is bound up with
feelings of taking care of, and being taken care of by, a sexual partner. Smallbone
and Wortley (2000) found that many child sexual abuse incidents occurred in the
Human nature
35
context of routine care-giving, such as giving the child a bath or tucking them into
bed. It is suggested that when adults carry out care-giving activities with children
they may on occasion experience involuntary sexual arousal.
Incest
Evolutionary psychology seeks to explain not only who is sexually victimised but
also who is not. One of the enduring human sexual taboos is incest (Lieberman
et al., 2003). Breeding between close kin can produce offspring with higher rates
of genetic abnormalities and health problems. In the late nineteenth century,
Westermarck (1889) proposed that in order to prevent this occurrence, humans
have an evolved mechanism to discourage incest. The so-called Westermarck
effect proposes that early and persistent close physical and emotional contact with
children during their early development inhibits subsequent sexual attraction to
those children. There is evidence for the Westermarck effect from a variety of
sources. Incest has been found to be lower between siblings who were emotionally
close in their early years than in those who were emotionally distant or physically
separated (Bevc and Silverman, 2000). Other studies have reported that couples
who were reared together as children (for example, children living communally on
a kibbutz) experience higher levels of sexual dysfunction than do other couples
(McCabe, 1983; Wolf, 1995). Finally, the incidence of father–daughter incest is
higher in cases where the father is separated from the child at an early age (Parker
and Parker, 1986; Williams and Finkelhor, 1995). Note that the Westermarck effect
depends upon an interactive view of evolved psychological mechanisms, in that the
incest taboo must be ‘switched on’ by certain environmental experiences.
Offender-focused evolutionary approaches
Evolutionary psychology is principally concerned with attributes that are shared by
us all. However, clearly criminality is not uniformly distributed throughout the
population; some people commit more crime than others. Evolutionary theory has
two ways of explaining individual differences in offending. The first is to relate variations in offending to demographic and environmental factors. In this analysis, the
underlying psychological mechanisms are assumed to be the same for offenders and
non-offenders, but some mechanisms operate in ways that put certain sections of the
population at an increased risk of criminality. The second approach is to treat criminal behaviour as an alternative strategy. Alternative strategies are variations in the
response to an adaptive problem that have been selected by evolution and that therefore have genetic bases (Rowe et al., 1997). In this analysis, there are seen to be
genetic variations between criminals and non-criminals.
Demographic variations in offending
Three of the most stable findings in criminology are that males commit vastly
more crime than do females; that crime rates peak when offenders are in their late
36
Human nature
teens and early twenties; and that convicted offenders come predominantly from
the poorer sections of the community. Traditionally in criminology, all three of
these crime–demographic relationships have been explained largely in terms
of social, cultural and environmental factors. Evolutionary psychology, on the
other hand, explains these variations in terms of the natural operation of evolved
psychological mechanisms. People face different adaptive problems depending
upon their role and position in society, and so psychological mechanisms have
equipped them with behavioural responses suited to their circumstances.
Sex
Across the world, males typically account for 80 per cent or more of all crimes
committed (Ayres and Murray, 2005; Heidensohn, 2002; Steffensmeier and Allan,
1996). Despite years of determined effort by social scientists to explain these gender
differences entirely in terms of the differential socialisation of males and females, it
is no longer plausible to ignore the role of biological factors. As will already be
evident from the earlier discussion of specific offences, the assumption that males
and females differ in biologically-based behavioural patterns is the starting point for
most evolutionary explanations of crime. When evolutionary psychologists talk
about the universality of human nature, in many cases this means consistencies
within the sexes. Many features of human nature are sex-specific and are the direct
consequence of the differences between males and females in their respective
parenting roles and sexual selection strategies. The task of reproduction presents
males and females with different adaptive problems and they have accordingly
evolved different adaptive solutions. Males are in competition for selection as mates
while females bear the brunt of child-rearing. Males have therefore evolved to be
more reckless, aggressive and sexually assertive to better meet the challenges of
securing mating rights. These are attributes which also correlate with criminality.
Females, on the other hand, are more cautious, restrained and fearful. These are
crucial attributes for the role of protecting offspring from danger, and also make it
less likely that females will engage in crime (Campbell, 2009; Campbell et al., 2001).
Where women do commit crime, evolved sex differences also show up in the
different types of crimes males and females commit. Women are particularly
underrepresented in confrontational crimes such as robbery (Campbell, 2009).
Robbery, Campbell argues, is a crime about the thrill of dominating a victim. To
some extent the relatively low numbers of women committing robbery might be
explained by their less powerful physique, but as Campbell points out, robbery
frequently involves multiple assailants and the use of weapons, and is committed
against vulnerable victims (women, children and the elderly). The sex differences
are less (though still substantial) for non-confrontational crimes of dishonesty
such as forgery, fraud, embezzlement, larceny and fraud. As discussed earlier,
these offences are typically committed by poor women needing to feed their
families. Summarising the different offending patterns of males and females,
Campbell draws parallels with the gender roles in ancestral hunter–gatherer
societies – male crime involves hunting and female crime involves gathering.
Human nature
37
Age
Almost as striking as gender differences in crime rates is the male age–crime curve
(Daly and Wilson, 1997; Gottfredson and Hirschi, 1990; Hirschi and Gottfredson,
1983; Kanazawa and Still, 2000). Offending generally begins after puberty, with
rates rising sharply to peak in the late teens, before going into a steady decline (see
Figure 1.1). By their thirties, the majority of offenders have aged-out of crime.
Again, there have been attempts to explain the age–crime curve purely in sociological terms without recourse to biological factors. For example, adolescence is seen
as the most unstructured period of a person’s life, sitting between the breaking free
of direct parental supervision and the taking on of adult responsibilities such as
marriage and mortgages. Crime is most likely to occur during this window of relative freedom from environmental control (Hirschi, 1969).
On the other hand, evolutionary theory provides a biosocial explanation for the
age–crime curve. Daly and Wilson (1997) argued that young men have evolved to
become more present-focused and risk-accepting at the developmental stage that
coincides with the age that they must begin to compete for a mate. It is at this critical
time, therefore, that they are more likely to fight and kill rivals, steal to accumulate
resources, and if these strategies fail, commit rape. This delayed activation of psychological mechanisms is analogous to certain physical characteristics that develop later
in life, such as the appearance of teeth in early childhood or the secondary sexual
characteristics that develop at puberty.
However, since males are capable of reproducing most of their lives, the fall in
crime with age must be explained by another process. The argument here is that
as males age, the relative costs of competition increase (ibid.; Kanazawa, 2009).
Once they begin to sire children, males have more to lose by becoming seriously
injured or losing their life, and their energies are more productively diverted into
making sure that their children will reach adulthood and in turn breed. Thus, risktaking tendencies have been designed to abate with age. Further, Daly and Wilson
reasoned that in addition to a general decline in risk-taking with age, risk-taking
propensity should also be responsive to social cues. For example, marriage or the
birth of a child should accelerate the decline in criminality. A number of studies
have found that marriage does have an effect on dampening crime rates independently of age (Daly and Wilson, 1990; Kanazawa, 2003). Complementing such
finding are biochemical studies which report falls in men’s testosterone following
their marriage (Mazur and Michalek, 1998).
Socio-economic status
While some criminologists argue that the over-representation of poor people in
the criminal justice system is the result of systematic bias, there seems little doubt
based both on official statistics and self-report studies that poor people commit
more crimes than do people from other socio-economic strata of the community
(Braithwaite, 1979; Carmichael and Ward, 2000; Shover, 1991; Weatherburn and
Lind, 2001). That crime is more prevalent among the poor is a finding wholly
38
Human nature
consistent with evolutionary psychology for reasons that will now be familiar to
the reader – low status individuals commit crime as a part of an unconscious
strategy to increase their attractiveness to potential mates. Crucially, the psychological mechanism that underpins this behaviour is universal in males; variations
in offending depend upon environmental factors. Both rich and poor males crave
status, but poor males have fewer options for how to achieve this goal and so they
are more likely to resort to crime.
However, the role of environmental factors is more complicated than this. Low
socio-economic class is associated with a range of developmental experiences that
further increase the risk of criminality. Children from low socio-economic circumstances are more likely to come from large families, to be raised by only one
parent, to receive harsh and inconsistent punishment, and to be victims of physical
and emotional neglect (Barber, 2000, 2002, 2008). These experiences in turn are
more likely to produce children who are aggressive, emotionally hardened and
self-concerned, and who as a consequence also commit crime. Barber (2008) has
argued that what seem like harsh and insensitive parenting strategies in some low
socio-economic families in fact have been selected by evolution to prepare children for survival within the challenging social environment in which they are to
live. To succeed in the lower strata of society, tough-mindedness and an egocentric concern for one’s self are valuable assets. Notwithstanding the fact that these
attributes may also increase criminality, they are adaptive given the environmental
circumstances in which they are designed to operate.
Crime as an alternative strategy
So far in this chapter, explanations of criminal behaviour have emphasised the
underlying similarities between offenders and non-offenders. Criminal behaviour
has been explained as the product of psychological mechanisms that we all
share, at least within our own sex. Where individual differences in offending
occur, the flexibility of psychological mechanisms to take account of individual
circumstances and environmental conditions has been stressed. However, some
evolutionary theorists (especially those with sociobiological leanings) have
proposed that individual differences in offending can also be explained by genetic
variations within the population. Sometimes in evolution two or more successful
solutions evolve to solve the same adaptive problem. Specifically, it has been
proposed that criminal behaviour has evolved as a genetically-based alternative
strategy to altruism.
Altruism works in the common interest as long as everyone plays fairly and
reciprocates. But what if some individuals try to cheat the system by accepting
resources from others without returning the favour? Recall that in the computer
simulations of the iterated prisoners’ dilemma game, tit-for-tat players won out
over uncooperative players. In these simulations, tit-for-tat – or reciprocal altruism
– was an evolutionary stable strategy (ESS), that is, one which drives all competing
strategies to extinction and becomes a universal strategy within a population. On
this basis it would seem that not reciprocating – cheating – is not a viable strategy.
Human nature
39
But simulations do not capture all aspects of reality, and in the real world reciprocal altruism is not an ESS (Raine, 1993). The punishing consequences of titfor-tat can be avoided under certain circumstances, allowing cheats to carve out
a niche for themselves within the population. In the simulation, players always
played the same player and thus the unreliability of the cheat quickly became
apparent. In real life, however, cheats can go from one victim to another each time
their unreliability is exposed. In this way, cheats can survive as long as they keep
on the move. Cheating strategies, therefore, are particularly suited to individuals
living in large populations where there is a high degree of anonymity; the strategies would be less successful for individuals living in small, closely-knit communities. Also, within any population, cheats should be in the minority. Cheats
cannot prosper from other cheats; they need a pool of altruistic people who will
give them the benefit of the doubt, even if it is just once.
The above theorising serves to demonstrate how genes predisposing individuals to cheating (criminal behaviour) can survive in a population dominated by
genes predisposing people to cooperative (law-abiding) behaviour. Of course, the
division between cheats and altruists is not as black and white as portrayed above.
In reality, cheating and altruism are on a continuum and individuals perform
varying mixes of both behaviours. Most people cheat sometimes; some people
cheat most of the time. At the extreme end of the cheating polarity are individuals
who may be described as having antisocial personality disorders and/or who
display life-course persistent offending habits. Note that from an evolutionary
perspective, while they may have genetic differences, antisocial individuals are
not pathological. Rather, the behaviours that they adopt have evolved to solve the
same adaptive problems faced by everyone. The propensity to cheat exists because
cheating has been an evolutionarily successful strategy.
Blatant cheating is easy to recognise and to guard against. To improve their
chances of going undetected, cheats need to evolve more subtle strategies. One
such strategy is to mimic the behaviours of non-cheats. Thus, one of the diagnostic
criteria for psychopathy is a superficial charm that enables psychopaths to create a
favourable first impression, a feature Cleckley (1941) referred to as a ‘mask of
sanity’. A specific example of mimicry occurs in the area of parental investment
and is described by the theory of cads and dads (Ellis and Walsh, 1997). Unfortunately for females, in many K-strategist species males do not always live up to their
obligations to contribute to child rearing. According the theory of cads and dads,
because females have been naturally selected to choose mates who will make a
high parental investment, two types of males have evolved. Dads are the genuine
article who fulfil females’ expectations and make a high investment in their
offspring. Cads, on the other hand, go through the motions of offering high investment but do not deliver on their promise. They have developed the ability to imitate
the behaviour of dads in order to trick females into mating with them. In effect,
they are r-strategists who seek to impregnate as many different women as possible
while avoiding all parental responsibilities. Evolutionary theorists have drawn a
parallel between this form of deception and criminal behaviour (ibid.; Raine,
1993). It is argued that the tendency to adopt cad strategies is part of a broader
40
Human nature
antisocial syndrome. In addition to deceiving females, cads are deceptive more
generally in other areas of their life and therefore are more likely than dads to
commit criminal behaviour.
In the evolutionary equivalent of an arms race, humans have evolved cheaterdetection mechanisms that provide some capacity to read the intentions of
others – for example, via their facial expressions, body language, voice tone – in
order to enable deployment of counter-strategies against cheats (Trivers, 1985;
Walsh, 2000). Most human moral precepts are based on obeying the rules of
reciprocal altruism (as in the biblical command to ‘do unto others as you would
have others do unto you’), and we have likewise evolved to feel anger towards
those who try to get a free ride by breaking the rules. Evolutionary theorists argue
that the development of laws to define criminal behaviours, and the construction
of criminal justice systems to catch and punish offenders, are institutional extensions of cheater-detection mechanisms and the human impulse to enforce reciprocal altruism (Duntley and Shackelford, 2008; Walsh, 2000). It is the evolutionary
basis of law that helps explain why there is a basic consistency across cultures in
the kinds of behaviours that are defined as crime.
Conclusion and evaluation
Criminology is said to have begun in the late nineteenth century with Lombroso’s
evolutionary theory of crime, and now evolutionary psychology is among the
newest perspectives in criminology. The contemporary evolutionary approach
to explaining crime, however, differs radically from that of Lombroso. Where
Lombroso conceived of offenders as pathological, evolutionary throwbacks,
contemporary evolutionary theory treats criminal behaviour – even that performed
by determinedly antisocial individuals – as a normal outcome of human nature.
The behaviours that we now call criminal did not start out as crimes. They were
adaptive behaviours that, in the environment in which they first evolved, gave
those who performed them a competitive edge in the struggle to reproduce.
Criminal behaviours are responses designed to solve problems from another time.
It may even be that in some circumstances criminal behaviour is still adaptive.
Certainly crime is costly to society and the consequences for the individuals who
commit crime – if they are caught – are unpleasant. However, the modern urban
landscape may suit predatory offenders well, providing plenty of opportunities for
them to locate victims and a degree of anonymity for them to reduce their chances
of detection.
The evolutionary perspective nevertheless remains deeply unfashionable in
sociological criminology, and only marginally less so in psychological criminology. In part, this rejection may be a legacy of the crudeness of Lombroso’s
original efforts to bring evolutionary principles into criminology. More generally,
Cosmides and Tooby (1997) have argued that the idea of human nature is unappealing to social scientists because it challenges the notion that human behaviour
is governed by rationality. Evolutionary psychology advances the disconcerting
proposition that human beings do many things for reasons which are hidden from
Human nature
41
them and over which they have no conscious control. However, the contrary proposition that humans – alone among earth’s animal species – could be born without
any inherent, universal behavioural propensities that define their nature seems
increasingly absurd.
The unique contribution of evolutionary psychology to psychological criminology is to explain the origins and functions of motivations that are usually taken
for granted. As Buss (1995) argues, without reference to human nature, most
psychological theories are little more than descriptions of the phenomena they
seek to explain. For example, control theories of crime propose that humans are
naturally selfish, but provide no reasons for why this should be so. Similarly,
theories of aggression may identify salient situational triggers, such as being
subject to a perceived insult, but do not explain the function of aggression in such
circumstances. To say that aggression is designed to restore the pride of the
aggressor, for example, only begs the question of why it is important in humans
for pride to be restored. The starting point for all psychological theories must be
some basic understanding of what Cosmides and Tooby refer to as ‘our universal
psychological human architecture’ (1997, p. 3). Thus, Buss asserts that evolutionary psychology has ‘profound and revolutionary implications . . . for the
conceptual foundations of the core of each branch of psychology’ (1995, p. 16).
Likewise, according to Cosmides and Tooby, evolutionary psychology ‘is not an
area of study (but) it is a way of thinking about psychology that can be applied to
any topic within it’ (1997, p. 1, emphasis in the original).
A corollary of this view, of course, is that evolutionary psychology cannot on
its own provide a complete explanation of crime, and nor do proponents pretend
that it can. While evolutionary psychology provides the foundation for other theories, it in turn needs these theories in order to help explain variations in the way
that human nature is expressed. The role of other theories in elaborating on the
causes of crime and criminality is the focus of the chapters that follow. In the first
instance, Chapter 3 takes up the idea raised by some evolutionary theorists that
variations in criminality are related to variations in genetic make-up.
3
Heredity
The previous chapter on human nature introduced the role played by genes in criminal behaviour and this chapter on heredity continues that examination. However,
where human nature is the product of the intergenerational transmission of genes
over the course of evolutionary history, this chapter is more narrowly concerned
with the transmission of genes within the family over just one or two generations.
Moreover, the study of human nature is largely concerned with the similarities in
genetic make-up across the human species, while the focus here is on genetic variability and individual differences within a given population. Nevertheless, the two
approaches are quite consistent with one another. The proposal that humans have a
universal, genetically-based, psychological structure does not preclude variations in
the strength with which certain characteristics are possessed by individuals, and
indeed, evolution depends upon a degree of genetic variability within a species.
The aim of this chapter is to examine the extent to which criminality can be
attributed to genetic predispositions that are passed down in the family. The field
of study that examines the relationship between genetic inheritance and the
psychological expression of those genes, in the form of emotions, actions, mood
and personality, is called behavioural genetics. The chapter begins with a brief
overview of behavioural genetics before going on to examine the evidence for the
heritability of criminality.
A primer in behavioural genetics
Behavioural genetics is a specialised and complex field bridging biology and
psychology, and it is not possible to cover it in detail here. However, it is important
that some of the fundamental principles of heredity be understood in order to assess
its role in criminality. A description of key genetic terminology is provided in Table
3.1, and a diagram of the DNA from which genes are made is shown in Figure 3.1.
Laws of heredity
As noted in Chapter 1, the laws of heredity were first demonstrated by Gregor Mendel
in 1865. Mendel showed that each inherited aspect of an organism involves two
genes with one gene taken randomly from each parent. The alternative forms of each
Heredity 43
Table 3.1 Key terms in genetics
Term
Definition and function
DNA
Short for deoxyribonucleic acid, DNA is the material from which genes
are made. The structure of the DNA molecule, famously described as a
double helix, was discovered by Watson and Crick in 1953. It consists of
two tightly twisted strands, known as polynucleotides, and between each
polynucleotide are ‘rungs’, known as base pairs. If unravelled, the DNA
in a single cell would resemble a rope ladder nearly 2 metres in length
(see Figure 3.1). The bases come in four chemical varieties – adenine,
thymine, guanine and cytosine – which are usually shortened to A, T, G
and C. A bases on one polynucleotide always link with T bases on the
other, while G bases always link with C bases. For example, a
hypothetical base sequence of ATTGGGACC on one polynucleotide
would bond with the base sequence TAACCCTGG on the other. It is the
sequencing of the base pairs that codes genetic information. One
complete set of human DNA comprises over 3 billion base pairs, although
the exact purpose of up to 98 per cent of DNA is unknown.
Gene
Genes are specific sections of the DNA molecule. A gene is a combination
of sequential base pairs – anywhere from a few dozen to a few thousand in
length – that work together to perform a task. Functionally, genes are basic
units of heredity that contain information relating to some aspect of an
organism’s construction, and are responsible for the transmission of
characteristics from one generation to the next. While genes have specific
functions, they also typically work in concert with other genes in complex
combinations. For most human characteristics, many genes are involved.
Human have two sets of between 20,000 and 25,000 genes, with one set
inherited from each parent. With the exception of identical twins, the exact
mix of genes for each person is unique. However, about 99.9 per cent of
genes code for basic structure and are responsible for the similarities
among humans; individual variance is accounted for by the remaining
.1 per cent of genes (about 3 million base pairs).
Chromosome Genes come packaged in chromosomes. Chromosomes are rod-shaped
structures comprising tightly packed coils of DNA; a gene for a particular
function occupies a specific location on a specific chromosome, and that
location is identical for all members of the species. Humans have 23 pairs
of chromosomes (thus 46 in total), one set inherited intact from each parent.
Twenty-two of the pairs do not vary by the sex of the individual (and are
referred to as autosomes); the 23rd pair is made up of two sex chromosomes
comprising an X and Y chromosome in males and two X chromosomes in
females. The 23 chromosomes contributed by the father are formed in the
testes in the production of sperm. The father’s 46 chromosomes divide
in a process called meiosis, in which sections from one chromosome of
a pair detach and combine with complementary sections from the other
chromosome of the same pair. In that way, the 23 new chromosomes are
built containing a mix of genes that have come originally from each of the
father’s parents. Fathers can produce either X or Y sex chromosomes. A
similar process occurs in the mother’s ovaries during the formation of an
ovum, except that mothers can only produce X sex chromosomes. Each
parent’s 23 contributing chromosomes provide an alternative set of genetic
instructions (e.g., brown eyes versus blue eyes) which are then selected or
combined in some fashion to construct the offspring.
(Continued overleaf )
44
Heredity
Table 3.1 Continued
Term
Definition and function
Genome
The genome is the full set of chromosomes, and thus it is the complete set of
genetic instructions necessary for making an organism. A copy of the
genome is found in the nucleus of every cell in an organism (except red
blood cells), and in the case of humans, cells number in the trillions. The
Human Genome Project began in 1990 with the task of sequencing the entire
human DNA (i.e., mapping the order of the base-pairs and their location on a
particular chromosome), a task which was largely completed in 2003. In
fact, there is no one human genome – to the extent that people have different
genetic make-ups they necessarily have different genomes. Differences in
base sequences (polymorphisms) between individuals at particular locations
of the DNA molecule are the basis of a person’s so-called DNA fingerprint.
Figure 3.1 A section of the DNA molecule showing the double helix structure.
Heredity
45
gene are called alleles and are rivals for expression in the offspring. Mendel made
this discovery by experimenting with pea plants, examining what happened when
plants displaying alternative versions of a particular aspect were crossed. For
example, some pea plants have purple flowers and some have white flowers. The key
to Mendel’s experimental method was the fact that for some aspects of the pea plant,
one alternative is dominant and the other is recessive, and in the case of flower colour,
purple is dominant over white. Dominant characteristics are displayed when both
genes are dominant, as well as in hybrids where there is one dominant and one recessive gene; recessive characteristics are displayed only when both genes are recessive.
The pattern of genes that underlies an observable characteristic of an organism is
referred to as the genotype, and the observable characteristic itself is called the
phenotype. For pea-flower colour, there are three possible genotypes and two phenotypes: some purple-flowered plants have two purple-flower genes (a purple homozygotic genotype); some purple-flowered plants have one purple-flower gene and one
white-flower gene (a heterozygotic genotype); and all white-flowered plants will
have two white-flower genes (a white homozygotic genotype).
Figure 3.2 shows what happens when plants with these three genotypes are crossed
in all six possible ways. For example, if two purple heterozygotic plants are crossed
(Figure 3.2, iv), in terms of the phenotype 75 per cent of the offspring will be purple
and 25 per cent will be white. However, in terms of the genotype, 25 per cent will
have two purple-flower genes, 50 per cent will have one purple-flower and one
Figure 3.2 Ratios for the transmission of dominant purple (P) and recessive white (w)
genes for different combinations of parental genotypes.
46
Heredity
white-flower gene, and 25 per cent will have two white-flower genes. Thus, half of
the flowers, while displaying the dominant purple trait, carry forward the recessive
white-flower gene which may reappear in subsequent generations. Note, that because
genes are taken from parents randomly, the ratios shown in Figure 3.2 are averages.
For example, it would be theoretically possible (though statistically improbable)
for a particular pair of heterozygotic pea plants to produce all homozygotic whiteflowered offspring.
The principal significance of Mendel’s research was to establish the pattern by
which genes are passed from one generation to the next. The dominant and recessive
nature of some genes is largely a secondary issue. Dominance was important in
Mendel’s experiments because it allowed him to accurately track the genotype of the
offspring. In fact, relatively few traits come in dominant and recessive versions. In
most cases where there is a heterozygotic genotype, the phenotype is a compromise
involving an intermediate design. This outward appearance of blending, however,
does not involve the genes themselves blending – they remain discrete ‘packages’ to
be passed unaltered (unless there is a mutation) down through the generations. Further,
Mendel was aided by the fact that pea-flower colour is a monogenetic trait, that is,
it is controlled by just one gene. In humans, most traits (e.g., height, skin colour,
intelligence) are polygenetic, involving complex combinations of many genes.
Genetic relatedness
The knowledge that exactly half of an offspring’s genes comes from each parent
allows degrees of genetic relatedness (proportion of shared genes) for different
relatives to be calculated. Relatedness is found by the formula r = .5n, where n is
the number of generational links. Thus, parent/child relatedness is .5. Relatedness
diminishes rapidly (halves) for each succeeding generation – it is .25 for grandparents/grandchildren, .125 for great-grandparent/great-grandchildren, and only
.0625 for great-great-grandparents/great-great-grandchildren. Relatedness can
also be calculated for indirect or collateral relationships. Relatedness among full
siblings is .5, .25 for half siblings and for aunts–uncles/nieces–nephews, and .125
for cousins. Note that identical twins are a special case. Identical (or monozygotic) twins are formed when a single ovum splits into two after it has been fertilised by a sperm. Thus identical twins share 100 per cent of their genes – relatedness
is 1. Non-identical fraternal (or dizygotic) twins are formed when two ova are
fertilised around the same time by two different sperm, and thus relatedness is
the same as for normal siblings (.5). As we will see, the different degree of
relatedness for identical and fraternal twins has important implications for genetic
research.
The rapid decay in relatedness as the number of generational links increases
imposes limits on the reach of heredity. To illustrate the point, many Australians
are now interested in their convict heritage, and to be able to claim a forebear on
the First Fleet is for many a matter of pride. However, if we assume nine generations have passed since Australia’s colonial founding in 1788, direct descendants
today would share less than one-thousandth of their genes with their convict
Heredity 47
forebear. (Descendants may find this disappointing or comforting depending on
their point of view.) Looking at the issue another way, genes are rapidly dispersed
throughout the population with each succeeding generation. For example, it has
been estimated that (theoretically at least) it would necessary to go back just 23
generations (around 550 years) for every Briton living today to find a common
ancestor with every other living Briton (Dawkins, 2004).
Again, apart from parent–child and identical twins relationships, relatedness
coefficients are averages. In the random selection of genes from a parent, it would
be possible for a person to inherit a disproportionate number of genes that came
originally from either their grandmother or grandfather. Likewise, siblings may be
more or less similar depending upon the exact parcels of genes that they have
inherited from their parents.
The various claims made about the percentage of shared genes can be the source
of some confusion. For example, how can humans have 98 per cent of their genes
in common with chimpanzees, but share just 50 per cent with each parent? The
answer lies in the distinction between fixed and segregating genes. Around 99.9
per cent of genes are fixed (i.e., the genes come in only one form so there is no
variation in the population) and code for universal physical structures of a species
(Plomin et al., 2002). All humans have these genes, and many are also shared with
other species. The remaining .1 per cent of genes are segregating genes and are
responsible for individual differences. While people do inherit 50 per cent of all
their genes from each parent, the vast majority of these are fixed; it is the 50 per
cent of the .1 per cent segregating genes which are crucial for relatedness.
Genes and behaviour
That people inherit physical characteristics from their parents is entirely uncontroversial; that they might also inherit temperament, personality characteristics and
behavioural patterns is one of the mostly hotly contested issues in criminology.
And yet people have for many years utilised the inheritance of behavioural traits
in selective breeding programs with animals. It is accepted, for example, that
different dog breeds have different temperaments and sometimes even characteristic behaviours (such as the freezing response of pointers). It seems reasonable to
assume as a starting point that the same principle may apply to humans.
The rationale for the effect of genes on behaviour is an extension of the process
by which genes affect physical traits. The role of genes is to control the manufacture
of proteins, and proteins are the bases of the body’s physical structure. Variations in
genes create variations in proteins which in turn cause variations in individual physical attributes. The brain is a physical entity comprising billions of proteins and it
has been estimated that up to 60 per cent of genes are involved in its construction
(Shore, 1997). Like evolutionary psychologists, behavioural geneticists assume
that all behaviour has a biochemical correlate in the brain. Genes for specific
behavioural predispositions direct the manufacture of relevant proteins that are
used to construct particular sections of the brain responsible for that behaviour
(Raine, 2008).
48
Heredity
Recall that traits can be either monogenetic or polygenetic. This distinction has
important implications for the gene–behaviour relationship (Bazzett, 2008;
Plomin et al., 2002; Steen, 1996). Traits which are monogenetic are qualitative in
nature. Because they involve just one gene, qualitative traits are either present or
not present, as prescribed by Mendelian laws of inheritance. (Where the alleles are
not dominant and recessive, there will also be a third intermediate version.) Thus
people fall into distinct categories with respect to the trait, just as Mendel’s peas
were either purple or white and not various shades of pale purple. In the case of
behaviour, qualitative traits may occasionally be associated with specific genetic
disorders, such as Huntington’s disease, a condition which causes jerky body
movements.
Most behavioural traits are polygenetic. Polygenetic traits are quantitative in
nature since the strength with which an individual possesses the trait varies
depending upon the exact mix of genes that they receive. It is the fact that many
genes are involved, present and absent in different combinations from one individual to the next, that permits the variability to occur. Thus, quantitative attributes
are usually normally distributed along a continuum. Most research on quantitative
behavioural traits relies on observational, inferential methods that involve
comparing the behaviours of people according to their degrees of genetic similarity and the similarity of the environments to which they are exposed. Known as
behavioural genetics, this line of research will be our primary focus in this chapter.
The most powerful methods for identifying genetic influences involve the study of
twins and adoptees. Precisely how twin and adoption studies are designed is
outlined a little later in this chapter.
Because criminality falls along a continuum, then any inheritable component is
almost certainly polygenetic. Further, as we will discuss in more depth in Chapter 5
(Personality), ‘criminality’ itself is not a unidimensional construct. Rather, there
are numerous quantitative attributes – for example, risk-taking, impulsiveness,
aggression, callousness – that each may contribute to an increased probability of
criminality. The upshot of this is that the search for a ‘crime gene’ that neatly distinguishes criminals from non-criminals is futile. Instead, to the extent that attributes
related to criminal predispositions are inheritable, it would be expected that many
genes will be involved and that individuals will vary in these attributes by degrees.
Heritability
The complexity of the gene–behaviour relationship is further increased by the fact
that the expression of genetic traits is significantly affected by the environment,
and particularly so in the case of polygenic traits. This point can be clearly illustrated by considering the case of height. A seed planted in fertile ground will grow
more vigorously than a genetically-identical seed planted in barren ground. Likewise for humans, a person may inherit genes for tallness from both parents, but
how tall the person actually grows will depend heavily on environmental factors
such as nutrition, exercise, pollution, climate and standard of living. It is because
of such environmental factors that people today are much taller generally than
Heredity 49
they were in medieval times, and taller even than they were one or two generations ago.
The extent to which variations in a given trait are inherited is referred to as its
heritability. Heritability is expressed as a coefficient that reflects the sources of
variance in a population. For example, the heritability for human height in a
particular sample has been estimated at .8 (Visscher et al., 2006). This means that
when accounting for the height differences among individuals, 80 per cent can be
attributed to genes, with the remaining 20 per cent to environmental factors. In
humans, heritability is usually estimated using twin and adoption studies designed
to tease out the relative contributions of genetic and environmental factors.
However, the exact methods used to calculate heritability coefficients can involve
complex multivariate statistical models, the precise details of which need not
concern us here. (Those readers wishing to follow up on the underlying statistics
of the heritability coefficient can be ‘walked through’ the basic computations by
Walsh, 2009, p. 34.)
Heritability is a term that is frequently misinterpreted so it is important to
clarify a number of issues. First, heritability is not a measure of the extent to
which genes contribute to an attribute; it is a measure of the contribution of genes
to variations in that attribute. For example, genes are completely responsible for
autonomic functions such as heartbeat, but since everybody has a heartbeat (i.e.,
there is no variability), the heritability coefficient is zero. Thus, it is not meaningful to say that 80 per cent of human height is caused by genes, or even that
genes are more important in determining height than is the environment. For any
biosocial trait, genes and the environment are by definition both indispensable,
irrespective of the heritability coefficient. Second, heritability is not fixed, but
may vary from group to group. With respect to height, a country that has a
uniformly high standard of nutrition is likely also to have greater heritability for
height than a country in which levels of nutritional are distributed unevenly
(e.g., half the population is well fed and half malnourished). This is because any
variations in height in the first country will be largely due to genetic differences
(since everyone’s nutritional level is similar), while in the second country variations in height are relatively more likely to be caused by variations in diet. Third,
heritability measures apply only to groups and not to individuals. Heritability
estimates are averages. The circumstances for every person are unique and so
the relative effects of heredity and environment in individual cases cannot be
determined.
We turn now to examine in detail the research on the heritability of crime. The
analysis is presented in two sections. First, the overall relationship between
heritability and criminality is examined. This is followed by a more fine-grained
analysis of variations in the heritability–crime relationship.
Heritability of criminality
Family studies of criminality and antisocial behaviour have consistently revealed
that crime often runs in families (Farrington et al., 2001, 2009; Rowe and
50
Heredity
Farrington, 1997), a fact that any police officer will readily confirm. However,
little can be concluded about the genetic bases of criminality from such family
data alone. Parents not only contribute their genes to their children, they also
potentially have a major influence on their children’s social development. Family
studies cannot disentangle the genetic and environmental influences acting on
children. Twin and adoption studies attempt to overcome this problem by holding
one factor constant while measuring the effect of the other. Importantly, by teasing
out the contributions of heredity and upbringing to criminality, these studies can
tell us just as much about the role of environmental factors as they can about the
role of genetics.1
MZ versus DZ twins
The most common heritability research method is to compare the respective
similarities for a given trait in monozygotic (MZ) twins and dizygotic (DZ) twins.
The rationale for this design lies in the fact that MZ and DZ twins vary in their
relatedness, with MZ twins sharing 100 per cent of their genes and DZ twins
sharing just 50 per cent of their genes (or more accurately, of their segregating
genes). The design is assumed to control for environmental effects since each twin
in a pair should experience much the same upbringing as the other twin. If genes
play a role in behaviour, it would be expected that there would be greater similarity in trait expression between MZ twins than between DZ twins, reflecting
their respective differences in relatedness. Based on the difference between
MZ and DZ twins in their degree of similarity a heritability coefficient can be
calculated.
There have been dozens of published MZ/DZ twin studies examining various
aspects of criminality and related concepts. Many studies utilise one of the large
established twin databases, such as the Danish twin registry, the Swedish Adoption/
Twin Study for Aging and the Minnesota twin registry. Typically, individual
published studies are part of larger, ongoing research program, and criminality is
just one of the heritability issues examined. Twin zygosity is usually determined by
a questionnaire (more than 95 per cent accuracy), blood test (99 per cent accuracy)
(Rhee and Waldman, 2002), and more recently, DNA testing (e.g., Baker et al.,
2007). The review below is organised in terms of the dependent measure of criminality that has been employed, whether that is official criminal convictions or
reported antisocial behaviour.
Criminal convictions
The first twin studies on criminality were conducted in the 1930s and examined
official conviction records (Table 3.2). When the dependent variable is dichotomous
in this way (criminal record versus no criminal record), the degree of similarity
between twins is usually given as a concordance rate. If one twin of a pair displays
a given trait, concordance is the number of cases, expressed as a percentage, in
which the other twin also displays the same trait. Every study in Table 3.2 shows
Heredity 51
Table 3.2 Twin studies showing concordance rates (%) for MZ and DZ twins based on
criminal conviction data
MZ
Author
Location
Sex
N
DZ
Concordance N
Concordance
Lange (1930)
Germany
M
13
77
17
12
Legras (1932)
Holland
M
4
100
5
0
Rosanoff et al. (1934)
U.S.
M
33
67
23
13
F
4
75
5
40
Stumpfl (1936)
Germany
M
18
65
19
37
F
3
67
2
0
Kranz (1936)
Germany
M
32
66
43
54
Slater (1953)
UK
M
2
50
10
30
Borgstrøm (1939)
Finland
M
4
75
5
40
Yoshimasu (1961)
Japan
M
28
61
18
11
Dalgard and Kringlen
(1976)
Norway
M
31
26
54
15
M
73
34
146
18
F
15
20
28
7
Cloninger and Gottesman Denmark
(1987)
Source: Adapted from Raine (1993).
higher concordance rates – on average more than twice as high – for MZ twins than
for DZ twins, suggesting a significant role for genes in criminality.
The studies shown in Table 3.2 vary in their methodological rigour and this had
led many criminologists to question the findings (see Dalgard and Kringlen, 1976).
Several of the early studies had small sample sizes and the determination of
zygosity was based on subjective judgements of the degree of resemblance between
the twins. The validity of two of the German studies (Kranz, 1936; Stumpfl, 1936)
has been further questioned because they were conducted during the Nazi era,
raising suspicions that they may be ideologically tainted. However, later studies are
more rigorous and the differences between MZ and DZ concordance, though rather
more muted, are still substantial. For example, the most recent study by Cloninger
and Gottesman (1987) is the culmination of a research project that extended over
almost twenty years, during which time a series of progress reports was published
(Christiansen, 1970, 1977a, 1977b; Cloninger et al., 1978; Gottesman et al., 1983).
The final data set comprised 4,175 twin pairs from the Danish twin registry with
zygosity determined using a questionnaire. Concordance rates were almost twice
for MZ male twins than for DZ male twins, and nearly three times for female MZ
twins than for DZ female twins. Converting concordance rates to a heritability
coefficient produced an estimate of .54, which is to say that 54 per cent of the
variation in criminality in the sample can be attributed to genetic factors.
52
Heredity
Reported antisocial behaviour
An obvious problem with conviction data is that people may commit offences
without getting caught. An alternative research strategy is to ask respondents or
other informants to provide reports of illegal and antisocial behaviours. Typically
these studies employ standardised behavioural checklists or personality scales
which produce continuous measures (i.e., they vary by degrees) rather than categorical ones as was the case for conviction data. The respective similarities within
MZ and DZ twin pairs are expressed as correlations rather than concordance rates,
before being converted to a heritability coefficient. There is considerable variation
among studies in the ages of the twins in the sample (children, juveniles and adults),
the sources from which information is obtained (self-report, parent reports, teacher
reports), the methods used to collect data (face-to-face interviews, telephone interviews, mail-out surveys), the nature of the dependent variable (actual behaviours,
personality traits, clinical diagnoses), and the psychological domain examined
(antisocial personality, delinquency, aggression, impulsivity, conduct disorder,
etc.). Despite these variations, studies consistently yield heritability coefficients in
the .3–.5 range (Baker et al., 2007; Blonigen et al., 2003; Coccaro et al., 1993,
1997; Edelbrock et al., 1995; Hicks et al., 2004; Jacobson et al., 2000, 2002; Rowe,
1985, 1986; Silberg et al., 1996; Slutske et al., 1997; Taylor et al., 2003).
A brief description of a recent study will give a flavour of this line of research.
Blonigen et al. (2003) studied 89 MZ and 47 DZ pairs of adult male twins (born
between 1961 and 1964) from the Minnesota twin registry. Zygosity was determined using blood tests. Participants completed the Psychopathic Personality
Inventory (PPI) sent to them in the mail and returned the same way. The PPI
comprises 163 self-report items reducing to eight subscales: Machiavellian
Egocentricity (narcissism and self-centredness), Social Potency (charisma and the
ability to manipulate others), Fearlessness (risk-taking), Coldheartedness (callousness and emotional detachment), Impulsive Non-conformity (recklessness and
rebelliousness), Blame Externalisation (rationalisation and guilt-avoidance),
Carefree Nonplanfulness (impulsivity), and Stress Immunity (lack of anxiety).
For MZ twins, correlations for all subscales were significant, ranging from a low
of .28 for Machiavellian Egocentricity to a high of .57 for Blame Externalisation,
with a total scale correlation of .46: for DZ twins, none of the correlations were
significant. (Remember, correlations are not the same as heritability coefficients.)
In other words, while MZ twins tended to be similar to each other on each of the
dimensions measured, there was no such trend for DZ twins. Heritability coefficients for the subscales ranged from .24 for Machiavellian Egocentricity to .56 for
Blame Externalisation, with a total scale heritability of .4.
Despite consistent findings of greater similarity between MZ twins than
between DZ twins, MZ/DZ studies continue to attract criticisms on methodological grounds. In particular, critics challenge the assumption that the MZ/DZ design
effectively controls for environmental influences. It is argued that, because they
are physically more similar, MZ twins are also treated more similarly than are DZ
twins. There is perhaps some validity to this criticism. For example, Carey (1992)
Heredity 53
found that MZ twins imitate each other more so than do DZ twins; that is, to some
extent the similarity between MZ derives from environmental factors. On the
other hand, others have argued that the opposite process can also occur, that MZ
twins may make conscious efforts to distinguish themselves from each other
(Schachter and Stone, 1985). One way to help resolve this issue is to examine the
behaviours of MZ twins reared apart.
MZ twins reared apart
The MZ/DZ design attempts to hold environmental effects constant while examining variations in the genetic make-up of participants. Studies examining MZ twins
reared apart (MZA) do the opposite – they hold the genetic make-up of participants
constant and examine the effects of different environments. In this way, they attempt
to counter criticisms that MZ twins share a more common environment than do DZ
twins. Unfortunately, there are relatively few participants who qualify for inclusion
in such research, so studies of MZA are relatively rare and have small samples.
Because there are so few studies, it is possible to describe the main ones briefly.
Only one MZA study has employed criminal convictions as the dependent variable. Christiansen (1977b) examined eight cases of MZA adult twin pairs, in
which at least one twin had a criminal record, accessed from the Danish twin
registry. Of these cases, there were four pairs for which both twins were criminal.
In addition to the small sample size, a methodological weakness of this study is
that there is no comparison group of DZ twins reared apart (DZA). Nevertheless,
the concordance rate (50 per cent) is higher than that found in most studies for DZ
twins reared together (DZT) and similar to that found for MZ twins reared together
(MZT), so it can be assumed that it would also be higher than that for DZA.
The remaining studies have employed various self-report measures. Tellegen
et al. (1988) examined 44 MZA, 27 DZA, 217 MZT and 114 DZT adult twin pairs
from the Minnesota twin registry. Twins were administered the Multidimensional
Personality Questionnaire (MPQ) comprising 11 subscales: Well-being, Social
Potency, Achievement, Social Closeness, Stress Reaction, Alienation, Aggression,
Control, Harm Avoidance, Traditionalism and Absorption. There were an additional three higher-order factors: Positive Emotionality, Negative Emotionality and
Constraint. While many of these scales do not directly examine antisocial behaviour, they do measure conceptually related concepts and are similar to scales on the
Psychopathic Personality Inventory described earlier. Correlations among MZA
ranged from .29 (Social Closeness) to .61 (for both Stress Reaction and Absorption)
with a median correlation of .49. The correlations were much stronger than for DZA
(median correlation .18) and DZT (median correlation .23), but similar to MZT
(median correlation .52). Heritability coefficients ranged from .39 (Achievement) to
.58 (Constraint), with a median value of .45.
Also drawing participants from the Minnesota twin registry, Grove et al. (1990)
assessed 32 sets of MZA adult twin pairs using the Diagnostic Interview Schedule,
which examines the presence of psychiatric disorder and antisocial personality.
Few participants were found to meet the criteria for a clinical diagnosis, but each
54
Heredity
was awarded scores on four dimensions: alcohol-related problems, drug-related
problems, childhood antisocial behaviour and adult antisocial behaviour. Only
alcohol-related problems showed no evidence of heritability. The other heritability estimates were .45 for drug-related problems, .41 for childhood antisocial
behaviour, and .28 for adult antisocial behaviour.
Finally, Coccaro et al. (1993) examined 74 MZA, 152 DZA, 117 MZT and 157
DZT adult twin pairs from the Swedish Adoption/Twin Study of Aging. Participants
completed a 223-item inventory, with items drawn from nine existing scales, designed
to measure two factors: assertiveness/aggression and irritability/impulsiveness. The
respective within-pair correlations for MZA, MZT, DZA and DZT were .21, .26, .08
and .16 for factor one, and .41, .42, .10 and .18 for factor 2. In keeping with previously discussed trends, MZA are more similar to MZT than they are to either DZA
or DZT. Heritability was estimated at .17 for factor one and .41 for factor two.
Adoption studies
Adoption studies offer an alternative method of overcoming the limitations of the
MZ/DZ twin design. In the full model, adoption studies systematically vary both
genetic and environmental factors in a 2×2 design. This is done by examining
cases where cross-fostering of adopted children has occurred. Biological and
adoptive parents can either be criminal or non-criminal. This means that adopted
children can grow up under one of four possible conditions – they can have criminal biological parents and criminal adoptive parents, criminal biological parents
and non-criminal adoptive parents, non-criminal biological parents and criminal
adoptive parents, and non-criminal biological parents and non-criminal adoptive
parents. By comparing the criminality of adoptees under these conditions, inferences can be drawn about the source of the criminogenic influences. As with twin
studies, because of the logistical difficulty involved in setting up adoption research,
most studies rely on accessing participants through one of the major established
databases, such as the Danish, Swedish and Iowa adoption registries.
Criminal convictions
The most widely cited adoption study of criminality was conducted by Mednick
et al. (1984) and involved the full 2×2 cross-fostering design described above.
Mednick et al. examined the court records of 14,427 Danish adoptees, along with
the records of their biological and adoptive parents. The greatest rate of criminal
conviction among adoptees (24.5 per cent) occurred when both a biological and an
adoptive parent also had a criminal conviction. The next most risky condition was
when a biological parent had a criminal conviction and the adoptive parents did not
(20 per cent). When the biological parents did not have criminal convictions, the
convictions rate for adoptees was 14.7 per cent when the adoptive parent had a
conviction and 13.3 per cent when they did not. Statistically, only the status of the
biological parents was found to increase the likelihood of an adoptee becoming
criminal. It was also found that the number of criminal convictions of the biological
Heredity 55
parent was significantly related to the number of convictions of the adoptee, but that
this applied only to property crime and not to violent crime. Later analysis of the
Danish sample, in which adoptees transferred to their adoptive home later than one
year after birth were excluded, found that both genetic and environmental factors
significantly contributed to property criminality (Baker, 1986; Baker et al., 1989).
Another important series of studies examining conviction data has utilised the
Swedish adoption registry. The first of these studies (Bohman, 1978) found no
evidence for an increased conviction rate among adoptees who had a biological
parent with a criminal record. Later analyses of 862 adoptees, however, found a
biological effect for petty crimes (Bohman et al., 1982; Cloninger et al., 1982;
Sigvardsson et al., 1982), a finding consistent with the Danish studies. Further, Cloninger et al. (1982) found an interaction effect between genetic and environmental
factors. Like Mednick et al. (1984), this study employed a 2×2 design. However,
instead of classifying the biological and adoptive parents solely on the basis of the
presence or absence of a criminal conviction, composite measures of ‘predispositions
to petty criminality’ were calculated using data about criminal convictions, alcohol
abuse, occupation, social status and medical history. In particular, this design
provided a more comprehensive measure of the quality of the family environment in
which the adoptee was raised. Both congenital (the influence of the biological
parents) and postnatal (the influence of the adoptive parents) backgrounds were classified as low and high risk. The rate of criminality among adoptees when both
congenital and post-natal predisposing conditions were high (40 per cent) was more
than twice the rate obtained when the separate effects of high congenital and high
post-natal predisposing factors are combined (18.8 per cent) (see Table 3.3). In other
words, the findings suggest that the effects of genes and environment are not simply
additive – when predisposing genetic and environmental factors occur together they
interact to intensify the impact of one another. The interplay between genes and
environment in this way emphasises the complexity of the biosocial perspective.
Reported antisocial behaviour
A series of studies by Cadoret and colleagues, using the Iowa adoption registry,
has examined the heritability of antisocial personality/behaviour among
Table 3.3 Percentage of adoptees with criminal convictions as a function of congenital and
post-natal predispositions to criminality
Congenital predisposition
to petty criminality (%)
Post-natal predisposition to petty criminality
Source: Adapted from Cloninger et al. (1982).
High
Low
High
Low
40.0
12.1
6.7
2.9
56
Heredity
cross-fostered adoptees (Cadoret, 1978; Cadoret and Cain, 1980; Cadoret et al.,
1983, 1985, 1987, 1990, 1994, 1995). For example, Cadoret et al. (1995) compared
adoptees (95 males and 102 females) who had at least one biological parent diagnosed with antisocial personality disorder and/or a history of alcohol abuse, with
a matched control group of adoptees for whom neither biological parent had a
psychiatric diagnosis. Information about biological parents was gathered from
institutional records, while all adoptees and their adoptive parents were interviewed in person using a standardised diagnostic schedule. Four adoptee outcome
variables were obtained: childhood aggression, adolescent aggression, conduct
disorder and adult antisocial behaviour. The quality of the adoptees’ upbringing
was assessed by gathering evidence about marital, legal, substance abuse and
mental health problems among adoptive parents. It was found that antisocial backgrounds of biological parents predicted increased adolescent aggression, conduct
disorder and adult antisocial behaviour in adoptees. In addition, adverse home
environments in which adoptees were raised independently predicted adult antisocial behaviour. Further, there were interaction effects for adolescent aggression
and conduct disorder. That is, the effect of a biological predisposition was accentuated by the addition of adverse environmental conditions, but adverse environmental conditions alone had no significant effect on these outcomes.
Meta-analyses
A meta-analysis is a way of synthesising the results from multiple comparable
studies. Only studies that meet specified selection criteria for methodological
rigour are included in the analysis. Using various statistical methods, findings
are pooled and the overall statistical significance is calculated for the various
effects. By combining studies in this way, statistical power is maximised and
some general conclusions can be drawn about the dominant trends identified in a
research field.
There have been three major meta-analyses examining the genetic bases of
criminal behaviour and related constructs. Walters (1992) analysed 38 family,
twin and adoption studies. Criminality was defined to include either criminal
conviction or diagnosis of antisocial personality. Heritability estimates were
.41–.43 for family studies, .33–.47 for twin studies and .11–.17 for adoption
studies. Miles and Carey (1997) focused on personality measures of aggression
and antisocial behaviour, examining 24 twin and adoption studies. Depending
upon the statistical model used, heritability was estimated to be up to .5. Finally,
Rhee and Waldman (2002) analysed 51 twin and adoption studies in which the
dependent measure was criminal conviction, clinical diagnosis, reported aggression or reported antisocial personality. Heritability was .41.
The meta-analyses confirm what the literature reviewed in this chapter has
suggested, that the weight of research evidence supports a role for genes in criminal behaviour. Estimates of the extent of that role vary, but on balance it seems
that genetic factors account for something less than half of the variance in criminality, with the remaining variance due to environmental factors.
Heredity 57
Variations in the heritability of criminality
The usual question in criminology is simply to ask if genes play a role in criminality. However, once that question has been answered, then a more fine-grained
analysis needs to occur in order to examine whether heritability varies for different
classes of offenders. This section examines whether genetic factors have differential influence according to offenders’ sex, crime, age and persistence.
Male versus female crime
It was established in the previous chapter that males commit vastly more crimes than
do females. However, whether male or female offenders have stronger inherited
criminal dispositions is a different question. In fact, it has been suggested that
precisely because female crime is relatively infrequent, then it is likely to be the result
of stronger heritability than is the case for males (Widom and Ames, 1988). The logic
for this argument is as follows. Females face much stronger social pressures and
expectations to behave in pro-social ways than do males. These social pressures have
the effect of suppressing criminality in many females who might otherwise have
committed crime. Thus there is a higher criminality threshold for females to cross.
Those relatively few females who overcome these social forces and go on to commit
crimes must therefore have especially strong genetic predispositions to do so.
There is some evidence to support stronger heritability for female crime,
although the findings are often conditional and dependent upon the type of crime
and the age of the offender. In their study of Swedish adoptees, Sigvardsson et al.
(1982) reported that adopted females who committed petty crimes were more than
twice as likely to have at least one biological parent with a criminal record than
was the case for adopted males who had committed petty crime (50 per cent versus
21 per cent). Further, the biological parents of the female offenders had on average
nearly three times the number of convictions than the biological parents of the
male offenders (3.6 versus 1.4). Baker et al. (1989), in their study of Danish adoptees, reported similar findings for property crime. Eley et al. (1999), comparing
MZ and DZ child and adolescent twins, found greater heritability for female nonaggressive antisocial behaviour when compared with that of males, but they found
no sex differences for aggressive antisocial behaviour. In Jacobson et al.’s (2002)
twin study, greater heritability was found for female than male antisocial behaviour in childhood, but these differences disappeared in adolescence and adulthood. However, a number of studies have failed to find sex differences in
heritability (Cadoret and Cain, 1980; Hicks et al., 2004; Jacobson et al., 2002),
and some have found greater heritability for male crime (Cadoret et al., 1985).
So where does this leave the issue? Two meta-analyses have examined male and
female heritability. Examining psychometric measures of aggression and antisocial
behaviour, Miles and Carey (1997) found that, contrary to the conclusions drawn
from studies examining conviction data, heritability was slightly stronger in males
than in females, though substantial for both. Rhee and Waldman (2002), looking at
broader measures of antisocial behaviour, found stronger heritability for female
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Heredity
crime when all studies in the meta-analysis were included. However, the authors
believed that the inclusion of studies in which only male offenders were examined
may have skewed the findings, since these studies often used less stringent criteria
for criminality that reduced levels of heritability. When a more rigorous selection
rule was adopted, and only those studies that included both males and females were
examined, no significant difference for heritability was found. The most parsimonious conclusion would seem to be that greater heritability for female crime remains
to be proven.
Violent versus property crime
Where the issue has been examined, most studies have either found heritability for
property and ‘petty’ crime but no heritability for violent crime (Baker, 1986;
Bohman et al., 1982; Cloninger et al., 1982; Mednick et al., 1984; Sigvardsson
et al., 1982), or stronger heritability for property crime than for violent crime
(Cloninger and Gottesman, 1987). This finding has puzzled researchers. Intuitively, it might be expected that the reverse would be the case. Violent crime
would seem more likely to be a result of psychological deficits while property
crime more likely to be an outcome of social learning and peers influence. Thus,
violent crime would seem the stronger candidate for heritability.
One theoretical explanation for the unexpected findings in adults may be
provided by the distinction between prudent and imprudent offending (Thornton,
1987). Prudent offending refers to crimes in which offenders calculate the advantages to themselves from offending, and proceed with the offence in full knowledge of the likely harm and distress that will be caused to victims. Thus, theft and
other acquisitive offences are typically prudent in nature. Imprudent offending, on
the other hand, occurs more or less spontaneously with little planning or wellformulated intentions. Arguably, many assaults and even murders fall into this
category. Thornton and Reid (1982) found that prudent offenders exhibited greater
levels of egocentric, instrumental moral reasoning than did imprudent offenders.
It is significant that definitions of antisocial personality disorder emphasise the
callous disregard for the plight of others. It will also be recalled from the previous
chapter that ‘cheating’ was advanced as a genetically-based alternative to altruistic, law-abiding behaviour. When looked at in this way, the finding of stronger
heritability for property crime than violent crime is perhaps not so surprising.
However, some researchers have pointed to methodological limitations of the
research to account for the low heritability found for violent offending. Violent
crime is less frequent than property crime and it is argued that when conviction is
used as the dependent measure, the low base rates may reduce the statistical power
needed to detect heritability effects (Raine, 1993). When self-report or informantreport measures of aggression and violent antisocial behaviour are used, the
evidence for heritability of aggression is generally stronger (Burt, 2009; Coccaro
et al., 1997; Eley et al., 1999; Tellegen et al., 1988). These measures can pick up
violent incidents that otherwise would go undetected so arguably are more sensitive than convictions. Moreover, self-report and psychological measures may
Heredity 59
better identify individuals who consistently and instrumentally behave in violent
antisocial ways, as opposed to those who may be convicted for isolated acts of
imprudent violence. As we shall see in Chapter 4, support for the argument that
the failure to detect heritability for violent crime is a methodological artefact is
provided by evidence linking specific genes to violence.
Juvenile versus adult crime
Research has generally found much stronger heritability for adult crime than for
juvenile crime. Reviewing seven twin studies on juvenile delinquency, Raine
(1993) calculated overall concordance rates of 84 per cent for MZ twins and 69
per cent for DZ twins. While this indicates greater similarity between MZ twins
than between DZ twins and thus the influence of genetic factors, the difference is
relatively small when compared to that typically found for adults (see Table 3.2).
Likewise, adoption studies generally find relatively weak evidence of heritability
for juvenile crime (Bohman, 1972; Cadoret, 1978; Cadoret et al., 1983). As with
the findings for violent offending, heritability for delinquency is often stronger
when self-report and informant-report measures are used rather than conviction
data (Baker et al., 2007; Edelbrock et al., 1995; Grove et al., 1990; Jacobson
et al., 2000; Silberg et al., 1996; Slutske et al., 1997).
There are three main explanations for the weaker heritability found for juvenile
crime. The first is that the genetic factors underlying crime do not ‘switch on’ until
late adolescence (Raine, 1993). According to this argument, the full effect of
genetic predispositions depends upon mature brain structures being in place, and
for some crucial sections of the brain, such as prefrontal areas, this does not occur
until early adulthood (see Chapter 4). The second explanation is that social factors
play a greater role in offending for young people than is the case for adults. Juvenile delinquency typically occurs in groups, and young people are particularly
susceptible to the influence of peers. The power of social pressures to offend overrides genetic influences in young offenders. The third argument is that low average
heritability coefficients mask important variations in heritability in subgroups of
delinquents. That is, while some juvenile offenders have strong heritability for
crime, most do not, and unless these two groups are considered separately, the
overall finding will be of weak heritability. This argument is considered more
fully below.
Adolescent-limited versus life-course persistent crime
As outlined in previous chapters, criminal-careers researchers have often distinguished between two classes of offenders. Adolescent-limited (AL) offenders
begin offending in adolescence and desist from offending as they mature in early
adulthood; life-course persistent (LCP) offenders show early signs of conduct
disorders in childhood and continue to offend throughout their adult years. It is
suggested that there are different aetiologies for these two classes of offender. AL
offending is associated with normal developmental changes and social factors
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Heredity
specific to adolescence; LCP offending, on the other hand, is a consequence of
antisocial predispositions that are evident at an early age and are stable over time.
Greater heritability would therefore be predicted for LCP offending than for AL
offending (Eley et al., 1999; Miles and Carey, 1997; Rhee and Waldman, 2002).
There is good evidence for the heritability of LCP offending. Childhood
conduct disorders have been shown to have strong heritability (Baker et al., 2007;
Edelbrock et al., 1995; Grove et al., 1990). It has also been shown that behavioural and emotional problems in childhood are good predictors of adolescent and
adult criminality (Caspi et al., 1995; Grove et al., 1990; Langbehn et al., 1998).
However, to date there is little research that directly tests the assumed differences
in heritability between LCP and AL offending. To do so it would be necessary to
conduct a longitudinal study following cohorts of twins and/or adoptees from
childhood through to adulthood, and comparing subgroups of LCP and AL
offenders.
One study has partially fulfilled this requirement. Taylor et al. (2000) examined
heritability for antisocial behaviour as a function of age of onset, with early onset
assumed to be predictive of LCP offending. The researchers studied three groups
of boys: 36 early-starter delinquents (LCP), 86 late-starter delinquents (AL), and
25 non-delinquents. Each participant was one of a twin. Participants were first
tested at age 11 and followed for six years, being retested at the ages of 14 years
and 17 years. Early starters were defined as boys who already showed signs of
antisocial behaviour on intake at age 11. Late starters were boys who showed no
signs of antisocial behaviour at age 11, but did show signs when retested at age 14
years or 17 years. Non-delinquents showed no signs of antisocial behaviour at any
of the three testing periods. Taylor et al. found that, when compared with late
starters and non-delinquents, early starters exhibited higher rates of psychopathology (attention deficit hyperactivity disorder and oppositional defiant disorder)
and personality measures indicating deficits in control (impulsivity, negative
emotionality and lack of constraint). While early starters also reported more antisocial peers than do the other two groups, late starters reported an increase in
antisocial peers just prior to the onset of their antisocial behaviour, a pattern
consistent with an AL offending. In terms of twin analysis, for early starters,
concordance rates were 55 per cent for MZ twins and 29 per cent for DZ twins,
with the difference between the two rates indicating high heritability. For late
starters, concordance rates were 43 per cent for MZ twins and 39 per cent for DZ
twins, a relatively small difference that indicates low heritability. These results
suggest that early starters had stronger predispositions to antisocial behaviour,
and that these predispositions were more likely to have a genetic base, than was
the case for late starters. A limitation of Taylor et al.’s study, however, is that
participants were not followed past adolescence. Thus, while the study was able
to examine patterns of onset, it did not examine patterns of desistance.
Nevertheless, on the available evidence it seems likely that there is stronger heritability for LCP offending than for AL offending, and this finding reinforces an
important theme of this book. Offenders are a heterogenous population. When heritability estimates for crime are cited, it is important to keep in mind that these are
Heredity 61
averages, and that individual offenders will vary considerably in the extent to which
they possess criminal predispositions. Despite the overall evidence for the heritability of crime, for many convicted offenders there may be no significant elevation
of inherited criminal dispositions when compared with the general population.
Beyond behavioural genetics: molecular genetics
This chapter has reviewed research that has examined the relationship between
genes and behaviour indirectly through the techniques of behavioural genetics.
The link between behaviour and genes has been inferred – the genes themselves
were not examined. In recent years, however, the Human Genome Project has
stimulated enormous advances in the gene technology. The mapping of the human
genome involved sequencing the 3 billion base pairs that comprise the complete
set of human DNA. Each gene occupies a specific location on a specific chromosome, and the task of the Human Genome Project was to identify the location of
each gene. Identifying genes, however, is not the same as determining what those
genes do. Researchers are now busily matching specific genes to specific functions. The direct examination of the causal relationship between the structure of
DNA and genetic expression in this way is referred to as molecular genetics. (At
this point the reader should be familiar with the contents of Table 3.1.)
As noted earlier, most genes are fixed; that is, they come in only one variety and
so they do not differ from one person to the next. No matter who your parents are,
you will inherit the same copy of the gene from each of them. Where there are at
least two alternative versions of a gene – alleles – within the gene pool, then variation can occur among humans according to Mendelian laws of inheritance. A
gene that comes in more than one version is called a genetic polymorphism. For
example, genetic polymorphisms are responsible for some people having blue
eyes and some people having brown eyes. There are three types of polymorphism
(Beaver, 2009). The most common variation (accounting for around 90 per cent of
all polymorphisms) is called a single nucleotide polymorphism (SNP). In an SNP,
one allele is distinguished from another allele by variation in just one of the base
pairs that define that gene. For example, instead of the base sequence
ATTGGGACC found in one allele, another allele might have the sequence
ATTAGGACC. The second type of polymorphism is called a microsatellite, also
known as a short tandem repeat. In this variation, alleles differ in length; that is,
one has more base pairs than the other. This occurs when small sections of the
gene – usually up to four sequential base pairs – are repeated a number of times.
For example, one allele may include the sequence ATTGGAGGACC (two
repeats of GGA) while another has the sequence ATTGGAGGAGGAGGACC
(four repeats of GGA). The third type of polymorphism is called a minisatellite,
also know as variable number tandem repeats (VNTP). Minisatellites are similar
to microsatellites, except there are many more sequential base pairs are repeated
(more than 20) and they may be repeated many times.
By comparing sequences of DNA from a particular chromosomal location taken
from different people, molecular geneticists seek to link genetic polymorphisms with
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Heredity
phenotypic variations. In other words, they examine whether different versions of a
particular gene produce different observable outcomes. There is accumulating
evidence linking specific genes to behaviour, personality traits and psychological
disorders. In many cases a single gene has pleiotropic effects; that is, it is responsible
for a number phenotypic outcomes, suggesting that different behavioural problems
may have a common genetic basis (Beaver, 2009). Most behaviour-related research
has been conducted on genes that are responsible for the regulation of biochemicals
in the brain that in turn help to regulate behaviour (to be discussed in more detail in
the following chapter). Polymorphisms of these genes have been identified as playing
a role in an increased probability of impulsive, violent, addictive and antisocial
behaviours (Beaver, 2009; Cardon, 2002; Caspi et al., 2002; Plomin et al., 2002).
One gene that has attracted a good deal of research is called D4DR, located on
chromosome 11 (Beaver, 2009). The job of D4DR is to help regulate the functioning of dopamine, a chemical in the brain associated with feelings of pleasure and
euphoria. D4DR is polymorphic and comes in numerous varieties. The polymorphisms are minisatellites that involve a 48 base pair sequence that is repeated
between two and 11 times depending upon the allele. The allele that has the sevenrepeat sequence causes a reduced availability of dopamine. Because dopamine is
associated with feelings of pleasure, reduced access to dopamine can increase an
individual’s tendency to engage in pleasure-seeking behaviours in an effort to
compensate for the reduction. Low levels of dopamine have been linked to the
personality trait of novelty-seeking and have been associated with increased risk of
attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), conduct disorder and pathological
gambling (Noble et al., 1998; Rowe et al., 2001). It should be noted that D4DR is
estimated to account for just 4 per cent of the variance for novelty-seeking (Benjamin
et al., 1996). This finding reinforces the polygenetic nature of quantitative traits –
D4DR is likely to be just one of many genes that contribute to sensation seeking.
In an exciting development, interactions between genes and the environment
(GxE) have also been observed at the molecular level. Caspi et al. (2002) examined the relationship between childhood maltreatment and the monoamine oxidase
A (MAOA) gene, located on the X chromosome. MAOA is an enzyme that helps
break down other biochemicals (including dopamine). Researchers have found a
relationship between conduct disorders and a minisatellite polymorphism of the
MAOA gene that causes low availability of the enzyme (Brunner et al., 1993;
Manuck et al., 2000). However, Caspi et al. (2002) subsequently found that the
increased antisocial behaviour in individuals who had the low-activity version of
the gene only occurred if they had also been maltreated as children. The allele on
its own had no direct criminogenic effect. Researchers are increasingly interested
in the implications of the complex interplay between genes and environment
(Delisi et al., 2008; Moffitt, 2005), and we will revisit this issue in later chapters.
Conclusion and evaluation
There is now an extensive body of research that has examined heritability for
crime. Studies have employed different research strategies (MZ versus DZ twins,
Heredity 63
MZ twins raised apart and cross-fostered adoptees), have been conducted on large
samples from different countries (notably Denmark, Sweden and the USA), and
have operationalised criminality in different ways (convictions, reported behaviour, and psychological and clinical assessment). The overwhelming weight of the
research findings is that there is a significant inherited component of criminality,
probably accounting for between .3 and .5 of the variance.
This conclusion is not widely accepted in criminology. Critics have countered
claims that there is heritability for crime with methodological criticism of genetic
research. To be sure, there are methodological limitations to be considered.
Zygosity, especially in early studies, was not always reliably assessed. But if
anything, misattributed zygosity is most likely to have reduced rather than
increased observed differences between MZ and DZ twins. It may also be true that
MZ twins are exposed to more similar environments than are DZ twins, leading to
overestimates of genetic effects. However, studies examining MZ twins reared
apart and cross-fostered adoptees overcome this problem and have reported
similar findings to those of traditional twin studies. Undoubtedly too, individual
studies may be examined to find particular weaknesses in design and execution.
However, it seems implausible that methodological biases could fully account for
all of the positive findings for heritability from over a hundred different studies. It
is hard to escape the conclusion that many criminologists simply do not want to
believe that genes play a role in crime.
To date, most research examining the genetic bases of crime has been in the
field of behavioural genetics and this has been our focus in this chapter. Studies
infer genetic effects based on the similarities in behaviour between individuals as
a function of their genetic relatedness. The genes themselves are not actually
studied. However, there have been enormous advances in gene technology in the
past decade or so and increasingly the field of molecular genetics is being applied
to understanding behaviour. Already a number of specific genes have been implicated in violent and antisocial behaviour. This does not mean that we are closer to
finding the crime gene – because there is no such gene – but it suggests that
genetic research is here to stay in criminology and destined to become even more
important.
Nevertheless, it is important to keep the findings in context. Criminologists
should not be frightened by genetic research, because what the research shows us
most clearly is just how dependent gene expression is on environmental influences. Across the board, environmental factors were found to be at least as strong,
and probably stronger, than genetic factors, in explaining variations in criminality,
accounting for between .5 and .7 of the variance. The genetic research cannot be
interpreted as supporting the idea of the ‘born criminal’.
Heritability coefficients also disguise important variations within offender
populations. While heritability will be strong for some offenders, many offenders
are likely to have no particular genetic predisposition for crime. One possibility
explored in this chapter was that there was stronger heritability for LCP offending
than for AL offending. But beyond broad classifications such as this, it must be
remembered that heritability coefficients tell us nothing about individual offenders.
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Heredity
The circumstances for each offender are complex and unique, and there is no way
to apportion genetic and environmental influences in individual cases.
One particularly important finding was evidence for a GxE interaction. The
addition of adverse post-adoption conditions had a relatively greater impact on
adoptees with a genetic predisposition to antisocial behaviour than it did on
adoptees without a genetic predisposition to antisocial behaviour (Cadoret et al.,
1985; Cloninger et al., 1982). Evidence of a GxE interaction was also found at a
molecular-genetic level (Caspi et al., 2002). The finding of GxE interactions takes
the biosocial perspective beyond the conclusion that both genes and environment
are separately important in crime; a gene–environment interaction means that the
effect of the same environment varies from individual to individual depending
upon the individual’s genetic makeup. Thus, environmental risk-factors are not
experienced equally; some individuals are genetically more susceptible to criminogenic environments and some are more resilient. Put another way, genes
responsible for criminal dispositions may remain dormant unless they are activated by specific environmental conditions.
The current chapter was limited to establishing whether there was heritability
for crime. There was little discussion of how genes affect behaviour. The biological pathway from genes to crime, via the brain, is the focus of Chapter 4.
Note
1 Most modern heritability studies further divide environmental influences into two
components: shared and non-shared. Shared environments refer to experiences an individual has in common with other members of the family and non-shared environments
refer to the unique experiences of an individual. We will leave discussion of this issue
until Chapter 6.
4
The brain
Genes may be responsible for certain behavioural predispositions, but they do not
themselves produce behaviour. The behavioural expression of genes occurs indirectly. Genes guide the construction of the brain and it is the brain that is responsible for the initiation, performance and maintenance of behaviour and other
psychological processes. The brain takes over where genes leave off. At the same
time, the brain is not a wholly genetically-engineered organ. Genes determine the
basic architecture of the brain and are responsible for a certain amount of hardwiring. But it would be impossible for the brain to come pre-programmed to deal
with all of the contingencies and challenges that will arise in an individual’s lifetime. The brain is adaptive and every experience causes a biological change within
it. Consequently, the brain that you possess now is physically very different from
the one you had when you were born. It is the essential plasticity of the brain that
is the basis for the biosocial nature of behaviour.
Examined in this chapter is the pivotal role in criminal behaviour played by the
brain as it mediates between internal biological inputs and external environmental
inputs. The area of psychology concerned with brain structure and function is
neuropsychology. Neuropsychologists examine the biological events in the brain
that underlie human action, emotion and thought, including those associated with
criminal behaviour. They are concerned with both normal brain structures and functions, and with the behavioural implications of brain impairments. We begin with an
overview of the general field of neuropsychology, before moving to a more specific
discussion of neuropsychological correlates and explanations of criminal behaviour.
Basic brain structures and functions
Neuropsychology, like behavioural genetics, is a specialist field and it is beyond
the scope of this book to cover it in detail here. What follows, then, is a simplified
description of basic brain structures and functions that are especially relevant to
neuropsychological explanations of crime.
The nervous system
The brain is part of the body’s nervous system, a network of nerve cells – or
neurons – that is responsible for all psychological, behavioural and physiological
66
The brain
activity. The basic job of a neuron is to relay information. Neurons come in a
variety of shapes and have different specialised functions, but most comprise four
main structures. The body of the neuron is called the soma and houses the basic
machinery of the cell. Extending from the soma are tree-like fibres – hundreds or
even thousands in number – called dendrites, which have receptors responsible for
receiving messages from other neurons. Also extending from the soma is a slender
tube called an axon, which is responsible for sending messages. The axon divides
and branches, and at the ends of the branches are terminal buttons from which the
messages are sent. A simplified diagram of a neuron is shown in Figure 4.1.
The nervous system is divided into two parts: the central nervous system (CNS)
and the peripheral nervous system (PNS) (see Figure 4.2). The CNS comprises the
brain and the spinal cord and is the body’s ‘command centre’. The brain receives
and processes stimuli from inside and outside of the body, it interprets and stores
information, and it dispatches messages to initiate responses. The spinal cord is
connected to the base of the brain and primarily acts as a conduit between the
brain and the rest of the body below the neck.
The PNS, as the name suggests, comprises the network of neurons outside the
CNS and extending to the extremities of the body. The function of the PNS is to
carry messages to and from the CNS. Sensory neurons provide information to the
CNS about the body and the outside world gathered from internal and external
sensory organs; motor neurons deliver commands from the CNS to muscles,
glands and organs to control movement and the performance of bodily functions.
Figure 4.1 A neuron.
The brain
67
Figure 4.2 Flow diagram of the nervous system.
The PNS is further divided into two parts: the somatic and the autonomic
nervous systems. The somatic nervous system is connected to the skeletal muscles
and governs voluntary actions. The behaviours involved in reading this book –
sitting comfortably, focusing on the words, turning the pages – are products of
your somatic nervous system. The autonomic nervous system (ANS) controls the
body’s involuntary functions such as heart rate, respiration, digestion, pupil dilation, perspiration, and so forth. These processes occur automatically and are
largely (though not entirely) outside of personal control.
Finally, the ANS comprises two parts: the sympathetic and the parasympathetic
nervous systems. These two systems work together but in opposing directions.
The sympathetic nervous system generally acts to increase autonomic functioning
and is responsible for the so-called flight-or-fight response. When faced with
a stressor, the body automatically prepares itself to respond with maximum
68
The brain
efficiency by increasing heart rate, increasing respiration, diverting blood to the
muscles and so on. The parasympathetic nervous system, on the other hand, acts
to slow autonomic functioning and restore equilibrium, allowing the body to ‘rest
and digest’. As we shall see, some offenders have been found to differ markedly
from non-offenders in the functioning of their ANS.
Biochemical messengers
Ultimately all behaviour can be traced back to the actions of chemicals that
transmit messages within the brain and around the body. There are two main categories of such biochemicals: neurotransmitters and hormones. Neurotransmitters
are responsible for fast-acting communication among neurons; hormones are
slower-acting and are transmitted via the bloodstream.
Neurotransmitters
Neurons are not physically connected to one another, and because of this any one
neuron can connect with perhaps thousands of other neurons. Communication
between two neurons across the miniscule gap between them – called the synaptic
cleft – involves a combination of electrical and biochemical activity. When a neuron
is stimulated, it generates minute amounts of electrical voltage. This causes a tiny
glob of neurotransmitter to be released from the neuron’s terminal buttons and to
travel across the synaptic cleft to the dendrite of another neuron, where it alters the
electrical charge of the receiving neuron. The connection made between two neurons
is called a synapse. Once a synapse between two neurons has occurred, those neurons
become more receptive to future intercommunication in a process called long-term
potentiation. It is through this strengthening of the connections between neurons with
repeated activity that neuronal circuits are laid down and learning takes place.
There are at least 75 types of neurotransmitters and each one binds only with
certain receptor sites, ensuring that messages go to the right neurons. Different
neurons in turn may be associated with particular psychological functions, and
excessive or deficient levels of the relevant neurotransmitter can produce harmful
effects. Neurotransmitter levels can be affected by a combination of genetic and
environmental factors. A number of specific genetic polymorphisms have been
implicated in variations in neurotransmitter production, while levels also fluctuate
in response to emotional stressors and other life events (Beaver, 2009; Caspi et al.,
2002). Scientists have used knowledge about the role of neurotransmitters to
develop drugs to treat some disorders. For example, low levels of the neurotransmitter serotonin are implicated in severe depression, and so some medications for
depression (such as Prozac) are designed to stimulate serotonin activity. Note that
the effects of a neurotransmitter depend more on the type of receptors to which it
binds than on its chemical composition per se, and so the same neurotransmitter
can be associated with multiple effects depending upon where it goes. Some of the
main neurotransmitters associated with psychological functioning are shown in
Table 4.1.
The brain
69
Table 4.1 Neurotransmitters and their associated effects
Neurotransmitter
Associated with neurons involved with . . .
Dopamine
Serotonin
Emotional arousal, pleasure, voluntary movement
Sleep, appetite, impulse control, aggression,
anxiety, depression
Norepinephrine
Emotional arousal, anxiety, fear
Acetlycholine
Learning, cognition, memory
Gamma-aminobutyric acid (GABA) Sexual functions, growth, motor functions
Hormones
Hormones are produced by the endocrine system, a collection of glands that are
located throughout the body. Endocrine glands include the adrenal glands, the
thyroid gland, the pituitary gland, and the sex glands or gonads (ovaries and testicles). Chemically, hormones are similar, and in some cases identical, to neurotransmitters. For example, the hormone noradrenaline (produced by the adrenal glands)
is the same as the neurotransmitter norepinephrine, and both have similar effects
(triggering physiological arousal). However, hormones are secreted into the bloodstream and delivered directly to organs, muscles and other glands around the body.
In comparison to neurotransmitters, hormones are relatively slow-acting.
Like neurotransmitters, different hormones are associated with different functions. Of particular interest to criminologists are the hormones secreted by the sex
glands. The major sex hormones are estrogens and androgens. Both classes of
hormones are present in males and females alike, but in vastly different amounts.
Most men produce 6–8 mg of testosterone (an androgen) per day, compared to
most women who produce 0.5 mg daily. Estrogens are also present in both sexes,
but in larger amounts for women. Sex hormones have both organisational and
activating effects. Organisational effects refer to the permanent physical changes
that occur during an individual’s formative years, such as the development
of secondary sex characteristics during puberty (e.g., breasts in females, beards
in males). Activating effects refer to temporary changes in the body and psychological functioning and include the production of sperm, ovulation and sexual
arousal.
Anatomy of the brain
In the late eighteenth century, Franz Gall developed the theory of phrenology,
which proposed that personality could be assessed by reading the bumps on
an individual’s head that were assumed to correspond to overdeveloped sections
of the brain below. While Gall’s principles of phrenology were fanciful and
quickly dismissed by the scientific community, the basic idea that different
parts of the brain are responsible for different functions is the basis of modern
neuropsychology.
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The brain
For classification purposes, the brain is usually divided into the hindbrain, the
midbrain and the forebrain, each of which contains several sub-divisions. The
hindbrain sits at the top of the spinal chord and is evolutionarily the oldest part of
the brain, sharing similarities with brain structures of other animals. Together the
subsections of the hindbrain regulate vital functions such as breathing and blood
circulation, and coordinate motor activity, equilibrium and sleep patterns. The
midbrain sits above the hindbrain and forms part of the brain stem that connects
the forebrain to the spinal cord. It is the smallest part of the brain – around 2 centimetres in length – and is primarily concerned with relaying auditory and visual
information. The forebrain is the uppermost part of the brain and is the largest
and most recently evolved structure. It deals with complex sensory, emotional,
cognitive and behavioural functions. A map of the brain is shown in Figure 4.3.
The largest and most complex of the forebrain substructures is the cerebral
cortex, accounting for 80 per cent of total brain mass. It is the cortex which is
largely responsible for the superior intelligence of humans. It comprises a layer
of cells that covers the entire forebrain and is often referred to as grey matter.
The cortex is physically divided into two hemispheres – the right and left –
connected by a collection of nerve fibres called the corpus callosum. There is
some division – or lateralisation – in the function of each hemisphere although
Figure 4.3 Cross-section of the brain showing hindbrain, midbrain and forebrain.
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there is also considerable overlap between hemispheres. The right hemisphere
tends to be associated with creativity and spatial manipulation, while the left
hemisphere tends to be associated with language and reasoning. For some functions, such as perception and motor behaviour, each hemisphere manages the
activities of the opposite side of the body.
Each hemisphere can be further divided into four lobes – parietal, occipital,
temporal and frontal. Thus there are two versions of each lobe – a left and right
version. In reality, the lobes are not defined by clear physical boundaries and functions tend to merge into one another (see Figure 4.4). The parietal lobes are at the
top of the head and are involved with movement, orientation, perception and recognition of stimuli, and sensory experiences. The occipital lobes are at the back of
the head and are involved with processing visual information. The temporal
lobes are located at the side of the head around the temples, and are involved with
hearing and speech. Finally, the frontal lobes are located at the front of the head
behind the forehead and are involved with motor behaviour, abstract thinking,
reasoning, planning, impulse control, problem solving, emotions and social skills.
Collectively, the complex cognitive processes of the frontal lobe are known as
executive function, and are particularly associated with the anterior (forward)
region known as the prefrontal cortex. It is obvious from the brief description
above that the frontal lobes, in particular, are associated with attributes and
behaviours related to the ability to sustain socially-appropriate behaviours.
Figure 4.4 Side view of the lobes of the cerebral cortex.
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Brain development and the environment
The human brain weighs about 350 grams at birth and will grow to around 1,400
grams by adulthood. While people are born with all the neurons that they will ever
have – in fact, neurons begin to die off from birth – most of the connections
among neurons are yet to develop. The growth of the brain is a product of the
relentless proliferation of synapses and neuronal circuits. Axons and dendrites
grow in length and complexity as they reach out to make connections with other
neurons. The trillions of neuronal connections that ultimately become established
develop in response to each individual’s unique interaction with his/her environment. These neuronal connections in turn govern how the individual responds to
new environments.
The most rapid growth in the brain occurs in the first few years of life, and by
the age of 3 the main brain structures are in place to provide the foundation for
future cognitive and behavioural development. The localisation of function in the
brain begins at birth but in these first few years, in particular, there is a high degree
of brain plasticity. At this point, many areas of the cortex are not committed to
specific functions and the young brain has the capacity to reorganise its structure
and utilise alternative locations if the original sites are damaged. The number of
neuronal circuits continues to increase during childhood, but after the age of 10,
weak or underused connections begin to be pruned to make room for more important and enduring ones. The result is that by early adulthood the brain is less
adaptable but more efficient and powerful than it was during childhood. Brain
maturation continues into the twenties with the final development of the frontal
lobe (Anderson, 2002; Steinberg, 2005). Because brain structures develop over
time, there are biologically-determined limits on cognitive functioning at given
stages of life. Children and adolescents simply do not have the cognitive machinery
to make some of the complex moral decisions that can be made by adults.
Researchers have distinguished between two ways in which environmental
experiences become incorporated into the structure of the brain: experienceexpectant and experience-dependent brain development (Black and Greenough,
1997). Experience-expectant mechanisms involve environmental inputs that
guide the development of species-typical functions. The associated brain structures are genetically hard-wired and have evolved to prepare members of the
species to deal with the environments they can be expected to encounter. However,
these structures depend upon the individual receiving particular environmental
stimuli to activate normal brain development. For example, in order to properly
develop, the section of the cortex dealing with vision requires that the host individual be exposed to light. Experience-dependent mechanisms, on the other hand,
involve environmental inputs that create new neuronal connections in response to
individual differences in genetic make-up and each individual’s idiosyncratic
experiences. Experience-dependent synapses are made throughout the lifespan
and allow individuals to learn new skills and to adapt to the changing demands of
everyday life. For example, learning to play the piano is an experience-dependent
process. The brain of a person who has learned to play the piano is physically
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different from the brain of someone who hasn’t. Together, experience-expectant
and experience-dependent mechanisms provide the neurological basis for the
biosocial approach advanced in the preceding chapters. Brain development
involves a combination of species-typical and individually-inherited structures,
both of which are shaped and built upon by specific environmental experiences.
Deficits in appropriate stimulation at crucial developmental stages can have
irreparable effects on cognitive abilities and social behaviour. In a classic series of
studies with rhesus monkeys, Harlow and Harlow (1962) found that monkeys who
were deprived of maternal contact as babies developed severe and permanent
behavioural pathologies, and especially an inability to form emotional attachments with other monkeys. Later research exploring the neurological bases of
these behavioural effects found (among other things) that stimulus-deprived
monkeys had less complex synaptic connections in their cortex (Kraemer, 1992).
It is of course not possible to conduct similar experiments on children but sometimes circumstances provide the opportunity to conduct natural experiments to
examine the detrimental effects of stimulus deprivation on brain development.
For example, Rutter et al. (2004) studied children discovered in Romanian orphanages after the fall of that country’s communist regime. While in the orphanages,
children were left alone in their cribs for extended periods without adult interaction. Many of these children were subsequently adopted by families in Great
Britain. Those children adopted before the age of six months showed considerable
cognitive and social improvements in their new environments. However, those
adopted after this age had severe and persistent cognitive and social deficits,
accompanied by below-average head size.
In the following sections, research evidence linking neuropsychological
processes with criminal, violent and antisocial conduct is reviewed. The
reviews examine psychophysiological, biochemical, neuroanatomical and neuroenvironmental correlates of crime.
Psychophysiology and crime
Psychophysiology is broadly concerned with the relationship between psychological processes and the nervous system. Of particular interest to psychologists
and criminologists is the functioning of the ANS. Recall that the ANS governs
involuntary physiological processes such as respiration, heart rate and perspiration. These processes in turn are related to emotional arousal and regulation. The
experience of psychological stress increases autonomic functioning via the
sympathetic nervous system. These physiological reactions can be easily observed
through non-invasive techniques; for example, by measuring heart rate or electrodermal activity. The literature typically reports arousal under three different
experimental conditions: (1) resting (in the absence of obvious stressors); (2) task
(in anticipation or the presence of experimental stressors, for example, an aversive
noise); and (3) reactivity (the change from resting to task). It has been found
that many offenders have slower ANS responses than do non-offenders and are
therefore less responsive to aversive environmental stimuli.
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Heart rate
The most common method of assessing autonomic functioning is heart rate,
usually measured for experimental purposes using an electrocardiograph (ECG),
although sometimes simply by manually taking a pulse. Conveniently, there
have been a number of meta-analyses examining the relationship between heart
rate and crime. Ortiz and Raine (2004) examined 40 studies that examined the
heart rates of delinquent and antisocial children and adolescents. The studies
involved 45 separate analyses. Of these analyses, 29 supported the prediction that
delinquency was related to low resting heart rate while a further 13 were nonsignificant but in the predicted direction. Nine studies also examined heart rates in
the presence of a stressor. All but one of these found a significant relationship
between delinquency and low heart rate.
Lorber (2004) examined 95 studies involving juveniles or adults displaying
aggression, psychopathy or conduct problems. Results for resting, task and reactivity heart rates were examined. The significant effects were mixed and depended
upon the condition under which heart rate was measured, the age of the sample,
and the nature of the problem behaviour. For both juveniles and adults, low resting
heart rates were associated with increased aggression and conduct problems.
There were no significant effects for the task condition, while for the reactivity
condition, low heart rates were associated with increased conduct problems in
adults. Lorber concluded that there is sufficient evidence to link low heart rates
with characteristics associated with antisocial behaviour but that there are aspects
of the complexity of the relationship that need to be explored in greater depth.
Electrodermal activity
Fluctuations in ANS functioning cause variations in perspiration, and because
sweat contains salt, there are accompanying variations in the extent to which skin
conducts electricity. By attaching electrodes to the skin (usually the fingertips)
these minute variations in electrodermal activity can be measured by a galvanic
skin response (GSR) meter. Increases in stress produce increases in conductivity.
Lorber (2004) included GSR studies in the meta-analysis described above. Low
resting GSR was significantly associated with psychopathy; low task GSR was
significantly associated with psychopathy and conduct problems; and low reactivity GSR was associated with aggression in adults only, and psychopathy. Thus,
in comparison to heart rate, the association between GSR and aggression and
conduct problems was weaker, but the relationship with psychopathy was more
robust.
Biochemistry and crime
Because biochemical messengers are often implicated in alterations of mood
and arousal they potentially play an important role in criminal behaviour, especially impulsive and violent crime. Of particular interest from a criminal careers
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perspective, research indicates that changes in biochemical activity in individuals
as they age can help explain corresponding changes in their levels of criminal
activity. This section reviews the research on three important biochemicals: the
neurotransmitters dopamine and serotonin, and the sex hormone testosterone.
Dopamine and serotonin
While numerous neurotransmitters have been linked to criminal and antisocial
activity, dopamine and serotonin are perhaps the two most widely researched. As
noted in the previous chapter, in recent years research has moved beyond simply
establishing the empirical link between particular neurotransmitters and behaviour;
with advances in molecular genetics, research has increasingly focused on tracking
down the specific genes associated with different neurotransmitters.
The release of dopamine is associated with the feelings of pleasure that accompany activities such as eating and sexual intercourse. Dopamine, therefore, has a
rewarding effect that encourages repetition of behaviour. Both excessive and deficient levels of dopamine are problematic. Higher-than-normal levels of dopamine
have been linked to increased aggression and violence (Niehoff, 1999), while
low levels may promote compensatory, self-rewarding behaviours such as
novelty-seeking, gambling and substance abuse (Beaver, 2009).
Serotonin is associated with impulse control. The release of serotonin decreases
neuronal activity and with this it also decreases the tendency for aggression
and other impulsive behaviour. Low levels of serotonin are hypothesised to
increase antisocial involvement by dulling sensitivity to punishment cues. In a
meta-analysis, Moore et al. (2002) reviewed 16 studies, involving 20 separate
analyses, examining the relationship between serotonin and various measures of
delinquency and antisocial behaviour. They found a moderate-sized effect (−.45)
for reduced serotonin on antisocial behaviour.
A number of genes have been identified as playing a role in regulating
neurotransmitters. Some genes – known as receptor genes – code for proteins that
facilitate the binding of neurotransmitters to neuronal receptors. Other genes –
known as transporter genes – code for proteins involved in the reuptake (i.e.,
absorption) of neurotransmitters after a neuronal synapse (Beaver, 2009). In the
case of dopamine, polymorphisms of the receptor genes DRD2 and DRD4, and
the transporter gene DAT1, have been linked to violent, addictive and antisocial
behaviours (ibid.; Guo et al., 2007; Lu et al., 2001). The polymorphisms of DRD4
and DAT1 are minisatellites (variable number tandem repeats) while DRD2 is a
single nucleotide polymorphism (see Chapter 3). Likewise, a minisatellite polymorphism of the serotonin transporter gene 5-HTTLPR has been found to
be related to increases in antisocial behaviour (Beitchman et al., 2006; Haberstick,
et al., 2006). Of course, these genes are just some of the many that combine in
complex permutations to influence the quantitative traits associated with criminal
dispositions.
In the cases of both dopamine and serotonin (and other neurotransmitters as
well) production levels fluctuate over the life-course. Changes in the levels of
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certain neurotransmitters may help explain the age–crime curve. As outlined in
earlier chapters, across all societies there is a surge in offending rates around the
age of 17, followed by a gradual decline after the age of 24 or so. It has been found
that serotonin levels increase with age, while dopamine peaks in adolescence
before dopamine receptors begin to decay (for reviews of the research, see Collins,
2004, and Spear, 2003). These changes over time in neurotransmitter levels
correspond to the increase and abatement of aggressive and sensation-seeking
behaviour, and fit with the predictions of evolutionary theory discussed in Chapter
2. When humans lived in hunter–gatherer societies, it was adaptive for males to
engage in risky behaviour during adolescence because this maximised their
preparedness to compete for a mate.
Testosterone
The fact that males in humans and many other species are typically more aggressive than females has led to obvious speculation about the role that the male sex
hormone testosterone may play in aggression. However, while there is good
evidence from animal studies linking variations in testosterone to variations in
aggressive behaviour, the evidence for humans is more mixed (Archer, 1991).
Research has examined violence in terms of both the organisational and activating
effects of testosterone.
Research on organisational effects has examined whether abnormal exposure to
androgens such as testosterone at critical developmental periods has resulted in
permanent increases in the propensity for violence. Most of the limited research
has examined the long-term effects on girls of prenatal exposure to androgens. It
has been found that while such girls may develop more ‘tomboy’ characteristics,
there is little consistent evidence of an increased risk of aggression (Berenbaum
et al., 2000; Ehrhardt and Meyer-Bahlburg, 1981).
Research on activating effects has examined whether levels of testosterone are
related to concurrent levels of violence. In a meta-analysis, Book et al. (2001)
reviewed 45 studies involving 54 independent analyses. Some 83 per cent (45) of
the analyses produced significant positive correlations between testosterone and
aggression, producing a weighted mean correlation of .14. Thus, while there is
evidence implicating testosterone in aggression, the overall strength of the effect
was modest. Examining the research more closely, Book et al. identified two
moderator variables that affected the strength of the relationship between testosterone and aggression. The first was age. Testosterone levels in males surge in
adolescence and, not surprisingly, the effect of testosterone on aggression was
greatest for males between the ages of 13 and 20 years, declining with age thereafter. This finding mirrors that for neurotransmitters and is similarly consistent
with an evolutionary explanation of the age–crime curve. The second moderator
was the time of day that testing for testosterone was conducted. Book et al. make
the point that testosterone is released into the bloodstream in spurts and that levels
fluctuate considerably during the day. Most researchers take just one measure of
testosterone, and that is usually done in the morning when levels are most unstable.
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The unreliability of testosterone measures may be one reason for the somewhat
patchy findings for the effects of testosterone on human aggression. Interestingly,
sex did not emerge as a moderator. While females have less testosterone than
males, and overall are less aggressive, the relationship between aggression and
testosterone was the same for males and females. That is, like males, aggressive
females had higher levels of testosterone than did non-aggressive females.
There are two ways to conceptualise the relationship between testosterone and
aggression, described by the basal and reciprocal models (Mazur and Booth,
1998). The basal model proposes a direct, one-way relationship in which increases
in testosterone produce increases in aggression. Most researchers, however,
endorse the reciprocal model in which testosterone and aggression are seen to be
interdependent. That is, testosterone not only facilitates aggression but aggression
(or the anticipation of aggression) increases testosterone. In this analysis, the
production of testosterone is an evolutionary adaptive response designed to help
an individual confront an environmental threat. For example, Mazur and Booth
reported that male testosterone rises prior to competition with other males. Mazur
and Booth argued that testosterone may be related to dominance rather than
aggression per se, with aggressive behaviour a by-product of attempts to assert
ascendency over others.
Neuroanatomy and crime
A fundamental challenge for neuropsychologists is to map brain structure and
function against outward behaviour without causing damage to the individual
being studied. To assist in this task, a number of techniques have been developed.
These include electroencephalography, brain imaging, and neuropsychological
assessment.
Electroencephalography
Electroencephalographs (EEGs) measure electrical impulses that are produced by
the firing of neurons in the brain and are relayed by electrodes attached to the
scalp. There are four main brainwave patterns that vary in frequency and that are
associated with different brain functions (Martin, 2006). Delta waves are the
slowest (frequency up to 4 Hz) and are found in babies, and in adults in deep
sleep; theta waves (4–7 Hz) are found in young children and in drowsy adults;
alpha waves (8–12 Hz) are associated with relaxed states in adults; and beta waves
(12–30 Hz) are associated with active concentration.
There has been extensive research over more than 50 years on the relationship
between brainwaves and constructs related to antisocial behaviour. There is a
substantial body of research that shows significant brainwave abnormalities in
criminal and antisocial populations. The most consistent finding is that under
conditions of rest, many antisocial individuals have high levels of slow-wave
activity. Slowing has been found to manifest as a shift to lower frequencies within
the alpha wave band (Finn et al., 2000; Linberg et al., 2005; Mednick et al.,
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1981), and a relative abundance of low-frequency theta and delta waves (Pillmann
et al., 1999). Further, these abnormalities have been found to occur particularly in
the frontal-lobe regions of the brain (Finn et al., 2000), and in the left hemisphere
(Deckel et al., 1996; Pillmann et al., 1999). Recall that the frontal lobe is associated with higher-order executive function, while the left hemisphere is associated
with verbal and linguistic reasoning.
Two main hypotheses have been offered to explain the slow brain activity of
offenders. The first is that, since slow brainwaves are characteristic of children,
slow wave activity in adults may reflect delayed neurological development.
However, longitudinal studies do not support this interpretation (Mednick et al.,
1981). The second and more widely accepted hypothesis is that slow brainwaves
are part of the same syndrome that produces the slow ANS responses reported
earlier. That is, slow brainwaves contribute to an interpretation of some offenders
as under-aroused (Raine, 2002a).
Another line of EEG research has examined brainwave patterns known as
event-related potentials (ERP) that occur in response to an internal or external
stimulus. Most research has examined an ERP called P300 (denoting that it is a
positive peak 300 milliseconds after the presentation of the stimulus), elicited
experimentally by presenting a subject with a novel stimulus that demands their
attention (e.g., discriminating between two auditory tones). The typical finding is
for antisocial and substance-dependent individuals to produce lower amplitude
ERP waves and longer response delays (latencies) when compared to non-clinical
samples (see Gao and Raine, 2009, for a meta-analytic review). P300 amplitude is
thought to be a measure of mental processing capacity, while latency is a measure
of processing speed (Polich, 2007). Low amplitudes and long latencies, therefore,
are thought to reflect deficits in attention, memory and cognitive processing.
Polich locates these processes in frontal, temporal and parietal brain structures.
While EEG research can go some way towards localising the dysfunction
detected by abnormal brainwave patterns, EEG is not ideally suited to the task of
mapping brain structures and functions. A single EEG electrode picks up signals
from millions of neurons, many of which may be some distance from the electrode. In recent years brain imaging techniques have taken over as the preferred
methods of investigating brain structure and function, allowing researchers to
view directly areas of brain abnormality.
Brain imaging
There are several different brain imaging methods (Martin, 2006). Some techniques
provide static, three-dimensional structural images of the brain. Computerised
tomography (CT) does this by analysing X-rays passed through the brain on a 180
degrees rotation; magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) detects changes in atomic
particles as a magnetic field is passed through the brain. Other techniques provide
images of ongoing brain activity. Positron emission tomography (PET) displays
neuronal activity based on measurements of glucose metabolism and oxygen
consumption in the brain; single photon emission computerised tomography
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(SPECT) tracks the flow of radioactive chemicals that are injected into the
bloodstream; and functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) measures
the effect of oxygen concentrations on the magnetic properties of the blood’s
haemoglobin.
In terms of brain structure, research indicates a number of differentiating neurological characteristics for antisocial and violent individuals. Using CT, more right
temporal abnormalities (Hucker et al., 1988) and smaller left temporal and frontal
brain area (Wright et al., 1990) have been found in violent sex offenders than
in non-violent controls, although other studies have failed to replicate these findings (Langevin et al., 1989). The findings for MRI have generally been more
consistent. Dolan et al. (2002) compared 18 personality-disordered prisoners
with 21 controls. They found that temporal lobe volumes were 20 per cent smaller
in the personality-disordered sample. Similarly, Huebner et al. (2008) found a
6 per cent reduction in average volume of grey matter in boys with conduct
disorder, with particular deficits in the left frontal lobe and both temporal
lobes.
Studies of brain activity reinforce and extend the findings of structural abnormalities in antisocial individuals. Using PET, Volkow and Tancredi (1987) found
decreased glucose metabolism at rest in the frontal and left-temporal regions
of violent offenders. Similarly, PET studies examining metabolic activity during
a performance task report abnormalities of the prefrontal and temporal regions of
antisocial individuals (Goyer et al., 1994; Raine et al., 1997). Studies using
SPECT report reduced blood flow in the prefrontal cortex, temporal cortex, and a
sub-cortical (i.e., beneath the cortex) forebrain structure associated with memory
called the hippocampus (Sondrestrom et al., 2000; Wong et al., 1997). Finally,
studies using fMRI report decreased neural activity – principally in the frontal
lobe, temporal lobe, and limbic system (a collection of sub-cortical forebrain
structures, including the hippocampus and amygdala, associated with learning,
memory and emotions) – during various cognitive and emotional tasks (Birbaumer
et al., 2005; Kiehl et al., 2004; Müller et al., 2003; Vollm et al., 2004). Birbaumer
et al. (2005), for example, subjected a sample of ten psychopaths and a comparison group of ten non-psychopaths to a learning condition in which pictures of
faces were paired with painful pressure. The procedure was designed to examine
the acquisition and maintenance of conditioned fear. Birbaumer et al. found that
non-psychopaths showed significant activation in limbic-prefrontal circuit – areas
involved in emotional learning – while the psychopaths did not. They concluded
that the psychopaths had neurological deficits in processing emotions and
anticipating painful events.
In summary, brain imaging studies have found a range of structural and functional neurological deficits in antisocial and violent offenders. While there are
some inconsistencies in the findings, in general, structural imaging has identified
abnormalities in the temporal region, and functional imaging has identified abnormalities in the prefrontal cortex. For more detailed reviews of brain imaging
studies on antisocial behaviour see Bassarath (2001), Buffkin and Luttrell (2005)
and Yang et al. (2008).
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Neuropsychological instruments
While brain imaging techniques provide accurate information on the location of
brain functions, everyday psychological assessments of brain functioning are
usually carried out using a range of cognitive tests. By presenting subjects with
different cognitive tasks, conclusions can be drawn about the functioning of those
areas of the brain assumed to be involved in the performance of those tasks.
The most common instruments assessing cognitive functioning are measures of
general intelligence (IQ). That offenders have on average IQ scores 8–10 points
below normal (100) is one of the most robust findings in criminology, with research
dating back almost a century (Doll, 1920; Hirschi and Hindelang, 1977; Moffitt
et al., 1981; West and Farrington, 1977). The effect of IQ on crime holds when
other possible confounding factors – such as parental criminality, socio-economic
status, and whether or not the offender was caught – are controlled for. Low IQ in
pre-school children predicts later delinquency (Lipsitt et al., 1990) and low IQ in
released prisoners is an independent predictor of recidivism (Gendreau et al.,
1996). As would be predicted, life-course persistent offenders have lower IQ scores
than do adolescent-limited offenders (Donnellan et al., 2000; Moffitt, 1993).
Measures of global intelligence, however, provide little information about
how different parts of the brain are functioning. Some tests break IQ down into
different abilities. For example, the most recent version of the Wechsler Adult
Intelligence Scale (the WAIS-III) comprises 14 sub-scales, with a broad division
made between verbal tasks (e.g., defining the meaning of words) and performance
tasks (e.g., assembling blocks). The characteristic pattern for offenders is to score
particularly poorly on verbal tasks, with deficits in serious, persistent offenders
of up to 12 points (Andrew, 1977; Binder, 1988; Cornell and Wilson, 1992;
Hirschi and Hindelang, 1977; Moffitt, 1993). Verbal tasks are assumed to provide
a measure of abstract reasoning and social judgement, and low scores are usually
interpreted as indicating left hemisphere dysfunction.
There are many other individual tests that are designed to measure specific
cognitive abilities. Particular attention has been given to measures of executive
function. As noted earlier in this chapter, executive function refers to the cognitive
processes involved in the planning and execution of goal-oriented behaviours.
These processes include reasoning, problem-solving and cognitive flexibility, and
are located in the frontal lobes, and more specifically, the prefrontal cortex
(Morgan and Lilienfeld, 2000; Royall et al., 2002). Common tests of executive
function include the Porteus Mazes Test (PMT), in which individuals are required
to trace the pathway through various mazes, and the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test
(WCST), in which individuals are required to sort cards containing different
numbers, colours and shapes according to specified rules. Typically, tests are
administered as part of a battery in order to capture the complex nature of executive function. In a meta-analysis, Morgan and Lilienfeld (2000) reviewed 39
studies involving at least one of six validated tests of executive function. They
found significant deficits in executive function for antisocial individuals, with
effect sizes described as medium to large depending on the test in question. In
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another meta-analysis, Ogilvie, Stewart, Chan and Shum (under review) reviewed
42 studies that were published after Morgan and Lilienfeld’s review, and which
involved at least one of 15 validated tests. They similarly found executive function impairments in antisocial individuals, with an average effect size described as
medium.
There remains debate about whether the effect of cognitive deficits on crime is
direct or indirect (McGloin et al., 2004; Ward and Tittle, 1994). The direct argument holds that less cognitively-able individuals are more prone to crime because
they possess impaired decision-making abilities, social judgement and impulse
control. The indirect argument holds that, because of these cognitive deficits, such
individuals do poorly at school and in other areas of life that are important for
social development, and it is this that increases their risk of criminality. In all
likelihood, the effect of cognitive deficits on crime involves a combination of both
direct biological influences and indirect environmental influences (Quay, 1987).
A further aspect of a biosocial approach, addressed below, is the extent to which
environmental factors also contribute to the cognitive deficits themselves.
Neuro-environmental factors and crime
It has been emphasised in this chapter that every environmental experience has
implications for brain structure as part of normal brain development. However,
this section is concerned more narrowly with the impact on neurological functioning, and the subsequent role in crime, that might be played by adverse environmental events such as perinatal trauma, child abuse and neglect, poor diet,
exposure to toxins and substance abuse.
Perinatal factors
Perinatal factors refer to events around the time of birth, covering conception,
gestation, delivery and the first weeks of life. Adverse events for the baby include
the mother smoking during pregnancy, her consumption of drugs and alcohol, and
birth complications such as oxygen deprivation, forceps delivery and low birth
weight.
There is now convincing evidence that if the mother smokes during pregnancy
there is an increased risk of childhood and adult behavioural problems in the
offspring (Brennan et al., 1999; Huijbregts et al., 2007; Linnet et al., 2003;
Maughan et al., 2004; Nigg and Breslau, 2007). Two components of cigarette
smoke, nicotine and carbon monoxide, are thought to be the main culprits through
their deleterious effect on the development of neurotransmitter systems (Olds,
1997). In one study, Brennan et al. (1999) found twice the rate of adult violent
offending in the offspring of mothers who smoked 20 cigarettes per day when
compared to the offspring of non-smokers. The levels of violent offending
increased with the levels of smoking. Further, there was an interaction effect when
foetal exposure to smoking was paired with birth complications; the concurrence
of these two conditions produced a five-fold increase in adult offending. Finally,
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the effects of smoking applied only to life-course persistent offenders, and not to
adolescent-limited offenders.
Alcohol consumption by the mother during pregnancy has also been found to
have a range of negative outcomes for the child. In extreme cases, the child may
develop foetal alcohol syndrome, which results in significant growth retardation,
physical abnormalities and neurological dysfunction (O’Leary, 2004). Linnet
et al. (2003) reviewed nine studies examining maternal drinking and behavioural
outcomes for the child. They found correlations between alcohol consumption
and increased rates of ADHD and similar behavioural symptoms such as inattention, impulsivity and externalising behaviour.
The findings for the long-term effects of birth complications are more mixed
and generally involve interactions with other variables. For example, Raine et al.
(1997), following a sample of 4,269 males, found that birth complications when
paired with maternal rejection predicted adult violent offending but not property
offending, and applied only to early onset offending. Similarly, Piquero and
Tibbetts (1999), in a prospective longitudinal study of 867 males, found that birth
complications interacted with disadvantaged family environments to increase the
risk of adult violence.
Child neglect and abuse
As the earlier discussion of Romanian orphans indicates, adverse childhood experiences have potentially significant implications for brain development. There has,
however, been little research examining the relationship between childhood abuse
and neglect, brain function and antisocial conduct. In one exception, Raine et al.
(2001) used fMRI to examine brain function in four groups: (1) individuals who
had experienced severe child abuse but had no history of violence; (2) those who
had experienced severe child abuse and did have a history of violence; (3) those
who had no experience of child abuse but had a history of violence; and (4) a
control group with no experience of child abuse or a history of violence. Abused
participants (irrespective of their violence status) showed reduced cortical activity,
especially in the left hemisphere, when compared with non-abused participants.
However, in comparison to non-violent individuals who had experienced abuse,
violent offenders who experienced abuse showed reduced right-hemispheric functioning. Overall, results suggest that abuse in childhood causes changes in brain
structure that build upon existing right-hemispheric dysfunction to increase the
risk of violence.
However, an earlier study by Raine et al. (1998) did not detect increased brain
dysfunction associated with abuse. Raine et al. examined the prefrontal functioning of convicted murderers. The sample was divided into two groups, those
who had a deprived background and those who came from relatively good homes.
The researchers found greater levels of impairment in the murderers who came
from a good home. Interpreting the findings, the authors argued that offenders
from deprived backgrounds became involved in crime largely through environmental factors. The offenders from good homes, however, committed crime in
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spite of their relative environmental advantages. It is likely then, that they were
born with biological deficits. In reconciling this study with the previously
described one, it may be that neglect and abuse need to be severe before it produces
brain dysfunction that is observable using current brain imaging techniques.
Diet
Research on the link between diet and antisocial behaviour has examined the
effects of deficiencies in certain vitamins and minerals; deficiencies in polyunsaturated fatty acids; intolerance to particular foods or food additives; and
consumption of sugar and other refined foods. A recent series of meta-analyses by
Benton (2007) examined the separate effects of each of these dietary conditions
on violence and antisocial behaviour.
Micro-nutrient deficiencies potentially affect behaviour by interfering with the
production of neurochemicals such as serotonin. Benton reviewed three studies
that examined the effects on misconduct of vitamin supplements. In one study the
participants were incarcerated juveniles, in another they were incarcerated adults,
and in the other they were school children with records of disciplinary infractions.
The three studies found significant reductions in rule violation of between 28 and
47 per cent after participants were administered the supplements.
The brain is a fatty organ and in particular contains high levels of essential
polyunsaturated fatty acids which must be obtained via diet (i.e., they are not
manufactured by the body). Benton examined the effects of polyunsaturated fatty
acid supplements on attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) in children
and aggression in adults. He found no reliable evidence that the supplements led
to improvements in ADHD. However, in the case of adults, a meta-analysis
involving eight studies showed significant reductions in violence following the
supplements.
Intolerance to certain foods can lead to malabsorption or other adverse reactions, although the mechanisms by which this then affects behaviour is unclear.
Most studies have examined the effects of food intolerance on ADHD in children.
Benton reviewed five studies that examined the efficacy of systematically eliminating problem foods from the diet. All five studies reported post-intervention
improvements in behaviour. Benton concluded that there is evidence that some
foods – especially wheat, dairy products and chocolate – can exacerbate ADHD.
However, the effects of the foods and the treatments vary among individuals.
Finally, consumption of sugar can affect blood glucose levels which in turn can
affect brain function. Too much sugar is thought to stimulate the production of
insulin which causes reduced sugar levels in the blood two to four hours after
ingestion, a condition which in extreme cases is known as hypoglycaemia. Sugar
intake is popularly thought to increase aggression. Benton found the evidence for
a link between sugar intake and violence to be weak. In normal adults, a drop in
blood glucose to the point of hypoglycaemia is rare. However, some individuals
are susceptible to low glucose levels and they may become more violent and
irritable as a result.
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Toxins
Heavy metals, such as lead and manganese, are highly toxic, and if they enter the
bloodstream they can seriously affect brain structure and function. Lead, for
example, affects the functioning of neurotransmitters such as dopamine, while
manganese affects levels of serotonin (Masters, 1998). Exposure to toxins can
occur as the result of environmental pollution, and some heavy metals may find
their way into the food chain.
One line of research involves large-scale epidemiological studies. Masters
(1998) examined the effects of exposure to lead and manganese on crime rates.
He compared data on lead and manganese pollution with crime rates for 1,165
USA counties, covering a population of over 130 million. Controlling for a wide
range of socio-demographic factors, he found highly significant effects on crime
rates for both metals. More recently, Nevin (2007), using a longitudinal design,
examined the relationship over several decades between blood lead levels in
preschool children and subsequent national adult crime rates in nine countries
(the USA, Britain, Canada, France, Australia, Finland, Italy, West Germany and
New Zealand). Lead levels predicted rates of juvenile offending, property crime,
violent crime and repeat offending.
Other studies have examined smaller, targeted samples. Needleman et al.
(1996) examined lead levels in the bones of 301 schoolboys. Lead levels correlated with teacher and parent ratings of aggressive and delinquent behaviour.
Similarly, Gottschalk et al. (1991) found higher levels of manganese in the hair of
violent criminals when compared to levels in controls. In a prospective longitudinal study involving 250 children, Wright et al. (2008) took prenatal measures
of maternal blood lead concentrations, followed by regular measures from the
children for the next 6.5 years. Both the mothers’ and the children’s blood lead
levels predicted higher rates of arrest in adulthood.
Substance abuse
Most research on the relationship between substance abuse and crime has focused
on violence. Research has shown consistently that substance abuse is involved
in a high proportion of violent crimes. For example, statistics from Australia
(Dearden and Payne, 2009), England and Wales (Kershaw et al., 2008), and the
USA (US Department of Justice, 2009) indicate that in around half of all violent
crimes the perpetrator was using alcohol at the time of the offence, while in onefifth to one-third of cases the perpetrator was using some other type of drug. For
our purposes, violence that occurs as a direct result of pharmacological effects of
substance abuse must be distinguished from violence associated with disputes in
the illegal drug trade or with the activities of users to obtain money to buy drugs.
The pharmacological effects of substance abuse may be the result of short-term
alterations to psychological functioning, or long-term impairment to brain structure. The neurological mechanisms by which substance abuse affects behaviour
varies from substance to substance, but in general is thought to involve alterations
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in the levels of various neurotransmitters, including dopamine and serotonin, and
impairment to prefrontal functioning (Boles and Miotto, 2003; Fishbein, 2000;
Giancola and Tarter, 1999).
Substance abuse is embedded in cultural, social and situational contexts, and
isolating the pharmacological effects from other factors has proved a challenge
for researchers. In a review of the literature, Boles and Miotto (2003) concluded
that the evidence of a direct link between substance abuse and violence was
strongest for alcohol. However, the effect of alcohol on aggression is most
pronounced in individuals with pre-existing dispositions for violence. In addition,
there is a debate about the extent to which alcohol-induced disinhibition is a
neurologically-based phenomenon, or a psychologically-based phenomenon that
has more to do with the expected effects of alcohol consumption. Some violent
offenders may use alcohol as a justification for their actions.
Of other types of drugs, Boles and Miotto found some evidence to link violence
with the pharmacological effects of benzodiazepines, amphetamines, cocaine and
phencyclidine (PCP). They found no evidence of a link with violence for marijuana, opiates and hallucinogens, although hallucinogens may trigger violent
outbursts in individuals with pre-existing psychopathology.
Putting it together: neuropsychological theories of crime
The focus in the previous sections was on reporting research findings on the
crime–brain relationship; organising these findings into coherent explanatory
models of crime is the task of this section. The findings reviewed in this chapter
present a complex and at times a seemingly contradictory picture of the role of
neurological factors in crime. Four explanations are described – sub-optimal
arousal, reward dominance, prefrontal dysfunction and hemispheric functioning
– each of which addresses different aspects of the data. These explanations are not
mutually exclusive and each may describe a particular set of crime patterns or
offender types.
Sub-optimal arousal
One of the most consistent neurological correlates of antisocial behaviour is low
arousal. Experimentally, low arousal has been exhibited in ANS functioning as
measured by ECG and GSR, and in cortical brain wave activity as measured by
EEG. Antisocial individuals have been shown to have lower resting arousal levels,
and to show less arousal in response to aversive stimuli. The neurological processes responsible for low arousal are thought to involve the reticular formation
(Eysenck, 1967; Lykken, 1957). The reticular formation is a hindbrain structure
with neural pathways into the limbic system and frontal cortex. Low arousal is
viewed as the failure of the reticular formation to activate cortical functioning
effectively.
Low arousal in antisocial individuals is thought to increase the predisposition to
crime in two ways. First, it is argued that individuals with low internal levels of
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cortical arousal will seek to compensate with increased levels of external
arousal (Ellis and Walsh, 2000; Eysenck, 1997; Raine, 2002b, 2002c; Walsh,
2009). According to this line of reasoning, humans have an optimal level of
arousal that they find comfortable. Low levels of internal arousal are experienced
by the individual as boredom. Individuals with low arousal are hence prone to
seek stimulation in order to increase arousal to optimal levels and relieve boredom.
It is because sensation-seeking individuals are under-aroused that Ritalin, which
is a stimulant designed to increase dopamine levels, is used as a treatment
for ADHD. One consequence of sensation-seeking, however, is an increased
likelihood of engaging in exciting and risky activities that may include illegal
behaviours. In addition to tangible rewards, an attraction for offenders of many
crimes, such as stealing cars and breaking into houses, may be the thrill involved.
Second, low ANS arousal is associated with a relative insensitivity to aversive
stimuli (Ellis and Walsh, 2000; Raine, 2002b, 2002c). If pain is experienced
less intensely, it is argued that an individual will be less inhibited and more
fearless, and is consequently more likely to engage in impulsive and reckless
behaviour. It takes a degree of toughness and a disregard for the prospect of injury
to get into a fight. Moreover, insensitivity to pain makes an individual less responsive to corrective environmental feedback. Individuals with low arousal are more
difficult to discipline and less likely to learn from experience because harmful
consequences have less impact on them.
It should be pointed out that the attributes associated with low arousal are not
necessarily bad. It is sensation-seeking that drives individuals to climb Mt Everest
and to sail solo around the world. And it is fearlessness that enables a war hero to
put his/her life at risk to save his/her platoon. Proponents of sub-optimal arousal
recognise the crucial role that social development and other environmental experiences play in shaping the way that sensation-seeking and risk-taking behaviour is
manifested.
Reward dominance
A number of researchers (Fowles, 1988; Gray, 1982) have proposed the existence
of two opposing but independent regulating systems in the brain for governing the
performance of voluntary behaviour. The behavioural activation system (BAS)
encourages behaviour by processing reward cues; the behavioural inhibition
system (BIS) discourages behaviour by processing punishment cues. In most
people, these two systems are roughly equivalent in strength. However, individuals who have a dominant BAS have an increased potential for impulsivity; those
with a dominant BIS have an increased susceptibility to anxiety. It is argued that
in offenders the BAS is dominant over the BIS. Offenders, therefore, are more
sensitive to the prospect of rewards than to the threat of punishment and they
behave in impulsive and self-defeating ways accordingly.
Structurally, neuronal connections linking the limbic system and the left frontal
lobes have been identified as the location for BIS/BAS functioning (Gray, 1982).
Among the functions of the limbic system is the regulation of fear, which plays an
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important role in the ability to learn associations between certain behaviours and
their unpleasant consequences. The presumed role of the frontal lobes and the
limbic system is consistent with findings of decreased neural activity in these
regions in psychopaths during conditioned fear trials (Birbaumer et al., 2005).
Behavioural studies investigating the role of BIS/BAS regulation involve examining the perseverance in a task in the face of negative feedback. One common
research design compares the strategies of antisocial and conduct disordered individuals with those of controls when playing computerised games (Matthys et al.,
1998; O’Brien and Frick, 1996). The games are programmed to deliver some initial
easy wins, and then to progressively increase the proportion of losses. Under these
conditions, antisocial and conduct disordered participants are more likely than
controls to persist in playing in spite of the mounting losses. It is claimed that this
focus on short-term rewards and the corresponding inattention to punishment are not
only responsible for criminal conduct, but also explain the high incidence of gambling
addiction and substance abuse among offender samples (Ellis and Walsh, 2000).
Prefrontal dysfunction
While many structures of the brain have at some point been implicated in antisocial
behaviour, the most consistent findings have been of frontal lobe dysfunction, particularly in the prefrontal cortex, which is responsible for executive function. Findings
of prefrontal abnormalities in antisocial and violent individuals have come from
research using EEG, brain imaging and neuropsychological instruments. In comparison to controls, offender samples display less neural activity in the prefrontal cortex,
and are less able to perform cognitive tasks associated with prefrontal structures.
The conceptual relationship between executive function and crime is readily
apparent. Executive function is involved in such tasks as planning, emotional
control, empathy and moral reasoning (Raine et al., 2000; Raine and Yang, 2006).
It is the complexity of the prefrontal cortex that most distinguishes the human
brain from that of other primates. From an evolutionary perspective, the skills
associated with the prefrontal cortex are essential for the ability to live cooperatively in social groups. Injury to the prefrontal cortex has been associated with the
development of impulsiveness, impaired decision-making, callousness and lack
of empathy (Bechara, et al., 1997; Damasio et al., 1994).
Executive function is among the last of the cognitive processes to develop, with
final maturation not occurring until the early twenties (Steinberg, 2005). The
normative development of executive function helps explain adolescent-limited
offending and the age–crime curve. In the case of pathological development,
impairment of executive function is likely to be a joint result of inherited deficits
in brain structures and adverse developmental experiences.
Hemispheric functioning
Lateralisation of brain abnormalities in offender samples has also been found, with
left-hemispheric dysfunction the most frequently reported. The left hemisphere
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plays a particular role in analytic, serial functions such as language and reasoning.
The right hemisphere specialises in synthesising information, and so has greater
involvement in tasks requiring holistic analyses such as spatial perception. Slow
brainwave activity and reduced structural volume are more common in the left
hemisphere than the right hemisphere of antisocial individuals when compared to
controls. In addition, neuropsychological tests consistently show that offenders
perform poorly on verbal in comparison to performance tasks, a disparity that is
thought to reflect inferior left-hemispheric functioning.
It is argued that left-hemispheric dysfunction results in deficits in languagebased reasoning, making it more difficult for individuals to understand and follow
social rules (Ellis and Walsh, 2000; Flor-Henry, 1989). In addition to deficits in
the left hemisphere, researchers have argued that the relative strength of the right
hemisphere is also problematic. Right hemispheric dominance has been associated with increased negative emotions and impulsivity (Ellis and Walsh, 2000).
It should be noted that not all researchers favour the left-hemispheric dysfunction explanation. Raine and colleagues (Raine, 2002a, 2002c; Raine et al., 2001)
have argued that some offenders, particularly those charged with crimes of
violence, are characterised by abnormalities of the right hemisphere. Raine et al.
(2001) suggested that just as the right hemisphere is associated with the expression of negative emotions, it is similarly involved in the recognition of those
emotions in others. Dysfunction of the right hemisphere may mean that an
individual responds inappropriately to emotional cues and this contributes to the
escalation of disputes.
Conclusion and evaluation
The brain occupies a central position in the chain of events that ultimately results
in crime. Its role is to receive and process biological and environmental data, and
to initiate and regulate responses that may include criminal behaviour. To the
extent that criminal behaviour has a genetic basis, the effect of genes is realised
via the construction and functioning of the brain. To the extent that criminal
behaviour is caused by the environment, the learning that occurs as a result of
environmental experiences must be encoded in neuronal circuits in the brain. In
terms of the nature/nurture debate, all behaviour, and hence all crime, are inescapably biosocial. The very physical structure of the brain is determined jointly by
biological and environmental factors.
An important distinction can be made between the roles played in crime by
normative and pathological brain development. Normative brain development
refers to the maturation processes that are common to us all. The normal patterns
by which brain structures and functions develop over time help explain changes
in general criminality risk at different ages. Levels of impulsivity, risk-taking
and sensation-seeking, and the capacity for moral reasoning, change over the
life-course. Males in particular experience surges in testosterone and changes
in neurotransmitter activity in early adolescence, an age at which widespread
involvement in delinquency also begins to occur. The final maturation of the
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frontal lobes and executive function does not occur until the early twenties when
most offenders begin to age out of crime.
Pathological brain development refers to the differences between offenders and
non-offenders in brain structures and functions. There is strong and consistent
evidence that many offenders have neurological deficits that underlie their criminal activities. These deficits include slow autonomic functioning, disrupted
biochemical activity, brain structure abnormalities and impaired brain function.
The effect of these deficits is to predispose the individual to greater-than-normal
levels of impulsive, risky, callous, and at times violent behaviour.
The results of the research reviewed in this chapter can be best understood
within the multiple pathways model of a criminal careers framework. It needs to
be emphasised that in most of the studies reviewed in this chapter the experimental samples comprised persistent antisocial, psychopathic and violent individuals; that is, offenders who were at the high-end of the offending-seriousness
scale. In the studies in which there were direct comparisons between life-course
persistent and adolescent-limited offenders, evidence of dysfunction was found
only in the life-course persistent sample (Brennan et al., 1999; Donnellan et al.,
2000; Moffitt, 1993; Moffitt and Caspi, 2001; Raine et al., 1997). For adolescentlimited offenders, the effects of normative brain development are of most relevance. While the brain plays an indispensable role in all crime, not all offenders
have neurological impairments.
This chapter has focused on the neurological bases of various attributes –
sensation-seeking, risk-taking, fearlessness, impulsiveness – that may predispose
individuals to criminality. How these attributes might be organised into a coherent
model of personality is the subject of Chapter 5.
5
Personality
In previous chapters we have examined some of the biosocial bases of criminality.
In the course of this examination it has been emphasised that criminality is not a
unitary construct. There is no one gene or neurological feature that distinguishes
offenders from non-offenders, and nor can criminality be defined in terms of a
single offender attribute. Rather, a predisposition to commit crime may involve a
variety of different personal characteristics. There has been some discussion
already about what these attributes include. For example, in the previous chapter
sensation-seeking, risk-taking and impulsivity were each identified as potential
contributors to criminal conduct. In this chapter we unpack in a more systematic
way the personal attributes that may increase an individual’s likelihood to engage
in crime.
The study of human attributes is the province of personality psychology.
Personality may be broadly defined as the consistent and enduring ways
of thinking, patterns of behaviour and emotional responses that characterise
an individual. The focus on personality in this chapter marks a shift for us
to a more overtly psychological view of criminality. Genes and neurons are
physical entities whereas personality is an abstract concept involving thoughts,
feelings and behaviour. While our analysis of personality remains firmly within
the biosocial perspective, our starting point is the psychological expression
of biological processes rather than the biological processes themselves. The
chapter begins with an examination of the concept of personality traits, moving
then to review the relationship between crime and various dimensions of
personality, before concluding with an examination of antisocial personality
disorder and the contribution this construct makes to understanding criminal
behaviour.
Trait approaches to personality
There are many different ways to conceptualise and explain personality. Indeed,
most psychological theories are at some level personality theories. However, in
this chapter we focus particularly on those theories that understand personality as
an organised assemblage of subunits known as traits.
Personality 91
What are personality traits?
Thinking in terms of personality traits comes naturally to humans. Every day we
use trait descriptors as shorthand ways of summarising the personal attributes of
ourselves and others. Based on our observations of someone’s behaviour we may
describe him/her as confident, lazy, generous, happy-go-lucky, disorganised, and
so on. We might refine our descriptions by qualifying the extent to which the
person possesses these attributes; for example, he/she may be very confident but
only moderately lazy. In any case, we assume that these labels say something
fundamental about the individual and have some predictive value – that the person
will tend to be very confident and moderately lazy across a variety of different
situations both now and in the future. Invoking personality traits is an efficient
way for us to process information and make sense of our social world.
Likewise, psychologists interested in personality traits seek to reduce the
complexities of human behaviour into manageable units of analysis in order to
build explanatory and predictive models. Trait theorists attempt to define and quantify the components of personality in ways that permit personality to be empirically
studied. Despite arguments about the precise definition of trait, most theorists agree
that a trait is a generalised tendency to behave in a certain way, and that a given
trait will be possessed by different individuals in varying strengths. A person who
consistently acts aggressively is assumed to have a stronger aggressive trait than a
person who does not consistently act aggressively. The goal of trait research is to
identify and measure ways in which individuals differ from one another.
Perhaps the most significant disagreement among trait theorists concerns the
issue of causality. For some theorists, traits are merely descriptive summaries of
behaviour. A person is described as aggressive only if he/she is observed to act
aggressively sufficiently frequently to suggest that there is a trend in his/her
behaviour. These theorists are interested only in the way that personality is
structured – no assumptions about causation are made. Other theorists, however,
argue that traits are internal predispositions – experienced as drives and desires –
that help to cause behaviour. Thus a person performs aggressive acts in part
because he/she has an aggressive trait. At the same time, for these theorists, the
expression of outward behaviour is not necessary for the trait to exist. An individual may refrain from assaulting someone – perhaps they count to ten – but still
have the latent capacity for aggression. For our analysis, the clear conclusion from
the foregoing chapters is that many traits have their foundations in biosocial structures and processes. As such, these traits can be considered to be more than
descriptive labels and to play at least some causal role in behaviour.
The stability debate
A necessary characteristic of a trait is that it describes a consistent pattern of behaviour. A major point of contention surrounding trait theory concerns the extent to
which behavioural patterns meet the criterion of consistency. Consistency can take
two forms: stability over time and stability across situations.
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Personality
Stability over time
The stability over time debate refers to the extent to which behavioural patterns are
fixed or changing throughout an individual’s life-span. Trait theorists would expect
that someone who was aggressive now was aggressive as they were growing up
and will be aggressive in the future. The alternative argument is that traits fluctuate
over time in response to an individual’s physical, social and intellectual maturity,
and to his/her changing circumstances, social roles and accumulated life experiences. An aggressive youth may mellow with age and come to look back on his
previous aggressive behaviour as if it was carried out by someone else.
In general, longitudinal research supports the idea of enduring traits, although
with a number of qualifications. First, consistency increases with age (Caspi et al.,
2005; McCrae, 2002; Roberts and Del Vecchio, 2000). Children and adolescents
are in the process of establishing aspects of their individual identities and demonstrate more variability in their behaviour than do adults. By the age of 30, however,
most broad patterns of behaviour have become firmly established. Second, traits
thought to have a biological basis – such as sensation-seeking and impulsivity
discussed in the previous chapter – show greater consistency than do attributes
assumed to be more sensitive to social and environmental influences – such as
attitudes, opinions and beliefs (Conley, 1984). Third, underlying traits may be
consistent but their manifestation may change over the years. The temper tantrums
of childhood may become irascibility in adulthood but both are products of the
same personality trait of disagreeableness (Caspi et al., 1987). Finally, the strength
with which an individual possesses a trait may remain stable relative to other
people, but the absolute strength may change (Costa and McCrae, 1994). For
example, as we have discussed in previous chapters, risk-taking behaviour generally declines with maturity. However, those who were most risky for their age
during adolescence are likely also to be the most risky for their age in later life.
Stability of traits over time has important implications for criminal careers’
research. For example, it was noted in Chapter 3 that childhood conduct disorders
are good predictors of adolescent and adult criminality, especially in the case of
life-course persistent offenders (Caspi et al., 1995; Grove et al., 1990; Langbehn
et al., 1998). We examine the developmental aspects of criminality in more detail
in the following chapter.
Stability across situations
The stability across situations debate refers to the extent to which individuals
behave in similar or dissimilar ways under different circumstances. We encountered this debate in the introductory chapter as one of the key questions in
psychology. Trait theorists argue that because traits reflect generalised behavioural tendencies, then manifestations of any given trait will show up in many
different areas of a person’s life. This does not mean that the trait will always
appear or that its expression will always be the same. An aggressive person is
unlikely to be aggressive at a funeral (certainly not their own), and the form his/
Personality 93
her aggression takes is likely to be different at work, say, than when playing sport.
Nevertheless, it is argued that when behaviour is aggregated across a range of situations, a consistent aggressive trend will be found. On the other side of the debate,
situationalists argue that behaviour is highly variable and is a specific response to
different demands and expectations. A person can be aggressive in one circumstance and not in others depending upon the situational context. This variability
makes the very notion of a trait unsustainable. It is the situation that causes the
behaviour not the person.
The correlation between measures of personality traits and their related behaviours is typically found to be in the order of .4 (Nisbett, 1980), a strength of association that can be described as medium.1 Both sides of the debate have claimed
this figure as support for their respective positions. Trait theorists argue that the
significant correlation demonstrates that behavioural patterns develop around a
stable core; situationalists point to the high level of unexplained variance as
evidence for the role of situations. The resolution of the person/situation debate
parallels that of the nature/nurture debate. Just as the acquisition of behavioural
traits is best understood as involving both biological and environmental factors, so
too is the performance of behaviour best understood as involving both dispositional
and situational factors. Furthermore, we can similarly expect dispositional and
situational factors to interact – different people will respond to the same situation
in different ways. Consider the case of two friends, one with a high level of dispositional aggression and the other with a low level. They are chatting peaceably at a
bar when they are accosted by a drunken patron. All other things being equal, the
probability of an overtly aggressive response to this provocation will be higher for
the aggressive friend than for the non-aggressive friend. The non-aggressive friend
can probably also be induced to retaliate at some point, but it will take much
stronger situational pressure for this to occur. At the same time, prior to the
provocation, there was little outward difference in the behaviour of the two friends.
The interactionist interpretation of the way traits operate is now widely accepted
by theorists and has resulted in the specificity model of personality. According to the
specificity model, while people do possess traits, trait differences between people
only become meaningful in certain circumstances. Moreover, in some cases those
circumstances can be very specific and encountered only occasionally. In the
example above, it may be that the aggressive friend is particularly sensitive to being
insulted in public but is relatively tolerant of other forms of provocation. As will
become more apparent in later chapters, the specificity model has crucial implications for why people commit crime, as distinct from why people become criminal.
It can help explain why individuals with criminal dispositions do not offend all of
the time – and why they do offend when they do – as well as why normally lawabiding people can sometimes commit crimes that are apparently out of character.
Identifying key traits
Two central questions for trait theorists are: what are the most important traits?
and what relationship do they have with one another? There are many ways to
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Personality
describe someone’s personality, with often subtle distinctions among terms.
Indeed, in a seminal study, Allport and Odbert (1936) pored over dictionaries and
identified some 4,500 stable trait descriptors. The task for researchers since has
been reducing the many available, overlapping traits to a manageable number of
meaningful and independent concepts.
Two main trait-reduction methods have been used. The first is the lexical
approach, by which trait descriptors are grouped together into conceptually-similar
clusters. For example, one cluster may include hostile, hot-headed, aggressive and
quick-tempered. The number of synonyms comprising a given cluster is taken to be
a measure of that concept’s cultural importance. Where there is agreement on the
importance of the concept across cultures, it is assumed that it represents a universally-relevant human trait. The rationale for this approach is that human beings will
invent lots of different ways to describe things that really matter to them (as in the
much-repeated, though apparently exaggerated story that Eskimos have over a
hundred words for snow). Using the lexical method, Cattell (1943) reduced Allport
and Odbert’s list of descriptors to 35 clusters.
The second reduction method is to use statistical techniques such as factor analysis to obtain clusters. Large samples of people rate themselves on a range of
personality dimensions. Factor analysing the responses reveals which descriptors
tend to go together (covary) and which ones are unrelated (orthogonal). For
example, people who identify as hostile are also likely to identify as quicktempered, but they may be just as likely as not to rate themselves as shy. Thus
hostility and quick-temperedness will go into one factor and attributes to do with
shyness go into another. Note that in factor analysis the covariation can be positive or negative. For example, ‘outgoing’ negatively covaries with ‘shy’ and so
both would go into the same factor (‘degree of outgoingness’) but at opposite
poles. When Cattell (1946) reanalysed Allport and Odbert’s items using factor
analysis, he further reduced the clusters to 16 personality factors.
As the above discussion indicates, traits exist at varying levels of generality.
Trait researchers seek to find the smallest number of traits that adequately explains
the breadth of human personality. But in achieving this, they are also conscious
that important nuances of personality may be lost as traits become more inclusive.
This problem is dealt with by organising traits into hierarchies. Further factor
analysis of Cattell’s 16 personality factors resulted in the isolation of five ‘higherorder’ factors (Cattell, 1957). These new super-traits comprised several primary
traits that often seemed to appear together in individuals. For example, people
who were impulsive were often also found to be sociable, so both of these traits
(along with some others) contributed to a super-trait of extraversion. The supertraits did not replace the original 16 factors, however, but sat at a level above
them. Thus the 16 personality factors are at one level independent traits in their
own right and at another level they combine to produce more global measures that
subsume the subordinate attributes.
The most recent and widely-researched hierarchical trait-theory of personality is
the five-factor – or Big Five – model. The Big Five are not identical to Cattell’s
original five higher-order factors but they are a product of the same line of lexical
Personality 95
and factor-analytic research. The five factors in a form similar to their current incarnation were first identified by Tupes and Christal (1961), and the basic five-factor
structure has been subsequently replicated by other researchers over the years
(e.g., Costa and McCrae, 1992a, 1992b; Norman, 1963). Supporters of the model
claim that the five factors are the basic building blocks of personality, at the same
time parsimonious and all-inclusive (Goldberg, 1993; McCrae and John, 1992). The
Big Five factors are openness, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness and
neuroticism, giving the acronym OCEAN. Descriptions of these five factors and
their contributing primary traits (facets) are provided in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1 The Big Five personality factors
Factor
Facets
Low score
High score
Openness:
Appreciation of new
experiences and
toleration of the
unfamiliar
Fantasy
Aesthetics
Feelings
Ideas
Actions
Values
Conventional,
down-to-earth,
narrow interests,
unartistic,
non-analytic
Curious, broad
interests, creative,
original,
imaginative,
untraditional
Conscientiousness:
Degree of persistence
and motivation in
goal-directed
behaviour
Self-discipline
Dutifulness
Competence
Order
Deliberation
Achievementstriving
Aimless, unreliable,
lazy, careless, lax,
negligent, weakwilled, hedonistic
Organised, reliable,
hard-working,
punctual,
scrupulous, neat,
ambitious,
persevering
Extraversion:
Activity level, need
for stimulation and
capacity for enjoyment
Gregariousness
Activity level
Assertiveness
Excitement-seeking
Positive emotions
Warmth
Reserved, sober, not
exuberant, aloof,
task-oriented,
retiring, quiet
Sociable,
active, talkative,
person-oriented,
optimistic,
fun-loving,
affectionate
Agreeableness: Degree
of compassion versus
antagonism in one’s
interpersonal
orientation
Straightforwardness
Trust
Altruism
Modesty
Tendermindedness
Compliance
Cynical, rude,
suspicious,
uncooperative,
vengeful, ruthless,
irritable,
manipulative
Soft-hearted,
good-natured,
trusting, helpful,
forgiving, gullible,
straightforward
Neuroticism: Level of
adjustment and degree
of emotional stability
Anxiety
Self-consciousness
Depression
Vulnerability
Impulsiveness
Angry hostility
Calm, relaxed,
Worrying, nervous,
unemotional, hardy, emotional,
secure, self-satisfied insecure,
inadequate,
hypochondriacal
Source: Adapted from Costa and McCrae (1992c).
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Measuring traits
The most common way to measure personality traits is with pencil-and-paper tests.
There are a number of different formats but the most common is to present statements – for example, ‘I am always courteous to my elders’ – to which respondents
indicate their agreement or disagreement. Sometimes the choice is dichotomous
(i.e., either ‘yes’ or ‘no’) but more frequently respondents check a position
on a multi-point Likert scale that represents the strength with which they agree
(e.g., ‘strongly agree’ through to ‘strongly disagree’). The measurement of any
given trait involves numerous statements that examine different aspects of trait
expression. Trying to measure personality with just a few items is akin to assessing
student performance in a semester-long course with a two-item multiple-choice
exam. Because of situational specificity, it is important that a comprehensive
range of items is included in order take in the full picture and to iron out variability across situations. As long as the statements are all measures of the same trait
(i.e., they have been found to covary), then the items can be summed to produce
an aggregate measure of trait strength for an individual.
The measurement of traits is never perfect. Error can come from a number of
sources. A test may have insufficient items to capture the trait, or the items may
not all go together. The psychological state and motivation of respondents can
also introduce error. Their responses may vary according to their mood, or they
may deliberately try to fake the test, a particular problem with offenders who may
have good reason to try to create a good impression. The accuracy of a test is
referred to as its reliability, and is given by a reliability coefficient that varies
between 0 (totally unreliable) to 1 (perfectly reliable). Most published tests have
reliability coefficients between .7 and .9.
Some test instruments are designed to measure a single trait, while others measure
many traits organised in terms of super-traits. Whether a researcher uses a singletrait or super-trait instrument depends upon what question he/she is trying to answer.
In the single-trait approach, the researcher is interested in the sorts of behaviours
related to a particular trait. In the super-trait approach, the researcher is interested in
which traits are the most important in accounting for a particular behaviour (Funder,
2007). Both of these approaches have been used to study criminality.
The single-trait approach and crime
Single-trait studies begin with a specific trait of interest and examine the role that it
might play in offending. The selection of the trait is based on prior theorising about the
underlying nature of criminal behaviour. Looking back on the previous chapters, a
number of key personality dimensions have been identified as theoretically important
in criminality. These include altruism, empathy, sensation-seeking and impulsivity.
Altruism
According to evolutionary psychologists, many crimes can be defined as failures
of altruism. Altruism, you will recall, is the tendency to perform self-sacrificing
Personality 97
behaviour in the aid of others. It is altruism that allows humans to function as
social beings. One hypothesis of evolutionary psychologists is that genes for
altruism and genes for cheating struggle for dominance in the gene pool. While
altruism is the dominant human condition, there will always be a proportion of the
population who are cheaters and seek to take advantage of altruists. Cheaters are
predicted to be more likely than altruists to commit criminal acts.
Surprisingly little research has been done on altruism as a personality construct.
The main instrument is the Self-Report Altruism (SRA) scale (Rushton et al.,
1981). The SRA scale comprises 20 items that measure altruistic behaviours
such as generosity, help-giving and volunteerism (e.g., ‘I have given money to a
stranger who needed it’). The few studies examining altruism and antisocial
behaviour have produced mixed findings. Rushton et al. (1986) administered the
SRA scale and a measure of aggression to a community sample of twins. As
predicted, they found a negative correlation (−.23) between the scales. Further,
the heritability for altruism was .56, indicating a strong genetic basis. However,
Krueger et al. (2001), also using a community sample of twins, found no correlation between altruism and self-reported levels of antisocial behaviour. They also
found little evidence of heritability for altruism, with most of the variance
accounted for by environmental factors. In explaining their negative findings,
Kruger et al. questioned whether the conceptualisation of altruism in the SRA
scale is broad enough to capture the full nature of the trait. In another negative
study, Book and Quinsey (2004) found no significant difference in altruism among
incarcerated psychopathic offenders, incarcerated non-psychopathic offenders
and non-offenders. They suggest that altruism may be difficult to measure on selfreport scales when used with antisocial individuals, since part of the cheater
syndrome is to hide one’s true intentions.
There has been more consistent success with other scales conceptually aligned
to the altruism-cheater dimension. For example, the Machiavellianism (Mach)
inventory (Christie and Geis, 1968) is a 20-item scale that focuses on the extent to
which respondents have a cunning, manipulative and unscrupulous approach to
dealing with others (e.g., ‘The best way to handle people is to tell them what they
want to hear’). As expected, Rushton et al. (1981) found an inverse correlation
between the SRA scale and the Mach inventory. Correlations for the Mach inventory have been found with self-reported psychopathy in community samples
(McHoskey et al., 1998; McHoskey, 2001; Paulhus and Williams, 2002; Williams
and Paulhus, 2003), and with clinical and psychometric measures of psychopathy
in prison inmates (Widiger et al., 1996).
Empathy
Another trait that falls into the broad domain of interpersonal transactions is
empathy. Empathy is the capacity to understand and share another’s emotional
state. This definition identifies two components of empathy: the cognitive ability
to ‘understand’ another’s emotional state, and the affective ability to ‘share’
another’s emotional state. Neuropsychological research locates the structures and
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Personality
functions associated with empathy in the prefrontal cortex. The capacity for
empathy is thought to be the product of a skill cluster known as executive
function. Lack of empathy is predicted to result in callous and uncaring behaviour
towards others and because of this an increased risk of criminality.
There are numerous measures of empathy, the most prominent being the Hogan
Empathy Scale (HES) (Hogan, 1969), the Questionnaire Measure of Emotional
Empathy (QMEE) (Mehrabian and Epstein, 1972), and the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) (Davis, 1980). A sample question from the IRI is: ‘I often have
tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me’. Jolliffe and
Farrington (2004) conducted a meta-analysis of studies that used any of these
three scales (or their derivatives) to investigate empathy and criminal behaviour.
Only studies that examined reported or official criminal offences were included in
the analysis. The final sample involved 35 studies, 21 that studied cognitive
empathy (involving the HES and a subscale of the IRI) and 14 that studied affective empathy (involving the QMEE and a different subscale of the IRI). The
weighted mean effect size for all studies was −.28, indicating a medium negative
relationship between empathy and offending (i.e., low empathy was related to
high offending). For cognitive empathy, 10 studies reported that offenders had
lower empathy than did non-offenders, while 11 studies found no differences
between the two groups, yielding a weighted mean effect size of −.48 (medium).
For the affective studies, four studies found lower empathy among offenders, nine
found no differences, and one found that offenders had higher levels of empathy
than did non-offenders, yielding a weighted mean effect size of −.11 (small).
Analysing the studies further, Jolliffe and Farrington found a number of factors
influencing effect size. The relationship between a lack of empathy and offending
was stronger for violent offenders than for sex offenders and for young offenders
than for older offenders. They also found that empathy correlated with intelligence and socio-economic status (SES), and concluded that effect sizes were
inflated by the failure to control for these covariates. In other words, to some
extent the differences between offenders and non-offender are explained by
differences in intelligence and SES rather than empathy. The interrelatedness
among these variables is open to a number of interpretations. For example, in the
case of intelligence, low intelligence may independently cause both offending and
low empathy; low intelligence may cause low empathy which causes offending;
or low empathy, low intelligence and offending may be collateral products of
deficits in executive function. In conclusion, while low empathy and offending are
related, the nature of that relationship is complex and may be indirect.
Sensation-seeking
Sensation-seeking has been defined as ‘the seeking of varied, novel, complex, and
intense sensations and experiences, and the willingness to take physical, social, legal
and financial risks for the sake of such experience’ (Zuckerman, 1994, p. 7). While
sensation-seeking and risk-taking are related, risk-taking is a possible outcome of
sensation-seeking but is not a necessary condition. Alternative explanations for
Personality 99
sensation-seeking have been provided by arousal theory and reward dominance
theory. According to arousal theory, individuals who have low levels of internal
stimulation compensate by seeking out external stimulation and as a consequence
they may engage in risky behaviour that may include crime. According to reward
dominance theory, individuals are prone to sensation-seeking when the behavioural
activation system (BAS) is stronger than the behavioural inhibition system (BIS).
There are two main scales dedicated to sensation-seeking, the 40-item Sensation
Seeking Scale (SSS-V) (Zuckerman, 1994) and the 20-item Arnett Inventory
of Sensation Seeking (AISS) (Arnett, 1994). A typical item from the AISS is: ‘I can
see how it must be exciting to be in a battle during a war’. Males and younger
respondents consistently score higher on sensation-seeking than do females and
older respondents (Zuckerman, 1994). Positive correlations have been reported
between sensation-seeking and a range of problematic behaviours including selfreported delinquency (Gatzke-Kopp et al., 2002; Hansen and Breivik, 2001;
Modecki, 2009; Newcomb and McGee, 1991; Simó and Pérez, 1991; White et al.,
1987), drug use (Martin et al., 2002; Stephenson et al., 2002), alcohol use (Andrew
and Cronin, 1996; Read et al., 2003), risky driving (Iversen and Rundmo, 2002)
and gambling (Breslin et al., 1999). At the same time, studies also find correlations
between sensation-seeking and many positive risk-taking behaviours such as
participating in sports (Malkin and Rabinowitz, 1998), pursuing stimulating vocations (Biersner and LaRocco, 1983), and undertaking outdoor adventure activities
(Hansen and Breivik, 2001). The point has been made before but is worth repeating:
personality traits may provide predispositions for behaviour but the environment
plays a crucial role in shaping the way that traits are expressed.
Impulsivity
Impulsivity refers to the performance of behaviour in anticipation of short-term as
opposed to long-term consequences. Impulsivity is theoretically and biologically
related to sensation-seeking (Hur and Bouchard, 1997) but focuses more particularly on the ability of an individual to inhibit or delay self-gratifying urges.
The two most common measures of impulsivity are the 30-item Barrett Impulsiveness Scale (BIS – not to be confused with the behavioural inhibition system)
(Barratt, 1985) and the 54-item Eysenck Impulsivity Scale (EIS) (Eysenck and
Eysenck, 1975). An example item from the EIS is: ‘Do you generally do and say
things without stopping to think?’ Of the single trait measures, impulsivity has
attracted the most research and has also produced the most consistent positive findings, suggesting that it is a particularly important trait in criminality. Convicted
offenders have been found to be more impulsive than non-offenders in both male
(Barratt et al., 1997; Carroll et al., 2006) and female (Komarovskaya et al., 2007)
samples; high-aggression inmates are more impulsive than low-aggression inmates
(Edwards et al., 2003; Komarovskaya et al., 2007); early onset offenders are more
impulsive than are late onset offenders (Carroll et al., 2006); and in non-institutionalised samples, impulsivity is positively correlated with self-reported measures of
criminal behaviour and delinquency (Luengo et al., 1994; White et al., 1994),
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Personality
substance abuse (Petry, 2001) and problem gambling (Blaszczynski et al., 1997;
Petry, 2001). Evidence has also been found for situational specificity for impulsivity. Lynam et al. (2000) found that the relationship between impulsivity and
delinquency was stronger in poor neighbourhoods than in better-off neighbourhoods, but that there was little difference in delinquency between non-impulsive
adolescents in the poor and better-off neighbourhoods. Thus there is an interaction
between impulsivity and adverse situational factors, and delinquency is especially
likely when both are present.
Evaluation of the single-trait approach
Overall, the evidence from single-trait approaches is that many offenders possess
distinctive personality traits, although the strength of association is sometimes
weak and the trends are not always consistent. The advantage of the single trait
approach is that it can examine very specific, theory-driven questions about the
relationship between certain traits and crime. The disadvantage is that this specificity can also produce a fragmented picture of the personality of offenders. Often
different traits – such as sensation-seeking and impulsivity – may be measuring
different aspects of the same construct. What is lacking in the single-trait approach
is an overall model of personality that makes sense of the relationship among
traits. This is where the super-trait approach comes in.
The super-trait approach: Eysenck’s three-factor
theory of crime
Research using super-trait instruments begins with a comprehensive model of
personality, with the aim of determining how well the model as a whole explains
criminality. By examining numerous traits simultaneously, the relationships
among traits can be examined. Thus a personality profile can be produced based
on the strength with which offenders possess different traits. In addition, examining variations among offenders in the pattern of traits permits the development
of typologies that discriminate among different categories of offenders.
In this section we will focus exclusively on the three-factor theory of Hans
Eysenck. Eysenck is a major figure in the history of trait psychology and there are
a number of reasons for choosing to examine his approach in preference to other
available models such as the Big Five. First, Eysenck’s theory comes with a
detailed account of the presumed causes of traits, explanations that are based on a
combination of genetic, neurological, psychophysiological and environmental
factors. Most other trait theorists, including those responsible for the Big Five,
make no assumptions about where traits come from – their aim is simply to describe
the structural framework of personality. Second, there is a long tradition in criminology of using Eysenck’s theory, and Eysenck himself was very interested in
the problem of crime and antisocial behaviour. While criminology researchers
have also used other models, there is in comparison far more Eysenck-related
research to draw upon for our review. Finally, as we shall see, there is in any case
Personality 101
considerable overlap between Eysenck’s three factors and super-traits identified by
other theorists. There is, then, little to lose and much to gain by focusing on
Eysenck’s three factors.
The three factors
Eysenck’s model of personality comprises three orthogonal dimensions: psychoticism (P), extraversion (E) and neuroticism (N), remembered by the acronym
PEN. Each dimension is a super-trait, and beneath each sits a number of more
specific, primary traits. The hierarchical nature of the three super-traits is shown
in Figure 5.1. Looking at Table 5.1 and Figure 5.1, overlaps between the Big
Five and Eysenck’s three factors are immediately evident. Eysenck’s E and N
scales parallel almost exactly the same-named scales in the five-factor model,
while P is a combination of low agreeableness and low conscientiousness (Clark
and Watson, 1999; Costa and McCrae, 1995). The remaining scale from the fivefactor model – openness – has no obvious match in Eysenck’s model. However,
openness has the weakest conceptual relationship to crime. It is also the most
contentious of the five factors, with some debate about how well it translates
across cultures (De Raad et al., 1998).
Extraversion and neuroticism were the first two super-traits identified by
Eysenck (1956, 1970). Eysenck’s definition of extraversion extends the common
understanding of the word. In addition to the usual characteristics of being sociable
and outgoing, in more extreme cases Eysenck’s extraverts are reckless, unreliable,
quick-tempered and prone to aggression. At the other end of the dimension, introverts are timid, reserved and cautious. Eysneck’s explanation for extraversionintroversion involves the concept of cortical arousal that we encountered in the
previous chapter. Extraverts are cortically under-aroused and seek positive
environmental stimulation (excitement) to alleviate boredom. The cluster of
extraverted-related traits identified by Eysenck through his factor-analytic
Figure 5.1 The hierarchical structure of Eysenck’s three super-traits.
Source: Adapted from Eysenck et al. (1992).
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Personality
studies – dominance, sociability, assertiveness and so on – all have this common
neurological root and derive from the same basic need for external stimulation.
The need for stimulation is predicted to increase the risk of criminal behaviour
through a combination of increased risk-taking and a reduced capacity to learn
from experience.
Neuroticism refers to negative emotionality. Neurotics are moody, anxious and
tense, and are prone to depression, phobias and psychosomatic illnesses such as
headaches and digestive problems. Emotionally-stable individuals, on the other
hand, are calm and even-tempered. According to Eysenck, the biological basis for
neuroticism is arousal of the autonomic nervous system (ANS). Recall from the
previous chapter that the sympathetic nervous system increases physiological
functioning – the ‘fight or flight’ response – while the parasympathetic nervous
system restores physiological equilibrium. Individuals with high neuroticism are
hypothesised to have relatively quick-acting sympathetic nervous systems and
slow-acting parasympathetic nervous systems. Neurotics, therefore, have more
easily provoked, stronger and longer-lasting adverse reactions to negative environmental stimulation (stress). According to Eysenck, crime is associated with
high neuroticism. He viewed neuroticism as a driver of behaviour. Under stress,
individuals are less likely to consider the consequences of their actions and
are more likely to resort to habitual patterns of responding. Thus, emotional
instability will accentuate any pre-existing antisocial tendencies an individual
may have.
The biological mechanisms underlying extraversion and neuroticism are
presumed to be independent of one another. While both are concerned with arousal
and environmental stimulation, extraverts experience cortical arousal as pleasant
while neurotics experience ANS arousal as unpleasant. Eysenck conceived of
extraversion and neuroticism (E-N) as intersecting dimensions, producing four
personality types: stable extraverts, unstable extraverts, stable introverts and
unstable introverts (see Figure 5.2). The four types parallel the four temperaments
described by Hippocrates in ancient Greece nearly two and a half thousand years
ago: sanguine, choleric, phlegmatic and melancholic. In its role as a behavioural
driver, emotional instability brings out the worst aspects of the extraversionintroversion dimension. Thus, stable extraverts (sanguines) have many desirable
qualities such as sociability, outgoingness and easygoingness, whereas unstable
extraverts (cholerics) have the less desirable qualities of excitability, restlessness
and aggressiveness. Likewise, stable introverts (phlegmatics) are calm, eventempered and thoughtful, while unstable introverts (melancholics) are moody,
pessimistic and unsociable. As will be evident from these descriptions, the combination of high extraversion and high neuroticism is seen to produce a particularly
high risk of criminal behaviour.
Eysenck’s third dimension, psychoticism, was a later addition designed to plug
perceived gaps in the E-N model (Eysenck and Eysenck, 1976). Psychoticism
does not refer to the psychotic behaviours – delusions, hallucination, and the
like – exhibited by the mentally ill. Rather, it describes behaviours that are closer
to those characteristic of antisocial individuals. Individuals high on psychoticism
Personality 103
Figure 5.2 The relationship between neuroticism and extraversion.
are cold, aloof, cruel, impulsive and insensitive; those low on psychoticism are
warm and tender-hearted. Crime, obviously enough, is thought to be related to
high psychoticism. Eysenck thought that psychoticism was related to high levels
of testosterone, and low levels of serotonin and monoamine oxidase (MOA)
(Eysenck, 1992, 1996). He also argued that, like extraversion, it also may be
related to cortical under-arousal (Eysenck and Gudjonsson, 1989). Visually representing three dimensions on a flat piece of paper is difficult but the reader should
imagine a third line passing perpendicularly through the point of intersection of
the E and N axes in Figure 5.2. The addition of the third axis doubles to eight
the number of possible personality types, although the characteristics of each
of these have not been spelled out. Nevertheless, the combination of high psychoticism, high extraversion and high neuroticism is viewed as the most problematic
constellation of traits when it comes to criminality.
PEN and crime
Eysenck constructed a psychometric instrument, the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire (EPQ), in order to test his predictions about PEN. The most recent
version of the instrument (the EPQ-R; Eysenck et al., 1985) comprises 100 yes/no
questions: 32 for P (e.g., ‘Do you stop to think things over before doing anything?’),
23 for E (e.g., ‘Are you a talkative person?’), 24 for N (e.g., ‘Does your mood
often go up and down?’), and a further 21 included as a ‘lie scale’ (e.g., ‘Are all
your habits good and desirable ones?’) to try to identify respondents who are
unduly concerned with creating a good impression.
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Personality
Empirically, support for Eysenck’s model has been mixed. Cale (2006)
conducted the most recent meta-analysis of studies which have examined delinquent, criminal and antisocial samples with measures of PEN. Most of the included
studies used the EPQ, but Cale also included some studies that had employed
comparable measures. Based on earlier statistical analyses (Sher and Trull, 1994),
E included measures of sociability, N included measures of negative emotionality,
and P included measures of impulsivity. Antisocial samples were identified either
by self-report or as members of known antisocial groups (e.g., prison inmates).
However, the analysis only examined studies that employed measures of general
antisocial behaviour – those examining specific offender types and individuals
diagnosed with antisocial personality disorders were excluded. Fifty-two studies,
involving 97 independent samples, were ultimately examined.
Cale’s findings were consistent with those of previous reviews (Feldman, 1993;
Furnham and Thompson, 1991; Miller and Lynam, 2001). She found that P/
impulsivity had the strongest association with antisocial behaviour, with 98
per cent of the samples producing a positive effect and with a weighted effect size
of .39 (moderate). N/negative emotionality had the next strongest association with
84 per cent of samples producing a positive effect and with a weighted effect size
of .19 (small). E/sociability had the weakest association with 73 per cent of
samples producing a positive effect and with a weighted effect size of .09 (weak).
Offender typologies
While Eysenck proposed that his three factors provided a general theory of crime,
he also recognised that not all offenders would score highly on all scales. He
suggested that the heterogeneity of the offender population might help account for
some of the weak empirical findings reported for the EPQ (Eysenck and Eysenck,
1970; Eysenck and Gudjonsson, 1989; Eysenck et al., 1977). Eysenck theorised
that there are two broad offender types: (1) high P, high E and high N; and (2) high
P, low E and high N. The first profile has the classic peaks on all three scales and
was that of the active offender type; the second profile was characterised by low E
and describes the inadequate offender type. Active types were predicted to be
‘typical’ offenders – young, boisterous, below-average intelligence, heavy drinkers,
prone to violence and likely to offend in company with peers. Inadequate types
were older, neurotic, introverted, likely to have psychiatric problems, to have poor
social and interpersonal relations, and typically to offend on the spur of the moment.
Research has supported Eysenck’s notion of typologies, but more PEN permutations have been reported than he predicted and not all are interpretable within
his theory (McEwan, 1983; McGurk and McDougall, 1981; van Dam et al., 2007).
Most recently, van Dam et al. (2007) identified three clusters among a sample
of incarcerated delinquents: (1) low P, high E and low N (63 per cent); (2) high
P, low E and high N (29 per cent); and (3) high P, high E and high N (8 per cent).
Van Dam et al. found Eysenck’s active and inadequate types, but together they
only accounted for around a third of the sample. The typical delinquent, these
researchers concluded, was a stable extravert with low levels of psychoticism.
Personality 105
While this finding clearly contradicts Eysenck’s theory, it is consistent with what
would be predicted by the life-course persistent/adolescent-limited distinction.
The high P found in two subgroups (groups 2 and 3) may be identifying lifecourse persistent offenders with established criminal dispositions. Low P scores
accompanied by high E and low N (group 1) may be identifying adolescentlimited offenders – essentially normal, if extraverted, young people with no
particularly strong criminal dispositions.
Evaluation of Eysenck’s theory
In the face of mixed research findings, there has been an ongoing debate about the
adequacy of Eysenck’s super-traits as explanations for crime, and of their
presumed biological bases. Of the three factors, the latest addition to the model, P,
has the strongest association with crime. This is not surprising given that this scale
was purposely constructed to tap behavioural problems, and it incorporates
attributes – aggressive, cold, antisocial, impulsive – that at face value are most
obviously linked to criminality. Most criticisms, therefore, have been reserved for
the original E and N scales.
There is general agreement among researchers that E is not a reliable predictor
of antisocial behaviour, and Eysenck’s proposal that offenders could be either
high or low on E seems to concede this point. This conclusion, however, poses a
dilemma. The mechanism presumed to be responsible for E is cortical underarousal and the weakness of E would appear to call this presumption into question.
At the same time, we saw in the previous chapter that there was good evidence
that many antisocial individuals are indeed cortically under-aroused just as
Eysenck predicted. A critical issue would seem to be the location of impulsivity
within the super-trait structure. In the single-trait studies cited earlier, impulsivity
was found to be the trait that had the most consistent association with antisocial behaviour. Originally, Eysenck located impulsivity in E as a companion to
sensation-seeking but later he decided that impulsivity belonged in P (Eysenck,
1992; Eysenck and Eysenck, 1978). Without impulsivity, E includes many items
concerned with sociability (e.g., ‘Do you have many friends?’) and it is perhaps
not surprising that many antisocial individuals do not score highly on measures of
positive social relations. It may be that it is impulsivity which is the key correlate
of cortical under-arousal for offenders. If this is so, and given the location of
impulsivity in the EPQ, then cortical arousal theory may be a better explanation of
P than it is of E (Cale, 2006).
There is better evidence that N is associated with offending, but the role of ANS
arousal is a matter of debate. Eysenck proposed that high ANS arousal increased
the potential for crime by energising antisocial tendencies. However, it will be
noted that Eysenck’s theory runs counter to the conclusions drawn in the previous
chapter, where a slow-acting ANS was found to be related to antisocial behaviour.
In Chapter 4, it was argued that resistance to stress – not sensitivity to it – increased
the likelihood of crime by making individuals more fearless. Where Eysenck
treated cortical arousal and ANS arousal as independent of one another, other
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Personality
researchers are inclined to regard them as indices of the same arousal phenomenon (Ellis and Walsh, 2000; Raine, 2002b, 2002c). Scarpa and Raine (1997) have
suggested that the role of ANS arousal varies depending upon offender-type.
Heightened ANS reactions to stress (and thus high neuroticism) may be related to
‘emotional’ crimes, while emotionally detached offenders (such as psychopaths)
are more likely to have a slow-acting ANS (low neuroticism).
In conclusion, Eysenck’s theory presents a comprehensive trait approach to
understanding criminal and antisocial behaviour. Eysenck not only proposed what
the key traits are, he also proposed explanations for the sources of those traits.
However, his model of personality and its relationship to crime has been challenged on empirical and theoretical grounds. Undoubtedly, not all of Eysenck’s
predictions can be supported by the evidence. Nevertheless, his work was
pioneering and his model still attracts active research interest more than 50 years
after the first version appeared.
Antisocial personality disorder (APD)
As noted in Chapter 1, many researchers employ the concept of antisocial behaviour, rather than crime, as the object of their research. The definition of antisocial
behaviour is independent of any particular legal system and so is not affected by
variations in law over time and across jurisdictions. Consequently, many of the
studies cited in this and previous chapters have utilised samples of individuals
categorised on the basis of the performance of antisocial behaviour. We have also
at various times referred to individuals who are persistently antisocial as having
an antisocial personality disorder (APD) and sometimes as being psychopathic. In
this section we examine in more detail APD and related concepts. We trace the
changing conceptualisation of APD and the terminology that has been used to
describe it; we look at the relationship between APD and crime, and we outline
the key personality traits that contribute to the syndrome.
Defining APD and related terms
Over the years, a confusing array of labels – including psychopathy, sociopathy,
dyssocial personality disorder and antisocial personality disorder – has been used
to describe the cluster of behaviours and traits that are seen to relate to antisocial
behaviour. Our first task is to sort out the distinctions among these terms by
tracing the history of academic and clinical interest in antisocial individuals.
While the existence of a class of particularly unscrupulous individuals has been
recognised throughout history, Philippe Pinel in the early nineteenth century is
credited with identifying extreme antisocial behaviour as a form of ‘insanity’
(Herpertz and Sass, 2000; Hervé, 2007; Millon et al., 1998). At that time, all
disorders were considered to arise from an impairment of reasoning. Pinel pointed
out that some individuals acted in erratic and self-defeating ways in spite of the
fact that they knew in an intellectual sense the consequences of their behaviour.
He coined the term manie sans délire – insanity without delirium – to indicate that
Personality 107
disorders could involve faculties other than the ‘mind’. The term moral insanity
became the Anglicised version of Pinel’s concept, emphasising more explicitly
that the syndrome involved deficits in character. By the late nineteenth century the
term psychopathic inferiority had emerged in reaction to the value-laden implications of moral insanity, and eventually the term psychopathic personality was
widely adopted.
Cleckley (1941), in his famous book The Mask of Sanity, was influential in
setting out the classic features of psychopathy as we know them today. Cleckley
was a practising psychiatrist and his book includes over twenty case studies of
psychopaths with whom he had dealt. Cleckley’s psychopaths were far from
common criminals. While many inevitably came into conflict with the law, others
did not and some were even successes in their chosen careers. The typical psychopath was not the bloodthirsty serial killer popularised in film (although such an
individual may be an extreme example of a psychopath), but more often a hustler,
conman, bigamist, and imposter. What intrigued Cleckley – reflected in the title of
his book – was the disconnect between the air of competence and sociability
exuded by psychopaths and the hollowness within. Psychopaths were outwardly
charming, relaxed, seemingly intelligent and generally gave a favourable first
impression (see Table 5.2). Quickly, however, the mask fell away and their fundamental unreliability, insincerity, selfishness and callousness became apparent.
Psychopaths not only caused grief to others but were also often their own worst
enemy, unable to sustain long-term commitment to any course of action and
frequently snatching defeat from the jaws of victory through their reckless and
impulsive behaviour.
Table 5.2 Comparisons of DSM-IV-TR (American Psychiatric Association, 2000) criteria
for APD, and Cleckley (1941) and Hare (1991) criteria for psychopathy
DSM-IV-TR
Cleckley
Hare PCL-R
Failure to conform to
social norms with respect
to lawful behaviours as
indicated by repeatedly
performing acts that are
grounds for arrest
Juvenile delinquency
Early behaviour problems
Revocation of conditional
release
Criminal versatility
Deceitfulness, as indicated Untruthfulness and insincerity
by lying, use of aliases, or
conning others for
personal profit or pleasure
Pathological lying
Cunning/manipulative
Parasitic life-style
Impulsivity or failure to
plan ahead
Need for stimulation,
boredom proneness
Lack of realistic long-term
goals
Poor behavioural control
Impulsivity
(Continued overleaf)
Inadequately motivated
antisocial behaviour
Failure to follow any life plan
Poor judgement and failure to
learn by experience
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Personality
Table 5.2 Continued
DSM-IV-TR
Cleckley
Hare PCL-R
Consistent
irresponsibility, as
indicated by repeated
failure to sustain
consistent work
behaviour or honour
financial obligations
Unreliability
Irresponsibility
Lack of remorse, as
indicated by being
indifferent to or
rationalising having
hurt, mistreated, or
stolen from another
Lack of remorse or shame
Lack of remorse or guilt
Failure to accept
responsibility for own
actions
Callous/lack of empathy
Superficial charm and ‘good’
intelligence
Glibness/superficial charm
Pathologic egocentricity and
incapacity for love
Grandiose sense of
self-worth
General poverty in major
affective reactions
Shallow affect
Sex life impersonal, trivial
and poorly integrated
Promiscuous sexual
behaviour
Unresponsiveness to general
interpersonal relations
Many short-term marital
relationships
Irritability and
aggressiveness, as
indicated by repeated
physical fights or assaults
Reckless disregard for
safety of self or others
Absence of delusions and
other signs of irrational
thinking
Absence of nervousness or
other psychoneurotic
manifestations
Specific loss of insight
Fantastic and uninviting
behaviours with drink and
sometimes without
Suicide rarely carried out
Personality 109
Meanwhile, from the 1930s, the term sociopath began to be used alongside
psychopath. From the start, psychopathy was conceptualised as a constitutional
defect. The term sociopathy, on the other hand, emphasised the social causes of
antisocial behaviour. Lykken (1957, 1998) proposed that psychopathy and sociopathy were distinct syndromes. Sociopaths shared many of the character flaws of
psychopaths – impulsiveness, callousness, deceitfulness – but lacked the plausibility and superficial charm. They were essentially unsocialised individuals, the
product of poverty, neglect, and harsh and inconsistent discipline. Numerically,
sociopaths were seen to be far more common than psychopaths.
In practice, however, the term psychopath was applied in an increasingly loose
manner as a catch-all diagnosis for almost anyone who had committed a crime. In
order to bring some definitional clarity a number of psychopathic subtypes were
proposed (Hare, 1970; Hervé, 2007; Millon and Davis, 1998; Poythress et al.,
2006). The most common distinction is between primary, secondary and dissocial
psychopaths (Hare, 1970). Primary – or true – psychopathy refers narrowly to the
classic, constitutional version of the syndrome defined by criteria similar to those
outlined by Cleckley. Secondary psychopaths are characterised by severe neurotic
symptoms. Their crimes were expressions of acting-out resulting from inner
emotional disturbances. Dissocial psychopaths are similar to sociopaths, and are
the product of a dysfunctional upbringing.
To diagnose primary psychopathy, Hare refined Cleckley’s criteria to develop
the Psychopathy Checklist (PCL; Hare, 1980) and a later revised edition (PCL-R;
Hare, 1991) (see Table 5.2). The PCL-R involves a structured rating process in
which points are allocated for each criterion and a total psychopathy score is
produced. Factor analysis of the PCL-R suggests it comprises three core factors:
(1) interpersonal deficits (manipulativeness, glibness, deceitfulness, etc.); (2)
emotional deficits (lack of remorse, absence of anxiety, fearlessness, callousness,
etc.); and (3) behavioural deficits (impulsivity, need for stimulation, lack of
planning, irresponsibility, etc.) (Cooke and Michie, 2001).
In an alternative attempt to end confusion about definitions and the abuse of the
term, the third edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM-III; American Psychiatric Association, 1980) dispensed with the label ‘psychopathy’
entirely and replaced it with APD. Similarly, the other major classification system,
the International Classification of Disease (ICD-10) (World Health Organization,
1992) adopted the term ‘dyssocial personality disorder’. Not only did DSM-III
and ICD-10 change the name of the disorder, they also made significant changes
to the diagnostic criteria. In particular, these classification systems shifted the
emphasis away from assumed dispositional factors and onto objective, behavioural criteria on which diagnoses were to be made. In the most recent version of
DSM (DSM-IV-TR) APD is defined as ‘a pervasive pattern of disregard for, and
violation of, the rights of others that begins in childhood or early adolescence and
continues into adulthood’ (American Psychiatric Association, 2000, p. 701). To
receive a diagnosis of APD, an individual must be over 18 years of age, have a
childhood history of conduct disorder, and satisfy at least three of the seven
criteria outlined in Table 5.2.
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Personality
The changes made by DSM have not settled the matter, however. Some
researchers have argued that modern definitions of APD are too behaviourally
oriented and do not encapsulate the core characterological deficits described in
early definitions of psychopathy. Most notably, Hare has criticised the DSM
criteria for over-diagnosing APD and as describing little more than habitual
criminality (Hare, 1996; Hart and Hare, 1989). While the labels APD and psychopathy are often used interchangeably, Hare maintains that true psychopaths are a
subset of those diagnosed with APD: all psychopaths have APD but not all individuals diagnosed with APD are psychopaths. In this book, APD is used as a
general term that includes psychopathy, while psychopathy is used to specifically
refer to those antisocial individuals who also satisfy the more restrictive Cleckley/
Hare criteria.
APD and crime
The proportion of offenders estimated to have APD depends upon how the
syndrome is defined. Generally speaking, the proportion is greater when DSM
criteria for APD are employed than when criteria for psychopathy are employed.
Fazel and Danesh (2002) conducted a meta-analysis of 28 studies from 12 countries examining APD among prison inmates. Overall, 47 per cent of male prisoners and 21 per cent of female prisoners were diagnosed with APD. On the other
hand, Hare (1996) estimated that the proportion of prison inmates who qualify as
psychopaths is between 15 and 25 per cent, while Simourd and Hoge (2000) put
the figure even lower at 11 per cent.
Individuals with APD do not necessarily commit crimes, but those who
do may exhibit distinctive patterns of offending. Antisocial individuals are
responsible for a disproportionate amount of crime (Farrington et al., 1986), and
Moffitt (1993) equates APD and life-course persistent offending. In the case
of psychopaths, when they commit serious crimes these crimes are often particularly savage. The lack of empathy possessed by psychopaths means that their
behaviour is not attenuated by the victims’ suffering. Homicides committed
by psychopaths are more likely than is the case for non-psychopaths to be
instrumental (calculating) rather than reactive (emotional), and to involve
gratuitous and excessive violence (Porter and Porter, 2007; Woodworth and
Porter, 2002).
Finally, offenders with APD are noted for their high rates of criminal recidivism. Hiscoke et al. (2003) found that prisoners diagnosed as antisocial/dyssocial
according to either DSM or ICD-10 criteria were 4.8 times more likely to
reoffend for any offence, and 3.7 times more likely to reoffend for a violent
offence, than were other prisoners. High recidivism rates also have been reported
when samples have been categorised in terms of psychopathy (Hemphill and
Hare, 2004; Quinsey et al., 1995; Serin and Amos, 1995). In a direct comparison
of violent recidivism rates for APD and psychopathy, Harris et al. (1991) found a
correlation of .26 when the diagnosis was based on DSM criteria and .56 when
diagnosis was based on the PCL-R.
Personality 111
APD and trait theory
APD is a multi-faceted syndrome comprising a diverse collection of maladaptive
personality traits. However, the conceptualisation of APD departs from trait
theory in two significant ways. First, APD is operationalised as a categorical
construct (Trull and Durrett, 2005; Widiger et al., 2009). An individual either has
or does not have APD, and those with APD are seen to be qualitatively different
from those without. Trait theory, on the other hand, is based on the premise that
personality traits are quantitative variables. People differ from one another by
degrees and there is no clear threshold at which a trait turns from normal to disordered. Second, APD is a heterogeneous construct (Widiger, 2005; Widiger et al.,
2009). In trait theory, personality constructs are formed from traits that are linked
to one another in a hierarchical structure. In contrast, the traits that make up APD
derive from clinical observation and are not necessarily connected in any conceptual way. Further, there is no requirement that an individual must meet all criteria
in order to receive a diagnosis, and thus two people may each be diagnosed with
APD but share no traits. This means that even if APD was conceptualised as a
dimensional rather than a categorical construct, there is no single continuum of
‘antisocialness’ along which individuals could be arranged.
In recent years a number of researchers have sought to understand APD in
terms of traditional trait theory such as the five-factor model (Lynam et al., 2005;
Lynam and Derefinko, 2006a, 2006b; Lynam and Widiger, 2001, 2007; Miller
et al., 2001; Trull and Durrett, 2005; Widiger, 2005; Widiger and Lynam, 1998a).
One research method for converting APD diagnoses to the language of the fivefactor model has drawn on expert ratings. Lynam and Widiger (2001) presented a
panel of experts in DSM classification of APD with a prototype description of an
APD case. The experts were asked to rate the case along the six facets for each
factor in the Big Five model (see Table 5.1). Miller et al. (2001) adopted a similar
research method, but on this occasion the ratings were performed by experts in
psychopathy. The findings are shown in Table 5.3. Only those facets on which the
case was rated to be particularly high or low are shown. It can be seen that there
is in fact little difference in the descriptions for APD and psychopathy, suggesting
that in the minds of experts at least, the distinction between the two is blurred. The
most significant factor was seen to be agreeableness, with all six facets rated as
low by both panels. The importance of neuroticism was also rated highly, with an
interesting mix of high and low ratings for the contributing facets. Extraversion
and conscientiousness were seen as moderately important, with openness seen as
marginally relevant.
An alternative approach to find the relationship between the five factors and
APD is to examine the personality profiles of diagnosed APD individuals. The
most common instrument for measuring the Big Five is NEO-Personality
Inventory Revised (NEO-PI-R). Lynam and Derefinko (2006b) conducted a metaanalysis involving 11 studies that examined psychopaths on measures of the Big
Five. The weighted effect sizes were −.52 for agreeableness, −38 for conscientiousness, .16 for neuroticism, −.10 for openness, and −.03 for extraversion. Unfortunately
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Personality
Table 5.3 Expert ratings of APD and psychopathy in terms of the five-factor model
Five factors
APD
Psychopathy
Openness
Feelings
Actions
high
low
high
Conscientiousness
Self-discipline
Dutifulness
Competence
Deliberation
Extraversion
Activity level
Assertiveness
Excitement-seeking
Warmth
Agreeableness
Straightforwardness
Trust
Altruism
Modesty
Tendermindedness
Compliance
Neuroticism
Anxiety
Self-consciousness
Depression
Vulnerability
Impulsiveness
Angry hostility
low
low
low
high
high
high
low
low
high
low
high
high
low
low
low
low
low
low
low
low
low
low
low
low
low
low
low
low
low
low
low
high
high
high
Source: Adapted from Lynam and Widiger (2001) and Miller et al. (2001).
the analysis was not able to examine the specific facets of each factor. However, at
the factor level, these findings closely match the predictions of the experts described
above. Low agreeableness and low conscientiousness are the key discriminating
factors. Contradicting Cleckley, psychopaths are moderately neurotic. However,
taking into consideration the ratings by the experts, it is likely that psychopaths
have high scores on some neuroticism facets and low scores on others. Openness
and extraversion were not strong predictors of psychopathy, although again the
experts suggest these factors may include a mix of low and high scores at the
facet level.
In summary, research supports a view of APD as a collection of extreme
personality traits, quantitatively rather than qualitatively different from the traits
that describe sub-clinical levels of antisocial behaviour. Converting APD and
psychopathy diagnostic criteria to continuous trait measures promises to bring
Personality 113
greater clarity and precision to a field of research and clinical practice that has
been notoriously plagued by confusion around definitions and terminology.
Conclusion and evaluation
There has been an enormous amount of research examining the personality traits
of offenders. It is fair to say that many criminologists – and not just sociologists
but psychologists as well – have been underwhelmed by the accumulated research
findings. Those hoping that the research would reveal a set of personality traits
that invariably predicted offending behaviour have certainly been disappointed.
As this chapter has revealed, the research is characterised by modest effect sizes
and sometimes frustratingly inconsistent findings.
However, the failure to identify strong relationships between personality traits
and criminal behaviour should not surprise and nor does it suggest that research
on personality and crime ought to be abandoned. The strength of the trait–crime
relationship reported in this chapter is comparable to strength of trait–behaviour
relationships reported for other behavioural domains. Personality theorists have
long given up the notion that traits are independent and direct predictors of behaviour. Rather, traits operate on the specificity principle. They describe generalised
tendencies to behave in certain ways, but behaviour on any given occasion is the
product of an interaction between traits and situations. The possession of criminogenic traits puts an individual at an increased risk of committing crime, but that
risk may not be realised until that individual encounters conducive situational
conditions. Equally, when criminogenic traits and criminogenic situations do
coincide, the risk of crime is multiplied.
The picture is also complicated by the fact that the strength with which traits
were possessed varied among offenders. Measures of a self-centred, cynical and
aggressive interpersonal style – high Machiavellianism, high P and low agreeableness – emerged as the strongest predictor of criminal and antisocial behaviour. However, van Dam et al.’s (2007) cluster analysis of the EPQ indicates that
many juvenile offenders do not score highly on these qualities. Similarly, the
inability of offenders to inhibit urges – measured most directly by univariate
impulsivity scales, but also as part of Eysenck’s P scale and the conscientiousness
and neuroticism scales from the NEO-PI-R – increased with the seriousness and
persistence of their offending. Finally, measures of negative emotionality – principally the N scales on the EPQ and NEO-PI-R – were moderately correlated with
crime and antisocial behaviour, but some psychopathic offenders are noted for
their lack of anxiety and their fearlessness. In sum, these findings reinforce the
general approach adopted in this book that offenders are a heterogeneous population and cannot be described by a single personality profile. All of these findings
are broadly interpretable within the life-course persistent and adolescent-limited
taxonomy.
The acquisition of traits has been presented in this chapter as the product of a
biosocial process. However, while the importance of environmental factors has
been stressed, the focus of the analysis to date has been on the role of genetic and
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Personality
neuropsychological processes in creating predispositions for crime. It is time to
turn our attention to examining in detail the role the environment plays in shaping
those predispositions into criminal behaviour. We begin in the following chapter
by looking at the role of developmental experiences.
Note
1 This coefficient should not be confused with the heritability coefficient reported in
Chapter 3. The environment influences personality in two stages. First, genes and the
developmental environment combine to create personality traits, and then those traits
combine with the immediate environment to produce behaviour.
6
Development
While the biosocial bases of crime have been emphasised throughout this book, to
date, there has been little attention given to the precise environmental events that
contribute to crime. In this chapter and the ones that follow, we shift to a more
explicit and detailed examination of the nurture side of the nature–nurture interplay. We begin in this chapter by taking a developmental perspective, examining
the significant life events that contribute to crime and criminality. Examining
crime in terms of developmental experiences can help increase our understanding
of when and why individuals begin offending, when and why they desist, and why
there are individual differences in these patterns.
This chapter is informed by theories and research in developmental psychology.
Developmental psychology is the study of the ways that humans both change and
remain constant over time. Developmental psychologists study orderly changes
and continuities in three interrelated domains: physical development, cognitive
development and psychosocial development. A common misconception about
developmental psychology is that it is child psychology. While a great deal of
attention in developmental psychology is indeed given to the critical early years
of childhood, development continues across the lifespan: from ‘womb to tomb’.
Many theorists argue that an individual’s future is not set in concrete by their
childhood experiences. Instead, throughout each period of life there are critical
transition points that may lead an individual down one pathway or another. The
chapter begins by setting out the biological and environmental foundations of
development. There follows a review of the critical developmental factors that
increase or reduce the risk that an individual will engage in crime. Development
in three specific psychological domains particularly relevant to criminology –
attachment, moral reasoning and self-control – is then discussed. Finally, the
criminal careers perspective is presented, with an examination of variations in
offending patterns across the lifespan.
The biological and environmental foundations
of human development
The focus of this section is on how genes and the environment combine to shape
the process of development. The key point to be made is that biosocial processes
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Development
produce a wide array of developmental possibilities that help account for individual differences in offending patterns. The first task in this analysis is to identify
the sources of influence on development.
Heritability revisited: shared and non-shared environments
As discussed in Chapter 3, heritability studies estimate the portion of the variance
in a trait that is attributable to genetic factors on the one hand, and environmental
factors on the other. These studies have revealed that in general .3–.5 of trait variance is attributable to genetic factors, leaving .5–.7 due to environmental factors.
However, in most modern heritability studies, environmental factors are further
broken down into shared (or common) environments and non-shared (unique)
environments (Plomin et al., 2001; Plomin and Daniels, 1987). The shared environment refers to environmental factors that are experienced by all children within
the same family and are therefore assumed to make the children alike. Shared
environmental influences include factors such as parenting style, family size,
socio-economic status, and the religious, social and moral values of parents. The
non-shared environment refers to environmental factors to which children within
the same family are differentially exposed and which are therefore assumed to
make the children unalike. Many non-shared experiences occur outside the family.
For example, children within the same family will have different teachers, mix
with different peers, and may grow up in different cultural eras. However, siblings
may also have non-shared experiences within the family. For example, being the
eldest child involves different developmental experiences to being the youngest or
middle child. Parents may also treat individual children differently; for example,
by showing favouritism to one child over another.
When considering the role of environmental factors in development, social scientists have traditionally focused on shared familial experiences. It has been generally
assumed that, to the extent that the environment is important in development, children raised in the same family will tend to acquire similar behavioural traits.
However, the significance of non-shared environments is readily apparent from
examining the results of twin and adoption studies. Consider the case of MZ twins
raised together. Because they are genetically identical, if their environmental experiences were also identical, then we would expect 100 per cent concordance in their
traits. But MZ twins never have identical personalities. Thus some of their environmental experiences must be working to make them different from one another.
These experiences comprise their non-shared environment. There are a number of
different ways of estimating shared and non-shared environmental effects, most
involving sophisticated multivariate statistical models. For our purposes, it is
sufficient to know that these techniques apportion the variance attributable to
environmental factors into shared and non-shared components.
To the surprise of many social scientists, the consistent finding from twin and
adoption studies is that non-shared environments account for more trait variance
than do shared environments. In studies of personality, it has been found that on
average around 40 per cent of trait variance is due to genetic factors, 35 per cent
Development 117
to non-shared environments, 5 per cent to shared environments, and the remaining
20 per cent to measurement error (Dunn and Plomin, 1990). There are relatively
few studies that have examined shared and non-shared environments and
crime, but the findings from those studies report a similar trend. For example,
the meta-analysis by Rhee and Waldman (2002) reported that environmental
factors accounted for 59 per cent of the variance for antisocial behaviour, a
total that comprised 16 per cent for the shared environment and 43 per cent for
the non-shared environment. In sum, to the extent that people within the same
family are alike, it is largely because of their genetic similarity; the environment
is important but its main effect is to make people different rather than to make
them alike.
Note that shared and non-shared environments have been sometimes interpreted as meaning inside and outside the family, and the conclusion has been
drawn by some that families do not matter. This is a serious over-simplification.
As described above, non-shared environments can include many within-family
experiences. The significance of the research on shared and non-shared environments is to address the important but neglected question of why children from the
same family have different developmental outcomes.
Gene–environment interplay
Identifying the sources of influence on development goes only part of the way to
explaining the acquisition of skills, traits and behaviours. Genes and environment
do not operate separately but rather they work in concert with one another in what
is referred to as the gene–environment (GxE) interplay. There are two broad types
of GxE interplay: interactions and correlations.
We have encountered GxE interactions in earlier chapters. A GxE interaction
occurs when the same environment affects genetically different individuals in
different ways. For example, a child high on sensation-seeking may be less
responsive to parental discipline than a child low on sensation-seeking, meaning
that the same parenting strategies will be more effective for some children than for
others. Similarly, a child predisposed to neuroticism may experience the divorce
of his/her parents more traumatically – be less resilient – than will a sibling low
on neuroticism. Thus while siblings may have the same shared environment, the
effect of their shared experiences can vary between them, depending upon their
individual genetic make-up.
A GxE correlation occurs when genetically different individuals are differentially exposed to different environments. Correlations come in three forms:
passive, reactive and active (Plomin, 1990; Plomin et al., 1977). A passive correlation occurs when a child is simultaneously provided with compatible genes and
environment. For example, a child may inherit genes for high sensation-seeking
from his/her parents. Because the parents are also high on sensation-seeking, the
home environment is likely to be one in which the child is given many opportunities to engage in exciting activities. Similarly, a child who inherits genes for high
intelligence is also likely to have a home environment that reinforces academic
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Development
pursuits. The correlation in these examples is passive because both the genes and
the environment are provided to the child without him/her needing to do anything.
A reactive correlation occurs when genetically different individuals evoke
different environmental reactions. Because a child high on sensation-seeking is
likely to be more boisterous and demanding than a child low on sensation-seeking,
he/she may elicit more negative parental responses such as harsher discipline and
less intimate physical contact. It is by the same principle that attractive individuals
tend to be treated more favourably in the wider world than are unattractive individuals. The nature of the environment experienced by an individual in part
depends upon the reactions he/she provokes from others.
An active correlation occurs when genetically different individuals select or
create particular environments. The child high on sensation-seeking is likely to
pursue more exciting and risky experiences than will the child low on sensationseeking; the child low on sensation-seeking, on the other hand, may be less likely to
skip school and be more likely to complete homework assignments. Active correlations are also called niche-picking (Scarr and McCartney, 1983). Individuals are not
necessarily passive recipients of environmental factors but can actively control
some aspects of their environment to suit their needs.
Epigenetics
A further layer of complexity to the relationship between genes and the environment
is provided by epigenetics. Whereas the GxE interplay is concerned with the role of
genes in the way that environments impact upon individuals, epigenetics is
concerned with the role of environments in the way that genes are expressed. The
term epigenetics has been around since the 1940s (Waddington, 1942) but its
meaning has changed over the years (Haig, 2004; van Speybroeck, 2002). Literally,
epigenetic means ‘on the outside of ’ or ‘beside’ genes and was originally used to
describe all of the non-genetic mechanisms that affect gene expression in the course
of development. The term was coined to emphasise the bi-directional nature of the
gene-environment relationship. For example, the onset of puberty is governed by
epigenetic processes. The genes responsible for puberty are present at birth but
exactly when these genes switch on partly depends upon environmental factors such
as nutrition and stress (Ellis, 2004).
Since the 1990s and the era of molecular genetics, epigenetics has become
more narrowly defined to mean ‘the study of heritable changes in gene expression
that occur without a change in DNA sequence’ (Wolffe and Matzke, 1999, p. 481).
The focus has shifted to explaining at a molecular level the process by which
genes are switched on and off in response to environmental signals (Champagne
and Mashoodh, 2009; Harper, 2005; Masterpasqua, 2009; Suffrein-Roberts et al.,
2008; Walsh, 2009). Two major epigenetic mechanisms have been identified:
DNA methylation and histone modification. Briefly, DNA methylation involves
molecules that attach to guanine-cytosine (C-G) base pairs (see Table 3.1) and
silence them. Histone modification affects the way the DNA molecule comes
wrapped (around proteins called histones) within each cell; the less tightly wrapped
Development 119
a sequence of DNA, the greater the likelihood of genetic expression. These epigenetic processes involve reversible changes to DNA that can be passed from one
generation to the next but that do not involve any alteration to the sequence of
DNA base pairs. The changes to DNA suggest that the genome has a certain degree
of plasticity analogous (but less pronounced) to the plasticity of the brain.
Relevant environmental factors affecting epigenetic mechanisms can include
diet, the quality of parental care, hormonal activity and exposure to drugs and
toxins (Masterpasqua, 2009; Suffrein-Roberts et al., 2008). To date, most research
investigating epigenetic mechanisms has involved animal studies since these
permit tight control of relevant variables. For example, Weaver et al. (2004) investigated the effects of maternal care on epigenetic regulation in rodents. They found
that rodent pups who received high levels of maternal care were more resistant to
stress than were pups who received low levels of maternal care. Examining the
genes responsible for suppressing excessive stress reactions, the researchers found
that the low maternal-care group had higher levels of DNA methylation than did
the high maternal-care group. That is, the genes that might have helped the low
maternal-care pups deal with stress had been switched off. These changes persisted
into adulthood, but were reversed if pups were cross-fostered with a high-care
mother.
Fraga et al. (2005) showed that epigenetic changes to the genome also occur in
humans. They examined a sample of MZ twins aged from 3 to 74. The researchers
found that for 50-year-old twins there were significant differences between twin
pairs in the distribution of DNA methylation and histone modification, while there
were no differences between twin pairs at age 3. In other words, epigenetic
changes to the genome accumulated over the lifespan. The presence of these
changes in the genome may help explain why a pair of MZ twins can develop
distinctive genotypes – including differential susceptibility to genetically-based
disorders such as schizophrenia – despite sharing 100 per cent of their genes.
Development across the lifespan
Developmental psychologists typically divide the lifespan into periods (see
Table 6.1). These divisions are based on chronological age and associated physical, cognitive and psychosocial developments, but they are also recognised as
social constructions. There are significant differences in the way development is
conceptualised in different eras and among different cultures. For example, what
we today call adolescence in the West is largely an invention of the twentieth
century (Keller, 1999). Similarly, in contrast to the divisions described in Table
6.1, in some East African tribes males are categorised as youths, junior warriors,
senior warriors, junior elders, senior elders and retired elders (Keith, 1985).
Developmental theories vary in the way that they portray the progress
of an individual through the developmental periods. Two broad theoretical positions may be characterised. Theories that emphasise the primacy of biological
processes generally present development as the fulfilment of a pre-programmed
genetic blueprint. Every individual is seen to follow the same developmental path,
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Table 6.1 Major periods of life
Periods of life
Approximate age
Typical characteristics
Prenatal
conception to birth
Period of most rapid physical development.
Vulnerability to environmental influences.
Infancy
first 2 years
Dramatic neurological development and
emergence of motor, perceptual and
cognitive abilities. Attachments to parents
form.
Early childhood
2–6 years
Refinement of motor skills and expansion
of cognitive and language skills through
play. Ties with peers begin to be
established.
Middle childhood
6–12 years
Advances in academic and social skills
associated with the school years. Peer
group becomes important. Concept of self
develops.
Adolescence
12–20 years
Onset of puberty leads to major physical
changes and sexual maturity. Search for
identity and establishing autonomy from
family. Peer group exerts increasing
influence.
Early adulthood
20–40 years
Physical conditions peaks. Concerns centre
on leaving home, entering the workforce
and forming intimate relationships. May
establish a family and take on responsibility
for others. Personality characteristics
become more stable.
Middle adulthood
40–65 years
Slow deterioration of sensory and physical
abilities but mental abilities peak. Height of
career. May need to help own children
become independent.
Late adulthood
65+ years
Health and physical abilities decline.
Adjustment to retirement. Reflecting on the
meaning of their lives.
moving lock-step with everyone else from one developmental stage to the next.
These stages comprise discrete developmental milestones that involve abrupt
shifts in development as genes switch on and off, producing a developmental
trajectory that resembles a staircase. On the other hand, theories that emphasise
the primacy of the environment generally present development as a dynamic
process that unfolds in response to each new experience. Developmental pathways are infinitely varied depending upon the unique environments and life experiences of each individual. There are no discrete stages; rather, development is a
continuous process involving the steady and incremental acquisition of new skills
and behaviours over time.
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The complex relationship between genes and the environment suggests a
compromise position somewhere between the two scenarios outlined above. One
way of integrating these two views is provided by a family of developmental
perspectives known collectively as lifespan psychology (Baltes, 1987; Baltes
et al., 1999; Smith and Baltes, 1999; Staudinger and Lindenberger, 2003).
Lifespan psychology is a meta-theoretical approach that stresses development as
a life-long process that is subject to multiple causal influences. Development is
seen to occur both as a series of qualitatively different stages, during which new
skills and abilities appear; and as periods of continuous, quantitative development,
during which skills and abilities are consolidated and honed. While stages are
biologically co-ordinated, the emergence of each new stage is mediated by environmental factors. Development is characterised by life-long plasticity and may
take many different courses according to each individual’s unique biological
make-up and ongoing environmental experiences.
Developmental risk and protective factors for crime
In researching risk and protective factors for crime, psychologists have traditionally focused on the role of early experiences as predictors of later criminality.
However, as suggested by the lifespan perspective, there are limitations to such an
approach. Risk factors early in life do not necessarily condemn an individual to a
life of crime, and nor do early protective factors provide a guaranteed inoculation
against criminality. Risk and protective factors can be both distal (occurring
during early formative years) and proximal (occurring near the time of offending).
The factors examined in the section are family structure, child maltreatment,
parental disciplinary styles, schooling, peers and marriage.
Family structure
In general, research shows that being raised in an intact family comprising both
biological parents is related to lower levels of delinquency than being raised in
alternative family structures (Apel and Kaukinen, 2008; Blazei et al., 2008;
Demuth and Brown, 2004; Harper and McLanahan, 2004; Heck and Walsh,
2000). For example, Kierkus and Hewitt (2009) examined the relationship
between four types of delinquency – general delinquency, violent crime, property
crime and substance abuse – and four family structures – two biological parents
(‘traditional’), single parent, single parent plus step-parent, and single parent plus
other relative. Children from the three alternative family structures had higher
levels of all types of delinquency than did those from traditional families. These
findings were independent of gender, race and socio-economic status.
Delving more deeply into the role of family structure, researchers have uncovered a number of moderating effects. Generally, the absence of mothers has a
more deleterious effect than does the absence of fathers (Demuth and Brown,
2004; Haas et al., 2004), although the absence of fathers has a greater impact on
boys than on girls (Ram and Hou, 2005; Schwartz, 2008). However, Demuth and
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Brown (2004) found that initial differences between single-father and singlemother families disappeared when the level of parental involvement and supervision was controlled for. In a similar vein, the negative effects of living in a
single-mother family can be mitigated if there is a loving and warm relationship
between the mother and child (Haas et al., 2004; Mack et al., 2007). In the case of
fathers, the positive effect of their presence in the family home is conditional on
their level of antisociality (Blazei et al., 2008; Jaffee et al., 2003). For fathers with
low levels of antisocial behaviour, the more time that they lived away from their
children, the greater the children’s risk of conduct problems: for fathers with high
levels of antisocial behaviours, the more time that they lived with their children,
the greater the children’s risk of conduct problems. What actually happens within
families may be more important than family structure per se.
Child maltreatment
Maltreatment of children may involve physical abuse, neglect, sexual abuse and
psychological abuse (Kinard, 1994). Kinard notes that overlaps in the definitions
of different types of maltreatment, and the fact that children may experience
multiple forms of maltreatment, make it difficult to disentangle separate maltreatment effects. For this reason, most studies employ composite measures of two or
more types of maltreatment. There is an extensive body of research that shows
children who experience various combinations of maltreatment have a significantly increased risk of engaging in delinquency and adult crime, after controlling
for other risk factors such as socio-economic status (Heck and Walsh, 2000;
McCord, 1983; Loeber and Stouthamer-Loeber, 1986; Mersky and Topitzes,
2009; Smith and Thornberry, 1995; Ryan and Testa, 2005; Stewart et al., 2008;
Teague et al., 2008; Weatherburn and Lind, 1997; Widom,1989; 2003; Widom
and Maxfield, 2001; Zingraff et al., 1993).
The effects of maltreatment may be moderated by a number of factors.
Kruttschnitt et al. (1987) found that abused males who had good social support
systems – close ties with siblings, involvement in sporting teams, and so on – had
lower subsequent rates of violent offending than did other abused males. Zingraff
et al. (1993) found that good performance at school – good grades, low absenteeism, good behavioural record – also reduced the risk of later criminality in
abused and neglected children. Alternatively, the level of delinquency has been
found to be stronger if the maltreated child is moved into foster care rather than
remaining at home (Ryan and Testa, 2005). Finally, Stewart et al. (2008) found
that maltreatment that extended into adolescence – that is, closer to the typical age
of offending onset – was related to higher rates of delinquency than was maltreatment that ceased prior to adolescence.
Parental disciplinary styles
Baumrind (1991) identified three types of parental disciplinary styles: authoritarian, permissive and authoritative. In the authoritarian style, parents set the
Development 123
behavioural standards to be achieved by their children in the form of a predetermined, inflexible set of rules. The rules need to be obeyed for their own sake –
little emphasis is given to negotiating with children or to explaining the rationale
upon which the rules are based. Rule infringements are punished with sanctions
that may include physical punishments. In the permissive style, parents do not
play an active role in the socialisation of their children. They provide little in the
way of firm behavioural guidelines to children and have a tolerant approach
towards their children’s behaviour, including acting out behaviour. Children have
a great deal of freedom in deciding when to go to bed, how much television they
watch, and when and with whom they socialise. The authoritative style is characterised by a firm but fair approach to discipline. Emphasis is given to providing
direction to children based around open communication and rational discussion.
Standards of behaviour are set against age-appropriate expectations. While independence and individuality are valued, family rules are enforced by the consistent
and balanced application of social controls.
Both authoritarian (Farrington et al., 2009; Grogan-Kaylor, 2005; Verona
et al., 2005; Verona and Sachs-Ericsson, 2005) and permissive (Beck and Shaw,
2005; Frick, 2006; Schaffer et al., 2009; Warr, 2005) parenting styles have been
found to correlate with juvenile and adult offending. It is argued that the authoritarian style generates hostility and distrust in children and fails to facilitate the
learning of the principle that underpins the rule. The permissive style is distinguished from neglect (Maccoby and Martin, 1983), but both may have much the
same outcome. Both permissiveness and neglect can contribute to antisocial
behaviour in the short term because children’s activities are not adequately monitored or supervised, and in the long term because children do not learn appropriate
behavioural boundaries and self-control.
One particular line of research has focused on the effects of corporal punishment – most likely a component of an authoritarian parenting style – on subsequent antisocial behaviour. Corporal punishment is distinguished from physical
abuse, and is defined as ‘the use of physical force with the intention of causing
the child to experience pain but not injury for the purposes of correction or control
of the child’s behavior’ (Straus, 1994, p. 4). Gershoff (2002) conducted a metaanalysis involving 88 studies. The only desirable outcome for corporal punishment was an increase in immediate compliance, with a large effect size of 1.13.
Undesirable outcomes included increased child aggression (effect size .36),
increased child delinquency and antisocial behaviour (effect size .42), increased
adult aggression (effect size of .57), increased adult delinquency and antisocial
behaviour (effect size of .42), decreased quality of parent–child relationship
(effect size of −.58) and decreased moral internalisation (effect size −.33).
Schooling
Poor academic performance has consistently been found to be related to the development of antisocial behaviour (Dodge and Pettit, 2003; Harlow, 2003; Henry et al.,
1999; Loeber et al., 1998; Lochner and Moretti, 2004; Meltzer et al., 1984).
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Children as young as 8 years of age who fail at school have been found to have
almost double the risk of later delinquency (Loeber et al., 1998). At every age
bracket, non-delinquent children outperform delinquent children in all academic
areas (Meltzer et al., 1984). Delinquency is negatively related to the length of time
spent at school (Harlow, 2003; Henry et al., 1999; Lochner and Moretti, 2004).
There are several possible reasons for the effect of school failure on delinquency. First, a poor education decreases employability and potential earnings,
making criminal behaviour a relatively more attractive option (Petras et al., 2004).
Second, repeated school failure may result in a damaged self-image that creates
an expectation of failure in other areas of life (Zamora, 2005). Third, negative
experiences at school inhibit the development of social bonds and attachments to
wider social institutions that serve to bind the individual to a prosocial life-style
(Henry et al., 1990; Sprott, 2004).
Peers
Having delinquent friends has been found to be a powerful predictor of delinquency and is perhaps the most significant proximal cause of offending onset.
Research has found that delinquency increases with the number of delinquent
friends (Akers et al., 1979; Matsueda, 1982; Mears et al., 1998), the proportion of
friends who are delinquent (Haynie, 2002), the intensity of the relationship with
delinquent friends (Alarid et al., 2000; Payne and Cornwell, 2007), the duration of
association with delinquent friends (Akers et al., 1979), and the frequency
of association with delinquent friends (Akers et al., 1979; Akers and Lee, 1996;
Haynie and Osgood, 2005).
Traditionally two alternative explanations have been proposed for the association between delinquent friendships and delinquency. The first is that delinquent
peers exert an undesirable influence that encourages individuals to engage in
crimes they might otherwise not have considered committing. The second explanation is that delinquent-prone individuals seek out like-minded friends in an example
of niche-picking, and thus the association between delinquency and delinquent
friends is merely correlational and not causational. More recent longitudinal
research suggests a third explanation that involves a reciprocal relationship between
delinquent peers and delinquency (Aseltine, 1995; Matsueda and Anderson, 1998).
Matsueda and Anderson (1998) examined self-report delinquency data from 1,725
youths collected in three waves over four years. They found that delinquents tended
to gravitate towards other delinquents. At the same time, associating with other
delinquents exacerbated existing delinquent tendencies. Delinquency both affects
and is affected by the choice of friends an individual makes.
Marriage
The variables examined so far have been concerned with the onset of offending.
Of equal interest are factors that increase desistance from crime. The most widely
researched of these factors is marriage (Beaver et al., 2008; Bersani et al., 2009;
Development 125
Farrington and West, 1995; King et al., 2007; Maume et al., 2005; Sampson et al.,
2006; Savolainen, 2009; Warr, 1998). In one of the most influential studies,
Sampson et al. (2006) reanalysed longitudinal data collected by Glueck and
Glueck (1950, 1968). The data included criminal records, personal interviews
and individual and family background measures for a sample of 500 high risk
boys from adolescence to the age of 32 years. Sampson et al. (2006) then traced a
stratified sample of 52 participants who at the time of the reanalysis (1994) were
aged up to 70 years. They found that marriage was associated with a 35 per cent
reduction in offending. Reductions in offending were also found for stable
cohabitation.
There are a number of qualifications concerning the protective effects of
marriage. First, marriage as individuals move out of adolescence is distinguished
from romantic relationships during adolescence. For adolescents, romantic
involvements typically increase existing delinquency propensities, especially for
girls (Capaldi et al., 2008; Cauffman et al., 2008; Eklund et al., 2009). Second,
the quality of the relationship is important. For marriage to have protective effects,
it must be characterised by stability and genuine attachment (Sampson et al.,
2006). Relatedly, marriage may be a risk factor for crime if the partner is also
engaged in antisocial behaviour (Capaldi et al., 2008; Sampson et al., 2006).
Third, the beneficial effects of marriage tend to be greater for men than for women
(King et al., 2007; Leverentz, 2006). While males typically marry partners with
less deviant histories than themselves, the reverse is typically true for women. As
Laub and Sampson (2003) put it, men tend to marry up while women tend to
marry down.
Social explanations for desistance propose either indirect or direct effects for
marriage on crime. The indirect argument is that marriage alters the pattern of
interaction with delinquent friends and the relative opportunities for crime
(Giordano et al., 2003; Maume et al., 2005; Warr, 1998). Offending is no longer
part of the individual’s daily routine. Those arguing for direct effects propose that
marriage fundamentally changes people through strengthening their social bonds
and their commitment to more conventional social values (Laub and Sampson
2001; Maume et al., 2005). Marriage becomes a turning point in the offender’s
life that provides the chance of a fresh start.
Few researchers had considered the biosocial bases for desistance. However,
recently Beaver et al. (2008) identified a number of genetic polymorphisms –
specifically, DRD2, DRD4, DAT1 and MAOA – that were directly related to
desistance. It will be recalled from Chapter 4 that these polymorphisms are
involved in the availability of dopamine, a neurotransmitter implicated in
emotional arousal, and that levels of dopamine normally drop sharply after adolescence. More importantly, Beaver et al. found that for males there was a GxE
interaction for three polymorphisms (DRD2, DRD4 and MAOA). The effect of
marriage on desistance depended upon which versions of these three genes an
individual possessed. While the exact reason for the interaction effect is at this
stage not clear, Beaver et al.’s findings highlight at a molecular level why marriage
may lead to desistance for one person but not for another.
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Psychosocial development and crime
The previous section identified the key environmental factors associated with the
development of criminal behaviour. This section considers some of the mediating
psychological mechanisms through which these environmental factors operate.
Three areas of psychosocial development of particular relevance to antisocial
behaviour are attachment, moral reasoning and self-control.
Attachment
Attachment refers to the strong and enduring bonds between people. Attachment
patterns are established in infancy between a child and his/her primary caregivers, and these patterns may affect the nature of an individual’s interpersonal
relationships later in life. The inability to form close bonds with others has potentially important consequences for the later development of antisocial behaviour.
Bowlby’s attachment theory
The need for attachment is thought to be innate, the product of evolution
and designed to ensure that offspring are cared for. In Harlow’s (Harlow and
Zimmermann, 1959) famous experiment, baby monkeys who were deprived of
contact with their mother clung for comfort to a soft cloth doll that did not provide
food, in preference to a wire doll that did provide food. Based on a combination
of ethological and psychoanalytic ideas, Bowlby (1969) proposed a theory of
attachment to account for the development of human parent–child bonds. Bowlby
argued that while infants come hard-wired for attachment, bonds develop as
a result of the interaction between the child and the caregiver over the first few
years of life. In normative development, childhood attachment occurs in four
stages. In the pre-attachment stage (0–2 months) infants do not discriminate
among adults and show no particular preference for any individual. In the ‘attachment-in-the-making’ stage (2–6 months) the infant shows a clear preference for
his/her primary caregivers but does not protest when separated from them. In the
‘clear-cut’ attachment stage (6 months–2 years) the infant displays separation
anxiety when taken from his/her primary caregivers. Finally, after 2 years of age,
the child begins to form reciprocal relationships with the primary caregivers as he/
she comes to understand and predict their comings and goings.
Not all children follow the normative developmental pathway. Ainsworth
(1973) identified four attachment styles based on how children during the attachment phase responded to the departure and return of their mother. In the secure
attachment style, the child may cry when the mother leaves but welcomes her
when she returns. The caregiver is an anchor-point for security. In the avoidant
attachment style, the child does not cry when the mother leaves and avoids her
when she returns. In the ambivalent (or anxious) attachment style, the child
becomes very upset when the mother leaves but resists contact with her when
she returns. Finally, in the disorganised attachment style, the child behaves in
Development 127
contradictory, ineffectual and unpredictable ways, perhaps resorting to rocking
behaviour or approaching the mother without looking at her.
Attachment style is affected by a number of factors, including the quantity of
caregiving opportunities, the quality of caregiving, characteristics of the child
and characteristics of the family environment. As described in previous chapters,
when children are deprived of close human contact early in life – as occurred with
the Romanian orphans (Rutter et al., 2004) – they have ongoing difficulty in
forming emotional bonds with others. In terms of the quality of caregiving,
secure attachment is related to loving, accepting, attentive, sympathetic and
understanding caregiver behaviour, while insecure attachment styles can result
from inconsistent, unresponsive, rejecting and abusive caregiver behaviour (van
IJzendoorn et al., 1999; van IJzendoorn et al., 2004). The quality of caregiver
behaviour may in turn be affected by the behaviour of the child; children who are
emotionally unresponsive or who are difficult to manage may elicit negative
responses from caregivers in an example of reactive correlation (van IJzendoorn
et al., 2004). Finally, caregiver behaviour can be affected by family stresses such
as financial difficulty and marital discord (Thompson and Raikes, 2003).
According to attachment theory, childhood attachment has long-term effects on
interpersonal behaviour and the ability to form close relations with others (Bowlby,
1980; Hazan and Shaver, 1987; Nelis and Rae, 2009). Attachment experiences
with the primary caregivers create expectations in the individual about the reliability of others and evaluations of one’s own self-worth. Secure attachments help
shape an interpersonal style that is characterised by confidence, cooperation and
empathy while an insecure attachment styles will lead to deficits in these area of
interpersonal behaviour (Thompson et al., 2003).
Attachment and criminal behaviour
Bowlby’s original theorising about attachment was based on his clinical analysis
of the backgrounds of 44 juvenile thieves (Bowlby, 1944). He concluded that 14
of the sample displayed a marked lack of affection and warmth for other human
beings, a condition he traced back to the inadequacy of their early home environment and weak parent–child bonds. Research has subsequently confirmed higher
levels of insecure childhood attachment among offenders than among non-offenders
(Anderson et al., 1999; Leiber et al., 2009; Mack et al., 2007; Rankin and Kern,
1994; Smallbone and Dadds, 2000). Rankin and Kern (1994) reported that children
who are securely attached to both parents have lower self-reported delinquency than
do children who are securely attached to just one. Smallbone and Dadds (2000)
found that self-reported antisocial behaviour was related most strongly to avoidant
paternal attachment, suggesting that the relationship with the father plays a particularly important role in determining whether or not an individual offends. Mack et al.
(2007) found that the level of maternal attachment was a stronger predictor of delinquency than whether the child came from a two-parent or single-mother family.
There has been particular interest in the relationship between attachment style
and sex offending. It is reasoned that the social-skills deficits that characterise
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insecure attachments impair the ability of individuals to gain intimacy with
adults in a socially appropriate manner and so the offender seeks compensatory
intimacy with children (Marshall, 1989). Sex offenders have been found to
have less secure attachments than non-sex offenders (Lyn and Burton, 2004;
Smallbone and Dadds, 1998) and non-offenders (Smallbone and Dadds, 1998;
2000; 2001), but attachment style does not reliably discriminate among different
types of sex offenders (Lyn and Burton, 2004).
Moral development
Moral development is concerned with the way that individuals make judgements
about ethical issues and social rules. The application of moral development theory
to criminology is premised on the assumption that deficits in moral reasoning
affect an individual’s ability to tell right from wrong and to fully appreciate the
rights and feelings of others. Moral development is most closely associated with
the work of Lawrence Kohlberg (1958, 1969).
Kohlberg’s moral development theory
Kohlberg’s formulation of the acquisition of increasingly sophisticated levels of
moral reasoning is an example of a developmental stage theory, but one that
recognises the role of environmental factors in helping to move individuals
between stages. Based on the pioneering work of Piaget (1932) on the stages of
cognitive development in children, Kohlberg proposed that moral development
involved a set of six sequential, qualitatively-different stages, separated into three
levels: pre-conventional, conventional and post-conventional (see Table 6.2).
Table 6.2 Kohlberg’s stages of moral reasoning
Stage
Offending is justified if . . .
Level 1: Pre-conventional reasoning
1. Punishment and obedience
2. Instrumental hedonism
. . . punishment can be avoided
. . . rewards outweigh risks
Level 2: Conventional reasoning
3. Good boy/girl
4. Authority and social order
. . . it maintains relationships
. . . it is in the interests of society or social
institutions
Level 3: Post-conventional reasoning
5. Social contract
6. Universal ethical principles
. . . it maintains human rights or furthers social
justice
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At the pre-conventional reasoning level the bases for moral decisions are seen
to be external to the individual. In stage one (when the child is approximately 4–8
years old), moral decisions are based on obeying powerful others and avoiding
externally imposed sanctions. Certain behaviours are wrong because they result in
punishment. In stage two, the rationale for obeying rules shifts to the relative
balance of rewards and punishments. The individual has an egocentric view of the
world and pursues behaviours that further his/her self-interest. Misbehaviour can
be justified if the rewards outweigh the costs. However, the motives of others are
also taken into account leading to decisions that may be reciprocally beneficial.
In the conventional reasoning level, the individual has internalised the rules and
expectations of society. At stage three, the individual sees him/herself in relation
to others and as embedded in a social network comprising family and friends.
Other people’s needs are taken into account and moral decisions are based on
maintaining important relationships. At stage four, the importance of maintaining
social institutions is recognised. These social institutions are seen to form the
basis for the fair and consistent functioning of society, and behaviour can be justified if it furthers these objectives.
Finally, in the post-conventional reasoning level, the individual adopts ethical
positions that are based on personal values selected from a set of universal moral
principles. At stage five, the individual understands that morality involves the
accommodation of competing interests and values. Moral decisions are not based on
a set of rigid rules but may involve compromise in order to deliver ‘the greatest good
for the greatest number of people’. At stage six, the individual operates on the basis
of abstract reasoning and internalised ethical principles, and has a duty to disobey
unjust laws. Kohlberg recognised that few people actually operate consistently at
stage six, and many researchers have omitted it from the hierarchy. However, Kohlberg favoured its retention as a logical, if theoretical, end-point of the hierarchy.
Moral development is linked to more general age-based stages of cognitive
development that impose strict limitations on the level of moral sophistication that
could be achieved. It is not neurologically possible, for example, for young children to reason at the same level as an adult. The stages are hierarchical in the sense
that an individual must move through the stages in strict succession – there is no
skipping or backtracking permitted – although at any one time an individual may
utilise reasoning strategies from adjacent stages. However, an individual need not
progress to all stages, and indeed, the relevance to criminology is that offenders
are generally assumed to become stuck at relatively low levels on the hierarchy.
According to Kohlberg, individuals have a natural tendency to prefer operating at
higher rather than lower stages of reasoning. However, their passage from one stage
to the next is facilitated or constrained by their personal developmental experiences.
In particular, progress may be advanced by exposing individuals to stages of reasoning
that are higher than the one in which they are currently operating. This is thought to
create ‘cognitive disequilibrium’. In an effort to resolve this state of internal conflict,
the individual is required to assimilate and accommodate moral arguments that challenge existing ways of thinking (Rest, 1973; Walker, 1983). Positive social interaction is the key to creating disequilibrium and stimulating moral development. The
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adoption by parents of inductive disciplinary strategies that involve explaining the
rationale for rules – an example of an authoritative disciplinary style – leads to higher
levels of moral reasoning in children (Boyes and Allen, 1993; Janssens and Deković,
1997). Similarly, a supportive and democratic family atmosphere that encourages
open discussion of moral issues also correlates with higher levels of moral reasoning
(Palmer and Hollin, 1996, 1997; Powers, 1988; Speicher-Dubin, 1982; Walker and
Taylor, 1991). The other side of the coin, of course, is that moral development may
be retarded when opportunities for disequilibrium are absent.
Moral development and criminal behaviour
Theoretically, as Table 6.2 shows, criminal behaviour can be justified at any
moral stage – it is the rationale for a moral judgement, not the judgement itself,
that determines the level of reasoning. In practice, however, most crime is not
committed to fulfil abstract ethical principles but generally involves self-interest.
It is predicted by moral development theory, therefore, that most offenders operate
at pre-conventional levels of reasoning.
For empirical purposes, moral development is typically measured by eliciting
responses to scenarios describing various moral dilemmas (Colby and Kohlberg,
1987; Gibbs et al., 1984). There have been several reviews and meta-analyses over
the years examining the relationship between offending and responses on these
measures (Blasi, 1980; Nelson et al., 1990; Palmer, 2003; Smetana, 1990; Stams
et al., 2006). In the most recent meta-analysis, Stams et al. (2006) examined 50
studies on moral reasoning and delinquency that included most studies examined in
earlier reviews. The overall effect size was .76 (large), indicating that delinquents
were rated to be significantly lower on Kohlberg’s hierarchy than were non-delinquents. A number of significant moderator variables were identified; that is, factors
that affected the strength of the relationship between low levels of moral reasoning
and delinquency. Effect sizes were greater for male delinquents than for female
delinquents; for delinquents in late adolescence than for delinquents in early adolescence; for psychopathic delinquents than for non-psychopathic delinquents; for
delinquents with low intelligence than for delinquents with average intelligence; for
incarcerated delinquents than for non-incarcerated delinquents; and for delinquents
incarcerated for 18 months or more than for delinquents incarcerated for 6 months
or less. The relationship between moral reasoning and delinquency was not moderated by socio-economic status (lower class or lower-middle class), type of delinquency (petty crime; violent/serious delinquency, or combined) or cultural
background (Caucasian white or other). Overall results suggest a robust relationship
between delinquency and low levels of moral reasoning that remains significant
after controlling for social class, cultural background, gender, age and intelligence.
Self-control
Self-control refers to the capacity of individuals to resist temptation and delay
gratification. Conversely, the absence of self-control is conceptually related to the
Development 131
trait of impulsivity. While self-control is a psychological construct, the most
comprehensive theorising about the relationship between self-control and crime is
presented by criminologists Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) in their general theory
of crime.
Gottfredson and Hirschi’s general theory of crime
The general theory of crime is an example of the control perspective in criminology. It will be remembered from Chapter 1 that control theories shift the focus
from explaining how criminal dispositions are acquired to explaining why lawabiding dispositions are not acquired. It is assumed that individuals are born with
the natural motivation to commit crime, and the main role of the environment as far
as crime is concerned is to suppress or not suppress these motivations. We have
encountered elements of the control perspective already in this book. Evolutionary
psychology stresses that the potential to behave in criminal ways is a universal
aspect of human nature, while behavioural-genetic, neuropsychological and many
trait perspectives propose that certain people are born with relatively strong predispositions to criminality. In each case, whether or not an individual commits a crime
depends upon how successful the environment is in controlling the expression of
the pre-existing criminal potential.
According to Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990), the cause of all criminal behaviour
can be reduced to an individual’s inability to exercise self-control. While they did
not speculate on the precise nature of its origins, Gottfredson and Hirschi viewed
poor self-control as a biologically-based phenomenon. People do not learn to be
‘impulsive, insensitive, physical (as opposed to mental), risk-taking, short-sighted,
and non-verbal’ (ibid., p. 90); they are born with these traits. However, unlike
Eysenck and other trait theorists, Gottfredson and Hirschi were stridently opposed
to including any role for inborn, individual differences in self-control. Everyone is
seen to be endowed with the same initial susceptibility to criminality.
A corollary of the control perspective is criminal versatility. Low self-control
may manifest in many different ways, including in non-criminal behaviours such
as excessive drinking and gambling. All crime is motivated by the same basic
desire – to satisfy one’s immediate desires and urges – and is caused by the same
inability to deny or delay self-gratification. The causes for rape are essentially the
same as the causes for theft. Accordingly, offenders tend to commit a wide range
of offences rather than specialising in any particular type. There is therefore no
need to build different theories to explain different sorts of crimes – all can be
explained by the one general theory.
As for the capacity to exercise control over criminal impulses, this Gottfredson
and Hirschi posited was a purely learned skill acquired during the first few years of
socialisation (by the age of around 8 years). Self-control is instilled by effective
child-rearing practices that are built on strong attachments between children and
caregivers, effective parental supervision, measured and consistent punishment of
deviant acts, and the modelling by parents of prosocial behaviour. Specifically, children need to internalise the lesson that criminal acts carry painful and negative
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consequences, and alternatively that the achievement of worthwhile long-term goals
requires the delay of immediate rewards. Differences in self-control depend upon
how well these lessons are learned within the family. According to Gottfredson and
Hirschi, once established, self-control remains stable across the life-course, although
it may be expressed in different ways. In comparison to the crucial and enduring
role of the family, other social institutions such as schools have a limited capacity
to affect criminality or the commission of crime. Accordingly, an individual’s
offending trajectory can be reliably predicted in childhood.
Self-control and criminal behaviour
Gottfredson and Hirschi’s general theory of crime is one of the most influential
and widely cited theories in criminology. The proposals that offenders have low
self-control and are therefore criminally versatile have considerable empirical
support. Grasmick et al. (1993) constructed a 24-item self-control scale based on
Gottfredson and Hirschi’s theory. In a meta-analysis of studies employing this
scale, Pratt and Cullen (2000, p. 952) report an effect size of .26, which they claim
‘rank[s] self-control as one of the strongest known correlates of crime’. Further,
there was no significant variation in effects size for different kinds of crime,
suggesting that low self-control is a general cause of crime. Undoubtedly the
construct of self-control is a major contribution to the explanation of criminal
behaviour.
However, aspects of Gottfredson and Hirschi’s theoretical portrayal of selfcontrol are controversial and have generated heated debate (Farrington, 2003;
Geis, 2000; Hay and Forrest, 2008; Paternoster et al., 1997). Their denial
of biologically-based individual differences in self-control is at odds with the
biosocial approach adopted in this book. In addition, their insistence that an
individual’s offending trajectory is set in childhood is contentious and clearly
contradicts the position taken in lifespan psychology that change is possible at any
stage across the life-course. An approach to explaining the development of criminality that is more compatible with these alternative positions is provided by the
criminal careers perspective.
Criminal careers
The criminal careers perspective has a criminological rather than psychological
heritage and has evolved in directions that are separate from (and sometimes in
opposition to) developmental psychology. There are nevertheless many overlaps
between lifespan psychology and the criminal careers perspective. The central
concern for criminal careers researchers is to understand patterns of offending
across the life-course. Their starting point is the familiar age–crime curve (see
Figure 1.1). The criminal careers perspective is founded on the possibility of
multiple age–crime trajectories to account for different developmental experiences
and/or different types of offenders. Offending patterns can vary among offenders
in a number of ways. Offenders may differ on the age that they first offend, the
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Figure 6.1 Age distribution for criminal offenders for a hypothetical data-set separating life-course persistent and adolescent-limited offenders.
frequency of their offending, the seriousness of their offending, the duration of
their offending, and the age that they stop offending. Traditionally the drop in
aggregate crime rates after adolescence was explained as a result in a change in
offending frequency across all offenders; there were the same number of offenders
but they all offended less frequently (Gottfredson and Hirschi, 1990). The criminal
careers perspective offered the alternative explanation that the aggregate crime rate
masks different patterns of criminal participation (onset, duration and desistance)
over time. The aggregate crime rate falls because some offenders stop offending.
Perhaps the most common distinction between criminal career patterns, and
one that has been used already throughout this book, is that of adolescent-limited
(AL) offenders and life-course persistent (LCP) offenders (Moffitt, 1993). AL
offenders have brief criminal careers involving relatively late onset and early
desistence, while LCP offenders continue to offend at much the same high rate
over their lifetime. The respective age–crime curves for AL and LCP offenders
are shown in Figure 6.1.
Life-course persistent offenders
The genesis of the criminal careers perspective was the observation that
crime rates across offenders are highly skewed. A small number of offenders
account for a large amount of crime. For example, Farrington et al. (1986) found
that 5 per cent of offenders commit 50 per cent of all crime. Criminologists and
policy-makers were interested in this finding because it suggested that large reductions in the crime rate could be achieved by the selective incapacitation of these
‘career criminals’ (Blumstein et al., 1986). It is this group of offenders that Moffitt
(1993) labelled LCP.
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LCP offenders are characterised by the longitudinal consistency in their criminality. While the nature of their antisocial acts may change with age, underlying
their behaviour is a persistent antisocial disposition across time. Troublesome
behaviour may begin in early childhood with conduct disorder, shift to delinquent
acts in adolescence, and culminate in serious criminality in adulthood. Thus, their
potential criminality may be predicted from an early age. Their antisocial nature
is likewise consistent across situations. They commit a wide diversity of crimes
and display antisocial characteristics in all areas of their life. In addition to their
formal criminal records they are likely to have poor work habits, substance
addictions and a history of poor relationships.
The characteristics of LCP offenders and the origins of their behaviour have
been discussed in previous chapters. LCP offenders are the offenders most likely
to possess inherited criminogenic dispositions; to display neuropsychological
deficits; and to attract a diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder. Moffitt,
however, was explicit in ruling out a purely biological explanation for LCP
offending. She saw LCP offending in terms of various forms of GxE interplay.
One important form of interplay is reactive correlation. LCP offenders typically
evoke negative responses from others and this serves to exacerbate and perpetuate
their antisocial tendencies. They are difficult babies, challenging for even
resourceful and loving parents let alone parents prone to inconsistent and harsh
discipline. Once LCP individuals have started off on the wrong foot, each subsequent negative experience has cumulative consequences, with failure piling upon
failure. When they move to school, they continue to elicit damaging responses
from teachers and peers. LCP offenders are also likely to engage in niche-picking,
gravitating towards other antisocial individuals with whom they engage in
mutual reinforcement of each other’s deviancy. The offending persistence of
LCP offenders is caused by a combination of their ongoing exposure to negative
experiences via GxE correlations, deficits in social skills that have resulted
from their impoverished social development, and the presence of the underlying
criminogenic traits that were there from the beginning.
Adolescent-limited offenders
AL offending is the modal age–crime pattern. Not only are the vast majority of
offenders adolescent-limited but the majority of all youths – up to 80 per cent –
have some formal contact with the police during adolescence (Farrington et al.,
1986). Delinquency during adolescence is normal. According to Moffitt (1993),
AL offending is marked by its discontinuity. The delinquent behaviour of the AL
offender is neither stable across time nor across situations. Future engagement in
delinquency cannot be reliably predicted in childhood by any particular biological
factors or developmental experiences. There is no prior history of behavioural
problems. Offending may begin abruptly, continue for a brief period, then end just
as abruptly. The offending itself may be patchy, occurring in some circumstances
and not in others, as dictated by the situation and in response to a rational consideration of available rewards.
Development 135
Moffitt argued that adolescents in modern Western cultures are caught in a
‘maturity gap’. With modernisation, biological maturity has fallen out of synchronisation with social maturity. Improved nutrition has meant that adolescents are
physically maturing earlier than ever before in history. At the same time, their
entry into the adult social world is increasingly being delayed. Instead of starting
work and getting married soon after puberty, they are staying on at school or
university, living at home under parental care, and delaying marriage and parenthood. In many areas of life, adolescents are legally prohibited from undertaking
adult behaviours and responsibilities. There are legally prescribed ages at which
they can get a job, drive a car, have sex, get married, vote, drink alcohol, and so
forth. AL crimes occur during this window of ‘role vacuum’ as adolescents seek
to resolve the frustration they experience at being denied the spoils of adulthood.
Crime is instigated and maintained by adolescent social networks. In particular,
AL offenders mimic the behaviours of LCP offenders, who assume the status of
role models. Impressed by the relative wealth, sexual experience and freedom of
LCP offenders, AL offenders see delinquency as a way to gain access to valued
possessions, to increase their social status among peers, and to assert their independence from family control. With respect to this latter point, the fact that delinquent acts are regarded as deviant by parents and other authority figures is part of
their attraction. Engaging in risky delinquent behaviour is a surrogate for the rites
of passage common in pre-industrialised societies. The crimes committed by AL
offenders reflect these motivations and comprise mainly thefts – to secure
resources – and vandalism, drug use and public order offences – to provoke
acknowledgement. In contrast to the crimes of LCP offenders, AL crimes typically involve co-offending and are sustained by peer support.
Desistance from crime occurs as adolescents move out of the maturity gap. As
AL offenders gain legitimate access to adult privileges, previously rewarding
delinquent behaviours lose their salience. Simultaneously, the perceived costs of
offending also increase. An arrest record, for example, is now seen to have serious
consequences for employment. Moffitt implies that the decline in criminal activity
for AL offenders is not invariant but is dependent upon how soon the adolescent
assumes adult responsibilities. Marriage, employment and other transition events
in the life-course provide the ‘opportunities for desistence’.
Evaluation of the criminal careers perspective
The investigation of the criminal careers model requires prospective longitudinal
research that tracks offenders over time. Moffitt’s original observations were
based on what is known as the Dunedin study, which followed a cohort of 1037
New Zealanders born in 1972–73 (Silva, 1990). Moffitt identified a small group
of boys who were rated as exhibiting antisocial characteristics at each of the
two-year data-collection points. Subsequent analysis of the Dunedin cohort has
continued to support the central prediction that early onset of offending is associated with a range of adverse psychological, social and criminal outcomes (Moffitt
and Caspi, 2000; Moffitt et al., 1996; Moffitt et al., 2002). Similar findings have
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been reported from other longitudinal studies (Farrington, 1995; Farrington et al.,
1998; Huesmann et al., 2009).
It should be emphasised, however, that AL and LCP offenders do not represent
a tidy, rigidly defined dichotomy. They are broad prototypes and within each
category variation in offender characteristics and offending patterns may exist.
Moreover, the typological career model continues to evolve. Moffitt et al. (2002)
found that many AL offenders continued to offend into their twenties, and exhibited more problematic characteristics (impulsivity, mental health problems,
substance dependence, etc.) than did a comparison group of non-offenders (though
still less than the rates for LCP offenders). Moffitt et al. argued that this prolonged
adolescent pattern might be explained by an increasing maturity gap during which
individuals experience continuing difficulty in assuming adult roles. Moffitt et al.
also found evidence for a third category represented by offenders who exhibited
behavioural problems in childhood, but subsequently exhibited low-level, chronic
offending at rates that did not warrant classification as LCP. Other researchers
have independently proposed four (Côté et al., 2001; Nagin and Land, 1993;
White et al., 2001) and even five (Chung et al., 2002; Loeber and StouthamerLoeber, 1998) offending trajectories.
Theoretical criticism of the criminal careers approach has come from two
opposing directions. On the one hand, researchers with a more traditional criminological view have objected that the approach is too heavily influenced by
biological and psychological concepts. Prominent among these critics are Laub
and Sampson (Laub and Sampson, 2001, 2003; Sampson and Laub, 2003, 2005)
who found no evidence for distinct offender groups. They argued that there were
no significant biological or psychological differences among offenders and that
the strongest influences on engaging in crime were family, peers and school.
Further, all offenders – irrespective of how criminally active they are – eventually
succumb to the age–crime curve and reduce their offending frequency. However,
Sampson and Laub (2003) argued that there were individual differences in
offending trajectories that could not be predicted by childhood factors. While a
poor upbringing is a disadvantage, an individual is not forever bound by it. Rather,
desistance from crime for all offenders is largely governed by contemporaneous
changes in lifestyle – such as getting married and getting a job – that provided
increased structure and social control (Sampson and Laub, 2005). The age of
desistance varies as exposure to these moderating social conditions varies.
On the other hand, Blonigen (2010) has recently commented on the failure of
criminal careers researchers to incorporate within their models important findings
from developmental psychology. In particular, he pointed to the lack of attention
given to normative biological and psychological changes over the life-course. A
number of these factors have been raised in previous chapters. Evolutionary
psychologists argue that males in particular are designed to be at their most
competitive, impulsive, risk-taking and aggressive during adolescence in order to
maximise their chances of securing a mate. Neuropsychologists point out that
adolescence is characterised by a surge in the production of sex hormones and
fluctuations of certain neurotransmitters implicated in behavioural regulation,
Development 137
while important brain structures governing executive function do not mature until
the early twenties. Personality theorists have found that the greatest change in
personality traits occurs with the transition to adulthood and that traits do not
become relatively fixed until around the age of 30. The converging picture from
these different fields of psychology is that adolescence is marked by psychological change and instability that have the potential to increase criminal propensity.
Largely ignoring these internal developmental factors, criminal careers researchers
assume that criminal propensity remains constant across the life-course, and thus
they are forced to explain criminal onset and desistance by relying solely on
changes in social circumstance (e.g., delinquent peers in the case of onset and
marriage in the case of desistance). Blonigen argues that environmental factors
must be understood in terms of their interplay with normal maturation processes.
Offending increases during adolescence because individuals are psychologically
more vulnerable to the effects of criminogenic influences during this phase
of development. Likewise, offending declines after adolescence at least in part
because individuals become psychologically more mature, a process that may be
accelerated by stabilising life-events such as marriage.
Conclusion and evaluation
This chapter has considered the development of criminality over the life-course.
Risk and protective factors for criminality were identified and theoretical explanations were proposed to account for the role played by those factors. In the course
of this examination, two key debates emerged.
The first debate concerns the relative importance of early and concurrent developmental experiences. Is criminality determined in the first few years of life (e.g.,
Gottfredson and Hirschi, 1990), or do childhood risk factors play a minor role in
later criminality when compared to more immediate life events (e.g., Sampson
and Laub, 2003)? Lifespan psychology attempts to resolve this debate. According
to the lifespan perspective, the journey through life involves both change and
continuity. Behaviour cannot be predicted solely on the basis of an individual’s
early life experiences, but neither are these early experiences irrelevant to the
performance of later behaviour. Each period of life presents an individual with
new challenges and experiences that are transition points for change. At the same
time, there is also a degree of longitudinal predictability in people’s lives. The
experiences absorbed at each period of life do not disappear each time an individual moves into a new phase. Rather, individuals carry their developmental
histories with them. Experiences accumulate as biologically encoded memories
and traits that can continue to exert an influence on future behaviour. Negative
experiences in early phases of life can set the groundwork for subsequent failure
in later phases.
The second debate concerns the role of biological factors in psychosocial development. This is the familiar nature/nurture debate. The biosocial perspective has
been advocated throughout in this book and this is also the position taken in
lifespan psychology. However, several of the theorists discussed in this chapter
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argued determinedly against according a role in the development of criminality
to biological factors. Their opposition was at two levels. First, they opposed
the idea that there were inherited individual differences between offenders and
non-offenders or among different types of offenders. Second, they rejected the
proposition that normative biological development played a role in shaping
patterns of offending onset and desistance over the life-course. This debate about
the role of biological factors to some extent reflects a clash of disciplinary paradigms. Brought together in this chapter were developmental perspectives from
psychology and criminology. There is within developmental criminology – as
distinct from developmental psychology – a traditional aversion by many theorists
to overtly biological and psychological explanations for behaviour. It is the
nature of sociological criminology that primacy is given to the role of social and
environmental forces.
It should not be concluded, however, that all psychologists endorse the biosocial perspective on crime. In Chapter 7, we examine the radical environmental
position advanced by learning theorists.
7
Learning
In the previous chapter we began the examination of environmental contributions
to crime. There we focused particularly on those aspects of the environment that
increased or protected against the development of criminality over an individual’s
lifespan. In this chapter we continue the examination of environmental factors.
Our particular focus here is on the psychological processes by which environmental experiences translate into criminal behaviour. For example, we know from
Chapter 6 that child maltreatment significantly increases the risk of later criminality. But just why is this so? By what mechanisms are criminal patterns of
behaviour acquired, triggered and maintained? In short, how do offenders learn to
offend?
The field of psychology concerned with the mechanics of behaviour is learning
theory, more commonly referred to as behaviourism. While there are different
models of behaviourism, all share the assumption that behaviour is shaped by
stimuli available in the environment. Learning is an adaptive response by an
organism to the environmental events it encounters that results in relatively
permanent changes in behaviour. The aim of behaviourists is to uncover through
scientific methods the laws which govern learning. Many of these laws apply to
all complex organisms and so the experimentation that forms the basis of the
scientific method employed by behaviourists may involve studies on rats, pigeons
and even worms. For behaviourists there is nothing special about offenders or
their behaviour. Crime is just another kind of behaviour that must be learned in the
same way as all other behaviours. We begin this chapter with an examination of
the philosophies and principles underpinning behaviourism that set the approach
apart from most other fields of psychology. We then examine three models of
learning – classical conditioning, operant conditioning and social learning – and
the ways that each accounts for criminal behaviour.
The science of behaviour
All fields of science – physics, chemistry, biology, astronomy and psychology –
have their roots in philosophy. The ancient Greeks, for example, were very interested in chemistry but their method of enquiry involved little more than thinking
about the composition of matter rather than undertaking careful and systematic
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observations of chemical phenomena. From around the sixteenth century or so,
one by one the scientific disciplines broke free from philosophy and began to
build testable laws based on observation and planned experimentation. This transition for psychology did not begin until the late nineteenth century and from the
beginning of the twentieth century the behaviourists became the leading advocates for bringing the same level of scientific rigour to psychology as existed
in the other sciences. The key concepts of behaviourism are examined in this
section through the contributions of the three leading behavioural theorists of the
twentieth century: John Watson, B.F. Skinner, and Albert Bandura.
A focus on observable events
The term behaviourism was coined by Watson in 1913 with the publication of
his article ‘Psychology as the Behaviorist Views It’. At that time, psychology
was primarily concerned with the mind or psyche. The way to study the mind was
through introspection – looking inside one’s head in an attempt to examine
conscious thoughts, emotions and other inner experiences. Watson pointed out
that introspection was subjective and unreliable, and that there was no way to
check the validity of a researcher’s findings. He argued that in order to be the
subject of scientific enquiry, variables had to be observable. As far as psychology
is concerned, there are only two observable variables: behaviour and the environment in which it occurs. What goes on in the mind is ultimately unknowable but
also irrelevant. Watson regarded internal events such as thoughts and feelings as
epiphenomena, the mere side-effects of behaviour. Speculation about internal
events is unnecessary. All behaviour can be adequately explained by careful analysis of the environmental events that cause it.
Behaviourism is not a unitary theory and over the years different behavioural
models have developed from Watson’s original formulation. While subsequent
models also stress the crucial role of the environment and behaviour, they differ
from Watson in their treatment of internal events. Like Watson, Skinner (1953)
believed that internal events were an ‘explanatory fiction’ that played no causative
role in behaviour. But unlike Watson, he did not dismiss them as epiphenomena.
Rather he regarded thoughts and feelings as another kind of behaviour. They are
internal, covert responses to the environment just as our overt actions are external
responses to the environment. Feelings and thoughts occur at the same time as
their associated observable behaviour. Consider the scenario of a person suddenly
encountering a dangerous animal while walking through a forest. Conventionally
we would say that the person saw the animal, then became afraid, and then ran
away. According to Skinner, the sequence of events is instead: the person saw the
animal, then both became afraid and ran away. There is no need to refer to fear to
explain the running; both the covert fear and overt running are explained by the
presence of the dangerous animal. Nevertheless, fear and other internal responses
are real phenomena.
The position taken by Skinner with respect to internal events is referred
to as radical behaviourism because of the uncompromising insistence on the
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examination only of observable events. It is also called black-box psychology
because what happens inside the person is regarded as being inaccessible for
scientific study. However, some behavioural approaches do examine internal
phenomena. In mediational models of behaviourism, internal events are treated as
intervening variables that sit between the environmental inputs and behavioural
outputs in a causal chain. Bandura (1977) proposed that environmental events do
not act upon the individual in an objective way but rather must be perceived and
interpreted in a process of cognitive mediation. People respond to their perceptions of environmental stimuli rather than to the stimuli per se. Coming full circle,
cognitive processes were now considered by many behaviourists to be a legitimate focus for scientific psychological research.
Environmental determinism
Determinism is sometimes erroneously thought to apply only to biological explanations of behaviour. Biological determinism is the idea that a person’s destiny is
fixed at birth by their genes. In fact, as we have discovered in previous chapters,
few biologists today would advance this proposition. Instead initial biological
states interact with the environment, and their effects are subject to considerable
plasticity over an individual’s lifetime. However, this does not mean that the
philosophy of determinism has been abandoned. Determinism can apply equally to
environmental causes of behaviour. According to determinism, all events are
subject to the law of cause and effect. Behaviourists assert that it is illogical to
think that an organism can self-generate behaviour. All action must have a prior
cause, and that cause resides outside of the person and in the environment. Unlike
biological determinism, environmental determinism is an ongoing, dynamic
process. Behaviour is not fixed at any point in time, but rather people change as
their environment changes. Thus, behavioural offender-rehabilitation programmes
are based on the assumption of environmental determinism. The goal of these
programmes is to identify the environmental inputs causing criminal behaviour and
replace them with environmental inputs that will promote law-abiding behaviour.
For most people, environmental determinism is as unappealing as is biological
determinism. Watson in particular seemed to portray human beings as passive
automatons, moulded by their upbringing and emitting behaviours only in
response to their chance encounters with environmental stimuli. Skinner (1971), a
committed environmental determinist, tried to counter this negative perception of
environmental determinism in his book Beyond Freedom and Dignity. Skinner
argued that is was the belief in free will, not in determinism, that limited human
potential for happiness and fulfilment. The belief in free will results in the blaming
of individuals for their misfortunes and encourages people to resort to punitive
methods of controlling behaviour. Skinner pointed out that while the environment
shapes behaviour, human beings were capable of shaping their environment. If
humans adopt ‘a more effective technology of behavior’, then they can learn to
engineer environments and social systems that will improve the collective human
condition without the need to resort to coercion, threats and punishment.
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Figure 7.1 Bandura’s principle of reciprocal determinism.
Bandura (1977, 1978) has taken the idea that individuals can change their
environments a step further and proposed the concept of reciprocal determinism.
He argued that the causal relationship between the environment and behaviour
was not one-way. Instead he proposed that behaviour, the environment and
personal factors (internal events) influence one another in a triadic interaction
(Figure 7.1). For example, imagine two strangers drinking in a bar. Let us focus
on the behaviour of person A and treat person B as part of person A’s environment. Person A hears person B laugh and turns to see the reason (the environment
has affected behaviour). Person A has a negative self-image and interprets the
laughter as being directed at him (personal factors have affected perception of the
environment). He walks towards person B in a threatening manner (personal
factors have affected behaviour). Person B responds by getting to his feet and
confronting person A (behaviour has affected the environment). Person A feels
intimidated (environment has affected personal factors) and backs down, but as a
result now feels even worse about himself (behaviour has affected personal
factors). By introducing a role for internal cognitive events, reciprocal determinism is a version of soft determinism – in contrast to the hard determinism
favoured by Watson and Skinner – since it allows some limited degree of personal
agency.
Evolution, biology and behaviourism
The behaviourists’ view on the role of biological factors is frequently misunderstood. The stereotype of the behaviourists’ position is that biology does not matter
– that each child is born as a tabula rasa (blank sheet), infinitely malleable
depending upon its life experiences. Indeed, early in the history of behaviourism
Watson (1930) made some provocative and now infamous claims about the
primacy of environmental factors:
Give me a dozen healthy infants, well-formed, and my own specified world
to bring them up in and I’ll guarantee to take any one of them at random and
train him to become any type of specialist I might select – doctor, lawyer,
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artist, merchant-chief, and, yes, even beggar-man and thief, regardless of his
talents, penchants, tendencies, abilities, vocations, and race of his ancestors.
(ibid., p. 104)
Watson was overstating the case and he knew it. In the very next sentence (which
is typically omitted from the quotation) he continued: ‘I am going beyond my
facts, but so have the advocates of the contrary and they have been doing it for
many thousands of years’ (ibid., p. 104). While few behaviourists would endorse
the extreme environmentalism described by Watson, the image has stuck.
Skinner (1953, 1974) recognised that behaviour occurred within a biological
context. He viewed behaviourism as a logical extension of evolutionary theory.
The very ability to learn is an adaptive skill that is biologically encoded and has
been passed down through natural selection. Organisms that were good at devising
flexible responses to environmental problems outperformed those which were not.
Moreover, the things in the environment that members of a species find to be
rewarding and punishing have acquired these characteristics because they are
evolutionarily important. For example, humans have evolved to prefer certain
foods that are essential to our survival and that therefore serve to motivate
behaviour. The foods that are rewarding to humans are very different from the
ones that are rewarding to a panda. At a conceptual level, too, there are parallels
between the process of natural selection and the process of learning. Through
natural selection, characteristics that are adaptive increase in frequency within a
species. Likewise through learning, behaviours that are adaptive increase in
frequency within an individual. Thus the acquisition of behaviours over an individual’s lifetime may be likened to a mini-evolutionary process – behaviours that
do not confer any advantage are discarded and those that produce favourable
outcomes are retained.
However, Skinner argued that biological factors provided only the capacity for
learning. They were necessary but not sufficient conditions. How an organism
actually behaves depends upon their environmental experiences. For example,
humans are born with the capacity for aggression, but for an individual to become
aggressive requires the learning of aggressive behaviours. Skinner also recognised that there were individual biological differences among people. His objection to including a role for genetics in the science of behaviour was based largely
on pragmatic grounds. Since nothing could be done to change an individual’s
genes, it was much more productive to focus on the modification of behaviour
through environmental means. He wrote:
Even when it can be shown that some aspect of behavior is due to season of
birth, gross body type, or genetic constitution, the fact is of limited use. It
may help us in predicting behavior, but it is of little value in an experimental
analysis or in practical control because such a condition cannot be manipulated after the individual has been conceived. The most that can be said is that
the knowledge of the genetic factor may enable us to make better use of other
causes. If we know that an individual has certain inherent limitations, we may
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use our techniques of control more intelligently, but we cannot alter the
genetic factor.
(Skinner, 1953, p. 26)
Personality, psychological disorder and behaviourism
Earlier we discussed the behaviourists’ view on transitory internal events such
as thoughts and feelings. Much the same arguments were raised by behaviourists
against including within their analyses stable internal factors such as personality
traits and psychological disorders. For behaviourists, traits and disorders are
merely descriptive labels for observed patterns of behaviour but they do not
cause the behaviours they describe. They are hypothetical – and unnecessary –
constructs. They are hypothetical because we cannot see them, only their
presumed effects. Thus, the constructs are also unnecessary because they tell
us nothing new. Their presumed existence depends upon circular logic. We
know someone has an aggressive trait because we observe him/her acting aggressively. And why is he/she acting aggressively? Because he/she has an aggressive
trait. And so on. Behaviourists point out that we can dispense with the whole
notion of the hypothetical construct and be no worse off. Simply identifying
the behavioural pattern and the environments in which it occurs is all that is
necessary.
Behaviourists also make no distinction between normal and so-called
pathological behaviour. Problem behaviours are caused by the same learning
processes as are any other behaviour. They differ from non-problematic behaviours quantitatively not qualitatively. Whether behaviour is labelled pathological,
abnormal, disordered, deviant or dysfunctional is a value judgement, not a
scientific one.
The denial of personality traits and psychopathology as causes of behaviour
does not mean that behaviourists regard everyone as being the same. They recognise that people have predictable behavioural patterns that vary from one person
to another. Everyone’s learning history is different so individuals have different
potentials to act in certain ways. For example, some people because of their
particular upbringing behave aggressively in a wider range of circumstances than
do others. Such a person may be described by others as being aggressive but this
does not mean that they have an aggressive trait that explains their aggression.
The behaviourists’ position is the specificity model outlined in Chapter 5. For
behaviourists, what is commonly referred to as an individual’s personality is in
reality a collection of acquired habits that are expressed under particular situational conditions. What elicits aggression in one person may have no effect on
another while even a person who has a reputation for aggression is not uniformly
aggressive in all circumstances. The key to behavioural analysis is identifying the
conditions that elicit a given behaviour for a particular person. Thus, as shown in
Figure 1.2, the behaviourists explicitly acknowledge the importance of both
historical and immediate environments in the commission of crime.
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A behaviour-specific focus
Many of the theoretical positions we have covered so far in this book may be
broadly classified as control theories. Control theories start from the premise that
individuals are born with an inherent tendency to behave in antisocial ways and
that it is the job of the environment to temper these natural inclinations. The antisocial acts themselves are thought to require little skill to perform. Because the
fundamental causes of all crime are general factors such as selfishness and impulsivity, offenders are likely to be versatile in their offending. Rapists and burglars
are subject to the same basic deficiencies in control. There is therefore no need to
develop different explanations for different types of crime.
The behaviourists put forward a very different argument. They view individuals
at birth to be criminally neutral. All criminal behaviour must be acquired during a
person’s lifetime through learning. Neither is learning criminal behaviours a trivial
matter. Referring explicitly to aggressive acts, but making an argument that applies
to all crime, Bandura wrote:
People are not born with preformed repertoires of aggressive behavior.
They must learn them one way or another. Some of the elementary forms of
aggression can be perfected with minimal guidance, but most aggressive
activities – whether they be duelling with switchblade knives, sparring with
opponents, military combat, or vengeful ridicule – entail intricate skills that
require extensive learning.
(1976, pp. 204–5)
Moreover, learning is very specific. The set of environmental experiences that
teach a person to rape will be different from those required to teach a person to
burgle or to steal a car. It is expected, therefore that there will be a degree of
specialisation in the crimes of offenders. Once an offender has perfected a modus
operandi, they are likely to repeat it. There can be no general theory of crime.
Explaining crime requires analysis of the particular environmental conditions that
led to the acquisition of a particular criminal behaviour.
There are three principal models of learning: classical conditioning, operant
conditioning and social learning. These models are associated respectively with
Watson, Skinner and Bandura. In the following sections each of these models is
described and their contribution to explaining criminal behaviour is examined.
Classical conditioning
The first formal model of behaviourism – the one that informed Watson’s
perspective on behaviourism – was classical conditioning. The principles of
classical conditioning, however, were first demonstrated not by Watson but by
Russian physiologist Ivan Pavlov at the turn of the twentieth century. Classical
conditioning is sometimes called respondent conditioning because it focuses
on the reaction of an organism to the environment. Respondent behaviours are
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involuntary reflexes such as salivating, perspiring, blinking, crying, yawning,
becoming sexually aroused, feeling nauseous, and so forth. It will be remembered
from Chapter 4 that involuntary behaviours are products of the autonomic nervous
system. These behaviours occur naturally in response to appropriate environmental
stimuli. For example, a puff of air in the eye causes an involuntary blink. This
process is referred to as the Stimulus-Response (S-R) model. The revolutionary
finding by Pavlov was that the respondent behaviours could also be learned.
Principles of classical conditioning
Pavlov’s research involved conditioning the salivation response in dogs. Pavlov
first showed that the dogs salivated when presented with food. The food is an
unconditioned stimulus (UCS) and the salivation is an unconditioned response
(UCR). Both the food and the salivation are unconditioned because no conditioning had taken place for the association to occur. Pavlov then presented a
neutral stimulus – in this case, a bell – that did not elicit the salivation response.
Next Pavlov presented the bell and the food simultaneously and again the dogs
salivated. Finally, after numerous trials presenting the bell and the food together,
Pavlov presented the bell on its own. Now the dogs salivated at the sound of the
bell. Through repeated association, the bell had assumed the eliciting properties
of the food. The bell had become a conditioned stimulus (CS) and the salivation
had become a conditioned response (CR). Pavlov’s experiment is represented
diagrammatically in Figure 7.2.
Watson later demonstrated that in addition to conditioning a neutral stimulus
to take on positive associations with an UCS, conditioning could also be used
to create aversive associations or mini-phobias. In a famous study (Watson
and Rayner, 1920), a baby boy – Little Albert – was conditioned to fear a white
Figure 7.2 Classical conditioning of the salivation response to the sound of a bell.
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rat. First Little Albert was shown the rat (the neutral stimulus) to which he showed
no signs of fear. The UCS was the loud sound of a hammer hitting an iron rail
positioned behind Little Albert’s head. The UCR to this noise was a range of fear
responses – crying, jumping and falling over. After six trials in which the white rat
and loud noise were paired, Little Albert showed fear responses to the white rat
alone. The white rat was now a CS (see Figure 7.3).
Three important principles associated with classical conditioning are generalisation, discrimination and extinction. In generalisation, another neutral stimulus
that is similar to the CS also becomes a CS. For example, after Little Albert was
conditioned to fear the white rat, he also showed fear responses towards a white
rabbit and a fur coat. On the other hand, discrimination refers to the specificity of
the CS. For example, Pavlov’s dogs only salivated to the sound of a bell and not
to other noises. That is, they were able to discriminate between the CS and related
stimuli. Finally, extinction refers to the weakening of the power of the CS
over time when it is presented in the absence of the UCS. For example, Pavlov’s
dogs would eventually stop salivating to the sound of the bell unless there was
occasional ‘topping-up’ of the association with food.
There are many examples of classical conditioning in everyday life. Your cat
magically arrives to be fed when it hears you take the can-opener out of the
drawer. The smell of lavender makes you think of your grandmother who always
used lavender talc. The sight of a hypodermic needle makes you break out in a
cold sweat. You once got food poisoning eating fish and now the smell of fish
makes you feel nauseous. You are trying to give up smoking but each time you see
someone with a cigarette you crave to light up. Remember, classical conditioning
does not rely on any mediational cognitive processes. In other words, you do not
need consciously to know why a CS elicits certain responses in you. You may feel
Figure 7.3 Classical conditioning of the fear response to sight of a white rat.
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sad every time you hear a certain piece of music and have no idea why (perhaps
you were depressed the first time that you heard it but have since forgotten).
Watson joked that later in life Little Albert, with no memory of his participation
in the conditioning experiments, might seek psychotherapy for his strange aversion to white rats and rabbits. Watson pictured Sigmund Freud confidently
proclaiming that Little Albert had an unresolved Oedipal complex.
Note that classical conditioning – like all behavioural approaches – is a model
of both the acquisition and the performance of behaviour. Pavlov and Watson
showed that behavioural responses could be conditioned but also that the CR
was situationally dependent. Once learned, a response (R) must be elicited by a
relevant stimulus (S) in the environment; otherwise it remains dormant. Thus
Pavlov’s dogs only salivated when they heard a bell and Little Albert only cried
when he saw a white rabbit. This suggests two ways to deliberately alter behaviour. The first is through un-conditioning in order to reverse the faulty learning.
Pavlov might have stopped the dogs salivating at the sound of the bell by then
pairing the bell with a noxious stimulus; while Watson might have restored Little
Albert’s affections for white furry animals by pairing them with pleasant stimuli.
(In fact, Jones, 1924, demonstrated the efficacy of this technique in a case similar
to that of Little Albert.) Clinically these techniques are used to treat certain
problem behaviours. In aversion therapy, the therapist creates a mini-phobia in
order to eliminate habitual behaviours. For example, a person with a drinking
problem might be given a drug that makes them feel nauseous each time they taste
alcohol. On the other hand, systematic desensitisation is used to eliminate phobias.
For example, a person with a fear of snakes might be progressively exposed to
snakes while simultaneously being put in a relaxed state by the therapist.
The second way to alter respondent behaviour is through stimulus control.
Stimulus control involves eliminating from the immediate environment stimuli that
elicit the problem behaviour (i.e., the UCS or the CS). For example, a person trying
to keep to a diet might be instructed to ensure that all food is put away in cupboards
and not left out in view where it is likely to elicit feelings of hunger. Using stimulus
control, the problem behaviour is not eliminated from the person’s repertoire but its
expression is suppressed, which is an outcome that may be sufficient.
Classical conditioning and crime
Watson claimed that all behaviour could be explained by S-R theory. However,
the sorts of behaviours described in the previous section are low-level reflexes and
physiological responses. How then do we get from these micro-behaviours to
complex behavioural patterns such as crime? Watson proposed that all behaviour
comprised long chains of simple S-R relationships that moved an organism along
in step-by-step fashion. This level of explanation is referred to as a molecular
approach (not to be confused with molecular genetics). In a molecular analysis,
behaviour is broken down moment-by-moment in order to identify the behaviour–
environment relationship governing each particular stage of the sequence. In practice, reconstructing such sequences of S-R is problematic and, as we shall see
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later, theorists such as Skinner and Bandura abandoned the molecular approach.
Nevertheless, when examining crime there are some relatively simple examples
of classical conditioning in action. In particular, classical conditioning is useful
for explaining crimes that involve autonomic physiological responses to environmental stimuli. Two examples are examined here: sex offences and violent crime.
Sex offences
Sexual arousal is respondent behaviour that can be elicited by a variety of sexual
stimuli. An eliciting stimulus may be a naturally occurring UCS, (e.g., the sight of
a naked body) or a CS that has become associated with sexual stimulation. The
process by which a CS for sexual arousal might be created was demonstrated in an
experiment by Rachman (1966). Rachman showed male subjects a series of
pictures of naked women interspersed with pictures of black boots. He found that
after a number of trials the subjects became sexually aroused just by the pictures
of boots. This study has been replicated using diverse neutral stimuli including
fur-lined boots (Rachman and Hodgson, 1968), geometric figures (McConaghy,
1967) and a penny jar (Plaud and Martini, 1999). It is through their natural association with sexual arousal that individuals find certain parts of the body (e.g.,
hair) or particular items of clothing (e.g., underwear) to be arousing. In extreme
cases, a person might develop a fetish whereby the CS becomes the primary
source of sexual stimulation.
Fetishes are not illegal although they may in some cases lead to illegal behaviour. For example, an offender may steal underwear from clothes lines or commit
rape in order to satisfy a particular fetish. In a more direct link to crime, classical
conditioning has been used to explain the development of sexual behaviours such
as voyeurism (Jackson, 1969), exhibitionism (Evans, 1968; Maletsky, 1980) and
paedophilia (Bancroft and Marks, 1968; Kelly, 1982). The general framework
within which deviant sexual interests are thought to develop is set out in McGuire
et al.’s (1965) sexual preference hypothesis. McGuire et al. argued that the early
chance pairing of a particular behaviour with sexual arousal provides an individual with material for sexual fantasies and masturbation imagery, which serve
to entrench the behaviour as a sexual preference. For example, it is hypothesised
that paedophiles are likely to have had one or more stimulating sexual experiences
with other children when they were also children, and that images of these experiences continue to dominate their sexual fantasies as they grow older. However, as
Marshall et al. (1999) point out, while intuitively appealing, there is in fact little
hard evidence to support the sexual preference hypothesis.
Though less popular now, aversion therapy based on classical conditioning has
been used extensively to treat sex offenders. The procedure typically involves
pairing an aversive stimulus with images or fantasies of the target sexual object or
behaviour. Aversive stimuli have included nausea-inducing drugs (Glynn and
Harper, 1961), electric shocks (Abel et al., 1970; Marshall, 1973; Quinsey et al.,
1980), foul odours (Laws et al., 1978) and noxious covert images (Callahan and
Leitenberg, 1973). In their review of behavioural treatment of sex offending,
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Laws and Marshall (2003; Marshall and Laws, 2003) conclude that attempts to
suppress deviant sexual preferences via aversive techniques have shown some
empirical success. However, they argue that in modern treatment programmes
changing sexual preferences is only part of a comprehensive approach to
rehabilitation that includes building the capacity for alternative, healthy sexual
relationships.
S-R theory suggests that sex crimes are triggered by the sight of stimuli that
elicit deviant sexual responses. For example, Smallbone et al. (2008) argued that
some child sex offenders do not have formulated plans to abuse children but
become aroused in the course of carrying out routine caregiving tasks such as
bathing the child or tucking him/her into bed. In relapse prevention therapy,
offenders are taught to recognise and avoid situations that might trigger offending
behaviour (Pithers et al., 1983).
Violent crime
Aggression is typically categorised as either instrumental or expressive. In instrumental aggression the individual engages in violence in a calculated attempt to
derive some gain. In expressive aggression, violence is an impulsive and involuntary response to some environmental cue. Berkowitz (1971, 1974; Berkowitz and
LePage, 1967) argued that expressive aggression may be cued by stimuli that have
been classically conditioned to be associated with violent behaviour. To demonstrate this principle, Berkowitz and LePage (1967) conducted an experiment with
100 male university students. The participants were first subjected to electric
shocks, with half receiving one shock (low arousal condition) and the other half
receiving seven shocks (high arousal condition). The participants were then given
the opportunity to deliver shocks to the person responsible for shocking them. In
some cases when the pay-back shocks were delivered, a gun was visible near the
shock apparatus, while in other cases there was no gun. The longest and most
severe pay-back shocks were delivered by the aroused participants who were
exposed to the gun. Berkowitz and LePage hypothesised that through their
frequent associations with violence, weapons assume the status of CS. Just the
sight of a weapon is capable of eliciting aggressive responses. This phenomenon
is known as the weapons effect.
The weapons effect has been replicated many times but variability for the effect
has also been found among subjects (see Turner et al., 1977, for a review). It has
been argued that the strength of the effect depends upon the extent to which each
individual associates weapons with violence, which is in turn a function of an individual’s learning history (Berkowitz, 1990). Bartholow et al. (2005) compared the
priming effects of weapons for hunters and non-hunters. They found that pictures
of hunting guns were more likely to prime aggressive thoughts and behaviour in
non-hunters than in hunters, while pictures of assault guns were more likely to
prime aggressive thoughts and behaviour in hunters than non-hunters. Explaining
these findings, the researchers argued that for hunters hunting guns were associated
with positive experiences (e.g., camaraderie), not with interpersonal violence.
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However, because hunters were more knowledgeable about guns than were nonhunters, they also better appreciated the connection between assault guns and the
killing of humans.
While most empirical research has focused on the aggression-eliciting effect of
guns, it should be obvious that the weapons effect has wider implications. Guns are
just one of many possible situational cues for aggression. Carlson et al. (1990)
conducted a meta-analysis on 23 studies that examined the effects of aggression
cues that included guns, knives, the names of people who had been previously
paired with violent images, Ku Klux Klan clothing, aggressive verbalisations,
vengeance-themed bumper-stickers, aggressive films and boxing films. The mean
effect size for the association between aggression cues and the expression of aggressive attitudes or behaviour was .38 (medium). The effects were stronger when the
target of the aggressive response was of low status or an outgroup member.
Operant conditioning
Operant conditioning is most closely associated with the work of B.F. Skinner.
Operant conditioning is also called instrumental conditioning because it applies to
behaviour that is performed in order to achieve some goal. According to the operant
conditioning model, behaviour is shaped by the consequences it produces. The
consequences of behaviour can be rewarding (i.e., reinforcing) or unpleasant (i.e.,
punishing). Behaviour that is rewarded will be repeated while behaviour that is
punished will be avoided. Skinner did not reject classical conditioning but he regarded
it as playing a relatively restricted role in learning. While classical conditioning
explains behaviour as a reaction to the environment, operant conditioning explains
behaviour as an action – or operation – upon the environment. While classical conditioning is concerned with what comes before behaviour, operant conditioning is
largely concerned with what comes after behaviour. While classical conditioning is
concerned with involuntary reflexes and physiological responses, operant conditioning is concerned with volitional behaviours. And while classical conditioning
portrays organisms as passive receivers of learning, operant conditioning views
organisms as active participants in learning.
Principles of operant conditioning
Skinner demonstrated the principles of operant conditioning in a series of experiments involving pigeons and rats. The general procedure for investigating the
reinforcement of behaviour is as follows. A pigeon is placed in a box – sometimes
referred to as Skinner box – which contains a disk that, when pecked, delivers
food from a chute below. Left to its own devices and through accidentally pecking
the disc from time to time, the pigeon eventually learns that each time the disc is
pecked it will be rewarded with food. The behavioural response (R) produces a
rewarding stimulus (SR). Next a red/green light is introduced into the Skinner box.
Now the food is delivered only when the disc is pressed and the light is red. The
red light signals the availability of the reward. Eventually the pigeon learns that
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pecking the disc when the light is green is futile, and it restricts its response to
when the light is red. The red light is an example of a discriminative stimulus
(SD), so-called because it allows an organism to discriminate between occasions
when a particular behaviour is appropriate and when it is not. The operant model
for the reinforcement of behaviour is shown in Figure 7.4(a).
A variation to the experimental design is used to demonstrate the effects of punishment on behaviour. This time half of the floor of the Skinner box is electrified. A rat
placed in the Skinner box quickly learns to escape being shocked by moving to the
non-electrified section when the electrified section is activated. The next step is to
teach the rat to avoid the shock before it occurs. Prior to electrifying the floor a light
is switched on in the box. The light is the SD that signals the imminent delivery of the
punishing stimulus (SP) and the rat learns to move to the other side of the cage to
avoid being shocked. The operant model for punishment is shown in Figure 7.4(b).
As Figure 7.4 shows, stimuli in operant conditioning may be antecedent (SD),
coming before the response, or contingent (SR or SP), coming after the response.
Thus instead of the classical conditioning S-R model, operant conditioning is
described by the S-R-S model. However, an antecedent stimulus in operant conditioning does not trigger a reflex response, but rather signals the nature of the
contingent stimulus. It is the contingent stimulus, by reinforcing or punishing a
response, that is responsible for the acquisition of behaviour; the antecedent stimulus determines when the behaviour will be performed.
Both reinforcement and punishment come in two forms: positive and negative.
Positive reinforcement involves the application of a rewarding consequence while
negative reinforcement involves the removal of a punishing consequence. The
food delivered to the pigeon in the Skinner box is an example of positive reinforcement; going to the dentist to stop a toothache is an example of negative
reinforcement. Note that reinforcement always encourages behaviour – negative
reinforcement is not punishment. Similarly, positive punishment is the application
of an aversive stimulus while negative punishment is the removal of a rewarding
stimulus. The electric floor in the Skinner box is an example of positive punishment; punishing a child by taking away privileges is an example of negative
punishment. As with classical conditioning, if after some time rewards and
punishments cease to occur when the behaviour is performed, eventually the
learned behaviour will extinguish.
Figure 7.4 Operant conditioning of (a) the pecking response in pigeons and
(b) the avoidance response in rats.
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Positive reinforcements may be delivered according to different schedules. On
a continuous reinforcement (CRF) schedule, behaviour is reinforced each time it
is performed. Giving a dog a treat each time it performs a trick is an example of a
CRF schedule. Behaviour may also be reinforced intermittently. There are four
types of intermittent reinforcement. On a fixed ratio (FR) schedule, reinforcement
is contingent upon a set number of responses. For example, a fruit-picker might be
paid a set amount for every basket of fruit picked. On a variable ratio (VR)
schedule, the reinforcement varies in an unpredictable way. Payouts from a slot
machine are on a VR schedule. On a fixed interval (FT) schedule, reinforcements
are delivered according to predictable time periods. A weekly pay cheque is a FT
reinforcer. Finally, on a variable interval (VI) schedule, reinforcements are delivered according to unpredictable periods of time. For example, a lion hunting prey
will encounter a likely meal at random time intervals. In general, response-based
schedules (FR and VR) produce higher response rates than do interval-based
schedules (FT and RT) because there is a closer relationship between the behaviour and the consequence. VR schedules produce particularly effective learning
that is relatively resistant to extinction. This is because it is difficult for an
organism to distinguish between the withdrawal of reinforcement and a particularly long gap between reinforcers. VR schedules are therefore associated with
persistent problematic behaviours such as gambling. VR schedules can also help
explain why people may stay in abusive relationships, sustained by the occasional
gestures of contrition and positive treatment from the abusive partner.
Skinner (1953, 1974) believed that reinforcement was generally preferable to
punishment as a means of changing behaviour. Punishment is most effective when
it is consistent and immediate. Unfortunately in the real world these conditions are
frequently not met. An individual may be punished for only a fraction of his/her
misbehaviours and punishment may be administered long after the misbehaviour
has been performed. Where punishment is used to change behaviour, it is important
that it be combined with the reinforcement of alternative appropriate behaviours.
Operant conditioning and crime
Where classical conditioning adopts a molecular approach to behavioural analyses, operant conditioning adopts a molar approach. In a molar analysis, behaviours and their causes are treated in an aggregate fashion. An extended behavioural
pattern – such as committing a crime – might be examined as a single activity and
explained by an accumulation of factors, rather than as a series of discrete microbehaviours each with their own cause (Baum, 2002). Adopting a molar approach,
it is easy to see how criminal behaviours fit within an operant conditioning model.
Most crimes are goal-directed behaviours that involve rewards in some way and
are therefore intrinsically reinforcing – stealing is positively reinforced by the
goods acquired, rape is positively reinforced by the sexual gratification obtained,
and murder is negatively reinforced by the elimination of someone unpleasant (as
far as the offender is concerned at any rate). On the other hand, most of us
refrain from committing crime because of the punishments – fines, imprisonment,
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condemnation by family and friends, and so forth – that we associate with getting
caught.
There is, however, little empirical research that directly examines the operant
conditioning of criminal behaviour. While Skinner and other radical behaviourists
are considered to be arch empiricists, there are obvious difficulties in carrying out
on humans operant conditioning experiments that involve the creation of problematic habits. In fact, Skinner did not think such experiments were necessary. He
believed that the principles of learning were universal and so the application to
humans could be extrapolated from the experiments with animals. Most behavioural analysis of crime involves reinterpreting known causes of crime within an
operant conditioning framework.
Like classical conditioning, operant conditioning is concerned with both the
acquisition of behaviour and the circumstances which cause that behaviour to be
performed. Offenders are assumed to have had learning histories that have established in them criminal habits as part of their behavioural repertoires. While the
principles of learning are universal, each habit is learned separately. Thus a car
thief must learn to steal cars, a burglar must learn to burgle houses, an assaulter
must learn to assault people, and so on. Let us take burglary as an example. We
can speculate that many burglars began stealing as children, perhaps sneaking into
their parents’ room and taking loose change or other items. The behaviour is naturally rewarded by the things taken, and with each success the habit would be
strengthened. Perhaps they stole many times without getting caught, or if they
were caught, they received ineffective and inconsistent punishments from their
parents. What Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) called poor self-control (see
Chapter 6), radical behaviourists explain as a failure to learn the contingent relationship between self-gratifying behaviour and punishing consequences. Rather
than being a generalised personality trait, ‘self-control’ may be exercised in some
areas of life and not in others, depending upon the varying reinforcement histories
in those areas.
It is likely that stealing from parents generalised. Offenders probably moved to
other targets, perhaps breaking into neighbours’ houses and later moving further
afield to burgle the houses of strangers. Along the way, they would need to hone
their technical skills. They would learn which were the best points of entry into a
house, how to jimmy a window, how to disable an alarm or to pacify a guard dog
if necessary, how to locate valuable goods within the house quickly and efficiently, how to make an escape without being seen, and how to dispose of the
goods that they stole. These skills would be learned through trial and error in a
process of successive approximations known as shaping. Their initial efforts would
be clumsy but with each successful attempt they would come closer to the optimal
response. As they became more practised in their crimes, they would also start to
recognise discriminative stimuli that would guide them to maximise the reinforcements and to minimise potential punishments. For example, they would come to
know that newspapers accumulating on the front lawn meant that the owner was
likely to be away and that the house was unguarded, while lights on inside the
house suggested that someone was home and the house should be avoided. In
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many houses they may find little of value but occasionally they would be rewarded
on a variable reinforcement schedule with a particularly lucrative haul that would
encourage their persistence. They are likely to perform many undetected and
therefore unpunished burglaries. And if they are caught for their crimes from time
to time, the delay between committing their crime and receiving a formal criminal
justice system sanction may be months and even years, effectively severing the
learning connection with their criminal acts.
Similar scenarios can be devised for all criminal behaviours. However, from
a practical point of view, behaviourists are less interested in the historical origins
of behaviour than they are in the here-and-now task of applying behavioural
technologies to change problem behaviour. They argue against the popular idea,
exemplified in the psychoanalytic tradition of Sigmund Freud, that you must
know the causes of a problem in order to fix it. It does matter how someone came
to be criminal; the same behavioural modification techniques can be applied irrespective of the aetiology. What is important to know from a behavioural analysis
are the current reward and punishment structures determining the performance of
the target behaviour, because these are the contingency arrangements that need to
be altered in order to change that behaviour.
If there is little direct research on the acquisition and performance of criminal
behaviour, the same cannot be said for research on the modification of criminal
behaviour. Behaviourists have developed an extensive array of therapeutic techniques based on operant conditioning. We do not have the space to review these
in detail here (see Braukmann and Fixsen, 1975; Davidson and Seidman, 1974;
Pearson et al., 2002) but as a general principle these techniques aim to create
prosocial habits and eliminate antisocial habits. This is achieved by strengthening
the connection between prosocial behaviours and rewarding outcomes, and
between antisocial behaviours and punishing outcomes. One technique is contingency contracting in which the punishments for misbehaviour and the rewards for
sticking to agreed-upon behavioural goals are set out in concrete terms, literally as
a written contract. For example, Stuart (1971) describes a contingency contract
developed between a 16-year-old delinquent girl and her parents in which privileges (e.g., going out one evening a week) were contingent upon the fulfilment of
specific responsibilities (e.g., maintaining a B average across all grades). A similar
principle has been applied at an institutional level in the form of token economies.
In token economies residents are rewarded for specified prosocial behaviours
(e.g., keeping their room clean) with points which they can accumulate and
exchange for privileges or treats (Phillips et al., 1971).
Social learning
Social learning – also called observational learning – presents a kinder, less
extreme side of behaviourism. The person most closely associated with social
learning theory is Albert Bandura. Bandura (1977) argued that a great deal of
human behaviour is learned not through direct experience, as the classical and
operant conditioning theorists suggest, but vicariously through the process of
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modelling. That is, he argued that we can learn through observing others and
imitating or avoiding their behaviours. We do not need to be personally run over
on a busy highway to know not to leap out in front of the traffic. If human beings
learn through modelling, then they must possess the ability to anticipate the consequences of behaviour that they have not yet performed. This ability to look into
the future suggests a role in behaviour for cognitive processes, that is, thoughts,
beliefs and perceptions. In recognition of the mediating role of internal events,
social learning theory is described by the Stimulus-Organism-Response (S-O-R)
model. Social learning is not an alternative to classical and operant conditioning
but an extension of the behavioural tradition. Note, however, that in more recent
theorising, Bandura (1986, 2001) has given increasing emphasis to cognitive
processes, and has relabelled his approach as social cognitive theory. We will deal
largely with the observational learning aspects of the theory in this chapter, and
with the more explicit cognitive aspects in the following chapter.
Principles of social learning
According to Bandura (1977), most behaviour is learned in the process of social
interaction and, in particular, by observing the actions of others. Models provide
people with information that guides their own performance. There are four components to the modelling process. First, people must attend to the model. Models that
are closely attended to – for example, because they are observed frequently, they
are interesting, or they have high status – will be subject to greater imitation than
models that do not capture the observer’s attention. Second, people must retain
the modelled information in memory. This requires the individual to convert the
observed events into symbolic cognitive representations in the form of internal
dialogue (self-talk) or pictorial images. Third, the cognitively encoded information must be converted into action. Observed behaviours, especially complex
ones, are rarely reproduced correctly the first time but must be practised and
perfected. Finally, the performance of modelled behaviour is subject to motivational factors. People acquire countless behaviours observationally, but their
performance of these behaviours is highly selective, depending upon the perceived
appropriateness and effectiveness of the behaviour in a given context. People
perform modelled behaviour in the anticipation of reinforcement rather than as a
consequence of reinforcement.
Bandura divided social learning into three stages: acquisition, instigation and
maintenance. Bandura (1965; Bandura et al., 1961, 1963a, 1963b) demonstrated
the acquisition of behaviour via modelling in a series of classic studies involving
a large inflatable Bobo doll. In the prototype study (Bandura et al., 1961), children
observed an adult model interacting with the doll. In one condition, the adult
behaved non-aggressively towards the doll; in the other condition the model
verbally and physically attacked the doll. In a variation of the study (Bandura
et al., 1963a) children observed a film of the encounters. In both studies children
imitated the behaviour of the model – those children who observed the aggressive
model behaved twice as aggressively towards the Bobo doll than did children who
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observed the non-aggressive model or no model. The children had learned the
aggressive responses without receiving any direct reinforcement.
Models are involved not only in the acquisition of behaviour but also in
providing guidance about where and when behaviour should be performed. Thus
models can also instigate more-or-less immediate imitation. However, social
cueing is not an automatic, ‘mindless’ process as it is presented in operant conditioning. Modelling cues must be interpreted and an individual makes a judgement
about the likely benefits of imitating the model. The power of a model to prompt
behaviour depends upon the regard that the observer has for the model as a reliable source of information. For example, Lefkowitz et al. (1955) found that people
were more likely to follow someone crossing the street against a red light if the
model was dressed in high-status clothes (a business suit) than if the model was
poorly dressed.
In operant conditioning, behaviour is maintained by the consequences it
produces. Whether or not a person retains a learned behaviour in their repertoire
depends upon if it is reinforced or punished. Bandura agreed that behaviour is
subject to direct reinforcement and punishment. However, he also argued that the
same operant process could occur vicariously in observational learning; that is, that
reinforcement rules could be drawn from noting the experiences of models. This
principle was demonstrated in a further extension of the Bobo doll experiment
(Bandura, 1965; Bandura et al., 1963b). In these experiments, the model behaved
aggressively towards the doll and subsequently either received rewards (candy,
drink and verbal praise), punishment (spanking and verbal condemnation), or no
consequences. The children then interacted with the doll. Those who observed the
punishment condition were significantly less aggressive towards the doll than were
the children in the other two conditions. In Bandura (1965) all children were then
offered treats to demonstrate the aggressive behaviour of the model. There was no
significant difference in the children’s performance of aggressive behaviour. That
is, the children in all three conditions had learned the aggressive behaviour; what
distinguished the children in the model-punished condition was that they also
learned the punishing consequences associated with performing the aggressive
behaviour. Bandura referred to the learning of contingency arrangements through
observation as vicarious conditioning.
In addition to vicarious conditioning, Bandura (1977) extended operant principles of behaviour maintenance in two further ways. First, he argued that some of
the most powerful consequences of behaviour were not the tangible rewards and
punishments emphasised in operant conditioning, but social and status rewards
and punishments in the form of approval or disapproval from significant others.
For example, children will seek to win the approval of parents without the promise
of tangible rewards. Likewise, being admonished by a valued figure can be more
distressing than tangible punishment. At a societal level, honorific titles, awards,
medals and other status-enhancing forms of public recognition are highly valued.
Second, Bandura argued that behaviour could be self-rewarded and selfpunished. Human beings engage in an ongoing assessment of their own performance, making judgements of self-adequacy – in the form of self-statements (talking
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to one’s self) – against personal standards of behaviour. Depending on the outcome
of this assessment, individuals will cognitively congratulate or censure themselves for their actions. We explore the cognitive aspects of reinforcement in more
detail in Chapter 8.
Social learning and crime
Social learning theory is arguably the most widely cited psychological theory of
crime. Versions of social learning theory are also found in sociological criminology – for example, Sutherland’s (1947) differential association theory –
although sociological versions lack the detailed behavioural framework and
experimental underpinnings of psychological approaches. Akers (1977; Burgess
and Akers, 1968) has attempted to combine the sociological and psychological
traditions of social learning in his differential association-reinforcement theory.
Bandura (1977) suggested that there were three main sources of models for observational learning: the family, the peer group and the mass media.
Familial models
As reported in Chapter 6, children who grow up in abusive households are at
a higher risk of criminality than are those raised in non-abusive families. From
a social learning perspective, it would be expected that the sorts of crimes
committed by individuals would reflect the specific sorts of experiences to which
they were exposed as children. There is empirical evidence for the intergenerational transmission hypothesis. Felson and Lane (2009) analysed interviews with
nearly 14,000 prisoners, focusing on their childhood experiences and their current
offending patterns. They found that offenders who experienced physical abuse
were most likely to commit violent offences and offenders who experienced
sexual abuse were most likely to commit sexual offences. Likewise, Teague et al.
(2008) found that the severity of physical abuse predicted self-reported violent
offending, but was only weakly associated with property offending and did not
predict sexual offending. The link between being a victim and a later perpetrator
of child sexual abuse has been reported in a number of studies (Connolly and
Woollons, 2008; Glasser et al., 2001; Paolucci et al., 2001). Stith et al. (2000)
conducted a meta-analysis of 39 studies examining the childhood familial experiences and subsequent spousal abuse. They found a weak to moderate relationship
between growing up in a family characterised by domestic abuse and becoming a
perpetrator (.18) and victim (.17) of domestic abuse.
Subcultural models
The correlation between having delinquent friends and engaging in criminal
activity was also reported in Chapter 6. Social learning theory has been widely
used to interpret the association between delinquency and delinquent associates
(Akers and Jensen, 2006). A novice offender has the opportunity to observe the
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delinquent acts of more experienced friends from whom he/she learns both
normalising beliefs about crime (committing crime is OK) and the technical
skills required to commit crime. He/she may also receive social approval by
peers for having engaged in crimes and this may be more important in terms of
reinforcement than tangible rewards delivered by their criminal acts.
There has been particular interest by social learning theorists in criminal
behaviour within delinquent gangs. Battin-Pearson et al. (1998) found that gang
members had double the offending rates of juveniles who just had delinquent
friends. The tight social structure of gangs increases the social learning opportunities. Winfree et al. (1994) examined data from 97 incarcerated male and female
juvenile offenders on self-reported delinquency, gang membership, the number of
friends who were gang members, the level of approval from friends of their gang
membership, and their acceptance of gang values. They found that gang members
were more likely to have friends who were also gang members, to have approval
from friends for their gang membership and activities, and to be more accepting
of gang values.
Symbolic models
Models for imitation do not have to appear in person but can be represented symbolically in words and pictures via the mass media (Bandura, 2001). Most research in
this area has examined the effects of media violence, including sexual violence.
There are numerous examples in the literature that indicate a copy-cat phenomenon
accompanying publicised crimes. Felson (1996) recounts a case in which a girl was
abducted and forced to douse herself in petrol before being set alight two days after
the screening of a television programme with a similar plot. Suicide has been found
to increase immediately following the portrayal of suicide in popular television
programmes (Gould and Shäffer, 1989; Phillips, 1989; Phillips and Carstensen,
1990; Schmidtke and Häfner, 1989). Phillips (1983) found that delinquent homicides increased in the days following the televising of major boxing matches.
Supporting the role of imitation, the increase only applied to cases where the losing
fighter and the homicide victim were of the same race.
There have been numerous systematic reviews and meta-analyses on the outcomes
of media violence more generally (Anderson et al., 2003; Anderson and Bushman,
2001; Bushman and Huesmann, 2006; Felson, 1996; Wood et al., 1991). In the most
recent study, Bushman and Huesmann (2006) conducted a meta-analysis on 431
studies, examining the effects of media violence on adults and children. The
researchers distinguished between short-term effects involving immediate but transient changes in behaviour (instigation), and long-term effects producing stable and
prolonged changes in behaviour (acquisition). The media examined included television, video games, movies and comic books and the outcome variables included
aggressive behaviour, aggressive thoughts and physiological arousal. Bushman and
Huesmann found average effect sizes ranging from .19 for violent behaviour to .26
for physiological arousal. The short-term effects were greater for adults while the
long-term effects were greater for children. The authors interpreted this finding as
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indicating that different psychological mechanisms were in play for children and
adults. For children, symbolic models were involved in the construction of violent
responses as predicted by social learning theory. Children had fewer existing learned
violence responses that might interfere with the absorption of new messages
modelled in the media. However, for adults, violent media had a priming effect,
eliciting already encoded violent responses rather than creating new ones, by a
process best described by S-R theory.
The relationship between pornography use and sexual offending is particularly
controversial (see reviews by Bauserman, 1996; Seto et al., 2001). While some
studies have reported high levels of pornography use by sex offenders (Bourke and
Hernandez, 2009; Kingston et al., 2008; Marshall, 1988), others have not (Becker
and Stein, 1991; Smallbone and Wortley, 2000). Moreover, because such studies are
correlational, it is unclear whether any reported association is because pornography
causes sex offending or sex offenders are attracted to pornography. To overcome this
limitation, the short-term psychological and behavioural effects of pornography have
been examined experimentally. Allen et al. (1995) conducted a meta-analysis of 30
laboratory studies examining the link between exposure to pornography and increased
aggression (for example, the willingness to deliver electric shocks to other participants). They found that increased aggression depended upon the type of pornography
and the pre-exiting emotional state of the observer. Pornography that simply involved
nudity actually decreased aggression; pornography involving non-violent sex and
violent sex both increased aggression, although the increase was greater for violent
sex. Subjects who were made to feel angry prior to viewing non-violent and violent
pornography became more aggressive after the viewing, while subjects who were not
made angry did not; again there was a decrease in both groups after viewing nudity.
The findings were similar for both men and women. There were also no gender
effects for the target of the post-viewing aggression. That is, post-viewing aggression
was displayed towards both male and female victims, even though the targets of
aggression in the pornography were overwhelmingly female. These findings suggest
that for sexual aggression, arousal is more important than the actual content of the
pornography. Viewers did not seem to be modelling specific elements they observed
in the pornographic images; rather their response depended upon their emotional
reaction to the pornography. This finding mirrors that of Bushman and Huesmann
(2006) for the short-term effects of violent media generally.
In summary, it seems that exposure to violent and pornographic media can have
deleterious psychological and behavioural effects on some viewers. However,
effect sizes are typically modest and there are inconsistencies and contradictions
among the findings. Moreover, the role of imitation is most apparent in the acquisition phase, while the short-term instigating effects are more likely to be related
to arousal-priming.
Conclusion and evaluation
Behavioural theories present a very different approach to understanding crime
from that offered by other psychological theories. In the behavioural approach,
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the focus is switched from a biosocial perspective to one which places the environment at the centre of the analysis. The role of the environment is to create
criminal behaviours from a criminality-neutral starting position, not to control
inherent, generalised criminal impulses. Behaviours are not organised around
biologically-based traits, but remain as discrete habits that are evoked on a
situationally-specific basis. Given these points of departure, behavioural theories
would appear to present some conceptual challenges to the integrative mission of
this book. However, some of the ‘radical’ aspects of behaviourism have been
overstated and perceptions of the approach are often based on ideas presented
nearly a hundred years ago. Skinner, for example, did not dismiss the role of
biological factors in behaviour but he did question the utility of incorporating
them into explanations of behaviour. This is a practical objection to the biosocial
perspective more so than a theoretical objection. More recent versions of
behaviourism – social learning theory and social cognitive theory – have gone
further and explicitly included personal variables in their explanations of
behaviour.
Moreover, behavioural approaches add significantly to our understanding of
crime, addressing issues ignored in other theories. The contribution of behavioural
approaches is to set out the precise mechanisms by which behaviour is learned and
the conditions under which it is performed. Behaviourists of all persuasions have
a shared commitment to rigorous and systematic empirical research. Through
application of the scientific method they have uncovered causal relationships that
have permitted the development of powerful laws of behaviour. From these laws,
behaviourists have developed a wide range of interventions for modifying and
preventing crime. The distinction made between learning and performance of
behaviour is crucial. Behaviourists are the first situationalists. Understanding why
individuals develop criminal habits is one thing; of equal or greater importance is
understanding why they commit crime. With the behavioural approach, we begin
our examination of the third stage of the integrative model, factors operating at the
crime scene (see Figure 1.2).
Behaviourism began as a reaction against the mentalism of the nineteenth
century. Ironically, the behavioural approach has been reinvigorated in recent
years by the incorporation of cognitive processes into the behavioural framework
via social learning theory, which has evolved into social cognitive theory. It is to
the role of cognition in crime that we now turn.
8
Cognition
As outlined in Chapter 7, psychology began in the late nineteenth century as the
study of mental processes, but the dominance of the behavioural perspective in the
first half of the twentieth century saw the virtual abandonment of cognition as a
topic of psychological investigation. By the end of the 1950s, however, many
researchers were becoming increasingly dissatisfied with what they saw as the
limitations of radical behaviourism. The behavioural paradigm, it was argued,
failed to account for the complexity and creativity of human behaviour. More
particularly, it did not capture the very quality that makes us human, namely our
capacity to think.
Cognition is studied in a number of different fields of psychology. The primary
field of study, naturally enough, is cognitive psychology. Cognitive psychology is
the study of how humans perceive, interpret, encode, store and recall information.
Cognitive psychologists study mental activities such as attention, memory,
language, problem-solving, reasoning and decision-making. Aside from the core
field of cognitive psychology, cognitive processes have also been incorporated into
other areas of psychology. We saw in the previous chapter that many psychologists
did not abandon behaviourism but introduced cognition into learning theory to
produce social learning theory, which later became social cognitive theory. Social
cognitive theorists are specifically interested in the mediational role that thoughts
and perceptions play in the learning process. Cognition has also found a home in
social psychology (of which we will hear more in Chapter 9) as social cognition.
Though similar in name to social cognitive theory, social cognition is more specifically concerned with the social perception of groups and events that underpins the
development of attitudes, values, stereotypes and schemas. The chapter begins by
outlining the key features and assumptions of cognitive approaches. Three ways of
understanding offender cognition are then examined – as a mediating process
in social cognitive learning, as a rational decision-making process, and as an
automatic, schema-driven process.
The cognitive revolution
The renaissance of cognitive psychology is commonly fixed at 1956 when two
influential conferences on cognition were held, one at Massachusetts Institute of
Cognition 163
Technology (MIT) and the other at Dartmouth College (Gardner, 1985; Neisser,
1988). The MIT conference brought together researchers from various academic
fields interested in perception, memory and the development of language; the
Dartmouth conference was attended by researchers in the nascent field of computer
science and focused on the implications of new technologies for understanding
human intelligence. Though perhaps not apparent at the time, the conferences are
credited with heralding what has been referred to as the cognitive revolution and
with setting the theoretical direction that cognitive psychology was to take in the
coming years.
The need for cognition
Radical behaviourists like Skinner argued that all behaviour could be explained
without recourse to internal events such as cognition. A serious challenge to this
claim came in the wake of the publication by Skinner (1957) of a book on the acquisition of language. According to Skinner, language is acquired incrementally via
reinforcement in the same way as is any other behaviour. As a child verbalises his/
her first words – for example, correctly identifying an object – parents reinforce the
response with praise and encouragement. The child then learns to associate words
with the objects in question and in this way builds a vocabulary and a catalogue of
sentences. However, many researchers felt that Skinner had pushed behaviourism
beyond its explanatory bounds. Most notably, linguist Noam Chomsky (1959) (who
had attended the MIT symposium) responded with a devastating critique in which
he argued that the infinite array of novel sentences that an individual is capable of
producing simply cannot be learned in a mechanistic way. Even when children are
first learning to talk they will utter sentences – often containing errors (e.g., ‘Me not
like doggie’) – that they have never heard before. The creative potential of language,
Chomsky argued, must have a cognitive basis. He proposed that the human brain
comes equipped with a hard-wired language acquisition devise (LAD) that allows
individuals to manipulate words that they hear according to a limited set of innate
grammatical rules in order to create new sentences. Many regard Chomsky’s critique
as a turning point in the decline in the pre-eminence of radical behaviourism and the
increasing influence of cognitive psychology (Lachman et al., 1979).
The computer analogy
Around the time that psychologists were rediscovering cognition there were rapid
advances in the development of the computer. As computers became more sophisticated, researchers became interested in the parallels between the informationprocessing capabilities of computers and human thought. The term artificial
intelligence (AI) was coined at the Dartmouth conference to describe the attempt
by programmers to simulate on computers the analytic skills of humans. The
computer chess game, capable of beating most human players, is an example of
AI. Working in the other direction, computers provided cognitive researchers with
a model for what goes on inside the ‘black box’.
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With the computer as metaphor, the information-processing model became the
dominant perspective in cognitive psychology (Lachman et al., 1979). According
to this model, humans process information through a sequence of stages. Like a
computer, the brain receives inputs which it encodes in symbolic form, it stores
this information, it retrieves this information, and it operates on and transforms
this information. The data used in mental activity involve an internal representation of environmental information, and human beings are active manipulators of
these data. The information processing model distinguishes between the physical
structure of the brain and mental processes, a distinction that is broadly (though
not perfectly) analogous to that between a computer’s hardware and its software.
Different software programs represent different types of mental activity.
Though useful as a descriptive device, the computer analogy should not be
pushed too far. There are significant differences between the brain and the
computer. Most importantly, the computer has a central processing unit that
rapidly performs tasks one at a time in a serial fashion. In contrast, the brain can
perform different tasks simultaneously, but less rapidly, utilising neuronal
networks throughout the brain. This model of cognition is referred to as parallel
distributed processing. The brain and computers also have different strengths and
weaknesses. Computers outperform the brain in some areas of functioning. For
example, by definition, computers are not prone to human error. On the other
hand, and despite advances in AI, the brain is still superior to computers in
performing conceptual tasks such as sorting objects into categories on the basis of
some underlying quality.
Consciousness
Consciousness is an elusive concept to define but is generally taken to have something to do with our subjective experience and awareness (Block, 1995; Kriegel,
2007). While we like to believe that our behaviour is under the control of our
conscious thoughts, in fact most cognition takes place below the level of phenomenal consciousness. Consider an experience common to most drivers. You are
driving home along a familiar route when suddenly a car pulls out in front of you.
You slam on the brakes and narrowly avoid an accident. Only then do you realise
that you have no recollection of your journey home up to that point when you are
jolted back to a state of conscious awareness. Your driving behaviour seems to
have been performed on ‘auto-pilot’.
This scenario illustrates the distinction between automatic processes and nonautomatic (or controlled) processes (Moors and De Houwer, 2006). An automatic
process is one that is activated without intention, occurs rapidly, and operates in the
absence of conscious attention. In contrast, a non-automatic process is one that is
intentionally initiated, is relatively slow-acting, and requires conscious attention.
Automatic processes generally develop as a function of practice. Many tasks that
start off requiring non-automatic processing can eventually be performed using
automatic processing. In the scenario above, when you first start to learn to drive,
you are conscious of every element of the task that you need to perform – scanning
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the road, turning the steering wheel, applying the brake, and so on. Only after
extensive experience are you able to switch to auto-pilot. Reading is another
example. When children learn to read, they laboriously sound out each word.
Eventually they read fluently without consciously attending to every word. Similarly, when people are learning a new sport, they concentrate on each component
of their technique until their play becomes automatic.
This analysis suggests there is a close link between consciousness and
attention. There is a limited number of things an individual can attend to at
any given time, and so there is also a limited number of non-automatic processes
that can be undertaken simultaneously. Since automatic processes occur with
minimal attention, they are seen as a way for humans to maximise informationprocessing resources. However, as the following section explores, the exact nature
of conscious thought and the purpose that it serves remain controversial.
The mind–body problem
As suggested in the preceding sections, cognitive psychology is the study of
mental processes rather than the study of the brain. While this distinction might
seem obvious enough, it involves a centuries-old philosophical conundrum known
as the mind–body problem. The problem concerns the nature of the mind. The
mental activities that comprise the mind – thoughts, ideas, imagination – are
intangible phenomena. We cannot see or touch them and they are not composed
of atoms or even energy. However, if the mind is a non-physical entity, then how
can it be contained within a designated physical space (i.e., the skull)? Moreover,
how can the non-physical mind exert a causal influence on the physical body
without violating the fundamental laws of physics?
There are two main philosophical approaches to the mind–body problem: dualism
and materialism (Fodor, 1981). Dualism was proposed by the French philosopher
René Descartes in the seventeenth century. Descartes maintained that the mind and
body are separate entities but that they causally interact with one another. However,
the ongoing weakness of dualism has been the inability for any proponents to satisfactorily account for how this mind–body interaction actually occurs. Nevertheless,
historically dualism has had a powerful influence in the development of cognitive
psychology and is the way that most people intuitively understand thinking.
Materialism holds that all mental activity has a physical correlate in the brain, and
therefore there is no separate mind. The mind–body problem disappears because the
mind and body are one. Radical behaviourists like Watson and Skinner were materialists, but so too are many cognitive psychologists. They argue that it is theoretically possible (even if it is highly unlikely ever to happen) for all cognition ultimately
to be described in terms of underlying neurological processes. However, materialism has been criticised on grounds that have been canvassed already; that is, that
it seems increasingly apparent to many that human behaviour cannot be explained
without invoking a separate role for mental activity.
Parallels may be observed between the mind–body problem and the free will/
determinism debate. Dualism implies that humans possess some level of free will.
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It portrays the existence of a separate mind that sits outside the physical brain and
operates as a moderating agent, overseeing and guiding our actions. Critics of
dualism sometimes compare this with the absurd image of having a little person (a
homunculus) inside the head telling us what to do. Materialism, on the other hand,
is consistent with determinism. Mental processes are firmly attached to the brain
and as such are subject to the same biological and environmental causal processes
that shaped the physical characteristics of the brain.
Debate about the mind–body relationship continues with no obvious resolution in
sight. Indeed, some researchers have concluded that the problem is essentially insoluble (McGinn, 1989). Despite the profundity of the philosophical issues involved,
in practice most cognitive psychologists are not constrained by the controversy.
They are content to focus on the function that cognition plays in human behaviour
and to leave the mind–body problem (and the free will/determinism debate for that
matter) to the side.
Social cognitive theory
As has been discussed, social cognitive theory developed from social learning
theory. Social cognitive theory is consistent with the basic operant conditioning
mode, but posits a range of cognitive processes that sit between environmental
inputs (the stimulus S) and behavioural outputs (the response R). Behaviour occurs
as a response to a cognitive representation of the environment (the StimulusOrganism-Response or S-O-R model), rather than to the environment per se.
Cognitive processes are in turn subject to bias, error and distortion. Thus, the
cognitive representation of the environment may involve dysfunctional perceptions and interpretations of events that result in dysfunctional behaviour. The
internal world that is created inside the head can even be entirely self-generated
and need not relate to any particular event occurring at the time. Sexual fantasies,
for example, can produce emotional and physiological responses similar to those
produced by actual sexual experience. Note that the conceptually similar cognitive
behavioural therapy (CBT) developed alongside social cognitive theory, though
with a slightly different heritage. CBT has its roots in the therapeutic applications
of behavioural and cognitive techniques and is associated with clinical researchers
such as Albert Ellis, Aaron Beck and Arnold Lazarus. Where traditional behaviour
therapies attempt to change behaviour by changing some aspect of the environment, CBT aims to change behaviour by changing an individual’s internal representation of the environment, a technique known as cognitive restructuring.
In this section a number of cognitive-mediational processes are described.
These are: expectancies, causal attributions, locus of control, frustration-aggression, perceived self-efficacy, self-reinforcement and moral disengagement.
Expectancies
According to operant conditioning, people are likely to perform behaviour for
which they have been previously rewarded. According to social cognitive theory,
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for this to occur, an individual must hold an expectation of being rewarded for that
behaviour, and this implies that they possess the cognitive capacity to imagine a
future event. Expectancies are memory constructs that inform individuals about
the likely outcome of goal-driven behaviour. Based on their expectancies,
offenders will commit crimes that promise to deliver them rewards. For example,
O’Donohue et al. (1996) examined expectancies for rape among a sample of
undergraduate college students. Possible outcomes of rape that were presented to
participants included enjoying the sex, feeling ashamed, getting a bad reputation,
being convicted and contracting an STD. Positive (or less negative) perceptions
of rape outcomes were associated with both higher self-reported past involvement
and predicted future involvement in coercive sex.
The significance of the cognitive basis of expectancies is most clearly demonstrated in research on the effects of alcohol on behaviour. The association between
alcohol consumption and aggression is well established (see Chapter 3). However,
what is not immediately clear from this association is the extent to which aggression is the result of the pharmacological effects of alcohol or alcohol expectancies. According to the expectancy argument, people may become aggressive after
drinking alcohol because this is what they expect the effects of alcohol to be. To
test this hypothesis, Lang et al. (1975) devised an innovative experiment designed
to control for the pharmacological effects of alcohol. Subjects were led to believe
that they were participating in a study to test the effects of alcohol on motor coordination. Half the subjects were given tonic water containing vodka, and the other
half were given straight tonic water. Pretesting on a different group of subjects
indicated that the tonic water effectively masked the taste of the vodka. In addition, two different expectancies were created. For both conditions, half the subjects
were led to believe that their beverage contained alcohol while the other half
were led to believe they were drinking straight tonic water. After subjects drank
their assigned beverage, they were then required to deliver shocks to another
subject (actually a confederate of the experimenter) in what was portrayed as a
learning phase of the experiment. (In fact the shocks were simulated.) Those
subjects who thought that they had imbibed alcohol – irrespective of whether or
not they had done so – delivered longer and more severe shocks to the confederate
than subjects who believed that they had not imbibed alcohol. The actual consumption of alcohol had no effect on aggression and there were no interaction effects.
The belief by subjects that they had consumed alcohol became a cognitive reality
that was independent of the objective reality. Assuming that they had imbibed
alcohol, subjects acted out their alcohol expectancies as if they had imbibed
alcohol.
Alcohol expectancies have subsequently become an important part of the
explanation for the effects of alcohol on violent and other criminal behaviour.
Quigley and Leonard (2006) conducted a systematic review of the alcohol expectancy literature in which they concluded that alcohol expectancies for aggression
contributed to the performance of aggressive behaviour, although the pharmacological effects of alcohol also played a role along with situational cues for aggression. The broader point, however, is that expectancies of all sorts are subjective
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cognitive creations that need not necessarily mirror the objective consequences of
behaviour.
Causal attributions
Causal attributions refer to the inferences individuals make about why an event
has occurred, or about the motives and dispositions of others (Heider, 1958;
Kelley, 1972). Human beings are driven by the need to understand and predict the
world and to exercise control over events. Attribution theorists take the view of
human beings as ‘naive scientists’ who continuously analyse and interpret environmental information to arrive at logically derived (though not always accurate)
conclusions. According to Weiner (1986), causal attributions are made along
three dimensions – is an event caused by factors in the environment (external) or
factors in the person (internal)?; is the cause long-term (stable) or temporary
(unstable)?; and is the cause intentional (controllable) or accidental (uncontrollable)? The causes which a person ascribes to an event may profoundly affect their
reaction to that event and their subsequent behaviour. For example, harmful
behaviour which is judged to be deliberate will elicit quite different responses
from an observer (or victim) than the same behaviour judged to be inadvertent.
Thus, in line with the principles of social cognitive learning, it is not the environmental event that causes behaviour but the interpretation placed on the event.
Human beings, however, are far from being good, deductive scientists, and attributional analyses are subject to a number of common errors and biases. For
example, fundamental attributional error refers to the tendency of individuals to
over-attribute the causes of another person’s behaviour to dispositional factors, and
correspondingly to underestimate the role played by environmental factors (Jones,
1979; Ross, 1977). In particular, we like to blame others for negative outcomes
even when objectively they are not at fault. However, we do not apply the
same rules to ourselves. We are prepared to attribute a greater role for environmental factors when explaining our own behaviour (especially in the case of
negative behaviour). This discrepancy is called actor-observer bias (Jones and
Nisbett, 1971).
Misattributions of cause are frequently implicated in violent behaviour. Hostile
attribution bias refers to the tendency to misinterpret social cues and to infer
aggressive motives to others when their intentions are in fact benign (Berkowitz,
1990). Having interpreted the intentions of the other person as hostile, an individual may respond in a way that leads to an escalation of violence. Many a barroom fight has begun because someone looked at someone else the ‘wrong way’.
Studies consistently show that aggressive individuals are more likely than nonaggressive individuals to misattribute hostile intent in hypothetical situations. For
example, Bailey and Ostrov (2008) found that levels of self-reported aggression
correlated with the tendency to interpreted ambiguous provocations (e.g., someone
spilling drink over you) as a hostile act. James and Seager (2006) likewise found
that criminal convictions for violence correlated with the tendency to make hostile
attributions.
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Locus of control
Locus of control refers to the extent to which individuals believe they have control
over their life events (Rotter, 1954, 1975). Individuals who have an internal locus
of control believe that the things that happen to them are a result of their own
actions and endeavours; individuals who have an external locus of control believe
that things happen to them because of fate, luck or the actions of powerful others.
Beliefs about control are a kind of causal attribution, but unlike attribution theory,
which is mainly concerned with normative perceptions, locus of control is
concerned with individual differences in perception. In social cognitive theory,
locus of control is important because of the moderating effect it has on expectancies. That is, locus of control affects the way an individual perceives the reinforcements of behaviour. For example, students who attribute their performance on an
exam to internal factors (e.g., the amount of study they do) will be encouraged to
work hard; students who attribute their performance to external factors (e.g., the
fairness of the exam) will not. In most circumstances, an internal locus of control
is considered to be desirable and to provide the basis for healthy psychological
adjustment. On this basis it would be predicted that offending would be associated
with an external locus of control. It is suggested that by attributing the cause of
their criminality to external factors, offenders are able to avoid the self-blame that
might discourage them from offending.
Locus of control is usually measured on one of several psychometric scales
(Gudjonsson and Singh, 1989; Nowicki and Strickland, 1973; Rotter, 1966).
Despite the theoretical relevance of locus of control to offending, direct empirical
research with offenders is not extensive. Research that has been conducted has
tended to focus on violent offenders (Deming and Lochman, 2008; Halloran et al.,
1999; Hollin and Wheeler, 1982; Marsa et al., 2004; Österman et al., 1999) and
child sex offenders (Elliott et al., 2009; Katz, 1990), and generally supports the
prediction that offenders have an external locus of control. In the case of violent
offending, gender differences have been reported in some studies, with the association between external locus on control and violence stronger for males than for
females (Halloran et al., 1999; Österman et al., 1999).
Frustration-aggression
Frustration is the emotional state produced when an individual is thwarted in
their pursuit of a goal. According to the frustration-aggression hypothesis
(Dollard et al., 1939), when an animal is prevented from performing a desired
behaviour, the animal automatically experiences an increased level of physiological arousal, which it seeks to dissipate through some form of aggressive response
(snarling, scratching, biting, etc.). When applied to humans, there have been a
number of challenges and refinements to Dollard et al.’s original theory. In particular, the idea that there is an invariable relationship between frustration and
aggression has been largely dismissed. Frustration does not always produce
aggression. Some people respond to frustration by productively striving to
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overcome the frustrating situation, while others simply become resigned to
defeat. In a reformulation of the frustration-aggression hypothesis to bring it into
line with social cognitive principles, Berkowitz (1989) argued that the presence of
frustrating stimuli in the environment increases the probability that an individual
will become angry and act aggressively but does not necessarily guarantee aggression. Berkowitz emphasised that it was not sufficient for an event to be perceived
as frustrating but that it must also be interpreted as aversive. People can tolerate
frustration if they believe that there was no deliberate attempt to harm them or if
they agree that the blocking of their goal was fair and legitimate. The precise form
the response to frustration takes depends upon an individual’s learning history,
cognitive interpretation of the event and available behavioural repertoire.
Studies have highlighted the relationship between frustration and antisocial
behaviour in a diversity of situations. Harding et al. (1998) found that incidents of
road rage correlated with high traffic volume and were initiated by factors such as
encounters with slow drivers, other drivers cutting in, and competition for parking
spaces. Frustration at work has also been found to be related to increased workplace vandalism and sabotage (Chen and Spector, 1992; Spector, 1997; Storms
and Spector, 1987). Homel and Clark (1994) found nightclub violence was related
to levels of patron boredom, lack of seating, unavailability of food and provocative behaviour of security staff.
Perceived self-efficacy
Perceived self-efficacy occupies a central place in social cognitive theory
(Bandura, 1997). It refers to an individual’s estimation of his/her capabilities
to perform a designated type of task. Tasks for which a person has high selfefficacy are the things that he/she thinks that he/she is good at and is likely to
succeed in if he/she tries. A person’s perceived self-efficacy will strongly influence the goals that he/she sets, and the effort and commitment he/she will devote
to achieving those goals. For example, a student with high self-efficacy in
mathematics is likely to aim for a high grade on the mathematics exam and
to work hard in order to attain that grade. On the other hand, a student with
low self-efficacy in mathematics may decide that study is pointless because he/
she is destined to receive a poor grade in any case. Moreover, perceived selfefficacy can causally affect the quality of performance. Collins (1982) showed
that when children of equal mathematical ability were given difficult mathematical problems to solve, those with higher perceived self-efficacy became less
rattled, were more persistent, and solved more problems than children with low
perceived self-efficacy.
Self-efficacy may sound similar to self-esteem but the concepts can be distinguished in two ways. First, where self-esteem is a global measure, perceived selfefficacy is task-specific. It is meaningless to say someone has high perceived
self-efficacy without specifying in what areas the perceived self-efficacy applies.
Second, where self-esteem is an abstract concept relating to beliefs about self-worth,
Cognition 171
perceived self-efficacy is anchored in behaviour and a person’s beliefs about what
they can do.
In the context of crime, research usually focuses on the protective effects
of perceived self-efficacy in prosocial behaviour. Individuals who perceive that
they are likely to achieve prosocial goals are more likely to attempt and succeed
in the behaviours necessary to achieve those goals. It is argued that offenders
perceive that they lack the skills that help them avoid crime and that this is
reflected in the choices they make and the quality of their performance. For
example, a number of studies have examined perceived self-efficacy to resist
peer pressure to engage in risky activities, seeking responses to items such as
‘How well can you resist peer pressure to use drugs?’ (Bandura et al., 2003;
Caprara et al., 1998, 2002; Jagers et al., 2007). High perceived self-efficacy is
associated with lower rates of self-reported violent and delinquent behaviour.
High perceived self-efficacy in controlling emotions (Bandura et al., 2003) and in
academic performance (ibid.; Chung and Elias, 1996) have also been shown to
protect against delinquency.
Self-reinforcement
According to social cognitive theory (Bandura, 1977), in addition to tangible and
social rewards and punishments, human beings have the capacity to self-reinforce
and self-punish their behaviour. Our behaviour is powerfully influenced by our
own judgements of its adequacy. We have personal standards of performance
against which we assess our actions. Depending upon our self-assessments, we
can self-reinforce behaviour through congratulatory self-statements – ‘I did well’
– or self-punish behaviour through condemnatory self-statements – ‘I did poorly’.
In this way we encourage ourselves to repeat the behaviour, to improve on our
performance, or to drop the behaviour from our repertoire.
It perhaps sounds odd to talk about positive self-assessments of criminal behaviour
but criminal performance can be for some a source of pride that is self-reinforced.
Sigmourd and van de Ven (1999) administered the Pride in Delinquency (PID) scale
to a sample of 141 incarcerated male offenders. They found that PID scores positively correlated with number of convictions, number of different offences, number
of incarcerations, number of recorded institutional misconducts, rearrest and reincarceration. Correlations were generally higher for non-violent offenders than for violent
offenders. Pride may be felt particularly for crimes which involve some degree of
skill or prowess. A number of studies have identified the pride that car thieves feel
about their ability to break into and hot-wire cars (Copes, 2003; Light et al., 1993;
O’Connor and Kelly, 2006). Computer-hacking is another crime that requires technical skill and can engender a sense of self-satisfaction (Barber, 2001; Thomas, 2005;
Wible, 2003). Likewise graffitists may regard their tags as artistic creations of which
they can be justly proud (Docuyanan, 2000; Halsey and Young, 2006; Lachmann,
1988). Finally, an enhanced sense of masculinity is drawn by some from their ability
to overcome and humiliate an opponent in a physical encounter (Baumeister et al.,
1996; McMurran et al., 2010).
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Moral disengagement
While some offenders may be proud of their criminal exploits and congratulate
themselves for their cleverness and daring, the evidence suggests that most
offenders do not positively value criminal behaviour. Most people, even offenders,
absorb the broad values of the society in which they live and know that criminal
behaviour is morally wrong. We should expect, then, many offenders to engage in
self-condemnation of their criminal behaviours. Criminologists Sykes and Matza
(1957) recognised the paradox that this posed. If offenders do not value their
crimes, then why do they continue to commit them? To address this question,
Sykes and Matza proposed neutralisation theory. According to neutralisation
theory, many offenders do not hold positively antisocial values, but ‘drift’ in and
out of crime by periodically redefining their behaviour as non-criminal. In this
way they are able to continue to offend without feeling bad about themselves.
Bandura (1976, 1977) took the same basic idea and proposed the concept of moral
disengagement within a social cognitive framework. In social cognitive terms,
when an individual makes a negative self-assessment of their behaviour, they may
avoid self-punishment by cognitively redefining the event in such a way as to
minimise their personal culpability. In plain language, neutralisations and moral
disengagements are excuses offenders make to convince themselves that they are
not to blame for their crimes.
Sykes and Matza suggested five specific techniques of neutralisation and
Bandura (1976, 1977) provided ten techniques of moral disengagement. Bandura
further suggested that these techniques can be grouped into four broad categories:
(1) those aimed at minimising the moral illegitimacy of the behaviour; (2) those
aimed at minimising the degree of personal responsibility for the behaviour; (3)
those aimed at minimising the negative consequences of the behaviour; and (4)
those aimed at minimising the worth or blamelessness of the victim. Both sets of
techniques are shown in Table 8.1 along with examples of accompanying cognitive distortions.
There has been extensive empirical research on excuse-making (both neutralisations and moral disengagements) by offenders. Research has been both
quantitatively based, involving questionnaires in which offenders endorse various
excuses for particular crimes, and qualitatively based, in which offenders give
an account of their crimes and the extent to which they seek to absolve themselves
of blame is assessed. Both quantitative (Agnew, 1994; Ball, 1966; Bandura
et al., 1996; Landsheer et al., 1994; Minor, 1981; Wortley, 1986) and qualitative
research (Dabney and Vaughn, 2000; Durkin and Bryant, 1999; Forsyth and
Evans, 1998; Shover et al., 2003) provide considerable empirical evidence that
offenders utilise neutralisations and moral disengagements. It is important to
note that excuses are offence-specific; that is, that offenders excuse their crimes,
not crime generally. For example, Wortley (1986) examined excuse-making by
offenders convicted either of murder, rape or theft. Offenders were more likely to
endorse excuses for the offence that they committed than they were for the other
two offences.
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Table 8.1 Comparison of Sykes and Matza (1957) and Bandura (1976, 1977)
Purpose
Sykes and Matza
Minimising moral Appeal to higher
illegitimacy
loyalties
Bandura
Examples
Justification in terms
of higher principles
‘I had to steal to help a
friend’
Condemning the
condemners
‘The police are the real
crooks’
Palliative comparison ‘At least I’m not a
child-molester’
Euphemistic labelling ‘It’s just tax
minimisation’
Minimising
personal
responsibility
Denial of
responsibility
Minimising
Denial of injury
negative outcomes
Minimising the
victim
Denial of the
victim
‘I was drunk and couldn’t
help myself’
Displacement of
responsibility
‘I was only doing what I
was told’
Diffusion of
responsibility
‘I was just one cog in the
machine’
Ignoring the
consequences
‘The shop was insured’
Minimising the
consequences
‘I just gave her a few
slaps’
Misconstruing the
consequences
‘She really enjoyed it’
Dehumanising the
victim
‘She was just a whore’
Blaming the victim
‘He started it’
Despite the conceptual similarity between neutralisations and moral disengagements, the two concepts have different theoretical bases. Bandura portrayed moral
disengagement as a dynamic process by which an individual’s moral standards are
gradually eroded. Neutralisations, on the other hand, are presented as temporary
releases from an individual’s moral status quo. However, the concept of a temporary release raises the question of whether neutralisations occur before or after
offending – do they permit the offender to engage in crime by freeing his/her
conscience in advance, or are they merely a means to make the offender feel better
after he/she has committed a crime? If they occur beforehand, how does the
offender know he/she will feel guilty for something they have not done? If
they occur afterwards, then how can neutralisations be said to help the cause of the
crime? Neutralisation theory does not have satisfactory answers to these questions.
Social cognitive theory suggests that disengagement occurs both before and
after offending in a process of graduated desensitisation (Bandura, 1976).
Initially, moral disengagement may occur as a reaction to having performed
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Cognition
self-disapproved-of behaviour. To the extent that disengagement is successful in
reducing self-punishment on this occasion, then in a future circumstance the
expectancy of self-condemnation will be reduced, thus increasing the probability
that the behaviour will be repeated. With each successive performance of the
behaviour, expected self-condemnation progressively reduces. With time, acts that
were once regarded by an individual as morally reprehensible can be performed
with an easy conscience.
Offender decision-making
A decision is a choice that is made among possible alternatives. We make choices
continually throughout the day, every day. Some decisions are trivial and the
outcome is of little consequence – ‘which socks should I buy?’ – and some decisions are serious and the outcome is life-changing – ‘which career should I
choose?’ Some decisions are simple and the outcome is obvious – ‘should I get
out of the way of this oncoming car?’ – and other decisions are hard and the
outcome is uncertain – ‘which shares should I buy to give the greatest return?’ In
this section we treat offenders as active decision-makers and examine the way that
they make choices in the process of committing their crimes.
The expected utility model
The classic description in cognitive psychology of the decision-making process is
the expected utility model. The expected utility model assumes that people seek to
maximise their pleasures and minimise their pains, and accordingly that they
make rational decisions based on an evaluation of the available alternatives in
order to achieve these ends. Decisions are made along the two dimensions hinted
at above: the value of the outcome and the probability that the outcome will occur.
Applied objectively, the model works as a straight mathematical formula; expected
utility equals probability times pay-off. For example, consider being faced with a
choice between a .5 probability of winning $100 and a .75 probability of winning
$80. The expected utility of each bet is $50 (.5 × $100) and $60 (.75 × $80)
respectively, and so rationally you should choose the second option. However,
human beings do not make decisions like mathematicians. Even when presented
with choices for which there is an objectively best option, we will often veer from
the expected utility formula. The expected utility model provides a normative
benchmark – the optimum strategy – against which the rationality of decisions can
be assessed.
Of course, the decisions we routinely make in our daily lives do not involve
objective values and probabilities but subjective ones. In real-world decisionmaking we need to make a personal judgement about what an outcome is worth to
us and how likely it is we think that we can achieve that outcome. This does not
mean that we actually assign numbers to subjective probabilities and pay-offs in
order to arrive at a decision. Our decision-making is much more informal than
that. Simon (1957) suggested that human beings are neither perfectly rational and
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nor are they irrational in their decision-making. Rather, humans display bounded
rationality. The concept of bounded rationality recognises that there are limits on
our capacity to make rational decisions. These limits include our cognitive abilities, the amount of relevant information at our disposal, and the amount of time
we have to make the decision.
Simon described the decision-making strategy humans employ as satisficing.
The expected utility model suggests that we examine all possible alternatives and
then we select the one that has the highest (subjective) expected utility. In satisficing decision-making, alternatives are examined one by one until we find one
that meets our minimum standards. In most cases, examining all options is simply
unrealistic. No one buying a house has the time to look at every house on the
market. Rather, house-buyers keep looking until they find a house that is satisfactory. Decisions based on a satisficing strategy are by nature often sub-optimal but
they are good enough.
The rational choice perspective
The best-known decision-making model in criminology is Cornish and Clarke’s
(1986, 2008) rational choice perspective. Rational choice perspective is an adaptation of the expected utility model, but has also been influenced by control theory,
Skinner’s model of operant conditioning, and Simon’s satisficing decision-making
model. The rational choice perspective views offenders as utility-maximisers who
weigh up the subjective costs and benefits of criminal behaviour when reaching
the decision of whether or not to commit a crime. Crime occurs when the perceived
benefits of a criminal act outweigh the perceived costs. Rational choice perspective bears similarities to the deterrence model proposed by classical criminologists such as Beccaria and Bentham in the eighteenth century. However, where
deterrence theory focuses on the administration of punishment by the criminal
justice system, Cornish and Clarke emphasised that much of the information that
an offender uses to make a cost–benefit analysis is located in the immediate environment of the potential crime scene. The benefits of crime include the tangible
rewards on offer (money, drugs, goods, etc.), the approval of friends, excitement,
and so forth; costs include the effort involved in committing the crime (e.g., the
presence of locks, bars and other security devices) and the risk of getting caught
(e.g., the presence of burglar alarms and surveillance equipment).
Cornish and Clarke (2008) identified six core concepts underpinning the rational
choice approach. The first is that criminal behaviour is purposive. Offenders
commit crime deliberately and with the intention of achieving some outcome.
Rational choice perspective rejects the view of crime as the product of irresistible
urges, a loss of control, or hidden psychological forces. The instrumental nature of
crime is obvious enough for property crimes. However, even crimes that are often
portrayed in the media, and by many psychologists and criminologists, as senseless, pathological, or impulsive – vandalism, hooliganism, assault, rape – involve
choices and pay-offs for the perpetrator in the form of excitement, revenge, control
and sexual gratification.
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Second, criminal behaviour is rational. Not only does the offender commit
crime in order to derive a benefit, the decision to commit the crime to achieve that
benefit represents the best available option from the perspective of the offender.
The behaviour of offenders is comprehensible when viewed in the context of their
motives and goals. This does not mean that offenders display perfect rationality.
Rather, their rationality is bounded, limited by their background, skills and the
turmoil and pressures that characterise many crime scenes. Their decisions may
well be poor ones when judged by others, but they are satisficing for the offender
given the conditions under which they are made.
Third, criminal decision-making is crime-specific. Every crime involves
different motives and pay-offs. The choices and decisions involved in committing
rape are different from the ones involved in stealing a car or passing a bad cheque.
There are even differences within crime categories. The motivations, decisionmaking processes and criminal strategies of professional car thieves are different
from those of joy-riders. Understanding crime from a rational choice perspective
requires a detailed analysis of what the offender is hoping to achieve.
Fourth, the distinction can be made between event decisions and involvement
decisions. Event decisions are made about the commission of specific crimes –
selecting a target, selecting the location, deciding on the modus operandi, and so
on. Involvement decisions are over a longer time-frame and are about the offender’s criminal career with respect to a particular kind of crime – the decision to
begin committing that type of crime, to continue committing that crime, and to
stop committing that crime.
Fifth, there are different stages of involvement. As suggested above, involvement may be divided into three main stages: initiation, habituation and desistance.
Each of these stages involves different sorts of motives and decisions. Consider
the career of a drug user. The reasons that a person begins to take drugs (curiosity,
peer pressure, image, boredom) are different from the reasons that he/she continues
to use (habit, enjoyment, lifestyle), and different again from the reasons that
finally prompt him/her to give up (arrest, concerns about health, cost, damage to
relationships).
Sixth, there are different stages of the crime event. Crime is often treated in
criminological research as a single data point. A moments thought will reveal
that crimes may extend over prolonged periods of time, and involve detailed planning and complex modus operandi. The crime event has a beginning, middle and
end, and unfolds in a dynamic fashion. Committing a crime does not involve one
decision but there are many decision points throughout the crime-commission
process as the offender deals with each new contingency. We examine the stages
of an offence in more detail in the final section of this chapter.
The rational choice perspective presents a stripped-down psychological model
of the offender. The approach focuses solely on the offender as a decision-maker
in the here-and-now. No consideration is given to the offender’s background or
unique psychological characteristics. The offender is assumed to enter the crime
scene already motivated to offend and without any moral scruples or emotional
defects that might get in the way of making a rational choice. Of course, Cornish
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and Clarke do not believe that this simplistic portrayal is an accurate psychological profile of offenders. Their aim was to present the most parsimonious (uncluttered) model of offender decision-making. They describe this as ‘good-enough
theorising’.
In fact, Cornish and Clarke did not regard the rational choice perspective as a
theory at all (and hence they are careful not refer to it as rational choice theory).
Rather it is a ‘heuristic device or conceptual tool’ (Cornish and Clarke, 2008,
p. 24). Their goal was to present a model of offending that is above all useful
and accessible to police and other criminal justice practitioners who actually deal
with offenders. The rational choice perspective has been extremely influential in
the development of situational strategies to prevent crime. If offenders commit
crime because the benefits are perceived to outweigh the costs, then redesigning
environments in ways that increase the relative costs of crime – by making crime
more risky, less rewarding, and more difficult to carry out – has the potential to
reduce offending (Clarke, 2008). This strategy is often referred to as opportunity
reduction and we will return to this topic in Chapter 9.
Research on offender decision-making
Information on offender decision-making has been obtained largely through
interviews in which offenders are quizzed on the reasoning behind their modus
operandi, or through simulations in which offenders respond to scenarios or
photographs of potential crime opportunities. Empirical research has been
conducted on the decision-making by burglars (Bennett and Wright, 1984;
Bernasco and Nieuwbeerta, 2005; Cromwell et al., 1991; Garcia-Retamero
and Dhami, 2009; Hochstetler, 2001; Hough, 1987; Nee and Meenaghan, 2006;
Walsh, 1986; Wright et al., 1995), robbers (Feeney, 1986; Hochstetler, 2001;
Indermaur, 1996; Luckenbill, 1982; Walsh, 1986), shoplifters (Carroll and
Weaver, 1986), assaulters (Bennett and Brookman, 2009; Tedeschi and Felson,
1994), child sex offenders (Conte et al., 1989; Elliott et al., 1995; Smallbone and
Wortley, 2000), rapists (Bachman et al., 1992; Beauregard and Leclerc, 2007)
and drug users (Bennett, 1986). For illustrative purposes, offender decisionmaking will be examined for an example of a property crime (burglary), a violent
crime (robbery) and a sexual crime (child sex offending).
Burglary
The case for rational choice is rather easy to make for property crime because the
potential benefits to offenders are self-evident. The most detailed empirical analysis of property crime from the rational choice perspective has been conducted on
burglary. Research has focused particularly on burglars’ search strategies and
target selection; that is, why they choose some houses for burglary and not others.
In a pioneering study, Bennett and Wright (1984) interviewed 316 persistent
burglars and showed them videos and photographs of prospective targets. Burglars
were categorised into three types:(1) opportunists (7 per cent), unskilled burglars
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Cognition
who committed burglaries more-or-less on the spur of the moment; (2) planners
(10 per cent), highly skilled burglars who informed themselves in advance about
the properties that they wanted to burgle; and (3) searchers (76 per cent), burglars
with mid-range skills who scanned houses sequentially until they encountered a
likely target. All groups, but searchers in particular, looked for visual cues when
selecting a target that indicated whether the house was likely to contain valuable
goods, whether the house was occupied, whether they could burgle the house
without being observed, whether there was easy accessibility, and whether there
were security measures in place. The burglars were making rational decisions,
albeit bounded ones, choosing houses that promised the greatest rewards but
entailed the fewest risks.
Subsequent research has confirmed and elaborated upon Bennett and Wright’s
findings. Much of this research has attempted to identify just what cues burglars
utilise to make their decisions. While there is strong evidence to support the
rational choice perspective, findings suggest some variability among burglars
(especially when experienced burglars are compared with inexperienced ones)
with no one cue consistently indentified as either an invariable deterrent or
attractor (Bennett and Wright, 1984, Garcia-Retamero and Dhami, 2009; Hough,
1987; Nee and Meenaghan, 2006; Nee and Taylor, 1988). Level of perceived
affluence is generally found to be an important attractor, and is judged by the
décor and general upkeep of the house, any visible expensive items, and the type
of car that residents own. Signs of occupancy are generally regarded to be a deterrent and are judged by the presence of a car in the drive or whether lights are on.
However, some offenders prefer the residents to be home, as long as they are
asleep, because it increases the chance that wallets and other personal items will
be in the house, and it means that the owners will not return to disturb them. Also
generally considered to be important is the layout out the house and the nature of
the surroundings. Offenders prefer targets that offer some cover from prying eyes
(shrubs and fences), and offer good escape routes (are on an intersection or have
a back lane). Perhaps surprisingly, most studies find that locks, dogs, alarms and
other security devices have a minimal deterrent effect. Most offenders seem to
regard these as occupational hazards that they can overcome.
Robbery
Robbery is the taking of goods from a victim against his/her will through the use
of intimidation or force. Actual or threatened violence used during a robbery may
be viewed as instrumental aggression designed to coerce the victim to comply
with the robber’s demands. Treating robbery as a series of rational choices,
researchers have examined why robbers decide to commit robbery, how they
choose a victim, and how they use force to gain compliance.
Feeney (1986) interviewed 113 convicted robbers. Over half said that their
offence was carried out without any planning and only 5 per cent made detailed
plans. Sixty per cent said that prior to the offence they did not consider the
possibility of being caught. Fifty-seven per cent were motivated by money or goods,
Cognition 179
24 per cent by other factors such as excitement or to impress friends, and 19 per cent
became involved ‘accidentally’ (e.g., they were interrupted during a burglary).
Robbery was selected by offenders over alternative crimes such as burglary because
it was quicker and yielded a higher return. Particular individuals or establishments
were chosen as victims because they were convenient, they looked as if they had
money, or they looked to involve little risk. In line with the general lack of planning,
few offenders travelled outside of their local neighbourhood or town to commit their
crime. Some 80 per cent of robbers used a weapon for intimidation, but about a
third of these involved an unloaded or toy gun. Those using a simulated weapon did
so in order to avoid accidental injury to the victim during the robbery, or because
they believed that they would receive a reduced sentence in the event that they were
caught. Where injury to the victim did occur, it was usually associated with victim
resistance. While many of the robbery offences examined by Feeney exhibited little
detailed planning, the decisions that the offenders made before and during the
offence nevertheless demonstrate purposive and rational decision-making.
Indermaur (1996) elaborated on the use of force by robbers, and particularly on
how violence developed as a function of victim–perpetrator interactions. In interviews with 88 convicted robbers, Indermaur found that the way that the robbery
progressed depended upon the reactions of the victim. Robbers talked about the
need to establish quickly an air of intimidation and so many offenders used
violence strategically before demanding money. Violence escalated if victims
resisted. Not only did offenders need to reassert their authority in order to complete
the robbery, but defiance by the victim was considered to be an affront and
offenders reacted with ‘righteous indignation’.
Child sex offending
Sex offenders, and particularly those who offend against children, are widely
assumed to possess motivations that are pathological and long-standing. Their
offending is largely portrayed as internally driven, the result of irresistible sexual
urges. However, in recent years a number of studies have challenged the stereotypic assumptions about the ‘irrationality’ of child sex offenders. It is now clear
that many offenders do not begin sexually offending until a relatively late age.
Smallbone and Wortley (2004b) reported a mean onset age of 32 years, around the
age when men typically have greater access to children through child care duties
and as volunteers in youth organisations. Additionally, child sexual offending has
a relatively low recidivism rate – around 13 per cent after five years according to
Hanson and Bussiere’s (1998) meta-analysis – much lower than would be expected
from individuals irresistibly driven to offend. It seems that detection and its consequences are sufficient to deter the overwhelming majority of offenders. As
distasteful as we may find the behaviour of child sex offenders, it is nevertheless
interpretable within a rational choice framework. Child sex offending is purposive, and within the terms of reference of offenders, rational.
Conte et al., (1989) interviewed 20 adult males who had sexually offended
against children. Participants were in treatment and most (17) were serial offenders
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with up to 40 victims. Offenders expressed clear preferences for the types of
victims that they targeted. While some of their preferred characteristics were to
do with things that they found to be physically attractive – for example, that the
child was pretty, or was wearing certain types of clothes – the overriding consideration was to find a compliant child who was unlikely to tell others about the
offence. They particularly looked for children who were trusting, vulnerable,
quiet, withdrawn and lacking in confidence. Children who came from unhappy
homes or those who had few friends were seen as likely targets. Often young
children were chosen, not so much because they were considered to be more
attractive, but because they were seen as easier to manipulate and less likely
to talk. Experienced child sex offenders do not offend randomly. On the contrary,
they carefully select vulnerable children who offer least resistance and pose
fewest risks.
The strategies used by offenders to gain victim compliance – often referred to
as grooming – similarly display rational decision-making and sometimes patient
planning. Smallbone and Wortley (2000) interviewed 182 convicted child sex
offenders, asking detailed questions about their modus operandi. The use of overt
coercions or violence by offenders to gain compliance was very rare. Offenders
typically built non-sexual, emotional bonds with victims prior to engaging in
sexual contact. Most perpetrators invested a lot of time with the child, touching
him/her non-sexually (67 per cent), giving him/her a lot of attention (65 per cent),
and playing with him/her (57 per cent). In most cases, sexual contact was introduced gradually. The perpetrator said nice things about the child (51 per cent),
touched him/her sexually more and more (49 per cent), and talked lovingly to him/
her (45 per cent). Similarly, offenders relied on the emotional bonds established
with the child to prevent disclosure of the abuse. The most commonly used
methods of keeping a child from disclosing was saying he (the offender) would
go to jail or get into trouble if the child told anyone (61 per cent), and relying
on the child not wanting to lose the offender because of the affection he provided
(36 per cent).
Schemas and scripts
Utility-based decision models, even those recognising the bounded nature
of rationality like rational choice perspective, portray decisions as a deliberative
process involving the conscious weighing-up of various alternatives. Engaging
in such conscious deliberations for every decision we have to make in our
lives, however, would be laborious, inefficient and time-consuming. Earlier in
the chapter the distinction was made between automatic and non-automatic
cognitive processes. Deliberative decision-making is a non-automatic process
that is most likely to occur when making new decisions involving unfamiliar
data. When making routine judgements and decisions that we have made many
times before, we are likely to use an automatic process involving cognitive
constructs called schemas and scripts (see Augoustinos et al., 2006; Fiske and
Taylor, 1991).
Cognition 181
What are schemas?
Schemas are content-based cognitive structures that contain learned information
about a specific domain. Schemas comprise our assumptions and expectations
about a social category. They provide us with a store of general knowledge we
have acquired about a person, group or event that helps us deal efficiently with
new situations involving that person, group or event. Drawing on existing schema,
we can rapidly interpret familiar social stimuli, fill in any gaps, and make predictions and judgements without needing to resort to deliberative decision-making.
Unless we encounter something unexpected that disconfirms our prior assumptions, the schema becomes our default position on which we base our subsequent
behaviour.
There are different types of schemas. Person schemas refer to our psychological
understanding of particular individuals. Our preconceived ideas about people we
know (either personally or through the media) help us make inferences about the
motives for their behaviour and to form expectation of how they will behave in
new situations. Self-schemas contain the assumptions we make about ourselves.
They provide us with our self-concept and sense of identity. Role schemas contain
the expectations that we have about people according to their social position or
category. Some roles are achieved by people. We expect doctors, soldiers and
teachers each to have certain characteristics and to behave in certain ways. Other
roles are ascribed to people. We have role schema for all sorts of social categories
such as those based on gender (men/women), race (black/white) and age (old/
young). The dark side of role schemas is stereotyping and prejudice.
All the accumulated assumptions that people have about themselves and the
world are collected and organised into schemas. Where these schemas involve
distorted assumptions they may contribute to criminal behaviour. For example, a
self-schema that includes beliefs such as ‘I can’t control my sexual urges’, and a
gender schema that includes beliefs such as ‘women really enjoy having forced
sex’, may facilitate the behaviour of a rapist. Further, the concept of schemas
suggests that many of the decisions of experienced offenders are made ‘off the top
of the head’ rather than as a conscious rational choice. For example, research
shows that experienced burglars – in comparison to novice burglars, police, homeowners and students – make very rapid, efficient and consistent judgements about
which houses are suitable for burglary (Garcia-Retamero and Dhami, 2009; Logie
et al., 1992; Nee and Meenaghan, 2006; Nee and Taylor, 2000; Taylor
and Nee, 1988; Wright et al., 1995). Through practice, burglars develop a ‘suitable house to burgle’ schema that guides their decisions about target selection.
Likewise, experienced rapists will have a ‘suitable rape victim’ schema, robbers
will have a ‘suitable robbery victim’ schema, and so on.
Crime scripts
A script is a particular type of schema called an event schema. An event schema
contains the appropriate behavioural sequence required for everyday activities.
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Cognition
The most commonly cited example of an event schema is the restaurant script
(Schank and Abelson, 1977). Without having to consciously deliberate, we know
that eating at a restaurant requires us to enter the restaurant, wait to be seated,
order from the menu, wait for the food, eat the food, pay the bill and leave.
Cornish (1994) has taken the concept of an event schema and has used it to
describe the different stages of the crime event. As described by Cornish and
Clarke:
[Crime scripts] are step-by-step accounts of the procedures used by offenders
to commit particular crime. Crime scripts are designed to help identify every
stage of the crime-commission process, the decisions and actions that must be
taken at each stage, and the resources – such as criminal cast, props and suitable locations – required for effective action at each step. By providing a
template that outlines the necessary steps involved in any kind of successful
offending, crime scripts can reveal the rationality in even ostensibly ‘senseless’ crimes, and the complexities of even simple ones.
(2008, pp. 31–2)
Scripts come at different levels of abstraction. From the most general to the most
specific, these levels are metascript, protoscript, script and script track (Abelson,
1981; Cornish, 1994; Gioia and Poole, 1984). For example, a general crime category, such as property crime, has a metascript that contains few specific details.
Moving to the next level of specificity, a particular category of property crime,
say, auto-theft, has a protoscript that outlines a general template for that category
of crime. A specific type of auto-theft, for example, taking a car for temporary use
(as opposed to selling it for parts), has a script that sets out in detail the precise
steps an offender needs to take. Finally, the particular form that the temporary use
of a car takes, for example, using it to get home from the city late at night (as
opposed to joyriding), is a script track that involves distinct motives and methods.
With each step down the hierarchy, the scripts become richer in content. Like
Russian dolls, each level in the hierarchy subsumes the next level down.
Crime scripts are a relatively new concept in criminology but protoscripts have
been developed for numerous types of crime, including joy-riding (Cornish, 1994),
burglary (Cornish and Clarke, 2008), child sex offending (Leclerc et al., in
press), terrorism (Clarke and Newman, 2006), organised crime (Hancock and
Laycock, 2010), professional car theft (Morselli and Roy, 2008; Tremblay et al.,
2001), sexual assault of a stranger (Beauregard et al., 2007), vandalism (Cornish,
1994) and fraud (Lacoste and Tremblay, 2003). By way of illustration, the protoscript developed by Cornish and Clarke (2008) for burglary is shown in Figure 8.1.
Of course, the precise script adopted by a particular offender will be more detailed
than the protoscript and scripts are likely to vary from one offender to another.
Crimes that go according to script can be performed as ‘mindless’, routinised
behaviour. The more practised the offender is in a particular crime, the less
conscious decision-making he/she needs to do at the various stages. For
example, Nee and Meenaghan (2006) reported that three-quarters of their sample
Cognition 183
Figure 8.1 Protoscript for burglary.
Source: Adapted from Cornish and Clarke (2008).
of experienced burglars actually used terms like ‘automatic’, ‘routine’, ‘second
nature’, and ‘instinctive’ when describing their burglary strategies. Similarly, the
robbers in Indermaur’s (1996) study talked about not thinking during their robbery
and acting on instinct. For cognitive psychologists, it is the automatic nature
of scripts that is of theoretical interest. For criminologists, crime scripts are
tools that can assist them devise ways to disturb the routine nature of offending.
By setting out all the steps in the crime-commission process, crime scripts give
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crime-prevention practitioners multiple points of intervention. Disrupting any
point in the script changes the routine behavioural sequence, and in the best-case
scenario, the crime may be prevented.
Conclusion and evaluation
Psychology was defined in Chapter 1 as the scientific study of behaviour and
mental processes. For over fifty years from the beginning of the twentieth century
scant attention was paid to the ‘mental processes’ part of this definition. There is
little doubt that the resurgent interest in cognition has invigorated psychology and
enriched our understanding of how human beings operate. Humans, including
those who commit crimes, think. Part of our understanding of offenders must
include an examination of the way that they think and the role that their thinking
plays in their crimes.
This is not to say that the thorny theoretical and philosophical issues which are
raised by cognition, and which were responsible for early behaviourists discarding
the concept in the first place, have been fully resolved. Whether mental processes
exist as separate phenomena from electrical activity and neurotransmitter secretions
in the brain is a matter of ongoing debate. Relatedly, the extent to which conscious
mental activity plays a causal role in behaviour also remains contentious.
But leaving these issues aside, having cognition as part of a descriptive model of
behaviour has proven to be enormously useful. Cognitive processes are proximal
elements in behaviour that provide access to the current psychological functioning
of an individual. It is only via an individual’s cognitions that we can learn about the
way that he/she perceives and interprets the world. In a therapeutic context, cognition gives clinicians access to immediate factors in the stimulus-behavioural chain.
People may develop faulty patterns of behaviour for all sorts of historical reasons.
However, changing the way an individual currently thinks about events can change
those behavioural patterns. Based on this principle, cognitive behavioural therapy
has become the dominant model in clinical psychology and the therapy of choice
with offenders. In the crime prevention context, the way that offenders make decisions about committing crime has provided the basis for situational interventions
designed to influence the choices that they make. By systematically examining the
reasons individuals decide to commit crime, why they select certain targets for
crime and not others, and their adoption of particular modus operandi, potential
crime scenes can be redesigned in ways that make crime more difficult and/or risky
to carry out.
Our investigation of offender cognition has taken us into the crime scene. The
focus on the role in crime of environmental factors at the crime scene is continued
in Chapter 9.
9
Situations
Criminology has been defined as the scientific study of crime and criminals.
However, most traditional criminological theories involve the study of criminals.
They seek to explain how biological factors, developmental experiences and/or
social forces create criminality. The occurrence of crime is understood largely as
an expression of the offender’s deviance, which may be a function of distant
events that occurred many years beforehand. Once criminality has been explained,
many theorists take the view that the theoretical task has been accomplished.
Criminals will inevitably commit crime; we just need to wait for them to do so. In
contrast, it has been emphasised in this book that criminal behaviour must be
understood in terms of the person–situation interaction. Crime may be committed
by individuals who do not have entrenched criminal dispositions. And even where
offenders might be regarded as ‘real’ criminals, they do not offend randomly; they
commit particular crimes in particular contexts. We require not just theories of
criminality but also theories that explain why offenders commit crimes when and
where they do. This requires a shift from an examination of the distal causes of
criminality to an examination of the proximal causes of crime.
The examination of situational influences on criminal behaviour was begun
in the previous two chapters. In those chapters, situations were viewed largely
through the eyes of the offender, that is, we examined the way that individuals
interpret and react to their personal environment. The situational factors contributing to crime tended to be specific to the individual, based on his/her particular
learning history and/or cognitive style. In this chapter we work in the other direction, beginning with situational factors and examining their impact on individuals.
Theories that examine situations in this way tend to be concerned with the
way that immediate environments affect people generally rather than with individual differences in situational effects. Two psychological perspectives – social
psychology and environmental psychology – are dedicated to the examination of
the effects on behaviour of the immediate environment. Social psychology focuses
on the social environment, examining the psychological effects on individuals
of the presence of others. Environmental psychology focuses on the physical
environment, examining the psychological effects on individuals of factors associated with built and natural environment. A third perspective, this time from
criminology, is also relevant to the analysis of situations, and that is the focus on
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opportunity. Opportunity theories – which may examine both social and physical
environmental factors – simply assert that crime occurs where it can occur, a
principle summed up in the well-known saying ‘opportunity makes the thief ’.
Before examining these three perspectives, we will have a closer look at just what
a ‘situation’ is.
What is a situation?
A situation is the setting in which behaviour occurs. Situations have both
spatial and temporal dimensions: they are specific locations at particular points in
time. Situational factors include tangible elements such as the physical aspects of
the immediate environment and the behaviour of the people who are present.
Somewhat less tangibly, situations can also refer to a state of affairs or set of
circumstances at a given moment. A funeral and a wedding, for example, both
may involve friends and relatives packed into a church, but the behaviour of the
respective congregations will be shaped by the circumstances of the occasion. A
clearer idea of what a situation is can be gained by examining the ways in which
the term has been operationalised in psychological and criminological research.
Levels of situational analysis
One issue confronting researchers is to define where a situation starts and finishes,
that is, how big is it? Addressing this problem, Brantingham and Brantingham
(1991) developed a typology of immediate environments comprising three levels
of analysis: macro, meso and micro.
Macro-level analyses refer to highly aggregated entities such as whole cities or
even counties, states and countries. Some of the earliest research in criminology
examined the effect of macro-level environments on crime. In the late 1820s,
Andre-Michel Guerry and Adolphe Quetelet independently conducted detailed
analyses of French crime statistics (see Beirne, 1993). They produced the first
recognisable examples of crime maps, depicting crime rates for the provinces of
France. Guerry and Quetelet found that crime was not evenly distributed across
the country, and that the distribution varied according to the crime in question.
Violent crime was highest in poorer rural areas while property crime was highest
in wealthy, industrialised areas. From these finding they reasoned that property
crime was not caused by poverty, but rather that wealthy provinces had more
property crime because there was more to steal. That is, variation in crime rates
could be explained by environmental features of different districts. Whether
someone lived in the city or country was a macro-situational influence on his/her
potential to commit crime.
Meso-level environments refer to subareas of a city, ranging from suburbs
down to individual streets and addresses. Crime is never evenly distributed
throughout a given city but clusters in ‘hotspots’ around certain suburbs, streets
and premises. The concentration of crime is an example of the 80/20 rule – a few
pubs, for example, account for most pub violence (Block and Block, 1995; Homel
Situations 187
and Clark, 1994). Crime rates also vary over the course of the day, by days of the
week, and throughout the year. In the case of pub violence, peaks occur on Friday
and Saturday nights (Finney, 2004). Crime patterns will vary for different sorts of
crime; hotspots for pub violence will be different from hotspots for burglary.
Meso-level analyses are concerned with identifying the geographic and sociodemographic characteristics of the locations in which hotspots occur that account
for their disproportionate share of particular crimes. Crime hotspots are the logical
places to direct policing and crime prevention resources.
Micro environments refer to features of the site in which behaviour is performed.
At this level of analysis, the focus is on the relationship between specific elements
of the immediate environment and specific decisions and behaviours of individuals. Psychologists are particularly interested in the role of micro environments in
behaviour. Many psychologists take an approach to behavioural analyses referred
to as reductionism. Reductionism involves the analysis of complex systems by
breaking them down into their smaller constituent parts. From this perspective,
the more specific and concrete the identified situational influence is the better. The
bell that caused Pavlov’s dog to salivate is an example of a micro-environmental
element. In terms of crime, micro-environmental elements include ‘building type
and its placement, landscaping and lighting, interior form, and security hardware’
(Brantingham and Brantingham, 1991, pp. 21–2). C. Ray Jeffery (1971), in his
seminal book, Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design, is credited with
being the first theorist to articulate in a comprehensive way the implications for
crime of micro environments. Jeffery argued that the key to crime control was
through the redesign of crime-prone environments that systematically eliminated
their criminogenic features.
Ways of conceptualising situational effects
There is no one theory to describe the effect that situations have on behaviour.
Many psychological perspectives include an explicit or implicit role for situational factors, and different theoretical perspectives conceptualise the role of situations in different ways. This section summarises the various ways that the
situation–behaviour relationship has been explained.
Situations as a source of social influence
Human beings are social animals and were designed by evolution to live in small,
cohesive social groups. In ancestral communities, acceptance by other members
of the group was essential for survival. Evolution has equipped humans with altruistic predispositions that encourage cooperative relationships with in-group
members. We are profoundly influenced by the expectations and demands that are
placed upon us in the course of our interactions and affiliations with other members
of our species. The opinions and reactions of others are important to us. We may
perform behaviours (including crime) through a sense of obligation and loyalty; to
fit in and win approval; and to maintain harmony and avoid giving offence.
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Situations
Equally, human social groups are also competitive and hierarchical. Members
struggle for power and status within the group. Insults and other threats to status,
particularly for males, call for behavioural responses – that may involve violence
– that will restore the individual’s standing in the group.
Situations as a source of moral guidance
The human conscience is highly malleable and sensitive to the physical and social
context in which behaviour is performed. Given the right circumstances, ordinary
individuals are often capable of great brutality. While we might like to think that
we are guided by a fixed moral compass, in fact we often we rely on the feedback
from the environment for guidelines for correct behaviour. Situational factors can
facilitate moral disengagement by obscuring the link between an individual’s
behaviour and its negative outcomes. The situational context can help shield individuals from the full consequences of their actions. The more remote an action is
from its consequence, the easier it is for the consequences to be ignored or minimised. For example, it is psychologically easier to imagine dropping a bomb on a
village from an aircraft than it is to imagine personally slaughtering each villager.
In addition, situations can help individuals minimise their responsibility for the
consequences of their behaviour. Individuals may blame alcohol, circumstances,
or social systems for their actions. One of the defences offered by Nazi war criminal Adolf Eichmann at his trial was that although he organised the transport that
took the Jews to the concentration camps he did not personally kill anyone. He
was just a cog in a machine.
Situations as a source of behavioural priming
Priming refers to the unconscious activation by an environmental stimulus of
emotions, thoughts or behaviours. Priming effects are described in classical conditioning as well as cognitive psychology. According to classical conditioning principles, environmental cues – conditioned or unconditioned stimuli – elicit involuntary,
reflex reactions. For example, viewing sexually explicit images increases sexual
arousal and this primes the individual for sexual behaviour (and sometimes sexual
offending). Cognitive models explain priming in terms of the automatic activation
of cognitive structures such as schemas (Fiske and Taylor, 1991). For example, the
weapons effect (Chapter 7) has been explained as both a product of classical conditioning (Berkowitz and LePage, 1967) and as a cognitive process (Anderson et al.,
1998). According to the cognitive approach, exposure to weapons and other symbols
of violence increases access to aggression-related thoughts that are stored in longterm memory and that prime the individual for violence.
Situations as a source of aversive physiological arousal
Situations can be sources of frustration, provocation and stress that threaten an
individual’s well-being and increase his/her physiological arousal. Aversive
Situations 189
arousal-inducing experiences include being thwarted, constrained, insulted,
threatened, annoyed, overwhelmed and discomforted. Physiological arousal
prepares the individual for a flight or fight response as a means of managing or
adapting to noxious conditions and events. Aversive physiological arousal may be
accompanied by emotional responses such as irritability, anxiety and depression,
and behavioural responses such as aggression, withdrawal and suicide. The extent
to which aversive situational experiences affect an individual is moderated by the
individual’s appraisal of that situation. Events that are regarded as stressful by one
person may be regarded as non-stressful to another. Similarly, even when an event
is judged to be stressful, some people have more effective coping skills to manage
the resultant stress than do others.
Situations as a source of anticipated consequences
Situations provide individuals with information about the likely outcomes of their
behaviours. It is this view that underpins operant conditioning, social cognitive
theory and the rational choice perspective. While these approaches differ in fundamental ways, they all share the assumption that behaviour is goal-directed. People
perform behaviour in order to obtain rewards, and refrain from performing behaviour in order to avoid punishments. The immediate environment contains the data
required by an individual to select between behaviours that will deliver rewarding
or punishing outcomes. Whether these data are interpreted as discriminative
stimuli, expectancy cues, or in terms of expected utility, behaviour is seen to be
governed by its anticipated consequences.
Precipitating and facilitating situations
Examining the various ways outlined above in which situations can affect behaviour, two broad types of situational forces can be identified (Wortley, 2001, 2008).
Some situations affect behaviour by precipitating action. Situational precipitators
actively induce individuals to perform behaviour that they may not have otherwise contemplated. Other situations affect behaviour by facilitating action. Facilitating environments encourage or permit individuals to proceed with behaviour
that they are predisposed to perform.
Consider the case of a young man – let us call him Jim – who arranges to meet
his friends at a local nightclub for an evening out. He arrives at the club in good
spirits anticipating an enjoyable night. However, when he arrives at the front door,
the doorman is surly and belligerent towards him before eventually allowing him
to go inside. When he enters the nightclub, he discovers it is packed to capacity.
After fighting his way through the crowd, he finally locates his friends. There are
no tables or chairs left and they are forced stand in the corner with people jostling
around them. The music is at full volume and continues without a break, making
it impossible to carry on a conversation. The air conditioning cannot cope with the
crowd and the room is hot, dark and oppressive. Jim and his friends drink steadily.
However, getting to the bar is an ordeal and it can take half an hour to get served.
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Situations
As Jim struggles back from the bar with the latest round of drinks, another patron
bumps him and knocks the drinks all over him. Jim’s friends urge him to retaliate
and hit the man.
That Jim is at the point of contemplating assault is the result of an accumulation
of precipitating events. Since he arrived at the nightclub, he has experienced a
series of stresses and frustrations that have primed him for aggression. This has
been compounded by his alcohol intake, which has lowered his inhibitions, and by
the social pressure not to back down in front of his friends. The spilled drinks
were the final straw. Had these events not occurred, then the confrontation with
the other patron would not have arisen. However, whether Jim now carries through
with the assault is subject to a different set of situational considerations. Perhaps
Jim sees a security guard out of the corner of his eye and decides it is too risky to
fight. Or perhaps the other man is much bigger than Jim, or is surrounded by his
friends, and Jim judges that he will come off worse in a physical encounter.
Whether or not Jim ultimately commits assault depends upon whether he judges
that he is safely able to do so.
Precipitating and facilitating factors differ in two main ways. First, precipitating
events occur prior to the contemplated behaviour; the facilitating characteristics
of the situation concern the events that are likely to follow the contemplated
behaviour (see Figure 9.1). The stresses and pressures Jim experienced are antecedents of action; consideration of whether the security staff will swoop if he
throws a punch is to do with the consequences of that action. Second, precipitating
events supply or intensify the motivation for behaviour; facilitating considerations
Figure 9.1 The relationship between precipitators and facilitators of crime.
Situations 191
are relevant after the person is already motivated to act. Jim became aggressive as
a direct consequence of his experiences in the nightclub; the assessment of whether
or not to proceed with the assault is only activated once the motivation to commit
assault was present.
We turn now to examine three perspectives that are concerned primarily with
the role of situational factors in behaviour: social psychology, environmental
psychology and opportunity theories. Social psychology and environmental
psychology focus largely on the role of precipitating events; opportunity theories
focus on the role of facilitating environments.
Social psychology
Social psychology is the study of the way people influence one another. A great
deal of our behaviour is governed by immediate social settings. We behave differently in the company of others than we do when we are alone. The social
psychology of crime has focused particularly on social influences that interfere
with moral judgements and allow good people to do evil things. This phenomenon
has been called the Lucifer Effect (Zimbardo, 2007), a reference to the supposed
transformation of God’s favourite angel, Lucifer, into the devil. In this section we
examine the tendency for individuals to conform to group norms, to obey the
instructions of authority figures, to comply with or defy requests and persuasive
arguments, and to submerge their identity within the group.
Conformity
Conformity is the tendency for individuals in groups to adopt group norms and
standards of behaviour, even when these contradict personally held beliefs and
values. Asch (1955) provided the classic laboratory demonstration of social
conformity. He devised an experiment that involved embedding a naïve subject in
a group of seven to nine confederate subjects. The group was shown two cards,
one on which was drawn three lines of different lengths, and the other on which
was drawn a single line equal in length to one of the three lines. Subjects were
required to identify the matching line on the first card and announce their judgements publicly to the group. Pretesting with other subjects showed that the correct
answer was obvious. However, in the experimental condition, all of the confederate subjects went first and publicly gave the wrong answer. Asch found that over
three-quarters of naïve subjects conformed to the group and nominated the obviously incorrect response.
In a variation of the experiment, in which the naïve subject was permitted to
write down his/her response after hearing the confederates’ wrong answer,
conformity fell to just 12.5 per cent. Asch concluded that there were two factors
inducing conformity. The first was informational social influence. Some subjects
actually believed that the group answer was correct and that their perception must
be wrong. The second and more powerful factor was normative social influence.
Most subjects who gave the wrong answer did so for fear of censure or ridicule by
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Situations
the group. Note, by the way, that conformity is different from modelling. In
modelling, the individual willingly emulates the behaviour of others, while in
conformity the individual feels pressured to follow the example of others.
The conformity effect suggests that offenders may commit crimes in order to
avoid social disapproval and to gain group acceptance. In particular, most delinquent behaviour is performed in groups, and peer pressure to conform to subcultural norms is commonly agreed to be an important factor (Harkins and Dixon,
2010; McGloin and Piquero, 2009; Warr, 2002; Warr and Stafford, 1991).
Conformity is particularly strong within gangs and may be strengthened by the
use of gang insignia (Quinn and Forsyth, 2009) as well as explicit intimidation
and violence (Decker, 1996; Padilla, 1995). Conformity can also induce illegal
behaviour in otherwise law-abiding adults. For example, a new employee entering
an organisation in which corrupt practices are common faces social pressures
from co-workers to also engage in those practices and may come to accept those
practices as normal (Altheide et al., 1978; Clark and Hollinger, 1983; Horning,
1970; Jaspan, 1974).
Obedience
Obedience is the following of a direct command issued by someone perceived to
possess legitimate authority. In a classic series of studies, Milgram (1974)
explored the willingness of individuals to comply with commands to inflict harm
on others. In the prototype study, a subject was strapped into an electrified chair,
while in an adjoining room another subject was placed before a shock generator.
This second subject was told that the purpose of the experiment was to examine
the effects of punishment on learning, and was instructed to deliver electric shocks
as punishment whenever the first subject got an answer wrong. In reality, the first
subject was a confederate who deliberately gave wrong answers, and the shock
generator was phoney. Even when the confederate subject screamed and begged
in apparent agony, almost two-thirds of the naïve subjects continued with the
experiment and administered the maximum ‘shock’ levels.
Milgram conducted a number of variations on the original study. He found that
obedience could be manipulated by varying the situational conditions. Levels of
obedience varied with the psychological closeness between the subject and the
victim. For example, if the subject moved next to the victim, obedience decreased.
If the victim remained silent and did not scream, obedience increased. Obedience
also varied according to the level of authority conveyed by the experimenter.
When the experimenter stood next to the subject, he exerted a stronger influence
and was more likely to be obeyed.
Obedience to authority has been widely used to explain atrocities perpetrated
by military regimes, such as the extermination of Jews by the Nazis (Milgram,
1974) and the My Lai massacre by US soldiers during the Vietnam War (Kelman
and Hamilton, 1989). However, inappropriate obedience can also play a role in
crimes in civilian contexts. Corruption within bureaucracies often involves subordinates who act illegally on the orders of superiors, motivated by a misguided
Situations 193
loyalty to the organisation. According to Beau and Buckley (2004), leaders
may encourage obedience by presenting illegal conduct to subordinates as
morally justified action, thus assisting subordinates to utilise moral disengagements. Examples of crimes of authority include cases of governmental abuses
of power (Kelman and Hamilton, 1989) corporate crime (ibid.), police corruption
(Fitzgerald, 1989) and prison officer brutality (Nagle, 1978).
Compliance and defiance
Compliance refers to the acquiescence to the direct request of others. Compliance is
similar to conformity and obedience in that the compliant individual is induced to
perform behaviour that he/she would rather not perform. However, compliance is
usually concerned with the role of persuasive communication in inducing behaviourchange rather than direct pressure. A number of techniques have been found to
increase compliance. Compliance with rules increases when people feel that they
have contributed to the formulation of those rules. For example, Snyder et al.
(1991) found that company theft was reduced when employees are consulted about
what constitutes legitimate and illegitimate use of company goods. Similarly,
compliance increases when people have actively endorsed a given rule. Iso-Ahola
and Niblock (in Roggenbuck, 1992) found that when campers were asked to sign
an anti-littering petition, levels of littering decreased. Generally, too, requests
made in person are more effective than impersonal requests (Oliver et al., 1985).
Encouraging compliance is an important factor in face-to-face interactions
between potential offenders and official guardians such as police, security guards,
nightclub crowd controllers and correctional officers. In many cases these
personnel cannot rely solely on their delegated authority to secure compliance, but
rather must utilise their personal legitimacy and interpersonal skills. Requests and
commands are more likely to be followed if they are perceived as fair, consistent
and legitimate (Bottoms et al., 1995; Lombardo, 1989; Sparks et al., 1996).
The flip side of compliance is defiance. According to Brehm’s (1966) theory of
reactance, when people feel that they are being manipulated or forced to comply
with a request, they may respond by behaving in the opposite direction. Reactance
is the psychological state experienced by people when they believe that their
freedom of choice is being restricted. The expression of defiance restores their
sense of personal freedom. Thus, when attempts to control behaviour are seen as
heavy-handed, illegitimate, or manipulative, they may well be counterproductive
and lead to outcomes opposite to those intended, including the performance of
antisocial and delinquent behaviour (Bushman and Stack, 1996; Goodstein et al.,
1984; Martin and Osgood, 1987; Sherman, 1993). The vandalising of public signs
prohibiting certain behaviours is a classic example of defiance.
Deindividuation
Being a member of a group or crowd can create a sense of reduced self-awareness
and induce a state of psychological disinhibition known as deindividuation
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(Diener, 1980; Prentice-Dunn and Rogers, 1982; Prentice-Dunn and Spivey,
1986; Zimbardo, 1970). Deindividuation interferes with two levels of selfawareness – public self-awareness and private self-awareness (Prentice-Dunn and
Rogers, 1982). Public self-awareness refers to the recognition of oneself as a
social object. As a member of a crowd, an individual is afforded a degree of
anonymity and becomes less concerned with the opinions and possible censure of
others. At this level of deindividuation, people may be aware of what they are
doing but have a reduced expectation of suffering any negative consequences.
Demonstrating this effect, Zimbardo (1970) abandoned a car in New York and
another in Palo Alto (population about 55,000). The car in New York was quickly
stripped by looters of all valuable parts while the car in Palo Alto was left
untouched. Zimbardo argued that the behaviour of New Yorkers could be
explained by the anonymity they felt in living in a large city and the relative
freedom from social and legal repercussions such anonymity provided. More
recently, Silke (2003) analysed the dynamics of interpersonal assaults in Northern
Ireland. He found that when perpetrators wore masks that hid their identities, the
levels of violence used in the attacks escalated.
Private self-awareness refers to the ability to focus on one’s own thoughts, feelings and values. As individuals become immersed in a group, they submerge their
identities and experience a decreased ability to self-monitor their behaviour. In
this state, their capacity for self-regulation is fundamentally impaired. Individuals
are particularly sensitive to situational pressures and may permit themselves
to engage in collective behaviour that they would never contemplate performing
on their own. This level of deindividuation is most likely to occur in groups that
are characterised by high cohesiveness and high arousal, as exemplified by the
herd mentality and frenzied behaviour displayed by members of a ‘lynch-mob’
(Colman, 1991; Leader et al., 2007; Prentice-Dunn and Spivey, 1986).
Perhaps the best-known empirical demonstration of deindividuation is the
Stanford prison study (Haney et al., 1973; Haney and Zimbardo, 1998; Zimbardo,
2004). This research involved the creation of a simulated prison in the basement
of Stanford University. Male college student volunteers were recruited to play the
parts of prisoners and guards. Participants were screened to ensure that they had
no pre-existing psychological problems, and their allocation to prisoner or guard
roles was randomly determined. Zimbardo and his colleagues found that shortly
into the experiment both groups began displaying pathological behaviours. The
guards harassed the inmates, deprived them of sleep, hosed them with fireextinguishers, forced them to do push-ups (while sometimes standing on the prisoners’ backs), and locked dissenters in solitary confinement. The prisoners became
servile and showed signs of psychological distress. The study, which was planned
to go for two weeks, was abandoned after six days because of concerns for the
psychological welfare of participants, and after the prisoners began to plan a mass
escape. The guards’ uniforms, which included reflecting sunglasses, provided a
disguise for their wearers that helped submerge their individuality and promote a
sense of group cohesion and collective identity. The inmates’ uniform, in contrast,
was humiliating and dehumanising; the use of numbers rather than names stripped
Situations 195
away personal identity; the dependency of inmates on guards for daily needs was
emasculating and promoted helplessness.
The results of the Stanford prison experiment have been used to explain the
abuses of power that occurred at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq in 2003 (Lankford,
2009; Zimbardo, 2007). In that case, US soldiers guarding the prison punched,
sexually abused, urinated on, threatened and tortured detainees, and forced them
to perform degrading acts such as wearing women’s underwear on their heads,
engaging in simulated sex acts with one another, and acting like dogs. Zimbardo
(2007) argued that the behaviour of the soldiers could not be understood in terms
of individual pathology, but as a consequence of the physical and social dynamics
of the prison that promoted deindividuation. The atrocities of Abu Ghraib were
not the result of a few rotten apples; rather, it was the barrel that was rotten.
Environmental psychology
Environmental psychology is ‘the study of the interrelationship between
behaviour and experience and the built and natural environment’ (Bell et al.,
1990, p. 7). Environmental psychologists are concerned with the psychological
effects of geographic and climatic variables such as temperature, sunshine, wind
and humidity; and of the unintended consequences of urbanisation, including the
effects of high-density living, workplace noise, artificial lighting and interior
design. Many of the harmful effects of the environment that might lead to crime
are interpreted within the environmental stress model (Baum et al., 1981). Taken
individually, environmental stressors may be little more than background
irritation; however, collectively and cumulatively, ambient noxious stimulation
can seriously affect psychological functioning and, in particular, lead to violent
responses. Three elements of environmental psychology are covered here: atmospheric conditions, crowding and territoriality.
Atmospheric conditions
The relationship between behaviour and atmospheric conditions has been a major
interest of environmental psychologists. At a macro-level of analysis, there has
been a long tradition in explaining the development of civilisations in terms of the
benefits of conducive climates (Huntington, 1915), or in using climate to explain
variations in culture and national character (Mills, 1934). At a more immediate
level of analysis, daily weather conditions and the changing seasons have been
used to help explain variations in behaviour within a given population.
The effects of temperature on behaviour have been of particular interest.
Laboratory studies suggest that as the temperature moves outside an individual’s
comfort zone, there is some deterioration on a number of performance variables
(vigilance, memory, cognitive tasks, etc.) (Fine and Kobrick, 1987; Riley and
Cochran, 1984). With respect to social behaviour, curvilinear relationships have
been found between temperature and aggression (Baron and Bell, 1975; Bell,
2005; Cohn and Rotton, 1997, 2005; Hipp et al., 2004). It seems that moderately
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warm and moderately cool temperatures increase aggression but extremely hot
and extremely cold temperatures reduce them. Aggression, then, is facilitated
within critical temperature bands. One explanation for this finding is that while
people become more irritable when the temperature is uncomfortable, at some
point heat has a debilitating effect while cold reduces arousal.
These laboratory findings have been supported by studies on the relationship
between temperature and crime rates. A number of studies have reported a correlation between outside temperature and violent crime (Anderson, 1987; Anderson
et al., 1997; Cotton, 1986; Harries and Stadler, 1988). Goranson and King (1970)
showed that riots were more likely to occur during heat waves. Atlas (1984)
reported that assault rates in prisons are lower for air-conditioned areas and areas
with easy access to showers than for areas where no relief from high temperatures
is provided.
In addition to temperature, other atmospheric conditions have also been examined. LeBeau (1994) reported a relationship between domestic disputes and the
temperature-humidity index. Banzinger and Owens (1978) found a correlation
between wind speed and delinquency. Rotton and Frey (1985) reported an association between air pollution levels and violent crime. In a field-observation study,
Homel and Clark (1994) found that nightclub violence correlated with a range of
aggravating environmental features such as the amount of cigarette smoke, lack of
ventilation and poor lighting.
Much of the early research on the effects of atmospheric conditions was based
on the assumption of a direct effect of climatic variables on psychological functioning, as per the environmental stress model. More recent research has explored
indirect effects. According to this line of research, changes in weather and the
seasons cause changes in social activity and it is this which accounts for increases
in antisocial behaviour. For example, a number of researchers have found that
burglary was most likely to occur in pleasant weather (Cohn and Rotton, 2000;
Hipp et al., 2004). It is argued that when the weather is fine, people are more
likely to go on excursions away from home, and this leaves domestic dwellings
unguarded and vulnerable to burglary. Similarly, McLean (2007) found that the
incidence of sexual assault increased with the maximum daily temperature and
hours of sunshine. According to McLean, the most likely explanation for these
findings was that long, sunny days increased levels of socialisation and therefore
also increased opportunities for sexual assault.
Crowding
Crowding research is concerned with the psychological consequences of high
density conditions. Foundational evidence for the harmful effects of crowding has
come from animal research. In both natural and laboratory environments, many
animal species have been found to have a critical upper threshold for population
concentration. In a classic study, Calhoun (1962) examined the behaviour of rats
who were confined to a fixed-sized environment but who were otherwise provided
with unlimited resources (food, water and nesting material). As the rat population
Situations 197
increased, the social order disintegrated and a multitude of physiological and
behavioural pathologies developed (abortions, infant mortality, desertion of
young, aggression, cannibalism, tumours).
In considering the effects of population density on human conduct, a number of
important distinctions need to be made. First, outside density can be distinguished
from inside density. Outside density refers to broad population trends (e.g., people
per acre) while inside density typically relates to primary living areas (e.g., people
per dwelling). Research on outside density has produced somewhat inconsistent
findings but, in general, high-density urban environments have been found to be
associated with increased crime rates (Booth et al., 1976; Galle et al., 1972; Gove
et al., 1977; Regoeczi, 2002, 2003; Roncek, 1981; Shichor et al., 1979). Research
on inside density has examined the physical, psychological and behavioural problems associated with specific crowded settings such as domestic residences
(Regoeczi, 2003; Roncek, 1981), college dormitories (Baum and Valins, 1977),
night-clubs (Graham et al., 2006; Macintyre and Homel, 1997), naval ships (Dean
et al., 1978) and prisons (Cox et al., 1984; Lahm, 2008; Paulus, 1988; Steiner and
Wooldredge, 2009). As a general rule, inside density effects are more pronounced
than are outside density effects.
Second, a distinction can be made between spatial density (i.e. the amount of
space per person) and social density, (i.e. the number of people in a given space).
Reducing population density can involve either increasing the amount of space
available for a given number of people – reducing spatial density – or decreasing
the number of people in a given space – reducing social density. When nightclubs
and similar establishments restrict the number of patrons that may enter, they are
manipulating social density; when prison administrators build more prisons to
alleviate overcrowding, they are manipulating spatial density. Social density may
be varied without altering spatial density. For example, a 500 sq metre room with
100 people in it has the same spatial density as, but greater social density than, a
50 sq metre room with 10 people in it. Generally, high social density is more
stressful than high spatial density (Baum and Valins, 1977; Cox et al., 1984).
Finally, crowding can be distinguished from density. Density is an objective
measure of spatial limitation (people in a given area); crowding is the subjective
experience of that spatial limitation. Perceptions of spaciousness can be changed
architecturally through the effective use of colour, lighting, windows, partitions, interior design and so forth, without altering density (Macintyre and Homel, 1997;
Marrero, 1977; Nacci et al., 1977; Paulus and Nagar, 1989). For example, Macintyre
and Homel (1997) showed that nightclub violence was related to inefficient floor
plans that created jostling among patrons as the paths of those going to the bar
intersected with the paths of those going to the toilets.
Territoriality
Territoriality refers to the behaviours and psychological states associated with the
perceived ownership of a physical space. Territorial behaviour includes the
tendency to defend claimed areas against intruders. There is an extensive body of
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animal research demonstrating territorial behaviour in many species, including
birds, mammals, reptiles and even insects (Edney, 1974; Hediger, 1950). Human
territoriality subsequently became a popular topic in environmental psychology
from the 1970s (Altman, 1975; Edney, 1974). Just as animals may mark their
territory, so humans may erect or display territorial markers – fences, gates, signs,
personal possessions – to signal ownership and to deter outsiders.
Territoriality has implications for the behaviour of both territorial possessors
and potential territorial intruders. In the case of territorial possessors, a direct relationship is proposed between territoriality and antisocial behaviour. A sense of
ownership is associated with psychological states that may produce two opposing
outcomes. On the one hand, possessing territory can inhibit aggression and promote
pro-social behaviours. ‘Home turf’ is a place where people can relax and feel in
control over their lives. Altman’s (1975) privacy regulation model suggests that
people require sanctuaries in which to retreat in order to reduce the stress and
overstimulation associated with excessive interpersonal contact. O’Neill and
Paluck (1973) reported a drop in the level of aggression among institutionalised
intellectually-disabled boys when they were given identifiable territories to call
their own. People also feel greater responsibility towards property over which they
have a sense of ownership. Greater care is taken of estates when tenants are given
greater involvement in their management (Foster and Hope, 1993; Power, 1994).
Likewise, vandalism in institutions can be reduced by promoting in residents a
sense of possession over their living areas by allowing freedom in personalising
environments with pictures, personal possessions, or individual furniture arrangement (Wener and Olsen, 1980; Zupan, 1991). On the other hand, precisely because
ownership is highly valued, invasion of territory can incite an aggressive response
in territorial possessors. At a macro level, gang warfare is often caused by aggressive reactions to territorial invasion (Ley and Cybriwsky, 1974). Similarly, a high
proportion of assaults against prisoner officers occur in the prisoners’ living areas
(Atlas, 1983; Light, 1991; Sylvester et al., 1977), suggesting that prisoners become
particularly hostile when they feel that their private domain has been invaded.
In the case of territorial intruders, signs of territorial possession can have a deterrent effect on criminal behaviour. This argument was introduced into criminology
primarily through the work of architect Oscar Newman (1972) in his seminal book,
Defensible Space: Crime Prevention Through Urban Design. Newman used territoriality as the basis for his concept of defensible space, which he defined as ‘a
surrogate term for the range of mechanisms – real and symbolic barriers, strongly
defined areas of influence, and improved opportunities for surveillance – that
combine to bring an environment under the control of its residents’ (ibid., p. 3).
According to Newman, potential offenders are sensitive to environmental cues that
indicate an area is uncontrolled and open to criminal opportunities. Residents are
encouraged to assume a greater sense of ownership over private and semi-public
areas within their domain and to become more vigilant in recognising and deterring
outsiders. According to Newman’s approach, territoriality affects the behaviour
of offenders indirectly. Environmental design aims to change the behaviour of
residents, who then, through their increased vigilance, deter potential offenders.
Situations 199
Newman’s (1972) original insights on the effectiveness of defensible space in
reducing crime were based on field observations. However, the research he cited
often amounted to little more than illustrative case studies. For example, he noted
instances of high-rise residential blocks that had real and symbolic barriers differentiating the building from the street, and he pointed out that they were less vandalised than similar buildings that had no such barriers. Later research has been more
systematic (Brown and Altman, 1983; Brown and Bentley, 1993; Brown et al.,
2004; Foster et al., in press; Ham-Rowbottom et al., 1999; McDonald and Gifford,
1989; Perkins et al., 1992; Perkins et al., 1993; Wortley and McFarlane, 2009).
For example, Brown and Altman (1983) used structured rating schedules to
compare the characteristics of 306 burglarised and non-burglarised houses. They
found that non-burglarised houses were more likely to have a range of territorial
features, including symbolic indicators of ownership such as signs with the
owner’s name; actual barriers such as fences and locked gates; and signs of current
occupation such as toys strewn on the front lawn. In a field experiment, Wortley
and McFarlane (2009) examined the theft of photocopy cards left on library desks.
The study employed a 2×2 design – cards were either signed or unsigned, and left
next to library books or on their own. Over a 500-minute observation period in
each condition, 18 cards were taken by library patrons in the unsigned/no-books
condition, while only two were taken in the signed/with-books condition.
Opportunity theories
Social psychology and environmental psychology are concerned, for the
most part, with the direct influence of immediate environments on psychological
functioning, and of particular interest to us, on the motivation to perform violent
or antisocial behaviour. However, we saw in the previous section that there
were exceptions to this rule. Weather conditions may affect patterns of social
activity that in turn make it easier or more difficult for offenders to carry out
crime. Likewise, territorial behaviours by residents may deter potential intruders
by providing increased surveillance. These are examples of the role that opportunity plays in crime. The starting point for opportunity theories is the assumption
that the offender is already motivated to commit crime. Opportunity theories
examine the situational factors – both social and physical – that facilitate the motivated offender in committing their contemplated crimes. We examine two new
theories – routine activities approach and crime pattern theory – and further
examine the situational implications of rational choice perspective, which was
introduced in the previous chapter. These three approaches respectively provide
macro-, meso- and micro-analyses of the role of situational factors in crime.
Routine activities approach
The routine activities approach provides a macro-level analysis of the effects of
broad social trends on the distribution of crime. Cohen and Felson (1979) formulated the routine activities approach to provide the most parsimonious account of
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crime possible. According to Cohen and Felson, the explanation for crime can be
reduced to the coincidence in time and space of three minimal elements: ‘(1) motivated offenders, (2) suitable targets and (3) the absence of capable guardians
against a violation’ (ibid., p. 589). For example, burglary occurs when a motivated
burglar encounters unguarded premises that contain desirable products. If the
burglar does not pass by the house, the property is guarded, or it contains little of
value, then burglary is unlikely to occur. The approach makes no attempt to
explain why offenders might be motivated to commit a crime.
The routine activities approach is a deceptively simple idea but it has great
explanatory power. Central to the routine activities approach is the proposal that the
concurrence of the three elements for crime is dictated by the natural rhythms of
everyday life, producing predictable crime patterns. Cohen and Felson originally set
out to explain the apparent paradox that crime rates after World War II rose substantially at the same time that economic conditions improved. According to traditional
criminological theories that associate crime with poverty, crime rates might have
been expected to fall during this period. Cohen and Felson argued that higher crime
rates could be explained by the changes in the routine activities that accompanied
economic prosperity. Improved economic conditions had the incidental effect of
bringing the three elements for crime into alignment. For example, with the increased
participation of women in the workforce, there was an accompanying increase in the
number of houses left unattended during the day. At the same time, growing affluence and technological advances meant that there were more small, valuable
personal possessions available to steal. These factors helped explain why rates of
daytime residential burglaries doubled between 1960 and 1975.
We have encountered examples of the routine activities approach previously in
this chapter. The proposals that burglary is more likely to occur in pleasant
weather because homeowners are away from home (Cohn and Rotton, 2000; Hipp
et al., 2004), and that rates of sexual assault rape increase with hours of sunshine
because people socialise more in warm weather (McLean, 2007), are routineactivities explanations. There are many other cases where crime patterns are
influenced by the respective lifestyles of victims and offenders. Young males
experience the highest rates of physical victimisation because they have risky
lifestyles that involve visiting bars in dangerous districts, staying out late at night,
and mixing with other alcohol-affected youths (Jensen and Brownfield, 1986);
juvenile violence peaks in the hour or so around the close of school in the afternoon when large numbers of young people – potential offenders and victims –
spill into the streets (Snyder et al., 1996); and burglary rates are highest for houses
with multiple streets leading to them that increase the amount of passing traffic
(Beavon, 1985, cited in Felson, 1987). One of the appealing features of the routine
activities approach is that it can explain apparently counterintuitive crime patterns.
For example, Felson (2002) notes research showing that young people who have
part-time jobs commit more crime than those who do not have jobs. As Felson
explains, a job allows a young person to fund a relatively risky lifestyle (in terms
of crime opportunities) that might include taking illegal drugs, drinking alcohol,
visiting shopping malls and driving his/her own car.
Situations 201
Crime pattern theory
Building on the routine activities approach, Brantingham and Brantingham (1984,
1991, 2008) developed crime pattern theory as a meso-level account of the movement of offenders in time and space. Whereas the routine activities approach is
principally concerned with the effect on crime of social trends and lifestyle
patterns, crime pattern theory focuses on the relationship between crime and the
urban landscape. According to Brantingham and Brantingham, crime is associated
with the distribution of key activities in a community and an offender’s familiarity
with the environment.
Brantingham and Brantingham identified two key environmental elements –
nodes and paths – that structure an individual’s daily movement patterns. Nodes
are locations that an individual regularly visits in the course of his/her routine
activities. They include where a person lives, where he/she works or goes to
school, the places he/she shops, and the entertainment venues and recreation facilities he/she frequents. Paths are the routes the person takes to move from one node
to the other. Together nodes and paths determine an individual’s awareness space.
This is the part of the urban environment that the individual knows well and in
which he/she feels comfortable. Most people, for example, have a set way that
they travel to work or school, and they become very familiar with the environment
along that path. They may, however, know little about the environment just one or
two streets outside of their usual route, and feel disoriented if they stray too far
from their awareness space.
A great deal of crime occurs in predictable locations defined by the intersection
of crime opportunities and an offender’s awareness space. In particular, crime
opportunities cluster around certain nodes referred to as crime generators and
crime attractors. Crime generators are locations, such as sports stadiums and
transport hubs, to which large people are attracted for legitimate, non-criminal
activities. The presence of so many people provides many criminal opportunities
that may tempt potential offenders who may happen to be mixed in with the
general crowd of patrons. Crime attractors are particular districts or premises that
attract potential offenders for the specific purpose of committing crime. They
include certain bars, red light districts, drug markets and non-secured parking lots.
Crime attractors are particularly likely to be located near freeway exits and public
transport hubs, which provide convenient access and escape. Crime generators
and attractors are likely hotspots for crime.
One prediction of crime pattern theory is that offenders generally will not travel
far from their key personal nodes – their home, work or school – in order to
commit crime. This prediction may seem counterintuitive – we might imagine that
offenders would travel away from their usual haunts in order to cover their tracks
and to search out the most desirable targets – but it is consistent with the routine
activities approach. Crime is most likely to occur in locations that are encountered
in the course of one’s daily routine. So-called ‘journey to crime’ research has verified the prediction that offending frequency decays as a function of the distance
the offender is from home. For example, Snook (2004) examined data from 41
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serial burglars. He found that the median distance travelled to commit a burglary
was 1.7 kilometres, and that 85 per cent of burglaries were committed within
5 kilometres of the burglar’s home. The rate of decay was rapid; 33 per cent of
burglary sites were within 1 kilometre of home, 25 per cent between one and two
kilometres, and 15 per cent between 2 and 3 kilometres. Further, Rengert and
Wasilchick (1985) examined the spatial orientation of burglary sites in relation to
the burglar’s home. They found that over 75 per cent of burglary sites were within
a 45 degree arc around the path between the burglar’s home and place of work,
while 57 per cent were in a 45 degree arc around the path between the burglar’s
home and place of recreation.
Rational choice perspective – implications for situations
It will be recalled from the previous chapter that, according to the rational choice
perspective (Cornish and Clarke, 1986, 2008), crime occurs when the perceived
benefits of offending outweigh the perceived costs. Clarke (1992) has used the
rational choice perspective as the basis for analysing the micro-environmental
factors that facilitate crime. Conducive environments for crime are ones in which
there are many perceived opportunities for the offender to benefit himself/herself.
Clarke outlined three dimensions along which opportunity judgements are made:
perceived effort, perceived risks and perceived rewards. These dimensions are the
basis for opportunity-reduction strategies in his model of situational crime prevention (increasing effort, increasing risk and reducing rewards).1
Effort
The amount of effort required to perform behaviour is a cost to the individual.
Offenders will generally commit crimes that entail the least effort, and they may
impulsively commit crimes just because they are easy to carry out. If effort seems at
first glance to be a trivial deterrent for crime, consider the following study. Clarke
and Mayhew (1988) examined suicide patterns in the UK. They noted that, historically, gassing oneself (for example, by putting one’s head in the oven and turning on
the gas) was the most common method of suicide, accounting for up to 40 per cent of
all cases. The traditional source of domestic gas is coal, and coal gas is toxic.
However, from the late 1950s, the UK gradually switched from coal gas to natural
gas, which is non-toxic. From 1958 to 1977, as the changeover occurred, suicide rates
fell from 5,298 to 3,944. This drop was almost entirely accounted for by the drop in
suicide by gassing, which fell from 2,637 to 2. Gassing is a relatively convenient and
easy method of suicide. Most UK homes have ready access to gas, and the act of
gassing requires little skill or planning. It seems that when the gassing option was
denied, a large proportion of potential suicide victims abandoned their suicide attempt
rather than seek out other, less convenient methods. Even for desperate and deeply
motivated behaviour such as suicide, opportunity plays a significant role.
Increasing effort is the rationale for crime prevention strategies that make
it more difficult for offenders to commit crime. The best-known strategy is
Situations 203
target-hardening, in which potential crime targets are protected by barriers, locks,
or toughened materials. For example, Webb (1997) found that the introduction of
steering locks for cars in Germany, Britain and the USA resulted in immediate and
long-term reductions car theft. Similarly, pop-up anti-bandit screens in banks and
post offices have been found to reduce over-the-counter robberies by up to 40 per
cent (Clarke et al., 1991; Ekblom, 1988). Making it more difficult for potential
offenders to gain access to tools and weapons used in crime is another example of
increasing the effort. For example, restricting access to firearms can reduce
firearm-related crime (Baker and McPhedran, 2007; Cook and Ludwig, 2004;
Gius, 2009; Ludwig, 2005).
Risk
Situations can provide important cues to offenders on the likelihood of getting
away with criminal acts. Crime rates can escalate dramatically when the chances
of detection and punishment are reduced. This fact can be demonstrated through
the natural experiments that occur when law and order breaks down during police
strikes (Nagin, 1978), riots (Rosenfeld, 1997), blackouts (Muhlin et al., 1981)
and natural disasters (LeBeau, 2002; Teh, 2008). For example, LeBeau (2002)
reported that burglary rates spiked the day that Hurricane Hugo hit Charlotte,
North Carolina, and remained high for the next three days as police resources
remained stretched.
Common sense tells us that potential crime sites that are guarded or under
surveillance are less likely to be subject to crime than are sites that are not.
Research confirms this assumption. The installation of CCTV cameras has been
found to reduce crime in a variety of settings, including car parks (Poyner, 1992),
town centres (Brown, 1996) and buses (Poyner, 1988). Improved street lighting
has been found to reduce theft, vandalism and vehicle crime by up to 45 per cent
(Painter and Farrington, 1999). The use of radar to detect speeding drivers has
resulted in crash reductions of up to 30 per cent (Cameron and Delaney, 2008;
Mountain et al., 2005; Novoa et al., 2010), while a meta-analysis on the preventive effects of random breath testing showed reductions in crashes of at least 17
per cent (Erke et al., 2009).
Rewards
People can be tempted to offend when rewards are on ready offer. Demetriou and
Silke (2003) provided neat empirical evidence for the seductive lure of illicit
temptations. They established a website that offered free legal shareware downloads. People were directed to the website if they searched for ‘shareware’, ‘freeware’, ‘free’, ‘free games’ and ‘free software’. However, once visitors arrived at
the site they were offered links to a range of software options – legal shareware,
hacked commercial games, hacked commercial software, softcore pornography,
hardcore pornography and stolen passwords. (The links to illegal sites were
dummies.) Demetriou and Silke found that the hardcore pornography link was the
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most popular site (clicked by 483 of the 803 visitors), followed by the softcore
pornography link (358 clicks), the illegal software link (338 clicks), the illegal
games link (302 clicks), the illegal passwords link (297 clicks) and the legal
shareware link (268 clicks). A check of the search words that visitors used
to reach the website confirmed that most (745 visitors) were actively searching
for legal shareware. However, once visitors arrived at the website, the legal
shareware was the least popular link. Presented with an unexpected chance to gain
free illicit software, apparently normally law-abiding individuals seized the
opportunity presented to them.
Crime may be prevented by reducing temptation. One way to do this is to
conceal or remove potential crime targets. For example, leaving expensive items
in open view in parked cars invites theft. For this reason, many car CD players
come with a removable face, and as portable car satellite navigation devices are
switched off they typically remind drivers to take the device with them. Likewise,
many self-service department stores place especially valuable, concealable items
in cabinets or behind the service counter. Crime targets can also be rendered
worthless if they are stolen. Electronic goods, car components and livestock that
are clearly marked are difficult to sell if they are stolen. Using an alternative
strategy, some clothing stores use ink tags that destroy the clothes if the tag is
removed incorrectly.
Do opportunities cause crime?
While opportunities determine where and when crime occurs, it is important to
appreciate that they do not just redistribute an existing amount of criminal activity;
they stimulate a net growth in criminal activity. The more opportunities there are
for crime, the more crime there is committed. In short, opportunity is a cause of
crime. This can be made clear by the following ‘thought experiment’ proposed by
Tilley and Laycock (2002, p. 31). Imagine that suddenly people stopped locking
their houses when they went out; that drivers left their parked cars unlocked and
with the keys in the ignition; and that customers took what they needed from unattended shops and left the money on the counter. Would crime increase? Of course
it would.
The logical obverse of the above scenario is that reducing opportunities will
reduce crime. The more risky, less rewarding and more effortful it is to commit
crime, the less crime there is committed. This is the rationale that underpins situational crime prevention. Nevertheless, one of the perennial criticisms levelled
against situational prevention is that it does not prevent crime but it merely
displaces it. That is, it is often argued that if opportunities are reduced in one location, an offender will simply move to another, more conducive location to commit
his/her crimes. While at first glance this criticism may seem intuitively plausible,
it underestimates the role that opportunities have in causing behaviour, and is an
example of the fundamental attributional error.
The conclusion that reducing opportunities reduces crime is supported not just
by theory but also by empirical research. Guerette and Bowers (2009) reviewed
Situations 205
102 studies that examined the displacement of crime following situational interventions. Crime displacement was observed in only 26 per cent of interventions.
Further, where displacement did occur, the amount of crime displaced was typically less than the amount prevented. That is, reducing opportunities resulted in a
net reduction in crime.
The person–situation interaction (again)
It should not be concluded from the foregoing discussion that situational
approaches assume that all offenders are hapless victims of circumstance and that
dispositions do not matter. As has been stressed throughout this volume, crime
occurs as an interaction between person and situation. Different individuals react
differently to the same situation, with some individuals dispositionally more
susceptible to criminogenic environments than are others. The stronger the individual’s antisocial commitment, the weaker the situational pressures required for
criminal behaviour to occur, and vice versa. Crime is especially likely when highcriminality individuals enter high-criminogenic situations. This interaction is
shown in Figure 9.2.
To clarify the relationship between offender dispositions and situations, Cornish
and Clarke (2003) proposed an offender typology based on the strength of the
offender’s criminal commitment and the nature of the immediate environment.
Three offender types were suggested: antisocial predators, mundane offenders
and provoked offenders.
Antisocial predators are the stereotypical, calculating criminal. They possess
ingrained criminal dispositions, and their offences involve premeditation and at
least some rudimentary planning. They are active manipulators of situations, and
obstacles to offending are challenges to be overcome. They enter the crime scene
with pre-exiting motivation to commit the crime, and their crimes are carried out
intentionally and with a purpose. Their motivations for offending derive from the
Figure 9.2 The hypothetical interaction between offenders and situations.
206
Situations
intrinsically rewarding nature of the crimes they commit. Predators may specialise
in a particular type of crime or may be criminally versatile, but in any event all
will have developed ‘knowledge, skills and experience enough to minimize risk
and effort, and maximize payoffs’ (ibid., p. 57).
Mundane offenders are flexible in their criminal commitment and opportunistic
in their offending. They engage in occasional, low-level criminality and may possess
generalised impulse-control problems, committing crime with minimal forethought.
Like predatory offenders, they seek to derive benefits from their crimes, but they
have a greater stake in conformity and are therefore subject to stronger personal and
social constraints on their behaviour. These constraints, however, weaken from time
to time, and mundane offenders are susceptible to precipitating events that engage
their criminal motivations. In particular, to facilitate their performance of morally
proscribed behaviour, they may invoke neutralisations for their crimes, especially
where situational factors serve to obscure personal responsibility.
Provoked offenders are reacting to a particular set of environmental circumstances – situational frustrations, irritations, social pressures and the like – that
induce them to commit crimes they would not have otherwise committed. Their
crimes include ‘crimes of violence that erupt in the heat of the moment; or impulsive
ones committed by offenders overcome by temptation, or a temporary failure of self
control’ (ibid., p. 70). Provoked offenders may have conventional value systems and
lead otherwise law-abiding lives. Their involvement in crime may represent an aberration that would not have occurred if it were not for the precipitating events.
Be clear that Cornish and Clarke are not saying that situations become less important as an individual’s criminality increases, but rather that the role that situations
play in crime changes. For antisocial predators, situations provide the data required
to make calculated decisions about offending. They are opportunity-seekers and, if
necessary, opportunity-makers. Their rate of offending may be reduced significantly
by making it more difficult for them to commit crimes. For mundane offenders, situations offer temptations to be seized. They are opportunity-takers. Because of the
moral ambivalence of the mundane offender, in the absence of easy opportunity
they may not be sufficiently motivated to seek out crime targets. For the provoked
offender, situations provide the impetus to offend. They are reactors to the immediate environment. Their engagement in crime requires a kick-start, and relieving
the precipitating conditions may be sufficient to prevent offending.
Note that all things being equal, antisocial predators are the most prolific
offenders across all situations. They do not just commit predatory crimes. Following
the principles of the person–situation interaction, it is likely that antisocial predators (as high-criminality offenders) will be even more likely to seize easy temptations and to react to situational precipitators (both high-criminality situations) than
will mundane or provoked offenders.
Conclusion and evaluation
Situations are a neglected element in many explanations of criminal behaviour, too
often treated as merely the incidental locations in which offenders act out their
Situations 207
criminality. Worse, an emphasis on situational factors is often argued by critics to
be misguided and to divert attention away from the ‘root causes’ of crime. But as
demonstrated in this chapter, the importance of situational factors in crime is
supported by a solid base of psychological and criminological theory and research.
Like all species, human beings are best understood from an ecological perspective,
as being in an intimate and dynamic relationship with their immediate environment. The performance of criminal behaviour is inextricably dependent upon the
situational context. Situational factors determine why offenders commit their
crimes when and where they do. They play a role in every crime. Some situations
can turn law-abiding citizens into offenders. But situations are no less important in
the offending by career criminals. The frequency with which they commit crime,
and the precise targets that they select, are both dependent upon situational conditions. Situational approaches do not ignore the root causes of crime; situations are
a root cause of crime.
The examination undertaken in this chapter has revealed a wide range of
situational variables that influence behaviour, and a variety of ways in which
situations and their effects may be understood. Situations can vary in size; some
approaches conceptualise situational factors in global terms (e.g., urban crowding)
while other approaches seek to break situations down into their precise elements
(e.g., specific territorial markers). Situations can involve both physical and social
variables; situational forces can refer to the influences of observable, concrete
stimuli (e.g., architectural features) and to influences that take place in the course
of interpersonal interaction (e.g., conformity). Finally, situations can have precipitating and facilitating effects on behaviour; some situations engender criminal
motivations while others make it easy for motivated offenders to carry through
with their criminal intentions.
Situational approaches do not deny the importance of criminal dispositions.
Individuals do not enter criminogenic situations as equals. They bring with them
different biological make-ups and developmental histories. Situational influences
on criminal behaviour are the final element outlined in the integrative model
described in Chapter 1 and summarised in Figure 1.2. In the next and final chapter
of the book, we review how biological, developmental and situational influences
fit together to produce criminal behaviour.
Note
1 In later publications (Clarke 2008; Cornish and Clarke, 2003), Clarke has added two
more dimensions to his situational crime prevention model – removing excuses and
reducing provocations. Excuses and provocations are not discussed here because they
are not strictly opportunity dimensions and, moreover, they have been covered in
previous chapters (excuse making) and earlier in this chapter (provocations).
10 Conclusion
The argument in a nutshell
People who commit crime are a diverse population. Almost everybody commits
trivial offences from time to time in their lives. Occasionally, a normally lawabiding person will commit a serious, isolated offence such as murder, fraud, or
sexual assault. Some people engage in bouts of criminal activity for a relatively
brief period of their lives – typically during adolescence – then desist. On the
other hand, other people begin getting into trouble with authority from an early
age and commit frequent and serious crimes throughout their lives. Offenders may
specialise in one type of crime, or they may be versatile in the crimes that they
commit. They may offend alone or in the company of others. Some offenders
carefully plan their offences and others act impulsively.
The pathways that lead individuals to crime are similarly diverse. Criminal
behaviour may have many causes, the precise mix of which varies from
offender to offender. Some causes involve psychological processes that are
common to us all, and that account for the latent potential for crime in all human
beings. Other causes involve biological factors and environmental experiences
that account for why some people become offenders and others do not. These
causes may be arranged temporally, from distal to proximal, according to three
stages.
The first stage involves factors that are present at birth. Every individual is born
with genetically-encoded predispositions that increase or decrease their risk of
committing crime. These predispositions are of two sorts: universal characteristics that are part of being human and that are dispersed throughout the species, and
individual characteristics that vary among people and that are passed down within
the family. The tendency to respond aggressively to insults and humiliating treatment, for example, is part of human nature. Aggression under these circumstances
was at some point in human evolution an adaptive behaviour that helped an individual maintain status within the group; now responding with physical violence to
perceived insults is a criminal offence. However, humans also differ in the degree
to which they are predisposed to aggression. Polymorphisms of the genes
that control for the availability of dopamine, for instance, have been linked to
differences in levels of aggressive behaviour.
Conclusion 209
The second stage involves factors that occur over the course of an individual’s
lifetime. People change across their lifespan. Some of these changes are normative – they occur for everyone as part of normal development. For example,
puberty is universally a period of rapid physical, psychological and social change.
Males, in particular, are much more likely to commit crimes in the year or so that
follows the onset of puberty than they are at any other period in their lives. Other
developmental changes are experience-dependent. People’s differing developmental experiences create different potentials to commit crime. Developmental
risk factors for crime include growing up in a broken home, experiencing child
maltreatment, being subjected to harsh parental discipline, failing at school,
having delinquent peers and failing to form a stable relationship with a partner.
Environmental experiences are reflected in the physical growth and structure of
the brain, they help form personality traits, they can influence the passage of an
individual through developmental stages, they determine the behaviours that a
person learns, and they shape the way he/she thinks about the world. As a result
of adverse developmental experiences, an individual may acquire criminal tendencies and/or fail to acquire the capacity to control inherent tendencies in all of us to
behave in self-serving ways.
The final stage involves factors present in the immediate environment at
the time of the crime. All behaviour is shaped by the context in which it occurs.
Situations can exert social influence, obscure moral insight, trigger behavioural
responses, provoke physiological arousal and signal the likely outcome of behaviour. Situations determine when and where crime is committed and even if it is
carried out at all. Criminogenic situations can induce normally law-abiding individuals to commit crime they would not have otherwise committed, and allow
seasoned offenders to commit more crime than they would otherwise have
committed. Some situations precipitate crime by stimulating the motivation to
offend, and other situations facilitate crime by enabling or encouraging offenders
to act on criminal motivations.
Causal factors are not only linked in a temporal sequence that allows multiple
pathways to crime, but there are interactions among causes as individuals move
from one stage to the next, providing additional layers of complexity. Moving
from stage one to stage two may involve gene–environment interactions that
affect the development of stable dispositions and habits. Depending on their
genetic make-up, different individuals may respond differently to the same
developmental experiences. Some individuals are resilient in the face of adverse
treatment while others are deeply and negatively affected. An individual may
have a genetic risk of developing certain criminality-related traits, but those traits
may only develop in the presence of the ‘right’ environment.
Moving from stage two to stage three may involve person–situation interactions that affect the behavioural expression of stable dispositions and habits.
Depending upon their personal characteristics, different individuals may act
differently in the same situation. Some individuals will seize criminal opportunities or succumb to criminogenic pressures, while others will resist such influences. The risk of criminal behaviour is especially great when individuals with
210
Conclusion
entrenched criminal dispositions enter high-criminogenic situations. Equally,
most of the time even predatory offenders are not committing crimes.
There is no one psychological theory of crime that covers the breadth of
causal factors described above. This is by no means surprising. It is common in
psychology for theorists to focus on a fairly narrow psychological domain. This
specialisation, however, can result in a fragmented picture overall. The temporal
arrangement of causal factors presented in this book is designed to provide an
integrative model to understand the relationship among theories in order to better
account for the variations in criminal behaviour that we observe. These theories
together provide a more complete picture of crime and criminality than each
theory provides individually.
The strengths and limits of integration
In broad terms, the proposition that criminal behaviour is caused by a combination
of biological, developmental, and situational factors would seem largely uncontroversial. However, things get trickier when it comes to combining individual theories within this broad framework. In undertaking this task, the term integrative
model rather than integrative theory has been used advisedly. What has been
presented in this book is by no means a seamless knitting together of theories into
a unified whole. It is well to remember that the theorists responsible for the various
theories often disagreed fiercely with one another. Learning theory, for example,
was developed as an explicit reaction against the study of the mind. It is not
possible to be simultaneously a radical behaviourist and a cognitive psychologist.
The term model has been used to imply no more than a general and flexible framework for conceptualising connections and commonalities among theories.
Despite tensions among theories, there are nevertheless many points of
agreement and complementarity. There are at least three kinds of relationships
among theories that permit some level of linkage. First, some theories are
natural bedfellows. They are based on similar philosophical and theoretical
assumptions, although they may examine different psychological domains. The
relationship between evolutionary theory and learning theory is an example of
this. Both approaches are concerned with the way that organisms adapt to their
environment, albeit over vastly different timescales. Characteristics or behaviours
that prove useful will be retained; those that confer no advantage will not. In their
respective explanations of adaptation, evolutionary theory and learning theory
hold to the same basic view of humanity, that is, of human beings as complex
animals shaped by environmental forces outside of individual control.
Second, some theories balance other theories. While they may be based on
different philosophical and theoretical assumptions they do not directly contradict
one another. They provide answers to different questions, and there may be
an implicit or explicit recognition that multiple theories are needed to complete
the bigger picture. The relationship between genetically-focused approaches
and environmentally-focused approaches illustrates this relationship. No geneticist would deny the vital importance of life experiences in the development of
Conclusion 211
behaviour, just as few environmentally-focused psychologists would deny
a genetic basis to behaviour. It is quite possible, for example, to accept the
principles of operant conditioning while also accepting that there are geneticallybased individual differences. Even Skinner, the arch environmental determinist,
acknowledged that biological factors play a role in behaviour, although on pragmatic grounds he believed that it was more productive to concentrate his efforts
on the role of environmental factors.
Third, some theories may fill perceived gaps in other theories. They are
based on different philosophical and theoretical assumptions and offer different
interpretations of the same problem. However, individually each theory may
be considered to be incomplete or deficient in some respect. A combination of
theories is thought to offer an improved explanation, but this is likely to require
modification of the original theories. At this level, true theoretical integration is
required. The development of social cognitive theory demonstrates this principle.
Operant conditioning denies a causative role for cognitive processes; cognitive
theory lacks an overarching framework that sets out the principles of learning.
Social cognitive theory incorporates a role for cognition within a learning framework. From this blending a new theory has emerged that differs in significant
ways from each contributing theory. It is worth noting, of course, that this does
not mean that those associated with the parent theories necessarily welcome the
arrival of the new offspring.
However, adopting an integrative approach entails risks and must be done with
prudence. There are two potential dangers to guard against. The first is that integration may violate Occam’s razor. Dating from the fourteenth century, Occam’s
razor is a principle of logic that is widely applied to science. According to Occam’s
razor, in a choice between two equally valid theories, the one that makes the
fewest assumptions – is the most parsimonious – is preferred. Further, where one
theory is adequate to explain a phenomenon, other theories should not be added
unnecessarily. Thus, while an attraction of integration is an increase in complexity,
in science it is simplicity not complexity that is the mark of a good explanation.
However, Einstein, in a restatement of Occam’s razor introduced a subtle change.
The so-called Einstein’s razor asserts: ‘Things should be as simple as possible, but
not simpler.’ In other words, simplicity is not of itself a virtue; the level of
complexity should be determined by what is required to do the job. Integration can
be justified if the combination of theories used adds to the explanatory power of
the individual contributing theories.
The second potential problem with integration is atheoreticism. The integrative
approach is also sometimes referred to as eclecticism. Eclecticism is defined as ‘the
selection and orderly combination of compatible features from diverse sources,
sometimes from incompatible theories and systems . . . into a harmonious whole’
(English and English, 1958; emphasis added). Integration, then, is not an excuse
for the haphazard or unsystematic application of theory, or for the artificial gluing
together of incompatible positions. There remain among the theories that have
been presented a number of issues for which there are fundamentally contradictory
and irreconcilable positions. The rationality of offenders is one such issue. Are the
212
Conclusion
motives for offending buried deep in the circuitry of the brain away from conscious
control as the evolutionary psychologists assert? Or are the decisions to commit
crime based on rationality (albeit bounded rationality) as some cognitive psychologists would have it? In the end, readers must make a choice about which set of
explanations makes most sense to them. When making this choice, they must retain
a coherent, overarching theoretical orientation to guide the integrative process.
Implications for practice
The purpose of theory is ultimately to inform practice. Theories are ways of
accounting for observed phenomena, providing principles and rules that can be
generalised to other settings. In psychology, theory serves two main practical
purposes. First, theories are applied to the problem of predicting how individuals
will behave in given environments. Second, theories provide guidelines for what
might be done to prevent a certain behaviour from becoming established or from
recurring once it has become established. Not much has been said in this book
about the application of theory – that was not its purpose. However, taking a view
of criminality that encompasses biological, developmental and situation causes
has important implications for the twin endeavours of prediction and prevention.
Detailing the complexity of crime causation highlights the enormity of the
challenge facing practitioners who intervene directly with offenders. Take the
problem of predicting which individuals among a sample of convicted offenders
are likely to reoffend. This is a task routinely performed by mental health professionals testifying in court, or writing reports to parole boards and similar bodies.
Traditionally, predictions about reoffending have involved clinical judgements.
Clinical predictions are based on personality assessments and clinical diagnoses
carried out on the offender by a psychologist or psychiatrist, informed by the
professional’s particular psychological approach. More recently, actuarial instruments have been constructed in an attempt to provide a more objective, scientifically-based method of prediction. Actuarial prediction involves using known
relationships between offending and demographic characteristics to place individuals in risk categories. For example, if it is shown that, overall, single offenders
are statistically more likely to reoffend than married offenders, then being single
is assumed to be a risk factor in the individual case. In actuarial prediction, there
is no need even to interview the offender as long as all the relevant demographic
risk factors are known.
Actuarial prediction routinely outperforms clinical prediction (Bonta et al.,
1998; Grove et al., 2000; Hanson and Morton-Bourgon, 2007). But the accuracy
rates for both clinical and actuarial prediction is worryingly low, given the weight
attached to prediction in the criminal justice system and the consequences of
getting it wrong. Lidz et al. (1993), for example, found that clinical prediction is
not much better than tossing a coin. In the case of actuarial prediction, claims of
predictive utility seem promising but look less impressive when examined more
closely. For example, Hanson and Thornton (2000) examined the performance of
three actuarial instruments designed to assess recidivism among sexual offenders.
Conclusion 213
The best performer was a scale called the Static-99. The scale was successful in
significantly discriminating between low- and high-risk recidivists. Offenders
who scored six or more on the Static-99 (the top 12 per cent of the sample) were
four times more likely to be rearrested for new sex offences after 15 years᾿ release
than offenders who scored zero (the bottom 10 per cent). However, within the
high-scoring group, just 52 per cent reoffended (compared with 13 per cent in
the low-scoring group). In other words, offenders rated as the highest risk were
just as likely to reoffend as not. Overall the correlation between Static-99 scores
and recidivism was .3, moderately strong but accounting for just 9 per cent of the
variance.
Why should this be so? It is certainly not through any lack of effort – risk
prediction is an active area of research producing hundreds of scholarly articles
and books. One likely reason is that risk prediction relies on an assessment of an
offender’s criminality, whether clinically assessed or inferred from demographic
variables. The task is limited to predicting risky individuals. However, we know
that there are limits to the cross-situational consistency of behaviour. According
to the specificity model, differences in dispositions only become meaningful in
particular situations. Assessing disposition, therefore, provides only half the
information needed to make a prediction; we also need to know what risky situations a risky individual is likely to encounter. Some actuarial instruments have
endeavoured to include more dynamic, ecological measures. Silver et al. (1999),
for example, found that the accuracy of risk prediction could be improved by
including characteristics of the neighbourhood (specifically, the concentration of
poverty) into which an individual was released. However, such ecological factors
are blunt situational measures. There are limits to the extent to which micro-situational factors can be captured on a prediction instrument. How can we predict in
any fine-grained way the criminogenic opportunities and situational pressures that
an individual is likely to encounter at some point in the future? Situational theories suggest that irrespective of the research effort devoted to risk prediction,
accuracy rates will inevitably hit a ceiling.
More optimistically, a causative model that spans biological, developmental and
situational factors expands the options available to prevent criminal behaviour.
Borrowing from the public health model, prevention programmes may be classified
as one of three types. Primary prevention involves interventions that are directed at
a community-wide level to prevent problems before they emerge. Mass inoculation
for polio, and advertising campaigns to encourage people to exercise more and eat
healthier diets, are examples of primary prevention initiatives in public health.
Secondary prevention involves interventions to prevent the emergence of problems
in specific at-risk groups. AIDS-HIV programs directed at intravenous drug-users
and the gay community, and health messages targeted specifically at smokers or the
overweight, are secondary prevention strategies. Tertiary prevention involves interventions directed at problems once they have appeared. Medical treatment for
cancer patients or those suffering heart disease are health examples.
Like the medical profession, psychologists have traditionally conceived
of prevention in tertiary terms. The task of preventing criminal behaviour has
214
Conclusion
focused on providing rehabilitation designed to prevent known offenders from
reoffending. A great deal of energy has gone into devising programs to treat sex
offending, violence, substance abuse and other antisocial behaviours. The most
common approach adopted is cognitive behavioural therapy in which offenders
are taught to modify the dysfunctional thoughts that support their problem behaviours. Rehabilitation efforts have yielded modest though worthwhile returns.
Meta-analyses of the efficacy of rehabilitation programs have reported reductions
in recidivism rates of 12 per cent (Redondo et al., 1999), 14 per cent (Tong
and Farrington, 2006), and up to 25 per cent (Landenberger and Lipsey, 2005).
Irrespective of the success rates, a fundamental problem with rehabilitation as a
prevention strategy is that it comes into play only once an offender has committed
a crime and the damage has been done. In addition, rehabilitation is only available
to those few who are caught and convicted for their crimes. Even then, a small
minority of convicted offenders actually undergo treatment.
In comparison to the efforts directed at rehabilitation, primary and secondary
prevention of criminal behaviour have suffered relative neglect. A broader view
of crime causation opens up the potential for preventing crime before it occurs.
Two alternative prevention methods are developmental prevention and situational
prevention. These approaches may involve either primary or secondary prevention depending upon whether the interventions are broadly applied across the
community or targeted at specific risky groups or locations.
Developmental prevention is based on understanding and manipulating the
factors associated with the formation of delinquent and criminal dispositions.
Prevention involves strengthening protective factors and reducing the risk factors
for crime along the individual’s developmental pathway. In addition to poor
parenting practices and negative socialisation experiences outlined earlier in this
chapter, risk factors include environmental events that have a detrimental effect
on neurological development. These include birth complications, substance abuse
during pregnancy, poor diet and exposure to toxins. While developmental prevention is ideally delivered as early as possible, intervention may occur at any point
in a person’s life. Successful developmental crime prevention programmes
include home visits and social support to young single mothers (Olds, 2002),
enriched pre-school education (Homel et al., 2006; Schweinhart, 2004), and
effective parenting programmes (Hawkins et al., 1999; Tremblay et al., 1995).
Farrington and Welsh (2003) conducted a meta-analysis of 40 family-based crime
prevention programs, reporting a 16 per cent reduction in offending in target
groups.
Situational crime prevention differs from other psychological interventions in
that it does not directly target or seek to alter the offender’s criminal disposition.
Rather, it works on the offender’s immediate motivation or ability to commit crime
by altering the situational dynamics around the potential crime scene. The aim is
pragmatic and modest – simply to stop crime occurring in a specified context. No
claim is made that the potential offender is changed in any permanent way. Cornish
and Clarke (2003) identified five broad situational strategies: reducing the perceived
rewards for crime, increasing the perceived effort of committing crime, increasing
Conclusion 215
the perceived risks associated with committing crime, reducing the provocations
for crime, and removing excuses for committing crime. There are now hundreds of
studies demonstrating the efficacy of situational crime prevention (see Clarke,
1997, for a collection of case studies; and Welsh and Farrington, 2000, for a
systematic review).
To date, interventions have focused on the role of environmental factors in the
effort to prevent crime. The implications that genes might play in prevention are
yet to be explored. The very thought of this is likely to evoke horror in many
readers, conjuring images of Nazi-like eugenics. It is not being suggested here that
programmes of selective breeding ought to be considered. However, the findings
of gene–environment interactions – that individuals respond more favourably to
some environments than to others – raise interesting possibilities of matching
individuals to the most appropriate intervention based on their genetic profile. In
this post-genomic age, incorporating genetic information into interventions with
offenders and potential offenders may be the next step in the quest to prevent
crime.
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Index
Note: Page numbers in italics are for tables, those in bold are for figures.
acetylcholine 69
actor-observer bias 168
adaptive behaviours 21, 28, 29, 30, 36,
40, 143
ADHD see attention deficit hyperactivity
disorder
adolescence 6, 37, 92, 119, 120, 136, 137;
testoterone levels 76, 88, see also
adolescent-limited (AL) offenders;
juvenile crime
adolescent-limited (AL) offenders 6, 10,
59–61, 63, 89, 105, 133, 134–5, 136
adoption studies 16, 48, 54–6, 63, 116;
child abuse and neglect 32; criminal
convictions 54–5; juvenile crime 59;
male versus female crime 57; reported
antisocial behaviour 55–6
affective empathy 98
age 37, 59–61; and testosterone levels 76
age–crime curve 6, 37, 76, 132–3, 136
aggression: alcohol consumption and 84,
85, 167–8; causal attributions 168;
classical conditioning and 150–1;
dopamine and 75, 208; frustration and
169–70; galvanic skin response and 74;
instrumental and expressive 150;
pornography and 160; temperature and
195–6; testosterone and 76–7
agreeableness 95, 111, 112, 113
Ainsworth, M.D.S. 126
Akers, R.L. 158
alcohol consumption: and aggression 84,
85, 167–8; maternal, during
pregnancy 82
alleles 45, 61
Allen, M. 160
Allport, G.W. 94
alternative strategies 35, 38–40
Altman, I. 198, 199
altruism 25–6, 39, 96–7; reciprocal 25–6,
38–9, 40
amygdala 79
Anderson, K. 124
androgens 69, 76
anticipated consequences 189
antisocial behaviour 4, 5, 97, 104, 106;
arousal levels and 85–6; brain activity
and 77–8, 79; corporal punishment and
123; diet and 83; environmental factors
and 117; frustration and 170; heart
rate and 74; heritability of 52–3, 55–6,
57–8, 60, 64; neurotransmitter levels
and 75; territoriality and 198
antisocial personality disorder (APD) 4–5,
6, 12, 39, 53–4, 55–6, 58, 106–13, 134
antisocial predators 205–6
approval/disapproval 157
Arnett Inventory of Sensation Seeking
(AISS) 99
arousal 99, 188–9; ANS (autonomic
nervous system) 85–6, 105–6; cortical
101, 105–6; sub-optimal 85–6
artificial intelligence (AI) 163
Asch, S.E. 191
Atlas, R. 196
atmospheric conditions 195–6
attachment 34, 126–8
attention, consciousness and 165
attention deficit hyperactivity disorder
(ADHD) 60, 62, 82, 83, 86
authority, obedience to 192–3
autonomic nervous system (ANS) 67–8,
73, 74, 85, 86, 102, 105–6
aversion therapy 148, 149–50
262
Index
aversive physiological arousal
188–9
axons 66, 72
Bailey, C.A. 168
Baker, L.A. 57
Bandura, A. 141, 142, 145, 155–6, 157–8,
170, 172, 173
Banzinger, G. 196
Barber, R. 38
Barrett Impulsiveness Scale (BIS) 99
Bartholow, B.D. 150
Battin-Pearson, S.R. 159
Baumrind, D. 122
Beau, D.S. 193
Beaver, K.M. 125
Beccaria, C. 8, 175
behavioural activation/inhibition systems
86–7, 99
behavioural genetics 42–61, 63
behavioural modification/therapies 155;
see also aversion therapy; cognitive
behavioural therapy; rehabilitation
programs
behaviourism 18, 160–1, 162, 163; formal
models of see classical conditioning;
operant conditioning; social learning;
molecular analysis 148–9; philosophies
and principles 139–45; (behaviourspecific focus 145; denial of personality
and psychopathology 144;
environmental determinism 141–3; and
evolution and biology 143–4; focus on
observable events 140–1)
Bennett, T. 177–8
Bentham, J. 8, 175
Benton, D. 83
Berkowitz, L. 150, 170
Big Five personality factors 94–5, 101,
111–12
biochemical activity 68–9, 74–7, 89; see
also neurotransmitters; testosterone
biological determinism 141
biological explanations 9, 10, 11, 15, 36,
37, 115–21, 137–8, 142–4, 208; see also
biochemical activity; gene-environment
(GxE) interaction; genes; genetics;
psychophysiology
biosocial perspective 10, 15, 37, 73,
137, 161
Birbaumer, N. 79
birth complications 81, 82, 214
black-box psychology 141
Blonigen, D.M. 52, 136, 137
Bobo doll experiment 156–7
Boles, S.M. 85
Book, A.S. 76, 97
Booth, A. 77
Borgstrøm, C. 51
bounded rationality 175, 212
Bowers, K.J. 204–5
Bowlby, J. 126, 127
brain imaging 78–9
brain structures and functions 17, 27, 28,
47, 65–89; abnormalities/impairments
77–81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 87–8, 89;
anatomy 69–71, 77–81; behavioural
activation/inhibition systems 86–7, 99;
computer analogy 29, 163–4;
environmental factors and 72–3, 81–5,
88; executive function 71, 78, 80–1, 87,
89, 98, 137; frontal lobe dysfunction 87;
hemispheric dysfunction 87–8;
investigative techniques 77–81; nervous
system and 65–8
brainwave patterns 77–8, 85; event-related
potentials (ERP) 78
Brantingham, P.J. and Brantingham, P.L.
186, 201
Brehm, J.W. 193
Brennan, P. 81
Brown, B.B. 199
Brown, S.L. 122
Buckley, M.R. 193
burglary 177–8, 183, 196, 200
Bushman, B.J. 159–60
Buss, D.M. 27, 30, 41
Bussiere, M.T. 179
Cadoret, R.J. 56
cads and dads theory 39–40
Cale, E.M. 104
Calhoun, J.B. 196
Campbell, A. 31, 33, 36
Carey, G. 52–3, 56
Carlson, M. 151
Caspi, A. 62
Cattell, R.B. 94
causal attributions 168
central nervous system (CNS) 66
cerebral cortex 70, 71
cheating 38, 39, 58, 97
childhood experiences 38, 73, 116, 137;
family structure 121–2; neglect 32, 38,
73, 82–3, 122; parenting styles 122–3;
physical abuse 158; schooling 123–4;
sexual abuse 4, 6, 34–5, 122, 149, 150,
158, 177, 179–80
Index 263
children: and media violence 159–60;
step- 32, 33
choleric temperament 102
Christal, R.E. 95
Christiansen, K.O. 53
Christie, R. 97
chromosomes 43
Clark, J. 196
Clarke, R.V. 175, 177, 182, 202,
205–6, 214
classical conditioning 18, 145–51, 188;
and crime 148–51; molecular approach
148–9; principles of 146–8
classical school 8
Cleckley, H. 39, 107–8, 109
climate 195–6, 199, 200
Cloninger, C.R. 51, 55
Coccaro, E.F. 54
cognition 8–9, 18, 184, 211; and
behavioural priming 188; and computers
analogy 18, 163–4; and consciousness
164–5; and mind–body problem 165–6;
need for 163; schemas and scripts
180–4; see also decision-making; social
cognitive theory
cognitive behavioural therapy 166,
184, 214
cognitive empathy 98
cognitive functioning 80–1
cognitive restructuring 166
cognitive revolution 162–6
Cohen, L.E. 199–200
Collins, J.L. 170
competitive behaviour 31
compliance 193
computerised tomography (CT) 78, 79
computers, and cognition analogy 18, 163–4
conditioned response (CS) 146, 147
conditioned stimulus (CR) 146, 147–8, 149
conditioning 9–10; vicarious 157; see also
classical conditioning; operant
conditioning
conduct disorders 59, 60, 62, 74, 92
conflict theory 4
conformity 191–2, 193
conscientiousness 95, 111, 112, 113
consciousness 164–5
constraint, lack of 60
Conte, J, R. 179–80
contingency contracting 155
continuous reinforcement (CRF)
schedule 153
control theories 12–13, 41, 131–2,
145, 175
conviction records 50–1, 54–5
Cornish, D.B. 175, 176–7, 182, 205–6, 214
corporal punishment 123
corruption 192–3
cortical arousal 101, 105–6
Cosmides, L. 28, 40, 41
creationism 20–1
crime event stages 176, 182
crime generators and attractors 201
crime pattern theory 201–2
crime prevention see prevention strategies
crime scripts 181–4
criminal careers perspective 6–7, 17, 74–5,
132–7
criminal convictions 50–1, 54–5
criminalisation 4
criminality as a continuum 5
cross-situational consistency debate 13
crowding 196–7
CT (computerised tomography) 78, 79
cuckoldry 31, 32
Cullen, F.T. 132
D4DR 62
Dadds, M.R. 127
Daly, M. 32, 37
Danesh, J. 110
Danish twin registry 51, 53
Darwin, C. 20, 21, 22, 23
DAT1 75, 125
Davis, M.H. 98
Dawkins, R. 21, 23–4
decision-making 174–80; expected utility
model 174–5; rational choice
perspective 175–7; research on
(burglary 177–8; child sex offending
177, 179–80; robbery 177, 178–9);
satisficing 175
defensible space 198–9
defiance 193
definitions of crime 4–5
deindividuation 193–5
Demetriou, C. 203–4
demographic variations 35–8
Demuth, S. 121–2
dendrites 66, 72
Derefinko, K.J. 111
Descartes, R. 165
determinism 8–9, 165, 166; biological 141;
environmental 141–3; hard 142;
reciprocal 142; soft 9, 142
deterrence theory 175
development 17, 115–38, 209; across the
lifespan 119–21; biological and
264
Index
environmental foundations of 115–21;
moral 128–30; psychosocial 126–32,
137; risk and protective factors for
crime 121–5, 137 (child maltreatment
122; family structure 121–2; marriage
124–5; parental disciplinary styles
122–3; peer goups 124; schooling
123–4)
developmental crime prevention 214
developmental psychology 115
Diagnostic Interview Schedule 53
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders (DSM-III) 109
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders (DSM-IV-TR) 4,
11–12, 107–8, 109, 110
diet 83, 214
differential association-reinforcement
theory 158
differential association theory 158
discipline, parental 122–3
discriminative stimulus (SD) 152
dizygotic (DZ) twins 46, 50, 51, 52–3, 59,
60, 62, 63
DNA 43, 44, 61
DNA methylation 118, 119
Dolan, M.C. 79
Dollard, J. 169
dopamine 62, 69, 75, 84, 85, 86, 125, 208
DRD2 75, 125
DRD4 75, 125
drug use 4, 84, 85
DSM see Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders
dualism, mind-body 165–6
Dunedin study 135
dyssocial personality disorder 106, 109
eclecticism 211
effort 202–3, 214
Eichmann, A. 188
80/20 rule 6, 186
Einstein, A. 211
electrodermal activity 74
electroencephalography (EEG) 77–8, 85
Eley, T.C. 57
Ellis, L. 4, 10, 39
emotionality, negative 60, 88, 102,
104, 113
empathy 97–8
endocrine system 69
environmental determinism 141–3
environmental factors 9, 10, 15, 38, 48–9,
53, 54, 56, 140, 161, 209, 210–11; brain
development and 72–3, 81–5, 88; gene
expression and 63; shared and
non-shared environments 64 n., 116–17;
see also classical conditioning;
environmental psychology; geneenvironment (GxE) interaction; operant
conditioning; opportunity theories;
social learning; social psychology
environmental psychology 185,
195–9
environmental stress model 195
epigenetics 118–19
Epstein, N. 98
estrogens 69
event decisions 176
event-related potentials (RP) 78
event schemas 181–4
evolutionary psychology 16–17, 24,
27–41, 96–7
evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) 38
evolutionary theory 15–16, 20–4, 143, 210
evolved psychological mechanisms 27–9,
33, 34, 35, 36
excuse-making 172
executive function 71, 78, 80–1, 87, 89,
98, 137
expectancies 166–8
expected utility model 174–5
experience-dependent brain development
72–3
experience-expectant brain development
72, 73
extraversion (E) 95, 101, 102, 104, 105,
111, 112
Eysenck, H.J., three-factor theory 100–6
Eysenck Impulsivity Scale (EIS) 99
Eysenck Personality Questionnaire (EPQ)
103–4, 113
factor analysis 94
familial experiences 116, 158; see also
childhood experiences
family structure 121–2
family studies 49–50, 56; see also adoption
studies; twin studies
Farrington, D. 98, 133, 214
fathers, absence/presence 121, 122
Fazel, S. 110
Feeney, F. 178–9
Felson, M. 199–200
Felson, R.B. 158, 159
fetishes 149
fitness 24–5, 27
5-HTTLPR 75
Index 265
five-factor personality model 94–5, 101,
111–12
flight-or-fight response 67–8,
102, 189
fMRI (functional magnetic resonance
imaging) 79, 82
foetal alcohol syndrome 82
food intolerance 83
forebrain 79
Fraga, M.F. 119
fraud 33, 36
free will 8–9, 141, 165
frequency of criminality 6
Freud, S. 9, 11
Frey, J. 196
frontal lobe 71, 72, 78, 79, 80, 86, 87, 89
frustration-aggression 169–70
functional magnetic resonance imaging
(fMRI) 79, 82
Gall, F. 69
galvanic skin response (GSR) studies
74, 85
game theory 26, 38
gamma-aminobutyric acid (GAA) 69
gang membership 159, 192
Geis, F.L. 97
gender differences see sex differences
gene–environment (GxE) interaction 55,
62, 64, 115, 116, 117–19, 121, 125,
209, 215; active correlation 118;
life-course persistent (LCP) offenders
134; passive correlation 117–18;
reactive correlation 118
gene selection 24
gene technology 10, 61, 63
general theory of crime (Gottfredson and
Hirschi) 131–2
genes 23, 42, 43, 65, 88, 116–17, 208; and
behaviour relationship 47–8, 143;
dominant 45, 46; fixed 47; receptor 75;
recessive 45, 46; segregating 47; selfish
23–4, 25; transporter 75
genetic mutations 23
genetic polymorphisms 61–2, 68, 75,
125, 208
genetic relatedness 32–3, 46–7
genetics 16, 17, 22–4, 38, 210–11;
behavioural 42–61, 63; molecular 61–2,
63, 64
genome 44
genotype 45, 46
Gershoff, E.T. 123
Glueck, S. and Glueck, E. 125
Goranson, R.E. 196
Goring, C. 22
Gottesman, I.I. 51
Gottfredson, M.R. 131–2, 154
Gottschalk, L.A. 84
Grasmick, H.G. 132
group selection 24, 25
Grove, W.M. 53–4
Guerette, R.T. 204–5
Guerry, A.-M. 186
Haney, C. 194–5
Hanson, R.K. 179, 212–13
Harding, R.W. 170
Hare, R.D. 107–8, 109, 110
Harlow, H. 73, 126
Harlow, M. 73, 126
Harris, G.T. 110
heart rate 73, 74
heredity 16, 23, 42–64; genetic relatedness
46–7; laws of 42, 45–6
heritability 48–9
heritability of criminality 49–57, 62–4,
116–17; adoption studies 54–6, 57, 59
(criminal convictions 54–5; reported
antisocial behaviour 55–6); metaanalyses 56, 57–8; twin studies 50–4,
56, 57, 59 (concordance rates 50–1;
criminal convictions 50–1, 53;
monozygotic twins reared apart (MZA)
53–4; reported antisocial behaviour
52–3); variations in 57–61 (adolescentlimited versus life-course persistent
crime 59–61, 63; juvenile versus adult
crime 59; sex differences 57–8; violent
versus property crime 58–9)
heterozygotic genotype 45, 46
Hewitt, J.D. 121
hindbrain 70, 85
hippocampus 79
Hippocrates 102
Hirschi, T. 131–2, 154
Hiscoke, U.L. 110
histone modification 118–19
Hoffman, H. 10
Hogan Empathy Scale (HES) 98
Hoge, R.D. 110
Homel, R. 196, 197
homicides 31, 32, 110, 159
homo delinquens 22
homozygotic genotype 45, 46
hormones 68, 69; see also
testosterone
hostile attribution bias 168
266
Index
Huebner, T. 79
Huesman, L.R. 159–60
Human Genome Project 61
human nature 15–16, 20–41, 42
ICD-10 (International Classification of
Disease) 109, 110
impulsivity 60, 74, 86, 88, 92, 99–100,
104, 105, 131
incest 35
Indermaur, D. 179, 183
infanticide 32
informant-report measures 58
information-processing model 163–4
instrumental conditioning see operant
conditioning
intelligence 80, 98; artificial 163
intelligent design 21
intergenerational transmission
hypothesis 158
International Classification of Disease
(ICD-10) 109, 110
Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) 98
introversion 101, 102
involvement decisions 176
Iowa adoption registry 55
Jacobson, K.C. 57
James, M. 168
jealous violence 31
Jeffrey, C.R. 187
Jolliffe, D. 98
Jones, M.C. 148
‘journey to crime’ research 201–2
juvenile crime 6, 59, 74, 88, 127, 158–9,
200; see also adolescent-limited (AL)
offenders
K-strategists 26, 39
Kanazawa, S. 33
Kern, R. 127
Kierkus, C.A. 121
kin selection 25, 26, 32
Kinard, E.M. 122
King, D. 196
Kohlberg, L. 128
Kranz, N. 51
Krueger, R.F. 97
Kruttschmitt, C. 122
Lane, K.J. 158
Lang, A.R. 167
Lange, J. 51
language acquisition 163
Laub, J.H. 136
Laws, D.R. 150
Laycock, G. 204
learning 18, 139; models of see classical
conditioning; operant conditioning;
social learning
learning theory see behaviourism
LeBeau, J.L. 196, 203
Lefkowitz, M. 157
left hemisphere 71, 78, 80, 82, 88
Legras, A.M. 51
Leonard, K.E. 167
LePage, A. 150
Lidz, C.W. 212
life-course persistent (LCP) offenders 6–7,
10, 59–61, 92; antisocial personality
disorder (APD) and 110, 134; brain
dysfunction 89; criminal careers
perspective 133–4, 135, 136; heritability
and 60, 63; as pathological 12;
personality traits 105
lifespan psychology 121, 132, 137
Lilienfeld, S. 80
limbic system 79, 85, 86–7
Linnet, K.M. 82
Little Albert 146–7, 148
locus of control 169
Lombroso, C. 9, 22, 40
Lorber, M.F. 74
Lucifer Effect 191
Lykken, D.T. 109
Lynam, D.R. 100, 111
Machiavellianism (Mach) 97, 113
Macintyre, S. 197
Mack, K.Y. 127
macro-level environments 186, 199–200
mad/bad debate 10, 11
magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) 78, 79
manie sans délire 106–7
marriage 37, 124–5
Marshall, W.L. 149, 150
Masters, R.D. 84
materialism 165, 166
Matsueda, R.L. 124
maturity gap 135, 136
Matza, D. 172, 173
Mayhew, P. 202
Mazur, A. 77
McFarlane, M. 199
McGuire, R.J. 149
McLean, I. 196
media violence 159–60
medical model 10
Index 267
Mednick, S.A. 54
Meenaghan, A. 182–3
Mehrabian, A. 98
melancholic temperament 102
men: heritability of crime 57–8; locus of
control 169; sexual proprietariness
31–2; testosterone levels 37, 69, 76–7;
see also fathers
Mendel, G. 22, 23, 42, 45, 46
meso-level environments 186–7, 201
meta-analyses, heritability of criminality
56, 57–8
micro environments 187
microsatellite polymorphism 61
midbrain 70
Miles, D.R. 56
Milgram, S. 192
military regimes 192
Miller, J.D. 111
mind-body problem 165–6
minisatellite polymorphism 61, 75
Minnesota twin registry 52, 53
Miotto, K. 85
Mischel, W. 13
modelled behaviour 156–7, 158–60
Moffitt, T.E. 110, 133, 134, 135, 136
molar analysis of behaviour 153
molecular analysis of behaviour 148–9
molecular genetics 61–2, 63, 64
monoamine oxidase (MAO) 103
monoamine oxidase A (MA0A) gene
62, 125
monogenetic traits 46, 48
monozygotic (MZ) twins 46, 50, 51, 52–3,
53–4, 59, 60, 62, 63, 116
Moore, T.M. 75
moral development 128–30
moral disengagement 172–4, 188
moral guidance, situations as source of 188
moral insanity 107
Morgan, A. 80
mothers: absence of 121; single 122;
smoking/alcohol consumption during
pregnancy 81–2
motor neurons 66
MRI (magnetic resonance imaging) 78, 79
Multidimensional Personality
Questionnaire (MPQ) 53
mundane offenders 206
natural selection 21–2, 23, 24, 33, 143
nature/nurture debate 9–10, 11, 12, 14,
15, 88
Nazi doctrines 10
Nee, C. 182–3
Needleman, H. 84
negative emotionality 60, 88, 102,
104, 113
NEO-Personality Inventory Revised
(NEO-PI-R) 111, 113
nervous system 65–8, 73
neurons 65, 66, 68
neuropsychology 65–73
neuroticism (N) 95, 101, 102, 104, 105,
106, 111, 112, 113
neurotransmitters 68, 69, 75–6, 84, 85, 88,
125, 136; see also dopamine; serotonin
neutralisation theory 172, 173
Nevin, R. 84
Newman, O. 198–9
niche-picking 118, 124, 134
noradrenaline 69
norepinephrine 69
normal/pathological debate 10–12
novelty-seeking 62, 75
nurturing 34; see also nature/nurture
debate
obedience 192–3
observational learning see social learning
Occam’s razor 211
occipital lobe 71
Odbert, H.S. 94
O’Donohue, W. 167
Ogilvie, J.M. 81
O’Neill, S.M. 198
openness 95, 101, 111, 112
operant conditioning 18, 151–5, 157, 166,
175, 189, 211; and crime 153–5; molar
analysis 153; principles of 151–3
opportunity reduction 177
opportunity theories 186, 199–205
oppositional defiant disorder 60
Ortiz, J. 74
Ostrov, J.M. 168
Owens, K. 196
paedophilia 149
Paluck, B.J. 198
parallel distributed processing 164
parasympathetic nervous system 67,
68, 102
parental disciplinary styles 122–3
parental investment 26–7, 28, 32, 34, 39
parietal lobe 71
pathology 10–12
Pavlov, I. 9, 145–6, 148
peer groups 124, 158–9, 192
268
Index
perceived self-efficacy 170–1
perinatal factors 81–2
peripheral nervous system (PNS) 66, 67
persistence of criminality 6; see also
adolescent-limited (AL) offenders;
life-course persistent (LCP) offenders
person schemas 181
person/situation interaction 13–14, 15,
92–3, 205–6, 209–10
personality 17, 116–17; see also trait
theory of personality
perspiration 73, 74
PET (positron emission tomography)
78, 79
petty crime 57, 58
phenotypes 45, 46, 62
Phillips, D.P. 159
phlegmatic temperament 102
phrenology 69
Piaget, J. 128
Pinel, P. 106–7
Piquero, A. 82
polygenetic traits 46, 48, 62
population density 196–7
pornography 160
Porteus Mazes Test (PMT) 80
positron emission tomography (PET)
78, 79
power 30–1, 33
Pratt, T.C. 132
prediction of criminal behaviour 3;
actuarial prediction 212–13; clinical
prediction 212
prefrontal cortex 71, 79, 80, 87, 98
prevention strategies 3, 213–15;
developmental crime prevention 214;
primary 213, 214; rehabilitation
programs 214; secondary 213, 214;
situational crime prevention 202–3,
204–5, 214–15; tertiary 213–14
Pride in Delinquency (PID) scale 171
priming 188
prison studies 194–5
prisoners’ dilemma 26, 38
property crime 33, 55, 58–9, 177–8, 182,
186; see also burglary; robbery
prostitution 4
protoscripts 182, 183
provoked offenders 206
prudent/imprudent offending 58
psychodynamic theory 9, 11
Psychopathic Personality Inventory (PPI)
52, 53
psychopathology 144
psychopathy 5, 39, 79, 106; galvanic skin
response (GSR) and 74; personality
traits 107–8, 109–10, 111, 112–13;
primary, secondary and dissocial 109
Psychopathy Checklist (PCL/PCL-R)
107–8, 109, 110
psychophysiology 73–4
psychosocial development 126–32
psychoticism (P) 101, 102–3, 113
punishment 152, 153, 155, 157;
self- 157–8, 171, 174
purposeful victimisation 4
Questionnaire Measure of Emotional
Empathy (QMEE) 98
Quetelet, A. 186
Quigley, B.M. 167
Quinsey, V.L. 97
r-strategists 26, 39
Rachman, S. 149
radical behaviourism 140–1, 162, 163
Raine, A. 59, 74, 82, 88, 106
Rankin, J. 127
rape 2, 33–4, 167
rational choice perspective 175–7, 189, 202–5
rationality 211–12; bounded 175, 212
Rayner, R. 146
reactance 193
recidivism 110, 212–13, 214
reductionism 187
rehabilitation programs 214
Reid, R.L. 58
reinforcement 156, 157; continuous 153;
fixed interval (FT) schedule 153; fixed
ratio (FR) schedule 153; intermittent
153; positive and negative 152, 153;
self- 171; variable interval (VI)
schedule 153
Rengert, G. 202
reproductive strategies 26, 36
respondent conditioning see classical
conditioning
reward 153, 154, 155, 157, 203–4;
reduction 214; self- 157–8
reward dominance 86–7, 99
Rhee, S.H. 56, 57–8, 117
right hemisphere 71, 88
risk-taking 37, 86, 88, 92, 98, 99, 102,
203, 215
robbery 36, 177, 178–9
role schemas 181
Rosanoff, A.J. 51
Rotton, J. 196
Index 269
routine activities approach 199–200, 201
Rushton, J.P. 97
Rutter, M. 73
Sampson, R.J. 125, 136
sanguine temperament 102
satisficing decision-making 175
Scarpa, A. 106
schemas and scripts 180, 181–4, 188
schooling 123–4
Seager, J.A. 168
self-awareness 194
self-control 12–13, 130–2, 154
self-efficacy 170–1
self-esteem 170
self-interest 15, 25–6
self-punishment 157–8, 171, 174
self-reinforcement 171
Self-Report Altruism (SRA) scale 97
self-report measures 58–9
selfish genes 23–4, 25
sensation-seeking 86, 88, 92, 98–9
Sensation Seeking Scale (SSS-V) 99
sensory neurons 66
serotonin 68, 69, 75, 76, 84, 85, 103
sex differences 36; in heritability 57–8;
locus of control 169
sex hormones 69, 76–7, 136; see also
testosterone
sexual offending 33–5; and attachment
style 127–8; aversion therapy 149–50;
child sexual abuse 4, 6, 34–5, 122, 149,
150, 158, 177, 179–80; classical
conditioning and 149–50; familial
models 158; incest 35; pornography and
160; rape 2, 33–4, 167; recidivism
212–13; weather conditions and
196, 200
sexual preference hypothesis 149
sexual proprietariness 31–2
sexual selection 28, 30–1, 33, 39
Shackelford, T.K. 30, 33
short tandem repeat 61
Sigmourd, D.J. 171
Sigvardsson, S. 57
Silke, A. 194, 203–4
Silver, E. 213
Simon, L.M.J. 34
Simon, H.A. 174–5
Simourd, D.J. 110
single nucleotide polymorphism (SNP)
61, 75
single photon emission computerised
tomography (SPECT) 78–9
situational crime prevention 202–3, 204–5,
214–15
situations 13–14, 15, 18–19, 92–3, 100,
185–207, 209–10; environmental
psychology perspectives 185, 195–9;
levels of analysis 186–7; opportunity
theories perspective 186, 199–205;
precipitating and facilitating 189–91;
rational choice implications for 202–4;
social psychology perspectives 185,
191–5; as source of anticipated
consequences 189; as source of aversive
physiological arousal 188–9; as source
of behavioural priming 188; as source
of moral guidance 188; as source of
social influence 187–8
Skinner, B.F. 140, 141, 143–4, 151–2,
153, 154, 161, 163, 175, 211
Slater, E. 51
Smallbone, S.W. 6, 34–5, 127, 150,
179, 180
Smith, T. 179–80
smoking, maternal, during pregnancy 81–2
Snook, B. 201–2
Snyder, H.N. 193
sociability 102, 104, 105
social cognition 162
social cognitive theory 18, 156, 161, 162,
166–74, 189, 211; causal attributions
168; expectancies 166–8; locus of
control 169; moral disengagement
172–4; perceived self-efficacy 170–1;
self-reinforcement 171
social learning 18, 155–60, 161, 162; and
crime 158–60 (familial models 158;
subcultural models 158–9; symbolic
models 159–60); principles of
156–8
social psychology 185, 191–5
socio-economic status (SES) 37–8, 98
sociobiology 24–7, 29
sociological criminology 1, 2–3, 4, 15, 40,
138, 158
sociopathy 106, 109
soft determinism 9
soma 66
somatic nervous system 67
specificity model 93, 144, 213
SPECT (single photon emission
computerised tomography) 78–9
Stams, G.J. 130
Stanford prison study 194–5
status 30–1, 33, 38
stepchildren 32, 33
270
Index
Stewart, A. 122
stimulation, need for 101, 102
stimulus control 148
stimulus deprivation 73
Stimulus-Organism-Response (S-O-R)
model 156, 166
Stimulus-Response (S-R) model
146–8, 150
Stimulus-Response-Stimulus (S-R-S)
model 152
Stith, S.M. 158
Stuart, R.B. 155
Stumpfl, F. 51
sub-optimal arousal 85–6
subcultural models 158–9
substance abuse 75, 84–5, 214; see also
alcohol consumption
sugar intake 83
suicide 202
Sutherland, E.H. 158
Swedish adoption registry 55
Swedish Adoption/Twin Study of
Aging 54
Sykes, G.M. 172, 173
symbolic models 159–60
sympathetic nervous system 67–8,
73, 102
Tancredi, L.R. 79
target-hardening 203
Taylor, J. 60
Teague, R. 158
Tellegen, A. 53
temperature 195–6
temporal lobe 71, 79
terminal buttons 66, 68
territoriality 197–9
testosterone 37, 69, 76–7, 88, 103
Thornton, D. 58, 212–13
three-factor theory 100–6
Tilley, N. 204
token economies 155
Tooby, J. 28, 40, 41
toxins, exposure to 84, 214
trait theory of personality 90–106, 113,
137; antisocial personality disorder
(APD) and 111–13; behaviourism and
144; causality issue 91; five-factor (Big
Five) model 94–5, 101, 111–12;
identification of key traits 93–5;
measuring traits 96; single-trait
approaches 96–100, 105; specificity
model 93, 144, 213; stability debate
91–3; super-trait approach: Eysenck’s
three-factor theory of crime 100–6;
trait-reduction methods 94
traumatic bonding 32
Trivers, R. 27, 28, 34
Tupes, E.C. 95
twin studies 16, 48, 50–4, 56, 63–4;
adolescent-limited versus life-course
persistent crime 60; altruism 97;
concordance rates 50–1, 53; criminal
convictions 50–1, 53; epigenetic
changes 119; juvenile delinquency 59;
male versus female crime 57;
monozygotic twins, reared apart (MZA)
53–4, 63; reported antisocial behaviour
52–3, 97; shared and non-shared
environments 116–17
twins: dizygotic (DZ) 46, 50, 51, 52–3, 59,
60, 62, 63; monozygotic (MZ) 46, 50,
51, 52–3, 53–4, 59, 60, 62, 63, 116
two-path career model 6–7
types of criminals 5–7
unconditioned response (UCR) 146, 147
unconditioned stimulus (UCS) 146, 147,
148, 149
uxoricide 31
van Dam, C. 104, 113
van de Ven, J. 171
variable number tandem repeats (VNTP)
61, 75
vicarious conditioning 157
victimisation, purposeful 4
violence, media 159–60
violent offending 30–3, 74, 186; classical
conditioning and 150–1; familial
experiences and 158; heritability for
58–9; locus of control and 169; see also
homicide; robbery
Volkow, N.D. 79
voyeurism 149
Waldman, I.D. 56, 57–8, 117
Walsh, A. 4, 39
Walters, G.D. 56
Wasilchick, J. 202
Watson, J. 140, 141, 142–3, 146–7, 148
weapons effect 150–1, 188
weather conditions 195–6, 199, 200
Weaver, I.C. 119
Webb, B. 203
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale
(WAIS-III) 80
Weiner, B. 168
Index 271
Welsh, B. 214
Westermarck effect 35
Widiger, T.A. 111
wife-killing 31
Wilson, E.O. 30
Wilson, M. 32, 37
Winfree, L.T. Jr. 159
Wisconsin Card Sorting Test
(WCST) 80
Wolf, S. 179–80
women 36; competition for mates 31;
heritability of criminality 57–8; property
crime 33, 36; sexual selection 30, 33,
39; testosterone levels 77; see also
mothers
Wortley, R.K. 6, 34–5, 172, 179, 180, 199
Wright, R. 177–8
Yoshimasu, S. 51
Zgoba, K. 34
Zimbardo, P.G. 194–5
Zingraf, M. 122
Zuckerman, M. 98, 99
Taylor & Francis Group
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